]> pere.pagekite.me Git - text-free-culture-lessig.git/blob - freeculture.xml
Translate two more.
[text-free-culture-lessig.git] / freeculture.xml
1 <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8' ?>
2 <?xml-stylesheet href="docbook-css-0.4/driver.css" type="text/css"?>
3 <!-- Converted to DocBook by Hans Schou 2004-03-29 -->
4 <!--
5 TODO
6 * indexterm primary
7 * quotes ?
8 -->
9 <!DOCTYPE book PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.5//EN"
10 "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd"
11 [
12 <!ENTITY copy "©">
13 <!ENTITY translationblock "">
14 ]>
15 <!--
16 -->
17
18 <book id="index" lang="en">
19 <bookinfo>
20 <title>Free Culture</title>
21
22 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
23
24 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
25 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY</subtitle>
26
27 <pubdate>2004-03-25</pubdate>
28
29 <releaseinfo>Version 2004-02-10</releaseinfo>
30
31 <authorgroup>
32 <author>
33 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
34 <surname>Lessig</surname>
35 </author>
36 </authorgroup>
37
38 <!-- <subjectset> and cover <mediaobject> Based on example from
39 http://jfearn.fedorapeople.org/en-US/Publican/2.7/html/Users_Guide/chap-Users_Guide-Creating_a_document.html
40 -->
41 <subjectset scheme="libraryofcongress">
42 <subject>
43 <subjectterm>Intellectual property&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
44 </subject>
45 <subject>
46 <subjectterm>Mass media&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
47 </subject>
48 <subject>
49 <subjectterm>Technological innovations&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
50 </subject>
51 <subject>
52 <subjectterm>Art&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
53 </subject>
54 </subjectset>
55
56
57 <publisher>
58 <publishername>The Penguin Press</publishername>
59 <address><city>New York</city></address>
60 </publisher>
61
62 <copyright>
63 <year>2004</year>
64 <holder>Lawrence Lessig</holder>
65 </copyright>
66 <legalnotice>
67 <para>
68 <inlinemediaobject>
69 <imageobject>
70 <imagedata fileref="images/cc.png" contentdepth="3em" width="100%" align="center"/>
71 </imageobject>
72 <imageobject>
73 <imagedata fileref="images/cc.svg" contentdepth="3em" width="100%" align="center"/>
74 </imageobject>
75 <textobject>
76 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</phrase>
77 </textobject>
78 </inlinemediaobject>
79 </para>
80
81 <para>
82 This version of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is licensed under
83 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
84 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
85 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
86 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
87 </para>
88 </legalnotice>
89
90 <abstract>
91 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
92 <para>
93 LAWRENCE LESSIG
94 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
95 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
96 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
97 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
98 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
99 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
100 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
101 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
102 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
103 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
104 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
105 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
106 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
107 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
108 Appeals.
109 </para>
110 </abstract>
111
112 <!-- testing different ways to tag the cover page -->
113 <mediaobject role="cover">
114 <imageobject remap="lrg" role="front-large">
115 <imagedata fileref="images/cover.png" format="PNG" width="444" />
116 </imageobject>
117 <!--
118 <imageobject remap="s" role="front">
119 <imagedata fileref="images/cover_thumbnail.png" format="PNG" width="444" />
120 </imageobject>
121 <imageobject remap="xs" role="front-small">
122 <imagedata fileref="images/cover_thumbnail.png" format="PNG" width="444" />
123 </imageobject>
124 <imageobject remap="cs" role="thumbnail">
125 <imagedata fileref="images/cover_thumbnail.png" format="PNG" width="444" />
126 </imageobject>
127 -->
128 </mediaobject>
129
130 <biblioid class="isbn">1-59420-006-8</biblioid>
131
132 <!-- LCCN from
133 http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v3=1&DB=local&CMD=010a+2003063276&CNT=10+records+per+page
134 -->
135 <biblioid class="libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
136
137 </bookinfo>
138 <!--PAGE BREAK 1-->
139 <dedication id="salespoints">
140 <title></title>
141 <para>
142 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
143 </para>
144 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
145 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
146 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
147 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
148 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
149 </itemizedlist>
150 </dedication>
151 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
153 <dedication id="alsobylessig">
154 <title></title>
155 <para>
156 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
157 </para>
158 <para>
159 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
160 </para>
161 <para>
162 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
163 </para>
164 </dedication>
165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
166 <dedication id="frontpublisher">
167 <title></title>
168 <para>
169 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
170 </para>
171 </dedication>
172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
173 <dedication id="frontbookinfo">
174 <title></title>
175 <para>
176 FREE CULTURE
177 </para>
178
179 <para>
180 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
181 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
182 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
183 </para>
184
185 <para>
186 LAWRENCE LESSIG
187 </para>
188 </dedication>
189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
190 <colophon>
191 <para>
192 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
193 York, New York
194 </para>
195 <para>
196 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
197 </para>
198 <para>
199 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
200 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, January 16, 2003. Copyright
201 &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
202 </para>
203 <para>
204 Cartoon in <xref linkend="fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
205 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
206 </para>
207 <para>
208 Diagram in <xref linkend="fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
209 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
210 </para>
211 <para>
212 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
213 </para>
214 <para>
215 Lessig, Lawrence.
216 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
217 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
218 </para>
219 <para>
220 p. cm.
221 </para>
222 <para>
223 Includes index.
224 </para>
225 <para>
226 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
227 </para>
228
229 <para>
230 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
231 </para>
232 <para>
233 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
234 </para>
235 <para>
236 KF2979.L47
237 </para>
238 <para>
239 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
240 </para>
241 <para>
242 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
243 </para>
244 <para>
245 Printed in the United States of America
246 </para>
247 <para>
248 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
249 </para>
250 <para>
251 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
252 </para>
253
254 <para>
255 &translationblock;
256 </para>
257
258 <para>
259 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
260 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
261 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
262 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
263 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
264 the above publisher of this book.
265 </para>
266 <para>
267 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
268 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
269 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
270 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
271 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
272 author's rights is appreciated.
273 </para>
274 </colophon>
275
276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
277 <dedication><title></title>
278 <para>
279 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
280 it continues still.
281 </para>
282 </dedication>
283
284 <toc id="toc"></toc>
285
286 <lot>
287 <title>List of figures</title>
288 </lot>
289
290 <!--
291 c PREFACE xiii
292 c INTRODUCTION
293 c "PIRACY"
294 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
295 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
296 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
297 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
298 2 Film
299 2 Recorded Music
300 2 Radio
301 2 Cable TV
302 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
303 2 Piracy I
304 2 Piracy II
305 c "PROPERTY"
306 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
307 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
308 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
309 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
310 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
311 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
312 2 Beginnings
313 2 Law: Duration
314 2 Law: Scope
315 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
316 2 Architecture and Law: Force
317 2 Market: Concentration
318 2 Together
319 c PUZZLES
320 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
321 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
322 2 Constraining Creators
323 2 Constraining Innovators
324 2 Corrupting Citizens
325 c BALANCES
326 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
327 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
328 c CONCLUSION
329 c AFTERWORD
330 1 Us, Now
331 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
332 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
333 1 Them, Soon
334 2 1. More Formalities
335 3 Registration and Renewal
336 3 Marking
337 2 2. Shorter Terms
338 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
339 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
340 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
341 c NOTES
342 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
343 c INDEX
344 -->
345
346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
347
348 <preface id="preface">
349 <title>PREFACE</title>
350 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
351 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
352 </indexterm>
353 <para>
354 At the end of his review of my first book, <citetitle>Code: And Other
355 Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle>, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and
356 author of countless technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
357 </para>
358 <blockquote>
359 <para>
360 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
361 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
362 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
363 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
364 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 30 January 2000.
365 </para></footnote>
366 </para>
367 </blockquote>
368 <para>
369 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
370 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
371 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
372 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
373 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
374 any troubles that exist in <emphasis>that</emphasis> space wouldn't
375 "affect" us anymore.
376 </para>
377 <para>
378 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
379 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
380 <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
381 causes even after the modem is turned
382 <!--PAGE BREAK 12-->
383 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
384 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
385 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
386 </para>
387 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
388 <para>
389 But unlike <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
390 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
391 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
392 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
393 important.
394 </para>
395 <para>
396 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
397 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
398 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
399 free software movement<footnote>
400 <para>
401 Richard M. Stallman, <citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
402 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets,"
403 "free trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A
404 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
405 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
406 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
407 follow-on creators and innovators remain <emphasis>as free as
408 possible</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
409 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
410 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
411 "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in which creators get to create
412 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
413 past.
414 </para>
415 <para>
416 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
417 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
418 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
419 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
420 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
421 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
422 culture deem fundamental.
423 </para>
424 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
425 <para>
426 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
427 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
428 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
429 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
430 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
431 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
432 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
433 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
434 he asked,
435 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
436 </para>
437 <blockquote>
438 <para>
439 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
440 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
441 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
442 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
443 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
444 "The Great Media Gulp," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 May 2003.
445 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
446 </para></footnote>
447 </para>
448 </blockquote>
449 <para>
450 This idea is an element of the argument of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle>, though my
451 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
452 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
453 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
454 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
455 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
456 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
457 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
458 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
459 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
460 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in <citetitle>Free Software, Free
461 Society</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
462 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
463 that this work is "merely" derivative.
464 </para>
465 <para>
466 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
467 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
468 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
469 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
470 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
471 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
472 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
473 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
474
475 <!--PAGE BREAK 14-->
476 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
477 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
478 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
479 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
480 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
481 what I advance here.
482 </para>
483 <para>
484 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
485 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
486 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
487 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
488 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
489 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
490 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
491 book is written.
492 </para>
493
494 </preface>
495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
496
497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
498 <chapter label="0" id="c-introduction">
499 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
500 <para>
501 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
502 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
503 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
504 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
505 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
506 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
507 </para>
508 <para>
509 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
510 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
511 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
512 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
513 St. George Tucker, <citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
514 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
515 </para></footnote>
516 For many
517 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
518 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
519 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
520 </para>
521 <para>
522 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
523 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
524 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
525 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
526 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
527 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
528 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
529 </para>
530 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
531 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
532 <para>
533 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
534 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
535 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
536 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
537 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
538 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
539 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
540 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
541 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
542 </para>
543 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
544 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
545 <para>
546 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
547 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
548 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
549 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
550 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
551 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
552 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
553 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
554 </para>
555 <blockquote>
556 <para>
557 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
558 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
559 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
560 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
561 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
562 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
563 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
564 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
565 <para>
566 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
567 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
568 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
569 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
570 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
571 Authorship," <citetitle>Stanford Law Review</citetitle> 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
572 Goldstein, <citetitle>Real Property</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
573 1112&ndash;13.
574 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
575 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
576 </para></footnote>
577 </para>
578 </blockquote>
579 <para>
580 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
581 </para>
582 <para>
583 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
584 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
585 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
586 <!--PAGE BREAK 18-->
587 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
588 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
589 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
590 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
591 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
592 </para>
593 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
594 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
595 <para>
596 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
597 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
598 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
599 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
600 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
601 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
602 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
603 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
604 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
605 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
606 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
607 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
608 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
609 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
610 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
611 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
612 </para>
613 <para>
614 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
615 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
616 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
617 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
618 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
619 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
620 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
621 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
622 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
623 understanding of radio.
624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
625 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham</primary></indexterm>
626 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
627 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
628 </para>
629 <para>
630 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
631 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
632 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
633 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
634 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
635 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
636 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
637 much less transmitter power and static.
638 </para>
639 <para>
640 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
641 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
642 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
643 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
644 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
645 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
646 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
647 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
648 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
649 </para>
650 <para>
651 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
652 </para>
653 <blockquote>
654 <para>
655 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
656 sounded like a glass of water being poured. &hellip; A paper was crumpled
657 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
658 fire. &hellip; Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
659 and guitar number were performed. &hellip; The music was projected with a
660 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
661 box."<footnote><para>
662 Lawrence Lessing, <citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong</citetitle>
663 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
664 </para></footnote>
665 </para>
666 </blockquote>
667 <para>
668 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
669 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
670 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
671 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
672 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
673 a handful of networks.
674 <!--PAGE BREAK 20-->
675 </para>
676 <para>
677 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
678 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
679 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
680 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
681 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
682 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
683 </para>
684 <blockquote>
685 <para>
686 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
687 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
688 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
689 RCA.<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
690 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
691 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
692
693 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
694 </para></footnote>
695 </para>
696 </blockquote>
697 <para>
698 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
699 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
700 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
701 described,
702 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
703 </para>
704 <blockquote>
705 <para>
706 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
707 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
708 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
709 unrestrained, posed &hellip; a complete reordering of radio power
710 &hellip; and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
711 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
712 </para></footnote>
713 </para>
714 </blockquote>
715 <para>
716 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
717 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
718 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
719 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
720 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
721 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
722 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
723 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
724 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
725 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
726 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
727 </para>
728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
729 <blockquote>
730 <para>
731 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
732 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
733 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
734 deviousness.<footnote><para>
735 Lessing, 256.
736 </para></footnote>
737 </para>
738 </blockquote>
739 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
740 <para>
741 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
742 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
743 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
744 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
745 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
746 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
747 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
748 least temporarily.
749 </para>
750 <para>
751 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
752 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
753 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
754 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
755 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
756 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
757 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
758 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
759 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
760 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
761 </para>
762 <para>
763 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
764 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
765 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
766 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
767 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
768 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
769 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
770 course always public spirited; the reality is something
771 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
772 to themselves, would crumble in
773 <!--PAGE BREAK 22-->
774 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
775 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
776 effect of technological change.
777 </para>
778 <para>
779 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
780 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
781 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
782 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
783 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
784 before.<footnote><para>
785 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
786 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
787 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
788 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
789 </para></footnote>
790 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
791 of 2004.
792 </para>
793 <para>
794 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
795 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
796 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
797 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
798 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
799 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
800 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
801 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
802 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
803 </para>
804 <para>
805 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
806 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
807 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
808 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
809 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
810 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
811 has introduced.
812 </para>
813 <para>
814 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
815 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
816 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
817 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
818 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
819 parks or on
820 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
821 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
822 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
823 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
824 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel</primary></indexterm>
825 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah</primary></indexterm>
826 </para>
827 <para>
828 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
829 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
830 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
831 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
832 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
833 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
834 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
835 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
836 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
837 </para>
838 <para>
839 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
840 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
841 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
842 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
843 marketplace.<footnote>
844 <para>
845 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
846 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
847 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
848 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
849 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
850 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
851 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
852 198&ndash;200.
853 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
854 </para></footnote>
855 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
856 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
857 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
858 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
859 </para>
860 <para>
861 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
862 been erased.<footnote><para>
863 See Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
864 2001), ch. 13.
865 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
866 </para></footnote>
867 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
868 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
869 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
870 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
871 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
872 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
873 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
874 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
875 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
876 culture, more and more a permission culture.
877 </para>
878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
879 <para>
880 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
881 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
882 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
883 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
884 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
885 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
886 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
887 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
888 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
889 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
890 Causbys.
891 </para>
892 <para>
893 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
894 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
895 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
896 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
897 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
898 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
899 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
900 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
901 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
902 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
903 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
904 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
905 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
906 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
907 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
908 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
909 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
910 </para>
911 <para>
912 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
913 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
914 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
915 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
916 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
917 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
918 remakes them.
919 </para>
920 <para>
921 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
923 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
924 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
925 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
926 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
927 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
928 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
929 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
930 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," <citetitle>New York
931 Times</citetitle>, 17 January 2002.
932 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
933 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
934 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
935 against it.
936 </para>
937 <para>
938 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
939 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
940 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
941 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
942 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
943 Internet.
944 </para>
945 <para>
946 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
947 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
948 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
949 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
950 </para>
951 <para>
952 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
953 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
954 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
955 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
956 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
957 <para>
958 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," <citetitle>Yale Law
959 Journal</citetitle> 106 (1996): 283.
960 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
961 </para></footnote>
962 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
963 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
964 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
965 could cultivate and extend our culture.
966 </para>
967 <para>
968 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
969 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
970 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
971 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
972 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
973 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
974 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
975 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
976 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
977 </para>
978 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
979 <para>
980 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
981 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
982 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
983 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
984 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
985 against an industry.
986 </para>
987 <para>
988 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
989 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
990 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
991 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
992 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
993 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
994 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
995 </para>
996 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
997 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
998 <para>
999 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
1000 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
1001 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
1002 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
1003 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
1004 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
1005 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1006 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1007 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1008 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1009 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
1010 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1011 trespass.
1012 </para>
1013 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1014 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1015 <para>
1016 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1017 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1018 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1019 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1020 war. Unlike
1021 <!--PAGE BREAK 27-->
1022 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1023 on its side.
1024 </para>
1025 <para>
1026 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1027 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1028 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1029 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1030 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
1031 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1032 <emphasis>uses</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1033 accepted as it is now.
1034 </para>
1035 <para>
1036 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1037 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1038 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1039 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1040 </para>
1041 <para>
1042 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1043 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1044 </para>
1045 <para>
1046 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1047 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1048 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1049 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1050 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1051 </para>
1052 <para>
1053 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1054 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1055 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1056 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1057 view?
1058 </para>
1059 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1060 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1061 <para>
1062 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1063 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1064 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1065 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
1066 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1067 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1068 this silliness will be much more profound.
1069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1070 </para>
1071 <para>
1072 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1073 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1074 ideas.
1075 </para>
1076 <para>
1077 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1078 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1079 obscure French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird
1080 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1081 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1082 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1083 </para>
1084 <para>
1085 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1086 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1087 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1088 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1089 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1090 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1091 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1092 law&mdash;and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1093 fundamental about who we have always been.
1094 </para>
1095 <para>
1096 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1097 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1098 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1099 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1100 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1101 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1102 </para>
1103 </chapter>
1104 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1105 <part id="c-piracy">
1106 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1107 <partintro>
1108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1109 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1110 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1111 </indexterm>
1112 <para>
1113 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1114 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1115 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1116 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1117 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1118 </para>
1119 <blockquote>
1120 <para>
1121 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1122 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1123 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1124 <!-- f1 -->
1125 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1126 </para></footnote>
1127 </para>
1128 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1129 </blockquote>
1130 <para>
1131 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1132 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1133 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1134 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1135 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1136 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1138 </para>
1139 <para>
1140 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1141 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1142 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1143 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1144 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1145 profit."
1146 </para>
1147 <para>
1148 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1149 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1150 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1151 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1152 never mind body piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming
1153 <emphasis>thieves</emphasis>!
1154 </para>
1155 <para>
1156 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1157 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1158 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1159 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1160 </para>
1161 <para>
1162 The idea goes something like this:
1163 </para>
1164 <blockquote>
1165 <para>
1166 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1167 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1168 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1169 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1170 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1171 piracy.
1172 </para>
1173 </blockquote>
1174 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1175 <para>
1176 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1177 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1178 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1179 <!-- f2 -->
1180 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1181 in the Pepsi Generation," <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review</citetitle> 65 (1990): 397.
1182 </para></footnote>
1183 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1184 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1185 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1186 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1187 <!-- f3 -->
1188 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1189 Up," <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 21 August 1996, available at
1190 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1191 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1192 Speech, No One Wins," <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 24 November 2002.
1193 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
1194 </para></footnote>
1195 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1196 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1197 </para>
1198 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1199 <para>
1200 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1201 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1203 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1204 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1205 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1206 </para>
1207 <para>
1208 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1209 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1210 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1211 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1212 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1213 </para>
1214 <para>
1215 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1216 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1217 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1218 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1219 copyright law today regulates both.
1220 </para>
1221 <para>
1222 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1223 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1224 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1225 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1226 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1227 more expense of doing business.
1228 </para>
1229 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1230 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)</primary></indexterm>
1231 <para>
1232 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1233 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1234 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1235 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1236 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1237 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1238 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1239 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1240 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1241 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1242 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1243 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1244 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1245 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1246 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1248 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative
1249 Class."<footnote>
1250 <para>
1251 <!-- f4 -->
1252 In <citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class</citetitle> (New York:
1253 Basic Books, 2002), Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of
1254 labor toward a labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't
1255 directly address the legal conditions under which that creativity is
1256 enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about the importance
1257 and significance of this change, but I also believe the conditions
1258 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1259
1260 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1261 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)</primary></indexterm>
1262 </para></footnote>
1263 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1264 this creative class.
1265 </para>
1266 <para>
1267 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1268 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1269 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1270 </para>
1271 </partintro>
1272
1273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1274 <chapter label="1" id="creators">
1275 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1276 <para>
1277 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1278 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called <citetitle>Plane Crazy</citetitle>.
1279 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1280 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle> brought
1281 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1282 </para>
1283 <para>
1284 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1285 movie <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1286 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1287 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1288 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1289 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1290 </para>
1291 <blockquote>
1292 <para>
1293 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1294 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1295 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1296 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1297 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1298 </para>
1299 <para>
1300 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1301 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1302 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1303 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1304 synchronization was pretty close.
1305 </para>
1306 <para>
1307 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1308 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1309 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1310 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1311 it was something new!<footnote><para>
1312 <!-- f1 -->
1313 Leonard Maltin, <citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1314 Cartoons</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1315 </para></footnote>
1316 </para>
1317 </blockquote>
1318 <para>
1319 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1320 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1321 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1322 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1323 </para>
1324 <para>
1325 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1326 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1327 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1328 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1329 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1330 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1331 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1332 </para>
1333 <para>
1334 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also marks
1335 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1336 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1337 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>.
1338 </para>
1339 <para>
1340 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of silent
1341 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1342 uncontrollable laughter from his audience. <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1343 Jr</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1344 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular
1345 and among the best of its genre.
1346 </para>
1347 <para>
1348 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1349 Willie.
1350 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1351 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1352 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1353 <!-- f2 -->
1354 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1355 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1356 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1357 use the music for five songs in <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1358 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1359 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1360 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1361 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1362 </para></footnote>
1363 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1364 the invention of synchronized sound in <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle> that we
1365 get <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1366 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1367 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1368 Mouse.
1369 </para>
1370 <para>
1371 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1372 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1373 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1374 <!-- f3 -->
1375 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1376 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1377 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1378 </para></footnote>
1379 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1380 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1381 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1382 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1383 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1384 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1385 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1386 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1387 old.
1388 </para>
1389 <para>
1390 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1391 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1392 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1393 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1394 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1395 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1396 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1397 </para>
1398 <para>
1399 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1400 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1401 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1402 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1403 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1404 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1405 work of others is astonishing when set together: <citetitle>Snow White</citetitle>
1406 (1937), <citetitle>Fantasia</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Pinocchio</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Dumbo</citetitle>
1407 (1941), <citetitle>Bambi</citetitle> (1942), <citetitle>Song of the South</citetitle> (1946),
1408 <citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle> (1950), <citetitle>Alice in Wonderland</citetitle> (1951), <citetitle>Robin
1409 Hood</citetitle> (1952), <citetitle>Peter Pan</citetitle> (1953), <citetitle>Lady and the Tramp</citetitle>
1410 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1411 (1955), <citetitle>Mulan</citetitle> (1998), <citetitle>Sleeping Beauty</citetitle> (1959), <citetitle>101
1412 Dalmatians</citetitle> (1961), <citetitle>The Sword in the Stone</citetitle> (1963), and
1413 <citetitle>The Jungle Book</citetitle> (1967)&mdash;not to mention a recent example
1414 that we should perhaps quickly forget, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>
1415 (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1416 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1417 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1418 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1419 </para>
1420 <para>
1421 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1422 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1423 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1424 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1425 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1426 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1427 culture around us and makes it something different.
1428 </para>
1429 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1430 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1431 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1432 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1433 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1434 <!-- f4 -->
1435 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1436 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1437 determining
1438 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1439 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1440 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1441 average
1442 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1443 Web site associated with this book, available at
1444 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1445 </para></footnote>
1446 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1447 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1448 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1449 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1450 </para>
1451 <para>
1452 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1453 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1454 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1455 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1456 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1457 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1458 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1459 </para>
1460 <para>
1461 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1462 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1463 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1464 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1465
1466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1467 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1468 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1469 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1470 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1471 content from before the Great Depression.
1472 </para>
1473 <para>
1474 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1475 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1476 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1477 universal.
1478 </para>
1479 <para>
1480 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1481 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: <citetitle>manga</citetitle>, or
1482 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1483 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1484 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1485 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1486 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1487 </para>
1488 <para>
1489 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1490 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1491 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1492 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1493 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1494 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1495 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1496 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1497 interestingly different way.
1498 </para>
1499 <para>
1500 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1501 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1502 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1503 </para>
1504 <para>
1505 This is the phenomenon of <citetitle>doujinshi</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1506 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1507 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is <emphasis>just</emphasis> a
1508 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1509 transforming it either subtly or
1510 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1511 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1512 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1513 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1514 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1515 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1516 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1517 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1518 </para>
1519 <para>
1520 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1521 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1522 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1523 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1524 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1525 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1526 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1527 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1528 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1529 </para>
1530 <para>
1531 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1532 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1533 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1534 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1535 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1536 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1537 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1538 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1539 Jr</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without
1540 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1541 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1542 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1543 </para>
1544 <indexterm id="idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'>
1545 <primary>Winick, Judd</primary>
1546 </indexterm>
1547 <para>
1548 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1549 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1550 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1551 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1552 in Japan now. &hellip; American comics were born out of copying each
1553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1554 other. &hellip; That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1555 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1556 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1557 <!-- f5 -->
1558 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, <citetitle>Reinventing Comics</citetitle> (New
1559 York: Perennial, 2000).
1560 </para></footnote>
1561 </para>
1562 <para>
1563 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1564 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1565 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1566 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1567 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1568 which are fifty years old."
1569 </para>
1570 <indexterm startref="idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'/>
1571 <para>
1572 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1573 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1574 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1575 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1576 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1577 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1578 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1579 <!-- f6 -->
1580 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1581 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1582 Review</citetitle> 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1583 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1584 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1585 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1586 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1587 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1588 </para></footnote>
1589 </para>
1590 <para>
1591 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1592 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1593 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1594 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1595 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1596 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1597 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1598 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1599 culture?
1600 </para>
1601 <para>
1602 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1603 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1604 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1605 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1606 to prosecute cases like this."
1607 </para>
1608 <para>
1609 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1610 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1611 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1612 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1614 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1615 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1616 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1617 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1618 their clients or hurt them?
1619 Let's pause for a moment.
1620 </para>
1621 <para>
1622 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1623 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1624 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1625 </para>
1626 <para>
1627 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1628 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1629 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1630 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1631 <!-- f7 -->
1632 The term <citetitle>intellectual property</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1633 Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 11 (New York: New York
1634 University Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
1635 (New York: Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately
1636 describes a set of "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents,
1637 trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the nature of those rights is
1638 very different.
1639 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
1640 </para></footnote>
1641 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1642 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1643 property.
1644 </para>
1645 <para>
1646 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1647 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1648 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1649 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1650 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1651 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1652 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1653 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1654 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1655 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1656 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1657 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1658 the public domain.
1659 </para>
1660 <para>
1661 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1662 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1663 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1664
1665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1666 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1667 freedom is good.
1668 </para>
1669 <para>
1670 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1671 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1672 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1673 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1674 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1675 form, whether large or small.
1676 </para>
1677 <para>
1678 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1679 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1680 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1681 particular find it hard to say why.
1682 </para>
1683 <para>
1684 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1685 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1686 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1687 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1688 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1689 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1690 permission from anyone. (Does <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> believe
1691 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1692 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1693 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1694 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s;
1695 two volcano disaster films in 1997.
1696 </para>
1697 <para>
1698 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1699 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1700 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1701 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1702 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1703 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1704 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1705 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1706 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1707 </para>
1708 <para>
1709 The hard question is therefore not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> a
1710 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1711 question instead is "<emphasis>How</emphasis> free is this culture?"
1712 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1713 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1714 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1715 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1716 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1717 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1718 a studio or not?
1719 </para>
1720 <para>
1721 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1722 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1723 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1724 </para>
1725
1726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1727 </chapter>
1728 <chapter label="2" id="mere-copyists">
1729 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1730 <indexterm id="idxphotography" class='startofrange'>
1731 <primary>photography</primary>
1732 </indexterm>
1733 <para>
1734 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1735 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1736 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1737 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1738 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1739 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1740 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1741 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1742 </para>
1743 <para>
1744 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1745 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1746 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1747 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1748 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1749 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1750 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1751 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1752 amateurs.
