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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>Version 2004-02-10</subtitle>
26
27 <authorgroup>
28 <author>
29 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig</surname>
31 </author>
32 </authorgroup>
33
34 <copyright>
35 <year>2004</year>
36 <holder>
37 Lawrence Lessig.
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
45 </holder>
46 </copyright>
47
48 <abstract>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
50 <para>
51 LAWRENCE LESSIG
52 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
66 Appeals.
67 </para>
68 </abstract>
69 </bookinfo>
70
71 <chapter id="c-info">
72 <title>Info</title>
73 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
74
75 <para>
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
77 </para>
78 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
79 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
83 </itemizedlist>
84 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
85
86 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
87 <para>
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
89 <sbr/>The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
90 in a Connected World
91 <sbr/>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
92 </para>
93
94 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
95 <para>
96 THE PENGUIN PRESS
97 <sbr/>NEW YORK
98 </para>
99
100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
101 <para>
102 FREE CULTURE
103 </para>
104
105 <para>
106 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
107 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
108 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
109 </para>
110
111 <para>
112 LAWRENCE LESSIG
113 </para>
114
115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
116 <para>
117 THE PENGUIN PRESS
118 <sbr/>a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
119 York, New York
120 <sbr/>Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
121 <sbr/>All rights reserved
122 <sbr/>Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
123 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
124 Reprinted with permission.
125 <sbr/>Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
126 <sbr/>All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
127 <sbr/>Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
128 <sbr/>Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
129 <sbr/>Lessig, Lawrence.
130 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
131 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
132 <sbr/>p. cm.
133 <sbr/>Includes index.
134 <sbr/>ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
135 <sbr/>1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
136 <sbr/>3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
137 <sbr/>KF2979.L47
138 <sbr/>343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
139 <sbr/>This book is printed on acid-free paper.
140 <sbr/>Printed in the United States of America
141 <sbr/>1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
142 <sbr/>Designed by Marysarah Quinn
143 </para>
144
145 <para>
146 &translationblock;
147 </para>
148
149 <para>
150 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
151 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
152 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
153 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
154 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
155 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
156 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
157 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
158 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
159 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
160 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
161 </para>
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
163
164 <para>
165 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
166 it continues still.
167 </para>
168
169 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
170 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
171 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
172 </figure>
173
174 <toc id="toc"></toc>
175
176 <lot>
177 <title>List of figures</title>
178 </lot>
179
180 <!--
181 c PREFACE xiii
182 c INTRODUCTION
183 c "PIRACY"
184 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
185 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
186 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
187 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
188 2 Film
189 2 Recorded Music
190 2 Radio
191 2 Cable TV
192 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
193 2 Piracy I
194 2 Piracy II
195 c "PROPERTY"
196 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
197 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
198 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
199 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
200 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
201 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
202 2 Beginnings
203 2 Law: Duration
204 2 Law: Scope
205 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
206 2 Architecture and Law: Force
207 2 Market: Concentration
208 2 Together
209 c PUZZLES
210 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
211 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
212 2 Constraining Creators
213 2 Constraining Innovators
214 2 Corrupting Citizens
215 c BALANCES
216 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
217 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
218 c CONCLUSION
219 c AFTERWORD
220 1 Us, Now
221 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
222 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
223 1 Them, Soon
224 2 1. More Formalities
225 3 Registration and Renewal
226 3 Marking
227 2 2. Shorter Terms
228 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
229 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
230 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
231 c NOTES
232 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
233 c INDEX
234 -->
235
236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
237
238 </chapter>
239 <chapter id="c-preface">
240 <title>PREFACE</title>
241 <para>
242 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
243 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
244 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
245 </para>
246 <blockquote>
247 <para>
248 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
249 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
250 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
251 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
252 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
253 </para></footnote>
254 </para>
255 </blockquote>
256 <para>
257 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
258 software,
259 or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review suggested
260 the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we could always
261 "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a switch and be back
262 home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and any troubles
263 that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
264 </para>
265 <para>
266 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
267 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
268 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
270 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
271 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
272 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
273 </para>
274 <para>
275 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
276 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
277 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
278 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
279 </para>
280 <para>
281 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
282 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
283 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
284 freesoftware movement<footnote>
285 <para>
286 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
287 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
288 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
289 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
290 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
291 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
292 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
293 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
294 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
295 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
296 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
297 or of creators from the past.
298 </para>
299 <para>
300 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
301 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
302 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
303 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
304 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
305 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
306 culture deem fundamental.
307 </para>
308 <para>
309 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
310 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
311 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
312 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
313 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
314 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
315 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
316 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
317 he asked,
318 </para>
319 <blockquote>
320 <para>
321 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
322 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
323 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
324 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
325 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
326 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
327 </para></footnote>
328 </para>
329 </blockquote>
330 <para>
331 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
332 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
333 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
334 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
335 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
336 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
337 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
338 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
339 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
340 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
341 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
342 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
343 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
344 that this work is "merely" derivative.
345 </para>
346 <para>
347 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
348 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this book
349 than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been its own.
350 Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of values. Like
351 Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And like Stallman,
352 I believe those are values of our past that will need to be defended in
353 our future. A free culture has been our past, but it will only be our
354 future
355 if we change the path we are on right now.
356 xv
357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
358 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
359 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
360 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
361 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
362 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
363 what I advance here.
364 </para>
365 <para>
366 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
367 between
368 anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is filled
369 with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract that get
370 enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its
371 property
372 becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism
373 in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear about our
374 culture
375 today. It is against that extremism that this book is written.
