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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>Version 2004-02-10</subtitle>
26
27 <authorgroup>
28 <author>
29 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig</surname>
31 </author>
32 </authorgroup>
33
34 <copyright>
35 <year>2004</year>
36 <holder>
37 Lawrence Lessig.
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
45 </holder>
46 </copyright>
47
48 <abstract>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
50 <para>
51 LAWRENCE LESSIG
52 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
66 Appeals.
67 </para>
68 </abstract>
69 </bookinfo>
70
71 <chapter id="c-info">
72 <title>Info</title>
73 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
74
75 <para>
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
77 </para>
78 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
79 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
83 </itemizedlist>
84 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
85
86 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
87 <para>
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
89 <sbr/>The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
90 in a Connected World
91 <sbr/>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
92 </para>
93
94 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
95 <para>
96 THE PENGUIN PRESS
97 <sbr/>NEW YORK
98 </para>
99
100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
101 <para>
102 FREE CULTURE
103 </para>
104
105 <para>
106 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
107 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
108 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
109 </para>
110
111 <para>
112 LAWRENCE LESSIG
113 </para>
114
115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
116 <para>
117 THE PENGUIN PRESS
118 <sbr/>a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
119 York, New York
120 <sbr/>Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
121 <sbr/>All rights reserved
122 <sbr/>Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
123 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
124 Reprinted with permission.
125 <sbr/>Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
126 <sbr/>All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
127 <sbr/>Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
128 <sbr/>Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
129 <sbr/>Lessig, Lawrence.
130 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
131 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
132 <sbr/>p. cm.
133 <sbr/>Includes index.
134 <sbr/>ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
135 <sbr/>1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
136 <sbr/>3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
137 <sbr/>KF2979.L47
138 <sbr/>343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
139 <sbr/>This book is printed on acid-free paper.
140 <sbr/>Printed in the United States of America
141 <sbr/>1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
142 <sbr/>Designed by Marysarah Quinn
143 </para>
144
145 <para>
146 &translationblock;
147 </para>
148
149 <para>
150 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
151 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
152 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
153 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
154 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
155 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
156 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
157 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
158 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
159 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
160 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
161 </para>
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
163
164 <para>
165 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
166 it continues still.
167 </para>
168
169 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
170 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
171 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
172 </figure>
173
174 <toc id="toc"></toc>
175
176 <lot>
177 <title>List of figures</title>
178 </lot>
179
180 <!--
181 c PREFACE xiii
182 c INTRODUCTION
183 c "PIRACY"
184 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
185 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
186 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
187 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
188 2 Film
189 2 Recorded Music
190 2 Radio
191 2 Cable TV
192 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
193 2 Piracy I
194 2 Piracy II
195 c "PROPERTY"
196 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
197 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
198 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
199 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
200 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
201 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
202 2 Beginnings
203 2 Law: Duration
204 2 Law: Scope
205 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
206 2 Architecture and Law: Force
207 2 Market: Concentration
208 2 Together
209 c PUZZLES
210 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
211 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
212 2 Constraining Creators
213 2 Constraining Innovators
214 2 Corrupting Citizens
215 c BALANCES
216 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
217 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
218 c CONCLUSION
219 c AFTERWORD
220 1 Us, Now
221 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
222 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
223 1 Them, Soon
224 2 1. More Formalities
225 3 Registration and Renewal
226 3 Marking
227 2 2. Shorter Terms
228 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
229 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
230 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
231 c NOTES
232 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
233 c INDEX
234 -->
235
236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
237
238 </chapter>
239 <chapter id="c-preface">
240 <title>PREFACE</title>
241 <para>
242 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
243 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
244 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
245 </para>
246 <blockquote>
247 <para>
248 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
249 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
250 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
251 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
252 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
253 </para></footnote>
254 </para>
255 </blockquote>
256 <para>
257 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
258 software,
259 or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review suggested
260 the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we could always
261 "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a switch and be back
262 home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and any troubles
263 that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
264 </para>
265 <para>
266 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
267 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
268 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
270 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
271 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
272 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
273 </para>
274 <para>
275 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
276 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
277 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
278 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
279 </para>
280 <para>
281 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
282 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
283 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
284 free software movement<footnote>
285 <para>
286 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
287 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
288 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
289 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
290 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
291 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
292 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
293 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
294 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
295 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
296 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
297 or of creators from the past.
298 </para>
299 <para>
300 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
301 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
302 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
303 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
304 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
305 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
306 culture deem fundamental.
307 </para>
308 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
309 <para>
310 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
311 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
312 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
313 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
314 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
315 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
316 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
317 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
318 he asked,
319 </para>
320 <blockquote>
321 <para>
322 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
323 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
324 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
325 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
326 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
327 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
328 </para></footnote>
329 </para>
330 </blockquote>
331 <para>
332 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
333 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
334 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
335 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
336 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
337 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
338 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
339 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
340 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
341 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
342 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
343 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
344 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
345 that this work is "merely" derivative.
346 </para>
347 <para>
348 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
349 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
350 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
351 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
352 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
353 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
354 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
355 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
356
357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
358 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
359 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
360 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
361 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
362 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
363 what I advance here.
364 </para>
365 <para>
366 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
367 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
368 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
369 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
370 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
371 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
372 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
373 book is written.
374 </para>
375
376 </chapter>
377 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
378
379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
380 <chapter id="c-introduction">
381 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
382 <para>
383 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
384 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
385 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
386 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
387 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
388 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
389 </para>
390 <para>
391 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
392 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
393 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
394 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
395 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
396 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
397 </para></footnote>
398 For many
399 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
400 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
401 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
402 </para>
403 <para>
404 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
405 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
406 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
407 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
408 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
409 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
410 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
411 </para>
412 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
413 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
414 <para>
415 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
416 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
417 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
418 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
419 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
420 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
421 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
422 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
423 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
424 </para>
425 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
426 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
427 <para>
428 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
429 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
430 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
431 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
432 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
433 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
434 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
435 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
436 </para>
437 <blockquote>
438 <para>
439 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
440 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
441 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
442 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
443 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
444 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
445 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
446 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
447 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
448 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
449 <para>
450 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
451 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
452 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
453 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
454 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
455 Authorship," Stanford Law Review 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
456 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
457 1112&ndash;13.
458 </para></footnote>
459 </para>
460 </blockquote>
461 <para>
462 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
463 </para>
464 <para>
465 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
466 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
467 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
469 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
470 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
471 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
472 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
473 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
474 </para>
475 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
476 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
477 <para>
478 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
479 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
480 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
481 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
482 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
483 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
484 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
485 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
486 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
487 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
488 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
489 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
490 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
491 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
492 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
493 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
494 </para>
495 <para>
496 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
497 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
498 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
499 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
500 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
501 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
502 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
503 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
504 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
505 understanding of radio.
506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
507 </para>
508 <para>
509 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
510 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
511 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
512 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
513 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
514 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
515 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
516 much less transmitter power and static.
517 </para>
518 <para>
519 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting
520 of the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in
521 New York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
522 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
523 seventeen
524 miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and then with a
525 clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an electrical
526 device,
527 it produced the sound of an announcer's voice: "This is amateur
528 station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on frequency
529 modulation
530 at two and a half meters."
531 </para>
532 <para>
533 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
534 </para>
535 <blockquote>
536 <para>
537 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
538 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was
539 crumpled and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling
540 forest fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a
541 piano
542 solo and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was
543 projected with a live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
544 "music box."<footnote><para>
545 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
546 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
547 </para></footnote>
548 </para>
549 </blockquote>
550 <para>
551 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a
552 vastly superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention,
553 Armstrong
554 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the
555 then dominant AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio
556 stations across the United States, but the stations in large cities were all
557 owned by a handful of networks.
558 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
559 </para>
560 <para>
561 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
562 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
563 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
564 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
565 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
566 </para>
567 <blockquote>
568 <para>
569 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
570 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a revolution&mdash;
571 start up a whole damn new industry to compete with RCA.<footnote><para>
572 See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," First
573 Electronic
574 Church of America, at www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
575
576 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
577 </para></footnote>
578 </para>
579 </blockquote>
580 <para>
581 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
582 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
583 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
584 described,
585 </para>
586 <blockquote>
587 <para>
588 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
589 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
590 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
591 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
592 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
593 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
594 </para></footnote>
595 </para>
596 </blockquote>
597 <para>
598 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
599 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
600 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
601 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
602 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
603 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
604 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
605 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
606 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
607 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
608 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
609 </para>
610 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
611 <blockquote>
612 <para>
613 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
614 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
615 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
616 deviousness.<footnote><para>
617 Lessing, 256.
618 </para></footnote>
619 </para>
620 </blockquote>
621 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
622 <para>
623 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
624 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
625 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
626 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
627 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
628 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
629 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
630 least temporarily.
631 </para>
632 <para>
633 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
634 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
635 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
636 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
637 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
638 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
639 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
640 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
641 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
642 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
643 </para>
644 <para>
645 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
646 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
647 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
648 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
649 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
650 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
651 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
652 course always public spirited; the reality is something
653 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
654 to themselves, would crumble in
655 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
656 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
657 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
658 effect
659 of technological change.
660 </para>
661 <para>
662 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good
663 date upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the
664 Internet
665 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
666 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had
667 access
668 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years before.<footnote><para>
669 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look
670 at Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
671 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
672 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
673 </para></footnote>
674 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
675 of 2004.
676 </para>
677 <para>
678 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
679 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
680 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
681 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
682 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
683 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
684 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
685 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
686 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
687 </para>
688 <para>
689 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
690 Internet
691 itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that the
692 Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
693 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as old as
694 the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change, would reject
695 it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet has introduced.
696 </para>
697 <para>
698 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
699 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
700 regulation
701 of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our culture
702 that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By "noncommercial
703 culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around parks or on
704 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
705 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
706 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader,"
707 or Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
708 </para>
709 <para>
710 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
711 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
712 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the peace,
713 then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly concerned
714 with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it left this
715 culture
716 "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary individuals shared and
717 transformed their culture&mdash;telling stories, reenacting scenes from plays
718 or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were
719 left alone by the law.
720 </para>
721 <para>
722 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
723 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
724 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
725 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
726 marketplace.<footnote>
727 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
728 <para>
729 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
730 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
731 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
732 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
733 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
734 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
735 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
736 198&ndash;200.
737 </para></footnote>
738 This is also, of
739 course, an important part of creativity and culture, and it has become
740 an increasingly important part in America. But in no sense was it
741 dominant
742 within our tradition. It was instead just one part, a controlled
743 part, balanced with the free.
744 </para>
745 <para>
746 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
747 been erased.<footnote><para>
748 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
749 2001), ch. 13.
750 </para></footnote>
751 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and,
752 pushed by big media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in
753 our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
754 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
755 expanded
756 to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
757 creativity
758 that it never reached before. The technology that preserved the
759 balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were free and
760 uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has been undone.
761 The consequence is that we are less and less a free culture, more and
762 more a permission culture.
763 </para>
764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
765 <para>
766 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
767 creativity.
768 And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the
769 protectionism that justifies the changes that I will describe below is not
770 the limited and balanced sort that has defined the law in the past. This
771 is not a protectionism to protect artists. It is instead a protectionism
772 to protect certain forms of business. Corporations threatened by the
773 potential of the Internet to change the way both commercial and
774 noncommercial culture are made and shared have united to induce
775 lawmakers to use the law to protect them. It is the story of RCA and
776 Armstrong; it is the dream of the Causbys.
777 </para>
778 <para>
779 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
780 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that
781 reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
782 marketplace
783 for making and cultivating culture generally, and that change
784 in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet is thus to
785 the industries that built and distributed content in the twentieth
786 century
787 what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was to the
788 railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of the end,
789 or at least a substantial transformation. Digital technologies, tied to the
790 Internet, could produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market
791 for building and cultivating culture; that market could include a much
792 wider and more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce
793 and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending
794 upon a few important factors, those creators could earn more on average
795 from this system than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our
796 day don't use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
797 </para>
798 <para>
799 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
800 happening
801 in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the early
802 twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using their
803 power to get the law to protect them against this new, more efficient,
804 more vibrant technology for building culture. They are succeeding in
805 their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet remakes them.
806 </para>
807 <para>
808 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
809 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
810 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
811 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
812 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
813 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
814 Motion
815 Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
816 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
817 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
818 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
819 Times, 17 January 2002.
820 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
821 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
822 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
823 against it.
824 </para>
825 <para>
826 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
827 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
828 especially
829 in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls "creative
830 property."
831 I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the law, properly tuned,
832 should punish "piracy," whether on or off the Internet.
833 </para>
834 <para>
835 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
836 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
837 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
838 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
839 </para>
840 <para>
841 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
842 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
843 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
844 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
845 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
846 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
847 <para>
848 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
849 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
850 </para></footnote>
851 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
852 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
853 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
854 could cultivate and extend our culture.
855 </para>
856 <para>
857 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
858 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
859 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
860 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
861 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
862 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
863 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
864 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
865 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
866 </para>
867 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26 -->
868 <para>
869 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
870 "centrality
871 of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or
872 otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for
873 neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a
874 morality
875 tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
876 </para>
877 <para>
878 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
879 inspired
880 by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its
881 code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace.
882 There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet
883 technologies
884 to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and
885 culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to
886 understand
887 the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
888 </para>
889 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
890 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
891 <para>
892 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
893 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
894 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
895 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
896 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
897 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
898 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
899 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
900 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
901 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
902 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
903 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
904 trespass.
905 </para>
906 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
907 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
908 <para>
909 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
910 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
911 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
912 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
913 war. Unlike
914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
915 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
916 on its side.
917 </para>
918 <para>
919 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
920 increasingly
921 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
922 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
923 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
924 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
925 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
926 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
927 </para>
928 <para>
929 The puzzle is, Why?
930 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
931 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
932 because
933 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
934 absolute
935 claim was wrong?
936 </para>
937 <para>
938 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
939 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
940 </para>
941 <para>
942 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
943 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
944 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
945 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
946 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
947 </para>
948 <para>
949 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
950 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
951 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
952 Armstrong
953 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
954 more powerful view?
955 </para>
956 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
957 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
958 <para>
959 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
960 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
961 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
962 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
963 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
964 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
965 this silliness will be much more profound.
966 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
967 </para>
968 <para>
969 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
970 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
971 ideas.
972 </para>
973 <para>
974 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
975 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
976 obscure
977 French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird sort we
978 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
979 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
980 can be more fully understood.
981 </para>
982 <para>
983 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
984 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
985 government,
986 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
987 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
988 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
989 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
990 threatened
991 by the changes to use their power to change the law&mdash;and more
992 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
993 who we have always been.
994 </para>
995 <para>
996 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
997 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
998 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
999 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1000 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1001 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1002 </para>
1003 </chapter>
1004 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1005 <chapter id="c-piracy">
1006 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1007
1008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1009 <para>
1010 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
1011 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1012 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1013 capture.
1014 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1015 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1016 </para>
1017 <blockquote>
1018 <para>
1019 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1020 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1021 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1022 <!-- f1 -->
1023 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1024 </para></footnote>
1025 </para>
1026 </blockquote>
1027 <para>
1028 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1029 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1030 efficient
1031 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1032 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1033 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1034 content
1035 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1036 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1037 </para>
1038 <para>
1039 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1040 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1041 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1042 sharing
1043 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1044 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1045 </para>
1046 <para>
1047 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1048 increasingly
1049 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1050 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1051 believe
1052 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1053 piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1054 </para>
1055 <para>
1056 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1057 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1058 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1059 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1060 </para>
1061 <para>
1062 The idea goes something like this:
1063 </para>
1064 <blockquote>
1065 <para>
1066 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1067 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1068 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1069 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1070 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1071 piracy.
1072 </para>
1073 </blockquote>
1074 <para>
1075 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1076 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1077 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1078 <!-- f2 -->
1079 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1080 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1081 </para></footnote>
1082 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1083 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1084 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1085 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1086 <!-- f3 -->
1087 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1088 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1089 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1090 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1091 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1092 </para></footnote>
1093 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1094 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1095 </para>
1096 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1097 <para>
1098 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1099 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1101 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1102 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1103 property.
1104 It has never taken hold within our law.
1105 </para>
1106 <para>
1107 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1108 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1109 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1110 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1111 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1112 </para>
1113 <para>
1114 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1115 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1116 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1117 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1118 copyright law today regulates both.
1119 </para>
1120 <para>
1121 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1122 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1123 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1124 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1125 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1126 more expense of doing business.
1127 </para>
1128 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1129 <para>
1130 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1131 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1132 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1133 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1134 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1135 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1136 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1137 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1138 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1139 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1140 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1141 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1142 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1143 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1144 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1146 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1147 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1148 <para>
1149 <!-- f4 -->
1150 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1151 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1152 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1153 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1154 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1155 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1156 enabled are much more tenuous.
1157 </para></footnote>
1158 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1159 this creative class.
1160 </para>
1161 <para>
1162 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1163 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1164 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1165 </para>
1166
1167 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1168 <sect1 id="creators">
1169 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1170 <para>
1171 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1172 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1173 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1174 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1175 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1176 </para>
1177 <para>
1178 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1179 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1180 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1181 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1182 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1183 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1184 </para>
1185 <blockquote>
1186 <para>
1187 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1188 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1189 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1190 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1191 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1192 </para>
1193 <para>
1194 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1195 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1196 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1197 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1198 synchronization was pretty close.
1199 </para>
1200 <para>
1201 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1202 electric.
1203 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1204 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1205 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1206 wonderful! And it was something new!<footnote><para>
1207 <!-- f1 -->
1208 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1209 Cartoons
1210 (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1211 </para></footnote>
1212 </para>
1213 </blockquote>
1214 <para>
1215 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1216 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1217 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1218 </para>
1219 <para>
1220 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1221 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1222 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1223 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1224 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1225 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1226 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1227 </para>
1228 <para>
1229 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1230 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1231 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1232 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1233 </para>
1234 <para>
1235 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1236 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1237 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1238 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1239 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1240 genre.
1241 </para>
1242 <para>
1243 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1245 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1246 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1247 <!-- f2 -->
1248 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1249 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1250 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1251 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1252 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1253 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1254 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1255 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1256 </para></footnote>
1257 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1258 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1259 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1260 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1261 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1262 Mouse.
1263 </para>
1264 <para>
1265 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1266 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1267 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1268 <!-- f3 -->
1269 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1270 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1271 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1272 </para></footnote>
1273 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1274 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1275 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1276 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1277 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1278 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1279 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1280 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1281 old.
1282 </para>
1283 <para>
1284 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1285 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1286 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1287 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1288 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1289 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1290 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1291 </para>
1292 <para>
1293 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1294 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1295 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1296 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1297 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1298 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1299 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937),
1300 Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of
1301 the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin
1302 Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1304 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1305 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1306 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1307 Treasure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1308 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1309 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1310 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1311 </para>
1312 <para>
1313 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1314 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1315 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1316 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1317 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1318 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1319 culture around us and makes it something different.
1320 </para>
1321 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1322 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1323 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1324 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1325 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1326 <!-- f4 -->
1327 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1328 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1329 determining
1330 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1331 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1332 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1333 average
1334 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1335 Web site associated with this book, available at
1336 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1337 </para></footnote>
1338 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1339 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1340 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1341 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1342 </para>
1343 <para>
1344 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1345 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1346 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1347 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1348 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1349 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1350 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1351 </para>
1352 <para>
1353 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1354 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1355 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1356 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1357
1358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1359 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1360 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1361 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1362 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1363 content from before the Great Depression.
1364 </para>
1365 <para>
1366 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1367 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1368 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1369 universal.
1370 </para>
1371 <para>
1372 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1373 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1374 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1375 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1376 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1377 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1378 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1379 </para>
1380 <para>
1381 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1382 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1383 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1384 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1385 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1386 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1387 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1388 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1389 interestingly different way.
1390 </para>
1391 <para>
1392 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1393 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1394 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1395 </para>
1396 <para>
1397 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1398 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1399 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1400 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1401 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1402 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1403 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1404 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1405 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1406 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1407 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1408 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1409 </para>
1410 <para>
1411 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1412 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1413 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1414 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1415 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1416 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1417 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1418 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1419 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1420 </para>
1421 <para>
1422 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1423 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1424 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1425 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1426 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1427 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1428 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1429 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1430 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1431 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1432 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1433 original copyright owner's permission.
1434 </para>
1435 <para>
1436 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1437 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1438 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1439 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1440 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1441
1442 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1443 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1444 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1445 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1446 <!-- f5 -->
1447 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1448 York: Perennial, 2000).
1449 </para></footnote>
1450 </para>
1451 <para>
1452 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1453 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1454 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1455 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1456 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1457 which are fifty years old."
1458 </para>
1459 <para>
1460 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1461 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1462 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1463 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1464 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1465 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1466 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1467 <!-- f6 -->
1468 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1469 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1470 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1471 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1472 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1473 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1474 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1475 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1476 </para></footnote>
1477 </para>
1478 <para>
1479 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1480 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1481 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1482 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1483 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1484 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1485 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1486 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1487 culture?
1488 </para>
1489 <para>
1490 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1491 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1492 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1493 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1494 to prosecute cases like this."
1495 </para>
1496 <para>
1497 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1498 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1499 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1500 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1502 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1503 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1504 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1505 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1506 their clients or hurt them?
1507 Let's pause for a moment.
1508 </para>
1509 <para>
1510 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1511 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1512 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1513 </para>
1514 <para>
1515 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1516 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1517 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1518 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1519 <!-- f7 -->
1520 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1521 Vaidhyanathan,
1522 Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1523 University
1524 Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1525 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately describes a set of
1526 "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the
1527 nature of those rights is very different.
1528 </para></footnote>
1529 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1530 property;
1531 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1532 intellectual property.
1533 </para>
1534 <para>
1535 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1536 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1537 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1538 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1539 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1540 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1541 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1542 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1543 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1544 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1545 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1546 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1547 the public domain.
1548 </para>
1549 <para>
1550 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1551 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1552 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1553
1554 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1555 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1556 freedom is good.
1557 </para>
1558 <para>
1559 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1560 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1561 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1562 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1563 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1564 form, whether large or small.
1565 </para>
1566 <para>
1567 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1568 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1569 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1570 particular find it hard to say why.
1571 </para>
1572 <para>
1573 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1574 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1575 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1576 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1577 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1578 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1579 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1580 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1581 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1582 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1583 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster
1584 films in 1997.
1585 </para>
1586 <para>
1587 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1588 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1589 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1590 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1591 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1592 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1593 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1594 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1596 </para>
1597 <para>
1598 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1599 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1600 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1601 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1602 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1603 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1604 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1605 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1606 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1607 </para>
1608 <para>
1609 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1610 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1611 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1612 </para>
1613
1614 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1615 </sect1>
1616 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1617 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1618 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1619 <para>
1620 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1621 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1622 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1623 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1624 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1625 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1626 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1627 </para>
1628 <para>
1629 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1630 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1631 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1632 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1633 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1634 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1635 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1636 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1637 amateurs.
1638 </para>
1639 <para>
1640 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1641 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1642 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1643 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1644 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1645 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1646 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1647 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1648 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1649 population of photographers.
1650 </para>
1651 <para>
1652 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1653 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1654 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1655 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1656 <!-- f1 -->
1657 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1658 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1659 </para>
1660 <blockquote>
1661 <para>
1662 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1663 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1664 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1665 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1666 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1667 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1668 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1669 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1670 chemicals.<footnote>
1671 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1672 <para>
1673 <!-- f2 -->
1674 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1675 1977), 53.
1676 </para></footnote>
1677 </para>
1678 </blockquote>
1679 <para>
1680 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1681 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1682 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1683 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1684 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1685 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1686 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1687 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1688 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1689 percent.<footnote><para>
1690 <!-- f3 -->
1691 Jenkins, 177.
1692 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1693 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1694 <!-- f4 -->
1695 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1696 </para></footnote>
1697 </para>
1698 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1699 <para>
1700
1701 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1702 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1703 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1704 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1705 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1706 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1707 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1708 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1709 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1710 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1711 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1712 <!-- f5 -->
1713 Coe, 58.
1714 </para></footnote>
1715 </para>
1716 <para>
1717 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1718 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1719 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1720 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1721 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1722 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1723 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1724 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1725 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1726 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1727 have before.
1728 </para>
1729 <para>
1730 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1731 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1732 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1733 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1734 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1735 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1736 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1737 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1738 <!-- f6 -->
1739 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1740 </para></footnote>
1741 </para>
1742 <para>
1743 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1744 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1745 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1746 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1747 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1748 draw
1749 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1750 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1751 that they thought valuable.
1752 </para>
1753 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1754 <para>
1755 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1756 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1757 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1758 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1759 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1760 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1761 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1762 <para>
1763 <!-- f7 -->
1764 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1765 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1766 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1767 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1768 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1769 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1770 </para>
1771 <para>
1772 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1773 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1774 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1775 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1776 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1777 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1778 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1779 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1780 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1781 <!-- f8 -->
1782 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1783 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1784 Review 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1785 Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1786 (1993).