1753 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William</primary></indexterm>
1754 </para>
1755 <indexterm id="idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'>
1756 <primary>Eastman, George</primary>
1757 </indexterm>
1758 <para>
1759 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1760 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1761 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1762 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1763 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1764 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1765 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1766 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1767 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1768 population of photographers.
1769 </para>
1770 <para>
1771 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1772 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1773 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1774 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1775 <!-- f1 -->
1776 Reese V. Jenkins, <citetitle>Images and Enterprise</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1777 </para></footnote> As he described in <citetitle>The Kodak Primer</citetitle>:
1778 <indexterm><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)</primary></indexterm>
1779 </para>
1780 <blockquote>
1781 <para>
1782 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1783 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1784 that only an expert can do. &hellip; We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1785 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1786 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1787 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1788 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1789 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1790 chemicals.<footnote>
1791 <para>
1792 <!-- f2 -->
1793 Brian Coe, <citetitle>The Birth of Photography</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1794 1977), 53.
1795 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1796 </para></footnote>
1797 </para>
1798 </blockquote>
1799 <para>
1800 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1801 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1802 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1803 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1804 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1805 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1806 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1807 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1808 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by 11
1809 percent.<footnote><para>
1810 <!-- f3 -->
1811 Jenkins, 177.
1812 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1813 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1814 <!-- f4 -->
1815 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1816 </para></footnote>
1817 </para>
1818 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1819 <para>
1820
1821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1822 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1823 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1824 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1825 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1826 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1827 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1828 permanent record of his family and its activities. &hellip; For the first
1829 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1830 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1831 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1832 <!-- f5 -->
1833 Coe, 58.
1834 </para></footnote>
1835 </para>
1836 <para>
1837 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1838 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1839 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1840 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1841 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1842 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1843 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1844 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1845 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1846 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1847 have before.
1848 </para>
1849 <para>
1850 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1851 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1852 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1853 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1854 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1855 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1856 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1857 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1858 <!-- f6 -->
1859 For illustrative cases, see, for example, <citetitle>Pavesich</citetitle>
1860 v. <citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co</citetitle>., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
1861 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Chinn</citetitle>, 123090 S.W. 364, 366
1862 (Ky. 1909); <citetitle>Corliss</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Walker</citetitle>, 64 F. 280 (Mass.
1863 Dist. Ct. 1894).
1864 </para></footnote>
1865 </para>
1866 <para>
1867 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1868 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1869 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1870 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1871 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1872 draw
1873 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1874 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1875 that they thought valuable.
1876 </para>
1877 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1878 <para>
1879 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1880 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1881 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1882 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1883 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1884 <para>
1885 <!-- f7 -->
1886 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1887 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review</citetitle> 4 (1890): 193.
1888 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1889 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1890 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1891 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1892 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1893 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1894 </para>
1895 <para>
1896 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1897 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1898 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1899 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1900 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1901 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1902 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1903 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1904 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1905 <!-- f8 -->
1906 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1907 Problems</citetitle> 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," <citetitle>California Law
1908 Review</citetitle> 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; <citetitle>White</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1909 Inc</citetitle>., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1910 (1993).
1911 </para></footnote>)
1912 </para>
1913 <para>
1914 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1915 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1916 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1917 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1918 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1919 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1920 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1921 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1922 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1923 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1924 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1925 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1926 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1927 </para>
1928 <para>
1929
1930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1931 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1932 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1933 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1934 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1935 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1936 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1937 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1938 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1939 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1940 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1941 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1942 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1943 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1944 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1945 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1946 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1947 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1948 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1949 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1950 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1951 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1952 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1953 learn.
1954 </para>
1955 <indexterm startref="idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'/>
1956 <indexterm startref="idxphotography" class='endofrange'/>
1957 <para>
1958 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1959 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1960 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1961 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1962 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1963 <!-- f9 -->
1964 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1965 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1966 cadalyst, February 2002, available at
1967 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1968 </para></footnote>
1969 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1970 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1971 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1972 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1973 </para>
1974 <para>
1975 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1976 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1977 Think!, puts it, "is the ability &hellip; to understand, analyze, and
1978 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1979 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1980 the way people access it."
1981 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave</primary></indexterm>
1982 </para>
1983 <para>
1984 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1985 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1986 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1987 about.
1988 </para>
1989 <para>
1990 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1991 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1992 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1993 <!-- f10 -->
1994 Judith Van Evra, <citetitle>Television and Child Development</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1995 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1996 Study," <citetitle>Denver Post</citetitle>, 25 May 1997, B6.
1997 </para></footnote>
1998 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1999 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
2000 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
2001 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
2002 (at least at first) terrible media.
2003 </para>
2004 <para>
2005 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
2006 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
2007 has written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult
2008 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
2009 language to be understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of
2010 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2011 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2012 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2013 </para>
2014 <para>
2015 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2016 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2017 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2018 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2019 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2020 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2021 </para>
2022 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
2023 <para>
2024 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2025 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2026 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2027
2028 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2029 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2030 about "the placement of objects, color, &hellip; rhythm, pacing, and
2031 texture."<footnote>
2032 <para>
2033 <!-- f11 -->
2034 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
2035 2002.
2036 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2037 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
2038 </para></footnote>
2039 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2040 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2041 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2042 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2043 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2044 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2045 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2046 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
2047 <!-- f12 -->
2048 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
2049 November 2000, available at
2050 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
2051 available at
2052 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
2053 </para></footnote>
2054 </para>
2055 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
2056 <para>
2057 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2058 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2059 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2060 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2061 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2062 </para>
2063 <para>
2064 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
2065 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
2066 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2067 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2068 </para>
2069 <blockquote>
2070 <para>
2071 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2072 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2073 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2074 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2075 being read-only.
2076 </para>
2077 </blockquote>
2078 <para>
2079 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2080 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2081 twentieth century.
2082 </para>
2083 <para>
2084 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2085 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2086 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2087 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2088 literacy,
2089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2090 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2091 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2092 express."<footnote>
2093 <para>
2094 <!-- f13 -->
2095 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2096 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2097 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2098 language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
2099 <!-- f14 -->
2100 Ibid.
2101 </para></footnote>
2102 </para>
2103 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2104 <para>
2105 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2106 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2107 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2108 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2109 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2110 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2111 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2112 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2113 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2114 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2115 </para>
2116 <para>
2117 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2118 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2119 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2120 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
2121 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2122 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2123 </para>
2124 <para>
2125 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2126 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2127 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2128 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2129 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2130 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2131 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2132 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2133 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2134 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2135 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2136 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2137 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2138 <emphasis>these</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2139 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2140 </para>
2141 <para>
2142
2143 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2144 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2145 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2146 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2147 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2148 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2149 part&mdash;and increasingly, not the most powerful part&mdash;of
2150 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2151 our interview,
2152 </para>
2153 <blockquote>
2154 <para>
2155 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2156 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2157 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2158 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2159 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2160 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2161 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2162 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2163 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2164 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2165 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2166 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2167 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2168 camera and &hellip; saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2169 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2170 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2171 about the topic.&hellip;
2172 </para>
2173 <para>
2174 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2175 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2176 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2177 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2178 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2179 </para>
2180 <para>
2181 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2182 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2183 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2185 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2186 had a lot of power with this language."
2187 </para>
2188 </blockquote>
2189 <para>
2190 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2191 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2192 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2193 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2194 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2195 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2196 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2197 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2198 world would be watching.
2199 </para>
2200 <para>
2201 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2202 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2203 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2204 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2205 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2206 entertainment is tragedy.
2207 </para>
2208 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2209 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2210 <para>
2211 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2212 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2213 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2214 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2215 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2216 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2217 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2218 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2219 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2220 the term in his book <citetitle>Cyber Rights</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2221 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2222 was also the Internet.
2223 </para>
2224 <para>
2225 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2226 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2227 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2228 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2229 movie
2230 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2231 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2232 with sound or text.
2233 </para>
2234 <para>
2235 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2236 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2237 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2238 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2239 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2240 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2241 spread practically instantaneously.
2242 </para>
2243 <para>
2244 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2245 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2246 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2247 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2248 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2249 cultures, it records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind
2250 of electronic <citetitle>Jerry Springer</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2251 </para>
2252 <para>
2253 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2254 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2255 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2256 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2257 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2258 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2259 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2260 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2261 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2262 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2263 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2264 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2265 </para>
2266 <para>
2267 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2268 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2269 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2270 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2271 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2272 people vote
2273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2274 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2275 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2276 </para>
2277 <para>
2278 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2279 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2280 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2281 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2282 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2283 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2284 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2285 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2286 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2287 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2288 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2289 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2290 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2291 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2292 <!-- f15 -->
2293 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, <citetitle>Democracy in America</citetitle>,
2294 bk. 1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2295 </para></footnote>
2296 </para>
2297 <para>
2298 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2299 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2300 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2301 <!-- f16 -->
2302 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," <citetitle>Journal of
2303 Political Philosophy</citetitle> 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2304 </para></footnote>
2305 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2306 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2307 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2308 </para>
2309 <para>
2310 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2311 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2312 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2313 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2314 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2315 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2316 <!-- f17 -->
2317 Cass Sunstein, <citetitle>Republic.com</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2318 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2319 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2320 little beyond what our friends say.
2321 </para>
2322 <para>
2323 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2324 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2325 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2326 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2327 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2328
2329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2330 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2331 place.
2332 </para>
2333 <para>
2334 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2335 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2336 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2337 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2338 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2339 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2340 </para>
2341 <para>
2342 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2343 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race
2344 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2345 is having an effect.
2346 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard</primary></indexterm>
2347 </para>
2348 <para>
2349 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2350 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2351 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2352 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2353 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2354 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2355 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2356 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2357 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2358 resign as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2359 <!-- f18 -->
2360 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2361 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2362 </para></footnote>
2363 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent</primary></indexterm>
2364 </para>
2365 <para>
2366 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2367 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2368 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2369 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2370 on.
2371 </para>
2372 <para>
2373 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2374 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2375 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2376 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2377 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2378 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2379 peer-generated rankings.
2380 </para>
2381 <indexterm id="idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'>
2382 <primary>Winer, Dave</primary>
2383 </indexterm>
2384 <para>
2385 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2386 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2387 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2388 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2389 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2390 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2391 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2392 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2393 get it out of the way."
2394 </para>
2395 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2396 <para>
2397 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2398 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2399 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2400 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2401 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2402 <!-- f19 -->
2403 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2404 </para></footnote>
2405 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2406 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2407 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2408 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2409 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2410 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2411 told her that <emphasis>they</emphasis> were writing "the story.")
2412 </para>
2413 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2414 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2415 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2416 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2417 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2418 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2419 had seen.<footnote><para>
2420 <!-- f20 -->
2421 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2422 Information Online," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2423 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2424 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2425 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2426 </para></footnote>
2427 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2428 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2429 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2430 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2431 </para>
2432 <para>
2433 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2434 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2435 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2436 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2437 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2438 <para>
2439 <!-- f21 -->
2440 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" <citetitle>New
2441 York Times</citetitle>, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2442 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2443 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2444 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2445 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a <citetitle>Houston Chronicle</citetitle> reporter, was
2446 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2447 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2448 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2449 </para></footnote>
2450 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2451
2452 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2453 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2454 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2455 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2456 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2457 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2458 </para>
2459 <para>
2460 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2461 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2462 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2463 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2464 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2465 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2466 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2467 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2468 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2469 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2470 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2471 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2472 extraordinary to report.
2473 </para>
2474 <indexterm startref="idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'/>
2475 <indexterm id="idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'>
2476 <primary>Brown, John Seely</primary>
2477 </indexterm>
2478 <para>
2479 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2480 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and &hellip; the
2481 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating &hellip; innovation."
2482 </para>
2483 <para>
2484 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2485 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2486 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2487 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2488 affect learning.
2489 </para>
2490 <para>
2491 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2492 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2493 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2494 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2495 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2496 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2498 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2499 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2500 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2501 the tinkering of many others.
2502 </para>
2503 <para>
2504 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2505 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2506 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2507 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2508 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2509 </para>
2510 <para>
2511 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2512 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you &hellip;
2513 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2514 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2515 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2516 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2517 </para>
2518 <para>
2519 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2520 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2521 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2522 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2523 platform. &hellip; You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2524 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2525 learn.
2526 </para>
2527 <para>
2528 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2529 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2530 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2531 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2532 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2533 text. "The Web &hellip; says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2534 you are visual, if you are interested in film &hellip; [then] there is a
2535 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2536 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2537 </para>
2538 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2539 <para>
2540 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2541 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2542
2543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2544 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2545 kind of recognition.
2546 </para>
2547 <para>
2548 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2549 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2550 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2551 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2552 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2553 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2554 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2555 </para>
2556 <para>
2557 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2558 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2559 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>)
2560 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2561 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2562 general.<footnote><para>
2563 <!-- f22 -->
2564 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2565 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," <citetitle>Communications
2566 of the Association for Computer Machinery</citetitle> 43 (2000): 9.
2567 </para></footnote>
2568 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2569 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2570 </para>
2571 <para>
2572 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2573 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2574 and want to learn."
2575 </para>
2576 <para>
2577 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2578 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2579 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. &hellip; We're building an
2580 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2581 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2582 </para>
2583 <indexterm startref="idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'/>
2584 <para>
2585 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2586 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2587 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2588 the law to close down that technology.
2589 </para>
2590 <para>
2591 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2592 chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="collectors"/>,
2593 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2594 </para>
2595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2596 </chapter>
2597 <chapter label="3" id="catalogs">
2598 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2599 <indexterm><primary>RPI</primary><see>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)</see></indexterm>
2600 <indexterm id="idxrensselaer" class='startofrange'>
2601 <primary>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)</primary>
2602 </indexterm>
2603 <para>
2604 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2605 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2606 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2607 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2608 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2609 </para>
2610 <para>
2611 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2612 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2613 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2614 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2615 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2616 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2617 </para>
2618 <para>
2619 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2620 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2621 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2622 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2623 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2624 </para>
2625 <para>
2626 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2627 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2628 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2629 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2630 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2631 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2632 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2633 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2634 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2635 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2636 </para>
2637 <para>
2638 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2639 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2640 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2641 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2642 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2643 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2644 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2645 </para>
2646 <para>
2647 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2648 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2649 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2650 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2651 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2652 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2653 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2654 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2655 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2656 on-line.
2657 </para>
2658 <para>
2659 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2660 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2661 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2662 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2663 be on users' computers.
2664 </para>
2665 <para>
2666 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2667 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2668 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2669 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2670 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2671 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2672 computer.
2673 </para>
2674 <para>
2675 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2676 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2677 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2678 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2679 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2680 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2681 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2682 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2683 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2684 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2685 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2686 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2687 supposed to do.
2688 </para>
2689 <para>
2690 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2691 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2692 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2693 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2694 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2695 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2696 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2697 </para>
2698 <para>
2699 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2700 wrong. &hellip; I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2701 engine that I ran or &hellip; what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2702 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2703 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2704 easier to use"&mdash;again, a <emphasis>search engine</emphasis>,
2705 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2706 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2707 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2708 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2709 with music.
2710 </para>
2711 <para>
2712 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2713 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2714 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2715 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2716 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2717 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2718 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2719 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2720 Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2721 </para>
2722 <para>
2723 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2724 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2725 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2726 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2727 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2728 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2729 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100
2730 <emphasis>billion</emphasis>&mdash;six times the
2731 <emphasis>total</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2732 2001.<footnote><para>
2733
2734 <!-- f1 -->
2735 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2736 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC</citetitle> 6
2737 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2738 </para></footnote>
2739 </para>
2740 <indexterm startref="idxrensselaer" class='endofrange'/>
2741 <para>
2742 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2743 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2744 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2745 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2746 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2747 </para>
2748 <para>
2749 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2750 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2751 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2752 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2753 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2754 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2755 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2756 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2757 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2758 </para>
2759 <para>
2760 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2761 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2762 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2763 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2764 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2766 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2767 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2768 </para>
2769 <para>
2770 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2771 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2772 </para>
2773 <para>
2774 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2775 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2776 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2777 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2778 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2779 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2780 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2781 <!-- f2 -->
2782 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2783 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2784 the Arts, <citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon</citetitle> (2000).
2785 </para></footnote>
2786 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2787 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2788 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2789 <!-- f3 -->
2790 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2791 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, A24.
2792 </para></footnote>
2793 </para>
2794 <para>
2795 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2796 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2797 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2798 activist:
2799 </para>
2800 <blockquote>
2801 <para>
2802 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2803 an activist. &hellip; [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2804 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2805 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2806 </para>
2807 </blockquote>
2808 <para>
2809 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2810 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2811 I. &hellip; He's not a tree hugger. &hellip; I think it's bizarre that they would
2812 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2813 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2814 </para>
2815 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2816 </chapter>
2817 <chapter label="4" id="pirates">
2818 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2819 <para>
2820 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2821 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2822 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2823 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2824 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2825 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2826 </para>
2827 <section id="film">
2828 <title>Film</title>
2829 <para>
2830 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2831 <!-- f1 -->
2832 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2833 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 87&ndash;93,
2834 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2835 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
2836 </para></footnote>
2837 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2838 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2839 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2840 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2841 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2842 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2843 this creative property
2844 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2845 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2846 </para>
2847 <para>
2848 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2849 </para>
2850 <blockquote>
2851 <para>
2852 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2853 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2854 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2855 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2856 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2857 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2858 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2859 </para>
2860 <para>
2861 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2862 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2863 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2864 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2865 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2866 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2867 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2868 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2869 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2870 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2871 <!-- f2 -->
2872 J. A. Aberdeen, <citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2873 Picture Producers</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2874 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2875 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2876 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2877 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2878 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2879 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2880 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2881 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2882 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2883 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William</primary></indexterm>
2884 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2885 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2886 </para>
2887 </blockquote>
2888 <para>
2889 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2890 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2891 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2892 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2893 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2894 <!-- f3 -->
2895 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," <citetitle>The Silents Majority</citetitle>, archived at
2896 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2897 </para></footnote>
2898 That led the independents to flee the East
2899 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2900 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2901 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2902 did just that.
2903 </para>
2904 <para>
2905 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2906 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2907 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2908
2909 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2910 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2911 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2912 Edison's creative property.
2913 </para>
2914 </section>
2915 <section id="recordedmusic">
2916 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2917 <para>
2918 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2919 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2920 </para>
2921 <indexterm id="idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'>
2922 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri</primary>
2923 </indexterm>
2924 <indexterm><primary>Russel, Phil</primary></indexterm>
2925 <para>
2926 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2927 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2928 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2929 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2930 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2931 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2932 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2933 right to perform it publicly.
2934 </para>
2935 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2936 <para>
2937 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2938 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2939 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2940 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2941 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2942 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2943 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2944 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2945 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2946 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2947 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2948 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2949 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2950 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2951 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2952 its composer anything.
2953 </para>
2954 <indexterm startref="idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'/>
2955 <para>
2956 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2958 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2959 put it,
2960 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred</primary></indexterm>
2961 </para>
2962 <blockquote>
2963 <para>
2964 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2965 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2966 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2967 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2968 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2969 rights.<footnote><para>
2970 <!-- f4 -->
2971 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2972 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2973 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2974 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in <citetitle>Legislative History of the
2975 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2976 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2977 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred</primary></indexterm>
2978 </para></footnote>
2979 </para>
2980 </blockquote>
2981 <para>
2982 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2983 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2984 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2985 <!-- f5 -->
2986 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2987 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2988 </para></footnote>
2989 and the "music publishing industry"
2990 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2991 <!-- f6 -->
2992 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2993 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2994 </para></footnote>
2995 As John Philip
2996 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2997 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2998 <!-- f7 -->
2999 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
3000 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3001 </para></footnote>
3002 </para>
3003 <para>
3004 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
3005 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
3006 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3007 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
3008 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
3009 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
3010 <!-- f8 -->
3011
3012 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
3013 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3014 Perforating Company of New York).
3015 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3016 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3017 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
3018 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3019 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3020 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3021 statute."<footnote><para>
3022 <!-- f9 -->
3023 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
3024 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3025 Graphophone Company Association).
3026 </para></footnote>
3027 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company</primary></indexterm>
3028 </para>
3029 <para>
3030 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3031 <emphasis>and</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3032 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical
3033 reproductions" of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3034 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3035 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3036 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3037 recorded once. This is the part of
3038
3039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3040 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3041 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3042 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3043 </para>
3044 <para>
3045 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
3046 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
3047 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3048 Copyright Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3049 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3050 the fee set by the statute.
3051 </para>
3052 <para>
3053 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3054 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3055 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3056 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3057 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3058 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3059 Grisham.
3060 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
3061 </para>
3062 <para>
3063 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3064 thus, in effect, the law <emphasis>subsidizes</emphasis> the recording
3065 industry through a kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a
3066 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3067 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3068 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3069 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3070 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3071 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3072 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3073 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3074 creativity.<footnote><para>
3075
3076 <!-- f10 -->
3077 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
3078 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
3079 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3080 in <citetitle>Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3081 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3082 </para></footnote>
3083 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
3084 </para>
3085 <para>
3086 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3087 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3088 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3089 relates,
3090 </para>
3091 <blockquote>
3092 <para>
3093 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3095 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3096 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3097 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3098 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3099 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3100 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3101 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before 1909 and
3102 the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3103 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3104 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3105 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3106 choice.<footnote><para>
3107 <!-- f11 -->
3108 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
3109 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
3110 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3111 this report.</para></footnote>
3112 </para>
3113 </blockquote>
3114 <para>
3115 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3116 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3117 </para>
3118 </section>
3119 <section id="radio">
3120 <title>Radio</title>
3121 <para>
3122 Radio was also born of piracy.
3123 </para>
3124 <para>
3125 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3126 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3127 <!-- f12 -->
3128 See 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3129 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3130 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3131 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3132 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3133 station. See <citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Whiteman</citetitle>, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3134 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3135 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3136 Copyright," <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 281.
3137 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3138 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3139 </para></footnote>
3140 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3141 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3142 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3143 </para>
3144 <para>
3145 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3146 copy of the <emphasis>composer's</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3147 also performing a copy of the <emphasis>recording artist's</emphasis>
3148 work. It's one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the
3149 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3150 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3151 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3152 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3153 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3154 music for his work.
3155 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
3156
3157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3158 </para>
3159 <para>
3160 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3161 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3162 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3163 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3164 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3165 of playing the song.
3166 </para>
3167 <indexterm id="idxmadonna" class='startofrange'>
3168 <primary>Madonna</primary>
3169 </indexterm>
3170 <para>
3171 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3172 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3173 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3174 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3175 </para>
3176 <para>
3177 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3178 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3179 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3180 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3181 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3182 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to
3183 <emphasis>pirate</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3184 her anything.
3185 </para>
3186 <indexterm startref="idxmadonna" class='endofrange'/>
3187 <para>
3188 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3189 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3190 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3191 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3192 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3193 to take something for nothing.
3194 </para>
3195 </section>
3196 <section id="cabletv">
3197 <title>Cable TV</title>
3198 <para>
3199
3200 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3201 </para>
3202 <para>
3203 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3204 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3205 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3206 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3208 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3209 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3210 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3211 give away.
3212 </para>
3213 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3214 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3215 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.</primary></indexterm>
3216 <para>
3217 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3218 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3219 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3220 <!-- f13 -->
3221 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3222 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3223 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3224 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3225 Commission).
3226 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.</primary></indexterm>
3227 </para></footnote>
3228 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3229 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3230 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3231 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3232 <!-- f14 -->
3233 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3234 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3235 </para></footnote>
3236 As another broadcaster put it,
3237 </para>
3238 <blockquote>
3239 <para>
3240 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3241 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3242 paid for.<footnote><para>
3243 <!-- f15 -->
3244 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3245 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3246 </para></footnote>
3247 </para>
3248 </blockquote>
3249 <para>
3250 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3251 </para>
3252 <blockquote>
3253 <para>
3254 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3255 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3256 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3257 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3258 <!-- f16 -->
3259 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3260 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3261 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3262 </para></footnote>
3263 </para>
3264 </blockquote>
3265 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton</primary></indexterm>
3266 <para>
3267 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3268 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3269 compensation."<footnote><para>
3270 <!-- f17 -->
3271 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3272 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3273 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton</primary></indexterm>
3274 </para>
3275 </footnote>
3276 </para>
3277 <para>
3278 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3279 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3280 </para>
3281 <blockquote>
3282 <para>
3283 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3284 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3285 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3286 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. &hellip; The
3287
3288 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3289 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3290 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3291 <!-- f18 -->
3292 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3293 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3294 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3295 </para></footnote>
3296 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3297 </para>
3298 </blockquote>
3299 <para>
3300 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3301 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3302 </para>
3303 <para>
3304 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3305 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3306 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3307 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3308 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3309 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3310 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3311 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3312 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3313 created by broadcasters' content.
3314 </para>
3315 <para>
3316 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3317 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3318 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3319 today<footnote><para>
3320 <!-- f19 -->
3321 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, <citetitle>The Engine
3322 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3323 Information</citetitle>, available at
3324 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3325 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3326 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3327 </para></footnote>
3328 &mdash; then <emphasis>every</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3329 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3330 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV. &hellip; The list is long and
3331 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3332 last. Every generation&mdash;until now.
3333 </para>
3334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3335 </section>
3336 </chapter>
3337 <chapter label="5" id="piracy">
3338 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3339 <para>
3340 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3341 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3342 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3343 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3344 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3345 should stop it.
3346 </para>
3347 <para>
3348 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3349 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3350 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3351 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3352 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3353 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3354 has so often done in the past.
3355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3356 </para>
3357 <section id="piracy-i">
3358 <title>Piracy I</title>
3359 <para>
3360 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3361 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3362 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3363 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3364 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3365 <!-- f1 -->
3366 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), <citetitle>The
3367 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003</citetitle>, July 2003, available
3368 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See
3369 also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk," <citetitle>Financial
3370 Times</citetitle>, 14 February 2003, 11.
3371 </para></footnote>
3372 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3373 estimates that it loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3374 </para>
3375 <para>
3376 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3377 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3378 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3379 This piracy is wrong.
3380 </para>
3381 <para>
3382 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3383 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3384 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3385 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3386 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3387 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3388 of our existence, treated as right.
3389 </para>
3390 <para>
3391 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3392 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3393 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3394 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3395 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3396 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3397 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3398 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3399 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3400 </para>
3401 <para>
3402 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3403 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3404 <beginpage pagenum="77"/>
3405 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3406 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3407 similar childhood.
3408 </para>
3409 <para>
3410 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3411 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3412 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3413 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3414 <!-- f2 -->
3415 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3416 <citetitle>Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The
3417 New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13, 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of
3418 Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member
3419 nations to create administrative and enforcement mechanisms for
3420 intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for developing
3421 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for
3422 staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the
3423 disparity between burdens imposed upon developing countries and
3424 benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit
3425 governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3426 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may
3427 be able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3428 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the
3429 TRIPS framework.
3430 <indexterm><primary>agricultural patents</primary></indexterm>
3431 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3432 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3433 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3434 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3435 is wrong.
3436 </para>
3437 <para>
3438 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3439 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3440 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3441 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3442 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3443 <!-- f3 -->
3444 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3445 Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3446 144&ndash;90. "In some instances &hellip; the impact of piracy on the
3447 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3448 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3449 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3450 pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3451 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3452 </para></footnote>
3453 </para>
3454 <para>
3455 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3456 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3457 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3458 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3459 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3460 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3461 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3462 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3463 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3464 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3465 piracy of the tangible.
3466 </para>
3467 <para>
3468 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3469 property right of a very special sort, it <emphasis>is</emphasis> a
3470 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3471 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3472 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3473 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3474 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3475 give people the right to "take" copyrighted content whether or not the
3476 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3477
3478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3479 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3480 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3481 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3482 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3483 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3484 </para>
3485 <para>
3486 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3487 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal"
3488 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3489 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3490 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3491 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3492 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3493 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3494 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3495 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3496 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3497 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3498 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3499 <indexterm>
3500 <primary>Microsoft</primary>
3501 <secondary>Windows operating system of</secondary>
3502 </indexterm>
3503 <indexterm><primary>Windows</primary></indexterm>
3504 </para>
3505 <para>
3506 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3507 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3508 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3509 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3510 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3511 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3512 </para>
3513 <para>
3514 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3515 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3516 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3517 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3518 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3519 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3520 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3521 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3522 what&mdash;at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3523 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3524 violating the law is still wrong.