376 </para>
377
378 </chapter>
379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
380
381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
382 <chapter id="c-introduction">
383 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
384 <para>
385 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
386 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
387 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
388 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
389 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
390 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
391 </para>
392 <para>
393 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
394 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
395 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
396 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
397 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
398 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
399 </para></footnote>
400 For many
401 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
402 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
403 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
404 </para>
405 <para>
406 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
407 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
408 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
409 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
410 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
411 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
412 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
413 </para>
414 <para>
415 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
416 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
417 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
418 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
419 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
420 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
421 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
422 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
423 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
424 </para>
425 <para>
426 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
427 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
428 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
429 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
430 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
431 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
432 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
433 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
434 </para>
435 <blockquote>
436 <para>
437 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
438 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
439 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
440 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
441 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
442 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
443 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
444 the public has a just claim.<footnote><para>
445 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find that
446 there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land effectively
447 destroyed
448 the value of the Causbys' land. This example was suggested to me
449 by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty:
450 Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship," Stanford Law
451 Review
452 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul Goldstein, Real Property
453 (Mineola,
454 N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984), 1112&ndash;13.
455 </para></footnote>
456 </para>
457 </blockquote>
458 <para>
459 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
460 </para>
461 <para>
462 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
463 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
464 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
466 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
467 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
468 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
469 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
470 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
471 </para>
472 <para>
473 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
474 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
475 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
476 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
477 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
478 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
479 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
480 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
481 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
482 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
483 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
484 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
485 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
486 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
487 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
488 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
489 </para>
490 <para>
491 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
492 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
493 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
494 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
495 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
496 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
497 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
498 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
499 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
500 understanding of radio.
501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
502 </para>
503 <para>
504 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
505 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
506 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
507 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
508 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
509 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
510 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
511 much less transmitter power and static.
512 </para>
513 <para>
514 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting
515 of the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in
516 New York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
517 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
518 seventeen
519 miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and then with a
520 clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an electrical
521 device,
522 it produced the sound of an announcer's voice: "This is amateur
523 station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on frequency
524 modulation
525 at two and a half meters."
526 </para>
527 <para>
528 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
529 </para>
530 <blockquote>
531 <para>
532 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
533 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was
534 crumpled and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling
535 forest fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a
536 piano
537 solo and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was
538 projected with a live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
539 "music box."<footnote><para>
540 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
541 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
542 </para></footnote>
543 </para>
544 </blockquote>
545 <para>
546 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a
547 vastly superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention,
548 Armstrong
549 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the
550 then dominant AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio
551 stations across the United States, but the stations in large cities were all
552 owned by a handful of networks.
553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
554 </para>
555 <para>
556 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
557 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
558 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
559 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
560 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
561 </para>
562 <blockquote>
563 <para>
564 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
565 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a revolution&mdash;
566 start up a whole damn new industry to compete with RCA.<footnote><para>
567 See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," First
568 Electronic
569 Church of America, at www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
570
571 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
572 </para></footnote>
573 </para>
574 </blockquote>
575 <para>
576 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
577 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
578 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
579 described,
580 </para>
581 <blockquote>
582 <para>
583 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
584 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
585 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
586 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
587 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
588 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
589 </para></footnote>
590 </para>
591 </blockquote>
592 <para>
593 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
594 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
595 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
596 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
597 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
598 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
599 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
600 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
601 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
602 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
603 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
604 </para>
605 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
606 <blockquote>
607 <para>
608 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
609 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
610 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
611 deviousness.<footnote><para>
612 Lessing, 256.
613 </para></footnote>
614 </para>
615 </blockquote>
616 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
617 <para>
618 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
619 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
620 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
621 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
622 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
623 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
624 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
625 least temporarily.
626 </para>
627 <para>
628 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
629 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
630 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
631 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
632 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
633 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
634 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
635 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
636 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
637 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
638 </para>
639 <para>
640 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
641 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
642 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
643 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
644 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
645 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
646 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
647 course always public spirited; the reality is something
648 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
649 to themselves, would crumble in
650 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
651 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
652 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
653 effect
654 of technological change.
655 </para>
656 <para>
657 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good
658 date upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the
659 Internet
660 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
661 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had
662 access
663 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years before.<footnote><para>
664 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look
665 at Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
666 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
667 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
668 </para></footnote>
669 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
670 of 2004.
671 </para>
672 <para>
673 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
674 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
675 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
676 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
677 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
678 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
679 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
680 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
681 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
682 </para>
683 <para>
684 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
685 Internet
686 itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that the
687 Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
688 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as old as
689 the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change, would reject
690 it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet has introduced.
691 </para>
692 <para>
693 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
694 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
695 regulation
696 of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our culture
697 that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By "noncommercial
698 culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around parks or on
699 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
700 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
701 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader,"
702 or Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
703 </para>
704 <para>
705 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
706 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
707 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the peace,
708 then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly concerned
709 with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it left this
710 culture
711 "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary individuals shared and
712 transformed their culture&mdash;telling stories, reenacting scenes from plays
713 or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were
714 left alone by the law.
715 </para>
716 <para>
717 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
718 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
719 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
720 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
721 marketplace.<footnote>
722 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
723 <para>
724 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
725 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
726 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
727 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
728 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
729 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
730 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
731 198&ndash;200.