1787 </para></footnote>)
1788 </para>
1789 <para>
1790 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1791 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1792 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1793 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1794 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1795 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1796 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1797 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1798 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1799 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1800 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1801 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1802 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1803 </para>
1804 <para>
1805
1806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1807 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1808 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1809 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1810 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1811 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1812 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1813 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1814 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1815 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1816 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1817 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1818 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1819 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1820 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1821 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1822 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1823 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1824 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1825 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1826 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1827 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1828 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1829 learn.
1830 </para>
1831 <para>
1832 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1833 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1834 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1835 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1836 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1837 <!-- f9 -->
1838 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1839 Software
1840 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1841 February 2002, available at
1842 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1843 </para></footnote>
1844 These buses are filled with technology that
1845 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1846 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1847 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1848 teachers call "media literacy."
1849 </para>
1850 <para>
1851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1852 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1853 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1854 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1855 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1856 the way people access it."
1857 </para>
1858 <para>
1859 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1860 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1861 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1862 about.
1863 </para>
1864 <para>
1865 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1866 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1867 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1868 <!-- f10 -->
1869 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1870 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1871 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1872 </para></footnote>
1873 it is increasingly important to understand the
1874 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1875 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1876 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1877 constructing
1878 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1879 </para>
1880 <para>
1881 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1882 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1883 written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult it is to
1884 sequence
1885 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1886 understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1887 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1888 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1889 emotion or builds suspense.
1890 </para>
1891 <para>
1892 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1893 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1894 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1895 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1896 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1897 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1898 </para>
1899 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
1900 <para>
1901 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1902 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1903 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1904
1905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1906 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1907 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1908 texture."<footnote>
1909 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1910 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
1911 <para>
1912 <!-- f11 -->
1913 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1914 2002.
1915 </para></footnote>
1916 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1917 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1918 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1919 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1920 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1921 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1922 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1923 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1924 <!-- f12 -->
1925 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1926 November 2000, available at
1927 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1928 available at
1929 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1930 </para></footnote>
1931 </para>
1932 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1933 <para>
1934 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1935 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1936 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1937 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1938 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1939 </para>
1940 <para>
1941 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1942 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1943 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1944 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1945 </para>
1946 <blockquote>
1947 <para>
1948 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1949 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1950 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1951 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1952 being read-only.
1953 </para>
1954 </blockquote>
1955 <para>
1956 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1957 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1958 twentieth century.
1959 </para>
1960 <para>
1961 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1962 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1963 understanding
1964 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1965 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1966 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1967 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1968 appropriate
1969 language for what they need to create or express."<footnote>
1970 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1971 <para>
1972 <!-- f13 -->
1973 Interview with Daley and Barish.
1974 </para></footnote> It is to enable
1975 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
1976 <!-- f14 -->
1977 Ibid.
1978 </para></footnote>
1979 </para>
1980 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1981 <para>
1982 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
1983 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
1984 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
1985 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
1986 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
1987 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
1988 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
1989 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
1990 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
1991 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
1992 </para>
1993 <para>
1994 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
1995 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
1996 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
1997 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
1998 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
1999 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2000 </para>
2001 <para>
2002 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2003 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2004 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2005 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2006 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2007 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2008 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2009 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2010 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2011 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2012 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2013 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2014 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2015 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2016 to this form of expression.
2017 </para>
2018 <para>
2019
2020 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2021 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2022 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2023 Daley
2024 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2025 meaning."
2026 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2027 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&mdash;and
2028 increasingly,
2029 not the most powerful part&mdash;of constructing meaning. As Daley
2030 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2031 </para>
2032 <blockquote>
2033 <para>
2034 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2035 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2036 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2037 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2038 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2039 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2040 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2041 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2042 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2043 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2044 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2045 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2046 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2047 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2048 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2049 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2050 about the topic. . . .
2051 </para>
2052 <para>
2053 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2054 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2055 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2056 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2057 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2058 </para>
2059 <para>
2060 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2061 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2062 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2064 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2065 had a lot of power with this language."
2066 </para>
2067 </blockquote>
2068 <para>
2069 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2070 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2071 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2072 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2073 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2074 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2075 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2076 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2077 world would be watching.
2078 </para>
2079 <para>
2080 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2081 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2082 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2083 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2084 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2085 entertainment is tragedy.
2086 </para>
2087 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2088 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2089 <para>
2090 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2091 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2092 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2093 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2094 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2095 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2096 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2097 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2098 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2099 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2100 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2101 was also the Internet.
2102 </para>
2103 <para>
2104 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2105 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2106 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2107 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2108 movie
2109 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2110 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2111 with sound or text.
2112 </para>
2113 <para>
2114 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2115 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2116 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2117 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2118 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2119 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2120 spread practically instantaneously.
2121 </para>
2122 <para>
2123 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2124 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2125 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2126 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2127 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2128 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2129 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2130 </para>
2131 <para>
2132 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2133 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2134 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2135 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2136 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2137 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2138 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2139 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2140 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2141 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2142 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2143 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2144 </para>
2145 <para>
2146 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2147 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2148 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2149 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2150 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2151 people vote
2152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2153 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2154 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2155 </para>
2156 <para>
2157 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2158 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2159 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2160 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2161 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2162 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2163 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2164 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2165 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2166 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2167 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2168 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2169 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2170 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2171 <!-- f15 -->
2172 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2173 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2174 </para></footnote>
2175 </para>
2176 <para>
2177 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2178 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2179 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2180 <!-- f16 -->
2181 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2182 Political
2183 Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2184 </para></footnote>
2185 And in some towns in
2186 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2187 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2188 deliberation"
2189 to occur.
2190 </para>
2191 <para>
2192 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2193 occur.
2194 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2195 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2196 politics
2197 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2198 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2199 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2200 <!-- f17 -->
2201 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2202 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2203 </para></footnote> We say what our
2204 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2205 </para>
2206 <para>
2207 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2208 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2209 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2210 Technologies
2211 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2212 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2213
2214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2215 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2216 place.
2217 </para>
2218 <para>
2219 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2220 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2221 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2222 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2223 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2224 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2225 </para>
2226 <para>
2227 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2228 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential
2229 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2230 reading
2231 is having an effect.
2232 </para>
2233 <para>
2234 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2235 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2236 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2237 praising
2238 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2239 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2240 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2241 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2242 instances
2243 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2244 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2245 as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2246 <!-- f18 -->
2247 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2248 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2249 </para></footnote>
2250 </para>
2251 <para>
2252 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2253 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2254 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2255 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2256 on.
2257 </para>
2258 <para>
2259 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2260 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2261 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2262 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2263 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2264 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2265 peer-generated rankings.
2266 </para>
2267 <para>
2268 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2270 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2271 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2272 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2273 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2274 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2275 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2276 get it out of the way."
2277 </para>
2278 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2279 <para>
2280 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2281 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2282 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2283 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2284 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2285 <!-- f19 -->
2286 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2287 </para></footnote>
2288 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2289 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2290 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2291 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2292 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2293 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2294 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2295 </para>
2296 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2297 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2298 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2299 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2300 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2301 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2302 had seen.<footnote><para>
2303 <!-- f20 -->
2304 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2305 Information Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2306 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2307 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2308 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2309 </para></footnote>
2310 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2311 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2312 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2313 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2314 </para>
2315 <para>
2316 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2317 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2318 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2319 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2320 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2321 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2322 <para>
2323 <!-- f21 -->
2324 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2325 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2326 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2327 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2328 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2329 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2330 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2331 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2332 </para></footnote>
2333 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2334
2335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2336 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2337 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2338 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2339 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2340 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2341 </para>
2342 <para>
2343 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2344 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2345 gatekeeper."
2346 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2347 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2348 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2349 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2350 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2351 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2352 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2353 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2354 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2355 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2356 extraordinary
2357 to report.
2358 </para>
2359 <para>
2360 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2361 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2362 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2363 </para>
2364 <para>
2365 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2366 differently
2367 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2368 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2369 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2370 </para>
2371 <para>
2372 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2373 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2374 lawnmower
2375 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2376 technologies
2377 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2378 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2379 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2381 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2382 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2383 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2384 tinkering of many others.
2385 </para>
2386 <para>
2387 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2388 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2389 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2390 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2391 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2392 </para>
2393 <para>
2394 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2395 platform,"
2396 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2397 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2398 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2399 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2400 becomes
2401 a major apprenticeship platform."
2402 </para>
2403 <para>
2404 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2405 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2406 abstract,
2407 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2408 doing
2409 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2410 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2411 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2412 </para>
2413 <para>
2414 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2415 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2416 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2417 multiple
2418 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2419 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2420 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2421 artistic,
2422 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2423 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2424 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2425 </para>
2426 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2427 <para>
2428 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2429 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2430
2431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2432 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2433 of recognition.
2434 </para>
2435 <para>
2436 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2437 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2438 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2439 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2440 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2441 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2442 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2443 </para>
2444 <para>
2445 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2446 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2447 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2448 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2449 general.<footnote><para>
2450 <!-- f22 -->
2451 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2452 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2453 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2454 </para></footnote>
2455 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2456 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2457 </para>
2458 <para>
2459 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2460 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2461 and want to learn."
2462 </para>
2463 <para>
2464 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2465 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2466 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2467 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2468 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2469 </para>
2470 <para>
2471 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2472 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2473 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2474 the law to close down that technology.
2475 </para>
2476 <para>
2477 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2478 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2479 </para>
2480 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2481 </sect1>
2482 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2483 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2484 <para>
2485 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2486 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2487 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2488 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2489 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2490 </para>
2491 <para>
2492 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2493 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2494 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2495 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2496 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2497 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2498 </para>
2499 <para>
2500 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2501 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2502 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2503 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2504 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2505 </para>
2506 <para>
2507 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2508 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2509 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2510 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2511 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2512 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2513 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2514 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2515 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2516 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2517 </para>
2518 <para>
2519 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2520 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2521 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2522 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2523 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2524 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2525 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2526 </para>
2527 <para>
2528 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2529 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2530 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2531 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2532 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2533 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2534 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2535 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2536 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2537 on-line.
2538 </para>
2539 <para>
2540 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2541 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2542 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2543 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2544 be on users' computers.
2545 </para>
2546 <para>
2547 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2548 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2549 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2550 students
2551 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2552 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2553 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2554 computer.
2555 </para>
2556 <para>
2557 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2558 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2559 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2560 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2561 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2562 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2563 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2564 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2565 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2566 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2567 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2568 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2569 supposed to do.
2570 </para>
2571 <para>
2572 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2573 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2574 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2575 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2576 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2577 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2578 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2579 </para>
2580 <para>
2581 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2582 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2583 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2584 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2585 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2586 easier to use"&mdash;again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2587 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2588 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2589 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2590 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2591 </para>
2592 <para>
2593 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2594 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2596 demanded
2597 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2598 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2599 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2600 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2601 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2602 that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2603 </para>
2604 <para>
2605 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2606 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2607 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2608 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2609 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2610 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2611 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2612 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2613 <!-- f1 -->
2614 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2615 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2616 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2617 </para></footnote>
2618 </para>
2619 <para>
2620 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2621 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2622 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2623 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2624 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2625 </para>
2626 <para>
2627 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2628 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2629 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2630 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2631 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2632 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2633 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2634 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2635 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2636 </para>
2637 <para>
2638 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2639 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2640 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2641 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2642 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2643 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2644 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2645 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2646 </para>
2647 <para>
2648 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2649 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2650 </para>
2651 <para>
2652 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2653 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2654 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2655 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2656 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2657 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2658 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2659 <!-- f2 -->
2660 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2661 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2662 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2663 </para></footnote>
2664 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2665 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2666 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2667 <!-- f3 -->
2668 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2669 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2670 </para></footnote>
2671 </para>
2672 <para>
2673 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2674 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2675 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2676 activist:
2677 </para>
2678 <blockquote>
2679 <para>
2680 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2681 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2682 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2683 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2684 </para>
2685 </blockquote>
2686 <para>
2687 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2688 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2689 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2690 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2691 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2692 </para>
2693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2694 </sect1>
2695 <sect1 id="pirates">
2696 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2697 <para>
2698 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2699 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2700 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2701 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2702 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2703 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2704 </para>
2705 <sect2 id="film">
2706 <title>Film</title>
2707 <para>
2708 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2709 <!-- f1 -->
2710 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2711 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2712 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2713 </para></footnote>
2714 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2715 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2716 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2717 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2718 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2719 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2720 this creative property
2721 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2722 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2723 </para>
2724 <para>
2725 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2726 </para>
2727 <blockquote>
2728 <para>
2729 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2730 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2731 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2732 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2733 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2734 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2735 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2736 </para>
2737 <para>
2738 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2739 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2740 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2741 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2742 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2743 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2744 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2745 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2746 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2747 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2748 <!-- f2 -->
2749 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2750 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2751 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2752 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2753 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2754 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2755 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2756 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2757 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2758 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2759 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2760 </para>
2761 </blockquote>
2762 <para>
2763 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2764 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2765 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2766 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2767 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2768 <!-- f3 -->
2769 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2770 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2771 </para></footnote>
2772 That led the independents to flee the East
2773 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2774 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2775 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2776 did just that.
2777 </para>
2778 <para>
2779 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2780 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2781 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2782
2783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2784 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2785 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2786 Edison's creative property.
2787 </para>
2788 </sect2>
2789 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2790 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2791 <para>
2792 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2793 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2794 </para>
2795 <para>
2796 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2797 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2798 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2799 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2800 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2801 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2802 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2803 right to perform it publicly.
2804 </para>
2805 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2806 <para>
2807 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2808 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2809 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2810 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2811 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2812 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2813 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2814 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2815 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2816 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2817 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2818 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2819 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2820 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2821 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2822 its composer anything.
2823 </para>
2824 <para>
2825 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2827 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2828 put it,
2829 </para>
2830 <blockquote>
2831 <para>
2832 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2833 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2834 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2835 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2836 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2837 rights.<footnote><para>
2838 <!-- f4 -->
2839 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2840 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2841 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2842 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2843 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2844 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2845 </para></footnote>
2846 </para>
2847 </blockquote>
2848 <para>
2849 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2850 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2851 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2852 <!-- f5 -->
2853 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2854 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2855 </para></footnote>
2856 and the "music publishing industry"
2857 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2858 <!-- f6 -->
2859 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2860 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2861 </para></footnote>
2862 As John Philip
2863 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2864 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2865 <!-- f7 -->
2866 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2867 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2868 </para></footnote>
2869 </para>
2870 <para>
2871 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2872 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2873 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2874 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2875 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2876 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2877 <!-- f8 -->
2878 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2879 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2880 Perforating
2881 Company of New York).
2882 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2883 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2884 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2885 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2886 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2887 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."<footnote><para>
2888 <!-- f9 -->
2889 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376
2890 (prepared
2891 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2892 American
2893 Graphophone Company Association).
2894 </para></footnote>
2895 </para>
2896 <para>
2897 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2898 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2899 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2900 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2901 control
2902 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2903 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2904 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2905
2906 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2907 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2908 authorizes
2909 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2910 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2911 </para>
2912 <para>
2913 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2914 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2915 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2916 Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2917 recordings
2918 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2919 by the statute.
2920 </para>
2921 <para>
2922 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2923 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
2924 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
2925 whatever
2926 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
2927 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
2928 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
2929 </para>
2930 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2931 <para>
2932 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2933 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
2934 of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
2935 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
2936 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
2937 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
2938 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
2939 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2940 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2941 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
2942 stifle
2943 follow-on creativity.<footnote><para>
2944 <!-- f10 -->
2945 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2946 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2947 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2948 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2949 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2950 </para></footnote>
2951 </para>
2952 <para>
2953 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2954 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2955 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2956 relates,
2957 </para>
2958 <blockquote>
2959 <para>
2960 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2962 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2963 industry
2964 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2965 importance
2966 in the United States and throughout the world; records
2967 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
2968 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
2969 access
2970 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
2971 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
2972 before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
2973 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
2974 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
2975 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
2976 improved
2977 quality, and a greater choice.<footnote><para>
2978 <!-- f11 -->
2979 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
2980 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
2981 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
2982 this report.</para></footnote>
2983 </para>
2984 </blockquote>
2985 <para>
2986 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
2987 creative
2988 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2989 </para>
2990 </sect2>
2991 <sect2 id="radio">
2992 <title>Radio</title>
2993 <para>
2994 Radio was also born of piracy.
2995 </para>
2996 <para>
2997 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
2998 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
2999 <!-- f12 -->
3000 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning, record
3001 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3002 messages
3003 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
3004 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
3005 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
3006 Manufacturing
3007 Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.
3008 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
3009 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
3010 Review 70 (2003): 281.
3011 </para></footnote>
3012 As I described above,
3013 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3014 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3015 composer
3016 money for that performance.
3017 </para>
3018 <para>
3019 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3020 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3021 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3022 Birthday"
3023 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3024 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3025 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3026 station.
3027 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3028 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3029 composer
3030 of the music for his work.
3031
3032 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3033 </para>
3034 <para>
3035 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3036 radio
3037 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3038 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3039 something
3040 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3041 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3042 playing the song.
3043 </para>
3044 <para>
3045 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3046 music.
3047 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3048 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3049 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3050 </para>
3051 <para>
3052 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3053 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3054 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3055 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3056 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3057 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3058 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3059 </para>
3060 <para>
3061 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3062 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3063 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3064 ordinarily
3065 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3066 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3067 something for nothing.
3068 </para>
3069 </sect2>
3070 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3071 <title>Cable TV</title>
3072 <para>
3073
3074 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3075 </para>
3076 <para>
3077 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3078 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3079 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3080 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3081 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3082 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3083 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3084 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3085 give away.
3086 </para>
3087 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3088 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3089 <para>
3090 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3091 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3092 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3093 <!-- f13 -->
3094 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3095 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3096 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3097 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3098 Commission).
3099 </para></footnote>
3100 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3101 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3102 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3103 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3104 <!-- f14 -->
3105 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3106 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3107 </para></footnote>
3108 As another broadcaster put it,
3109 </para>
3110 <blockquote>
3111 <para>
3112 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3113 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3114 paid for.<footnote><para>
3115 <!-- f15 -->
3116 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3117 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3118 </para></footnote>
3119 </para>
3120 </blockquote>
3121 <para>
3122 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3123 </para>
3124 <blockquote>
3125 <para>
3126 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3127 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3128 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3129 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3130 <!-- f16 -->
3131 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3132 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3133 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3134 </para></footnote>
3135 </para>
3136 </blockquote>
3137 <para>
3138 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3139 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3140 compensation."<footnote><para>
3141 <!-- f17 -->
3142 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3143 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3144 </para></footnote>
3145 </para>
3146 <para>
3147 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3148 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3149 </para>
3150 <blockquote>
3151 <para>
3152 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3153 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3154 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3155 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3156
3157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3158 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3159 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3160 <!-- f18 -->
3161 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3162 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3163 </para></footnote>
3164 </para>
3165 </blockquote>
3166 <para>
3167 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3168 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3169 </para>
3170 <para>
3171 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3172 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3173 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3174 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3175 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3176 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3177 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3178 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3179 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3180 created by broadcasters' content.
3181 </para>
3182 <para>
3183 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3184 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3185 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3186 today<footnote><para>
3187 <!-- f19 -->
3188 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3189 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3190 Information, available at
3191 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3192 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3193 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3194 </para></footnote>
3195 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3196 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3197 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3198 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3199 generation&mdash;until now.
3200 </para>
3201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3202 </sect2>
3203 </sect1>
3204 <sect1 id="piracy">
3205 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3206 <para>
3207 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3208 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3209 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3210 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3211 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3212 should stop it.
3213 </para>
3214 <para>
3215 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3216 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3217 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3218 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3219 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3220 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3221 has so often done in the past.
3222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3223 </para>
3224 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3225 <title>Piracy I</title>
3226 <para>
3227 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3228 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3229 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3230 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3231 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3232 <!-- f1 -->
3233 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3234 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3235
3236 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3237 Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3238 </para></footnote>
3239 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3240 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually
3241 worldwide to piracy.
3242 </para>
3243 <para>
3244 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3245 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3246 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3247 This piracy is wrong.
3248 </para>
3249 <para>
3250 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3251 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3252 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3253 foreign
3254 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3255 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3256 developing
3257 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3258 existence, treated as right.
3259 </para>
3260 <para>
3261 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3262 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3263 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3264 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3265 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3266 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3267 violate
3268 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3269 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3270 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3271 </para>
3272 <para>
3273 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3274 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3276 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3277 pirate
3278 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3279 childhood.
3280 </para>
3281 <para>
3282 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3283 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3284 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3285 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3286 <!-- f2 -->
3287 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3288 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3289 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3290 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3291 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3292 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3293 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3294 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3295 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3296 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3297 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3298 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3299 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3300 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3301 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3302 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3303 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3304 is wrong.
3305 </para>
3306 <para>
3307 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3308 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3309 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3310 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3311 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3312 <!-- f3 -->
3313 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3314 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3315 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3316 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3317 instance
3318 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3319 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3320 </para></footnote>
3321 </para>
3322 <para>
3323 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3324 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3325 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3326 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3327 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3328 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3329 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3330 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3331 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3332 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3333 piracy of the tangible.
3334 </para>
3335 <para>
3336 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3337 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3338 property
3339 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3340 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3341 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3342 licenses
3343 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3344 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3345 copyrighted
3346 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3347
3348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3349 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3350 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3351 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3352 technology
3353 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3354 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3355 </para>
3356 <para>
3357 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3358 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3359 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3360 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3361 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3362 nation
3363 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3364 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3365 benefit
3366 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3367 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3368 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3369 Microsoft.
3370 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3371 </para>
3372 <para>
3373 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3374 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3375 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3376 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3377 become
3378 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3379 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3380 </para>
3381 <para>
3382 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3383 alcoholic
3384 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3385 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3386 ordinarily
3387 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3388 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3389 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3390 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3391 giving
3392 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what&mdash;at
3393 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3394 copyright
3395 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3396 wrong.
3397 </para>
3398 <para>
3399 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3400 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3401 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3402 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3403 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3404 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3405 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3406 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3407 is flat out wrong.
3408 </para>
3409 <para>
3410 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3411 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3412 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3413 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3414 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3415 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3416 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3417 </para>
3418 <para>
3419 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3420 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3421 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3422 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3423 </para>
3424 <para>
3425 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3426 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3427 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3428 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3429 </para>
3430 <para>
3431 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3432 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3433 sharing
3434 to survive.
3435 </para>
3436 </sect2>
3437 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3438 <title>Piracy II</title>
3439 <para>
3440 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3441 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3442 <!-- f4 -->
3443 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3444 </para></footnote>
3445 This means we must determine whether
3446 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3447 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3448 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3449 author of his profit.
3450 </para>
3451 <para>
3452 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors
3453 of the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3454 innovations.
3455 Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and,
3456 arguably,
3457 off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3458 <!-- f5 -->
3459 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3460 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3461 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3462 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
3463 up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.
3464 This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing
3465 technology
3466 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see
3467 Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3468 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3469 put together components that had been developed independently.
3470 </para>
3471 <para>
3472 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3473 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3474 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3475 system.<footnote><para>
3476 <!-- f6 -->
3477 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3478 San Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3479 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3480 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3481 "Napster's
3482 Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3483 "Hollywood
3484 at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3485 </para></footnote>
3486 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3487 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3488 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3489 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3490 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3491 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3492 or your 20,000 best friends.
3493 </para>
3494 <para>
3495 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3496 Americans
3497 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3498 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3499 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3500 <!-- f7 -->
3501 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3502 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3503 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3504 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3505 </para></footnote>
3506 A survey by the NPD
3507 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens
3508 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3509 <!-- f8 -->
3510 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3511 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3512 </para></footnote>
3513 The vast
3514 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3515 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3516 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3517 enjoy
3518 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3519 </para>
3520 <para>
3521 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3522 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3523 infringement,
3524 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3525 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more carefully
3526 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do&mdash;the kinds of
3527 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3528 </para>
3529 <para>
3530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3531 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3532 different kinds into four types.
3533 </para>
3534 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3535 <listitem><para>
3536 <!-- A. -->
3537 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3538 purchasing
3539 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3540 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3541 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3542 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3543 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3544 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3545 instead
3546 of purchasing.
3547 </para></listitem>
3548 <listitem><para>
3549 <!-- B. -->
3550 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3551 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3552 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3553 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3554 succeed.
3555 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3556 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3557 recommendations
3558 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3559 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3560 </para></listitem>
3561 <listitem><para>
3562 <!-- C. -->
3563 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3564 copyrighted
3565 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3566 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3567 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3568 rewarding
3569 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3570 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3571 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3572 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3573 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3574 available.)
3575 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3576 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3577 content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same harm
3578 that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3579 a local collector.
3580 </para></listitem>
3581 <listitem><para>
3582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3583 <!-- D. -->
3584 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3585 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3586 wants to give away.