3525 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3526 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer</primary></indexterm>
3527 <indexterm><primary>Netscape</primary></indexterm>
3528 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3529 </para>
3530 <para>
3531 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3532 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3533 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3534 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3535 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3536 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3537 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3538 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3539 is flat out wrong.
3540 </para>
3541 <para>
3542 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3543 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3544 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3545 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3546 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3547 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3548 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3549 </para>
3550 <para>
3551 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3552 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3553 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3554 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3555 </para>
3556 <para>
3557 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3558 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3559 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3560 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3561 </para>
3562 <para>
3563 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3564 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3565 sharing to survive.
3566 </para>
3567 </section>
3568 <section id="piracy-ii">
3569 <title>Piracy II</title>
3570 <para>
3571 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3572 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3573 <!-- f4 -->
3574 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3575 </para></footnote>
3576 This means we must determine whether
3577 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3579 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3580 author of his profit.
3581 </para>
3582 <para>
3583 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3584 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3585 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3586 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3587 <!-- f5 -->
3588 See Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3589 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle> (New York:
3590 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3591 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3592 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3593 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3594 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3595 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3596
3597 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3598 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3599 put together components that had been developed independently.
3600 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3601 </para>
3602 <para>
3603 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3604 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3605 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3606 system.<footnote><para>
3607 <!-- f6 -->
3608 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," <citetitle>San
3609 Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3610 <citetitle>New Scientist</citetitle>, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3611 Secures New Financing," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 23 May 2003, C1;
3612 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3613 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) <citetitle>Times</citetitle>, 26 July 2002, 18.
3614 </para></footnote>
3615 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3616 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3617 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3618 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3619 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3620 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3621 or your 20,000 best friends.
3622 </para>
3623 <para>
3624 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3625 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3626 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3627 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3628
3629 <!-- f7 -->
3630 See Ipsos-Insight, <citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution</citetitle>
3631 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3632 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3633 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3634 </para></footnote>
3635 A survey by the NPD group quoted in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>
3636 estimated that 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3637 exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3638 <!-- f8 -->
3639 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," <citetitle>New
3640 York Times</citetitle>, 6 June 2003, A1.
3641 </para></footnote>
3642 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3643 massive quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The
3644 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3645 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3646 </para>
3647 <para>
3648 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3649 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3650 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3651 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more
3652 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3653 do&mdash;the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3654 of harm it entails.
3655 </para>
3656 <para>
3657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3658 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3659 different kinds into four types.
3660 </para>
3661 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3662 <listitem><para>
3663 <!-- A. -->
3664 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3665 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3666 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3667 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3668 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3669 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3670 users who download instead of purchasing.
3671 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
3672 </para></listitem>
3673 <listitem><para>
3674 <!-- B. -->
3675 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3676 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3677 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3678 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3679 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3680 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3681 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3682 music purchased.
3683 </para></listitem>
3684 <listitem><para>
3685 <!-- C. -->
3686 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3687 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3688 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3689 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3690 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3691 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3692 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old
3693 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3694 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3695 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3696 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same
3697 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3698 a local collector.
3699 </para></listitem>
3700 <listitem><para>
3701 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3702 <!-- D. -->
3703 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3704 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3705 wants to give away.
3706 </para></listitem>
3707 </orderedlist>
3708 <para>
3709 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3710 </para>
3711 <para>
3712 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3713 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3714 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3715 harmful.<footnote><para>
3716 <!-- f9 -->
3717 See Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle>, 148&ndash;49.
3718 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3719 </para></footnote>
3720 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3721 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3722 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3723 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3724 answer&mdash;and certainly much more difficult than the current
3725 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3726 </para>
3727 <para>
3728 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3729 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3730 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3731 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3732 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is
3733 "devastating" the industry.
3734 </para>
3735 <para>
3736 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3737 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3738 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3739 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3740 &amp; Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3741 technology, the labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3742 <!-- f10 -->
3743 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, <citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3744 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis</citetitle> (2003), 3. This report
3745 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3746 practice of cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising
3747 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping
3748 is killing music." At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3749 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3750 behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3751 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3752 Assessment, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law</citetitle>,
3753 OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3754 October 1989), 145&ndash;56. </para></footnote>
3755 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3756 when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the industry claimed
3757 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3758 regulating technology was the answer.
3759 </para>
3760 <para>
3761 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3762 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3763 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' &hellip; was
3764 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3766 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3767 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3768 <!-- f11 -->
3769 U.S. Congress, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying</citetitle>, 4.
3770 </para></footnote>
3771 </para>
3772 <para>
3773 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3774 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3775 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3776 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3777 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3778 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3779 harmful. The question is also <emphasis>how</emphasis> harmful type A
3780 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3781 </para>
3782 <para>
3783 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3784 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3785 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3786 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3787 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3788 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3789 therefore have little <emphasis>static</emphasis> reason to resist
3790 them.
3791
3792 </para>
3793 <para>
3794 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3795 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3796 actually suggest it might be close.
3797 </para>
3798 <para>
3799 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent,
3800 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7
3801 percent.<footnote><para>
3802 <!-- f12 -->
3803 See Recording Industry Association of America, <citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics</citetitle>,
3804 available at
3805 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later
3806 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3807 Association of America, <citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy</citetitle>, 25 June 2003,
3808 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3809 #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3810 have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in to 860 million
3811 units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3812 of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in to $12.6
3813 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3814 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3815 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3816 shipments)."
3817 </para></footnote>
3818 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3819 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3820 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3821 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That no
3822 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3823 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3824 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3825 <!-- f13 -->
3826 <para>
3827 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3828 February 2003, available at
3829 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3830 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3831 </para>
3832 </footnote>
3833 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3834 the decline. As Jane Black of <citetitle>BusinessWeek</citetitle> notes, "The
3835 soundtrack to the film <citetitle>High Fidelity</citetitle> has a list price of
3836 $18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3837 $19.99."<footnote><para>
3838 <!-- f14 -->
3839 Ibid.
3840 </para></footnote>
3841 </para>
3842 <para>
3843
3844 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3845 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3846 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3847 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3848 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3849 although 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3850 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3851 </para>
3852 <para>
3853 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3854 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3855 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between
3856 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own numbers
3857 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3858 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3859 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3860 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of
3861 Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry
3862 would have suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7
3863 percent drop. If 2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3864 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is
3865 a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3866 </para>
3867 <para>
3868 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3869 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3870 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3871 these costs?
3872 </para>
3873 <para>
3874 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that
3875 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3876 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3877 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3878 available.<footnote><para>
3879 <!-- f15 -->
3880 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3881 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3882 Law&mdash;Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3883 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April
3884 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3885 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3886 </para></footnote>
3887 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3888 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3889 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3890 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3891 sense <emphasis>to the company</emphasis> to make it available.
3892 </para>
3893 <para>
3894 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3896 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3897 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3898 today.<footnote><para>
3899 <!-- f16 -->
3900 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3901 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3902 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, <citetitle>The Quiet
3903 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market</citetitle> (2002), available at
3904 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3905 National
3906 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3907 Results,"
3908 available at
3909 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3910 </para></footnote>
3911 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3912 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3913 content, <emphasis>even if the content is still under
3914 copyright</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3915 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3916 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3917 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3918 the content they sell.
3919 </para>
3920 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3921 <para>
3922 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3923 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3924 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3925 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3926 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3927 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3928 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3929 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3930 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3931 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3932 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3933 </para>
3934 <para>
3935 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3936 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3937 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3938 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3939 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3940 shut as well?
3941 </para>
3942 <para>
3943 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3944 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3945 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3946 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3947 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
3948 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3949
3950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3951 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3952 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3953 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3954 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3955 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3956 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3957 great book!)
3958 </para>
3959 <para>
3960 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3961 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3962 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3963 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3964 </para>
3965 <para>
3966 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3967 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3968 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3969 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3970 unavailable?"
3971 </para>
3972 <para>
3973 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3974 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3975 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
3976 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="pirates"/>, much of
3977 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3978 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3979 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3980 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3981 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3982 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3983 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3984 found only with time.
3985 </para>
3986 <para>
3987 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3988 just what you call type A sharing?"
3989 </para>
3990 <para>
3991 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3992 effect
3993 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3994 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3995 Napster
3996 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3997 developed
3998 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4000 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
4001 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4002 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
4003 <!-- f17 -->
4004 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
4005 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
4006 MHP, available at
4007
4008 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an
4009 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
4010 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster</citetitle> (New
4011 York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
4012 </para></footnote>
4013 </para>
4014 <para>
4015 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4016 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4017 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
4018 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
4019 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
4020 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4021 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4022 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4023 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4024 </para>
4025 <para>
4026 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4027 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4028 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4029 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4030 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4031 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4032 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4033 </para>
4034 <para>
4035 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
4036 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4037 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4038 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4039 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4040 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4041 complained to Congress that their "creative property" was not being
4042 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4043 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4044 benefit was enough.
4045 </para>
4046 <para>
4047 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4048 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4049 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4050 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4051 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4052 price.
4053 </para>
4054 <para>
4055
4056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4057 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4058 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals
4059 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4060 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4061 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4062 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4063 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4064 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4065 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4066 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4067 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4068 Congress chose a path that would assure
4069 <emphasis>compensation</emphasis> without giving the past
4070 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4071 </para>
4072 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
4073 <para>
4074 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4075 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4076 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4077 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4078 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4079 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4080 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4081 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4082 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4083 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4084 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4085 </para>
4086 <para>
4087 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4088 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4089 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4090 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4091 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4092 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4093 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4094 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4096 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4097 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4098 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4099 for the architecture it chose.
4100 </para>
4101 <para>
4102 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4103 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4104 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4105 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4106 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4107 copyright."<footnote><para>
4108 <!-- f18 -->
4109 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4110 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4111 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4112 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4113 </para></footnote>
4114 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4115 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4116 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4117 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4118 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4119 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4120 <!-- f19 -->
4121 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4122 </para></footnote>
4123 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4124 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4125 <!-- f20 -->
4126 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4127 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4128 </para></footnote>
4129 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4130 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4131 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4132 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4133 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4134 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4135 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4136 <!-- f21 -->
4137 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4138 of Jack Valenti).
4139 </para></footnote>
4140 </para>
4141 <para>
4142 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4143 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4144 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex
4145 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood
4146 Circuit"&mdash;held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4147 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4148 rule, this totally familiar technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had
4149 called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry" (worse
4150 yet, it was a <emphasis>Japanese</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4151 American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4152 technology.<footnote><para>
4153 <!-- f22 -->
4154 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4155 1981).
4156 </para></footnote>
4157 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex</primary></indexterm>
4158 </para>
4159 <para>
4160 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4161
4162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4163 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4164 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4165 Court wrote,
4166 </para>
4167 <blockquote>
4168 <para>
4169 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4170 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4171 market
4172 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4173 authority
4174 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4175 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4176 implicated
4177 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4178 <!-- f23 -->
4179 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4180 </para></footnote>
4181 </para>
4182 </blockquote>
4183 <para>
4184 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4185 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4186 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4187 enough, this "taking" notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4188 together, a pattern is clear:
4189 </para>
4190
4191 <informaltable id="t1">
4192 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4193 <thead>
4194 <row>
4195 <entry>CASE</entry>
4196 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4197 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4198 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4199 </row>
4200 </thead>
4201 <tbody>
4202 <row>
4203 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4204 <entry>Composers</entry>
4205 <entry>No protection</entry>
4206 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4207 </row>
4208 <row>
4209 <entry>Radio</entry>
4210 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4211 <entry>N/A</entry>
4212 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4213 </row>
4214 <row>
4215 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4216 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4217 <entry>No protection</entry>
4218 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4219 </row>
4220 <row>
4221 <entry>VCR</entry>
4222 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4223 <entry>No protection</entry>
4224 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4225 </row>
4226 </tbody>
4227 </tgroup>
4228 </informaltable>
4229
4230 <para>
4231 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4232 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4233 <!-- f24 -->
4234 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4235 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4236 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4237 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4238 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4239 1992 (Title 17 of the <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4240 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4241 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4242 Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4243 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4244 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4245 </para></footnote>
4246 In each case, throughout our history,
4247 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4248 work.
4249 </para>
4250 <para>
4251 In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4252 Congress eliminate all free riding. In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of
4253 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4254 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4255 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy."
4256 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4257 the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed some new
4258 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4259 interests at stake.
4260 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4261 </para>
4262 <para>
4263 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4264 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4265 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4266 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4267 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4268 regulated?
4269 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4270 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4271 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4272 permission to record a song?
4273 </para>
4274 <para>
4275 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4276 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4277 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4278 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4279 <!-- f25 -->
4280 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
4281 (1984).
4282 </para></footnote>
4283 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4284 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4285 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4286 balancing has historically been done <emphasis>after</emphasis> a
4287 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4288 facilitate the distribution of content.
4289 </para>
4290 <para>
4291 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4292 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4293 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4294 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither
4295 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4296 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4297 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4298 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4299 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4300 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4301 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4302 public interest that innovation continue.
4303 </para>
4304 <para>
4305
4306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4307 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4308 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4309 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4310 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4311 efficient. Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz
4312 writes in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, "could be delayed in the P2P
4313 fight."<footnote><para>
4314 <!-- f26 -->
4315 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4316 Echoes Past Efforts," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 September 2003, C3.
4317 </para></footnote>
4318 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright warriors
4319 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance and
4320 incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content," the
4321 warriors insist, "is our <emphasis>property</emphasis>. Why should we
4322 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4323 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4324 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4325 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4326 arrest him?"
4327 </para>
4328 <para>
4329 "It is <emphasis>our property</emphasis>," the warriors insist. "And
4330 it should be protected just as any other property is protected."
4331 </para>
4332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4333 </section>
4334 </chapter>
4335 </part>
4336 <part id="c-property">
4337 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4338 <partintro>
4339 <para>
4340
4341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4342 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4343 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4344 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4345 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4346 the price she can get.
4347 </para>
4348 <para>
4349 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4350 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4351 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4352 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4353 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4354 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4355 when I take the good <emphasis>idea</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4356 table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4357 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4358 then?
4359 </para>
4360 <para>
4361 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4362 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4363 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4364 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4365 narrow
4366 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4367 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4368 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4369 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4370 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4371 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4372 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4373 <!-- f1 -->
4374 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4375 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</citetitle>, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4376 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4377 </para></footnote>
4378 </para>
4379 <para>
4380 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4381 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4382 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4383 expression
4384 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4385 property.
4386 </para>
4387 <para>
4388 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details,
4389 in other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4390 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4391 "property" in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4392 <!-- f2 -->
4393 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4394 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4395 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4396 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4397 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4398 Adam Mossoff, "What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,"
4399 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review</citetitle> 45 (2003): 373, 429 n. 241.
4400 </para></footnote>
4401 </para>
4402 <para>
4403 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4404 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4405 "copyright material is property" in context. Where did the idea come
4406 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4407 these stories, the significance of this true
4408 statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash; will be a bit
4409 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4410 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4411 </para>
4412 </partintro>
4413
4414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4415 <chapter label="6" id="founders">
4416 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4417 <indexterm><primary>Henry V</primary></indexterm>
4418 <para>
4419 William Shakespeare wrote <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> in 1595. The play
4420 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4421 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4422 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4423 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4424 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4425 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4426 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare
4427 is so full of clichés."
4428 </para>
4429 <para>
4430 In 1774, almost 180 years after <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> was written, the
4431 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4432 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4433 <!-- f1 -->
4434 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4435 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4436 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to <citetitle>Romeo and
4437 Juliet</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4438 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4439 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4440 Bookseller," <citetitle>American Scholar</citetitle> 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4441 </para></footnote>
4442 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4443 the Conger<footnote><para>
4444 <!-- f2 -->
4445 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle> (Nashville:
4446 Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4447 </para></footnote>
4448 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4449 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of
4450 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4451 that no
4452 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4453 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4454 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4455 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4456 </para>
4457 <para>
4458 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4459 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4460 history of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament
4461 adopted the first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4462 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4463 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4464 works already published by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4465 additional years.<footnote><para>
4466 <!-- f3 -->
4467 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4468 "copyright law." See Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 40.
4469 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4470 </para></footnote> Under this law, <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> should have been
4471 free in 1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4472 Tonson's control in 1774?
4473 </para>
4474 <para>
4475 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a "copyright"
4476 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4477 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4478 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4479 expired in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4480 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4481 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4482 that the publishers, or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print
4483 books.
4484 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (1662)</primary></indexterm>
4485 </para>
4486 <para>
4487 There was no <emphasis>positive</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4488 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4489 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4490 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4491 from legislatures "positive law." We call the words from judges
4492 "common law." The common law sets the background against which
4493 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4494 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4495 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4496 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4497 </para>
4498 <para>
4499 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4500 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4501 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4502 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4503
4504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4505 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4506 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4507 ultimately
4508 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4509 </para>
4510 <para>
4511 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book an
4512 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4513 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4514 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4515 copyright "expired," and the work would then be free and could be
4516 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4517 believed.
4518 </para>
4519 <para>
4520 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4521 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4522 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4523 <emphasis>at all?</emphasis>
4524 </para>
4525 <para>
4526 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4527 strong claim. Take <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> as an example: That play
4528 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4529 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4530 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4531 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4532 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4533 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4534 reason is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4535 </para>
4536 <para>
4537 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4538 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4539 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4540 "booksellers."
4541 </para>
4542 <para>
4543 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4544 to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in 1710, it
4545 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4546 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4547 others from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right
4548 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4549 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4550 generally how
4551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4552 a work could be <emphasis>used</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4553 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4554 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4555 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4556 </para>
4557 <para>
4558 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4559 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4560 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4561 permission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4562 anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4563 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4564 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive
4565 right to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4566 </para>
4567 <indexterm><primary>Henry VIII, King of England</primary></indexterm>
4568 <para>
4569 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4570 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4571 especially "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had
4572 fought a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4573 monopolies&mdash;especially monopolies for works that already
4574 existed. King Henry VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a
4575 monopoly to Darcy to print playing cards. The English Parliament began
4576 to fight back against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the
4577 Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new
4578 inventions. And by 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing
4579 monopoly in publishing.
4580 </para>
4581 <para>
4582 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
4583 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing the
4584 claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4585 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4586 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but
4587 only so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4588 specialinterest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4589 </para>
4590 <para>
4591 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4592 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4593 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4594 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4596
4597 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4598 kind&mdash;tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4599 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4600 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees
4601 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do
4602 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4603 indetted."<footnote><para>
4604
4605 <!-- f4 -->
4606 Philip Wittenberg, <citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4607 Property</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4608 </para></footnote>
4609 </para>
4610 <para>
4611 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4612 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4613 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4614 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4615 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4616 with that idea.
4617 </para>
4618 <para>
4619 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4620 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4621 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4622 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4623 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4624 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4625 compromise
4626 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4627 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4628 construction and spread of culture.
4629 </para>
4630 <para>
4631 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4632 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4633 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4634 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4635 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4636 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4637 they said; they needed more time.
4638 </para>
4639 <para>
4640 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4641 words that echo today,
4642 </para>
4643 <blockquote>
4644 <para>
4645 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4646 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4648 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4649 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4650 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4651 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4652 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4653 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4654 <!-- f5 -->
4655 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4656 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4657 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4658 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4659 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4660 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4661 al., 8, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4662 </para></footnote>
4663 </para>
4664 </blockquote>
4665 <para>
4666 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4667 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4668 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4669 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4670 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4671 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4672 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4673 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4674 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4675 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4676 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4677 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4678 way to protect authors.
4679 </para>
4680 <para>
4681 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4682 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4683 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4684 "The publishers &hellip; had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4685 rancher has for cattle."<footnote><para>
4686 <!-- f6 -->
4687 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4688 Law Review</citetitle> 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4689 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4690 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4691 </para></footnote>
4692 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4693 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4694 </para>
4695 <para>
4696 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4697 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4698 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4699 <!-- f7 -->
4700 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, <citetitle>Authorship and Copyright</citetitle>
4701 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4702 </para></footnote>
4703 </para>
4704 <para>
4705 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4706 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4707 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4708 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4709 <!-- f8 -->
4710 Mark Rose, <citetitle>Authors and Owners</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4711 1993), 92.
4712 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark</primary></indexterm>
4713 </para></footnote>
4714 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4716 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4717 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4718 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4719 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4720 <!-- f9 -->
4721 Ibid., 93.
4722 </para></footnote>
4723 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James</primary></indexterm>
4724 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4725 </para>
4726 <para>
4727 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4728 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4729 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4730 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4731 Property."<footnote><para>
4732 <!-- f10 -->
4733 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle>, 167 (quoting
4734 Borwell).
4735 </para></footnote>
4736 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4737 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4738 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4739 </para>
4740 <para>
4741 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4742 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4743 the most important early victory being <citetitle>Millar</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Taylor</citetitle>.
4744 </para>
4745 <para>
4746 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4747 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4748 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4749 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4750 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4751 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4752 <!-- f11 -->
4753 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4754 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," <citetitle>Wayne Law Review</citetitle> 29
4755 (1983): 1152.
4756 </para></footnote>
4757 </para>
4758 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4759 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4760 </indexterm>
4761 <para>
4762 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4763 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4764 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4765 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4766 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4767 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4768 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4769 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4770 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4771 </para>
4772 <para>
4773 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4774 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4775 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4776 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4777 with in 1710: How best to limit
4778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4779 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4780 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4781 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4782 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4783 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4784 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4785 </para>
4786 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4787 <para>
4788 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4789 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4790 </para>
4791 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4792 <para>
4793 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4794 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4795 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4796 <!-- f12 -->
4797 Ibid., 1156.
4798 </para></footnote>
4799 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4800 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in <citetitle>Millar</citetitle>,
4801 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4802 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4803 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4804 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4805 </para>
4806 <para>
4807 As few legal cases ever do, <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle> drew an
4808 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4809 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4810 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4811 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4812 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4813 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4814 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4815 </para>
4816 <para>
4817 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4818 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4819 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4820 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4821 House of Lords generally voted.
4822 </para>
4823 <para>
4824 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4825 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4827 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4828 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4829 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4830 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4831 passed into the public domain.
4832 </para>
4833 <para>
4834 "The public domain." Before the case of <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle>
4835 v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4836 England. Before 1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4837 copyrights were perpetual. After 1774, the public domain was
4838 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4839 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4840 history&mdash;including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4841 and Bunyan&mdash;were free of legal restraint.
4842 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4843 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4844 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4845 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4846 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4847 </para>
4848 <para>
4849 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4850 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4851 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4852 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the <citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser</citetitle>
4853 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4854 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4855 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4856 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4857 and illuminations."<footnote><para>
4858 <!-- f13 -->
4859 Rose, 97.
4860 </para></footnote>
4861 </para>
4862 <para>
4863 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4864 equally strong in the opposite direction. The <citetitle>Morning Chronicle</citetitle>
4865 reported:
4866 </para>
4867 <blockquote>
4868 <para>
4869 By the above decision &hellip; near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4870 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4871 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4872 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4873 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4874 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4875 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4876 successors.<footnote><para>
4877 <!-- f14 -->
4878 Ibid.
4879 </para></footnote>
4880 </para>
4881 </blockquote>
4882 <para>
4883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4884 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4885 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4886 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4887 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4888 <emphasis>free</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4889 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4890 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4891 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4892 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4893 book from someone. But <emphasis>free</emphasis> in the sense that the
4894 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4895 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4896 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4897 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4898 develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4899 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a <emphasis>competitive
4900 context</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4901 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4902 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4903 </para>
4904 <para>
4905 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4906 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4907 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4908 protected.
4909 </para>
4910 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4911 </chapter>
4912 <chapter label="7" id="recorders">
4913 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4914 <para>
4915 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4916 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4917 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4918 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4919 He was their god.)
4920 </para>
4921 <para>
4922 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4923 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4924 today.
4925 </para>
4926 <para>
4927 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4928 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4929 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4930 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4931 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4932 stage.
4933 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4934 </para>
4935 <para>
4936 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4937 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4938 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4939 and the opera company played Wagner, was <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. As Else judged
4940 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4941 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4942 about the scene.
4943 </para>
4944 <para>
4945 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4946 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>.
4947 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4948 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4949 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4950 </para>
4951 <para>
4952 Else called <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4953 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4954 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4955 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4956 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4957 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4958 </para>
4959 <para>
4960 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4961 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4962 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4963 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4964 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4965 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4966 </para>
4967 <para>
4968 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4969 &hellip; that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4970 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4971 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4972 to use this four-point-five seconds of &hellip; entirely unsolicited
4973 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot."
4974 </para>
4975 <para>
4976 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4977 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4978 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. &hellip; We're
4979 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4980 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4981 confirm what he had been told.
4982 </para>
4983 <para>
4984 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4985 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4986 clip of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4987 about
4988
4989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4990 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4991 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4992 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4993 the money."
4994 </para>
4995 <para>
4996 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4997 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4998 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4999 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
5000 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
5001 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity</citetitle>, from ten years before.
5002 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
5003 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The</primary></indexterm>
5004 </para>
5005 <para>
5006 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
5007 copyright to <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
5008 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
5009 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5010 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5011 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5012 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
5013 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
5014 says the owner gets to control.
5015 </para>
5016 <para>
5017 For example, "public performance" is a use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> that the
5018 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5019 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
5020 Favorite <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>," then you need to get permission from the copyright
5021 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5022 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
5023 by the law.
5024 </para>
5025 <para>
5026 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5027 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
5028 <!-- f1 -->
5029 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
5030 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
5031 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5032 Wake of <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>" (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5033 Law School, 5 August 2003.
5034 </para></footnote>
5035 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>
5036 episode is clearly a fair use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>&mdash;and fair use does
5037 not require the permission of anyone.
5038 </para>
5039 <para>
5040 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5041 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
5042 </para>
5043 <blockquote>
5044 <para>
5045 The <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5046 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5047 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5048 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
5049 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5050 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5051 </para>
5052 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
5053 <listitem><para>
5054 <!-- 1. -->
5055 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5056 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5057 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
5058 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
5059 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
5060 </para></listitem>
5061 <listitem><para>
5062 <!-- 2. -->
5063 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5064 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5065 tracking down and stopping unlicensed <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> usage, just as George
5066 Lucas had a very high profile litigating <citetitle>Star Wars</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5067 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5068 license to four seconds of <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5069 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5070 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5071 principle.
5072 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George</primary></indexterm>
5073 </para></listitem>
5074 <listitem><para>
5075 <!-- 3. -->
5076 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5077 School &hellip; who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5078 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5079 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5080 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5081 pockets, me or them.
5082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5083 </para></listitem>
5084 <listitem><para>
5085 <!-- 4. -->
5086 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5087 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5088 money.
5089 </para></listitem>
5090 </orderedlist>
5091 </blockquote>
5092 <para>
5093 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5094 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5095 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5096 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5097 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5098 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5099 </para>
5100 <para>
5101 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5102 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5103 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5104 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5105 not.
5106 </para>
5107 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5108 </chapter>
5109 <chapter label="8" id="transformers">
5110 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5111 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5112 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5113 <para>
5114 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5115 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5116 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5117 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5118 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5119 </para>
5120 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5121 <para>
5122 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5123 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5124 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5125 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5126 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5127 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5128 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5129 important to his career.
5130 </para>
5131 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5132 <para>
5133 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5134 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5135 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5136 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5137 </para>
5138 <para>
5139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5140 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5141 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5142 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5143 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5144 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5145 </para>
5146 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5147 <para>
5148 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5149 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5150 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5151 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5152 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5153 actor's career."
5154 </para>
5155 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5156 <para>
5157 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5158 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5159 </para>
5160 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5161 <para>
5162 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5163 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5164 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5165 for it."<footnote>
5166 <para>
5167 <!-- f1 -->
5168 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5169 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5170 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5171 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5172 <indexterm>
5173 <primary>artists</primary>
5174 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5175 </indexterm>
5176 </para></footnote>
5177 </para>
5178 <para>
5179 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5180 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5181 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5182 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5183 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5184 </para>
5185 <para>
5186 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5187 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5188 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5189 </para>
5190 <blockquote>
5191 <para>
5192 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5193 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5194 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from <citetitle>Dirty
5195 Harry</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5196 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5197 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5198 </para>
5199 <para>
5200 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5201 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5202 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5203 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5204 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5205 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5206 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5207 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5208 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5209 started calling people.