732 </para></footnote>
733 This is also, of
734 course, an important part of creativity and culture, and it has become
735 an increasingly important part in America. But in no sense was it
736 dominant
737 within our tradition. It was instead just one part, a controlled
738 part, balanced with the free.
739 </para>
740 <para>
741 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
742 been erased.<footnote><para>
743 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
744 2001), ch. 13.
745 </para></footnote>
746 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and,
747 pushed by big media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in
748 our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
749 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
750 expanded
751 to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
752 creativity
753 that it never reached before. The technology that preserved the
754 balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were free and
755 uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has been undone.
756 The consequence is that we are less and less a free culture, more and
757 more a permission culture.
758 </para>
759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
760 <para>
761 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
762 creativity.
763 And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the
764 protectionism that justifies the changes that I will describe below is not
765 the limited and balanced sort that has defined the law in the past. This
766 is not a protectionism to protect artists. It is instead a protectionism
767 to protect certain forms of business. Corporations threatened by the
768 potential of the Internet to change the way both commercial and
769 noncommercial culture are made and shared have united to induce
770 lawmakers to use the law to protect them. It is the story of RCA and
771 Armstrong; it is the dream of the Causbys.
772 </para>
773 <para>
774 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
775 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that
776 reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
777 marketplace
778 for making and cultivating culture generally, and that change
779 in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet is thus to
780 the industries that built and distributed content in the twentieth
781 century
782 what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was to the
783 railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of the end,
784 or at least a substantial transformation. Digital technologies, tied to the
785 Internet, could produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market
786 for building and cultivating culture; that market could include a much
787 wider and more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce
788 and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending
789 upon a few important factors, those creators could earn more on average
790 from this system than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our
791 day don't use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
792 </para>
793 <para>
794 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
795 happening
796 in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the early
797 twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using their
798 power to get the law to protect them against this new, more efficient,
799 more vibrant technology for building culture. They are succeeding in
800 their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet remakes them.
801 </para>
802 <para>
803 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
804 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
805 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
806 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
807 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
808 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
809 Motion
810 Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
811 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
812 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
813 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
814 Times, 17 January 2002.
815 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
816 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
817 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
818 against it.
819 </para>
820 <para>
821 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
822 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
823 especially
824 in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls "creative
825 property."
826 I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the law, properly tuned,
827 should punish "piracy," whether on or off the Internet.
828 </para>
829 <para>
830 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
831 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
832 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
833 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
834 </para>
835 <para>
836 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
837 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
838 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
839 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
840 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote><para>
841 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
842 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
843 </para></footnote>
844 copyright law,
845 properly
846 balanced, protected creators against private control. Our tradition
847 was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of patrons. It instead carved out
848 a wide berth within which creators could cultivate and extend our culture.
849 </para>
850 <para>
851 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
852 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the effective
853 regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or critique the
854 culture
855 around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like, for permission first.
856 Permission is, of course, often granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to
857 the critical or the independent. We have built a kind of cultural
858 nobility;
859 those within the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it
860 is nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
861 </para>
862 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26 -->
863 <para>
864 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
865 "centrality
866 of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or
867 otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for
868 neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a
869 morality
870 tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
871 </para>
872 <para>
873 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
874 inspired
875 by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its
876 code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace.
877 There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet
878 technologies
879 to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and
880 culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to
881 understand
882 the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
883 </para>
884 <para>
885 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property."
886 The property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
887 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding this
888 "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
889 sacredness
890 of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
891 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners of
892 "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys, treat
893 these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object when
894 a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to us as it
895 was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are "trespassing"
896 upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to us as it was to
897 them that the law should intervene to stop this trespass.
898 </para>
899 <para>
900 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
901 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
902 Common
903 sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky Causbys,
904 common sense is on the side of the property owners in this war. Unlike
905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
906 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
907 on its side.
908 </para>
909 <para>
910 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
911 increasingly
912 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
913 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
914 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
915 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
916 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
917 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
918 </para>
919 <para>
920 The puzzle is, Why?
921 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
922 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
923 because
924 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
925 absolute
926 claim was wrong?
927 </para>
928 <para>
929 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
930 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
931 </para>
932 <para>
933 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
934 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
935 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
936 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
937 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
938 </para>
939 <para>
940 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
941 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
942 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
943 Armstrong
944 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
945 more powerful view?
946 </para>
947 <para>
948 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe
949 it was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
950 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt against
951 the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual property."
952 What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a sheriff
953 arresting
954 an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of this silliness will
955 be much more profound.
956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
957 </para>
958 <para>
959 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
960 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
961 ideas.
962 </para>
963 <para>
964 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
965 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
966 obscure
967 French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird sort we
968 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
969 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
970 can be more fully understood.
971 </para>
972 <para>
973 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
974 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
975 government,
976 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
977 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
978 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
979 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
980 threatened
981 by the changes to use their power to change the law&mdash;and more
982 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
983 who we have always been.
984 </para>
985 <para>
986 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
987 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
988 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
989 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
990 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
991 to which most of us remain oblivious.
992 </para>
993 </chapter>
994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
995 <chapter id="c-piracy">
996 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
997
998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
999 <para>
1000 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
1001 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1002 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1003 capture.