3587 </para></listitem>
3588 </orderedlist>
3589 <para>
3590 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3591 </para>
3592 <para>
3593 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3594 perspective
3595 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3596 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<footnote><para>
3597 <!-- f9 -->
3598 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3599 </para></footnote>
3600 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3601 illegal,
3602 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3603 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3604 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer&mdash;and
3605 certainly
3606 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3607 suggests.
3608 </para>
3609 <para>
3610 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3611 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3612 Hollywood,
3613 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3614 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3615 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3616 that is "devastating" the industry.
3617 </para>
3618 <para>
3619 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3620 harmful
3621 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3622 practice
3623 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3624 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp;
3625 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3626 labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3627 <!-- f10 -->
3628 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3629 Industry's
3630 Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music
3631 industry's
3632 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3633 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3634 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3635 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3636 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent
3637 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3638 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3639 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3640 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&ndash;56.
3641 </para></footnote>
3642 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3643 album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the
3644 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3645 problem,
3646 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3647 </para>
3648 <para>
3649 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3650 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3651 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3652 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3653 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3654 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3655 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3656 <!-- f11 -->
3657 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3658 </para></footnote>
3659 </para>
3660 <para>
3661 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3662 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3663 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3664 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3665 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3666 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3667 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3668 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3669 </para>
3670 <para>
3671 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3672 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3673 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3674 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3675 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3676 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3677 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3678 </para>
3679 <para>
3680 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3681 because
3682 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3683 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3684 </para>
3685 <para>
3686 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3687 percent,
3688 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3689 <!-- f12 -->
3690 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3691 available at
3692 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3693 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3694 25 June 2003, available at
3695 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3696 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3697 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3698 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3699 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3700 music
3701 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3702 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3703 </para></footnote>
3704 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3705 Internet
3706 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3707 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3708 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3709 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3710 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3711 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3712 <!-- f13 -->
3713 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3714 <para>
3715 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3716 February 2003, available at
3717 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3718 </para>
3719 </footnote>
3720 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3721 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3722 High Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie
3723 [on DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3724 <!-- f14 -->
3725 Ibid.
3726 </para></footnote>
3727 </para>
3728 <para>
3729
3730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3731 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3732 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3733 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3734 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3735 although
3736 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3737 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3738 </para>
3739 <para>
3740 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3741 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3742 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3743 between
3744 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3745 numbers
3746 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3747 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3748 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3749 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3750 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3751 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3752 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3753 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3754 between
3755 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3756 </para>
3757 <para>
3758 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3759 assume,
3760 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3761 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3762 costs?
3763 </para>
3764 <para>
3765 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3766 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3767 available.
3768 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3769 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3770 <!-- f15 -->
3771 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3772 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3773 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3774 Committee
3775 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3776 statement
3777 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3778 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3779 </para></footnote>
3780 And while it's
3781 conceivable
3782 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3783 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3784 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3785 distributor
3786 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3787 make it available.
3788 </para>
3789 <para>
3790 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3792 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3793 thousands
3794 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3795 <!-- f16 -->
3796 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3797 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3798 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3799 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3800 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3801 National
3802 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3803 Results,"
3804 available at
3805 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3806 </para></footnote>
3807 These
3808 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3809 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3810 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3811 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3812 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3813 companies
3814 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3815 owner for the content they sell.
3816 </para>
3817 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3818 <para>
3819 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3820 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3821 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3822 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3823 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3824 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3825 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3826 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3827 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3828 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3829 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3830 </para>
3831 <para>
3832 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3833 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3834 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3835 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3836 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3837 shut as well?
3838 </para>
3839 <para>
3840 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3841 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3842 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3843 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3844 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3845 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3846
3847 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3848 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3849 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3850 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3851 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3852 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3853 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3854 great book!)
3855 </para>
3856 <para>
3857 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3858 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3859 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3860 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3861 </para>
3862 <para>
3863 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3864 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3865 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3866 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3867 unavailable?"
3868 </para>
3869 <para>
3870 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3871 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3872 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
3873 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3874 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3875 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3876 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3877 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3878 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3879 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3880 found only with time.
3881 </para>
3882 <para>
3883 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3884 just what you call type A sharing?"
3885 </para>
3886 <para>
3887 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3888 effect
3889 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3890 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3891 Napster
3892 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3893 developed
3894 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3896 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3897 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3898 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3899 <!-- f17 -->
3900 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3901 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3902 MHP, available at
3903 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3904 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3905 Fanning's
3906 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3907 </para></footnote>
3908 </para>
3909 <para>
3910 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3911 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3912 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3913 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3914 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3915 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3916 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3917 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3918 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3919 </para>
3920 <para>
3921 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3922 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3923 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3924 content
3925 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3926 technology.
3927 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3928 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3929 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3930 </para>
3931 <para>
3932 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3933 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3934 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3935 composers,
3936 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3937 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3938 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3939 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3940 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3941 broadcast),
3942 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3943 </para>
3944 <para>
3945 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3946 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3947 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3948 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3949 companies
3950 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3951 </para>
3952 <para>
3953
3954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3955 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3956 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
3957 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3958 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3959 Second,
3960 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3961 content
3962 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3963 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3964 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3965 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3966 Congress
3967 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3968 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3969 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3970 control
3971 over the future (cable).
3972 </para>
3973 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
3974 <para>
3975 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3976 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3977 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3978 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3979 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3980 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3981 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3982 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3983 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3984 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3985 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3986 </para>
3987 <para>
3988 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3989 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3990 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3991 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3992 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
3993 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
3994 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
3995 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
3996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
3997 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
3998 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
3999 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4000 for the architecture it chose.
4001 </para>
4002 <para>
4003 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4004 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4005 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4006 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4007 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4008 copyright."<footnote><para>
4009 <!-- f18 -->
4010 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4011 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4012 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4013 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4014 </para></footnote>
4015 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4016 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4017 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4018 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4019 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4020 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4021 <!-- f19 -->
4022 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4023 </para></footnote>
4024 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4025 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4026 <!-- f20 -->
4027 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4028 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4029 </para></footnote>
4030 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4031 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4032 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4033 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4034 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4035 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4036 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4037 <!-- f21 -->
4038 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4039 of Jack Valenti).
4040 </para></footnote>
4041 </para>
4042 <para>
4043 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4044 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4045 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4046 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4047 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4048 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4049 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4050 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4051 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4052 technology.<footnote><para>
4053 <!-- f22 -->
4054 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4055 1981).
4056 </para></footnote>
4057 </para>
4058 <para>
4059 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4060
4061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4062 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4063 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4064 Court wrote,
4065 </para>
4066 <blockquote>
4067 <para>
4068 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4069 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4070 market
4071 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4072 authority
4073 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4074 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4075 implicated
4076 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4077 <!-- f23 -->
4078 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4079 </para></footnote>
4080 </para>
4081 </blockquote>
4082 <para>
4083 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4084 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4085 Congress
4086 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4087 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4088 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4089 </para>
4090
4091 <table id="t1">
4092 <title>Table</title>
4093 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4094 <thead>
4095 <row>
4096 <entry>CASE</entry>
4097 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4098 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4099 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4100 </row>
4101 </thead>
4102 <tbody>
4103 <row>
4104 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4105 <entry>Composers</entry>
4106 <entry>No protection</entry>
4107 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4108 </row>
4109 <row>
4110 <entry>Radio</entry>
4111 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4112 <entry>N/A</entry>
4113 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4114 </row>
4115 <row>
4116 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4117 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4118 <entry>No protection</entry>
4119 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4120 </row>
4121 <row>
4122 <entry>VCR</entry>
4123 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4124 <entry>No protection</entry>
4125 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4126 </row>
4127 </tbody>
4128 </tgroup>
4129 </table>
4130
4131 <para>
4132 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4133 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4134 <!-- f24 -->
4135 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4136 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4137 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4138 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4139 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4140 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4141 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4142 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4143 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4144 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4145 </para></footnote>
4146 In each case, throughout our history,
4147 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4148 work.
4149 </para>
4150 <para>
4151 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4152 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4153 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4154 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4155 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4156 legitimacy
4157 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4158 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4159 the interests at stake.
4160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4161 </para>
4162 <para>
4163 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4164 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4165 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4166 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4167 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4168 regulated?
4169 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4170 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4171 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4172 permission to record a song?
4173 </para>
4174 <para>
4175 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4176 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4177 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4178 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4179 <!-- f25 -->
4180 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4181 (1984).
4182 </para></footnote>
4183 Instead, the particular uses that the
4184 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4185 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4186 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4187 technology
4188 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4189 the distribution of content.
4190 </para>
4191 <para>
4192 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4193 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4194 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4195 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4196 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4197 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4198 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4199 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4200 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4201 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4202 protection
4203 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4204 continue.
4205 </para>
4206 <para>
4207
4208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4209 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4210 superior
4211 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4212 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4213 network.
4214 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4215 efficient.
4216 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4217 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4218 <!-- f26 -->
4219 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4220 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4221 </para></footnote>
4222 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4223 warriors
4224 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4225 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4226 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4227 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4228 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4229 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4230 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4231 </para>
4232 <para>
4233 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4234 just as any other property is protected."
4235 </para>
4236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4237 </sect2>
4238 </sect1>
4239 </chapter>
4240 <chapter id="c-property">
4241 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4242 <para>
4243
4244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4245 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4246 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4247 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4248 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4249 the price she can get.
4250 </para>
4251 <para>
4252 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4253 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4254 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4255 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4256 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4257 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4258 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4259 going
4260 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4261 thing I am taking then?
4262 </para>
4263 <para>
4264 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4265 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4267 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4268 narrow
4269 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4270 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4271 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4272 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4273 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4274 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4275 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4276 <!-- f1 -->
4277 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4278 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4279 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4280 </para></footnote>
4281 </para>
4282 <para>
4283 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4284 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4285 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4286 expression
4287 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4288 property.
4289 </para>
4290 <para>
4291 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4292 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4293 turning
4294 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4295 "property"
4296 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4297 <!-- f2 -->
4298 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4299 intangible.
4300 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4301 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4302 physical
4303 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4304 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4305 Property?
4306 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4307 373, 429 n. 241.
4308 </para></footnote>
4309 </para>
4310 <para>
4311 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4312 preceding
4313 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4314 material
4315 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4316 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4317 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4318 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4319 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4320 us draw.
4321 </para>
4322
4323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4324 <sect1 id="founders">
4325 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4326 <para>
4327 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4328 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4329 Shakespeare
4330 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4331 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4332 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4333 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4334 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4335 adaptation
4336 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4337 </para>
4338 <para>
4339 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4340 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4341 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4342 <!-- f1 -->
4343 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4344 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4345 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4346 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4347 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4348 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4349 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4350 </para></footnote>
4351 Tonson was the
4352 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4353 <!-- f2 -->
4354 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4355 Vanderbilt
4356 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4357 </para></footnote>
4358 who
4359 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4360 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4361 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4363 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4364 copyright.
4365 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4366 produce
4367 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4368 </para>
4369 <para>
4370 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4371 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4372 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4373 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4374 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4375 renewable
4376 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4377 published
4378 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4379 <!-- f3 -->
4380 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4381 "copyright
4382 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4383 </para></footnote>
4384 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4385 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4386 </para>
4387 <para>
4388 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4389 "copyright"
4390 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4391 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4392 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4393 expired
4394 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4395 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4396 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4397 publishers,
4398 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4399 </para>
4400 <para>
4401 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4402 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4403 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4404 govern
4405 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4406 "positive
4407 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4408 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4409 legislature,
4410 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4411 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4412 expired
4413 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4414 independent
4415 of any positive law.
4416 </para>
4417 <para>
4418 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4419 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4420 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4421 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4422
4423 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4424 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4425 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4426 ultimately
4427 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4428 </para>
4429 <para>
4430 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4431 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4432 however,
4433 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4434 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4435 "expired,"
4436 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4437 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4438 </para>
4439 <para>
4440 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4441 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4442 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4443 </para>
4444 <para>
4445 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4446 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4447 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4448 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4449 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4450 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4451 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4452 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4453 reason
4454 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4455 </para>
4456 <para>
4457 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4458 special
4459 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4460 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4461 "booksellers."
4462 </para>
4463 <para>
4464 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4465 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4466 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4467 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4468 others
4469 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4470 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4471 beyond
4472 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4474 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4475 restrictions
4476 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4477 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4478 perform, and so on.
4479 </para>
4480 <para>
4481 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4482 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4483 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4484 permission
4485 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4486 anything,
4487 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4488 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4489 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4490 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4491 </para>
4492 <para>
4493 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4494 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4495 especially
4496 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4497 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4498 monopolies&mdash;especially
4499 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4500 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4501 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4502 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4503 Monopolies,
4504 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4505 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4506 publishing.
4507 </para>
4508 <para>
4509 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4510 naturally
4511 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4512 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4513 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4514 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4515 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4516 specialinterest
4517 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4518 </para>
4519 <para>
4520 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4521 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4522 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4523 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4525 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4526 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4527 themselves
4528 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4529 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4530 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4531 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4532 <!-- f4 -->
4533 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4534 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4535 </para></footnote>
4536 </para>
4537 <para>
4538 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4539 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4540 Enlightenment
4541 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4542 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4543 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4544 that idea.
4545 </para>
4546 <para>
4547 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4548 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4549 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4550 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4551 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4552 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4553 compromise
4554 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4555 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4556 construction and spread of culture.
4557 </para>
4558 <para>
4559 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4560 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4561 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4562 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4563 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4564 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4565 they said; they needed more time.
4566 </para>
4567 <para>
4568 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4569 words that echo today,
4570 </para>
4571 <blockquote>
4572 <para>
4573 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4574 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4575 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4576 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4577 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4578 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4579 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4580 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4581 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4582 <!-- f5 -->
4583 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4584 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4585 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4586 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4587 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4588 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4589 al., 8, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4590 </para></footnote>
4591 </para>
4592 </blockquote>
4593 <para>
4594 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4595 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4596 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4597 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4598 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4599 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4600 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4601 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4602 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4603 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4604 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4605 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4606 way to protect authors.
4607 </para>
4608 <para>
4609 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4610 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4611 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4612 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4613 rancher has for cattle."<footnote><para>
4614 <!-- f6 -->
4615 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4616 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4617 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4618 </para></footnote>
4619 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4620 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4621 </para>
4622 <para>
4623 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4624 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4625 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4626 <!-- f7 -->
4627 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4628 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4629 </para></footnote>
4630 </para>
4631 <para>
4632 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4633 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4634 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4635 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4636 <!-- f8 -->
4637 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4638 1993), 92.
4639 </para></footnote>
4640 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4642 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4643 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4644 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4645 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4646 <!-- f9 -->
4647 Ibid., 93.
4648 </para></footnote>
4649 </para>
4650 <para>
4651 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4652 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4653 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4654 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4655 Property."<footnote><para>
4656 <!-- f10 -->
4657 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4658 Borwell).
4659 </para></footnote>
4660 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4661 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4662 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4663 </para>
4664 <para>
4665 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4666 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4667 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4668 </para>
4669 <para>
4670 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4671 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4672 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4673 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4674 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4675 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4676 <!-- f11 -->
4677 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4678 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review 29
4679 (1983): 1152.
4680 </para></footnote>
4681 </para>
4682 <para>
4683 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4684 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4685 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4686 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4687 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4688 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4689 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4690 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4691 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4692 </para>
4693 <para>
4694 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4695 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4696 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4697 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4698 with in 1710: How best to limit
4699 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4700 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4701 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4702 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4703 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4704 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4705 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4706 </para>
4707 <para>
4708 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4709 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4710 </para>
4711 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4712 <para>
4713 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4714 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4715 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4716 <!-- f12 -->
4717 Ibid., 1156.
4718 </para></footnote>
4719 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4720 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4721 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4722 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4723 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4724 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4725 </para>
4726 <para>
4727 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4728 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4729 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4730 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4731 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4732 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4733 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4734 statute were no longer protected.
4735 </para>
4736 <para>
4737 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4738 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4739 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4740 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4741 House of Lords generally voted.
4742 </para>
4743 <para>
4744 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4745 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4746 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4747 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4748 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4749 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4750 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4751 passed into the public domain.
4752 </para>
4753 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4754 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4755 <para>
4756 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4757 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4758 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4759 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4760 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4761 and the greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of
4762 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of
4763 legal restraint.
4764 </para>
4765 <para>
4766 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4767 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4768 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4769 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4770 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4771 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4772 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4773 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4774 and illuminations."<footnote><para>
4775 <!-- f13 -->
4776 Rose, 97.
4777 </para></footnote>
4778 </para>
4779 <para>
4780 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4781 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4782 reported:
4783 </para>
4784 <blockquote>
4785 <para>
4786 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4787 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4788 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4789 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4790 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4791 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4792 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4793 successors.<footnote><para>
4794 <!-- f14 -->
4795 Ibid.
4796 </para></footnote>
4797 </para>
4798 </blockquote>
4799 <para>
4800 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4801 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4802 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4803 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4804 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4805 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4806 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4807 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4808 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4809 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4810 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4811 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4812 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4813 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4814 readers chose to let it develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought
4815 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4816 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4817 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4818 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4819 </para>
4820 <para>
4821 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4822 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4823 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4824 protected.
4825 </para>
4826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4827 </sect1>
4828 <sect1 id="recorders">
4829 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4830 <para>
4831 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4832 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4833 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4834 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4835 He was their god.)
4836 </para>
4837 <para>
4838 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4839 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4840 today.
4841 </para>
4842 <para>
4843 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4844 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4845 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4846 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4847 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4848 stage.
4849 </para>
4850 <para>
4851 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4852 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4853 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4854 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4855 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4856 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4857 about the scene.
4858 </para>
4859 <para>
4860 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4861 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4862 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4863 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4864 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4865 </para>
4866 <para>
4867 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4868 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4869 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4870 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4871 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4872 </para>
4873 <para>
4874 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4875 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4876 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4877 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4878 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4879 </para>
4880 <para>
4881 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4882 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4883 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4884 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4885 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4886 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4887 </para>
4888 <para>
4889 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4890 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4891 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4892 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4893 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4894 confirm what he had been told.
4895 </para>
4896 <para>
4897 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4898 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4899 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4900 about
4901
4902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4903 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4904 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4905 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4906 the money."
4907 </para>
4908 <para>
4909 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4910 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4911 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4912 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4913 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4914 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4915 </para>
4916 <para>
4917 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4918 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4919 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4920 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4921 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4922 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4923 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4924 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4925 says the owner gets to control.
4926 </para>
4927 <para>
4928 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4929 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4930 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4931 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4932 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4933 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
4934 by the law.
4935 </para>
4936 <para>
4937 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4938 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4939 <!-- f1 -->
4940 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4941 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4942 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4943 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4944 Law School, 5 August 2003.
4945 </para></footnote>
4946 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4947 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use does
4948 not require the permission of anyone.
4949 </para>
4950 <para>
4951 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4952 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4953 </para>
4954 <blockquote>
4955 <para>
4956 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4957 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4958 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4959 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4960 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4961 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4962 </para>
4963 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
4964 <listitem><para>
4965 <!-- 1. -->
4966 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4967 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
4968 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
4969 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
4970 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
4971 </para></listitem>
4972 <listitem><para>
4973 <!-- 2. -->
4974 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
4975 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
4976 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
4977 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
4978 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
4979 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
4980 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
4981 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
4982 principle.
4983 </para></listitem>
4984 <listitem><para>
4985 <!-- 3. -->
4986 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
4987 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
4988 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
4989 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
4990 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
4991 pockets, me or them.
4992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
4993 </para></listitem>
4994 <listitem><para>
4995 <!-- 4. -->
4996 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
4997 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
4998 money.
4999 </para></listitem>
5000 </orderedlist>
5001 </blockquote>
5002 <para>
5003 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5004 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5005 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5006 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5007 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5008 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5009 </para>
5010 <para>
5011 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5012 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5013 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5014 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5015 not.
5016 </para>
5017 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5018 </sect1>
5019 <sect1 id="transformers">
5020 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5021 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5022 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5023 <para>
5024 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5025 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5026 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5027 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5028 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5029 </para>
5030 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5031 <para>
5032 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5033 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5034 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5035 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5036 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5037 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5038 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5039 important to his career.
5040 </para>
5041 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5042 <para>
5043 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5044 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5045 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5046 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5047 </para>
5048 <para>
5049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5050 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5051 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5052 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5053 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5054 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5055 </para>
5056 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5057 <para>
5058 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5059 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5060 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5061 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5062 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5063 actor's career."
5064 </para>
5065 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5066 <para>
5067 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5068 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5069 </para>
5070 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5071 <para>
5072 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5073 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5074 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5075 for it."<footnote>
5076 <indexterm>
5077 <primary>artists</primary>
5078 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5079 </indexterm>
5080 <para>
5081 <!-- f1 -->
5082 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5083 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5084 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5085 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5086 </para></footnote>
5087 </para>
5088 <para>
5089 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5090 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5091 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5092 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5093 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5094 </para>
5095 <para>
5096 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5097 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5098 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5099 </para>
5100 <blockquote>
5101 <para>
5102 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5103 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5104 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5105 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5106 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5107 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5108 </para>
5109 <para>
5110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5111 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5112 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5113 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5114 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5115 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5116 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5117 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5118 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5119 started calling people.
5120 </para>
5121 </blockquote>
5122 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5123 <para>
5124 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5125 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5126 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5127 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5128 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5129 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5130 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5131 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5132 career.
5133 </para>
5134 <para>
5135 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5136 were totally in the clear."
5137 </para>
5138 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5139 <para>
5140 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5141 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5142 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5143 </para>
5144 <blockquote>
5145 <para>
5146 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5147 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5148 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5149 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5150 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5151 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5152 systematically and cleared the rights.
5153 </para>
5154 </blockquote>
5155 <para>
5156
5157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5158 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5159 loved it, and it sold very well.
5160 </para>
5161 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5162 <para>
5163 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5164 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5165 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5166 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5167 at all."<footnote><para>
5168 <!-- f2 -->
5169 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5170 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5171 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5172 </para></footnote>
5173 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5174 has to be made?
5175 </para>
5176 <para>
5177 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5178 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5179 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5180 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5181 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5182 </para>
5183 <blockquote>
5184 <para>
5185 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5186 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5187 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5188 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5189 compensated for that.
5190 </para>
5191 </blockquote>
5192 <para>
5193 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5194 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license
5195 that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips
5196 like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
5197 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get
5198 explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the
5199 legal part of the creative process could be made to be more clean?
5200 </para>
5201 <blockquote>
5202 <para>
5203 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5204 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5205 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5206 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5208 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5209 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5210 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5211 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5212 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5213 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5214 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5215 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5216 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5217 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5218 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5219 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5220 </para>
5221 </blockquote>
5222 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5223 <para>
5224 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5225 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5226 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5227 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5228 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5229 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5230 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5231 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5232 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5233 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5234 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5235 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5236 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5237 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5238 "Does this still make sense?"
5239 </para>
5240 <para>
5241 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5242 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5243 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5244 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5245
5246 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5247 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5248 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5249 </para>
5250 <para>
5251 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5252 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5253 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5254 judges loved every minute of it.
5255 </para>
5256 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5257 <para>
5258 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5259 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5260 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5261 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5262 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5263 were just violated in this room?"
5264 </para>
5265 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5266 <para>
5267 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5268 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5269 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5270 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5271 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5272 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5273 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5274 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5275 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5276 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5277 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5278 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5279 couldn't easily do them legally.
5280 </para>
5281 <para>
5282 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5283 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5284 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5285 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5286 planted in your presentation.
5287 </para>
5288 <para>
5289 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5290 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5291 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5292 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5293 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5294 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5295 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5296 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5297 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5298 </para>
5299 <para>
5300 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5301 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5302 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5303 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5304 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5305 </para>
5306 <para>
5307 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5308 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5309 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5310 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5311 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5312 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5313 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5314 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5315 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5316 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5317 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5318 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5319 registers the work.
5320 </para>
5321 <para>
5322 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5323 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5324 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5325 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5326 </para>
5327 <para>
5328 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5329 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5330 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5331 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5332 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5333 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5334 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5335 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5336 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5337 entertainment."
5338 </para>
5339 <para>
5340 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5341 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5342 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5343 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5344 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5345 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5346 new audiences, it is Mike."
5347 </para>
5348 <para>
5349 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5350 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5351 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5352 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5353 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5354 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5355 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5356 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5357 </para>
5358 <para>
5359 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5360 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5361 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5362 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5363 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5364 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5365 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5366 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5367 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5368 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5369 curse, reserved for the few.
5370 </para>
5371 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5372 </sect1>
5373 <sect1 id="collectors">
5374 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5375 <para>
5376 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5377 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5378 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5379 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5380 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5381 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5382 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5383 </para>
5384 <para>
5385 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5386 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5387 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5388 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5389 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5390 well as when those pages changed.