5210 </para>
5211 </blockquote>
5212 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5213 <para>
5214 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5215 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5216 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5217 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5218 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5219 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5220 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5221 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5222 career.
5223 </para>
5224 <para>
5225 It was one <emphasis>year</emphasis> later&mdash;"and even then we
5226 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear."
5227 </para>
5228 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5229 <para>
5230 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5231 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5232 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5233 </para>
5234 <blockquote>
5235 <para>
5236 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5237 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5238 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5239 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5240 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5241 directors, &hellip; this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5242 systematically and cleared the rights.
5243 </para>
5244 </blockquote>
5245 <para>
5246
5247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5248 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5249 loved it, and it sold very well.
5250 </para>
5251 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5252 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5253 <para>
5254 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5255 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5256 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5257 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5258 at all."<footnote><para>
5259 <!-- f2 -->
5260 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, <citetitle>Seven
5261 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition</citetitle>, available at
5262 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5263 </para></footnote>
5264 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5265 has to be made?
5266 </para>
5267 <para>
5268 For, as he acknowledged, "very few &hellip; have the time and resources,
5269 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5270 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5271 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5272 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5273 </para>
5274 <blockquote>
5275 <para>
5276 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5277 he or she gets paid very well. &hellip; And then when 30 seconds of
5278 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5279 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person &hellip; should be
5280 compensated for that.
5281 </para>
5282 </blockquote>
5283 <para>
5284 Or at least, is this <emphasis>how</emphasis> the artist should be
5285 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5286 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5287 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5288 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5289 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5290 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5291 made to be more clean?
5292 </para>
5293 <blockquote>
5294 <para>
5295 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5296 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5297 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5298 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5299 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5300 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5301 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5302 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5303 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5304 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5305 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5306 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5307 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5308 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5309 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5310 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5311 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5312 </para>
5313 </blockquote>
5314 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5315 <para>
5316 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5317 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5318 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5319 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5320 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5321 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5322 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5323 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5324 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5325 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5326 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5327 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5328 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5329 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5330 "Does this still make sense?"
5331 </para>
5332 <para>
5333 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5334 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5335 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5336 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5337
5338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5339 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5340 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5341 </para>
5342 <para>
5343 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5344 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode.
5345 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5346 judges loved every minute of it.
5347 </para>
5348 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5349 <para>
5350 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5351 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5352 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5353 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5354 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5355 were just violated in this room?"
5356 </para>
5357 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5358 <para>
5359 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5360 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5361 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5362 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5363 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5364 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5365 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5366 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5367 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5368 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5369 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5370 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5371 couldn't easily do them legally.
5372 </para>
5373 <para>
5374 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5375 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5376 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5377 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5378 planted in your presentation.
5379 </para>
5380 <para>
5381 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5383 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5384 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5385 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5386 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5387 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5388 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5389 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5390 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5391 </para>
5392 <para>
5393 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5394 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5395 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5396 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5397 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5398 </para>
5399 <para>
5400 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5401 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5402 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5403 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5404 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5405 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5406 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5407 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5408 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5409 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5410 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5411 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5412 registers the work.
5413 </para>
5414 <para>
5415 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5416 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5417 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5418 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5419 </para>
5420 <para>
5421 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5422 Myers, the comic genius of <citetitle>Saturday Night Live</citetitle> and
5423 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5424 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5425 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5426 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5427 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5428 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5429 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5430 entertainment."
5431 </para>
5432 <para>
5433 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5434 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5435 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5436 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5437 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5438 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5439 new audiences, it is Mike."
5440 </para>
5441 <para>
5442 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5443 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5444 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5445 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5446 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5447 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5448 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5449 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5450 </para>
5451 <para>
5452 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5453 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5454 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5455 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5456 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5457 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5458 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5459 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5460 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5461 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5462 curse, reserved for the few.
5463 </para>
5464 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5465 </chapter>
5466 <chapter label="9" id="collectors">
5467 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5468 <para>
5469 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5470 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5471 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5472 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5473 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5474 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5475 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5476 </para>
5477 <para>
5478 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5479 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5480 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5481 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5482 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5483 well as when those pages changed.
5484 </para>
5485 <para>
5486 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5487 appreciated. In the dystopia described in <citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5488 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5489 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5490 reports.
5491 </para>
5492 <para>
5493 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5494 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5495 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5496 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5497 </para>
5498 <para>
5499 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5500 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5501 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5502 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5503 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5504 </para>
5505 <para>
5506 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5507 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5508 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5509 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5510 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5511 <!-- f1 -->
5512 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5513 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5514 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5515 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5516 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5517 </para></footnote>
5518 </para>
5519 <para>
5520 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5521 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5522 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5523 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5524 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5525 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5526 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5527 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5528 truth.
5529 </para>
5530 <para>
5531 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5532 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We <emphasis>all</emphasis>
5533 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5534 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5535 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5536 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5537 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5538 </para>
5539 <para>
5540 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5541 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5542 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5543 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5544 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5545 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5546 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5547 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5548 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5549 </para>
5550 <para>
5551 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5552 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5553 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5554 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5555 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5556 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5557 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5558 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5559 </para>
5560 <para>
5561 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5562 human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5563 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the
5564 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5565 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5566 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5567 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5568 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5569 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5570 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5571 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5572 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5573 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5574 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5575 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5576 </para>
5577 <blockquote>
5578 <indexterm><primary>Quayle, Dan</primary></indexterm>
5579 <para>
5580 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5581 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5582 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5583 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5584 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5585
5586 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5587 <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode that came out after it &hellip; it would be almost
5588 impossible. &hellip; Those materials are almost unfindable. &hellip;
5589 </para>
5590 </blockquote>
5591 <para>
5592 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5593 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5594 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5595 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5596 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5597 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5598 </para>
5599 <para>
5600 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5601 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5602 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5603 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5604 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5605 work.
5606 </para>
5607 <para>
5608 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5609 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5610 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5611 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5612 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed
5613 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5614 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5615 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5616 <!-- f2 -->
5617 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5618 the Library of Congress," <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly</citetitle> 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5619 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, <citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5620 Preservation in the United States</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5621 Co., 1992), 36.
5622 </para></footnote>
5623 </para>
5624 <para>
5625 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5626 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5627 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5628 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5629 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5630 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5631 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5632 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5633 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5634 </para>
5635 <para>
5636 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5637 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5638 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5639 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5640 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5641 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5642 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5643 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5644 events of that day.
5645 </para>
5646 <para>
5647 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5648 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5649 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5650 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5651 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5652 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5653 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5654 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5655 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5656 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5657 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5658 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5659 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5660 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5661 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5662 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5663 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive</primary></indexterm>
5664 </para>
5665 <para>
5666 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5667 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5668 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5669 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5670 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5671 to find them.
5672 </para>
5673 <para>
5674 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5675 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5676 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5677 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5678 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5679 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5680 </para>
5681 <para>
5682 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5683 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5684 life, if the
5685
5686 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5687 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5688 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5689 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5690 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5691 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5692 </para>
5693 <para>
5694 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5695 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5696 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5697 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5698 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5699 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5700 longer sold.
5701 </para>
5702 <para>
5703 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5704 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5705 <!-- f3 -->
5706 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5707 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>,
5708 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5709 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5710 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," <citetitle>Boston
5711 College Law Review</citetitle> 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5712 </para></footnote>). After
5713 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5714 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5715 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5716 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5717 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5718 </para>
5719 <para>
5720 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5721 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5722 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5723 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5724 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5725 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5726 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5727 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5728 disappears.
5729 </para>
5730 <para>
5731 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5732 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5733 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5734 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5735 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5736 generally, the
5737 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5738 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5739 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5740 little practical effect.
5741 </para>
5742 <para>
5743 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5744 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5745 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5746 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5747 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5748 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5749 </para>
5750 <para>
5751 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5752 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5753 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5754 Kahle describes,
5755 </para>
5756 <blockquote>
5757 <para>
5758 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5759 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5760 movies, &hellip; and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5761 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5762 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5763 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5764 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5765 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5766 &hellip; thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5767 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5768 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5769 </para>
5770 </blockquote>
5771 <para>
5772 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5773 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5774 libraries or archives could be. <emphasis>When</emphasis> the
5775 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5776 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5777 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5778 will draw upon it to understand it;
5779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5780 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5781 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5782 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5783 future <emphasis>for</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5784 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5785 </para>
5786 <para>
5787 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5788 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5789 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5790 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5791 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5792 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5793 </para>
5794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5795 </chapter>
5796 <chapter label="10" id="property-i">
5797 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5798 <para>
5799 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5800 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5801 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5802 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5803 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5804 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5805 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5806 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5807 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.</primary></indexterm>
5808 </para>
5809 <para>
5810 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5811 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5812 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5813 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5814 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5815 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5816 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5817 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5818 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5819 Warner Brothers.
5820 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.</primary></indexterm>
5821 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment</primary></indexterm>
5822 <indexterm><primary>MGM</primary></indexterm>
5823 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5824 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox</primary></indexterm>
5825 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5826 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers</primary></indexterm>
5827 </para>
5828 <para>
5829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5830 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5831 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5832 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5833 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5834 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5835 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5836 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5837 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5838 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5839 Washingtonian way.
5840 </para>
5841 <para>
5842 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5843 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5844 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5845 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5846 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5847 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5848 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5849 </para>
5850 <para>
5851 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5852 perfectly:
5853 </para>
5854 <blockquote>
5855 <para>
5856 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5857 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5858 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5859 theme which animates this entire debate: <emphasis>Creative property
5860 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5861 other property owners in the nation</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5862 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5863 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5864 <!-- f1 -->
5865 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5866 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5867 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5868 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5869 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5870 Valenti).
5871 </para></footnote>
5872 </para>
5873 </blockquote>
5874 <para>
5875 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5876 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5877 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5878 this:
5879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5880 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5881 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5882 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5883 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5884 </para>
5885 <para>
5886 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5887 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5888 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5889 extreme a claim made by <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> who is serious in
5890 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5891 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5892 it comes to the nature and scope of "creative property." His views
5893 have <emphasis>no</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5894 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5895 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5896 </para>
5897 <para>
5898 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5899 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5900 <!-- f2 -->
5901 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5902 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5903 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5904 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5905 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5906 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, <citetitle>Private Property and the
5907 Constitution</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5908 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5909 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5910 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5911 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5912 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5913 in our tradition.
5914 </para>
5915 <para>
5916 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5917 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5918 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5919 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5920 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5921 culture would develop.
5922 </para>
5923 <para>
5924 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5925 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5926 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5927 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5928 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5929 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5930 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5931 the same would be to
5932
5933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5934 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5935 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5936 perfect control.
5937 </para>
5938 <para>
5939 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5940 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5941 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5942 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5943 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5944 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5945 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5946 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5947 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5948 Constitution itself.
5949 </para>
5950 <para>
5951 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5952 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5953 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
5954 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5955 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5956 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5957 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5958 sacred. It cannot <emphasis>ever</emphasis> be taken from the property
5959 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5960 </para>
5961 <para>
5962 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5963 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5964 power to create "creative property," the Constitution
5965 <emphasis>requires</emphasis> that after a "limited time," Congress
5966 take back the rights that it has granted and set the "creative
5967 property" free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
5968 the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your copyright and turns it
5969 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
5970 pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
5971 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5973 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5974 compensation at all.
5975 </para>
5976 <para>
5977 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5978 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5979 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5980 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5981 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5982 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5983 itself.
5984 </para>
5985 <para>
5986 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5987 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5988 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5989 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5990 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5991 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
5992 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5993 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5994 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5995 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5996 </para>
5997 <para>
5998 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5999 least try to understand <emphasis>why</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
6000 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
6001 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
6002 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
6003 domain?
6004 </para>
6005 <para>
6006 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6007 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
6008 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6009 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
6010 should be at the core of this war: Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis>
6011 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
6012 <emphasis>whether</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
6013 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
6014 ought to be. Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> artists should be paid,
6015 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
6016 also control how culture develops.
6017 </para>
6018 <para>
6019
6020 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6021 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6022 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6023 than the narrow language of the law allows. In <citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6024 Cyberspace</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6025 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6026 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6027 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6028 </para>
6029 <figure id="fig-1331">
6030 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
6031 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6032 </figure>
6033 <para>
6034 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6035 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6036 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6037 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6038 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6039 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6040 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6041 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6042 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6043 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6044 Web, you can be punished
6045 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6046 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6047 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6048 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
6049 </para>
6050 <para>
6051 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6052 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6053 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6054 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6055 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6056 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6057 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6058 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6059 the source of the enforcement.
6060 </para>
6061 <para>
6062 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6063 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6064 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6065 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6066 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6067 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6068 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6069 individual or group might behave.
6070 </para>
6071 <para>
6072 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6073 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
6074 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6075 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6076 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6077 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6078 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6079 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6080 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6081 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder
6082 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6083 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6084 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6085 </para>
6086 <para>
6087
6088 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6089 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6090 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6091 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6092 undermined by another.
6093 </para>
6094 <para>
6095 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6096 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6097 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6098 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6099 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6100 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6101 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6102 </para>
6103 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6104 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6105 </indexterm>
6106 <para>
6107 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6108 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6109 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6110 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6111 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6112 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6113 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6114 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6115 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6116 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6117 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6118 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6119 </para>
6120 <para>
6121 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6122 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6123 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6124 <!-- f3 -->
6125 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6126 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6127 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6128 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6129 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Code: And
6130 Other Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6131 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies</citetitle>,
6132 June 1998.
6133 </para></footnote>
6134 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6135 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6136 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6137 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6138 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6139 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6140 used to require that other laws be more
6141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6142 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6143 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6144 driving.
6145 </para>
6146 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6147
6148 <figure id="fig-1361">
6149 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6150 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6151 </figure>
6152 <para>
6153 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6154 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6155 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6156 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6157 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6158 another.<footnote>
6159 <para>
6160 <!-- f4 -->
6161 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6162 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6163 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6164 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6165 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6166 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6167 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6168 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6169 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6170 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6171 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6172 of liberty. As I argued in <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, we come from a
6173 long tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the
6174 narrow question of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill
6175 defended freedom of speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow
6176 minds, not from the fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
6177 <citetitle>On Liberty</citetitle> (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
6178 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of
6179 labor from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, "The
6180 Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
6181 <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays</citetitle> (London:
6182 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6183 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6184 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6185 places easier; 42 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6186 12101 (2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6187 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of
6188 those interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the
6189 effective liberty that each of these groups might face.
6190 <indexterm><primary>Americans with Disabilities Act (1990)</primary></indexterm>
6191 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6192 </para></footnote>
6193 </para>
6194 <section id="hollywood">
6195 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6196 <para>
6197 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6198 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6199 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6200 rallying makes sense.
6201 </para>
6202 <para>
6203 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6204 Internet:
6205 </para>
6206 <figure id="fig-1371">
6207 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6208 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6209 </figure>
6210 <para>
6211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6212 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6213 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6214 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6215 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6216 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6217 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6218 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6219 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6220 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6221 this form of infringement.
6222 </para>
6223 <para>
6224 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6225 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6226 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6227 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6228 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6229 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6230 </para>
6231 <para>
6232 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6233 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6234 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6235 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6236 Iraq
6237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6238 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6239 looting that results.
6240 </para>
6241 <figure id="fig-1381">
6242 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6243 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6244 </figure>
6245 <para>
6246 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6247 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6248 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6249 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6250 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6251 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6252 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6253 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6254 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6255 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6256 </para>
6257 <para>
6258 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6259 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6260 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6261 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6262 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6263 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6264 life. Homeowners living in a
6265
6266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6267 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6268 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6269 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6270 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6271 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6272 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6273 </para>
6274 <para>
6275 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6276 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6277 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6278 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6279 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6280 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6281 </para>
6282 <indexterm><primary>railroad industry</primary></indexterm>
6283 <para>
6284 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6285 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6286 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6287 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6288 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6289 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6290 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6291 <!-- f5 -->
6292 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6293 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6294 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6295 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6296 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6297 October 2003, available at
6298 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6299 </para></footnote>
6300
6301 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6302 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6303 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6304 <emphasis>for the purpose of</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6305 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6306 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring
6307 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6308 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6309 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6310 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6311 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6312 </para>
6313 <para>
6314 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6315 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6316 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6317 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6318 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6319 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6320 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6321 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6322 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6323 <!-- f6 -->
6324 Fred Warshofsky, <citetitle>The Patent Wars</citetitle> (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6325 </para></footnote>
6326 And relative to a
6327 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6328 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6329 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6330 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6331 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6332 Brezhnev.
6333 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6334 </para>
6335 <para>
6336 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6337 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6338 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6339 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6340 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6341 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6342 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6343 opportunities for innovation and change.
6344 </para>
6345 <para>
6346 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6347 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6348 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6349 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6350 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6351 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6352 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6353 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6354 shall make no law &hellip; abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6355 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6356 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6357 regulation is justified.
6358 </para>
6359 <para>
6360 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6362 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6363 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6364 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6365 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6366 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6367 </para>
6368 <para>
6369 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6370 </para>
6371 <indexterm id="idxddt" class='startofrange'>
6372 <primary>DDT</primary>
6373 </indexterm>
6374 <para>
6375 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6376 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6377 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6378 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6379 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6380 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann</primary></indexterm>
6381 </para>
6382 <para>
6383 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6384 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6385 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6386 </para>
6387 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6388 <para>
6389 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published <citetitle>Silent Spring</citetitle>, which argued that
6390 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6391 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6392 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6393 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6394 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6395 </para>
6396 <para>
6397 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6398 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6399 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6400 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6401 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6402 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6403 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6404 </para>
6405 <para>
6406 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6407 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6408 culture.<footnote><para>
6409 <!-- f7 -->
6410 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6411 Environmentalism for the Net?" <citetitle>Duke Law Journal</citetitle> 47 (1997): 87.
6412 </para></footnote>
6413 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6414 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6415 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6416 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6417 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6418 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6420 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6421 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6422 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6423 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6424 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6425 </para>
6426 <para>
6427 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6428 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6429 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6430 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6431 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6432 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6433 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6434 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6435 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6436 </para>
6437 <para>
6438 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6439 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6440 be lost.
6441 </para>
6442 <indexterm startref="idxddt" class='endofrange'/>
6443 </section>
6444 <section id="beginnings">
6445 <title>Beginnings</title>
6446 <para>
6447 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6448 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6449 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6450 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6451 </para>
6452 <para>
6453 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6454 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6455 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6456 </para>
6457 <para>
6458 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6459 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6460 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6461
6462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6463 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6464 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6465 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power
6466 <emphasis>to promote progress</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6467 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6468 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6469 </para>
6470 <para>
6471 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6472 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="founders"/>,
6473 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6474 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6475 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6476 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6477 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6478 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6479 </para>
6480 <para>
6481 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6482 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6483 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6484 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6485 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6486 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6487 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6488 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6489 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6490 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6491 case, a <emphasis>structure</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6492 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6493 concentrations of power.
6494 </para>
6495 <para>
6496 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6497 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6498 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6499 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6500 years since they first struck its design.
6501 </para>
6502 <para>
6503 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6504 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6505 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6506 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6507 started here:
6508 </para>
6509 <figure id="fig-1441">
6510 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6511 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6512 </figure>
6513 <para>
6514 We will end here:
6515 </para>
6516 <figure id="fig-1442">
6517 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6518 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6519 </figure>
6520 <para>
6521 Let me explain how.
6522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6523 </para>
6524 </section>
6525 <section id="lawduration">
6526 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6527 <para>
6528 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6529 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6530 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6531 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6532 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6533 authorship.<footnote>
6534 <para>
6535 <!-- f8 -->
6536 William W. Crosskey, <citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6537 the United States</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6538 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6539 Law of the Land,' <emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6540 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law</emphasis>"
6541 (emphasis added).
6542 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6543 </para></footnote>
6544 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6545 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6546 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6547 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6548 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6549 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6550 </para>
6551 <para>
6552 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6553 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6554 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6555 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6556 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6557 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6558 </para>
6559 <para>
6560 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6561 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6562 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6563 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6564 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6565 </para>
6566 <para>
6567 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6568 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6569 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6570 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6571 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6572 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6573 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6574 <!-- f9 -->
6575 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6576 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <citetitle>A
6577 History of Book Publishing in the United States</citetitle>, vol. 1, <citetitle>The Creation
6578 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6579 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6580 1790 act; William J. Maher, <citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6581 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context</citetitle>, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6582 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6583 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6584 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6585 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6586 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6587 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6588 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6589 </para>
6590 <para>
6591 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6592 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6593 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6594 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6595 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6596 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6597 copyright, either.
6598 </para>
6599 <para>
6600 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6601 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6602 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6603 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6604 domain.<footnote><para>
6605 <!-- f10 -->
6606 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6607 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6608 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6609 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6610 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright</citetitle>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6611 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6612 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6613 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6614 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6615 </para>
6616 <para>
6617 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6618 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6619 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6620 <!-- f11 -->
6621 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6622 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6623 no longer <emphasis>effectively</emphasis> controlled by
6624 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6625 is to sell the books as used books; that use&mdash;because it does not
6626 involve publication&mdash;is effectively free.
6627 </para>
6628 <para>
6629 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6630 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6631 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6632 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6633 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6634 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6635 </para>
6636 <para>
6637 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6638 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6639 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6640 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6641 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6642 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6643 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6644 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6645 </para>
6646 <para>
6647 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6648 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6649 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6650 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6651
6652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6653 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6654 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6655 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6656 </para>
6657 <para>
6658 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6659 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6660 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6661 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6662 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6663 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6664 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6665 value.
6666 </para>
6667 <para>
6668 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6669 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6670 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6671 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6672 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6673 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6674 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6675 was ninety-five years.
6676 </para>
6677 <para>
6678 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6679 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6680 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6681 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6682 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6683 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6684 them.
6685 </para>
6686 <para>
6687 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6688 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6689 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6690 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6691 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6692 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6693 years.<footnote><para>
6694 <!-- f12 -->
6695 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6696 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6697 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6698 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6699 </para></footnote>
6700 </para>
6701 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6702 </section>
6703 <section id="lawscope">
6704 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6705 <para>
6706 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6707 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6708 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6709 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6710 </para>
6711 <para>
6712 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6713 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6714 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6715 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6716 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6717 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6718 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6719 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6720 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6721 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6722 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6723 </para>
6724 <para>
6725 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6726 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6727 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6728 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6729 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6730 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6731 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6732 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6733 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6734 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6735 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6736 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6737 on the initial creative work.
6738 </para>
6739 <para>
6740 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6741 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6742 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6743 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6744 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6745 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6746 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6747 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6748 famous &copy; or the word <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>. And for most
6749 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6750 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6751 secured.
6752 </para>
6753 <para>
6754 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6755 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6756 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6757 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6758 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6759 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6760 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6761 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6762 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6763 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6764 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6765 original author.
6766 </para>
6767 <para>
6768 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6769 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6770 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6771 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6772 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6773 copy available for others to copy.
6774 </para>
6775 <para>
6776 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6777 differences.
6778 </para>
6779 <para>
6780 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6781 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6782 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6783 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6784 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6785 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6786 <!-- f13 -->
6787 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6788 Creation of American Literature," 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6789 International Law and Politics</citetitle> 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6790 Federal Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6791
6792 </para></footnote>
6793 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6794 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6795 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6796 </para>
6797 <para>
6798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6799 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6800 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6801 was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6802 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6803 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6804 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6805 were restrained.
6806 </para>
6807 <para>
6808 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6809 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6810 every note to your spouse, every doodle, <emphasis>every</emphasis>
6811 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is
6812 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6813 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6814 protect it.
6815 </para>
6816 <para>
6817 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6818 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6819 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6820 </para>
6821 <para>
6822 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6823 control
6824 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6825 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6826 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6827 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6828 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6829 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6830 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6831 exclusive
6832 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6833 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6834 </para>
6835 <para>
6836 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6837 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6838 expansion
6839 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6840 copyright.
6841 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6842 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6843 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6844 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6845 </para>
6846 <para>
6847 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6848 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6849 within a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you
6850 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6851 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6852 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6853 <emphasis>that</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6854 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6855 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6856 not protect derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6857 <!-- f14 -->
6858 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," <citetitle>Legal
6859 Affairs</citetitle>, July/August 2003, available at
6860 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6861 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
6862 </para></footnote>
6863 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6864 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6865 the wrong of direct piracy.
6866 </para>
6867 <para>
6868 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6869 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6870 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6871 of my book.<footnote><para>
6872 <!-- f15 -->
6873 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6874 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6875 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and
6876 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination:
6877 Copyright's Constitutionality," <citetitle>Yale Law
6878 Journal</citetitle> 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially
6879 pp. 53&ndash;59).
6880 <indexterm><primary>Rubenfeld, Jeb</primary></indexterm>
6881 </para></footnote>
6882 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
6883 </para>
6884 <para>
6885 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
6886 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
6887 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
6888 called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
6889 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
6890 created?
6891 </para>
6892 <para>
6893 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6894 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6895 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
6896 the rights originally granted.
6897 </para>
6898 </section>
6899 <section id="lawreach">
6900 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6901 <para>
6902 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6903 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6904 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6905 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6906 <!-- f16 -->
6907 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
6908 certainly regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a
6909 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
6910 per se doesn't make a copy; 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6911 106(4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17
6912 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 112(a). But the presumption under the
6913 existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6914 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6915 </para></footnote>
6916 </para>
6917 <para>
6918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6919 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
6920 <emphasis>copy</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
6921 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative
6922 property" deserves the "same rights" as all other property, it is the
6923 <emphasis>obvious</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
6924 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
6925 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
6926 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
6927 copies should <emphasis>not</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
6928 law. More precisely, they should not <emphasis>always</emphasis> be
6929 the trigger for copyright law.
6930 </para>
6931 <para>
6932 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6933 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6934 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6935 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6936 <!-- f17 -->
6937 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
6938 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
6939 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
6940 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
6941 technology.
6942 </para></footnote>
6943 because it is clear that the
6944 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6945 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6946 </para>
6947 <para>
6948 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6949 empty circle.
6950 </para>
6951 <figure id="fig-1521">
6952 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6953 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6954 </figure>
6955 <para>
6956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6957 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6958 all its potential <emphasis>uses</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
6959 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
6960 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
6961 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
6962 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
6963 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
6964 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
6965 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
6966 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
6967 acts do not make a copy.
6968 </para>
6969 <figure id="fig-1531">
6970 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6971 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6972 </figure>
6973 <para>
6974 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6975 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6976 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6977 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6978 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6979 diagram on next page).
6980 </para>
6981 <para>
6982 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6983 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6984 </para>
6985 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6986 <figure id="fig-1541">
6987 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6988 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6989 </figure>
6990 <para>
6991 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
6992 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6993 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
6994 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
6995 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
6996 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
6997 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses"
6998 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6999 </para>
7000 <figure id="fig-1542">
7001 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
7002 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
7003 </figure>
7004 <para> </para>
7005 <figure id="fig-1551">
7006 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
7007 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
7008 </figure>
7009 <para>
7010 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7011 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7012 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
7013 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7014 </para>
7015 <para>
7016 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
7017 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
7018 <!-- f18 -->
7019 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
7020 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
7021 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
7022 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7023 of copies remain.
7024 </para></footnote>
7025 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7026 digital network, the scope of category 1 changes dramatically. Uses
7027 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7028 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7029 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7030 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7031 a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into category 2. And those who
7032 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7033 exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7034 shift.
7035 </para>
7036 <para>
7037 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7038 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7039 be no plausible <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>-related argument that
7040 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7041 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7042 the book once, ten times, or every
7043 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7044 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7045 use&mdash;reading&mdash; could be regulated by copyright law because
7046 none of those uses produced a copy.
7047 </para>
7048 <para>
7049 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7050 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7051 only once or only once a month, then <emphasis>copyright
7052 law</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7053 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7054 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7055 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7056 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7057 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7058 copyright owner's wish.
7059 </para>
7060 <para>
7061 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7062 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7063 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7064 points also become clear:
7065 </para>
7066 <para>
7067 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7068 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7069 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7070 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7071 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7072 part of free culture before the Internet.