1004 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1005 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1006 </para>
1007 <blockquote>
1008 <para>
1009 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1010 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1011 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1012 <!-- f1 -->
1013 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1014 </para></footnote>
1015 </para>
1016 </blockquote>
1017 <para>
1018 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1019 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1020 efficient
1021 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1022 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1023 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1024 content
1025 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1026 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1027 </para>
1028 <para>
1029 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1030 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1031 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1032 sharing
1033 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1034 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1035 </para>
1036 <para>
1037 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1038 increasingly
1039 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1040 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1041 believe
1042 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1043 piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1044 </para>
1045 <para>
1046 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1047 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1048 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1049 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1050 </para>
1051 <para>
1052 The idea goes something like this:
1053 </para>
1054 <blockquote>
1055 <para>
1056 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1057 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1058 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1059 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1060 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1061 piracy.
1062 </para>
1063 </blockquote>
1064 <para>
1065 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1066 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1067 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1068 <!-- f2 -->
1069 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1070 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1071 </para></footnote>
1072 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1073 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1074 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1075 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1076 <!-- f3 -->
1077 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1078 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1079 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1080 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1081 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1082 </para></footnote>
1083 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1084 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1085 </para>
1086 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1087 <para>
1088 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1089 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1091 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1092 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1093 property.
1094 It has never taken hold within our law.
1095 </para>
1096 <para>
1097 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1098 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1099 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1100 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1101 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1102 </para>
1103 <para>
1104 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1105 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1106 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1107 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1108 copyright law today regulates both.
1109 </para>
1110 <para>
1111 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1112 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1113 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1114 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1115 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1116 more expense of doing business.
1117 </para>
1118 <para>
1119 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1120 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1121 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1122 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1123 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1124 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1125 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1126 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1127 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1128 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1129 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1130 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1131 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1132 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1133 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1135 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote><para>
1136 <!-- f4 -->
1137 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1138 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1139 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1140 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1141 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1142 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1143 enabled are much more tenuous.
1144 </para></footnote>
1145 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1146 this creative class.
1147 </para>
1148 <para>
1149 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1150 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1151 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1152 </para>
1153
1154 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1155 <sect1 id="creators">
1156 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1157 <para>
1158 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1159 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1160 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1161 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1162 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1163 </para>
1164 <para>
1165 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1166 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1167 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1168 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1169 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1170 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1171 </para>
1172 <blockquote>
1173 <para>
1174 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1175 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1176 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1177 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1178 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1179 </para>
1180 <para>
1181 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1182 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1183 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1184 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1185 synchronization was pretty close.
1186 </para>
1187 <para>
1188 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1189 electric.
1190 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1191 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1192 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1193 wonderful! And it was something new!<footnote><para>
1194 <!-- f1 -->
1195 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1196 Cartoons
1197 (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1198 </para></footnote>
1199 </para>
1200 </blockquote>
1201 <para>
1202 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1203 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1204 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1205 </para>
1206 <para>
1207 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1208 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1209 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1210 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1211 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1212 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1213 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1214 </para>
1215 <para>
1216 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1217 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1218 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1219 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1220 </para>
1221 <para>
1222 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1223 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1224 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1225 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1226 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1227 genre.
1228 </para>
1229 <para>
1230 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1232 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1233 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1234 <!-- f2 -->
1235 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1236 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1237 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1238 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1239 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1240 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1241 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1242 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1243 </para></footnote>
1244 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1245 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1246 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1247 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1248 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1249 Mouse.
1250 </para>
1251 <para>
1252 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1253 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1254 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1255 <!-- f3 -->
1256 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1257 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1258 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1259 </para></footnote>
1260 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1261 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1262 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1263 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1264 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1265 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1266 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1267 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1268 old.
1269 </para>
1270 <para>
1271 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1272 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1273 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1274 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1275 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1276 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1277 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1278 </para>
1279 <para>
1280 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1281 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1282 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1283 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1284 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1285 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1286 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937),
1287 Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of
1288 the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin
1289 Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1290 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1291 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1292 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1293 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1294 Treasure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1295 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1296 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1297 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1298 </para>
1299 <para>
1300 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1301 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1302 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1303 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1304 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1305 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1306 culture around us and makes it something different.
1307 </para>
1308 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1309 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1310 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1311 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1312 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1313 <!-- f4 -->
1314 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1315 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1316 determining
1317 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1318 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1319 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1320 average
1321 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1322 Web site associated with this book, available at
1323 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1324 </para></footnote>
1325 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1326 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1327 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1328 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1329 </para>
1330 <para>
1331 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1332 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1333 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1334 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1335 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1336 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1337 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1338 </para>
1339 <para>
1340 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1341 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1342 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1343 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1344
1345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1346 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1347 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1348 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1349 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1350 content from before the Great Depression.
1351 </para>
1352 <para>
1353 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1354 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1355 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1356 universal.
1357 </para>
1358 <para>
1359 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1360 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1361 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1362 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1363 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1364 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1365 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1366 </para>
1367 <para>
1368 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1369 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1370 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1371 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1372 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1373 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1374 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1375 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1376 interestingly different way.
1377 </para>
1378 <para>
1379 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1380 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1381 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1382 </para>
1383 <para>
1384 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1385 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1386 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1387 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1388 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1389 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1390 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1391 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1392 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1393 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1394 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1395 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1396 </para>
1397 <para>
1398 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1399 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1400 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1401 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1402 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1403 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1404 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1405 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1406 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1407 </para>
1408 <para>
1409 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1410 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1411 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1412 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1413 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1414 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1415 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1416 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1417 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1418 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1419 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1420 original copyright owner's permission.