5391 </para>
5392 <para>
5393 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5394 appreciated. In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5395 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5396 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5397 reports.
5398 </para>
5399 <para>
5400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5401 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5402 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5403 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5404 </para>
5405 <para>
5406 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5407 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5408 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5409 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5410 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5411 </para>
5412 <para>
5413 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5414 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5415 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5416 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5417 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5418 <!-- f1 -->
5419 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5420 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5421 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5422 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5423 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5424 </para></footnote>
5425 </para>
5426 <para>
5427 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5428 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5429 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5430 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5431 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5432 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5433 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5434 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5435 truth.
5436 </para>
5437 <para>
5438 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5439 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is
5440 whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More
5441 directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
5442 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it,
5443 for schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society
5444 presumes this knowedge.
5445 </para>
5446 <para>
5447 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5448 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5449 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5450 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5451 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5452 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5453 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5454 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5455 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5456 </para>
5457 <para>
5458 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5459 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5460 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5461 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5462 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5463 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5464 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5465 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5466 </para>
5467 <para>
5468 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5469 human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5470 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the
5471 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5472 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5473 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5474 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5475 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5476 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5477 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5478 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5479 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5480 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5481 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5482 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5483 </para>
5484 <blockquote>
5485 <para>
5486 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5487 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5488 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5489 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5490 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5491
5492 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5493 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5494 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5495 </para>
5496 </blockquote>
5497 <para>
5498 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5499 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5500 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5501 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5502 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5503 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5504 </para>
5505 <para>
5506 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5507 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5508 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5509 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5510 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5511 work.
5512 </para>
5513 <para>
5514 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5515 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5516 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5517 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5518 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed
5519 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5520 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5521 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5522 <!-- f2 -->
5523 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5524 the Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5525 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5526 Preservation in the United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5527 Co., 1992), 36.
5528 </para></footnote>
5529 </para>
5530 <para>
5531 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5532 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5533 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5534 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5535 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5536 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5537 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5538 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5539 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5540 </para>
5541 <para>
5542 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5544 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5545 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5546 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5547 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5548 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5549 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5550 events of that day.
5551 </para>
5552 <para>
5553 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5554 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5555 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5556 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5557 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5558 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5559 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5560 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5561 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5562 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5563 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5564 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5565 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5566 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5567 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5568 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5569 </para>
5570 <para>
5571 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5572 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5573 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5574 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5575 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5576 to find them.
5577 </para>
5578 <para>
5579 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5580 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5581 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5582 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5583 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5584 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5585 </para>
5586 <para>
5587 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5588 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5589 life, if the
5590
5591 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5592 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5593 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5594 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5595 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5596 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5597 </para>
5598 <para>
5599 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5600 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5601 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5602 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5603 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5604 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5605 longer sold.
5606 </para>
5607 <para>
5608 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5609 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5610 <!-- f3 -->
5611 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5612 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5613 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5614 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5615 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston
5616 College Law Review 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5617 </para></footnote>). After
5618 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5619 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5620 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5621 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5622 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5623 </para>
5624 <para>
5625 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5626 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5627 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5628 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5629 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5630 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5631 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5632 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5633 disappears.
5634 </para>
5635 <para>
5636 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5637 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5638 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5639 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5640 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5641 generally, the
5642 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5643 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5644 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5645 little practical effect.
5646 </para>
5647 <para>
5648 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5649 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5650 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5651 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5652 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5653 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5654 </para>
5655 <para>
5656 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5657 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5658 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5659 Kahle describes,
5660 </para>
5661 <blockquote>
5662 <para>
5663 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5664 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5665 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5666 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5667 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5668 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5669 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5670 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5671 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5672 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5673 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5674 </para>
5675 </blockquote>
5676 <para>
5677 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5678 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5679 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5680 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5681 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5682 remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
5683 it;
5684 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5685 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5686 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5687 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5688 future for our past. The technology of digital arts could make the
5689 dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5690 </para>
5691 <para>
5692 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5693 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5694 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5695 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5696 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5697 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5698 </para>
5699 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5700 </sect1>
5701 <sect1 id="property-i">
5702 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5703 <para>
5704 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5705 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5706 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5707 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5708 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5709 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5710 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5711 </para>
5712 <para>
5713 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5714 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5715 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5716 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5717 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5718 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5719 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5720 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5721 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5722 Warner Brothers.
5723 </para>
5724 <para>
5725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5726 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5727 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5728 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5729 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5730 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5731 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5732 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5733 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5734 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5735 Washingtonian way.
5736 </para>
5737 <para>
5738 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5739 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5740 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5741 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5742 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5743 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5744 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5745 </para>
5746 <para>
5747 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5748 perfectly:
5749 </para>
5750 <blockquote>
5751 <para>
5752 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5753 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5754 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5755 theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must
5756 be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other
5757 property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the
5758 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
5759 debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5760 <!-- f1 -->
5761 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5762 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5763 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5764 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5765 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5766 Valenti).
5767 </para></footnote>
5768 </para>
5769 </blockquote>
5770 <para>
5771 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5772 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5773 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5774 this:
5775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5776 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5777 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5778 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5779 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5780 </para>
5781 <para>
5782 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5783 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5784 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5785 extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this
5786 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant,
5787 is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature
5788 and scope of "creative property." His views have no reasonable
5789 connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of
5790 his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
5791 Washington.
5792 </para>
5793 <para>
5794 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5795 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5796 <!-- f2 -->
5797 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5798 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5799 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5800 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5801 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5802 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the
5803 Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5804 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5805 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5806 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5807 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5808 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5809 in our tradition.
5810 </para>
5811 <para>
5812 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5813 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5814 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5815 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5816 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5817 culture would develop.
5818 </para>
5819 <para>
5820 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5821 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5822 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5823 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5824 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5825 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5826 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5827 the same would be to
5828
5829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5830 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5831 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5832 perfect control.
5833 </para>
5834 <para>
5835 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5836 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5837 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5838 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5839 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5840 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5841 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5842 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5843 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5844 Constitution itself.
5845 </para>
5846 <para>
5847 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5848 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5849 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
5850 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5851 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5852 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5853 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5854 sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the
5855 government pays for the privilege.
5856 </para>
5857 <para>
5858 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5859 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5860 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that
5861 after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
5862 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet
5863 when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term
5864 "takes" your copyright and turns it over to the public domain,
5865 Congress does not have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for
5866 this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that requires
5867 compensation for your land
5868 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5869 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5870 compensation at all.
5871 </para>
5872 <para>
5873 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5874 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5875 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5876 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5877 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5878 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5879 itself.
5880 </para>
5881 <para>
5882 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5883 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5884 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5885 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5886 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5887 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
5888 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5889 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5890 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5891 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5892 </para>
5893 <para>
5894 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5895 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5896 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given
5897 the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5898 creative property there must be a public domain?
5899 </para>
5900 <para>
5901 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5902 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5903 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5904 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5905 should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property
5906 should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights
5907 the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix
5908 of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether
5909 institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
5910 control how culture develops.
5911 </para>
5912 <para>
5913
5914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5915 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5916 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5917 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5918 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5919 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5920 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5921 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5922 </para>
5923 <figure id="fig-1331">
5924 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
5925 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
5926 </figure>
5927 <para>
5928 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5929 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5930 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5931 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5932 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5933 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5934 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5935 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5936 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5937 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5938 Web, you can be punished
5939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5940 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5941 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5942 </para>
5943 <para>
5944 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5945 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5946 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5947 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5948 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5949 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5950 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5951 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5952 the source of the enforcement.
5953 </para>
5954 <para>
5955 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5956 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5957 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5958 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5959 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5960 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5961 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5962 individual or group might behave.
5963 </para>
5964 <para>
5965 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
5966 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
5967 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
5968 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
5969 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
5970 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
5971 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
5972 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
5973 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
5974 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder
5975 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
5976 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
5977 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
5978 </para>
5979 <para>
5980
5981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
5982 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
5983 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
5984 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
5985 undermined by another.
5986 </para>
5987 <para>
5988 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
5989 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
5990 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
5991 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
5992 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
5993 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
5994 must consider how these four in particular interact.
5995 </para>
5996 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
5997 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
5998 </indexterm>
5999 <para>
6000 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6001 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6002 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6003 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6004 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6005 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6006 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6007 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6008 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6009 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6010 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6011 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6012 </para>
6013 <para>
6014 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6015 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6016 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6017 <!-- f3 -->
6018 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6019 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6020 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6021 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6022 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And
6023 Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6024 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies,
6025 June 1998.
6026 </para></footnote>
6027 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6028 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6029 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6030 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6031 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6032 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6033 used to require that other laws be more
6034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6035 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6036 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6037 driving.
6038 </para>
6039 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6040
6041 <figure id="fig-1361">
6042 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6043 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6044 </figure>
6045 <para>
6046 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6047 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6048 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6049 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6050 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6051 another.<footnote>
6052 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6053 <para>
6054 <!-- f4 -->
6055 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6056 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6057 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6058 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6059 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6060 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6061 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6062 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6063 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6064 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6065 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6066 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6067 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6068 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6069 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6070 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6071 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6072 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6073 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6074 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6075 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6076 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6077 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6078 places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6079 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6080 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6081 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6082 of these groups might face. </para></footnote>
6083 </para>
6084 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6085 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6086 <para>
6087 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6088 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6089 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6090 rallying makes sense.
6091 </para>
6092 <para>
6093 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6094 Internet:
6095 </para>
6096 <figure id="fig-1371">
6097 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6098 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6099 </figure>
6100 <para>
6101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6102 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6103 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6104 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6105 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6106 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6107 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6108 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6109 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6110 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6111 this form of infringement.
6112 </para>
6113 <para>
6114 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6115 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6116 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6117 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6118 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6119 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6120 </para>
6121 <para>
6122 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6123 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6124 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6125 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6126 Iraq
6127 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6128 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6129 looting that results.
6130 </para>
6131 <figure id="fig-1381">
6132 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6133 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6134 </figure>
6135 <para>
6136 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6137 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6138 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6139 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6140 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6141 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6142 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6143 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6144 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6145 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6146 </para>
6147 <para>
6148 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6149 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6150 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6151 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6152 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6153 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6154 life. Homeowners living in a
6155
6156 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6157 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6158 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6159 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6160 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6161 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6162 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6163 </para>
6164 <para>
6165 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6166 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6167 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6168 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6169 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6170 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6171 </para>
6172 <para>
6173 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6174 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6175 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6176 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6177 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6178 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6179 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6180 <!-- f5 -->
6181 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6182 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6183 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6184 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6185 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6186 October 2003, available at
6187 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6188 </para></footnote>
6189
6190 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6191 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6192 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6193 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6194 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6195 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6196 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6197 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6198 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6199 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6200 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6201 </para>
6202 <para>
6203 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6204 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6205 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6207 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6208 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6209 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6210 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6211 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6212 <!-- f6 -->
6213 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6214 </para></footnote>
6215 And relative to a
6216 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6217 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6218 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6219 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6220 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6221 Brezhnev.
6222 </para>
6223 <para>
6224 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6225 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6226 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6227 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6228 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6229 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6230 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6231 opportunities for innovation and change.
6232 </para>
6233 <para>
6234 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6235 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6236 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6237 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6238 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6239 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6240 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6241 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6242 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6243 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6244 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6245 regulation is justified.
6246 </para>
6247 <para>
6248 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6249 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6250 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6251 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6252 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6253 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6254 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6255 </para>
6256 <para>
6257 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6258 </para>
6259 <para>
6260 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6261 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6262 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6263 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6264 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6265 </para>
6266 <para>
6267 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6268 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6269 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6270 </para>
6271 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6272 <para>
6273 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6274 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6275 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6276 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6277 </para>
6278 <para>
6279 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6280 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6281 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6282 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6283 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6284 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6285 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6286 </para>
6287 <para>
6288 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6289 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6290 culture.<footnote><para>
6291 <!-- f7 -->
6292 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6293 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6294 </para></footnote>
6295 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6296 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6297 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6298 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6299 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6300 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6301 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6302 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6303 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6304 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6305 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6306 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6307 </para>
6308 <para>
6309 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6310 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6311 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6312 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6313 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6314 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6315 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6316 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6317 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6318 </para>
6319 <para>
6320 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6321 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6322 be lost.
6323 </para>
6324 </sect2>
6325 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6326 <title>Beginnings</title>
6327 <para>
6328 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6329 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6330 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6331 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6332 </para>
6333 <para>
6334 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6335 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6336 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6337 </para>
6338 <para>
6339 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6340 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6341 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6342
6343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6344 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6345 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6346 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6347 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6348 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6349 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6350 </para>
6351 <para>
6352 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6353 in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6354 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6355 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6356 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6357 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6358 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6359 </para>
6360 <para>
6361 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6362 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6363 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6364 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6365 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6366 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6367 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6368 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6369 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6370 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6371 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6372 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6373 power.
6374 </para>
6375 <para>
6376 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6377 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6378 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6379 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6380 years since they first struck its design.
6381 </para>
6382 <para>
6383 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6384 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6386 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6387 started here:
6388 </para>
6389 <figure id="fig-1441">
6390 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6391 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6392 </figure>
6393 <para>
6394 We will end here:
6395 </para>
6396 <figure id="fig-1442">
6397 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6398 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6399 </figure>
6400 <para>
6401 Let me explain how.
6402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6403 </para>
6404 </sect2>
6405 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6406 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6407 <para>
6408 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6409 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6410 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6411 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6412 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6413 authorship.<footnote>
6414 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6415 <para>
6416 <!-- f8 -->
6417 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6418 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6419 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6420 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6421 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6422 </para></footnote>
6423 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6424 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6425 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6426 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6427 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6428 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6429 </para>
6430 <para>
6431 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6432 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6433 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6434 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6435 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6436 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6437 </para>
6438 <para>
6439 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6440 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6441 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6442 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6443 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6444 </para>
6445 <para>
6446 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6447 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6448 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6449 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6450 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6451 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6452 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6453 <!-- f9 -->
6454 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6455 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6456 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6457 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6458 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6459 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6460 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6461 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6462 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6463 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6464 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6465 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6466 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6467 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6468 </para>
6469 <para>
6470 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6471 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6473 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6474 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6475 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6476 copyright, either.
6477 </para>
6478 <para>
6479 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6480 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6481 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6482 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6483 domain.<footnote><para>
6484 <!-- f10 -->
6485 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6486 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6487 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6488 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6489 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6490 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6491 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6492 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6493 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6494 </para>
6495 <para>
6496 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6497 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6498 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6499 <!-- f11 -->
6500 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6501 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6502 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6503 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6504 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6505 effectively free.
6506 </para>
6507 <para>
6508 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6509 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6510 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6511 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6512 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6513 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6514 </para>
6515 <para>
6516 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6517 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6518 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6519 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6520 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6521 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6522 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6523 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6524 </para>
6525 <para>
6526 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6527 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6528 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6529 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6530
6531 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6532 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6533 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6534 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6535 </para>
6536 <para>
6537 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6538 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6539 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6540 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6541 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6542 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6543 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6544 value.
6545 </para>
6546 <para>
6547 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6548 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6549 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6550 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6551 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6552 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6553 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6554 was ninety-five years.
6555 </para>
6556 <para>
6557 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6558 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6559 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6560 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6561 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6562 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6563 them.
6564 </para>
6565 <para>
6566 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6567 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6568 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6569 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6570 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6571 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6572 years.<footnote><para>
6573 <!-- f12 -->
6574 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6575 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6576 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6577 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6578 </para></footnote>
6579 </para>
6580 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6581 </sect2>
6582 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6583 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6584 <para>
6585 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6586 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6587 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6588 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6589 </para>
6590 <para>
6591 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6592 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6593 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6594 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6595 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6596 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6597 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6598 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6599 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6600 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6601 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6602 </para>
6603 <para>
6604 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6605 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6606 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6607 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6608 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6609 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6610 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6611 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6612 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6613 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6614 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6615 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6616 on the initial creative work.
6617 </para>
6618 <para>
6619 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6620 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6621 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6622 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6623 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6624 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6625 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6626 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6627 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6628 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6629 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6630 </para>
6631 <para>
6632 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6633 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6634 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6635 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6636 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6637 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6638 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6639 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6640 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6641 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6642 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6643 original author.
6644 </para>
6645 <para>
6646 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6647 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6648 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6649 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6650 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6651 copy available for others to copy.
6652 </para>
6653 <para>
6654 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6655 differences.
6656 </para>
6657 <para>
6658 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6659 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6660 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6661 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6662 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6663 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6664 <!-- f13 -->
6665 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6666 Creation
6667 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6668 International
6669 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6670 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6671 </para></footnote>
6672 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6673 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6674 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6675 </para>
6676 <para>
6677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6678 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6679 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6680 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6681 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6682 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6683 creative
6684 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6685 restrained.
6686 </para>
6687 <para>
6688 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6689 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6690 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6691 reduced
6692 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6693 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6694 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6695 </para>
6696 <para>
6697 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6698 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6699 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6700 </para>
6701 <para>
6702 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6703 control
6704 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6705 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6706 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6707 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6708 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6709 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6710 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6711 exclusive
6712 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6713 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6714 </para>
6715 <para>
6716 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6717 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6718 expansion
6719 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6720 copyright.
6721 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6722 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6723 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6724 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6725 </para>
6726 <para>
6727
6728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6729 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6730 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6731 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6732 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6733 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6734 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6735 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6736 protect
6737 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6738 <!-- f14 -->
6739 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6740 2003, available at
6741 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6742 </para></footnote>
6743 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6744 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6745 the wrong of direct piracy.
6746 </para>
6747 <para>
6748 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6749 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6750 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6751 transformative
6752 use of my book.<footnote><para>
6753 <!-- f15 -->
6754 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6755 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6756 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6757 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6758 Constitutionality,"
6759 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6760 </para></footnote>
6761 These two different uses of my creative work are
6762 treated the same.
6763 </para>
6764 <para>
6765 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6766 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6767 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6768 creates
6769 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6770 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6771 originally created?
6772 </para>
6773 <para>
6774 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6775 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6776 simply
6777 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6778 rights originally granted.
6779 </para>
6780 </sect2>
6781 <sect2 id="lawreach">
6782 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6783 <para>
6784 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6785 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6786 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6787 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6788 <!-- f16 -->
6789 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6790 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
6791 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6792 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
6793 sometimes
6794 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
6795 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
6796 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6797 </para></footnote>
6798 </para>
6799 <para>
6800 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6801 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6802 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6803 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6804 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6805 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6806 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6807 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6808 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6809 trigger for copyright law.
6810 </para>
6811 <para>
6812 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6813 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6814 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6815 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6816 <!-- f17 -->
6817 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6818 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6819 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6820 basis
6821 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6822 </para></footnote>
6823 because it is clear that the
6824 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6825 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6826 </para>
6827 <para>
6828 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6829 empty circle.
6830 </para>
6831 <figure id="fig-1521">
6832 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6833 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6834 </figure>
6835 <para>
6836 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6837 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6838 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6839 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6840 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6841 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6842 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6843 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6844 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6845 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6846 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6847 not make a copy.
6848 </para>
6849 <figure id="fig-1531">
6850 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6851 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6852 </figure>
6853 <para>
6854 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6855 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6856 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6857 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6858 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6859 diagram on next page).
6860 </para>
6861 <para>
6862 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6863 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6864 </para>
6865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6866 <figure id="fig-1541">
6867 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6868 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6869 </figure>
6870 <para>
6871 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6872 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6873 unregulated.
6874 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6875 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6876 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6877 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6878 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6879 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6880 </para>
6881 <figure id="fig-1542">
6882 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6883 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6884 </figure>
6885 <para> </para>
6886 <figure id="fig-1551">
6887 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6888 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
6889 </figure>
6890 <para>
6891 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6892 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6893 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
6894 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6895 </para>
6896 <para>
6897 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
6898 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
6899 <!-- f18 -->
6900 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6901 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6902 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6903 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6904 </para></footnote>
6905 And because of this single,
6906 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6907 category
6908 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6909 unregulated
6910 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6911 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6912 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6913 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
6914 category
6915 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6916 copyrighted
6917 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
6918 burden of this shift.
6919 </para>
6920 <para>
6921 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6922 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
6923 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
6924 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
6925 nothing
6926 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
6927 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6928 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
6929 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6930 produced
6931 a copy.
6932 </para>
6933 <para>
6934 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
6935 different
6936 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6937 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
6938 copyright
6939 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
6940 accidental
6941 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
6942 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
6943 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
6944 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
6945 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
6946 </para>
6947 <para>
6948 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6949 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6950 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6951 points also become clear:
6952 </para>
6953 <para>
6954 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6955 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6956 presumptively
6957 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6958 evidence
6959 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
6960 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
6961 free culture before the Internet.
6962 </para>
6963 <para>
6964 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
6965 transformative
6966 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
6967 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
6968 transformation
6969 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
6970 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
6971 releasing
6972 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
6973 justification.
6974 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
6975 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
6976 transformative
6977 uses of creative work.
6978 </para>
6979 <para>
6980 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
6981
6982 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
6983 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
6984 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
6985 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
6986 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
6987 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
6988 Internet,
6989 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
6990 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
6991 protected
6992 before because reading was not regulated.
6993 </para>
6994 <para>
6995 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
6996 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
6997 depend
6998 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
6999 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7000 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7001 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7002 protections
7003 of fair use are not enough.
7004 </para>
7005 <para>
7006 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7007 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7008 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7009 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7010 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7011 </para>
7012 <para>
7013 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7014 began
7015 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7016 previews.
7017 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7018 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7019 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7020 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7021 before
7022 you bought it.
7023 </para>
7024 <para>
7025 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7026 distributors
7027 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7028 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7029 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7031 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7032 business
7033 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7034 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7035 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7036 immediately.
7037 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7038 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7039 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7040 </para>
7041 <para>
7042 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7043 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7044 infringed"
7045 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7046 willful
7047 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7048 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7049 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7050 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7051 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7052 </para>
7053 <para>
7054 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7055 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7056 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7057 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7058 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7059 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7060 Disney's permission.
7061 </para>
7062 <para>
7063 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7064 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7065 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7066 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7067 marketplace,
7068 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7069 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7070 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7071 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7072 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7073 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7074 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7075 </para>
7076 <para>
7077 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7078 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7079 control
7080 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7081 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7082 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7083 Noble
7084 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7085 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7086 argument
7087 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7088 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7089 exercising
7090 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7091 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7092 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7093 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7094 </para>
7095 <para>
7096 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7097 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7098 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7099 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7100 owners
7101 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7102 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7103 </para>
7104 </sect2>
7105 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7106 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7107 <para>
7108 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7109 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7110 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7111 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7112 </para>
7113 <para>
7114 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7115 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7116 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7117 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7118 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7119 your freedom.
7120 </para>
7121 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7122 <para>
7123 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7124 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7125 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7126 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7127 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7128 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7129 <!-- f19 -->
7130 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7131 Contemporary
7132 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7133 </para></footnote>
7134 </para>
7135 <para>
7136 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7137 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7138 you were."<footnote><para>
7139 <!-- f20 -->
7140 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7141 </para></footnote>
7142 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7143 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7144 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7145 </para>
7146 <para>
7147 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7148 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7149 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7150 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7151 </para>
7152 <para>
7153 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7154 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7155 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7156 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7157 copyrighted
7158 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7159 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7160 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7161 that is not at all funny.
7162 </para>
7163 <para>
7164 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7165 </para>
7166 <para>
7167 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7168 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7169 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7170 technology,
7171 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7172 </para>
7173 <para>
7174 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7175 Reader.
7176 </para>
7177 <para>
7178 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7179 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7180 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7181 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7182 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7183 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7185 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7186 called Permissions.
7187 </para>
7188 <figure id="fig-1611">
7189 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7190 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7191 </figure>
7192 <para>
7193 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7194 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7195 </para>
7196 <figure id="fig-1612">
7197 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7198 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7199 </figure>
7200 <para>
7201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7202 According to my eBook
7203 Reader, I have the permission
7204 to copy to the clipboard of the
7205 computer ten text selections
7206 every ten days. (So far, I've
7207 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7208 I also have the permission to
7209 print ten pages from the book
7210 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7211 the permission to use the Read
7212 Aloud button to hear
7213 Middlemarch
7214 read aloud through the
7215 computer.
7216 </para>
7217 <para>
7218 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7219 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7220 </para>
7221 <figure id="fig-1621">
7222 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7223 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7224 </figure>
7225 <para>
7226 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7227 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7228 the book.