7073 </para>
7074 <para>
7075 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7076 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7077 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7078 <emphasis>any</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7079 using a machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become
7080 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7081 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7082 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7083 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7084 creative work.
7085 </para>
7086 <para>
7087 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7088
7089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7090 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to
7091 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7092 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7093 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7094 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7095 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7096 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7097 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7098 regulated.
7099 </para>
7100 <para>
7101 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7102 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7103 depend upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question
7104 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7105 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7106 <emphasis>unregulated</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7107 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7108 enough.
7109 </para>
7110 <para>
7111 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7112 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7113 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7114 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7115 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7116 </para>
7117 <para>
7118 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it began
7119 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7120 previews. The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling"
7121 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7122 "browsing." Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7123 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7124 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7125 </para>
7126 <para>
7127 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7128 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7129 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7130 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7132 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7133 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7134 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7135 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7136 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7137 "fair use" rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7138 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7139 their rights.
7140 </para>
7141 <para>
7142 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7143 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7144 infringed" on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7145 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7146 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7147 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7148 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7149 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7150 </para>
7151 <para>
7152 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7153 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7154 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7155 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7156 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7157 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7158 Disney's permission.
7159 </para>
7160 <para>
7161 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7162 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7163 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7164 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7165 was in the marketplace, the "first-sale doctrine" would free the
7166 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7167 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7168 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7169 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7170 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7171 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7172 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7173 </para>
7174 <para>
7175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7176 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7177 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the
7178 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7179 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7180 abuse. If Barnes &amp; Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7181 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7182 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7183 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7184 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7185 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7186 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7187 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7188 happening are quite slight.
7189 </para>
7190 <para>
7191 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7192 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7193 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7194 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7195 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7196 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7197 </para>
7198 </section>
7199 <section id="lawforce">
7200 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7201 <para>
7202 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7203 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7204 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7205 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7206 </para>
7207 <para>
7208 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7209 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7210 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7211 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7212 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7213 your freedom.
7214 </para>
7215 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7216 <indexterm id="idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7217 <primary>Marx Brothers</primary>
7218 </indexterm>
7219 <indexterm id="idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7220 <primary>Warner Brothers</primary>
7221 </indexterm>
7222 <para>
7223 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7224 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7226 <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7227 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7228 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7229 plan.<footnote><para>
7230 <!-- f19 -->
7231 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," <citetitle>Law and
7232 Contemporary Problems</citetitle> 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7233 </para></footnote>
7234 </para>
7235 <para>
7236 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7237 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7238 you were."<footnote><para>
7239 <!-- f20 -->
7240 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and
7241 Copywrongs</citetitle>, 1&ndash;3.
7242 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
7243 </para></footnote>
7244 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7245 <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7246 trying to control <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>, then the Marx
7247 Brothers would insist on control over <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>.
7248 </para>
7249 <para>
7250 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7251 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7252 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7253 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7254 </para>
7255 <para>
7256 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7257 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7258 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7259 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7260 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7261 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7262 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7263 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7264 </para>
7265 <indexterm startref="idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7266 <indexterm startref="idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7267
7268 <indexterm id="idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'>
7269 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader</primary>
7270 </indexterm>
7271 <para>
7272 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7273 </para>
7274 <para>
7275 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7276 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7277 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7278 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7279 technology.
7280 </para>
7281 <para>
7282 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7283 Reader.
7284 </para>
7285 <para>
7286 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7287 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7288 public domain: <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, for example, is in
7289 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7290 public domain: My own book <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
7291 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7292 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7293 copy of
7294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7295 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7296 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7297 </para>
7298 <figure id="fig-1611">
7299 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7300 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7301 </figure>
7302 <para>
7303 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7304 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7305 </para>
7306 <figure id="fig-1612">
7307 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7308 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7309 </figure>
7310 <para>
7311 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7312 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7313 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7314 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7315 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7316 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>
7317 read aloud through the computer.
7318 </para>
7319 <para>
7320 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7321 translation): Aristotle's <citetitle>Politics</citetitle>.
7322 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle</primary></indexterm>
7323 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics</citetitle>, (Aristotle)</primary></indexterm>
7324 </para>
7325 <figure id="fig-1621">
7326 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7327 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7328 </figure>
7329 <para>
7330 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7331 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7332 the book.
7333 </para>
7334 <figure id="fig-1622">
7335 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7336 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7337 </figure>
7338 <para>
7339 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7340 original e-book version of my last book, <citetitle>The Future of
7341 Ideas</citetitle>:
7342 </para>
7343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7344 <figure id="fig-1631">
7345 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7346 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7347 </figure>
7348 <para>
7349 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7350 </para>
7351 <para>
7352 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7353 "permissions"&mdash; as if the publisher has the power to control how
7354 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7355 certainly does have the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright
7356 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7357 power.<footnote><para>
7358 <!-- f21 -->
7359 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7360 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7361 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7362 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7363 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7364 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7365 subsequently acquired the book.
7366 </para></footnote>
7367 When my e-book of <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> says I have the
7368 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7369 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7370 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7371 control that the law would enable.
7372 </para>
7373 <para>
7374 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7375 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7376 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us
7377 deal with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till
7378 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7379 till 2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7380 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7381 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7382 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7383 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7384 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7385 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7386 aloud&mdash;it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7387 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7388 won't read aloud.
7389 </para>
7390 <para>
7391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7392 These are <emphasis>controls</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7393 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7394 you tried to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the
7395 sentence.
7396 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers</primary></indexterm>
7397 </para>
7398 <para>
7399 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7400 <emphasis>law</emphasis> as copyright <emphasis>code</emphasis>. The
7401 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7402 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7403 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7404 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7405 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7406 </para>
7407 <para>
7408 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7409 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7410 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7411 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7412 to defeat these protections as well?
7413 </para>
7414 <para>
7415 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7416 eBook Reader.
7417 </para>
7418 <para>
7419 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7420 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7421 on the Adobe site was a copy of <citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7422 Wonderland</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7423 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7424 following report:
7425 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)</primary></indexterm>
7426 </para>
7427 <figure id="fig-1641">
7428 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7429 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7430 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7431 </figure>
7432 <beginpage pagenum="164"/>
7433 <para>
7434 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7435 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7436 "permissions" indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7437 </para>
7438 <para>
7439 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7440 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7441 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7442 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7443 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7444 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7445 </para>
7446 <para>
7447 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7448 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7449 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7450 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7451 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7452 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7453 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7454 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7455 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7456 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7457 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7458 </para>
7459 <para>
7460 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7461 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7462 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7463 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7464 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7465 often crazy.
7466 </para>
7467 <indexterm startref="idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'/>
7468 <para>
7469 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7470 story of mine that makes the same point.
7471 </para>
7472 <indexterm id="idxaibo1" class='startofrange'>
7473 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7474 </indexterm>
7475 <indexterm id="idxroboticdog1" class='startofrange'>
7476 <primary>robotic dog</primary>
7477 </indexterm>
7478 <indexterm id="idxsonyaibo1" class='startofrange'>
7479 <primary>Sony</primary>
7480 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7481 </indexterm>
7482 <para>
7483 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7484 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7485 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7486 </para>
7487 <para>
7488 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7489 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7490 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7491 <beginpage pagenum="165"/>
7492 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7493 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7494 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7495 </para>
7496 <para>
7497 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7498 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7499 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7500 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7501 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7502 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7503 </para>
7504 <para>
7505 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
7506 <citetitle>hack</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly
7507 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in
7508 horror movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call
7509 them, <citetitle>hack</citetitle> is a much more positive
7510 term. <citetitle>Hack</citetitle> just means code that enables the
7511 program to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to
7512 do. If you buy a new printer for an old computer, you might find the
7513 old computer doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered
7514 that, you'd later be happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone
7515 who has written a driver to enable the computer to drive the printer
7516 you just bought.
7517 </para>
7518 <para>
7519 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7520 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7521 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7522 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7523 ethically.
7524 </para>
7525 <para>
7526 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7527 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7528 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7529 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7530 than Sony had built.
7531 </para>
7532 <indexterm startref="idxsonyaibo1" class='endofrange'/>
7533 <indexterm startref="idxroboticdog1" class='endofrange'/>
7534 <indexterm startref="idxaibo1" class='endofrange'/>
7535 <para>
7536 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7537 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7538 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7539 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7540 the
7541
7542 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7543 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7544 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7545 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7546 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7547 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7548 thought, <emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7549 a robot dog to dance?</emphasis>
7550 </para>
7551 <para>
7552 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7553 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7554 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7555 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7556 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7557 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7558 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7559 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7560 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7561 </para>
7562 <para>
7563 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7564 <!-- f22 -->
7565 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7566 <citetitle>Science</citetitle> 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7567 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," <citetitle>American Prospect</citetitle>,
7568 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7569 DMCA," <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter</citetitle>, 11 December 2001; Bill
7570 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," <citetitle>Billboard</citetitle>,
7571 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7572 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7573 Questions about <citetitle>Felten and USENIX</citetitle> v. <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> Legal Case," available at
7574 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7575 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7576 </para></footnote>
7577 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7578 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7579 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7580 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7581 </para>
7582 <para>
7583 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7584 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7585 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7586 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7587 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7588 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7589 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7590 Internet much more.
7591 </para>
7592 <para>
7593 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7594 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7595 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7596 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7597 </para>
7598 <para>
7599 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7600 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7601 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7602 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7603 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7604 </para>
7605 <para>
7606 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7607 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7608 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7609 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7610 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7611 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7612 </para>
7613 <para>
7614 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7615 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7616 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7617 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7618 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7619 constituted, succeed.
7620 </para>
7621 <indexterm id="idxaibo2" class='startofrange'>
7622 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7623 </indexterm>
7624 <indexterm id="idxroboticdog2" class='startofrange'>
7625 <primary>robotic dog</primary>
7626 </indexterm>
7627 <indexterm id="idxsonyaibo2" class='startofrange'>
7628 <primary>Sony</primary>
7629 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7630 </indexterm>
7631 <para>
7632 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7633 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7634 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7635 wrote:
7636 </para>
7637 <blockquote>
7638 <para>
7639 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7640 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7641 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7642 </para>
7643 </blockquote>
7644 <indexterm startref="idxsonyaibo2" class='endofrange'/>
7645 <indexterm startref="idxroboticdog2" class='endofrange'/>
7646 <indexterm startref="idxaibo2" class='endofrange'/>
7647 <para>
7648 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7649 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7650 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7651 </para>
7652 <blockquote>
7653 <para>
7654 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7655 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7656 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7657 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7658 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7659 </para>
7660 </blockquote>
7661 <para>
7662 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7663 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7664 spreading such information an offense.
7665 </para>
7666 <para>
7667 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7668 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7669 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7670 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7671 technologies&mdash; technologies to control the replication and
7672 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7673 <emphasis>code</emphasis> to modify the original
7674 <emphasis>code</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7675 protection for copyright owners.
7676 </para>
7677 <para>
7678 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7679 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7680 <emphasis>legal code</emphasis> intended to buttress
7681 <emphasis>software code</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7682 support the <emphasis>legal code of copyright</emphasis>.
7683 </para>
7684 <para>
7685 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7686 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7687 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7688 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7689 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7690 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7691 have been a copyright violation.
7692 </para>
7693 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7694 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7695 <indexterm>
7696 <primary>Sony</primary>
7697 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7698 </indexterm>
7699 <para>
7700 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7701 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7702 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7703 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7704 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7705 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7706 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7707 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7708 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7709 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7710 </para>
7711 <para>
7712 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7713 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7714 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7715 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7716 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7717 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7718 </para>
7719 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred</primary></indexterm>
7720 <para>
7721 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7722 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7723 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7724 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7725 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7726 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "<citetitle>Mr. Rogers</citetitle>,"
7727 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7728 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7729 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7730 </para>
7731 <blockquote>
7732 <para>
7733 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7734 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7735 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7736 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7737 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7738 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7739 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7740 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7741 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7742 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7743 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7744 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7745 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7746 important.<footnote><para>
7747 <!-- f23 -->
7748 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
7749 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7750 James Lardner, <citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7751 the VCR</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7752 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred</primary></indexterm>
7753 </para></footnote>
7754 </para>
7755 </blockquote>
7756 <para>
7757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7758 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7759 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7760 the VCR responsible.
7761 </para>
7762 <para>
7763 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7764 the DMCA.
7765 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7766 </para>
7767 <para>
7768 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7769 </para>
7770 <para>
7771 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7772 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7773 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7774 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7775 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7776 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7777 </para>
7778 <para>
7779 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7781 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7782 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7783 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7784 and bad uses.
7785 </para>
7786 <figure id="fig-1711">
7787 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7788 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7789 </figure>
7790 <para>
7791 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7792 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7793 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: <emphasis>No one ever
7794 died from copyright circumvention</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7795 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7796 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7797 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7798 </para>
7799 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7800 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7801 <indexterm>
7802 <primary>Sony</primary>
7803 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7804 </indexterm>
7805 <para>
7806 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7807 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7808 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7809 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7810 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7811 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7812 </para>
7813 <para>
7814 This is how <emphasis>code</emphasis> becomes
7815 <emphasis>law</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7816 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7817 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7818 law&mdash;increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7819 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7820 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7821 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect&mdash;at
7822 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7823 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7824 </para>
7825 <para>
7826 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7827 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7828 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7829 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7830 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7831 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7832 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7833 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7834 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7835 </para>
7836 <para>
7837
7838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7839 For example, imagine you were part of a <citetitle>Star Trek</citetitle> fan club. You
7840 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7841 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7842 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7843 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7844 <!-- f24 -->
7845 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7846 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7847 Entertainment Law Journal</citetitle> 17 (1997): 651.
7848 </para></footnote>
7849 </para>
7850 <para>
7851 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7852 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7853 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7854 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7855 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7856 </para>
7857 <para>
7858 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7859 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7860 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7861 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7862 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7863 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7864 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7865 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7866 </para>
7867 <para>
7868 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7869 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7870 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7871 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7872 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7873 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7874 </para>
7875 </section>
7876 <section id="marketconcentration">
7877 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7878 <para>
7879 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7880 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7881 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7882 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7883 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7884 find better ways
7885 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7886 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7887 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7888 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7889 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7890 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7891 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7892 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7893 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7894 control.
7895 </para>
7896 <para>
7897 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7898 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7899 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7900 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7901 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7902 </para>
7903 <para>
7904 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7905 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7906 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7907 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7908 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7909 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7910 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7911 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7912 of the media.
7913 </para>
7914 <para>
7915 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7916 nature.
7917 </para>
7918 <para>
7919 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7920 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7921 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7922 <!-- f25 -->
7923 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7924 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7925 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7926 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7927 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7928 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7929 <!-- f26 -->
7930 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7931 Slide," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 23 December 2002.
7932 </para></footnote>
7933 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7934 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7935 <!-- f27 -->
7936 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," <citetitle>Charleston Gazette</citetitle>,
7937 31 May 2003.
7938 </para></footnote>
7939 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7940 <indexterm><primary>EMI</primary></indexterm>
7941 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John</primary></indexterm>
7942 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group</primary></indexterm>
7943 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group</primary></indexterm>
7944 </para>
7945 <para>
7946 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7947 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7949 seventy-five stations. Today <emphasis>one</emphasis> company owns
7950 more than 1,200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
7951 total number of radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most
7952 markets, the two largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that
7953 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of
7954 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
7955 </para>
7956 <para>
7957 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7958 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7959 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7960 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7961 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7962 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7963 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7964 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7965 protected&mdash; by the market.
7966 </para>
7967 <para>
7968 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7969 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7970 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7971 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7972 </para>
7973 <blockquote>
7974 <para>
7975 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7976 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7977 &hellip; Fox TV shows &hellip; Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7978 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7979 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7980 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7981 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7982 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7983 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7984 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7985 <!-- f28 -->
7986 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly</citetitle> (September
7987 2003): 89.
7988 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7989 </para></footnote>
7990 </para>
7991 </blockquote>
7992 <para>
7993 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7994 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7995 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7996 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7997 </para>
7998 <figure id="fig-1761">
7999 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
8000 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
8001 </figure>
8002 <para>
8003 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8004 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8005 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8006 distribute content?
8007 </para>
8008 <para>
8009 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8010 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8011 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8012 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8013 </para>
8014 <para>
8015 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8016 integration may matter.
8017 </para>
8018 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
8019 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8020 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8021 <para>
8022 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle>. He took
8023 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8024 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8025 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8026 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8027 </para>
8028 <para>
8029 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8030 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8031 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8032 control.<footnote><para>
8033 <!-- f29 -->
8034 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8035 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
8036 Missouri, 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8037 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
8038 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8039 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
8040 </para></footnote>
8041 </para>
8042 <para>
8043
8044 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8045 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
8046 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
8047 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
8048 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
8049 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8050 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the
8051 networks.
8052 </para>
8053 <para>
8054 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
8055 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
8056 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8057 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In 1992,
8058 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8059 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8060 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16
8061 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8062 year there was one."<footnote><para>
8063 <!-- f30 -->
8064 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8065 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
8066 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8067 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8068 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8069 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8070 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
8071 2003.
8072 </para></footnote>
8073 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8074 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
8075 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8076 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8077 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8078 63%."<footnote><para>
8079 <!-- f31 -->
8080 Ibid.
8081 </para></footnote>
8082 </para>
8083 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8084 <para>
8085 Today, another Norman Lear with another <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle> would
8086 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8087 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8088 owned by the network.
8089 </para>
8090 <para>
8091 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8092 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8093 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8094 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry</primary></indexterm>
8095 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill</primary></indexterm>
8096 </para>
8097 <blockquote>
8098 <para>
8099 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8100 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8101 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8102 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8104 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8105 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8106 handful.<footnote><para>
8107 <!-- f32 -->
8108 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers</citetitle>, Bill
8109 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8110 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8111 </para></footnote>
8112 </para>
8113 </blockquote>
8114 <para>
8115 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8116 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8117 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8118 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8119 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8120 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8121 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
8122 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8123 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8124 democracy.
8125 </para>
8126 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8127 <para>
8128 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8129 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8130 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8131 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8132 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8133 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8134 <!-- f33 -->
8135 Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8136 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle>
8137 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
8138 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8139 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8140 Concepts in Technological Evolution," <citetitle>Research Policy</citetitle> 14 (1985):
8141 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8142 Kaplan, <citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8143 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them</citetitle>
8144 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
8145
8146 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8147 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8148 sprinting.
8149 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8150 </para>
8151 <para>
8152 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8153 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8154 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8155 measure.
8156 </para>
8157 <para>
8158 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8159 suggest the concern.
8160 </para>
8161 <para>
8162 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8163 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8164 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8165 </para>
8166 <para>
8167 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8168 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8169 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8170
8171 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8172 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8173 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8174 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8175 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8176 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8177 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8178 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8179 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8180 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8181 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8182 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8183 outweigh these costs.
8184 </para>
8185 <para>
8186 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8187 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8188 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8189 these issues.
8190 </para>
8191 <para>
8192 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8193 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8194 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8195 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8196 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8197 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8198 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8199 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8200 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8201 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8202 </para>
8203 <para>
8204 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8205 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8206 </para>
8207 <para>
8208 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8209 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8210 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8211 war. Can you do it?
8212 </para>
8213 <para>
8214 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8216 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8217 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8218 message will be heard then?
8219 </para>
8220 <para>
8221 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8222 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8223 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8224 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8225 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8226 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8227 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8228 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8229 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8230 <!-- f34 -->
8231 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8232 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8233 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8234 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8235 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8236 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8237 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8238 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8239 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8240 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," <citetitle>New
8241 York Times</citetitle>, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8242 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8243 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8244 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8245 Radio," <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review</citetitle> 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8246 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8247 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association</citetitle> v. <citetitle>FCC</citetitle>, 184 F. 3d 872
8248 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8249 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8250 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8251 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8252 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8253 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8254 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8255 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8256 <indexterm><primary>Comcast</primary></indexterm>
8257 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project</primary></indexterm>
8258 <indexterm><primary>NBC</primary></indexterm>
8259 <indexterm><primary>WJOA</primary></indexterm>
8260 <indexterm><primary>WRC</primary></indexterm>
8261 </para></footnote>
8262 </para>
8263 <para>
8264 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8265 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8266 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8267 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8268 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8269 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8270 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8271 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8272 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8273 </para>
8274 </section>
8275 <section id="together">
8276 <title>Together</title>
8277 <para>
8278 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8279 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8280 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8281 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8282 </para>
8283 <para>
8284 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8285 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8286 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8287 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8288 to seem
8289
8290 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8291 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8292 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8293 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8294 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8295 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8296 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8297 be redefined.
8298 </para>
8299 <para>
8300 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8301 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8302 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8303 our culture today.
8304 </para>
8305 <para>
8306 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8307 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8308 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8309 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8310 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8311 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8312 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8313 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8314 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8315 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8316 </para>
8317 <para>
8318 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8319 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8320 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8321 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8322 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8323 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8324 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8325 future. And these changes have to be <emphasis>reductions</emphasis>
8326 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8327 in control that technology and the market enable.
8328 </para>
8329 <para>
8330 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8331 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8333 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8334 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8335 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8336 more of the development of our culture than now</emphasis>.
8337 </para>
8338 <para>
8339 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8340 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8341 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8342 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8343 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8344 were independent of the networks. <emphasis>Never</emphasis> has
8345 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8346 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8347 regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8348 energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation
8349 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8350 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8351 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8352 known.<footnote><para>
8353 <!-- f35 -->
8354 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8355 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8356 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
8357 </para></footnote>
8358 </para>
8359 <para>
8360 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8361 </para>
8362 <para>
8363 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8364 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8365 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8366 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8367 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8368 </para>
8369
8370 <informaltable id="t2">
8371 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8372 <thead>
8373 <row>
8374 <entry></entry>
8375 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8376 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8377 </row>
8378 </thead>
8379 <tbody>
8380 <row>
8381 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8382 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8383 <entry>Free</entry>
8384 </row>
8385 <row>
8386 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8387 <entry>Free</entry>
8388 <entry>Free</entry>
8389 </row>
8390 </tbody>
8391 </tgroup>
8392 </informaltable>
8393
8394 <para>
8395 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8396 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8397 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8398
8399 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8400 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8401 noncommercial work was also free.
8402 </para>
8403 <para>
8404 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8405 </para>
8406
8407 <informaltable id="t3">
8408 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8409 <thead>
8410 <row>
8411 <entry></entry>
8412 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8413 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8414 </row>
8415 </thead>
8416 <tbody>
8417 <row>
8418 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8419 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8420 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8421 </row>
8422 <row>
8423 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8424 <entry>Free</entry>
8425 <entry>Free</entry>
8426 </row>
8427 </tbody>
8428 </tgroup>
8429 </informaltable>
8430
8431 <para>
8432 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8433 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8434 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8435 transformation were still essentially free.
8436 </para>
8437 <para>
8438 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8439 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8440 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8441 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8442 we could say the law began to look like this:
8443 </para>
8444
8445 <informaltable id="t4">
8446 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8447 <thead>
8448 <row>
8449 <entry></entry>
8450 <entry>COPY</entry>
8451 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8452 </row>
8453 </thead>
8454 <tbody>
8455 <row>
8456 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8457 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8458 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8459 </row>
8460 <row>
8461 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8462 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8463 <entry>Free</entry>
8464 </row>
8465 </tbody>
8466 </tgroup>
8467 </informaltable>
8468
8469 <para>
8470 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8471 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8472 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8473 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8474 that the law now looks like this:
8475 </para>
8476
8477 <informaltable id="t5">
8478 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8479 <thead>
8480 <row>
8481 <entry></entry>
8482 <entry>COPY</entry>
8483 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8484 </row>
8485 </thead>
8486 <tbody>
8487 <row>
8488 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8489 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8490 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8491 </row>
8492 <row>
8493 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8494 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8495 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8496 </row>
8497 </tbody>
8498 </tgroup>
8499 </informaltable>
8500
8501 <para>
8502 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8503 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8504 creativity&mdash;
8505 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8506 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8507 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8508 </para>
8509 <para>
8510 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8511 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8512 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8513 these domains actually does any good.
8514 </para>
8515 <para>
8516 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8517 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8518 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8519 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8520 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8521 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/> and
8522 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="transformers"/>, one
8523 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8524 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8525 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8526 </para>
8527 <para>
8528 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8529 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8530 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8531 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8532 property rights<footnote><para>
8533 <!-- f36 -->
8534 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8535 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8536 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8537 Disintegration of Property," in <citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property</citetitle>, J. Roland
8538 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8539 Press, 1980).
8540 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement</primary></indexterm>
8541 </para></footnote>)
8542 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8543 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8544 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8545 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8546 did not control <emphasis>at all</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8547 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8548 free, and for almost 180 years our country consistently protected a
8549 vibrant and rich free culture.
8550 </para>
8551 <para>
8552 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8553 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8554 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8555 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8556 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8557 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8558 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8559 chapter 7). Adding
8560 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8561 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8562 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8563 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8564 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8565 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8566 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8567 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8568 dominates the debate today.
8569 </para>
8570 <para>
8571 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8572 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8573 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8574 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8575 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8576 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8577 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8578 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8579 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8580 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8581 lawyer.
8582 </para>
8583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8584 </section>
8585 </chapter>
8586 </part>
8587 <part id="c-puzzles">
8588 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8589
8590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8591 <chapter label="11" id="chimera">
8592 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8593 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8594 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8595 </indexterm>
8596 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8597 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8598 </indexterm>
8599 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8600 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8601 </indexterm>
8602
8603 <para>
8604 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8605 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8606 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8607 <!-- f1. -->
8608 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8609 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8610 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8611 </para></footnote>
8612 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8613 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8614 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8615 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8616 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8617 villagers to explore life as a king.
8618 </para>
8619 <para>
8620 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8621 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8622 "blind." They don't have the word <citetitle>blind</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8623 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8624 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8625 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8626 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8627 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8628 alone!'"
8629 </para>
8630 <para>
8631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8632 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8633 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8634 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8635 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8636 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8637 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8638 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8639 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8640 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8641 </para>
8642 <para>
8643 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8644 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8645 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8646 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8647 </para>
8648 <para>
8649 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8650 is affected," he reports.
8651 </para>
8652 <para>
8653 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8654 called the eyes &hellip; are diseased &hellip; in such a way as to affect
8655 his brain."
8656 </para>
8657 <para>
8658 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8659 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8660 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8661 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8662 </para>
8663 <para>
8664 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8665 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8666 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8667 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8668 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8669 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8670 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8671 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8672
8673 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8674 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8675 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8676 scene. &hellip;"
8677 </para>
8678 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8679 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8680 <para>
8681 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8682 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8683 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8684 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8685 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8686 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8687 </para>
8688 <para>
8689 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8690 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8691 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8692 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8693 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8694 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8695 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8696 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8697 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8698 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8699 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8700 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8701 </para>
8702 <para>
8703 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8704 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8705 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8706 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8707 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8708 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8709 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8710 </para>
8711 <para>
8712 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8713 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8714 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8715 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8716 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8717 from Tower.
8718 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
8719 </para>
8720 <para>
8721
8722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8723 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8724 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8725 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8726 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8727 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8728 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8729 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8730 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8731 </para>
8732 <para>
8733 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8734 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8735 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8736 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8737 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8738 </para>
8739 <para>
8740 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8741 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8742 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8743 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8744 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8745 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8746 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8747 implemented.<footnote><para>
8748 <!-- f2. -->
8749 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8750 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8751 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003,
8752 available at
8753 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8754 #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8755 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8756 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8757 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up
8758 Stakes on Piracy," <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 17 July 2003, available at
8759 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil
8760 penalties are currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent
8761 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8762 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than 600 songs
8763 through a family computer, see <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8764 re. Verizon Internet Services)</citetitle>, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24
8765 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
8766 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8767 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8768 $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8769 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8770 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8771 Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8772 August 2003, available at
8773 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an
8774 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8775 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8776 identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8777 Name Students," <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 8 August 2003, D3, available at
8778 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8779 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.</primary></indexterm>
8780 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
8781 </para></footnote>
8782
8783 </para>
8784 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8785 <para>
8786 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8787 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8788 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8789 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8790 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8791 </para>
8792 <para>
8793 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8794 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8795 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8796 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8797 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8798 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe <emphasis>either</emphasis> extreme
8799 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8800 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8801 </para>
8802 <para>
8803
8804 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8805 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8806 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8807 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8808 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8809 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8810 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8811 </para>
8812 <para>
8813 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8814 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8815 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8816 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8817 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8818 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8819 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8820 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8821 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8822 protection for copyrighted material,
8823 </para>
8824 <blockquote>
8825 <para>
8826 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8827 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8828 </para>
8829 <para>
8830 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
8831 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8832 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8833 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
8834 produce a totally different industry model.