1421 </para>
1422 <para>
1423 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1424 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1425 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1426 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1427 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1428
1429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1430 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1431 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1432 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1433 <!-- f5 -->
1434 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1435 York: Perennial, 2000).
1436 </para></footnote>
1437 </para>
1438 <para>
1439 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1440 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1441 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1442 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1443 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1444 which are fifty years old."
1445 </para>
1446 <para>
1447 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1448 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1449 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1450 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1451 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1452 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1453 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1454 <!-- f6 -->
1455 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1456 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1457 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1458 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1459 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1460 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1461 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1462 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1463 </para></footnote>
1464 </para>
1465 <para>
1466 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1467 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1468 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1469 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1470 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1471 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1472 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1473 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1474 culture?
1475 </para>
1476 <para>
1477 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1478 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1479 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1480 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1481 to prosecute cases like this."
1482 </para>
1483 <para>
1484 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1485 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1486 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1487 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1488 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1489 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1490 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1491 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1492 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1493 their clients or hurt them?
1494 Let's pause for a moment.
1495 </para>
1496 <para>
1497 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1498 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1499 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1500 </para>
1501 <para>
1502 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1503 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1504 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1505 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1506 <!-- f7 -->
1507 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1508 Vaidhyanathan,
1509 Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1510 University
1511 Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1512 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately describes a set of
1513 "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the
1514 nature of those rights is very different.
1515 </para></footnote>
1516 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1517 property;
1518 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1519 intellectual property.
1520 </para>
1521 <para>
1522 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1523 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1524 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1525 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1526 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1527 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1528 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1529 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1530 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1531 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1532 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1533 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1534 the public domain.
1535 </para>
1536 <para>
1537 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1538 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1539 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1540
1541 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1542 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1543 freedom is good.
1544 </para>
1545 <para>
1546 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1547 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1548 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1549 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1550 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1551 form, whether large or small.
1552 </para>
1553 <para>
1554 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1555 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1556 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1557 particular find it hard to say why.
1558 </para>
1559 <para>
1560 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1561 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1562 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1563 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1564 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1565 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1566 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1567 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1568 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1569 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1570 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster
1571 films in 1997.
1572 </para>
1573 <para>
1574 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1575 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1576 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1577 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1578 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1579 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1580 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1581 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1583 </para>
1584 <para>
1585 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1586 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1587 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1588 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1589 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1590 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1591 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1592 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1593 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1594 </para>
1595 <para>
1596 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1597 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1598 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1599 </para>
1600
1601 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1602 </sect1>
1603 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1604 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1605 <para>
1606 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1607 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1608 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1609 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1610 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1611 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1612 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1613 </para>
1614 <para>
1615 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1616 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1617 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1618 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1619 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1620 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1621 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1622 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1623 amateurs.
1624 </para>
1625 <para>
1626 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1627 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1629 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1630 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1631 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1632 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1633 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1634 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1635 population of photographers.
1636 </para>
1637 <para>
1638 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1639 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1640 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1641 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1642 <!-- f1 -->
1643 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1644 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1645 </para>
1646 <blockquote>
1647 <para>
1648 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1649 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1650 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1651 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1652 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1653 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1654 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1655 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1656 chemicals.<footnote>
1657 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1658 <para>
1659 <!-- f2 -->
1660 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1661 1977), 53.
1662 </para></footnote>
1663 </para>
1664 </blockquote>
1665 <para>
1666 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1667 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1668 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1669 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1670 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1671 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1672 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1673 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1674 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1675 percent.<footnote><para>
1676 <!-- f3 -->
1677 Jenkins, 177.
1678 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1679 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1680 <!-- f4 -->
1681 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1682 </para></footnote>
1683 </para>
1684 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1685 <para>
1686
1687 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1688 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1689 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1690 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1691 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1692 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1693 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1694 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1695 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1696 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1697 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1698 <!-- f5 -->
1699 Coe, 58.
1700 </para></footnote>
1701 </para>
1702 <para>
1703 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1704 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1705 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1706 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1707 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1708 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1709 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1710 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1711 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1712 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1713 have before.
1714 </para>
1715 <para>
1716 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1717 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1718 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1719 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1720 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1721 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1722 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1723 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1724 <!-- f6 -->
1725 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1726 </para></footnote>
1727 </para>
1728 <para>
1729 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1730 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1731 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1732 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1733 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1734 draw
1735 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1736 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1737 that they thought valuable.
1738 </para>
1739 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1740 <para>
1741 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1742 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1743 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1744 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1745 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1746 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1747 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1748 <para>
1749 <!-- f7 -->
1750 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1751 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1752 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1753 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1754 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1755 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1756 </para>
1757 <para>
1758 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1759 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1760 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1761 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1762 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1763 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1764 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1765 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1766 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1767 <!-- f8 -->
1768 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1769 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1770 Review 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1771 Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1772 (1993).
1773 </para></footnote>)
1774 </para>
1775 <para>
1776 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1777 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1778 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1779 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1780 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1781 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1782 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1783 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1784 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1785 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1786 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1787 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1788 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1789 </para>
1790 <para>
1791
1792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1793 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1794 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1795 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1796 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1797 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1798 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1799 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1800 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1801 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1802 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1803 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1804 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1805 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1806 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1807 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1808 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1809 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1810 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1811 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1812 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1813 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1814 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1815 learn.
1816 </para>
1817 <para>
1818 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1819 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1820 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1821 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1822 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1823 <!-- f9 -->
1824 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1825 Software
1826 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1827 February 2002, available at
1828 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1829 </para></footnote>
1830 These buses are filled with technology that
1831 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1832 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1833 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1834 teachers call "media literacy."