7229 </para>
7230 <figure id="fig-1622">
7231 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7232 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7233 </figure>
7234 <para>
7235 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7236 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7237 </para>
7238 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7239 <figure id="fig-1631">
7240 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7241 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7242 </figure>
7243 <para>
7244 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7245 </para>
7246 <para>
7247 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7248 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7249 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7250 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7251 under
7252 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7253 <!-- f21 -->
7254 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7255 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7256 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7257 obligation
7258 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7259 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7260 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7261 </para></footnote>
7262 When my e-book of
7263 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7264 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7265 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7266 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7267 </para>
7268 <para>
7269 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7270 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7271 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7272 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7273 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7274 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7275 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7276 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7277 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7278 restrictions:
7279 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7280 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7281 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7282 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7283 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7284 </para>
7285 <para>
7286 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7287 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7288 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7289 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7290 </para>
7291 <para>
7292 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7293 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7294 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7295 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7296 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7297 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7298 </para>
7299 <para>
7300 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7301 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7302 technologies
7303 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7304 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7305 protections as well?
7306 </para>
7307 <para>
7308 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7309 eBook Reader.
7310 </para>
7311 <para>
7312 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7313 public
7314 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7315 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7316 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7317 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7318 </para>
7319 <figure id="fig-1641">
7320 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7321 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7322 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7323 </figure>
7324 <para>
7325 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7326 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7327 allowed
7328 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7329 "permissions"
7330 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7331 </para>
7332 <para>
7333 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7334 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7335 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7336 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7337 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7338 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7339 </para>
7340 <para>
7341 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7342 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7343 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7344 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7345 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7346 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7347 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7348 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7349 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7350 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7351 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7352 </para>
7353 <para>
7354 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7355 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7356 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7357 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7358 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7359 often crazy.
7360 </para>
7361 <para>
7362 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7363 story of mine that makes the same point.
7364 </para>
7365 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7366 <para>
7367 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7368 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7369 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7370 </para>
7371 <para>
7372 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7373 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7374 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7375 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7376 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7377 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7378 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7379 </para>
7380 <para>
7381 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7382 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7383 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7384 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7385 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7386 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7387 </para>
7388 <para>
7389 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7390 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7391 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7392 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7393 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7394 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7395 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7396 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7397 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7398 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7399 </para>
7400 <para>
7401 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7402 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7403 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7404 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7405 ethically.
7406 </para>
7407 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7408 <para>
7409 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7410 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7411 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7412 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7413 than Sony had built.
7414 </para>
7415 <para>
7416 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7417 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7418 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7419 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7420 the
7421
7422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7423 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7424 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7425 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7426 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7427 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7428 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7429 dog to dance?
7430 </para>
7431 <para>
7432 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7433 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7434 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7435 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7436 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7437 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7438 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7439 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7440 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7441 </para>
7442 <para>
7443 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7444 <!-- f22 -->
7445 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7446 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7447 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7448 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7449 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7450 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7451 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7452 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7453 Questions
7454 about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7455 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7456 </para></footnote>
7457 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7458 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7459 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7460 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7461 </para>
7462 <para>
7463 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7464 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7465 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7466 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7467 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7468 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7469 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7470 Internet much more.
7471 </para>
7472 <para>
7473 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7474 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7475 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7476 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7477 </para>
7478 <para>
7479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7480 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7481 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7482 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7483 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7484 </para>
7485 <para>
7486 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7487 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7488 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7489 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7490 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7491 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7492 </para>
7493 <para>
7494 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7495 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7496 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7497 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7498 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7499 constituted, succeed.
7500 </para>
7501 <para>
7502 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7503 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7504 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7505 wrote:
7506 </para>
7507 <blockquote>
7508 <para>
7509 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7510 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7511 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7512 </para>
7513 </blockquote>
7514 <para>
7515 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7516 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7517 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7518 </para>
7519 <blockquote>
7520 <para>
7521 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7523 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7524 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7525 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7526 </para>
7527 </blockquote>
7528 <para>
7529 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7530 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7531 spreading such information an offense.
7532 </para>
7533 <para>
7534 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7535 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7536 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7537 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7538 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7539 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7540 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7541 </para>
7542 <para>
7543 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7544 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7545 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7546 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7547 </para>
7548 <para>
7549 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7550 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7551 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7552 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7553 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7554 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7555 have been a copyright violation.
7556 </para>
7557 <para>
7558 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7559 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7560 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7561 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7562 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7563 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7564 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7566 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7567 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7568 </para>
7569 <para>
7570 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7571 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7572 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7573 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7574 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7575 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7576 </para>
7577 <para>
7578 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7579 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7580 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7581 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7582 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7583 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7584 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7585 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7586 </para>
7587 <blockquote>
7588 <para>
7589 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7590 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7591 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7592 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7593 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7594 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7595 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7596 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7597 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7598 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7599 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7600 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7601 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7602 important.<footnote><para>
7603 <!-- f23 -->
7604 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7605 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7606 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7607 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7608 </para></footnote>
7609 </para>
7610 </blockquote>
7611 <para>
7612 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7613 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7614 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7615 the VCR responsible.
7616 </para>
7617 <para>
7618 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7619 the DMCA.
7620 </para>
7621 <para>
7622 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7623 </para>
7624 <para>
7625 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7626 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7627 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7628 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7629 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7630 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7631 </para>
7632 <para>
7633 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7634 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7635 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7636 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7637 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7638 and bad uses.
7639 </para>
7640 <figure id="fig-1711">
7641 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7642 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7643 </figure>
7644 <para>
7645 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7646 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7647 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7648 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7649 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7650 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7651 </para>
7652 <para>
7653 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7654 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7655 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7656 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7657 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7658 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7659 </para>
7660 <para>
7661 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7662 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7663 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7664 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7665 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7666 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7667 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7668 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7669 </para>
7670 <para>
7671 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7672 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7673 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7674 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7675 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7676 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7677 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7678 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7679 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7680 </para>
7681 <para>
7682
7683 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7684 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7685 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7686 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7687 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7688 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7689 <!-- f24 -->
7690 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7691 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7692 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7693 </para></footnote>
7694 </para>
7695 <para>
7696 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7697 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7698 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7699 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7700 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7701 </para>
7702 <para>
7703 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7704 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7705 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7706 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7707 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7708 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7709 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7710 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7711 </para>
7712 <para>
7713 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7714 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7715 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7716 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7717 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7718 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7719 </para>
7720 </sect2>
7721 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
7722 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7723 <para>
7724 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7725 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7726 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7727 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7728 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7729 find better ways
7730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7731 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7732 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7733 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7734 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7735 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7736 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7737 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7738 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7739 control.
7740 </para>
7741 <para>
7742 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7743 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7744 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7745 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7746 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7747 </para>
7748 <para>
7749 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7750 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7751 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7752 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7753 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7754 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7755 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7756 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7757 of the media.
7758 </para>
7759 <para>
7760 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7761 nature.
7762 </para>
7763 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7764 <para>
7765 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7766 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7767 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7768 <!-- f25 -->
7769 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7770 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7771 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7772 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7773 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7774 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7775 <!-- f26 -->
7776 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7777 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
7778 </para></footnote>
7779 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7780 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7781 <!-- f27 -->
7782 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7783 31 May 2003.
7784 </para></footnote>
7785 </para>
7786 <para>
7787 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7788 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7789 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7790 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
7791 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7792 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7793 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
7794 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
7795 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7796 </para>
7797 <para>
7798 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7799 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7800 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7801 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7802 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7803 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7804 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7805 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7806 protected&mdash; by the market.
7807 </para>
7808 <para>
7809 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7810 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7811 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7812 </para>
7813 <blockquote>
7814 <para>
7815 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7816 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7817 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7818 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7819 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7820 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7821 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7822 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7823 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7824 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7825 <!-- f28 -->
7826 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7827 2003): 89.
7828 </para></footnote>
7829 </para>
7830 </blockquote>
7831 <para>
7832 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7833 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7834 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7835 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7836 </para>
7837 <figure id="fig-1761">
7838 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7839 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7840 </figure>
7841 <para>
7842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7843 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7844 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7845 distribute content?
7846 </para>
7847 <para>
7848 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7849 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7850 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7851 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7852 </para>
7853 <para>
7854 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7855 integration may matter.
7856 </para>
7857 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7858 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7859 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7860 <para>
7861 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7862 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7863 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7864 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7865 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7866 </para>
7867 <para>
7868 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7869 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7870 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7871 control.<footnote><para>
7872 <!-- f29 -->
7873 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7874 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7875 Missouri,
7876 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7877 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7878 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7879 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7880 </para></footnote>
7881 </para>
7882 <para>
7883
7884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7885 The network did not control those copyrights because the law
7886 forbade
7887 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The
7888 law required a separation between the networks and the content
7889 producers;
7890 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
7891 1992, because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7892 television&mdash;75
7893 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the networks.
7894 </para>
7895 <para>
7896 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this
7897 independence.
7898 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.
7899 In 1985, there were twenty-five independent television production
7900 studios;
7901 in 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
7902 1992, only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a
7903 company it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7904 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992,
7905 16 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control,
7906 last year there was one."<footnote><para>
7907 <!-- f30 -->
7908 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on
7909 Media Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th
7910 Cong., 1st sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of
7911 Consumers
7912 Union and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7913 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of
7914 America, West, in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond,
7915 Virginia, 27 February 2003.
7916 </para></footnote>
7917 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television
7918 was owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
7919 1992 and 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week
7920 produced by network studios increased over 200%, whereas the
7921 number
7922 of prime time television hours per week produced by independent
7923 studios decreased 63%."<footnote><para>
7924 <!-- f31 -->
7925 Ibid.
7926 </para></footnote>
7927 </para>
7928 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7929 <para>
7930 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
7931 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7932 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7933 owned by the network.
7934 </para>
7935 <para>
7936 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the
7937 ownership
7938 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller
7939 few. As Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7940 </para>
7941 <blockquote>
7942 <para>
7943 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7944 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7945 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7946 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7948 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent
7949 production
7950 companies producing television programs. Now you have less
7951 than a handful.<footnote><para>
7952 <!-- f32 -->
7953 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
7954 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
7955 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
7956 </para></footnote>
7957 </para>
7958 </blockquote>
7959 <para>
7960 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of
7961 such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
7962 Increasingly
7963 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from
7964 networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the network
7965 wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from the
7966 inside,
7967 it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question
7968 without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment to Siberia,
7969 but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are
7970 quashed. This is not the environment for a democracy.
7971 </para>
7972 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
7973 <para>
7974 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
7975 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
7976 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
7977 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
7978 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
7979 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
7980 <!-- f33 -->
7981 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
7982 National
7983 Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard
7984 Business School Press, 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was
7985 first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of
7986 Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
7987 Research Policy 14 (1985): 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard
7988 Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are
7989 Built to Last Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform
7990 Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001).
7991 </para></footnote>
7992
7993 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
7994 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
7995 sprinting.
7996 </para>
7997 <para>
7998 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
7999 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8000 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8001 measure.
8002 </para>
8003 <para>
8004 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8005 suggest the concern.
8006 </para>
8007 <para>
8008 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8009 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8010 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8011 </para>
8012 <para>
8013 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8014 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8015 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8016
8017 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8018 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8019 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8020 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8021 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8022 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8023 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8024 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8025 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8026 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8027 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8028 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8029 outweigh these costs.
8030 </para>
8031 <para>
8032 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8033 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8034 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8035 these issues.
8036 </para>
8037 <para>
8038 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8039 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8040 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8041 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8042 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8043 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8044 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8045 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8046 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8047 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8048 </para>
8049 <para>
8050 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8051 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8052 </para>
8053 <para>
8054 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8055 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8056 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8057 war. Can you do it?
8058 </para>
8059 <para>
8060 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8062 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8063 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8064 message will be heard then?
8065 </para>
8066 <para>
8067 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8068 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8069 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8070 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8071 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8072 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8073 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8074 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8075 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8076 <!-- f34 -->
8077 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8078 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8079 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8080 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8081 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8082 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8083 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8084 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8085 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8086 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8087 York Times, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8088 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8089 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8090 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8091 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8092 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8093 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d 872
8094 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8095 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8096 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8097 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8098 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8099 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8100 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8101 </para></footnote>
8102 </para>
8103 <para>
8104 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8105 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8106 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8107 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8108 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8109 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8110 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8111 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8112 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8113 </para>
8114 </sect2>
8115 <sect2 id="together">
8116 <title>Together</title>
8117 <para>
8118 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8119 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8120 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8121 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8122 </para>
8123 <para>
8124 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8125 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8126 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8127 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8128 to seem
8129
8130 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8131 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8132 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8133 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8134 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8135 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8136 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8137 be redefined.
8138 </para>
8139 <para>
8140 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8141 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8142 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8143 our culture today.
8144 </para>
8145 <para>
8146 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8147 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8148 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8149 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8150 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8151 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8152 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8153 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8154 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8155 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8156 </para>
8157 <para>
8158 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8159 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8160 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8161 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8162 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8163 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8164 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8165 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8166 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8167 technology and the market enable.
8168 </para>
8169 <para>
8170 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8171 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8173 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8174 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8175 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8176 the development of our culture than now.
8177 </para>
8178 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8179 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8180 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8181 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8182 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8183 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8184 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8185 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny
8186 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8187 founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8188 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8189 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8190 culture that our free society has known.<footnote><para>
8191 <!-- f35 -->
8192 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8193 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8194 </para></footnote>
8195 </para>
8196 <para>
8197 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8198 </para>
8199 <para>
8200 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8201 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8202 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8203 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8204 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8205 </para>
8206
8207 <table id="t2">
8208 <title></title>
8209 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8210 <thead>
8211 <row>
8212 <entry></entry>
8213 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8214 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8215 </row>
8216 </thead>
8217 <tbody>
8218 <row>
8219 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8220 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8221 <entry>Free</entry>
8222 </row>
8223 <row>
8224 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8225 <entry>Free</entry>
8226 <entry>Free</entry>
8227 </row>
8228 </tbody>
8229 </tgroup>
8230 </table>
8231
8232 <para>
8233 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8234 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8235 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8236
8237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8238 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8239 noncommercial work was also free.
8240 </para>
8241 <para>
8242 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8243 </para>
8244
8245 <table id="t3">
8246 <title></title>
8247 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8248 <thead>
8249 <row>
8250 <entry></entry>
8251 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8252 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8253 </row>
8254 </thead>
8255 <tbody>
8256 <row>
8257 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8258 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8259 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8260 </row>
8261 <row>
8262 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8263 <entry>Free</entry>
8264 <entry>Free</entry>
8265 </row>
8266 </tbody>
8267 </tgroup>
8268 </table>
8269
8270 <para>
8271 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8272 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8273 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8274 transformation were still essentially free.
8275 </para>
8276 <para>
8277 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8278 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8279 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8280 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8281 we could say the law began to look like this:
8282 </para>
8283
8284 <table id="t4">
8285 <title></title>
8286 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8287 <thead>
8288 <row>
8289 <entry></entry>
8290 <entry>COPY</entry>
8291 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8292 </row>
8293 </thead>
8294 <tbody>
8295 <row>
8296 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8297 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8298 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8299 </row>
8300 <row>
8301 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8302 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8303 <entry>Free</entry>
8304 </row>
8305 </tbody>
8306 </tgroup>
8307 </table>
8308
8309 <para>
8310 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through,
8311 say, copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the
8312 commercial
8313 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of
8314 digital technologies, especially in the context of a digital network,
8315 means that the law now looks like this:
8316 </para>
8317
8318 <table id="t5">
8319 <title></title>
8320 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8321 <thead>
8322 <row>
8323 <entry></entry>
8324 <entry>COPY</entry>
8325 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8326 </row>
8327 </thead>
8328 <tbody>
8329 <row>
8330 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8331 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8332 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8333 </row>
8334 <row>
8335 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8336 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8337 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8338 </row>
8339 </tbody>
8340 </tgroup>
8341 </table>
8342
8343 <para>
8344 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8345 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8346 creativity&mdash;
8347 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8348 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8349 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8350 </para>
8351 <para>
8352 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8353 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8354 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8355 these domains actually does any good.
8356 </para>
8357 <para>
8358 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8359 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8360 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8361 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8362 reasons sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8363 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8364 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8365 rights were more sharply restricted.
8366 </para>
8367 <para>
8368 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8369 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8370 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8371 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8372 property rights<footnote><para>
8373 <!-- f36 -->
8374 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8375 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8376 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8377 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8378 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8379 Press, 1980).
8380 </para></footnote>)
8381 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8382 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8383 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8384 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8385 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8386 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8387 almost 180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8388 free culture.
8389 </para>
8390 <para>
8391 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8392 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8393 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8394 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8395 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8396 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8397 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8398 chapter 7). Adding
8399 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8400 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8401 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8402 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8403 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8404 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8405 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8406 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8407 dominates the debate today.
8408 </para>
8409 <para>
8410 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8411 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8412 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8413 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8414 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8415 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8416 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8417 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8418 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8419 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8420 lawyer.
8421 </para>
8422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8423 </sect2>
8424 </sect1>
8425 </chapter>
8426 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8427 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8428 <para></para>
8429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8430 <sect1 id="chimera">
8431 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8432 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8433 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8434 </indexterm>
8435 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8436 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8437 </indexterm>
8438 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8439 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8440 </indexterm>
8441
8442 <para>
8443 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8444 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8445 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8446 <!-- f1. -->
8447 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8448 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8449 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8450 </para></footnote>
8451 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8452 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8453 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8454 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8455 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8456 villagers to explore life as a king.
8457 </para>
8458 <para>
8459 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8460 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8461 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8462 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8463 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8464 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8465 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8466 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8467 alone!'"
8468 </para>
8469 <para>
8470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8471 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8472 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8473 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8474 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8475 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8476 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8477 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8478 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8479 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8480 </para>
8481 <para>
8482 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8483 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8484 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8485 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8486 </para>
8487 <para>
8488 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8489 is affected," he reports.
8490 </para>
8491 <para>
8492 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8493 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8494 his brain."
8495 </para>
8496 <para>
8497 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8498 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8499 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8500 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8501 </para>
8502 <para>
8503 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8504 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8505 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8506 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8507 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8508 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8509 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8510 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8511
8512 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8513 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8514 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8515 scene. . . ."
8516 </para>
8517 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8518 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8519 <para>
8520 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8521 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8522 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8523 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8524 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8525 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8526 </para>
8527 <para>
8528 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8529 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8530 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8531 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8532 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8533 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8534 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8535 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8536 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8537 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8538 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8539 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8540 </para>
8541 <para>
8542 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8543 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8544 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8545 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8546 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8547 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8548 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8549 </para>
8550 <para>
8551 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8552 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8553 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8554 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8555 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8556 from Tower.
8557 </para>
8558 <para>
8559
8560 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8561 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8562 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8563 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8564 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8565 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8566 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8567 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8568 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8569 </para>
8570 <para>
8571 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8572 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8573 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8574 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8575 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8576 </para>
8577 <para>
8578 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8579 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8580 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8581 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8582 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8583 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8584 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8585 implemented.<footnote><para>
8586 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8587 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8588 "Copyright
8589 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available
8590 at
8591 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8592 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8593 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8594 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8595 Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8596 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8597 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8598 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8599 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer,
8600 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.
8601 Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8602 high as $90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8603 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8604 from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8605 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8606 billion
8607 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8608 Elizabeth
8609 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8610 August 2003, available at
8611 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8612 targeting
8613 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8614 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8615 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003,
8616 D3, available at
8617 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8618 </para></footnote>
8619
8620 </para>
8621 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8622 <para>
8623 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8624 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8625 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8626 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8627 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8628 </para>
8629 <para>
8630 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8631 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8632 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8633 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter
8634 is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance
8635 extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a reasonable
8636 alternative.
8637 But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
8638 of the two extremes.
8639 </para>
8640 <para>
8641
8642 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8643 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8644 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land
8645 grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give
8646 content
8647 holders a kind of control over our culture that they have never had
8648 before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8649 innovation
8650 and new creativity will be lost.
8651 </para>
8652 <para>
8653 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8654 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8655 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8656 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8657 innovation
8658 that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the
8659 passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to distribute
8660 content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the vice president
8661 for global public policy at one of these new innovators, eMusic.com,
8662 put it when criticizing the DMCA's added protection for copyrighted
8663 material,
8664 </para>
8665 <blockquote>
8666 <para>
8667 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8668 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8669 </para>
8670 <para>
8671 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8672 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8673 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8674 answer
8675 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8676 well produce a totally different industry model.
8677 </para>
8678 <para>
8679 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8680 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8681 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8682 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8683 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8684 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8685 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8686 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8687 interests.<footnote><para>
8688 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8689 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8690 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8691 Protection,
8692 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
8693 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8694 EMusic.com),
8695 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8696 Congressional
8697 Testimony File.
8698 </para></footnote>
8699 </para>
8700 </blockquote>
8701 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8702 <para>
8703 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8704 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8705 changed.
8706 </para>
8707 <para>
8708 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8709 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8710 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8711 </para>
8712
8713 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8714 </sect1>
8715 <sect1 id="harms">
8716 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8717 <para>
8718
8719 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8720 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8721 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8722 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8723 prohibition,
8724 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8725 </para>
8726 <para>
8727 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8728 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8729 extend
8730 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8731 justified?
8732 </para>
8733 <para>
8734 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8735 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8736 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8737 our history.
8738 </para>
8739 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8740 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8741 <para>
8742 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8743 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8744 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8745 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8746 </para>
8747 <para>
8748 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8749 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8750 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8751 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8752 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8753 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8754 </para>
8755 <sect2 id="constrain">
8756 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8757 <para>
8758 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8759 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8760 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8761 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8762 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8763 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8764 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8765 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8766 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8767 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8768 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8769 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8770 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8771 </para>
8772 <para>
8773 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8774 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8775 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8776 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8777 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8778 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8779 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8780 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8781 the culture all around.
8782 </para>
8783 <para>
8784 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8785 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8786
8787 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8788
8789 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8790 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8791 storytelling extended across the globe.
8792 </para>
8793 <para>
8794 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8795 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8796 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8797 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8798 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8799 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8800 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8801 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8802 work is presumptively illegal.
8803 </para>
8804 <para>
8805 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8806 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8807 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8808 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8809 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8810 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8811 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8812 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8813 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8814 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8815 million.<footnote><para>
8816 <!-- f1. -->
8817 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8818 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8819 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8820 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8821 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8822 </para></footnote>
8823 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8824 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8825 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8826 suffering.<footnote>
8827 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8828 <para>
8829 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8830 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8831 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8832 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8833 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8834 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8835 available at
8836 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8837 recent months.
8838 </para></footnote>
8839 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8840 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8841 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8842 </para>
8843 <para>
8844 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8845 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8846 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8847 creative
8848 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8849 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8850 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8851
8852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8853 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8854 create,
8855 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8856 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8857 begin
8858 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
8859 necessarily
8860 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8861 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8862 "illegal
8863 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
8864 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
8865 available
8866 at
8867 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8868 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
8869 </para></footnote>
8870 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8871 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8872 critical or reflective.
8873 </para>
8874 <para>
8875 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8876 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
8877 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8878 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8879 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8880 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8881 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8882 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8883 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8884 </para>
8885 <para>
8886 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8887 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8888 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8889 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8890 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8891 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8892 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8893 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8894 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8895 </para>
8896 <para>
8897 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8898 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
8899 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8900 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8901 law regulates such a use.
8902 </para>
8903 <para>
8904
8905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8906 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8907 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8908 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
8909 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8910 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8911 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8912 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8913 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8914 </para>
8915 <para>
8916 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8917 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8918 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8919 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8920 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8921 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8922 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8923 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8924 comfort themselves.
8925 </para>
8926 <para>
8927 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
8928 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8929 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8930 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8931 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
8932 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8933 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8934 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8935 culture that is free.
8936 </para>
8937 <para>
8938 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8939 </para>
8940 <blockquote>
8941 <para>
8942 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8943 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8944 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8945 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8946 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8948 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8949 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8950 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8951 </para>
8952 </blockquote>
8953 </sect2>
8954 <sect2 id="innovators">
8955 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
8956 <para>
8957 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8958 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8959 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8960 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8961 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8962 think there's little in this story to worry you.
8963 </para>
8964 <para>
8965 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
8966 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
8967 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
8968 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
8969 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
8970 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
8971 affecting culture are more fundamental.
8972 </para>
8973 <para>
8974 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
8975 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
8976 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
8977 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
8978 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
8979 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
8980 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
8981 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
8982 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
8983 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
8984 against the competitors of tomorrow.
8985 </para>
8986 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
8987 <para>
8988 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
8989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
8990 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
8991 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
8992 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
8993 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
8994 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
8995 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
8996 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
8997 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
8998 </para>
8999 <para>
9000 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9001 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9002 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9003 </para>
9004 <para>
9005 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9006 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9007 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9008 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9009 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9010 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9011 </para>
9012 <para>
9013 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9014 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9015 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9016 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9017 Raitt. And so on.
9018 </para>
9019 <para>
9020 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9021 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9022 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9023 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9024 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9025 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9026 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9027 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9028 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9029 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9030 </para>
9031 <para>
9032 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9033 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9034
9035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9036 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9037 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9038 the kind of content the users liked.
9039 </para>
9040 <para>
9041 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9042 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9043 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9044 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9045 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9046 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9047 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9048 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9049 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9050 they had already bought.