8835 </para>
8836 <para>
8837 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8838 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8839 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8840 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8841 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8842 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8843 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8844 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8845 interests.<footnote><para>
8846 <!-- f3. -->
8847 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8848 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8849 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8850 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Peter
8851 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8852 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8853 Congressional Testimony File. </para></footnote>
8854 </para>
8855 </blockquote>
8856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8857 <para>
8858 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8859 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8860 changed.
8861 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal</primary></indexterm>
8862 </para>
8863 <para>
8864 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8865 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8866 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8867 </para>
8868
8869 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8870 </chapter>
8871 <chapter label="12" id="harms">
8872 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8873 <para>
8874 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8875 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now
8876 brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one will
8877 have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8878 prohibition, these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8879 </para>
8880 <para>
8881 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8882 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8883 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8884 justified?
8885 </para>
8886 <para>
8887 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8888 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8889 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8890 our history.
8891 </para>
8892 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8893 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8894 <para>
8895 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8896 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8897 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8898 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8899 </para>
8900 <para>
8901 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8902 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8903 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8904 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8905 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8906 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8907 </para>
8908 <section id="constrain">
8909 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8910 <para>
8911 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8912 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8913 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8914 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8915 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8916 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8917 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8918 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8919 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8920 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8921 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8922 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8923 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8924 </para>
8925 <para>
8926 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8927 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8928 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8929 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8930 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8931 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8932 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8933 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8934 the culture all around.
8935 </para>
8936 <para>
8937 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8938 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8939
8940 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8941
8942 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8943 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8944 storytelling extended across the globe.
8945 </para>
8946 <para>
8947 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8948 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8949 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8950 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8951 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8952 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8953 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8954 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8955 work is presumptively illegal.
8956 </para>
8957 <para>
8958 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8959 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8960 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8961 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8962 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8963 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8964 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8965 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8966 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8967 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8968 million.<footnote><para>
8969 <!-- f1. -->
8970 See Lynne W. Jeter, <citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom</citetitle>
8971 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8972 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8973 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8974 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8975 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8976 </para></footnote>
8977 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8978 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8979 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8980 suffering.<footnote>
8981 <para>
8982 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8983 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8984 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8985 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8986 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8987 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8988 available at
8989 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8990 recent months.
8991 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8992 </para></footnote>
8993 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8994 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8995 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8996 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8997 </para>
8998 <para>
8999 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9000 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
9001 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
9002 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
9003 Disneys "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
9004 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
9005 designed to
9006
9007 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9008 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
9009 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
9010 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
9011 we will begin to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the
9012 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
9013 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
9014 fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
9015 States.<footnote><para>
9016 <!-- f3. -->
9017
9018 See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," <citetitle>Wired</citetitle>, 7 July
9019 2003, available at
9020 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9021 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
9022 </para></footnote>
9023 In what does their "illegality" consist?
9024 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9025 critical or reflective.
9026 </para>
9027 <para>
9028 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9029 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
9030 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. But an
9031 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9032 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9033 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9034 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9035 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9036 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9037 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9038 </para>
9039 <para>
9040 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9041 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9042 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9043 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9044 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9045 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9046 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9047 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9048 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9049 </para>
9050 <para>
9051 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9052 described in chapter
9053 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/>, in
9054 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9055 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9056 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9057 use.
9058 </para>
9059 <para>
9060
9061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9062 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9063 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9064 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
9065 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9066 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9067 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9068 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9069 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9070 </para>
9071 <para>
9072 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9073 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
9074 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9075 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9076 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9077 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9078 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9079 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9080 comfort themselves.
9081 </para>
9082 <para>
9083 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
9084 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9085 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9086 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9087 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
9088 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9089 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9090 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9091 culture that is free.
9092 </para>
9093 <para>
9094 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9095 </para>
9096 <blockquote>
9097 <para>
9098 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9099 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9100 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9101 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made &hellip; you're not
9102 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9104 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9105 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9106 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9107 </para>
9108 </blockquote>
9109 </section>
9110 <section id="innovators">
9111 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9112 <para>
9113 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9114 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9115 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9116 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9117 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9118 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9119 </para>
9120 <para>
9121 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9122 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9123 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9124 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9125 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9126 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9127 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9128 </para>
9129 <para>
9130 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9131 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9132 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9133 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9134 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9135 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9136 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9137 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9138 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9139 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9140 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9141 </para>
9142 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9143 <para>
9144 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9146 strategy that I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select:
9147 labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9148 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9149 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9150 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9151 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9152 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9153 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9154 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9155 </para>
9156 <para>
9157 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9158 I told in <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9159 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9160 </para>
9161 <indexterm><primary>Roberts, Michael</primary></indexterm>
9162 <para>
9163 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9164 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9165 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9166 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9167 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9168 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9169 </para>
9170 <para>
9171 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9172 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9173 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9174 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9175 Raitt. And so on.
9176 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
9177 </para>
9178 <para>
9179 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9180 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9181 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9182 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9183 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9184 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9185 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9186 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9187 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9188 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9189 </para>
9190 <para>
9191 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9192 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9193
9194 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9195 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9196 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9197 the kind of content the users liked.
9198 </para>
9199 <para>
9200 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9201 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9202 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9203 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9204 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9205 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9206 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9207 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9208 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9209 they had already bought.
9210 </para>
9211 <indexterm id="idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'>
9212 <primary>Vivendi Universal</primary>
9213 </indexterm>
9214 <para>
9215 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9216 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9217 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9218 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9219 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9220 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9221 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9222 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9223 </para>
9224 <para>
9225 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9226 </para>
9227 <para>
9228 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9229 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9230 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9231 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9232 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9233 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9234 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9235 demanded.
9236 </para>
9237 <para>
9238 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9239 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9240 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9241 clients in this
9242 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9243 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9244 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9245 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9246 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9247 </para>
9248 <indexterm startref="idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'/>
9249 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9250 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9251 <indexterm><primary>Hummer Winblad</primary></indexterm>
9252 <para>
9253 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9254 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9255 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9256 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9257 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9258 <!-- f4. -->
9259 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," <citetitle>Los Angeles
9260 Times</citetitle>, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9261 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9262 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available
9263 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9264 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," <citetitle>Los Angeles
9265 Times</citetitle>, 28 May 2001.
9266 </para></footnote>
9267 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9268 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9269 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9270 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9271 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9272 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9273 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9274 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9275 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9276 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9277 <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9278 discussion with BMW:
9279 <indexterm><primary>EMI</primary></indexterm>
9280 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group</primary></indexterm>
9281 </para>
9282 <blockquote>
9283 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9284 <para>
9285 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9286 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9287 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9288 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9289 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9290 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9291 United States with bona fide MP3 players. &hellip; <footnote>
9292 <para>
9293 <!-- f5. -->
9294 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, 16 June
9295 2003, available at
9296 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9297 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9298 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9299 </para></footnote>
9300 </para>
9301 </blockquote>
9302 <para>
9303 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9304 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9305 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9306 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9307 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9308 constantly threatened by litigation.
9309 </para>
9310 <para>
9311
9312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9313 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9314 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a
9315 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9316 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9317 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9318 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9319 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9320 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9321 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9322 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9323 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9324 much less creativity.
9325 </para>
9326 <para>
9327 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9328 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9329 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9330 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9331 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9332 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9333 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9334 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9335 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9336 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9337 </para>
9338 <para>
9339 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9340 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9341 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9342 culture&mdash;a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9343 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9344 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9345 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9346 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9347 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9348 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9349 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9350 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9352 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9353 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9354 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9355 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9356 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9357 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9358 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9359 </para>
9360 <para>
9361 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9362 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9363 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9364 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9365 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9366 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9367 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9368 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9369 </para>
9370 <para>
9371 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9372 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9373 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9374 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9375 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9376 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9377 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9378 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9379 </para></footnote>
9380 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9381 "broadcast flag" that would be required on any device capable of
9382 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9383 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9384 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9385 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9386 copyright violators and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9387 <!-- f7. -->
9388 GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9389 </para></footnote>
9390 </para>
9391 <para>
9392 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9393 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9394 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9395 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9396 and costs on
9397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9398 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9399 those requirements.
9400 </para>
9401 <para>
9402 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9403 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9404 would impose.<footnote><para>
9405 <!-- f8. -->
9406 See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9407 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9408 </para></footnote>
9409 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9410 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9411 harm than good.
9412 <indexterm><primary>Intel</primary></indexterm>
9413 </para>
9414 <para>
9415 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9416 innovation&mdash;again, a story that will be quite familiar to the
9417 free market crowd.
9418 </para>
9419 <para>
9420 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9421 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9422 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9423 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9424 </para>
9425 <para>
9426 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9427 linkend="property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9428 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9429 Jessica Litman in her book <citetitle>Digital
9430 Copyright</citetitle>,<footnote><para>
9431 <!-- f9. -->
9432 Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (Amherst,
9433 N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001).
9434 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
9435 </para></footnote>
9436 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter 10 details,
9437 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9438 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9439 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9440 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9441 </para>
9442 <para>
9443 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9444 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9445 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9446 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9447 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9448 </para>
9449 <para>
9450 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9451 <!-- f10. -->
9452 The only circuit court exception is found in <citetitle>Recording Industry
9453 Association of America (RIAA)</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems</citetitle>, 180 F. 3d
9454 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9455 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9456 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9457 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9458 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9459 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9460 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Grokster, Ltd</citetitle>., 259 F. Supp. 2d
9461 1029 (C.D. Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the
9462 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9463 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9464 liability.
9465 </para></footnote>
9466 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9467 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9468 here.<footnote><para>
9469 <!-- f11. -->
9470 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9471 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9472 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9473 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9474 August 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9475 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9476 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that
9477 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9478 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9479 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9480 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and
9481 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34,
9482 available at
9483 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9484 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
9485 <indexterm><primary>Hollings, Fritz</primary></indexterm>
9486 </para></footnote>
9487 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9488 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9489 </para>
9490 <para>
9491
9492 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9493 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9494 linkend="pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9495 artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she
9496 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9497 version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9498 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9499 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9500 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9501 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9502 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.</primary></indexterm>
9503 </para>
9504 <para>
9505 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9506 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9507 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9508 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9509 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9510 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9511 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9512 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9513 recording artists.
9514 </para>
9515 <para>
9516 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9517 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9518 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9519 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9520 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9521 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9522 metropolitan area.
9523 </para>
9524 <para>
9525 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9526 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9527 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9528 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9529 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9530 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9531 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9532 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9533 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9534 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9535 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9536 </para>
9537 <para>
9538
9539 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9540 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9541 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9542 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9543 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9544 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9545 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9546 FM radio,
9547 </para>
9548 <blockquote>
9549 <para>
9550 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9551 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9552 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9553 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9554 than by technical restrictions. &hellip; Armstrong likened the situation
9555 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9556 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9557 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9558 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9559 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9560 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9561 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9562 shackles.<footnote><para>
9563 <!-- f12. -->
9564 Lessing, 239.
9565 </para></footnote>
9566 </para>
9567 </blockquote>
9568 <para>
9569 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not
9570 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9571 underestimated the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and
9572 legislation"<footnote><para>
9573 <!-- f13. -->
9574 Ibid., 229.
9575 </para></footnote>
9576 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9577 </para>
9578 <para>
9579 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9580 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9581 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9582 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9583 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9584 radio?
9585 </para>
9586 <para>
9587 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9588 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9589
9590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9591 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9592 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9593 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9594 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9595 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9596 of "Happy Birthday" on the air, <emphasis>Internet radio
9597 does</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9598 radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9599 burdens terrestrial radio.
9600 </para>
9601 <para>
9602 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9603 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9604 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9605 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9606 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9607 <para>
9608 <!-- f14. -->
9609 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9610 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9611 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9612 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9613 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9614 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9615 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9616 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9617 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9618 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9619 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9620 Distribution," <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin</citetitle> (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9621 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9622 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9623 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9624 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9625 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9626 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9627 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9628 </para></footnote>
9629 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9630 equivalent fee.
9631 </para>
9632 <para>
9633 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9634 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9635 station) would have to collect the following data from <emphasis>every
9636 listening transaction</emphasis>:
9637 </para>
9638 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9639 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9640 <listitem><para>
9641 name of the service;
9642 </para></listitem>
9643 <listitem><para>
9644 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9645 </para></listitem>
9646 <listitem><para>
9647 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9648 </para></listitem>
9649 <listitem><para>
9650 date of transmission;
9651 </para></listitem>
9652 <listitem><para>
9653 time of transmission;
9654 </para></listitem>
9655 <listitem><para>
9656 time zone of origination of transmission;
9657 </para></listitem>
9658 <listitem><para>
9659 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9660 </para></listitem>
9661 <listitem><para>
9662 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9663 </para></listitem>
9664 <listitem><para>
9665 sound recording title;
9666 </para></listitem>
9667 <listitem><para>
9668 ISRC code of the recording;
9669 </para></listitem>
9670 <listitem><para>
9671 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9672 </para></listitem>
9673 <listitem><para>
9674 featured recording artist;
9675 </para></listitem>
9676 <listitem><para>
9677 retail album title;
9678 </para></listitem>
9679 <listitem><para>
9680 recording label;
9681 </para></listitem>
9682 <listitem><para>
9683 UPC code of the retail album;
9684 </para></listitem>
9685 <listitem><para>
9686 catalog number;
9687 </para></listitem>
9688 <listitem><para>
9689 copyright owner information;
9690 </para></listitem>
9691 <listitem><para>
9692 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9693 </para></listitem>
9694 <listitem><para>
9695 name of the service or entity;
9696 </para></listitem>
9697 <listitem><para>
9698 channel or program;
9699 </para></listitem>
9700 <listitem><para>
9701 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9702 </para></listitem>
9703 <listitem><para>
9704 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9705 </para></listitem>
9706 <listitem><para>
9707 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9708 </para></listitem>
9709 <listitem><para>
9710 unique user identifier;
9711 </para></listitem>
9712 <listitem><para>
9713 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9714 </para></listitem>
9715 </orderedlist>
9716
9717 <para>
9718 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9719 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9720 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9721 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9722 Internet radio has to pay a <emphasis>type of copyright fee</emphasis>
9723 that terrestrial radio does not.
9724 </para>
9725 <para>
9726 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9727 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9728 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9729 </para>
9730 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9731 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks</primary></indexterm>
9732 <para>
9733 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9734 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9735 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9736 </para>
9737 <blockquote>
9738 <para>
9739 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9740 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9741 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9742 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9743 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9744 webcasters asked the RIAA, &hellip; "How do you come up with a
9745
9746 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9747 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
9748 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and
9749 that should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so
9750 high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out of
9751 business. &hellip;"
9752 </para>
9753 <para>
9754 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an
9755 industry with thousands of webcasters, <emphasis>we think it should be
9756 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9757 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market</emphasis>." (Emphasis
9758 added.)
9759 </para>
9760 </blockquote>
9761 <para>
9762 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9763 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9764 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9765 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9766 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9767 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9768 effective to prevent it.
9769 </para>
9770 </section>
9771 <section id="corruptingcitizens">
9772 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9773 <para>
9774 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9775 dinosaurs
9776 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9777 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9778 </para>
9779 <para>
9780 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9781 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9782 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9783 </para>
9784 <para>
9785 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9786 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9787 large number of citizens. According to <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, 43 million
9788 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9789 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9790 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9791 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9792 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9793 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9794 </para></footnote>
9795 According to the RIAA,
9796 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9797 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9798
9799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9800 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9801 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9802 increasingly
9803 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9804 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9805 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9806 extreme
9807 response by the other.
9808 </para>
9809 <para>
9810 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9811 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9812 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9813 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9814 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9815 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9816 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9817 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9818 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9819 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9820 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9821 was.<footnote><para>
9822 <!-- f16. -->
9823 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," <citetitle>Los
9824 Angeles Times</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, Business.
9825 </para></footnote>
9826 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9827 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9828 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9829 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9830 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9831 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9832 they oppose.
9833 </para>
9834 <para>
9835 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9836 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9837 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9838 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9839 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9840 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9841 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9842 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9843 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9844 <!-- f17. -->
9845 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9846 Prohibition," <citetitle>American Economic Review</citetitle> 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9847 </para></footnote>
9848 We have
9849 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9850 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9851 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9852 <!-- f18. -->
9853 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9854 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9855 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9856 </para></footnote>
9857 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9858 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9859 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9860 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9861 cheat.<footnote><para>
9862 <!-- f19. -->
9863 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9864 Compliance," <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature</citetitle> 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9865 compliance literature).
9866 </para></footnote>
9867 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9868 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9869 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9870 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition</primary></indexterm>
9871 </para>
9872 <para>
9873 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9874 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9875 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9876 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9877 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9878 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9879 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9880 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9881 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9882 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9883 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9884 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9885 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9886 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9887 degree of illegality.
9888 <indexterm><primary>law schools</primary></indexterm>
9889 </para>
9890 <para>
9891 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9892 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9893 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9894 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9895 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9896 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9897 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9898 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9899 to consider the alternative.
9900 </para>
9901 <para>
9902
9903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9904 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9905 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9906 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9907 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9908 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9909 </para>
9910 <para>
9911 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9912 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9913 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9914 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9915 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9916 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9917 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9918 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9919 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9920 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9921 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9922 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9923 </para>
9924 <para>
9925 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9926 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9927 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9928 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9929 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9930 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9931 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9932 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9933 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9934 a nation of felons?
9935 </para>
9936 <para>
9937 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9938 </para>
9939 <para>
9940 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9941 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9942 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9943 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9944 used
9945
9946 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9947 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9948 recordings is free.
9949 </para>
9950 <para>
9951 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9952 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9953 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9954 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9955 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9956 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9957 capacities of digital technologies.
9958 </para>
9959 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9960 <para>
9961 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9962 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9963 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9964 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9965 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9966 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9967 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9968 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9969 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9970 </para>
9971 <para>
9972 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9973 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9974 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9975 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9976 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9977 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9978 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9979 on people's machines.
9980 </para>
9981 <para>
9982 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9983 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9984 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9985 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9986 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9987 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9988
9989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9990 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9991 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9992 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9993 management" system.
9994 </para>
9995 <para>
9996 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9997 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9998 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9999 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10000 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10001 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10002 freedom to move content easily?
10003 </para>
10004 <para>
10005 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10006 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10007 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10008 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10009 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10010 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10011 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10012 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10013 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10014 </para>
10015 <para>
10016 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10017 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10018 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10019 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10020 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10021 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10022 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10023 </para>
10024 <para>
10025 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10026 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10027 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10028 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10029 </para>
10030 <para>
10031 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10032 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10033
10034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10035
10036 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10037 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10038 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10039 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10040 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
10041 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
10042 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
10043 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
10044 generally.
10045 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
10046 </para>
10047 <para>
10048 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
10049 explains,
10050 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10051 </para>
10052 <blockquote>
10053 <para>
10054 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10055 evaporate to one degree or another. &hellip; If you're a copyright
10056 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10057 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10058 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10059 access? &hellip; Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
10060 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
10061 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10062 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
10063 </para>
10064 </blockquote>
10065 <para>
10066 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10067 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10068 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10069 </para>
10070 <para>
10071 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
10072 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10073 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10074 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10075 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10076 an Internet user is revealed.
10077 </para>
10078 <para>
10079 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10080 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10081 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10082 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10083 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10084 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10085 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10086 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10087 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
10088 <!-- f20. -->
10089 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10090 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10091 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
10092 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10093 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10094 Being Sued," <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
10095 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 15 September
10096 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10097 Fan, Either," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
10098 Brianna a Criminal?" <citetitle>Toronto Star</citetitle>, 18 September 2003, P7.
10099 </para></footnote>
10100
10101 </para>
10102 <para>
10103 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10104 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10105 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10106 <!-- f21. -->
10107 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10108 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10109 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10110 </para></footnote>
10111 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10112 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10113 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10114 </para>
10115 <para>
10116 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10117 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10118 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10119 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10120 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10121 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10122 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10123 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10124 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10125 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10126 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10127 <!-- f22. -->
10128 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10129 <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10130 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10131 Colleges," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10132 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," <citetitle>Christian Science
10133 Monitor</citetitle>, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10134 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10135 Lawsuit Possible," <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10136 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," <citetitle>Internet News</citetitle>, 30 January
10137 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10138 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
10139 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10140 Sharing," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10141 Are Weapons at Universities," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10142 </para></footnote>
10143 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10144 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10145 </para>
10146 <para>
10147 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10148 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10149 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10150 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10151 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10152 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10153 college students
10154
10155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10156 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10157 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10158 Says von Lohmann,
10159 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10160 </para>
10161 <blockquote>
10162 <para>
10163 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10164 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10165 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10166 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10167 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10168 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10169 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10170 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10171 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10172 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10173 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10174 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10175 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10176 larger number of Americans than drug use. &hellip; If forty to sixty
10177 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10178 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10179 million of them.
10180 </para>
10181 </blockquote>
10182 <para>
10183 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10184 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10185 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10186 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10187 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10188 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10189 </para>
10190
10191 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10192 </section>
10193 </chapter>
10194 </part>
10195 <part id="c-balances">
10196 <title>BALANCES</title>
10197 <partintro>
10198
10199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10200 <para>
10201 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10202 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10203 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10204 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10205 </para>
10206 <para>
10207 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10208 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10209 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10210 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10211 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10212 everything around.
10213 </para>
10214 <para>
10215 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10216 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10217 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10218 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10219 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10220 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10221 </para>
10222 <para>
10223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10224 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10225 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10226 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10227 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10228 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10229 made that is happening all around.
10230 </para>
10231 <para>
10232 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10233 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10234 gasoline onto this fire.
10235 </para>
10236 <para>
10237 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10238 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10239 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10240 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10241 </para>
10242 <para>
10243 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10244 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10245 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10246 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10247 success will require.
10248 </para>
10249 </partintro>
10250
10251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10252 <chapter label="13" id="eldred">
10253 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10254 <indexterm id="idxhawthornenathaniel" class='startofrange'>
10255 <primary>Hawthorne, Nathaniel</primary>
10256 </indexterm>
10257 <para>
10258 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10259 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10260 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10261 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10262 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10263 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10264 come alive.
10265 </para>
10266 <para>
10267 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10268 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10269 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10270 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10271 them available for free.
10272 </para>
10273 <para>
10274 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10275 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10276 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10277 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10278 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10279 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10280 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10281 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10282 accessible&mdash;today.
10283 </para>
10284 <para>
10285 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10286 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's <citetitle>Scarlet Letter</citetitle> had passed into the
10287 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10288 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10289 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10290 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10291 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10292 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (<citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle>), sometimes not
10293 (<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame</citetitle>, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>). These are all
10294 commercial publications of public domain works.
10295 </para>
10296 <indexterm startref="idxhawthornenathaniel" class='endofrange'/>
10297 <para>
10298 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10299 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10300 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10301 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10302 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10303 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10304 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10305 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10306 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10307 generally.<footnote><para>
10308 <!-- f1. -->
10309 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10310 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10311 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10312 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10313 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10314 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10315 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10316 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10317 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10318 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10319 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10320 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10321 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10322 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10323 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10324 </para>
10325 <para>
10326 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10327 collection of poems <citetitle>New Hampshire</citetitle> was slated to
10328 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10329 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10330 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
10331 linkend="property-i"/>, in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10332 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by
10333 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10334 than 1923 to his collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10335 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10336 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10337 more than 1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10338 </para>
10339 <para>
10340
10341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10342 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10343 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10344 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10345 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10346 <!-- f2. -->
10347 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10348 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10349 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10350 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10351 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10352 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10353 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10354 </para></footnote>
10355
10356 </para>
10357 <para>
10358 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10359 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10360 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10361 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10362 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10363 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10364 to undertake.
10365 </para>
10366 <para>
10367 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10368 constitutional
10369 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10370 interpretation.
10371 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10372 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10373 importantly
10374 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10375 </para>
10376 <blockquote>
10377 <para>
10378 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science &hellip;
10379 by securing for limited Times to Authors &hellip; exclusive Right to
10380 their &hellip; Writings. &hellip;
10381 </para>
10382 </blockquote>
10383 <para>
10384 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10385 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10386 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10387 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10388 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10389 specific&mdash;to "promote &hellip; Progress"&mdash;through means that
10390 are also specific&mdash; by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10391 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10392 </para>
10393 <para>
10394 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10395 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10396 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10397 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10398 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10399 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10400 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10401 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the
10402 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10403 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10404 </para>
10405 <para>
10406 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10407 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10408 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10409 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10410 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10411 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10412 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10413 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10414 this gravy train going.
10415 </para>
10416 <para>
10417 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10418 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10419 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10420 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10421 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10422 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10423 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10424 </para>
10425 <para>
10426 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10427 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10428 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10429 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10430 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10431 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10432 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10433 published by anyone for free.
10434 </para>
10435 <para>
10436 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10437 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10438 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10439 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10440 report:
10441 </para>
10442 <para>
10443 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10444
10445 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10446 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10447 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10448 those works.
10449 </para>
10450 <para>
10451 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10452 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10453 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10454 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10455 </para>
10456 <para>
10457 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10458 about it?"
10459 </para>
10460 <para>
10461 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10462 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10463 they support the bill."
10464 </para>
10465 <para>
10466 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10467 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10468 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10469 much is it worth?"
10470 </para>
10471 <para>
10472 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10473 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10474 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10475 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10476 </para>
10477 <para>
10478 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10479 correct conclusion:
10480 </para>
10481 <para>
10482 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10483 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10484 contributions
10485 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10486 </para>
10487 <para>
10488 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10489 contribute
10490 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10491 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10492 </para>
10493 <para>
10494 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10495 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10496 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10497 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10498 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10499 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10500 copyrights
10501 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10502 the copyright term extended.
10503 </para>
10504 <para>
10505 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10506 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10507 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10508 </para>
10509 <para>
10510 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10511 Copyright
10512 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10513 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10514 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10515 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10516 contributions.<footnote><para>
10517 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10518 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10519 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 17 October 1998, 22.
10520 </para></footnote>
10521 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10522 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10523 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10524 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10525 Age," available at
10526 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10527 </para></footnote>
10528 Disney is estimated to have
10529 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10530 cycle.<footnote><para>
10531 <!-- f5. -->
10532 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10533 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week</citetitle>, 8 August 1990, available at
10534 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10535 </para></footnote>
10536
10537 </para>
10538 <para>
10539 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10540 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10541 reality
10542 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10543 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10544 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10545 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10546 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10547 "limited."
10548 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10549 and again.
10550 </para>
10551 <para>
10552 It was also my judgment that <emphasis>this</emphasis> Supreme Court
10553 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10554 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10555 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10556 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10557 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10558 Supreme Court's
10559
10560 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10561 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10562 guns near schools.
10563 </para>
10564 <para>
10565 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10566 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10567 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10568 "interstate
10569 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10570 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10571 interstate
10572 commerce.
10573 </para>
10574 <para>
10575 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10576 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10577 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10578 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10579 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10580 </para>
10581 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.</primary></indexterm>
10582 <para>
10583 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10584 that in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The government had
10585 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10586 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10587 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10588 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10589 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10590 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10591 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10592 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10593 position to second-guess Congress.
10594 </para>
10595 <para>
10596 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,"
10597 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10598 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10599 </para></footnote>
10600 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10601 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10602 Congress's power. The decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10603 later in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>.<footnote><para>
10604 <!-- f7. -->
10605 <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10606 </para></footnote>
10607 </para>
10608 <para>
10609 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10610 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10611 <!-- f8. -->
10612 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10613 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10614 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10615 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10616 regulate commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce
10617 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10618 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10619 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights&mdash;the
10620 limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10621 </para></footnote>
10622 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10623 yield the conclusion that Congress
10624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10625 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10626 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power over
10627 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10628 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10629 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10630 term of existing copyrights.
10631 </para>
10632 <para>
10633 <emphasis>If</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
10634 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> stood for
10635 politics&mdash;a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10636 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10637 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10638 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10639 demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an interpretation of the
10640 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10641 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10642 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10643 were going to be petty politicians.