1835 </para>
1836 <para>
1837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1838 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1839 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1840 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1841 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1842 the way people access it."
1843 </para>
1844 <para>
1845 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1846 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1847 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1848 about.
1849 </para>
1850 <para>
1851 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1852 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1853 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1854 <!-- f10 -->
1855 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1856 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1857 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1858 </para></footnote>
1859 it is increasingly important to understand the
1860 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1861 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1862 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1863 constructing
1864 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1865 </para>
1866 <para>
1867 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1868 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1869 written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult it is to
1870 sequence
1871 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1872 understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1873 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1874 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1875 emotion or builds suspense.
1876 </para>
1877 <para>
1878 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1879 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1880 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1881 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1882 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1883 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1884 </para>
1885 <para>
1886 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just
1887 film, as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of
1888 Southern
1889 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1890
1891 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1892 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1893 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1894 texture."<footnote>
1895 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1896 <para>
1897 <!-- f11 -->
1898 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1899 2002.
1900 </para></footnote>
1901 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1902 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1903 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1904 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1905 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1906 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1907 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1908 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1909 <!-- f12 -->
1910 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1911 November 2000, available at
1912 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1913 available at
1914 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1915 </para></footnote>
1916 </para>
1917 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1918 <para>
1919 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1920 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1921 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1922 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1923 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1924 </para>
1925 <para>
1926 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1927 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1928 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1929 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1930 </para>
1931 <blockquote>
1932 <para>
1933 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1934 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1935 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1936 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1937 being read-only.
1938 </para>
1939 </blockquote>
1940 <para>
1941 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1942 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1943 twentieth century.
1944 </para>
1945 <para>
1946 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1947 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1948 understanding
1949 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1950 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1951 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1952 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1953 appropriate
1954 language for what they need to create or express."<footnote>
1955 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1956 <para>
1957 <!-- f13 -->
1958 Interview with Daley and Barish.
1959 </para></footnote> It is to enable
1960 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
1961 <!-- f14 -->
1962 Ibid.
1963 </para></footnote>
1964 </para>
1965 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1966 <para>
1967 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
1968 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
1969 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
1970 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
1971 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
1972 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
1973 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
1974 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
1975 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
1976 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
1977 </para>
1978 <para>
1979 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
1980 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
1981 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
1982 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
1983 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
1984 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
1985 </para>
1986 <para>
1987 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
1988 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
1989 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
1990 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
1991 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
1992 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
1993 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
1994 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
1995 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
1996 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
1997 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
1998 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
1999 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2000 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2001 to this form of expression.
2002 </para>
2003 <para>
2004
2005 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2006 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2007 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2008 Daley
2009 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2010 meaning."
2011 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2012 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&mdash;and
2013 increasingly,
2014 not the most powerful part&mdash;of constructing meaning. As Daley
2015 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2016 </para>
2017 <blockquote>
2018 <para>
2019 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2020 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2021 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2022 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2023 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2024 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2025 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2026 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2027 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2028 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2029 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2030 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2031 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2032 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2033 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2034 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2035 about the topic. . . .
2036 </para>
2037 <para>
2038 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2039 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2040 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2041 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2042 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2043 </para>
2044 <para>
2045 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2046 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2047 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2048 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2049 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2050 had a lot of power with this language."
2051 </para>
2052 </blockquote>
2053 <para>
2054 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2055 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2056 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2057 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2058 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2059 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2060 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2061 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2062 world would be watching.
2063 </para>
2064 <para>
2065 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2066 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2067 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2068 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2069 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2070 entertainment is tragedy.
2071 </para>
2072 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2073 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2074 <para>
2075 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2076 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2077 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2078 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2079 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2080 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2081 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2082 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2083 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2084 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2085 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2086 was also the Internet.
2087 </para>
2088 <para>
2089 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2090 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2091 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2092 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2093 movie
2094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2095 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2096 with sound or text.
2097 </para>
2098 <para>
2099 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2100 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2101 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2102 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2103 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2104 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2105 spread practically instantaneously.
2106 </para>
2107 <para>
2108 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2109 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2110 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2111 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2112 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2113 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2114 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2115 </para>
2116 <para>
2117 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2118 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2119 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2120 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2121 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2122 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2123 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2124 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2125 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2126 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2127 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2128 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2129 </para>
2130 <para>
2131 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2132 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2133 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2134 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2135 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2136 people vote
2137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2138 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2139 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2140 </para>
2141 <para>
2142 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2143 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2144 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2145 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2146 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2147 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2148 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2149 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2150 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2151 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2152 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2153 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2154 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2155 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2156 <!-- f15 -->
2157 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2158 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2159 </para></footnote>
2160 </para>
2161 <para>
2162 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2163 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2164 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2165 <!-- f16 -->
2166 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2167 Political
2168 Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2169 </para></footnote>
2170 And in some towns in
2171 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2172 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2173 deliberation"
2174 to occur.
2175 </para>
2176 <para>
2177 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2178 occur.
2179 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2180 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2181 politics
2182 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2183 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2184 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2185 <!-- f17 -->
2186 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2187 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2188 </para></footnote> We say what our
2189 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2190 </para>
2191 <para>
2192 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2193 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2194 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2195 Technologies
2196 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2197 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2198
2199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2200 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2201 place.