9051 </para>
9052 <para>
9053 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9054 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9055 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9056 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9057 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9058 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9059 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9060 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9061 </para>
9062 <para>
9063 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9064 </para>
9065 <para>
9066 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9067 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9068 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9069 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9070 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9071 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9072 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9073 demanded.
9074 </para>
9075 <para>
9076 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9077 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9078 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9079 clients in this
9080 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9081 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9082 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9083 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9084 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9085 </para>
9086 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9087 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9088 <para>
9089 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9090 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9091 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9092 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9093 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9094 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9095 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9096 innovation
9097 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9098 Revolution
9099 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9100 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9101 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9102 Times, 28 May 2001.
9103 </para></footnote>
9104 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9105 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9106 industry
9107 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9108 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9109 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9110 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9111 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9112 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9113 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9114 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9115 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9116 </para>
9117 <blockquote>
9118 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9119 <para>
9120 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9121 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9122 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9123 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9124 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9125 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9126 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote>
9127 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9128 <para>
9129 <!-- f5. -->
9130 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9131 2003, available at
9132 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9133 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9134 </para></footnote>
9135 </para>
9136 </blockquote>
9137 <para>
9138 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9139 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9140 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9141 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9142 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9143 constantly threatened by litigation.
9144 </para>
9145 <para>
9146
9147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9148 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9149 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9150 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9151 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9152 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9153 imposes,
9154 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9155 conservative
9156 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9157 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9158 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9159 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9160 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9161 </para>
9162 <para>
9163 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9164 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9165 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9166 systematically
9167 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9168 industries
9169 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9170 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9171 competition.
9172 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9173 competition.
9174 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9175 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9176 overregulatedregulated
9177 market.
9178 </para>
9179 <para>
9180 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9181 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9182 burden
9183 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&mdash;a
9184 culture
9185 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9186 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9187 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9188 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9189 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9190 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9191 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9192 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9194 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9195 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9196 creativity.
9197 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9198 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9199 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9200 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9201 technology
9202 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9203 </para>
9204 <para>
9205 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9206 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9207 Internet's
9208 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9209 feature
9210 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9211 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9212 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9213 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9214 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9215 </para>
9216 <para>
9217 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9218 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9219 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9220 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9221 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9222 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9223 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9224 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9225 </para></footnote>
9226
9227 Congress
9228 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9229 "broadcast
9230 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9231 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9232 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9233 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9234 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9235 violators
9236 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9237 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9238 </para></footnote>
9239
9240 </para>
9241 <para>
9242 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9243 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9244 regulation
9245 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9246 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9247
9248 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9249 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9250 those requirements.
9251 </para>
9252 <para>
9253 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9254 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9255 impose.<footnote><para>
9256 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9257 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9258 </para></footnote>
9259 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9260 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9261 harm than good.
9262 </para>
9263 <para>
9264 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9265 innovation&mdash;again,
9266 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9267 crowd.
9268 </para>
9269 <para>
9270 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9271 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9272 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9273 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9274 </para>
9275 <para>
9276 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9277 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9278 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9279 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9280 2001).
9281 </para></footnote>
9282 overall this history of copyright
9283 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9284 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9285 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9286 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9287 </para>
9288 <para>
9289 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9290 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9291 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9292 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9293 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9294 </para>
9295 <para>
9296 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9297 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9298 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9299 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9300 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9301 copyright
9302 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9303 music
9304 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9305 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9306 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9307 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9308 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9309 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9310 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9311 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9312 </para></footnote>
9313 It has been
9314 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9315 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9316 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9317 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9318 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9319 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9320 August
9321 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9322 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9323 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9324 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9325 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9326 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9327 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9328 World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34, available at
9329 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9330 </para></footnote>
9331 But there is one
9332 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9333 demise
9334 of Internet radio.
9335 </para>
9336 <para>
9337
9338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9339 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9340 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9341 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9342 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9343 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9344 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9345 copyright
9346 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9347 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9348 </para>
9349 <para>
9350 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9351 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9352 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9353 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9354 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9355 Probably
9356 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9357 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9358 efforts
9359 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9360 </para>
9361 <para>
9362 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9363 technology
9364 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9365 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9366 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9367 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9368 regular
9369 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9370 </para>
9371 <para>
9372 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9373 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9374 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9375 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9376 broadcasters
9377 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9378 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9379 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9380 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9381 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9382 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9383 in to this new form of radio.
9384 </para>
9385 <para>
9386
9387 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9388 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9389 improvement
9390 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9391 improvement
9392 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9393 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9394 establish
9395 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9396 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9397 </para>
9398 <blockquote>
9399 <para>
9400 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9401 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9402 radio
9403 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9404 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9405 competition
9406 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9407 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9408 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9409 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9410 communications
9411 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9412 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9413 acquire
9414 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9415 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9416 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.<footnote><para>
9417 <!-- f12. --> Lessing, 239.
9418 </para></footnote>
9419 </para>
9420 </blockquote>
9421 <para>
9422 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not because
9423 Armstrong
9424 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9425 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<footnote><para>
9426 <!-- f13. --> Ibid., 229.
9427 </para></footnote>
9428 to
9429 retard
9430 the growth of this competing technology.
9431 </para>
9432 <para>
9433 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9434 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9435 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9436 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9437 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9438 radio?
9439 </para>
9440 <para>
9441 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9442 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9443
9444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9445 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9446 phenomenon
9447 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9448 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9449 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9450 hypothetical
9451 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9452 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9453 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9454 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9455 </para>
9456 <para>
9457 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9458 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9459 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9460 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9461 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9462 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9463 <para>
9464 <!-- f14. -->
9465 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9466 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9467 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9468 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9469 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9470 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9471 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9472 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9473 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9474 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9475 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9476 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9477 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9478 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9479 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9480 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9481 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9482 </para></footnote>
9483 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9484 equivalent fee.
9485 </para>
9486 <para>
9487 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9488 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9489 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9490 </para>
9491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9492 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9493 <listitem><para>
9494 name of the service;
9495 </para></listitem>
9496 <listitem><para>
9497 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9498 </para></listitem>
9499 <listitem><para>
9500 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9501 </para></listitem>
9502 <listitem><para>
9503 date of transmission;
9504 </para></listitem>
9505 <listitem><para>
9506 time of transmission;
9507 </para></listitem>
9508 <listitem><para>
9509 time zone of origination of transmission;
9510 </para></listitem>
9511 <listitem><para>
9512 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9513 </para></listitem>
9514 <listitem><para>
9515 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9516 </para></listitem>
9517 <listitem><para>
9518 sound recording title;
9519 </para></listitem>
9520 <listitem><para>
9521 ISRC code of the recording;
9522 </para></listitem>
9523 <listitem><para>
9524 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9525 </para></listitem>
9526 <listitem><para>
9527 featured recording artist;
9528 </para></listitem>
9529 <listitem><para>
9530 retail album title;
9531 </para></listitem>
9532 <listitem><para>
9533 recording label;
9534 </para></listitem>
9535 <listitem><para>
9536 UPC code of the retail album;
9537 </para></listitem>
9538 <listitem><para>
9539 catalog number;
9540 </para></listitem>
9541 <listitem><para>
9542 copyright owner information;
9543 </para></listitem>
9544 <listitem><para>
9545 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9546 </para></listitem>
9547 <listitem><para>
9548 name of the service or entity;
9549 </para></listitem>
9550 <listitem><para>
9551 channel or program;
9552 </para></listitem>
9553 <listitem><para>
9554 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9555 </para></listitem>
9556 <listitem><para>
9557 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9558 </para></listitem>
9559 <listitem><para>
9560 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9561 </para></listitem>
9562 <listitem><para>
9563 Unique User identifier;
9564 </para></listitem>
9565 <listitem><para>
9566 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9567 </para></listitem>
9568 </orderedlist>
9569
9570 <para>
9571 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9572 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9573 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9574 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9575 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9576 does not.
9577 </para>
9578 <para>
9579 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9580 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9581 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9582 </para>
9583 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9584 <para>
9585 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9586 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9587 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9588 </para>
9589 <blockquote>
9590 <para>
9591 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9592 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9593 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9594 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9595 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9596 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9597
9598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9599 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9600 Because
9601 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9602 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9603 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9604 of business. . . ."
9605 </para>
9606 <para>
9607 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9608 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9609 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9610 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9611 </para>
9612 </blockquote>
9613 <para>
9614 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9615 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9616 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9617 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9618 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9619 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9620 effective to prevent it.
9621 </para>
9622 </sect2>
9623 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9624 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9625 <para>
9626 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9627 dinosaurs
9628 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9629 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9630 </para>
9631 <para>
9632 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9633 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9634 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9635 </para>
9636 <para>
9637 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9638 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9639 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9640 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9641 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9642 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9643 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9644 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9645 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9646 </para></footnote>
9647 According to the RIAA,
9648 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9649 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9650
9651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9652 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9653 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9654 increasingly
9655 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9656 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9657 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9658 extreme
9659 response by the other.
9660 </para>
9661 <para>
9662 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9663 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9664 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9665 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9666 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9667 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9668 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9669 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9670 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9671 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9672 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9673 was.<footnote><para>
9674 <!-- f16. -->
9675 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9676 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9677 </para></footnote>
9678 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9679 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9680 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9681 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9682 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9683 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9684 they oppose.
9685 </para>
9686 <para>
9687 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9688 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9689 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9690 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9691 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9692 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9693 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9694 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9695 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9696 <!-- f17. -->
9697 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9698 Prohibition," American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9699 </para></footnote>
9700 We have
9701 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9702 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9703 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9704 <!-- f18. -->
9705 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9706 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9707 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9708 </para></footnote>
9709 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9710 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9711 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9712 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9713 cheat.<footnote><para>
9714 <!-- f19. -->
9715 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9716 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9717 compliance literature).
9718 </para></footnote>
9719 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9720 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9721 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9722 </para>
9723 <para>
9724 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9725 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9726 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9727 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9728 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9729 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9730 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9731 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9732 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9733 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9734 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9735 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9736 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9737 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9738 degree of illegality.
9739 </para>
9740 <para>
9741 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9742 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9743 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9744 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9745 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9746 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9747 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9748 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9749 to consider the alternative.
9750 </para>
9751 <para>
9752
9753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9754 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9755 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9756 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9757 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9758 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9759 </para>
9760 <para>
9761 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9762 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9763 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9764 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9765 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9766 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9767 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9768 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9769 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9770 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9771 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9772 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9773 </para>
9774 <para>
9775 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9776 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9777 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9778 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9779 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9780 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9781 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9782 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9783 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9784 a nation of felons?
9785 </para>
9786 <para>
9787 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9788 </para>
9789 <para>
9790 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9791 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9792 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9793 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9794 used
9795
9796 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9797 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9798 recordings is free.
9799 </para>
9800 <para>
9801 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9802 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9803 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9804 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9805 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9806 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9807 capacities of digital technologies.
9808 </para>
9809 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9810 <para>
9811 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9812 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9813 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9814 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9815 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9816 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9817 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9818 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9819 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9820 </para>
9821 <para>
9822 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9823 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9824 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9825 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9826 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9827 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9828 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9829 on people's machines.
9830 </para>
9831 <para>
9832 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9833 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9834 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9835 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9836 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9837 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9838
9839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9840 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9841 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9842 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9843 management" system.
9844 </para>
9845 <para>
9846 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9847 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9848 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9849 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9850 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9851 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9852 freedom to move content easily?
9853 </para>
9854 <para>
9855 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9856 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9857 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9858 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9859 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9860 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9861 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9862 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9863 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9864 </para>
9865 <para>
9866 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9867 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9868 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9869 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9870 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9871 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9872 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9873 </para>
9874 <para>
9875 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9876 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9877 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9878 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9879 </para>
9880 <para>
9881 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9882 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9883
9884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9885
9886 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9887 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9888 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9889 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9890 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9891 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9892 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9893 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9894 generally.
9895 </para>
9896 <para>
9897 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9898 explains,
9899 </para>
9900 <blockquote>
9901 <para>
9902 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9903 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9904 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9905 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9906 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9907 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9908 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9909 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9910 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9911 </para>
9912 </blockquote>
9913 <para>
9914 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9915 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9916 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9917 </para>
9918 <para>
9919 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
9920 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9921 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9922 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9923 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9924 an Internet user is revealed.
9925 </para>
9926 <para>
9927 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9928 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9929 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9930 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9931 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9932 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9933 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9934 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9935 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
9936 <!-- f20. -->
9937 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9938 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9939 Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9940 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9941 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9942 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
9943 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September
9944 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9945 Fan, Either," New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9946 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
9947 </para></footnote>
9948
9949 </para>
9950 <para>
9951 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9952 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9953 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
9954 <!-- f21. -->
9955 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9956 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9957 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
9958 </para></footnote>
9959 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9960 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9961 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9962 </para>
9963 <para>
9964 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
9965 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
9966 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
9967 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
9968 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
9969 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
9970 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
9971 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
9972 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
9973 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
9974 to deploy,<footnote><para>
9975 <!-- f22. -->
9976 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
9977 Boston Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
9978 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
9979 Colleges," Washington Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
9980 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
9981 Monitor, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
9982 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
9983 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
9984 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News, 30 January
9985 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
9986 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
9987 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
9988 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
9989 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
9990 </para></footnote>
9991 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
9992 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
9993 </para>
9994 <para>
9995 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
9996 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
9997 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
9998 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
9999 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10000 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10001 college students
10002
10003 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10004 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10005 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10006 Says von Lohmann,
10007 </para>
10008 <blockquote>
10009 <para>
10010 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10011 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10012 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10013 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10014 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10015 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10016 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10017 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10018 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10019 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10020 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10021 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10022 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10023 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10024 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10025 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10026 million of them.
10027 </para>
10028 </blockquote>
10029 <para>
10030 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10031 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10032 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10033 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10034 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10035 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10036 </para>
10037
10038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10039 </sect2>
10040 </sect1>
10041 </chapter>
10042 <chapter id="c-balances">
10043 <title>BALANCES</title>
10044
10045 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10046 <para>
10047 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10048 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10049 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10050 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10051 </para>
10052 <para>
10053 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10054 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10055 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10056 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10057 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10058 everything around.
10059 </para>
10060 <para>
10061 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10062 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10063 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10064 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10065 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10066 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10067 </para>
10068 <para>
10069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10070 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10071 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10072 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10073 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10074 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10075 made that is happening all around.
10076 </para>
10077 <para>
10078 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10079 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10080 gasoline onto this fire.
10081 </para>
10082 <para>
10083 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10084 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10085 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10086 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10087 </para>
10088 <para>
10089 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10090 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10091 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10092 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10093 success will require.
10094 </para>
10095
10096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10097 <sect1 id="eldred">
10098 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10099 <para>
10100 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10101 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10102 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10103 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10104 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10105 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10106 come alive.
10107 </para>
10108 <para>
10109 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10110 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10111 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10112 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10113 them available for free.
10114 </para>
10115 <para>
10116 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10117 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10118 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10119 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10120 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10122 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10123 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10124 accessible&mdash;today.
10125 </para>
10126 <para>
10127 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10128 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10129 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10130 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10131 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10132 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10133 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10134 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10135 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10136 commercial publications of public domain works.
10137 </para>
10138 <para>
10139 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10140 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10141 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10142 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10143 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10144 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10145 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10146 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10147 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10148 generally.<footnote><para>
10149 <!-- f1. -->
10150 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10151 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10152 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10153 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10154 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10155 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10156 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10157 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10158 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10159 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10160 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10161 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10162 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10163 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10164 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10165 </para>
10166 <para>
10167 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10168 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10169 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10170 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
10171 in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10172 terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
10173 would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
10174 collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10175 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10176 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
10177 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10178 </para>
10179 <para>
10180
10181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10182 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10183 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10184 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10185 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10186 <!-- f2. -->
10187 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10188 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10189 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10190 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10191 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10192 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10193 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10194 </para></footnote>
10195
10196 </para>
10197 <para>
10198 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10199 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10200 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10201 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10202 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10203 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10204 to undertake.
10205 </para>
10206 <para>
10207 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10208 constitutional
10209 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10210 interpretation.
10211 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10212 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10213 importantly
10214 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10215 </para>
10216 <blockquote>
10217 <para>
10218 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10219 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10220 their . . . Writings. . . .
10221 </para>
10222 </blockquote>
10223 <para>
10224 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10225 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10226 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10227 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10228 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10229 specific&mdash;to
10230 "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that are also specific&mdash;
10231 by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
10232 </para>
10233 <para>
10234 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10235 extending
10236 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10237 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10238 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10239 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10240 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10241 Congress
10242 has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what
10243 the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the installment
10244 plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10245 </para>
10246 <para>
10247 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10248 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10249 consideration
10250 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10251 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10252 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the
10253 practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10254 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10255 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to
10256 keep this gravy train going.
10257 </para>
10258 <para>
10259 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10260 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
10261 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10262 beneficiaries
10263 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce
10264 it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can
10265 do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must do&mdash;and those
10266 things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10267 </para>
10268 <para>
10269 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10270 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10271 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10272 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10273 continues
10274 to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10275 benefits
10276 greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher would
10277 pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be published
10278 by anyone for free.
10279 </para>
10280 <para>
10281 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10282 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10283 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10284 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10285 report:
10286 </para>
10287 <para>
10288 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10289
10290 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10291 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10292 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10293 those works.
10294 </para>
10295 <para>
10296 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10297 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10298 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10299 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10300 </para>
10301 <para>
10302 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10303 about it?"
10304 </para>
10305 <para>
10306 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10307 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10308 they support the bill."
10309 </para>
10310 <para>
10311 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10312 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10313 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10314 much is it worth?"
10315 </para>
10316 <para>
10317 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10318 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10319 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10320 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10321 </para>
10322 <para>
10323 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10324 correct conclusion:
10325 </para>
10326 <para>
10327 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10328 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10329 contributions
10330 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10331 </para>
10332 <para>
10333 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10334 contribute
10335 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10336 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10337 </para>
10338 <para>
10339 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10340 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10341 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10342 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10344 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10345 copyrights
10346 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10347 the copyright term extended.
10348 </para>
10349 <para>
10350 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10351 legislation
10352 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10353 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10354 </para>
10355 <para>
10356 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10357 Copyright
10358 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10359 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10360 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10361 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10362 contributions.<footnote><para>
10363 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10364 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10365 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10366 </para></footnote>
10367 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10368 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10369 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10370 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10371 Age," available at
10372 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10373 </para></footnote>
10374 Disney is estimated to have
10375 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10376 cycle.<footnote><para>
10377 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10378 Congressional
10379 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10380 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10381 </para></footnote>
10382
10383 </para>
10384 <para>
10385 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10386 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10387 reality
10388 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10389 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10390 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10391 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10392 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10393 "limited."
10394 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10395 and again.
10396 </para>
10397 <para>
10398 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10399 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10400 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10401 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10402 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10403 scholars,
10404 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10405
10406 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10407 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10408 guns near schools.
10409 </para>
10410 <para>
10411 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10412 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10413 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10414 "interstate
10415 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10416 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10417 interstate
10418 commerce.
10419 </para>
10420 <para>
10421 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10422 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10423 activity,
10424 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10425 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10426 interpreted
10427 to impose no limit.
10428 </para>
10429 <para>
10430 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10431 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10432 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10433 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10434 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10435 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10436 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10437 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10438 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10439 government
10440 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10441 </para>
10442 <para>
10443 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10444 arguments,"
10445 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10446 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10447 </para></footnote>
10448 If anything Congress says is interstate
10449 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10450 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10451 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10452 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10453 </para></footnote>
10454
10455 </para>
10456 <para>
10457 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10458 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10459 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10460 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10461 context
10462 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10463 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10464 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10465 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10466 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10467 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10468 </para></footnote>
10469 And if it is applied to the
10470 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10471 Congress
10472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10473 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10474 existing
10475 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10476 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10477 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10478 copyrights
10479 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10480 existing copyrights.
10481 </para>
10482 <para>
10483 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10484 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10485 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10486 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10487 rejected
10488 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10489 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10490 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10491 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10492 boring.
10493 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10494 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10495 </para>
10496 <para>
10497 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10498 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10499 Constitution's
10500 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10501 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10502 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10503 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10504 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10505 already
10506 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10507 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10508 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10509 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10510 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10511 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10512 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10513 </para>
10514 <para>
10515 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10516
10517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10518 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10519 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10520 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10521 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10522 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10523 </para></footnote>
10524 But
10525 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10526 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10527 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10528 </para>
10529 <para>
10530 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10531 copyright
10532 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10533 influence
10534 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10535 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10536 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10537 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10538 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10539 bought to extend them again.
10540 </para>
10541 <para>
10542 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10543 extended.
10544 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10545 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10546 society
10547 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10548 Disney's.
10549 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10550 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10551 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10552 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10553 exploited,
10554 and no longer available as a result.
10555 </para>
10556 <para>
10557 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10558 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10559 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10560 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10561 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10562 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10563 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10564 Congressional
10565 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10566 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10567 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10568 </para></footnote>
10569
10570 </para>
10571 <para>
10572 Think practically about the consequence of this
10573 extension&mdash;practically,
10574 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10575
10576 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10577 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10578 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10579 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10580 remaining
10581 9,873. What would you have to do?
10582 </para>
10583 <para>
10584 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10585 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10586 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10587 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10588 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10589 list of books still under copyright.
10590 </para>
10591 <para>
10592 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10593 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10594 </para>
10595 <para>
10596 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10597 owners
10598 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10599 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10600 being at least a list?
10601 </para>
10602 <para>
10603 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10604 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10605 practically
10606 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10607 thousands
10608 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10609 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10610 </para>
10611 <para>
10612 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10613 apologists
10614 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10615 owners?"
10616 </para>
10617 <para>
10618 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10619 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10620 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10621 suggesting
10622 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10623 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10624 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10625 </para>
10626 <para>
10627 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10628 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10629 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10630
10631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10632 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10633 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10634 happen
10635 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10636 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10637 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10638 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10639 know quite well who owns what property.
10640 </para>
10641 <para>
10642 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10643 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10644 already
10645 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10646 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10647 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10648 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10649 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10650 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10651 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10652 </para>
10653 <para>
10654 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10655 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10656 consequence
10657 for other creative works is much more dire.
10658 </para>
10659 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10660 <para>
10661 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10662 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10663 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10664 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10665 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10666 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10667 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10668 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10669 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10670 films."<footnote><para>
10671 <!-- f11. -->
10672 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10673 Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10674 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10675 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
10676 </para></footnote>
10677
10678 </para>
10679 <para>
10680 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10681 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10682 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10683 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10684 </para>
10685 <para>
10686 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10687
10688 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10689 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10690 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10691 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10692 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10693 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10694 work available for distribution.
10695 </para>
10696 <para>
10697 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10698 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10699 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10700 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10701 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10702 mm film.<footnote><para>
10703 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10704 Supporting
10705 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
10706 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10707 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10708 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10709 </para></footnote>
10710
10711 </para>
10712 <para>
10713 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10714 important.
10715 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10716 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10717 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10718 locate the copyright owner.
10719 </para>
10720 <para>
10721 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10722 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10723 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10724 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10725 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10726 exceptionally
10727 high.
10728 </para>
10729 <para>
10730 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10731 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10732 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10733 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10734 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10735 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10736 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10737 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10738 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10739 </para>
10740 <para>
10741 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10742
10743 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10744 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10745 benefit
10746 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10747 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10748 the copyright expires.
10749 </para>
10750 <para>
10751 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10752 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10753 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10754 canisters
10755 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10756 than dust.
10757 </para>
10758 <para>
10759 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10760 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10761 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10762 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10763 creative
10764 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10765 free expression."
10766 </para>
10767 <para>
10768 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10769 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10770 indicated,
10771 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10772 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10773 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10774 distributors,
10775 the commercial life ends.
10776 </para>
10777 <para>
10778 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10779 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10780 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10781 between
10782 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10783 Friday
10784 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10785 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10786 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10787 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10788 have, we need to have access to this history.
10789 </para>
10790 <para>
10791 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10792
10793 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10794 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10795 this context do no good.
10796 </para>
10797 <para>
10798 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10799 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10800 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10801 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10802 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10803 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10804 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10805 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10806 </para>
10807 <para>
10808 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10809 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10810 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10811 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10812 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10813 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10814 market didn't have more to offer.
10815 </para>
10816 <para>
10817 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10818 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10819 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10820 would not have interfered with anything.
10821 </para>
10822 <para>
10823 But this situation has now changed.
10824 </para>
10825 <para>
10826 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10827 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10828 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10829 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10830 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10831 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10832 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10833 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10834 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10835 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10836 </para>
10837 <para>
10838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10839 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10840 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10841 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10842 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10843 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10844 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10845 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10846 written for a radically different context.
10847 </para>
10848 <para>
10849 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10850 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10851 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10852 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10853 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10854 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10855 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10856 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10857 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10858 </para>
10859 <para>
10860 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10861 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10862 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10863 culture widely?"