10644 </para>
10645 <para>
10646 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10647 argument in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10648 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10649 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10650 piracy&mdash;piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10651 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10652 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10653 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10654 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10655 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10656 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10657 power&mdash;expressed through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to
10658 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10659 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10660 piracy that affects us all.
10661 </para>
10662 <para>
10663 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10664
10665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10666 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10667 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10668 <!-- f9. -->
10669 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10670 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available
10671 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10672 </para></footnote>
10673 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10674 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10675 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10676 charter.
10677 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association</primary></indexterm>
10678 </para>
10679 <para>
10680 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10681 copyright
10682 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10683 influence
10684 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10685 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10686 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10687 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10688 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10689 bought to extend them again.
10690 </para>
10691 <para>
10692 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10693 extended.
10694 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10695 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10696 society
10697 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10698 Disney's.
10699 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10700 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10701 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10702 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10703 exploited,
10704 and no longer available as a result.
10705 </para>
10706 <para>
10707 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10708 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10709 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10710 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10711 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10712 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10713 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10714 Congressional
10715 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10716 of Petitioners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 7, available at
10717 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10718 </para></footnote>
10719
10720 </para>
10721 <para>
10722 Think practically about the consequence of this
10723 extension&mdash;practically,
10724 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10725
10726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10727 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10728 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10729 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10730 remaining
10731 9,873. What would you have to do?
10732 </para>
10733 <para>
10734 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10735 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10736 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10737 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10738 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10739 list of books still under copyright.
10740 </para>
10741 <para>
10742 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10743 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10744 </para>
10745 <para>
10746 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10747 owners
10748 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10749 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10750 being at least a list?
10751 </para>
10752 <para>
10753 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10754 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10755 practically
10756 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10757 thousands
10758 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10759 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10760 </para>
10761 <para>
10762 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10763 apologists for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of
10764 copyright owners?"
10765 </para>
10766 <para>
10767 Well, actually, if you think about it, there <emphasis>are</emphasis>
10768 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10769 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10770 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10771 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10772 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10773 what tangible property.
10774 </para>
10775 <para>
10776 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10777 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10778 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10779
10780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10781 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10782 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10783 happen
10784 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10785 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10786 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10787 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10788 know quite well who owns what property.
10789 </para>
10790 <para>
10791 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10792 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10793 already
10794 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10795 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10796 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10797 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10798 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10799 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10800 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10801 </para>
10802 <para>
10803 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10804 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10805 consequence
10806 for other creative works is much more dire.
10807 </para>
10808 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10809 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios</primary></indexterm>
10810 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films</primary></indexterm>
10811 <para>
10812 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10813 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10814 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10815 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, <citetitle>The Lucky Dog</citetitle>, is
10816 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10817 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10818 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10819 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10820 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10821 films."<footnote><para>
10822 <!-- f11. -->
10823 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10824 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10825 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10826 Down Copyright Extension," <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 9 October 2002.
10827 </para></footnote>
10828
10829 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The</primary></indexterm>
10830 </para>
10831 <para>
10832 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10833 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10834 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10835 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10836 </para>
10837 <para>
10838 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10839
10840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10841 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10842 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10843 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10844 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10845 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10846 work available for distribution.
10847 </para>
10848 <para>
10849 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10850 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10851 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10852 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10853 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10854 mm film.<footnote><para>
10855 <!-- f12. -->
10856 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10857 Supporting the Petitoners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
10858 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01- 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
10859 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10860 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, available at
10861 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10862 </para></footnote>
10863
10864 </para>
10865 <para>
10866 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10867 important.
10868 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10869 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10870 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10871 locate the copyright owner.
10872 </para>
10873 <para>
10874 Or more accurately, <emphasis>owners</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
10875 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
10876 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
10877 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
10878 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
10879 to these films is exceptionally high.
10880 </para>
10881 <para>
10882 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10883 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10884 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10885 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10886 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10887 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10888 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10889 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10890 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10891 </para>
10892 <para>
10893 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10894
10895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10896 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10897 benefit
10898 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10899 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10900 the copyright expires.
10901 </para>
10902 <para>
10903 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10904 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10905 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10906 canisters
10907 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10908 than dust.
10909 </para>
10910 <para>
10911 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10912 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10913 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10914 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10915 creative
10916 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10917 free expression."
10918 </para>
10919 <para>
10920 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10921 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10922 indicated,
10923 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10924 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10925 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10926 distributors,
10927 the commercial life ends.
10928 </para>
10929 <para>
10930 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10931 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10932 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10933 between
10934 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10935 Friday
10936 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10937 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10938 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10939 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10940 have, we need to have access to this history.
10941 </para>
10942 <para>
10943 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10944
10945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10946 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10947 this context do no good.
10948 </para>
10949 <para>
10950 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10951 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10952 <emphasis>copyright-related use</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
10953 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
10954 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
10955 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
10956 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
10957 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
10958 was independent of copyright law.
10959 </para>
10960 <para>
10961 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10962 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10963 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10964 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10965 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10966 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10967 market didn't have more to offer.
10968 </para>
10969 <para>
10970 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10971 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10972 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10973 would not have interfered with anything.
10974 </para>
10975 <para>
10976 But this situation has now changed.
10977 </para>
10978 <para>
10979 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10980 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10981 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10982 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10983 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10984 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10985 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10986 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10987 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10988 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10989 </para>
10990 <para>
10991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10992 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10993 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10994 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10995 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10996 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10997 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10998 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10999 written for a radically different context.
11000 </para>
11001 <para>
11002 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11003 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11004 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11005 <emphasis>copyright</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
11006 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
11007 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
11008 context, copyright is serving no purpose <emphasis>at all</emphasis>
11009 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
11010 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11011 </para>
11012 <para>
11013 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11014 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11015 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11016 culture widely?"
11017 </para>
11018 <para>
11019 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11020 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
11021 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11022 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11023 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
11024 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
11025 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11026 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
11027 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11028 </para>
11029 <para>
11030 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11031 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11032 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11033 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11034
11035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11036 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11037 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11038 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11039 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
11040 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
11041 <!-- f13. -->
11042 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
11043 December 2002, available at
11044 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
11045 </para></footnote>
11046
11047 </para>
11048 <para>
11049 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11050 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11051 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11052 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
11053 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
11054 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11055 </para>
11056 <para>
11057 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11058 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11059 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11060 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11061 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11062 </para>
11063 <para>
11064 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11065 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
11066 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11067 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11068 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11069 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11070 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11071 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11072 power to extend existing terms.
11073 </para>
11074 <para>
11075 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11076 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11077 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11078 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11079 </para>
11080 <para>
11081 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11082 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11083
11084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11085 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11086 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11087 overstepped its bounds.
11088 </para>
11089 <para>
11090 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11091 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11092 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11093 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11094 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11095 </para>
11096 <para>
11097 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11098 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11099 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
11100 briefs and preparing for argument.
11101 </para>
11102 <para>
11103 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11104 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11105 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11106 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11107 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11108 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11109 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11110 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11111 </para>
11112 <para>
11113 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11114 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11115 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11116 mistake lost it.
11117 </para>
11118 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11119 <para>
11120 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11121 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11122 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11123 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11124 heat
11125 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11126 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11127 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11128 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11129 </para>
11130 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11131 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11132 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11133 <para>
11134 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11135 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11136 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11137 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11138 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11139 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11140 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11141 most powerful media companies in the world."
11142 </para>
11143 <para>
11144 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11145 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11146 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11147 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11148 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11149 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11150 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11151 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11152 interpretation
11153 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11154 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11155 unconstitutional,
11156 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11157 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11158 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11159 Constitution,
11160 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11161 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11162 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11163 </para>
11164 <para>
11165 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11166 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11167 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11168 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11169 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11170 why it was unconstitutional.
11171 </para>
11172 <para>
11173 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11174
11175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11176 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11177 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11178 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11179 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11180 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11181 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11182 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11183 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11184 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11185 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11186 <emphasis>law</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11187 the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11188 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11189 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11190 </para>
11191 <para>
11192 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11193 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11194 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11195 Congress. In November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11196 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11197 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11198 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11199 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11200 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11201 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11202 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11203 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11204 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11205 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis</primary></indexterm>
11206 </para>
11207 <para>
11208 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11209 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11210 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11211 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11212 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11213 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11214 </para>
11215 <para>
11216 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11217 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11218
11219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11220 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11221 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11222 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11223 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11224 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11225 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11226 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11227 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11228 <indexterm><primary>Intel</primary></indexterm>
11229 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11230 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11231 </para>
11232 <para>
11233 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11234 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11235 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11236 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11237 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries</primary></indexterm>
11238 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union</primary></indexterm>
11239 </para>
11240 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios</primary></indexterm>
11241 <para>
11242 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11243 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11244 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11245 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11246 clear.
11247 </para>
11248 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11249 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11250 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11251 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11252 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11253 <para>
11254 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11255 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11256 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11257 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11258 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11259 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11260 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11261 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11262 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11263 </para>
11264 <para>
11265 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11266 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11267 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11268 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11269 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11270 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11271 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11272 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11273
11274 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11275 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11276 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11277 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11278 <indexterm><primary>Morrison, Alan</primary></indexterm>
11279 <indexterm><primary>Public Citizen</primary></indexterm>
11280 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11281 </para>
11282 <para>
11283 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11284 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11285 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11286 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11287 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11288 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11289 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11290 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11291 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11292 confidence in our argument.
11293 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11294 </para>
11295 <para>
11296 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11297 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11298 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11299 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11300 copyright holders.
11301 </para>
11302 <para>
11303 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11304 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11305 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11306 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11307 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11308 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11309 wanted to control.
11310 </para>
11311 <para>
11312 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11313 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11314 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11315 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11316 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11317 pornography."<footnote><para>
11318 <!-- f14. -->
11319 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
11320 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11321 </para></footnote>
11322 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11323 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11324 to license <citetitle>Porgy and Bess</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11325 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11326 <!-- f15. -->
11327 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11328 Mouse Joins the Fray," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 28 March 1998, B7.
11329 </para></footnote>
11330 That's
11331 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11332 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11333 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11334 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11335 </para>
11336 <para>
11337 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11338 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11339 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11340 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11341 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11342 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11343 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11344 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11345 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11346 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11347 </para>
11348 <para>
11349 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11350 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11351 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11352 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11353 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11354 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11355 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11356 </para>
11357 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.</primary></indexterm>
11358 <para>
11359 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we
11360 called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest." The
11361 Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11362 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11363 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11364 five who had supported the <citetitle>Lopez/Morrison</citetitle> line
11365 of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be interpreted to
11366 assure that Congress's powers had limits.
11367 </para>
11368 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11369 <para>
11370 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11371 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11372 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11373 the Constitution
11374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11375 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11376 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11377 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11378 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11379 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11380 </para>
11381 <para>
11382 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11383 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11384 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11385 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11386 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11387 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11388 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11389 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11390 sense.
11391 </para>
11392 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11393 <para>
11394 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11395 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11396 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11397 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11398 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11399 these retrospective extensions.
11400 </para>
11401 <para>
11402 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11403 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11404 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11405 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11406 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11407 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11408 </para>
11409 <para>
11410 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus had to
11411 be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these
11412 five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11413 overriding argument that animated our claim rested on the
11414 Conservatives' most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the
11415 argument that Judge Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals,
11416 that Congress's power must be interpreted so that its enumerated
11417 powers have limits.
11418 </para>
11419 <para>
11420 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11421 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11422 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
11423 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11424 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11425 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11426 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11427 supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the Court to
11428 reconcile <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> with
11429 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce
11430 was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright
11431 be limited.
11432 </para>
11433 <para>
11434 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11435 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11436 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11437 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11438 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11439 </para>
11440 <para>
11441 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11442 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in 1831
11443 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11444 existing
11445 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11446 </para>
11447 <para>
11448 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11449 extended
11450 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11451 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11452 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11453 existing
11454 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11455 restraint
11456 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11457 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11458 hesitated
11459 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11460 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11461 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11462 arrived
11463 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11464 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11465
11466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11467 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11468 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11469 </para>
11470 <para>
11471 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11472 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11473 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11474 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11475 Congress
11476 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11477 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11478 this central idea.
11479 </para>
11480 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11481 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11482 <para>
11483 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11484 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11485 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11486 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11487 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11488 </para>
11489 <para>
11490 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11491 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11492 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11493 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11494 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11495 </para>
11496 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11497 <para>
11498 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11499 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11500 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11501 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11502 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11503 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11504 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11505 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11506 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11507 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11508 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11509
11510 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11511 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11512 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11513 </para>
11514 <para>
11515 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11516 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11517 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11518 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11519 congressmen
11520 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11521 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11522 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11523 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11524 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11525 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11526 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11527 family of the Justices.
11528 </para>
11529 <para>
11530 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11531 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11532 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11533 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11534 </para>
11535 <para>
11536 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11537 The history was bothering her.
11538 </para>
11539 <blockquote>
11540 <para>
11541 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11542 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11543 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11544 practice that began with the very first act.
11545 </para>
11546 </blockquote>
11547 <para>
11548 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11549 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11550 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11551 </para>
11552 <blockquote>
11553 <para>
11554 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11555 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11557 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11558 is yes.
11559 </para>
11560 </blockquote>
11561 <para>
11562 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11563 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11564 Kennedy, who observed,
11565 </para>
11566 <blockquote>
11567 <para>
11568 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11569 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11570 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11571 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11572 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11573 </para>
11574 </blockquote>
11575 <para>
11576 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11577 student,
11578 I answered,
11579 </para>
11580 <blockquote>
11581 <para>
11582 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11583 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11584 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11585 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11586 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11587 </para>
11588 </blockquote>
11589 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11590 <para>
11591 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11592 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11593 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11594 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11595 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11596 </para>
11597 <para>
11598 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11599 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> ruling,
11600 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11601 </para>
11602 <para>
11603 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11604 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11605
11606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11607 </para>
11608 <blockquote>
11609 <para>
11610 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11611 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11612 </para>
11613 <para>
11614 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11615 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11616 domain
11617 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11618 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11619 into the Copyright Clause.
11620 </para>
11621 </blockquote>
11622 <para>
11623 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11624 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11625 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11626 </para>
11627 <blockquote>
11628 <para>
11629 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11630 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11631 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11632 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11633 time.
11634 </para>
11635 </blockquote>
11636 <para>
11637 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11638 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11639 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11640 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11641 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11642 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11643 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11644 Patent Clause&mdash; indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11645 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11646 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11647 Court to my side.
11648 </para>
11649 <para>
11650 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11651 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11652
11653 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11654 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11655 optimistic.
11656 </para>
11657 <para>
11658 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11659 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11660 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11661 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11662 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11663 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11664 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11665 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11666 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11667 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11668 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in particular,
11669 the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11670 law that it had established elsewhere.
11671 </para>
11672 <para>
11673 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11674 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11675 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11676 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11677 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11678 </para>
11679 <para>
11680 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11681 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11682 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11683 </para>
11684 <para>
11685 My <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11686 money in the world against <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. And here
11687 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11688 reasoning.
11689 </para>
11690 <para>
11691 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11692 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11693 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11694 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11695 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11696 </para>
11697 <para>
11698
11699 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11700 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11701 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11702 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11703 </para>
11704 <para>
11705 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11706 Souter. Neither believes in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11707 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11708 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11709 </para>
11710 <para>
11711 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11712 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11713 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11714 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11715 reconcile the two simply <emphasis>by not addressing the
11716 argument</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11717 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11718 followed from the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11719 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11720 </para>
11721 <para>
11722 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11723 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11724 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11725 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11726 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11727 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11728 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11729 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11730 the system we have.
11731 </para>
11732 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11733 <para>
11734 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11735 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11736 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11737 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11738 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11739 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11740 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11741 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11742 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11743 </para>
11744 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11745 <para>
11746 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11747 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11748 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11749 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11750 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11751 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11752 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11753 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11754 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11755 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11756 </para>
11757 <para>
11758 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11759 because neither believed in the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11760 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11761 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11762 Sentelle. It was <citetitle>Hamlet</citetitle> without the Prince.
11763 </para>
11764 <para>
11765 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11766 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11767 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11768 </para>
11769 <para>
11770 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11771 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> didn't
11772 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11773 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11774 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11775 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11776 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11777 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11778 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11779 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11780 "originalism" now?
11781 </para>
11782 <para>
11783 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11784 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11785 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11786 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11787
11788 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11789 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11790 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11791 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11792 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11793 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11794 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11795 own principles.
11796 </para>
11797 <para>
11798 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11799 myself.
11800 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11801 the law as it is.
11802 </para>
11803 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11804 <para>
11805 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11806 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11807 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11808 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11809 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11810 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11811 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11812 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11813 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11814 </para>
11815 <para>
11816 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11817 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11818 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11819 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11820 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11821 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11822 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11823 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11824 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11825 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11826 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11827 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11828 effort to persuade; but I
11829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11830 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11831 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11832 should decide the issue.
11833 </para>
11834 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11835 <para>
11836 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11837 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11838 Kathleen Sullivan?
11839 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11840 </para>
11841 <para>
11842 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11843 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11844 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11845 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11846 </para>
11847 <para>
11848 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11849 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11850 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11851 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11852 have persuaded.
11853 </para>
11854 <para>
11855 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11856 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11857 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11858 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11859 issue should not be raised until it is.
11860 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
11861 </para>
11862 <para>
11863 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11864 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11865 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11866 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11867 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11868 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11869 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11870 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11871 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11872 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11873 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11874
11875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11876 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11877 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11878 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11879 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11880 harmful law. <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
11881 </para>
11882 <blockquote>
11883 <para>
11884 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11885 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11886 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11887 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11888 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11889 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11890 </para>
11891 </blockquote>
11892 <para>
11893 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11894 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11895 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
11896 (<xref linkend="fig-18"/>). The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit
11897 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
11898 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
11899 </para>
11900 <figure id="fig-18">
11901 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon</title>
11902 <graphic fileref="images/18.png"></graphic>
11903 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
11904 </figure>
11905 <para>
11906 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11907 quote from <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>. That "grand experiment" we call the
11908 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11909 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11910 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11911 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11912 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11913 </para>
11914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11915 </chapter>
11916 <chapter label="14" id="eldred-ii">
11917 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11918 <para>
11919 The day <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11920 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was
11921 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11922 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11923 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11924 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11925 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11926 </para>
11927 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11928 <para>
11929 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11930 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11931 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11932 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11933 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11934 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11935 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11936 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11937 </para>
11938 <para>
11939 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11940 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11942 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11943 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11944 the work passed into the public domain.
11945 </para>
11946 <para>
11947 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11948 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11949 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11950 </para>
11951 <para>
11952 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11953 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11954 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11955 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11956 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11957 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11958 everything else, let the content go.
11959 </para>
11960 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11961 <para>
11962 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11963 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11964 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11965 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11966 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11967 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11968 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11969 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11970 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11971 the stupid harm of the present system.
11972 </para>
11973 <para>
11974 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11975 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11976 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11977 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11978 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11979 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11980 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11981 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11982 where copyright owners could be identified.
11983 </para>
11984 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11985 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11986 <para>
11987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11988 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
11989 linkend="property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
11990 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11991 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11992 <!-- f1. -->
11993 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11994 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11995 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11996 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11997 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11998 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11999 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
12000 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12001 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12002 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12003 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12004 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12005 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12006 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12007 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12008 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>International
12009 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
12010 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
12011 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
12012 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12013 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12014 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12015 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12016 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12017 </para>
12018 <para>
12019 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12020 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12021 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12022 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12023 know what's protected and what's not.
12024 </para>
12025 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12026 <para>
12027 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12028 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12029 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12030 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12031 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12032 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12033 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an <citetitle>i</citetitle> or cross a
12034 <citetitle>t</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12035 </para>
12036 <para>
12037 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12038 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12039 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12040 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12041 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12042 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12043 </para>
12044 <para>
12045 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12046 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12047 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12048 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12049 burden
12050 imposed upon creators.
12051 </para>
12052 <para>
12053 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
12054 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12055
12056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12057 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12058 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12059 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
12060 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12061 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12062 table.
12063 </para>
12064 <para>
12065 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12066 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12067 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12068 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12069 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12070 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12071 spread.
12072 </para>
12073 <para>
12074 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12075 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12076 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12077 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12078 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12079 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
12080 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12081 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12082 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12083 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12084 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12085 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12086 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12087 system of protection for property generally.
12088 </para>
12089 <para>
12090 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12091 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12092 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12093 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12094 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12095 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12096 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12097 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12098
12099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12100 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12101 <emphasis>lawyer</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12102 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
12103 </para>
12104 <para>
12105 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12106 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12107 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12108 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12109 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12110 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12111 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12112 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12113 </para>
12114 <para>
12115 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12116 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12117 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12118 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12119 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12120 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12121 seen before <emphasis>because there are no formalities</emphasis>.
12122 </para>
12123 <para>
12124 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12125 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12126 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12127 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12128 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12129 </para>
12130 <para>
12131 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12132 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12133 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12134 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12135 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12136 </para>
12137 <para>
12138 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12139 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12140 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12141 registration?
12142 </para>
12143 <para>
12144 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12145 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12146 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12147
12148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12149 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12150 address the real problem of <emphasis>governments</emphasis> standing
12151 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12152 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12153 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12154 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12155 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12156 upon historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of
12157 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12158 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12159 </para>
12160 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12161 <para>
12162 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12163 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12164 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12165 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12166 </para>
12167 <para>
12168 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12169 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12170 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12171 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12172 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12173 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12174 something good might happen here.
12175 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe</primary></indexterm>
12176 </para>
12177 <para>
12178 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12179 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12180 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12181 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12182 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12183 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12184 </para>
12185 <para>
12186 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12187 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12188 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12190 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12191 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12192 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12193 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12194 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12195 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12196 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12197 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12198 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12199 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12200 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12201 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12202 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12203 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12204 film is a valid derivative use.
12205 </para>
12206 <para>
12207 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12208 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12209 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12210 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12211 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12212 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12213 </para>
12214 <para>
12215 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12216 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12217 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12218 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12219 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12220 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12221 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12222 threat.
12223 </para>
12224 <para>
12225 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12226 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12227 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12228 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12229 sense?
12230 </para>
12231 <para>
12232
12233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12234 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12235 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12236 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12237 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12238 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12239 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12240 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12241 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12242 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12243 </para>
12244 <para>
12245 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12246 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12247 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12248 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12249 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12250 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12251 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12252 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12253 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin</primary></indexterm>
12254 </para>
12255 <para>
12256 What does this industry really want?
12257 </para>
12258 <para>
12259 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12260 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12261 protecting <emphasis>their</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12262 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12263 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12264 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12265 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12266 content that doesn't require <emphasis>their</emphasis> permission
12267 first.
12268 </para>
12269 <para>
12270 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12271 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12272 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12273 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12274 theirs. <emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12275 theirs</emphasis>.
12276 </para>
12277 <para>
12278 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12279 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12280
12281 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12282 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12283 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12284 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12285 and to share its own creation.
12286 </para>
12287 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12288 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12289 <para>
12290 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12291 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12292 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12293 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12294 block the progress of others.
12295 </para>
12296 <para>
12297 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12298 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12299 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12300 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12301 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12302 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12303 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12304 </para>
12305 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12306 </chapter>
12307 </part>
12308 <chapter label="15" id="c-conclusion">
12309 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12310 <para>
12311 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12312 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12313 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12314 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12315 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12316 </para>
12317 <para>
12318 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12319 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12320 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12321 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12322 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12323 the disease almost invisible.
12324 </para>
12325 <para>
12326 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12327 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12328 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12329 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12330 population:
12331 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12332 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12333 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12334 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12335 available at
12336 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12337 release
12338 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12339 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12340 </para></footnote>
12341 </para>
12342 <para>
12343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12344 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12345 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12346 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12347 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12348 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12349 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12350 </para>
12351 <para>
12352 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12353 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12354 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12355 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12356 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12357 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12358 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12359 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12360 changes.
12361 </para>
12362 <para>
12363 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12364 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12365 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12366 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12367 costs significantly below the market price.
12368 </para>
12369 <para>
12370 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12371 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12372 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12373 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12374 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12375 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12376 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12377 <para>
12378 <!-- f2. -->
12379 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12380 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12381 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12382 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12383 </para></footnote>
12384 </para>
12385 <para>
12386 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12387 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12388 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa &hellip;
12389 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12390 imports."<footnote><para>
12391 <!-- f3. -->
12392 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12393 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12394 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12395 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 14, available at
12396 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a
12397 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12398 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12399 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess.,
12400 Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57 (statement of James
12401 Love).
12402 </para></footnote>
12403 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12404 government asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add
12405 pressure to that request, in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12406 possible trade sanctions.
12407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12408 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12409 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12410 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12411 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12412 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12413 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12414 patent&mdash; pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12415 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12416 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12417 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12418 <!-- f4. -->
12419 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12420 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12421 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12422 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12423 </para>
12424 <para>
12425 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12426 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12427 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12428 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12429 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12430 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12431 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12432 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12433 </para>
12434 <para>
12435 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12436 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12437 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12438 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12439 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12440 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12441 </para>
12442 <para>
12443 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12444 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12445 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12446 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12447 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12448 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12449 by U.S. companies.
12450 </para>
12451 <para>
12452 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12453 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12454 argument
12455 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12456 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12457 <!-- f5. -->
12458 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12459 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24
12460 May 1999, A1, available at
12461 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12462 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12463 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12464 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12465 Medicines," <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus</citetitle> 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12466 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12467 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12468 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12469 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," <citetitle>Widener Law
12470 Symposium Journal</citetitle> (Spring 2001): 175.
12471 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12472 </para></footnote>
12473 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12474 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12475 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12476 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12477 </para>
12478 <para>
12479 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12480 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12481 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12482 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12483 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12484 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12485 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12486 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12487 </para>
12488 <para>
12489 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12490 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12491 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12492 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12493 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12494 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12495 </para>
12496 <para>
12497 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12498 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12499 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12500 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12501 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12502 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12503 </para>
12504 <para>
12505 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12506 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12507 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12508 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12509 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12510 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12511 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12512 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12514 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12515 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12516 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12517 idea called "intellectual property."
12518 </para>
12519 <para>
12520 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12521 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12522 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12523 What is the argument?
12524 </para>
12525 <para>
12526 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12527 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12528 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12529 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12530 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12531 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12532 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12533 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12534 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12535 were balanced in just this sense.
12536 </para>
12537 <para>
12538 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12539 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12540 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12541 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12542 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12543 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12544 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12545 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12546 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12547 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12548 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12549 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12550 our
12551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12552 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12553 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12554 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12555 this common sense open its eyes.
12556 </para>
12557 <para>
12558 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12559 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12560 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12561 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12562 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12563 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12564 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12565 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12566 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12567 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12568 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12569 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12570 </para>
12571 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
12572 <para>
12573 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12574 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12575 meeting.<footnote><para>
12576 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>,
12577 August 2003, E1, available at
12578 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12579 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12580 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12581 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12582 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12583 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12584 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12585 </para></footnote>
12586 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12587 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12588 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12589 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12590 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12591 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12592 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12593 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12594 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12595 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12596 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12597 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12598 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12599 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12600 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12601 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12602 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12603 in the early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12604 <indexterm><primary>academic journals</primary></indexterm>
12605 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
12606 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12607 </para>
12608 <para>
12609 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12610 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12611 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12612 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12613 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12614 </para>
12615 <para>
12616 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12617 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12618 meeting.
12619 </para></footnote>
12620 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12621 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12622 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12623 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12624 property issues.