2202 </para>
2203 <para>
2204 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2205 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2206 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2207 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2208 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2209 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2210 </para>
2211 <para>
2212 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2213 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential
2214 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2215 reading
2216 is having an effect.
2217 </para>
2218 <para>
2219 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2220 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2221 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2222 praising
2223 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2224 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2225 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2226 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2227 instances
2228 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2229 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2230 as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2231 <!-- f18 -->
2232 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2233 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2234 </para></footnote>
2235 </para>
2236 <para>
2237 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial
2238 pressures
2239 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2240 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2241 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move on.
2242 </para>
2243 <para>
2244 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2245 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2246 particularly
2247 interesting story, more and more people link to that story. And as
2248 the number of links to a particular story increases, it rises in the ranks
2249 of stories. People read what is popular; what is popular has been
2250 selected
2251 by a very democratic process of peer-generated rankings.
2252 </para>
2253 <para>
2254 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2255 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2256 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2257 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2258 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2259 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2260 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2261 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2262 get it out of the way."
2263 </para>
2264 <para>
2265 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2266 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide
2267 more from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN
2268 admitted it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the
2269 consequences
2270 to its own employees.<footnote><para>
2271 <!-- f19 -->
2272 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2273 </para></footnote>
2274 It also needs to sustain a more
2275 coherent
2276 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the
2277 Internet from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite
2278 uplink
2279 with a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the
2280 reporter over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She
2281 needed to offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that
2282 wasn't warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2283 </para>
2284 <para>
2285 Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the debate&mdash;"amateur" not
2286 in the sense of inexperienced, but in the sense of an Olympic athlete,
2287 meaning not paid by anyone to give their reports. It allows for a much
2288 broader range of input into a story, as reporting on the Columbia
2289 disaster
2290 revealed, when hundreds from across the southwest United States
2291 turned to the Internet to retell what they had seen.<footnote><para>
2292 <!-- f20 -->
2293 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2294 Information
2295 Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci D. Kramer,
2296 "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall," Online
2297 Journalism
2298 Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2299 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2300 </para></footnote>
2301 And it drives
2302 readers to read across the range of accounts and "triangulate," as Winer
2303 puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are "communicating directly with
2304 our constituency, and the middle man is out of it"&mdash;with all the
2305 benefits,
2306 and costs, that might entail.
2307 </para>
2308 <para>
2309 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected with
2310 blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts, for
2311 public
2312 figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's not clear that
2313 "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists have been told to
2314 curtail their blogging.<footnote><para>
2315 <!-- f21 -->
2316 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2317 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2318 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2319 correspondent
2320 in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the war on March 9,
2321 stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses' request. Last year Steve
2322 Olafson,
2323 a Houston Chronicle reporter, was fired for keeping a personal Web log,
2324 published under a pseudonym, that dealt with some of the issues and
2325 people he was covering.")
2326 </para></footnote>
2327 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2328
2329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2330 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2331 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2332 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2333 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2334 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2335 </para>
2336 <para>
2337 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2338 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2339 gatekeeper."
2340 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2341 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2342 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2343 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2344 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2345 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2346 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2347 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2348 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2349 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2350 extraordinary
2351 to report.
2352 </para>
2353 <para>
2354 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2355 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2356 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2357 </para>
2358 <para>
2359 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2360 differently
2361 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2362 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2363 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2364 </para>
2365 <para>
2366 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2367 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2368 lawnmower
2369 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2370 technologies
2371 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2372 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2373 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2375 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2376 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2377 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2378 tinkering of many others.
2379 </para>
2380 <para>
2381 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2382 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2383 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2384 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2385 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2386 </para>
2387 <para>
2388 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2389 platform,"
2390 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2391 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2392 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2393 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2394 becomes
2395 a major apprenticeship platform."
2396 </para>
2397 <para>
2398 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2399 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2400 abstract,
2401 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2402 doing
2403 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2404 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2405 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2406 </para>
2407 <para>
2408 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2409 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2410 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2411 multiple
2412 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2413 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2414 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2415 artistic,
2416 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2417 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2418 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2419 </para>
2420 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2421 <para>
2422 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2423 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2424
2425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2426 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2427 of recognition.
2428 </para>
2429 <para>
2430 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2431 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2432 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2433 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2434 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2435 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2436 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2437 </para>
2438 <para>
2439 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2440 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2441 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2442 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2443 general.<footnote><para>
2444 <!-- f22 -->
2445 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2446 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2447 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2448 </para></footnote>
2449 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2450 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2451 </para>
2452 <para>
2453 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2454 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2455 and want to learn."
2456 </para>
2457 <para>
2458 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2459 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2460 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2461 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2462 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2463 </para>
2464 <para>
2465 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2466 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2467 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2468 the law to close down that technology.
2469 </para>
2470 <para>
2471 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2472 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2473 </para>
2474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2475 </sect1>
2476 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2477 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2478 <para>
2479 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2480 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2481 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2482 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2483 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2484 </para>
2485 <para>
2486 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2487 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2488 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2489 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2490 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2491 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2492 </para>
2493 <para>
2494 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2495 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2496 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2497 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2498 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2499 </para>
2500 <para>
2501 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2502 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2503 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2504 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2505 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2506 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2507 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2508 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2509 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2510 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2511 </para>
2512 <para>
2513 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2514 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2515 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2516 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2517 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2518 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2519 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2520 </para>
2521 <para>
2522 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2523 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2524 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2525 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2526 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2527 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2528 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2529 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2530 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2531 on-line.