10864 </para>
10865 <para>
10866 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10867 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
10868 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10869 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10870 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10871 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
10872 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10873 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
10874 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10875 </para>
10876 <para>
10877 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10878 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10879 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10880 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10881
10882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10883 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10884 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10885 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10886 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
10887 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
10888 <!-- f13. -->
10889 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
10890 December 2002, available at
10891 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
10892 </para></footnote>
10893
10894 </para>
10895 <para>
10896 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10897 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10898 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10899 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
10900 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
10901 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10902 </para>
10903 <para>
10904 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10905 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10906 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10907 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10908 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10909 </para>
10910 <para>
10911 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10912 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10913 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10914 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10915 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10916 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10917 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10918 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10919 power to extend existing terms.
10920 </para>
10921 <para>
10922 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10923 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10924 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10925 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10926 </para>
10927 <para>
10928 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10929 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10930
10931 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10932 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10933 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10934 overstepped its bounds.
10935 </para>
10936 <para>
10937 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10938 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10939 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10940 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10941 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10942 </para>
10943 <para>
10944 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10945 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10946 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
10947 briefs and preparing for argument.
10948 </para>
10949 <para>
10950 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10951 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10952 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10953 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10954 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10955 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10956 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10957 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10958 </para>
10959 <para>
10960 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10961 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10962 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10963 mistake lost it.
10964 </para>
10965 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
10966 <para>
10967 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
10968 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
10969 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
10970 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
10971 heat
10972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
10973 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
10974 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
10975 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
10976 </para>
10977 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
10978 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
10979 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
10980 <para>
10981 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
10982 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
10983 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
10984 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
10985 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
10986 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
10987 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
10988 most powerful media companies in the world."
10989 </para>
10990 <para>
10991 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
10992 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
10993 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
10994 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
10995 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
10996 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
10997 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
10998 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
10999 interpretation
11000 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11001 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11002 unconstitutional,
11003 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11004 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11005 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11006 Constitution,
11007 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11008 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11009 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11010 </para>
11011 <para>
11012 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11013 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11014 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11015 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11016 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11017 why it was unconstitutional.
11018 </para>
11019 <para>
11020 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11021
11022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11023 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11024 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11025 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11026 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11027 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11028 minority.
11029 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11030 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11031 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11032 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11033 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11034 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11035 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11036 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11037 </para>
11038 <para>
11039 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11040 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11041 beginning.
11042 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11043 November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11044 Republican
11045 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11046 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11047 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11048 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11049 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11050 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11051 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11052 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11053 </para>
11054 <para>
11055 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11056 supporting
11057 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11058 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11059 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11060 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11061 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11062 </para>
11063 <para>
11064 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11065 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11066
11067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11068 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11069 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11070 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11071 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11072 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11073 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11074 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11075 </para>
11076 <para>
11077 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11078 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11079 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11080 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11081 </para>
11082 <para>
11083 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11084 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11085 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11086 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11087 clear.
11088 </para>
11089 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11090 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11091 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11092 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11093 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11094 <para>
11095 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11096 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11097 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11098 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11099 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11100 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11101 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11102 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11103 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11104 </para>
11105 <para>
11106 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11107 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11108 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11109 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11110 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11111 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11112 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11113 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11114
11115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11116 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11117 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11118 </para>
11119 <para>
11120 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11121 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11122 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11123 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11124 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11125 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11126 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11127 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11128 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11129 confidence in our argument.
11130 </para>
11131 <para>
11132 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11133 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11134 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11135 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11136 copyright holders.
11137 </para>
11138 <para>
11139 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11140 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11141 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11142 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11143 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11144 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11145 wanted to control.
11146 </para>
11147 <para>
11148 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11149 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11150 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11151 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11152 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11153 pornography."<footnote><para>
11154 <!-- f14. -->
11155 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11156 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11157 </para></footnote>
11158 That was also the motive of
11159 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11160 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11161 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11162 <!-- f15. -->
11163 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11164 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11165 </para></footnote>
11166 That's
11167
11168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11169 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11170 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11171 </para>
11172 <para>
11173 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11174 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11175 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11176 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11177 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11178 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11179 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11180 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11181 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11182 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11183 </para>
11184 <para>
11185 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11186 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11187 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11188 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11189 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11190 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11191 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11192 </para>
11193 <para>
11194 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11195 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11196 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11197 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11198 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11199 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11200 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11201 powers had limits.
11202 </para>
11203 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11204 <para>
11205 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11206 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11207 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11208 the Constitution
11209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11210 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11211 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11212 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11213 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11214 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11215 </para>
11216 <para>
11217 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11218 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11219 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11220 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11221 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11222 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11223 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11224 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11225 sense.
11226 </para>
11227 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11228 <para>
11229 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11230 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11231 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11232 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11233 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11234 these retrospective extensions.
11235 </para>
11236 <para>
11237 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11238 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11239 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11240 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11241 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11242 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11243 </para>
11244 <para>
11245 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11246 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11247 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11248 overriding
11249 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11250 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11251 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11252 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11253 </para>
11254 <para>
11255 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11256 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11257
11258 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11259 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11260 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11261 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11262 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11263 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11264 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11265 copyright be limited.
11266 </para>
11267 <para>
11268 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11269 Congress
11270 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11271 government
11272 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11273 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11274 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11275 </para>
11276 <para>
11277 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11278 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11279 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11280 existing
11281 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11282 </para>
11283 <para>
11284 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11285 extended
11286 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11287 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11288 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11289 existing
11290 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11291 restraint
11292 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11293 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11294 hesitated
11295 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11296 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11297 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11298 arrived
11299 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11300 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11301
11302 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11303 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11304 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11305 </para>
11306 <para>
11307 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11308 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11309 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11310 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11311 Congress
11312 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11313 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11314 this central idea.
11315 </para>
11316 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11317 <para>
11318 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11319 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11320 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11321 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11322 </para>
11323 <para>
11324 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11325 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11326 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11327 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11328 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11329 </para>
11330 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11331 <para>
11332 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11333 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11334 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11335 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11336 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11337 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11338 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11339 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11340 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11341 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11342 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11343
11344 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11345 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11346 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11347 </para>
11348 <para>
11349 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11350 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11351 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11352 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11353 congressmen
11354 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11355 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11356 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11357 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11358 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11359 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11360 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11361 family of the Justices.
11362 </para>
11363 <para>
11364 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11365 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11366 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11367 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11368 </para>
11369 <para>
11370 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11371 The history was bothering her.
11372 </para>
11373 <blockquote>
11374 <para>
11375 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11376 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11377 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11378 practice that began with the very first act.
11379 </para>
11380 </blockquote>
11381 <para>
11382 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11383 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11384 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11385 </para>
11386 <blockquote>
11387 <para>
11388 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11389 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11391 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11392 is yes.
11393 </para>
11394 </blockquote>
11395 <para>
11396 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11397 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11398 Kennedy, who observed,
11399 </para>
11400 <blockquote>
11401 <para>
11402 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11403 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11404 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11405 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11406 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11407 </para>
11408 </blockquote>
11409 <para>
11410 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11411 student,
11412 I answered,
11413 </para>
11414 <blockquote>
11415 <para>
11416 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11417 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11418 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11419 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11420 effectively
11421 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11422 </para>
11423 </blockquote>
11424 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11425 <para>
11426 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11427 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11428 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11429 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11430 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11431 </para>
11432 <para>
11433 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11434 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11435 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11436 </para>
11437 <para>
11438 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11439 sympathetic.
11440 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11441
11442 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11443 </para>
11444 <blockquote>
11445 <para>
11446 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11447 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11448 </para>
11449 <para>
11450 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11451 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11452 domain
11453 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11454 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11455 into the Copyright Clause.
11456 </para>
11457 </blockquote>
11458 <para>
11459 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11460 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11461 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11462 </para>
11463 <blockquote>
11464 <para>
11465 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11466 unlimited
11467 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11468 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11469 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11470 an unlimited time.
11471 </para>
11472 </blockquote>
11473 <para>
11474 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11475 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11476 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11477 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11478 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11479 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11480 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause&mdash;
11481 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11482 specific
11483 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11484 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11485 </para>
11486 <para>
11487 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11488 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11489
11490 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11491 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11492 optimistic.
11493 </para>
11494 <para>
11495 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11496 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11497 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11498 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11499 believed
11500 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11501 Copyright
11502 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11503 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11504 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11505 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11506 Copyright
11507 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11508 believe
11509 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in
11510 particular, the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule
11511 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11512 </para>
11513 <para>
11514 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11515 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11516 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11517 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11518 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11519 </para>
11520 <para>
11521 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11522 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11523 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11524 </para>
11525 <para>
11526 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11527 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11528 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11529 </para>
11530 <para>
11531 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11532 distinguish
11533 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11534 argument
11535 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11536 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11537 in the Court's opinion.
11538 </para>
11539 <para>
11540
11541 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11542 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11543 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11544 generally,
11545 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11546 </para>
11547 <para>
11548 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11549 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11550 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11551 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11552 </para>
11553 <para>
11554 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11555 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11556 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11557 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11558 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11559 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11560 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11561 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11562 would not.
11563 </para>
11564 <para>
11565 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11566 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11567 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11568 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11569 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11570 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11571 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11572 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11573 the system we have.
11574 </para>
11575 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11576 <para>
11577 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11578 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11579 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11580 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11581 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11582 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11583 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11584 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11585 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11586 </para>
11587 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11588 <para>
11589 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11590 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11591 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11592 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11593 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11594 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11595 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11596 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11597 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11598 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11599 </para>
11600 <para>
11601 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11602 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11603 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11604 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11605 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11606 </para>
11607 <para>
11608 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11609 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11610 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11611 </para>
11612 <para>
11613 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11614 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11615 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11616 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11617 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11618 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11619 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11620 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11621 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11622 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11623 "originalism" now?
11624 </para>
11625 <para>
11626 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11627 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11628 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11629 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11630
11631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11632 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11633 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11634 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11635 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11636 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11637 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11638 own principles.
11639 </para>
11640 <para>
11641 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11642 myself.
11643 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11644 the law as it is.
11645 </para>
11646 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11647 <para>
11648 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11649 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11650 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11651 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11652 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11653 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11654 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11655 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11656 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11657 </para>
11658 <para>
11659 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11660 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11661 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11662 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11663 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11664 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11665 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11666 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11667 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11668 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11669 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11670 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11671 effort to persuade; but I
11672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11673 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11674 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11675 should decide the issue.
11676 </para>
11677 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11678 <para>
11679 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11680 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11681 Kathleen Sullivan?
11682 </para>
11683 <para>
11684 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11685 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11686 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11687 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11688 </para>
11689 <para>
11690 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11691 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11692 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11693 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11694 have persuaded.
11695 </para>
11696 <para>
11697 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11698 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11699 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11700 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11701 issue should not be raised until it is.
11702 </para>
11703 <para>
11704 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11705 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11706 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11707 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11708 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11709 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11710 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11711 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11712 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11713 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11714 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11715
11716 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11717 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11718 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11719 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11720 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11721 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11722 </para>
11723 <blockquote>
11724 <para>
11725 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11726 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11727 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11728 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11729 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11730 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11731 </para>
11732 </blockquote>
11733 <para>
11734 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11735 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11736 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11737 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11738 in the face felt exactly like that.
11739 </para>
11740 <para>
11741 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11742 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11743 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11744 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11745 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11746 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11747 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11748 </para>
11749 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11750 </sect1>
11751 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
11752 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11753 <para>
11754 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11755 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11756 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11757 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11758 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11759 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11760 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11761 </para>
11762 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11763 <para>
11764 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11765 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11766 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11767 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11768 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11769 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11770 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11771 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11772 </para>
11773 <para>
11774 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11775 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11776 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11777 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11778 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11779 the work passed into the public domain.
11780 </para>
11781 <para>
11782 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11783 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11784 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11785 </para>
11786 <para>
11787 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11788 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11789 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11790 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11791 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11792 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11793 everything else, let the content go.
11794 </para>
11795 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11796 <para>
11797 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11798 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11799 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11800 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11801 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11802 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11803 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11804 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11805 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11806 the stupid harm of the present system.
11807 </para>
11808 <para>
11809 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11810 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11811 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11812 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11813 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11814 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11815 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11816 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11817 where copyright owners could be identified.
11818 </para>
11819 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11820 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11821 <para>
11822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11823 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
11824 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11825 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11826 <!-- f1. -->
11827 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11828 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11829 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11830 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11831 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11832 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11833 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11834 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11835 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11836 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11837 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11838 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11839 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11840 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11841 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11842 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11843 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11844 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11845 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11846 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11847 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11848 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11849 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11850 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11851 </para>
11852 <para>
11853 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11854 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11855 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11856 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11857 know what's protected and what's not.
11858 </para>
11859 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11860 <para>
11861 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11862 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11863 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11864 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11865 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11866 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11867 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11868 in the loss of widows' only income.
11869 </para>
11870 <para>
11871 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11872 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11873 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11874 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11875 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11876 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11877 </para>
11878 <para>
11879 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11880 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11881 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11882 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11883 burden
11884 imposed upon creators.
11885 </para>
11886 <para>
11887 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
11888 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11889
11890 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11891 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11892 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11893 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11894 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11895 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11896 table.
11897 </para>
11898 <para>
11899 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11900 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11901 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11902 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11903 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11904 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11905 spread.
11906 </para>
11907 <para>
11908 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11909 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11910 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11911 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11912 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11913 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
11914 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11915 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11916 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11917 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11918 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11919 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11920 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11921 system of protection for property generally.
11922 </para>
11923 <para>
11924 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11925 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11926 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11927 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11928 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11929 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11930 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11931 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11932
11933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11934 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
11935 take their place.
11936 </para>
11937 <para>
11938 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11939 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11940 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11941 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11942 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11943 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11944 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11945 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11946 </para>
11947 <para>
11948 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11949 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11950 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11951 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11952 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11953 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11954 seen before because there are no formalities.
11955 </para>
11956 <para>
11957 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11958 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11959 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11960 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11961 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11962 </para>
11963 <para>
11964 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11965 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
11966 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
11967 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
11968 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
11969 </para>
11970 <para>
11971 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
11972 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
11973 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
11974 registration?
11975 </para>
11976 <para>
11977 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
11978 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
11979 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
11980
11981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
11982 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
11983 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
11984 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
11985 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
11986 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
11987 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
11988 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
11989 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
11990 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
11991 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
11992 </para>
11993 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11994 <para>
11995 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
11996 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
11997 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
11998 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
11999 </para>
12000 <para>
12001 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12002 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12003 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12004 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12005 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12006 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12007 something good might happen here.
12008 </para>
12009 <para>
12010 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12011 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12012 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12013 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12014 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12015 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12016 </para>
12017 <para>
12018 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12019 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12020 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12022 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12023 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12024 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12025 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12026 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12027 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12028 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12029 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12030 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12031 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12032 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12033 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12034 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12035 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12036 film is a valid derivative use.
12037 </para>
12038 <para>
12039 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12040 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12041 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12042 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12043 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12044 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12045 </para>
12046 <para>
12047 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12048 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12049 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12050 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12051 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12052 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12053 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12054 threat.
12055 </para>
12056 <para>
12057 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12058 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12059 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12060 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12061 sense?
12062 </para>
12063 <para>
12064
12065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12066 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12067 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12068 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12069 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12070 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12071 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12072 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12073 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12074 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12075 </para>
12076 <para>
12077 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12078 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12079 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12080 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12081 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12082 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12083 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12084 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12085 </para>
12086 <para>
12087 What does this industry really want?
12088 </para>
12089 <para>
12090 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12091 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12092 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12093 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12094 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12095 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12096 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12097 permission first.
12098 </para>
12099 <para>
12100 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12101 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12102 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12103 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12104 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12105 </para>
12106 <para>
12107 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12108 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12109
12110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12111 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12112 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12113 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12114 and to share its own creation.
12115 </para>
12116 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12117 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12118 <para>
12119 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12120 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12121 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12122 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12123 block the progress of others.
12124 </para>
12125 <para>
12126 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12127 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12128 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12129 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12130 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12131 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12132 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12133 </para>
12134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12135 </sect1>
12136 </chapter>
12137 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12138 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12139 <para>
12140 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12141 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12142 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12143 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12144 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12145 </para>
12146 <para>
12147 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12148 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12149 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12150 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12151 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12152 the disease almost invisible.
12153 </para>
12154 <para>
12155 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12156 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12157 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12158 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12159 population:
12160 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12161 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12162 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12163 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12164 available at
12165 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12166 release
12167 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12168 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12169 </para></footnote>
12170 </para>
12171 <para>
12172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12173 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12174 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12175 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12176 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12177 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12178 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12179 </para>
12180 <para>
12181 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12182 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12183 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12184 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12185 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12186 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12187 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12188 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12189 changes.
12190 </para>
12191 <para>
12192 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12193 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12194 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12195 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12196 costs significantly below the market price.
12197 </para>
12198 <para>
12199 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12200 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12201 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12202 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12203 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12204 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12205 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12206 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12207 <para>
12208 <!-- f2. -->
12209 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12210 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12211 </para></footnote>
12212 </para>
12213 <para>
12214 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12215 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12216 Association
12217 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12218 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12219 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12220 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12221 Prepared
12222 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12223 2000), 14, available at
12224 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12225 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12226 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12227 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12228 (statement of James Love).
12229 </para></footnote>
12230 Through the
12231 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12232 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12233 request,
12234 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12236 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12237 began
12238 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12239 government's
12240 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12241 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12242 companies,
12243 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12244 international
12245 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12246 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12247 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12248 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12249 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12250 <!-- f4. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12251 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12252 Prepared
12253 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12254 2000), 15.
12255 </para></footnote>
12256 </para>
12257 <para>
12258 We should place the intervention by the United States in context.
12259 No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans
12260 don't have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12261 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12262 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their
12263 demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12264 marginal,
12265 there was an effect from our government's intervention to stop
12266 the flow of medications into Africa.
12267 </para>
12268 <para>
12269 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12270 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12271 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12272 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12273 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12274 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12275 </para>
12276 <para>
12277 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12278 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12279 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12280 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12281 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12282 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12283 by U.S. companies.
12284 </para>
12285 <para>
12286 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12287 information,
12288 which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument
12289 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12290 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12291 <!-- f5. --> See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12292 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12293 May 1999, A1, available at
12294 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink> ("compulsory licenses and gray
12295 markets
12296 pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property protection");
12297 Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
12298 Access
12299 to Essential Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999),
12300 available at
12301 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink> (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS,
12302 Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
12303 Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a
12304 Synopsis,"
12305 Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12307 </para></footnote>
12308 It was because "intellectual property"
12309 would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was
12310 a principle about the importance of "intellectual property" that led
12311 these government actors to intervene against the South African
12312 response
12313 to AIDS.
12314 </para>
12315 <para>
12316 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12317 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12318 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12319 direct
12320 cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans, and
12321 whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an idea?
12322 What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results
12323 in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so
12324 many to die for such an abstraction?
12325 </para>
12326 <para>
12327 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12328 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12329 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12330 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12331 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12332 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12333 </para>
12334 <para>
12335 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12336 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to sell their
12337 drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere.
12338 There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn't get
12339 back into the United States, but those are mere problems of
12340 technology.
12341 They could be overcome.
12342 </para>
12343 <para>
12344 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12345 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12346 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12347 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12348 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12349 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12350 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12351 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12352 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12353 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12354 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12355 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12356 idea called "intellectual property."
12357 </para>
12358 <para>
12359 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12360 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12361 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12362 What is the argument?
12363 </para>
12364 <para>
12365 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the
12366 patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly
12367 the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and
12368 strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the
12369 spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could
12370 endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block
12371 the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market
12372 prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12373 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were
12374 balanced in just this sense.
12375 </para>
12376 <para>
12377 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12378 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12379 extremism.
12380 A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our
12381 tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with consequences
12382 more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other
12383 single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12384 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much
12385 happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically
12386 do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice
12387 how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12388 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that
12389 we don't even question when the control of that property removes our
12390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12391 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12392 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12393 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12394 this common sense open its eyes.
12395 </para>
12396 <para>
12397 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12398 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12399 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12400 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12401 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12402 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12403 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12404 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12405 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12406 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12407 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12408 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12409 </para>
12410 <para>
12411 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12412 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12413 meeting.<footnote><para>
12414 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12415 August 2003, E1, available at
12416 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12417 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12418 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12419 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12420 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12421 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12422 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12423 </para></footnote>
12424 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had
12425 decided
12426 to hold a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to
12427 create public goods." These are projects that have been successful in
12428 producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary
12429 use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the
12430 World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of
12431 protocols
12432 in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support
12433 open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science
12434 project
12435 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12436 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12437 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12438 comprised
12439 a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12440 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12441 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12442 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12443 Glaxo-SmithKline,
12444 IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included
12445 the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the
12446 early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12447 </para>
12448 <para>
12449 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12450 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12451 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12452 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12453 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12454 </para>
12455 <para>
12456 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12457 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12458 meeting.
12459 </para></footnote>
12460 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12461 noncommercial
12462 work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12463 perspectives.
12464 And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12465 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12466 property issues.
12467 </para>
12468 <para>
12469 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12470 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12471 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information
12472 Society
12473 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked
12474 what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12475 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12476 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12477 interrupted
12478 to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12479 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12480 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12481 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12482 relatively
12483 minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual
12484 property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an
12485 "Information Society" unless one also talked about the range of
12486 information
12487 and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my
12488 immoderate
12489 moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the
12490 scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of
12491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12492 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12493 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12494 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12495 </para>
12496 <para>
12497 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual
12498 property,
12499 I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and
12500 should. And thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to
12501 create public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO
12502 agenda.
12503 </para>
12504 <para>
12505 But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial,
12506 at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source and free
12507 software."
12508 Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From
12509 its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software
12510 would be like a conference to discuss Apple's operating system. Both
12511 open source and free software compete with Microsoft's software. And
12512 internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements
12513 that they use open source or free software, rather than "proprietary
12514 software," for their own internal uses.
12515 </para>
12516 <para>
12517 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12518 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12519 noncommercial
12520 software. There are many important companies that depend
12521 fundamentally
12522 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12523 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12524 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM is
12525 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12526 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12527 support a mode of software development that is different from
12528 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12529 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12530 sophisticated.
12531 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12532 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12533 opposition
12534 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12535 license
12536 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12537 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12538 Marketplace
12539 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12540 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12541 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2002), 69,
12542 available at
12543 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12544 president,
12545 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12546 Stern School of Business (3 May 2001), available at
12547 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12548 </para></footnote>
12549 </para>
12550 <para>
12551 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12552 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12553 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12554 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12555 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12556 by
12557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12558 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12559 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12560 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12561 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12562 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12563 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12564 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12565 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12566 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12567 </para>
12568 <para>
12569 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12570 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12571 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12572 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12573 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12574 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12575 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12576 <!-- f9. -->
12577 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12578 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12579 </para></footnote>
12580 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12581 </para>
12582 <para>
12583 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12584 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12585 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12586 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12587 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12588 its lobbying efforts.
12589 </para>
12590 <para>
12591 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12592 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12593 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12594 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12595 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12596 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12597 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12598 goals of WIPO."
12599 </para>
12600 <para>
12601 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12602 </para>
12603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12604 <para>
12605 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12606 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12607 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12608 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12609 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12610 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12611 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12612 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12613 </para>
12614 <para>
12615 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12616 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12617 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12618 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12619 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12620 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12621 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12622 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12623 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12624 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12625 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12626 </para>
12627 <para>
12628 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12629 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12630 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12631 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12632 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12633 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12634 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12635 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12636 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12637 right to decide what to do with their property.
12638 </para>
12639 <para>
12640 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12641 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12642 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12643 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12644 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12645 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12646 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12647 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12648 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12649 way possible.
12650 </para>
12651 <para>
12652 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12653 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12654 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12655 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12656 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12657 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12658 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12659 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12660 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12661 that control.
12662 </para>
12663 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12664 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12665 <para>
12666 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12667 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12668 <!-- f10. -->
12669 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
12670 </para></footnote>
12671 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12672 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12673 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12674 </para>
12675 <para>
12676 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12677 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12678 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12679 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12680 </para>
12681 <blockquote>
12682 <para>
12683 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12684 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12685 should be to promote the right balance of intellectualproperty rights,
12686 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12687 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12688 say anything wrong. But in the world
12689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12690 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12691 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12692 </para>
12693 </blockquote>
12694 <para>
12695 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12696 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12697 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12698 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12699 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12700 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12701 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12702 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12703 </para>
12704 <para>
12705 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12706 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12707 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12708 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12709 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12710 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12711 </para>
12712 <para>
12713 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12714 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12715 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12716 our own country's history).
12717 </para>
12718 <para>
12719 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12720 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12721 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12722 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12723 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12724 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12725 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12726 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12727 democracy in the world, become?