12625 </para>
12626 <para>
12627 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12628 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12629 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12630 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12631 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12632 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12633 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12634 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12635 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12636 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12637 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12638 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12639 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12640 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12641 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12642 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12643 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12644 stuff of
12645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12646 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12647 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12648 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12649 </para>
12650 <para>
12651 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12652 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12653 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12654 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12655 </para>
12656 <para>
12657 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12658 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12659 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12660 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12661 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12662 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12663 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12664 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12665 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12666 </para>
12667 <para>
12668 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12669 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12670 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12671 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12672 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12673 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM
12674 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12675 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12676 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12677 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12678 <!-- f8. -->
12679 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12680 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12681 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12682 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12683 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12684 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12685 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide," <citetitle>Government Policy
12686 Toward Open Source Software</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12687 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12688 Public Policy Research, 2002), 69, available at
12689 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also
12690 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, <citetitle>The Commercial Software
12691 Model</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (3
12692 May 2001), available at
12693 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12694 </para></footnote>
12695 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
12696 <indexterm><primary>"copyleft" licenses</primary></indexterm>
12697 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12698 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12699 </para>
12700 <para>
12701 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12702 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12703 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12704 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12705 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12706 by
12707 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12708 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12709 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12710 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12711 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12712 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12713 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12714 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12715 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12716 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12717 </para>
12718 <para>
12719 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12720 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12721 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12722 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12723 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12724 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12725 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12726 <!-- f9. -->
12727 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12728 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12729 </para></footnote>
12730 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12731 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
12732 </para>
12733 <para>
12734 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12735 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12736 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12737 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12738 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12739 its lobbying efforts.
12740 </para>
12741 <para>
12742 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12743 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12744 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12745 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12746 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12747 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12748 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12749 goals of WIPO."
12750 </para>
12751 <para>
12752 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12753 </para>
12754 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12755 <para>
12756 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12757 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12758 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12759 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12760 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12761 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12762 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12763 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12764 </para>
12765 <para>
12766 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12767 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12768 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12769 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12770 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12771 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12772 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12773 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12774 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12775 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12776 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12777 </para>
12778 <para>
12779 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12780 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12781 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12782 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12783 <emphasis>their</emphasis> rights. If they want to "waive" or
12784 "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12785 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $20 billion to do
12786 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12787 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12788 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12789 to do with <emphasis>their</emphasis> property.
12790 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
12791 </para>
12792 <para>
12793 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12794 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12795 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12796 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12797 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12798 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12799 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12800 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12801 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12802 way possible.
12803 </para>
12804 <para>
12805 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12806 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12807 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12808 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12809 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12810 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12811 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12812 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12813 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12814 that control.
12815 </para>
12816 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12817 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12818 <para>
12819 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12820 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12821 <!-- f10. -->
12822 See Drahos with Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism</citetitle>, 210&ndash;20.
12823 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12824 </para></footnote>
12825 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12826 choice now is whether that information society will be
12827 <emphasis>free</emphasis> or <emphasis>feudal</emphasis>. The trend is
12828 toward the feudal.
12829 </para>
12830 <para>
12831 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12832 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12833 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12834 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12835 </para>
12836 <blockquote>
12837 <para>
12838 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12839 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12840 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12841 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12842 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12843 say anything wrong. But in the world
12844 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12845 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12846 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12847 </para>
12848 </blockquote>
12849 <para>
12850 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12851 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12852 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12853 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12854 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12855 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12856 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12857 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12858 </para>
12859 <para>
12860 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12861 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12862 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12863 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12864 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12865 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12866 </para>
12867 <para>
12868 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12869 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12870 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12871 our own country's history).
12872 </para>
12873 <para>
12874 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12875 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12876 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12877 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12878 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12879 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12880 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12881 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12882 democracy in the world, become?
12883 </para>
12884 <para>
12885 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12886 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12887 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12888 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12889 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12890 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12891 </para>
12892 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12893 <para>
12894 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12895 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12896 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12897 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12898 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12899 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12900 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12901 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12902 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12903 hearings and a different result.
12904 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted</primary></indexterm>
12905 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
12906 </para>
12907 <para>
12908 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12909 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12910 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12911 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12912 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12913 concentration in the media.
12914 </para>
12915 <para>
12916 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12917 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12918 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12919 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12920 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12921 </para>
12922 <para>
12923 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12924 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12925 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12926 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12927 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12928 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12929 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12930 </para>
12931 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12932 <para>
12933 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12934 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12935 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12936 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12937 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12938 </para>
12939 <para>
12940 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12941 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12942 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12943 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12944 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12945 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12946 </para>
12947 <para>
12948 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12949 of our tragedy.
12950 </para>
12951 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
12952 <para>
12953 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12954 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12955 <!-- f11. -->
12956 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12957 2003, available at
12958 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12959 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12960 2003, available at
12961 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12962 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12963 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," <citetitle>New York Daily News</citetitle>, 9
12964 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12965 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12966 Defendants," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12967 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," <citetitle>Wired News</citetitle>, 10 September 2003,
12968 available at
12969 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12970 </para></footnote>
12971 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12972 music.<footnote><para>
12973 <!-- f12. -->
12974 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued &hellip; by a Little Old Lady,"
12975 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12976 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12977 </para></footnote>
12978 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12979 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12980 <!-- f13. -->
12981 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12982 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12983 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12984 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12985 </para></footnote>
12986 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12987 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12988 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12989 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12990 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12991 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12992 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12993 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12994 kids who use a computer to share content.
12995 </para>
12996 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12997 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12998 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
12999 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
13000 <para>
13001 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13002 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
13003 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
13004 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
13005 24 August 2003, available at
13006 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
13007 </para></footnote>
13008 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13009 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13010 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13011 country.<footnote><para>
13012 <!-- f15. -->
13013 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
13014 available at
13015 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
13016 </para></footnote>
13017 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13018 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13019 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13020 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13021 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13022 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13023 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13024 day into the Causbys.
13025 </para>
13026 <para>
13027 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13028 potential is ever to be realized.
13029
13030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13031
13032 </para>
13033 </chapter>
13034 <chapter label="16" id="c-afterword">
13035 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
13036 <para>
13037
13038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13039 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
13040 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
13041 maps what might be done.
13042 </para>
13043 <para>
13044 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13045 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13046 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13047 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13048 </para>
13049 <para>
13050 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13051 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13052 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
13053 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13054 is so important.
13055 </para>
13056 <para>
13057 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13058 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13059 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13060 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13061 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13062 </para>
13063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13064
13065 <section id="usnow">
13066 <title>US, NOW</title>
13067 <para>
13068 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
13069 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
13070 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13071 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13072 </para>
13073 <para>
13074 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13075 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13076 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
13077 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
13078 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
13079 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
13080 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13081 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13082 </para>
13083 <para>
13084 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13085 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13086 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13087 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13088 the
13089
13090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13091 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13092 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13093 unprotected.
13094 </para>
13095 <para>
13096 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13097 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13098 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13099 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13100 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13101 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
13102 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
13103 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13104 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13105 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
13106 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
13107 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13108 </para>
13109 <para>
13110 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
13111 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
13112 reserved"&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13113 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13114 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13115 before.
13116 </para>
13117
13118 <section id="examples">
13119 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
13120 <para>
13121 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13122 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13123 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13124 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13125 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13126 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13127 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
13128 assured.
13129 </para>
13130 <para>
13131 What made it assured?
13132 </para>
13133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13134 <para>
13135 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13136 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>, your
13137 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13138 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13139 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13140 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13141 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13142 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13143 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13144 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13145 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13146 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13147 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13148 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13149 </para>
13150 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13151 <para>
13152 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13153 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13154 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13155 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13156 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13157 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13158 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13159 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13160 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet</primary></indexterm>
13161 </para>
13162 <para>
13163 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13164 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13165 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13166 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13167 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13168 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13169 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13170 disappears.
13171 </para>
13172 <para>
13173 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13174 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13175 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13176 friction did.<footnote><para>
13177 <!-- f1. -->
13178
13179 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13180 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13181 Law Review</citetitle> 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13182
13183 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13184 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13185 also Jeffrey Rosen, <citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13186 in an Anxious Age</citetitle> (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13187 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13188 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13189 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13190
13191 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13192 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13193 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13194 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13195 </para>
13196 <para>
13197 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13198 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13199 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13200 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13201 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13202 care much about controlling their software.
13203 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
13204 </para>
13205 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13206 <para>
13207 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13208 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13209 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13210 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13211 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13212 people's work.
13213 </para>
13214 <para>
13215 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13216 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13217 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13218 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13219 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13220 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13221 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13222 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13223 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13224 anything else?
13225 </para>
13226 <para>
13227 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13228 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13229 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13230 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13231 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13232 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13233 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13234 </para>
13235 <para>
13236 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13237 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13238 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13239 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13240 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13241 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13242 fundamentally weakened.
13243 </para>
13244 <para>
13245 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13246 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13247 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13248 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13249 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13250 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13251 </para>
13252 <para>
13253 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13254 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13255 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13256 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13257 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13258 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13259 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13260 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13261 byproduct.
13262 </para>
13263 <para>
13264 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13265 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13266 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13267 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13268 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13269 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13270 </para>
13271 <para>
13272 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13273 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13274 scientific journals are produced.
13275 </para>
13276 <indexterm id="idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'>
13277 <primary>academic journals</primary>
13278 </indexterm>
13279 <para>
13280 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13281 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13282 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13283 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13284 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13285 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13286 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13287 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13288 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13289 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13290 and Westlaw are also free
13291 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13292 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13293 Court opinion through their respective services.
13294 </para>
13295 <para>
13296 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13297 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13298 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13299 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13300 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13301 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13302 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13303 </para>
13304 <para>
13305 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13306 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13307 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13308 </para>
13309 <para>
13310 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13311 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13312 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13313 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13314 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13315 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13316 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13317 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13318 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13319 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13320 </para>
13321 <para>
13322 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13323 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13324 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13325 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13326 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13327 granted before.
13328 </para>
13329 <para>
13330 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13331 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13332 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13333 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13335 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13336 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13337 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13338 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13339 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13340 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13341 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13342 </para>
13343 <para>
13344 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13345 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13346 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13347 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13348 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13349 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13350 and science.
13351 </para>
13352 <indexterm startref="idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'/>
13353
13354 </section>
13355 <section id="oneidea">
13356 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13357 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13358 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13359 </indexterm>
13360 <para>
13361 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13362 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13363 </para>
13364 <para>
13365 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13366 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13367 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13368 <emphasis>reasonable</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13369 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13370 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13371 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13372 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13373 make this possible.
13374 </para>
13375 <para>
13376 <emphasis>Simple</emphasis>&mdash;which means without a middleman, or
13377 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13378 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13379 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13380 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13381 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13382 shared. These three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a
13383 human-readable description, and
13384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13385 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13386 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13387 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13388 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13389 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13390 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13391 certain freedoms are given.
13392 </para>
13393 <para>
13394 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13395 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13396 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13397 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13398 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13399 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13400 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13401 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13402 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13403 </para>
13404 <para>
13405 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13406 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13407 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13408 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13409 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13410 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13411 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13412 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13413 a public domain.
13414 </para>
13415 <para>
13416 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13417 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13418 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13419 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13420 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13421 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13423 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13424 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13425 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13426 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13427 </para>
13428 <para>
13429 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13430 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13431 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13432 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13433 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13434 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13435 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13436 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13437 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13438 to begin to build those rules.
13439 </para>
13440 <para>
13441 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13442 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13443 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
13444 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13445 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13446 </para>
13447 <para>
13448 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13449 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13450 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13451 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13452 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13453 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13454 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13455 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13456 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13457 <emphasis>increase</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13458 </para>
13459 <para>
13460 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13461 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13462 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13463 was a total success.
13464 </para>
13465 <para>
13466 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13467 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13469 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled <citetitle>Free for All</citetitle>,
13470 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13471 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13472 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13473 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13474 well.
13475 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)</primary></indexterm>
13476 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter</primary></indexterm>
13477 </para>
13478 <indexterm><primary>Public Enemy</primary></indexterm>
13479 <indexterm><primary>rap music</primary></indexterm>
13480 <para>
13481 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13482 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13483 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13484 reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because anything
13485 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13486 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13487 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13488 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13489 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13490 <emphasis>legal</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13491 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13492 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow"
13493 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13494 high<footnote><para>
13495 <!-- f2. -->
13496 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13497 Culture Wars</citetitle> (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13498 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13499 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13500 </para></footnote>),
13501 these artists release into the creative environment content
13502 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13503 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter</primary></indexterm>
13504 </para>
13505 <para>
13506 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13507 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13508 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13509 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13510 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13511 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13512 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13513 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13514 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13515 say it to others.
13516 </para>
13517 <para>
13518 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13519 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13520 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13521 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13522
13523 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13524 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13525 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13526 </para>
13527 <para>
13528 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13529 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13530 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13531 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13532 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13533 steps are possible.
13534 </para>
13535 <para>
13536 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13537 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13538 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13539 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13540 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13541 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13542 creativity to spread more easily.
13543 </para>
13544 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13545
13546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13547 </section>
13548 </section>
13549 <section id="themsoon">
13550 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13551 <para>
13552 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13553 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13554 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13555 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13556 changes that we need.
13557 </para>
13558 <para>
13559 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13560 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13561 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13562 to our end.
13563 </para>
13564
13565 <section id="formalities">
13566 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13567 <para>
13568 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13569 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13570 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13571 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13572 </para>
13573 <para>
13574 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13575 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13576 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13577 protected.
13578 </para>
13579 <para>
13580 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13581 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13582 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13583 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13584 </para>
13585 <para>
13586 Why?
13587 </para>
13588 <para>
13589 As I suggested in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
13590 linkend="property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13591 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13592 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13593 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13594 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13595 formalities were getting in the way.
13596 </para>
13597 <para>
13598 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13599 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13600 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13601 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13602 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13603 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13604 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13605 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13606 past. And thus, the <emphasis>lack</emphasis> of formalities forces
13607 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13608 </para>
13609 <para>
13610 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13611 <!-- f1. -->
13612 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13613 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13614 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13615 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13616 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13617 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13618 </para>
13619 <para>
13620 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13621 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13622 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13623 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13624 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13625 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13626 developed by others.
13627 </para>
13628
13629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13630
13631 <section id="registration">
13632 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13633 <para>
13634 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13635 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13636 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13637 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13638 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13639 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13640 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13641 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13642 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13643 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13644 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13645 </para>
13646 <para>
13647 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13648 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13649 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13650 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13651 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13652 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13653 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13654 </para>
13655 <para>
13656 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13657 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13658 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13659 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13660 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13661 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13662 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13663 with which registration occurs up.
13664 </para>
13665 <para>
13666 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13667 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13668 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13669 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13670 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13671 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13672 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13673 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13674 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13676 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13677 </para>
13678
13679 </section>
13680 <section id="marking">
13681 <title>MARKING</title>
13682 <para>
13683 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13684 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13685 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13686 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13687 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13688 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13689 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13690 uniformly across all media.
13691 </para>
13692 <para>
13693 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13694 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13695 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13696 use the work.
13697 </para>
13698 <para>
13699 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13700 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13701 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13702 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13703 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13704 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13705 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13706 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13707 </para>
13708 <para>
13709 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13710 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13711 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13712 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13713 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13714 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13715 <!-- f2. -->
13716 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13717 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13718 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13719 </para></footnote>
13720 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13721 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13722 stop using the work in any new
13723 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13724 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13725 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13726 their work.
13727 </para>
13728 <para>
13729 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13730 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13731 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13732 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13733 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13734 </para>
13735 <para>
13736 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13737 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13738 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13739 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13740 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13741 <emphasis>solely</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13742 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13743 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13744 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13745 other important functions.
13746 </para>
13747 <para>
13748 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13749 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13750 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13751 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13752 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13753 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13754 </para>
13755 <para>
13756 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13757 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13758 make things unclear.
13759 </para>
13760 <para>
13761 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13762 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13763 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13764 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13765 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13766 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13767 </para>
13768
13769 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13770 </section>
13771 </section>
13772 <section id="shortterms">
13773 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13774 <para>
13775 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13776 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13777 natural authors.
13778 </para>
13779 <para>
13780 In <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13781 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13782 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13783 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13784 radical. <citetitle>The Economist</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13785 copyright term.<footnote><para>
13786
13787 <!-- f3. -->
13788 "A Radical Rethink," <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13789 available at
13790 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13791 </para></footnote>
13792 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13793 </para>
13794 <para>
13795 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13796 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13797 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13798 terms.
13799 </para>
13800 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13801 <listitem><para>
13802 <!-- (1) -->
13803 <emphasis>Keep it short:</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13804 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13805 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13806 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13807 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13808 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13809 </para></listitem>
13810 <listitem><para>
13811 <!-- (2) -->
13812 <emphasis>Keep it simple:</emphasis> The line between the public
13813 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13814 fuzziness of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13815 "expression." That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13816 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
13817 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
13818 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
13819 "lawyer-free zone" makes the complexities of "fair use" and
13820 "idea/expression" less necessary to navigate.
13821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13822 </para></listitem>
13823 <listitem><para>
13824 <!-- (3) -->
13825 <emphasis>Keep it alive:</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
13826 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13827 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
13828 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
13829 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
13830 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
13831 pension.<footnote><para>
13832 <!-- f4. -->
13833 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13834 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13835 available at
13836 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13837 </para></footnote>
13838 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13839 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13840 single form.
13841 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions</primary></indexterm>
13842 </para></listitem>
13843 <listitem><para>
13844 <!-- (4) -->
13845 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:</emphasis> Whatever the term of
13846 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
13847 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
13848 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
13849 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
13850 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in 1923 than we
13851 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
13852 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
13853 the number of authors who wrote in 1923. Of course, we can increase
13854 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
13855 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
13856 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
13857 creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
13858 we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13859 </orderedlist>
13860 <para>
13861 These changes together should produce an <emphasis>average</emphasis>
13862 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976,
13863 the average term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
13864 same.
13865 </para>
13866 <para>
13867 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13868 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13869 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13870 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13871 </para>
13872
13873 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13874
13875 </section>
13876 <section id="freefairuse">
13877 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13878 <para>
13879 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13880 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13881 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13882 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13883 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13884 the emergence of that new technology.
13885 </para>
13886 <para>
13887 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13888 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13889 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13890 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13891 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13892 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13893 though that movie is not "my writing."
13894 </para>
13895 <para>
13896 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13897 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13898 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13899 <!-- f5. -->
13900 Benjamin Kaplan, <citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
13901 University Press, 1967), 32.
13902 </para></footnote>
13903 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13904 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13905 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13906 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin</primary></indexterm>
13907 </para>
13908 <blockquote>
13909 <para>
13910 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13911 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13912 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13913 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13914 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13915 </para></footnote>
13916 </para>
13917 </blockquote>
13918 <para>
13919 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13920 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13921 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13922 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13923 Consider each limitation in turn.
13924 </para>
13925 <para>
13926 <emphasis>Term:</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
13927 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
13928 sense to protect John
13929
13930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13931 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13932 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13933 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13934 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13935 after the creative work is done.
13936 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
13937 </para>
13938 <para>
13939 <emphasis>Scope:</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
13940 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
13941 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
13942 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
13943 material. When all "reuse" of creative material was within the control
13944 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
13945 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
13946 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
13947 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
13948 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
13949 the creative process. Smothers it.
13950 </para>
13951 <para>
13952 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13953 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13954 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13955 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13956 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13957 much more sense.
13958 </para>
13959 <para>
13960 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13961 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13962 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13963 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13964 <para>
13965 <!-- f7. -->
13966 Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13967 Jukebox</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13968 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13969 </para></footnote>
13970 His view is that the law should be written so that
13971 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13972 </para>
13973 <para>
13974 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13975 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13976 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13977 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13978 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13979 </para>
13980 <para>
13981 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13982 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13983 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13984 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13985 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13986 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13987 </para>
13988 </section>
13989
13990 <section id="liberatemusic">
13991 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13992 <para>
13993 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13994 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13995 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13996 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13997 battles around the sharing of music.
13998 </para>
13999 <para>
14000 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14001 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14002 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
14003 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
14004 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
14005 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14006 innovation on the network.
14007 </para>
14008 <para>
14009 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14010 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14011 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14012 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14013 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14014 </para>
14015 <para>
14016 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
14017 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
14018 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
14019 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="piracy"/>, they enable
14020 four different kinds of sharing:
14021 </para>
14022 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
14023 <listitem><para>
14024 <!-- A. -->
14025 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14026 for purchasing CDs.
14027 </para></listitem>
14028 <listitem><para>
14029 <!-- B. -->
14030 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14031 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14032 </para></listitem>
14033 <listitem><para>
14034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14035 <!-- C. -->
14036 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14037 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14038 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14039 </para></listitem>
14040 <listitem><para>
14041 <!-- D. -->
14042 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14043 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14044 owner plainly endorses.
14045 </para></listitem>
14046 </orderedlist>
14047 <para>
14048 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14049 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14050 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14051 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14052 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14053 significantly weakened.
14054 </para>
14055 <para>
14056 As I said in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
14057 linkend="piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14058 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14059 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14060 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14061 networks.
14062 </para>
14063 <para>
14064 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14065 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14066 should respond.
14067 </para>
14068 <para>
14069 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14070 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14071 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14072 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14073 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
14074 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14075 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14076 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14077 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14078 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14079 </para>
14080 <para>
14081 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14082 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14083 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14085 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14086 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14087 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14088 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14089 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14090 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
14091 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
14092 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14093 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14094 </para>
14095 <para>
14096 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14097 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio,
14098 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14099 then, is the critical point: When it is <emphasis>extremely</emphasis>
14100 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14101 <emphasis>easier</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14102 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14103 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14104 content</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14105 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14106 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14107 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14108 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14109 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14110 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14111 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
14112 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
14113 <!-- f8. -->
14114 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
14115 April 2002, available at
14116 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
14117 </para></footnote>
14118
14119 </para>
14120 <para>
14121 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14122 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14123 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
14124 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14125 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14126 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14127 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14128 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14129 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14130 artists get paid, during
14131
14132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14133 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14134 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14135 </para>
14136 <para>
14137 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14138 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14139 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14140 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14141 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14142 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14143 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14144 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14145 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14146 </para>
14147 <para>
14148 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14149 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14150 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14151 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14152 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14153 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14154 way that returns something to the artist.
14155 </para>
14156 <para>
14157 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14158 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14159 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14160 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14161 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14162 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14163 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14164 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14165 </para>
14166 <para>
14167 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14168 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14169 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14170 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14171 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14172 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14173 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14174 </para>
14175 <para>
14176
14177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14178 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14179 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14180 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14181 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14182 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14183 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14184 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14185 trade.
14186 </para>
14187 <para>
14188 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14189 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14190 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14191 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14192 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14193 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14194 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14195 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14196 </para>
14197 <para>
14198 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14199 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14200 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14201 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14202 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14203 delivering and accessing content.
14204 </para>
14205 <para>
14206 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14207 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14208 </para>
14209 <para>
14210 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14211 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14212 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14213 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14214 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14215 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14216 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14217 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14218 </para>
14219 <para>
14220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14221 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14222 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14223 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14224 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14225 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14226 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14227 </para>
14228 <para>
14229 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14230 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14231 <para>
14232 <!-- f9. -->
14233 William Fisher, <citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities</citetitle> (last
14234 revised: 10 October 2000), available at
14235 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William
14236 Fisher, <citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14237 Entertainment</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14238 2004), ch. 6, available at
14239 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14240 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14241 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14242 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14243 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14244 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14245 Broadband?" <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14246 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14247 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14248 available at
14249 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, <citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14250 Use Fee (IPUF)</citetitle>, 3 March 2002, available at
14251 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14252 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 13 May
14253 2002, available at
14254 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14255 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14256 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14257 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14258 2002, available at
14259 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14260 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14261 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14262 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14263 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14264 debate by about a decade. See
14265 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14266 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14267 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14268 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)</primary></indexterm>
14269 </para></footnote>
14270 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14271 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14272 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14273 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14274 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14275 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14276 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14277 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14278 tax.
14279 </para>
14280 <para>
14281 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14282 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14283 <citetitle>Promises to Keep</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14284 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14285 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14286 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14287 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14288 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14289 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14290 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14291 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14292 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14293 controlling access.
14294 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)</primary></indexterm>
14295 </para>
14296 <para>
14297 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14298 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14299 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14300 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14301 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14302 limits on derivative
14303
14304 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14305 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14306 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14307 allowed to do with the content itself.
14308 </para>
14309 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks</primary></indexterm>
14310 <para>
14311 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14312 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14313 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14314 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14315 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14316 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14317 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14318 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14319 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14320 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14321 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14322 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14323 on-line.
14324 </para>
14325 <para>
14326 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14327 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14328 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14329 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14330 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14331 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14332 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14333 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14334 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14335 finding ways to compete with "free."
14336 </para>
14337 <para>
14338 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14339 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14340 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14341 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14342 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14343 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14344 the law.
14345 </para>
14346 <para>
14347 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14348 </para>
14349 <para>
14350
14351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14352 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14353 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14354 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14355 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14356 create.
14357 </para>
14358 <para>
14359 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14360 by
14361 </para>
14362 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14363 <listitem><para>
14364 <!-- 1. -->
14365 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14366 </para></listitem>
14367 <listitem><para>
14368 <!-- 2. -->
14369 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14370 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14371 statute;
14372 </para></listitem>
14373 <listitem><para>
14374 <!-- 3. -->
14375 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14376 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14377 </para></listitem>
14378 </orderedlist>
14379 <para>
14380 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14381 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14382 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14383 something then?
14384 </para>
14385 <para>
14386 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14387 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14388 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14389 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14390 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size <citetitle>x</citetitle>,
14391 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14392 market of five times <citetitle>x</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14393 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14394 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14395 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14396 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14397 pirates.
14398 </para>
14399 <para>
14400 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14401 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14402 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14403
14404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14405 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14406 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14407 </para>
14408 </section>
14409
14410 <section id="firelawyers">
14411 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14412 <para>
14413 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14414 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14415 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14416 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14417 </para>
14418 <para>
14419 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14420 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14421 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14422 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14423 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14424 strong view queers the law.
14425 </para>
14426 <para>
14427 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14428 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14429 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14430 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14431 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14432 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14433 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14434 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14435 <!-- f10. -->
14436 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14437 Memorial Lecture), <citetitle>UCLA Law Review</citetitle> 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14438 </para></footnote>
14439
14440 </para>
14441 <para>
14442 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14443 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14444 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14445 </para>
14446 <para>
14447 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14448 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14449 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14450 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14451 <!-- f11. -->
14452 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14453 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14454 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14455 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14456 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14457 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14458 J. Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14459 Drive the Digital Marketplace</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14460 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14461 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June 2003,
14462 available at
14463 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14464 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14465 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14466 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14467 <citetitle>Rethinking</citetitle>, 174&ndash;76.
14468 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
14469 </para></footnote>
14470 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14471 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14472 them it works.
14473 </para>
14474 <para>
14475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14476 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14477 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14478 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14479 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14480 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14481 practically never be done.
14482 </para>
14483 <para>
14484 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14485 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14486 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14487 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14488 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14489 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14490 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14491 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14492 </para>
14493 <para>
14494 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14495 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14496 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14497 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14498 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14499 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14500 </para>
14501 <para>
14502 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14503 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14504 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14505 its review.
14506 </para>
14507 <para>
14508 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14509 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14510 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14511 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14512 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14513 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14514 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14515 </para>
14516 <para>
14517 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14518 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14519
14520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14521 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14522 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14523 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14524 </para>
14525 <para>
14526 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14527 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14528 keep your lawyers away.
14529 </para>
14530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14531 </section>
14532 </section>
14533 </chapter>
14534 <chapter label="17" id="c-notes">
14535 <title>NOTES</title>
14536 <para>
14537 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14538 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14539 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14540 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14541 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14542 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14543 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14544 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14545 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14546 the material.
14547 </para>
14548 <!--PAGE BREAK 336-->
14549
14550 </chapter>
14551 <chapter label="18" id="c-acknowledgments">
14552 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14553 <para>
14554 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14555 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14556 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14557 to him that this book is dedicated.
14558 </para>
14559 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark</primary></indexterm>
14560 <para>
14561 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14562 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14563 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14564 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14565 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14566 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14567 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14568 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14569 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14570 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14571 critical eye on much of this.
14572 </para>
14573 <para>
14574 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14575 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14576 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14577 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14578 <!--PAGE BREAK 337-->
14579 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14580 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14581 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14582 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14583 </para>
14584 <para>
14585 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14586 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14587 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14588 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14589 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14590 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14591 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14592 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14593 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14594 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14595 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14596 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14597 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14598 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14599 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14600 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14601 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14602 a bunch of great replies.)
14603 </para>
14604 <para>
14605 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14606 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14607 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14608 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14609 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14610 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14611 throughout this book.
14612 </para>
14613 <para>
14614 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14615 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14616 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14617 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14618 </para>
14619 <!--PAGE BREAK 338-->
14620
14621 </chapter>
14622 <index></index>
14623 </book>