12728 </para>
12729 <para>
12730 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12731 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12732 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12734 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12735 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12736 </para>
12737 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12738 <para>
12739 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12740 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12741 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12742 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12743 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12744 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12745 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12746 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12747 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12748 hearings and a different result.
12749 </para>
12750 <para>
12751 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12752 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12753 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12754 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12755 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12756 concentration in the media.
12757 </para>
12758 <para>
12759 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12760 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12761 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12762 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12763 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12764 </para>
12765 <para>
12766 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12767 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12768 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12769 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12770 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12771 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12772 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12773 </para>
12774 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12775 <para>
12776 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12777 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12778 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12779 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12780 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12781 </para>
12782 <para>
12783 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12784 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12785 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12786 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12787 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12788 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12789 </para>
12790 <para>
12791 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12792 of our tragedy.
12793 </para>
12794 <para>
12795 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12796 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12797 <!-- f11. -->
12798 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12799 2003, available at
12800 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12801 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12802 2003, available at
12803 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12804 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12805 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News, 9
12806 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12807 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12808 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12809 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
12810 available at
12811 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12812 </para></footnote>
12813 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12814 music.<footnote><para>
12815 <!-- f12. -->
12816 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12817 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12818 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12819 </para></footnote>
12820 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12821 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12822 <!-- f13. -->
12823 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12824 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12825 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12827 </para></footnote>
12828 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12829 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12830 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12831 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12832 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12833 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12834 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12835 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12836 kids who use a computer to share content.
12837 </para>
12838 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12839 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12840 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
12841 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12842 <para>
12843 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12844 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12845 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12846 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12847 24 August 2003, available at
12848 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12849 </para></footnote>
12850 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12851 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12852 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12853 country.<footnote><para>
12854 <!-- f15. -->
12855 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
12856 available at
12857 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12858 </para></footnote>
12859 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12860 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12861 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12862 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12863 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12864 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12865 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12866 day into the Causbys.
12867 </para>
12868 <para>
12869 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12870 potential is ever to be realized.
12871
12872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12873
12874 </para>
12875 </chapter>
12876 <chapter id="c-afterword">
12877 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
12878 <para>
12879
12880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12881 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12882 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12883 maps what might be done.
12884 </para>
12885 <para>
12886 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12887 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12888 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12889 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12890 </para>
12891 <para>
12892 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12893 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12894 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
12895 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12896 is so important.
12897 </para>
12898 <para>
12899 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12900 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12901 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12902 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12903 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12904 </para>
12905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12906
12907 <sect1 id="usnow">
12908 <title>US, NOW</title>
12909 <para>
12910 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12911 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
12912 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12913 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12914 </para>
12915 <para>
12916 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12917 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12918 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
12919 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
12920 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12921 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12922 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12923 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12924 </para>
12925 <para>
12926 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12927 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12928 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12929 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12930 the
12931
12932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12933 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12934 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12935 unprotected.
12936 </para>
12937 <para>
12938 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12939 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12940 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12941 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12942 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12943 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12944 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12945 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12946 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12947 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12948 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12949 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12950 </para>
12951 <para>
12952 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither "all
12953 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"&mdash;
12954 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content
12955 as they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of
12956 freedoms
12957 that we could just take for granted before.
12958 </para>
12959
12960 <sect2 id="examples">
12961 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
12962 <para>
12963 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12964 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12965 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12966 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12967 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12968 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12969 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12970 assured.
12971 </para>
12972 <para>
12973 What made it assured?
12974 </para>
12975 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12976 <para>
12977 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12978 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
12979 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12980 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
12981 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
12982 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
12983 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
12984 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
12985 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
12986 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
12987 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
12988 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
12989 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
12990 </para>
12991 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
12992 <para>
12993 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
12994 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
12995 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
12996 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
12997 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
12998 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
12999 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13000 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13001 </para>
13002 <para>
13003 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13004 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13005 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13006 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13007 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13008 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13009 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13010 disappears.
13011 </para>
13012 <para>
13013 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13014 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13015 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13016 friction did.<footnote><para>
13017 <!-- f1. -->
13018
13019 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13020 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
13021 Law Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13022
13023 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13024 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13025 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13026 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13027 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13028 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13029 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13030
13031 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13032 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13033 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13034 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13035 </para>
13036 <para>
13037 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13038 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13039 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13040 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13041 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13042 care much about controlling their software.
13043 </para>
13044 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13045 <para>
13046 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13047 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13048 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13049 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13050 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13051 people's work.
13052 </para>
13053 <para>
13054 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13055 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13056 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13057 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13058 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13059 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13060 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13061 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13062 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13063 anything else?
13064 </para>
13065 <para>
13066 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13067 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13068 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13069 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13070 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13071 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13072 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13073 </para>
13074 <para>
13075 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13076 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13077 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13078 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13079 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13080 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13081 fundamentally weakened.
13082 </para>
13083 <para>
13084 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13085 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13086 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13087 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13088 </para>
13089 <para>
13090 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13091 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13092 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13093 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13094 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13095 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13096 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13097 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13098 byproduct.
13099 </para>
13100 <para>
13101 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13102 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13103 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13104 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13105 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13106 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13107 </para>
13108 <para>
13109 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13110 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13111 scientific journals are produced.
13112 </para>
13113 <para>
13114 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many
13115 that printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending
13116 them to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13117 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13118 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
13119 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
13120 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
13121 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
13122 service.
13123 Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and
13124 anyone
13125 is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free
13126 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13127 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13128 Court opinion through their respective services.
13129 </para>
13130 <para>
13131 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability
13132 to charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13133 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13134 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been
13135 allowed
13136 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13137 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13138 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13139 </para>
13140 <para>
13141 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13142 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13143 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13144 </para>
13145 <para>
13146 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13147 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
13148 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to
13149 the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts
13150 because
13151 the library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand
13152 the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks by reading all
13153 available articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a
13154 function of the institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of
13155 paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it was very hard to control
13156 access to a paper journal.
13157 </para>
13158 <para>
13159 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13160 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13161 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13162 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13163 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13164 granted before.
13165 </para>
13166 <para>
13167 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13168 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13169 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13170 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13171 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13172 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13173 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13174 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13175 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13176 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13177 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13178 </para>
13179 <para>
13180 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13181 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13182 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13183 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13184 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13185 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13186 and science.
13187 </para>
13188
13189 </sect2>
13190 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13191 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13192 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13193 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13194 </indexterm>
13195 <para>
13196 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13197 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13198 </para>
13199 <para>
13200 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13201 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13202 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13203 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13204 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13205 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13206 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13207 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13208 </para>
13209 <para>
13210 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13211 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13212 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13213 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13214 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13215 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13216 three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable
13217 description, and
13218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13219 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13220 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13221 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13222 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13223 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13224 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13225 certain freedoms are given.
13226 </para>
13227 <para>
13228 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13229 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13230 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13231 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13232 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13233 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13234 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13235 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13236 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13237 </para>
13238 <para>
13239 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13240 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13241 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13242 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13243 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13244 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13245 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13246 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13247 a public domain.
13248 </para>
13249 <para>
13250 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13251 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13252 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13253 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13254 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13255 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13257 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13258 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13259 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13260 </para>
13261 <para>
13262 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13263 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13264 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13265 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13266 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13267 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13268 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13269 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13270 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13271 to begin to build those rules.
13272 </para>
13273 <para>
13274 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13275 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13276 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13277 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13278 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13279 </para>
13280 <para>
13281 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13282 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13283 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13284 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13285 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13286 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13287 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13288 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13289 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13290 sales of Cory's book.
13291 </para>
13292 <para>
13293 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13294 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13295 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13296 was a total success.
13297 </para>
13298 <para>
13299 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13300 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13301 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13302 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13303 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13304 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13305 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13306 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13307 well.
13308 </para>
13309 <para>
13310 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13311 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13312 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13313 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13314 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13315 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13316 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13317 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13318 with their own art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13319 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13320 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13321 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13322 because the legal costs are so high<footnote><para>
13323 <!-- f2. -->
13324
13325 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13326 Culture Wars (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13327 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13328 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13329 </para></footnote>),
13330 these artists release into the creative environment content
13331 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13332 </para>
13333 <para>
13334 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13335 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13336 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13337 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13338 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13339 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13340 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13341 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13342 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13343 say it to others.
13344 </para>
13345 <para>
13346 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13347 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13348 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13349 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13350
13351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13352 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13353 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13354 </para>
13355 <para>
13356 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13357 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13358 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13359 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13360 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13361 steps are possible.
13362 </para>
13363 <para>
13364 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13365 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13366 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13367 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13368 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13369 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13370 creativity to spread more easily.
13371 </para>
13372 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13373
13374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13375 </sect2>
13376 </sect1>
13377 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13378 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13379 <para>
13380 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13381 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13382 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13383 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13384 changes that we need.
13385 </para>
13386 <para>
13387 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13388 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13389 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13390 to our end.
13391 </para>
13392
13393 <sect2 id="formalities">
13394 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13395 <para>
13396 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13397 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13398 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13399 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13400 </para>
13401 <para>
13402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13403 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13404 requirements
13405 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
13406 </para>
13407 <para>
13408 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13409 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13410 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13411 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13412 </para>
13413 <para>
13414 Why?
13415 </para>
13416 <para>
13417 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13418 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13419 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13420 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13421 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13422 formalities
13423 were getting in the way.
13424 </para>
13425 <para>
13426 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13427 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13428 burdens
13429 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what,
13430 or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13431 creative
13432 work of others. There are no records, there is no system to trace&mdash;
13433 there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the
13434 massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is
13435 a necessary step for any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
13436 lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could
13437 speak.
13438 </para>
13439 <para>
13440 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13441 <!-- f1. --> The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13442 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
13443 by other countries as well.
13444 </para></footnote>&mdash;but it should
13445 not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We should
13446 require
13447 formalities, but we should establish a system that will create the
13448 incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13449 </para>
13450 <para>
13451 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13452 registering
13453 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally,
13454 the first of these three was something the copyright owner did; the
13455 second
13456 two were something the government did. But a revised system of
13457 formalities would banish the government from the process, except for
13458 the sole purpose of approving standards developed by others.
13459 </para>
13460
13461 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13462
13463 <sect3 id="registration">
13464 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13465 <para>
13466 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13467 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13468 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13469 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13470 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13471 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13472 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13473 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13474 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13475 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13476 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13477 </para>
13478 <para>
13479 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13480 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13481 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13482 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13483 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13484 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13485 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13486 </para>
13487 <para>
13488 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13489 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13490 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13491 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13492 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13493 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13494 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13495 with which registration occurs up.
13496 </para>
13497 <para>
13498 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13499 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13500 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13501 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13502 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13503 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13504 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13505 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13506 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13507 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13508 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13509 </para>
13510
13511 </sect3>
13512 <sect3 id="marking">
13513 <title>MARKING</title>
13514 <para>
13515 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13516 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13517 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13518 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13519 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13520 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13521 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13522 uniformly across all media.
13523 </para>
13524 <para>
13525 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13526 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13527 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13528 use the work.
13529 </para>
13530 <para>
13531 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13532 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13533 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13534 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13535 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13536 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13537 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13538 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13539 </para>
13540 <para>
13541 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13542 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13543 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13544 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13545 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13546 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13547 <!-- f2. -->
13548 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13549 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13550 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13551 </para></footnote>
13552 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13553 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13554 stop using the work in any new
13555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13556 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13557 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13558 their work.
13559 </para>
13560 <para>
13561 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13562 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13563 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13564 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13565 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13566 </para>
13567 <para>
13568 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13569 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13570 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13571 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13572 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13573 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13574 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13575 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13576 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13577 </para>
13578 <para>
13579 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13580 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13581 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13582 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13583 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13584 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13585 </para>
13586 <para>
13587 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13588 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13589 make things unclear.
13590 </para>
13591 <para>
13592 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13593 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13594 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13595 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13596 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13597 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13598 </para>
13599
13600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13601 </sect3>
13602 </sect2>
13603 <sect2 id="shortterms">
13604 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13605 <para>
13606 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13607 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13608 natural authors.
13609 </para>
13610 <para>
13611 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13612 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13613 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13614 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13615 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13616 term.<footnote><para>
13617 <!-- f3. -->
13618 "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13619 available at
13620 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13621 </para></footnote>
13622 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13623 </para>
13624 <para>
13625 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13626 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13627 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13628 terms.
13629 </para>
13630 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13631 <listitem><para>
13632 <!-- (1) -->
13633 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13634 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13635 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13636 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13637 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13638 regulations when it no longer benefits an author. </para></listitem>
13639 <listitem><para>
13640 <!-- (2) -->
13641 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13642 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13643 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13644 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13645 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13646 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13647 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13648 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13649 navigate.
13650 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13651 </para></listitem>
13652 <listitem><para>
13653 <!-- (3) -->
13654 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13655 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13656 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13657 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13658 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13659 veteran to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
13660 <!-- f4. -->
13661 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13662 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13663 available at
13664 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13665 </para></footnote>
13666 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13667 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13668 single form.
13669 </para></listitem>
13670 <listitem><para>
13671 <!-- (4) -->
13672 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13673 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13674 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in 1923 for the law to
13675 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13676 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13677 fewer authors to create in 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13678 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13679 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13680 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13681 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13682 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13683 not increase their creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done,
13684 and there's nothing we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13685 </orderedlist>
13686 <para>
13687 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13688 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
13689 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13690 </para>
13691 <para>
13692 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13693 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13694 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13695 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13696 </para>
13697
13698 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13699
13700 </sect2>
13701 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
13702 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13703 <para>
13704 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13705 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13706 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13707 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13708 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13709 the emergence of that new technology.
13710 </para>
13711 <para>
13712 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13713 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13714 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13715 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13716 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13717 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13718 though that movie is not "my writing."
13719 </para>
13720 <para>
13721 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13722 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13723 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13724 <!-- f5. -->
13725 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13726 University Press, 1967), 32.
13727 </para></footnote>
13728 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13729 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13730 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13731 </para>
13732 <blockquote>
13733 <para>
13734 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13735 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13736 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13737 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13738 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13739 </para></footnote>
13740 </para>
13741 </blockquote>
13742 <para>
13743 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13744 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13745 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13746 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13747 Consider each limitation in turn.
13748 </para>
13749 <para>
13750 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13751 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13752
13753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13754 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13755 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13756 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13757 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13758 after the creative work is done.
13759 </para>
13760 <para>
13761 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13762 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13763 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13764 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13765 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13766 perhaps
13767 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer
13768 makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the
13769 creative
13770 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine
13771 pouring
13772 molasses into the machines. That's what this general requirement
13773 of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13774 </para>
13775 <para>
13776 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13777 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13778 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13779 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13780 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13781 much more sense.
13782 </para>
13783 <para>
13784 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13785 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13786 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13787 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13788 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13789 <para>
13790 <!-- f7. -->
13791 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13792 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13793 </para></footnote>
13794 His view is that the law should be written so that
13795 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13796 </para>
13797 <para>
13798 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13799 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13800 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13801 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13802 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13803 </para>
13804 <para>
13805 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13807 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13808 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13809 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13810 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13811 </para>
13812 </sect2>
13813
13814 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
13815 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13816 <para>
13817 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13818 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13819 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13820 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13821 battles around the sharing of music.
13822 </para>
13823 <para>
13824 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13825 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13826 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13827 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13828 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13829 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13830 innovation on the network.
13831 </para>
13832 <para>
13833 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13834 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13835 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13836 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13837 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13838 </para>
13839 <para>
13840 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13841 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13842 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13843 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13844 </para>
13845 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
13846 <listitem><para>
13847 <!-- A. -->
13848 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13849 for purchasing CDs.
13850 </para></listitem>
13851 <listitem><para>
13852 <!-- B. -->
13853 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13854 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13855 </para></listitem>
13856 <listitem><para>
13857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13858 <!-- C. -->
13859 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13860 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13861 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13862 </para></listitem>
13863 <listitem><para>
13864 <!-- D. -->
13865 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13866 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13867 owner plainly endorses.
13868 </para></listitem>
13869 </orderedlist>
13870 <para>
13871 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13872 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13873 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13874 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13875 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13876 significantly weakened.
13877 </para>
13878 <para>
13879 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13880 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13881 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13882 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13883 networks.
13884 </para>
13885 <para>
13886 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13887 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13888 should respond.
13889 </para>
13890 <para>
13891 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13892 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13893 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13894 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13895 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
13896 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13897 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13898 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13899 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13900 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13901 </para>
13902 <para>
13903 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13904 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13905 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13906 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13907 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13908 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13909 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13910 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13911 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13912 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
13913 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
13914 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13915 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13916 </para>
13917 <para>
13918 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13919 that give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet
13920 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13921 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
13922 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
13923 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
13924 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
13925 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
13926 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13927 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13928 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13929 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13930 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13931 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13932 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13933 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
13934 <!-- f8. -->
13935 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
13936 April 2002, available at
13937 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
13938 </para></footnote>
13939
13940 </para>
13941 <para>
13942 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13943 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13944 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
13945 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13946 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13947 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13948 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13949 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13950 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13951 artists get paid, during
13952
13953 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13954 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13955 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13956 </para>
13957 <para>
13958 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13959 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
13960 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13961 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13962 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13963 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13964 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13965 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13966 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13967 </para>
13968 <para>
13969 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13970 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13971 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13972 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13973 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13974 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13975 way that returns something to the artist.
13976 </para>
13977 <para>
13978 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13979 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13980 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13981 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13982 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13983 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13984 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
13985 his being compensated is less than ideal.
13986 </para>
13987 <para>
13988 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
13989 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
13990 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
13991 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
13992 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
13993 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
13994 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
13995 </para>
13996 <para>
13997
13998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
13999 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14000 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14001 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14002 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14003 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14004 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14005 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14006 trade.
14007 </para>
14008 <para>
14009 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14010 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14011 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14012 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14013 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14014 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14015 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14016 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14017 </para>
14018 <para>
14019 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14020 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14021 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14022 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14023 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14024 delivering and accessing content.
14025 </para>
14026 <para>
14027 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14028 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14029 </para>
14030 <para>
14031 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14032 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14033 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14034 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14035 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14036 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14037 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14038 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14039 </para>
14040 <para>
14041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14042 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14043 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14044 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14045 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14046 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14047 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14048 </para>
14049 <para>
14050 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14051 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14052 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14053 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14054 <para>
14055 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14056 10 October 2000), available at
14057 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14058 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14059 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
14060 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14061 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14062 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14063 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14064 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14065 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14066 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14067 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14068 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14069 available at
14070 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14071 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14072 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14073 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14074 2002, available at
14075 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14076 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14077 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14078 McCullagh,
14079 "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14080 2002, available at
14081 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14082 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14083 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14084 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14085 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14086 debate
14087 by about a decade. See
14088 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14089 </para></footnote>
14090 Fisher suggests a
14091 very clever way around the current impasse of the Internet. Under his
14092 plan, all content capable of digital transmission would (1) be marked
14093 with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to evade
14094 these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once the
14095 content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to
14096 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the
14097 basis
14098 of those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The
14099 compensation
14100 would be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
14101 </para>
14102 <para>
14103 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14104 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14105 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14106 simple:
14107 Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14108 system.
14109 I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of the
14110 proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
14111 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14112 facilitating
14113 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal
14114 after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free
14115 exchange
14116 of content, supported through a taxation system, then it can be
14117 continued. If this form of protection is no longer necessary, then the
14118 system could lapse into the old system of controlling access.
14119 </para>
14120 <para>
14121 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His
14122 aim is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the
14123 system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But
14124 the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes
14125 I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the limits on derivative
14126
14127 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14128 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14129 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14130 allowed
14131 to do with the content itself.
14132 </para>
14133 <para>
14134 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14135 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14136 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14137 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14138 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14139 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14140 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14141 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14142 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14143 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14144 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14145 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14146 on-line.
14147 </para>
14148 <para>
14149 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14150 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14151 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14152 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14153 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14154 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14155 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14156 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14157 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14158 finding ways to compete with "free."
14159 </para>
14160 <para>
14161 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14162 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14163 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14164 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14165 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14166 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14167 the law.
14168 </para>
14169 <para>
14170 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14171 </para>
14172 <para>
14173
14174 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14175 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14176 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14177 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14178 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14179 create.
14180 </para>
14181 <para>
14182 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14183 by
14184 </para>
14185 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14186 <listitem><para>
14187 <!-- 1. -->
14188 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14189 </para></listitem>
14190 <listitem><para>
14191 <!-- 2. -->
14192 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14193 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14194 statute;
14195 </para></listitem>
14196 <listitem><para>
14197 <!-- 3. -->
14198 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14199 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14200 </para></listitem>
14201 </orderedlist>
14202 <para>
14203 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a
14204 competitive
14205 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14206 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14207 something then?
14208 </para>
14209 <para>
14210 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14211 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But
14212 the real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract.
14213 The real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14214 technology
14215 that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x, or
14216 (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14217 market
14218 of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14219 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14220 authorized
14221 sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14222 compensation
14223 without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then it
14224 may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty pirates.
14225 </para>
14226 <para>
14227 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14228 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not be
14229 on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14230
14231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14232 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting the
14233 space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14234 </para>
14235 </sect2>
14236
14237 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14238 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14239 <para>
14240 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14241 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14242 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14243 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14244 </para>
14245 <para>
14246 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14247 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it is
14248 my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client. And
14249 in a world where the rich clients have one strong view, the
14250 unwillingness
14251 of the profession to question or counter that one strong view queers
14252 the law.
14253 </para>
14254 <para>
14255 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14256 "radical"
14257 by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14258 advocating
14259 are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate and
14260 significant figures in the history of this branch of the law. Many, for
14261 example,
14262 thought crazy the challenge that we brought to the Copyright
14263 Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the dominant scholar
14264 and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville Nimmer, thought it
14265 obvious.<footnote><para>
14266 <!-- f10. --> Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14267 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14268 </para></footnote>
14269
14270 </para>
14271 <para>
14272 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14273 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14274 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14275 </para>
14276 <para>
14277 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and
14278 benefits.
14279 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the
14280 legal system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction
14281 costs of the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14282 <!-- f11. --> A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is to
14283 be commended for his careful review of data about infringement, leading
14284 him to question his own publicly stated position&mdash;twice. He initially
14285 predicted
14286 that downloading would substantially harm the industry. He then
14287 revised his view in light of the data, and he has since revised his view again.
14288 Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True
14289 Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002),
14290 (reviewing his original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J.
14291 Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper,
14292 June 2003, available at
14293 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14294 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14295 effect
14296 of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he underestimates the
14297 costs of the legal system. See, for example, Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14298 </para></footnote>
14299 They see a system that has been
14300 around for hundreds of years, and they assume it works the way their
14301 elementary school civics class taught them it works.
14302 </para>
14303 <para>
14304 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14305 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't
14306 work for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14307 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal level, at
14308 least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of our legal
14309 system
14310 are so astonishingly high that justice can practically never be done.
14311 </para>
14312 <para>
14313 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14314 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14315 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14316 obscure
14317 strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality: very
14318 little.
14319 The law depended upon the careful articulation and development
14320 of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development of legal
14321 doctrine
14322 depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work costs too much,
14323 except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14324 </para>
14325 <para>
14326 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14327 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14328 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14329 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14330 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14331 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14332 </para>
14333 <para>
14334 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the
14335 law away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is
14336 precisely
14337 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left
14338 to its review.
14339 </para>
14340 <para>
14341 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with
14342 digital technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or
14343 think about the amazing things your community could facilitate with
14344 digital technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change
14345 something.
14346 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold
14347 molasses poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that
14348 requires
14349 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's
14350 Russia.
14351 </para>
14352 <para>
14353 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14354 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14355
14356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14357 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14358 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14359 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14360 </para>
14361 <para>
14362 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14363 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14364 keep your lawyers away.
14365 </para>
14366 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14367 </sect2>
14368 </sect1>
14369 </chapter>
14370 <chapter id="c-notes">
14371 <title>NOTES</title>
14372 <para>
14373 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14374 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14375 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14376 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14377 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14378 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14379 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14380 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14381 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14382 the material.
14383 </para>
14384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14385
14386 </chapter>
14387 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14388 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14389 <para>
14390 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14391 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14392 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14393 to him that this book is dedicated.
14394 </para>
14395 <para>
14396 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14397 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14398 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14399 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14400 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14401 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14402 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14403 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14404 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14405 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14406 critical eye on much of this.
14407 </para>
14408 <para>
14409 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14410 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14411 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14412 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14413 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14414 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14415 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14416 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14417 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14418 </para>
14419 <para>
14420 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14421 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14422 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14423 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14424 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14425 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14426 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14427 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14428 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14429 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14430 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14431 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14432 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14433 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14434 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14435 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14436 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14437 a bunch of great replies.)
14438 </para>
14439 <para>
14440 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14441 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14442 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14443 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14444 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14445 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14446 throughout this book.
14447 </para>
14448 <para>
14449 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14450 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14451 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14452 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14453 </para>
14454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14455
14456 </chapter>
14457 </book>