2532 </para>
2533 <para>
2534 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2535 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2536 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2537 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2538 be on users' computers.
2539 </para>
2540 <para>
2541 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2542 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2543 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2544 students
2545 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2547 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2548 computer.
2549 </para>
2550 <para>
2551 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2552 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2553 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2554 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2555 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2556 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2557 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2558 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2559 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2560 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2561 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2562 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2563 supposed to do.
2564 </para>
2565 <para>
2566 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2567 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2568 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2569 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2570 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2571 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2572 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2573 </para>
2574 <para>
2575 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2576 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2577 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2578 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2579 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2580 easier to use"&mdash;again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2581 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2582 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2583 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2584 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2585 </para>
2586 <para>
2587 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2588 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2589 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2590 demanded
2591 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2592 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2593 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2594 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2595 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2596 that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2597 </para>
2598 <para>
2599 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2600 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2601 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2602 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2603 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2604 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2605 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2606 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2607 <!-- f1 -->
2608 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2609 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2610 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2611 </para></footnote>
2612 </para>
2613 <para>
2614 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2615 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2616 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2617 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2618 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2619 </para>
2620 <para>
2621 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2622 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2623 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2624 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2625 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2626 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2627 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2628 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2629 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2630 </para>
2631 <para>
2632 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2633 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2634 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2635 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2636 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2637 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2638 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2639 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2640 </para>
2641 <para>
2642 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2643 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2644 </para>
2645 <para>
2646 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2647 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2648 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2649 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2650 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2651 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2652 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2653 <!-- f2 -->
2654 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2655 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2656 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2657 </para></footnote>
2658 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2659 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2660 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2661 <!-- f3 -->
2662 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2663 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2664 </para></footnote>
2665 </para>
2666 <para>
2667 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2668 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2669 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2670 activist:
2671 </para>
2672 <blockquote>
2673 <para>
2674 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2675 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2676 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2677 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2678 </para>
2679 </blockquote>
2680 <para>
2681 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2682 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2683 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2684 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2685 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2686 </para>
2687 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2688 </sect1>
2689 <sect1 id="pirates">
2690 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2691 <para>
2692 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2693 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2694 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2695 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2696 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2697 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2698 </para>
2699 <sect2 id="film">
2700 <title>Film</title>
2701 <para>
2702 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2703 <!-- f1 -->
2704 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2705 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2706 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2707 </para></footnote>
2708 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2709 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2710 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2711 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2712 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2713 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2714 this creative property
2715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2716 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2717 </para>
2718 <para>
2719 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2720 </para>
2721 <blockquote>
2722 <para>
2723 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2724 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2725 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2726 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2727 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2728 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2729 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2730 </para>
2731 <para>
2732 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2733 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2734 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2735 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2736 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2737 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2738 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2739 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2740 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2741 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2742 <!-- f2 -->
2743 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2744 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2745 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2746 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2747 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2748 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2749 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2750 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2751 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2752 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2753 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2754 </para>
2755 </blockquote>
2756 <para>
2757 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2758 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2759 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2760 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2761 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2762 <!-- f3 -->
2763 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2764 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2765 </para></footnote>
2766 That led the independents to flee the East
2767 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2768 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2769 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2770 did just that.
2771 </para>
2772 <para>
2773 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2774 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2775 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2776
2777 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2778 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2779 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2780 Edison's creative property.
2781 </para>
2782 </sect2>
2783 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2784 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2785 <para>
2786 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2787 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2788 </para>
2789 <para>
2790 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2791 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2792 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2793 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2794 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2795 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2796 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2797 right to perform it publicly.
2798 </para>
2799 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2800 <para>
2801 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2802 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2803 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2804 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2805 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2806 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2807 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2808 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2809 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2810 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2811 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2812 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2813 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2814 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2815 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2816 its composer anything.
2817 </para>
2818 <para>
2819 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2820 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2821 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2822 put it,
2823 </para>
2824 <blockquote>
2825 <para>
2826 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2827 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2828 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2829 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2830 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2831 rights.<footnote><para>
2832 <!-- f4 -->
2833 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2834 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2835 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2836 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2837 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2838 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2839 </para></footnote>
2840 </para>
2841 </blockquote>
2842 <para>
2843 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2844 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2845 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2846 <!-- f5 -->
2847 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2848 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2849 </para></footnote>
2850 and the "music publishing industry"
2851 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2852 <!-- f6 -->
2853 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2854 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2855 </para></footnote>
2856 As John Philip
2857 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2858 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2859 <!-- f7 -->
2860 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2861 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2862 </para></footnote>
2863 </para>
2864 <para>
2865 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2866 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2867 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2868 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2869 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2870 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2871 <!-- f8 -->
2872 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2873 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2874 Perforating
2875 Company of New York).
2876 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2877 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2878 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2879 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2880 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2881 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."<footnote><para>
2882 <!-- f9 -->
2883 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376
2884 (prepared
2885 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2886 American
2887 Graphophone Company Association).
2888 </para></footnote>
2889 </para>
2890 <para>
2891 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2892 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2893 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2894 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2895 control
2896 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2897 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2898 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2899
2900 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2901 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2902 authorizes
2903 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2904 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2905 </para>
2906 <para>
2907 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2908 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2909 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2910 Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2911 recordings
2912 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2913 by the statute.
2914 </para>
2915 <para>
2916 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2917 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
2918 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
2919 whatever
2920 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
2921 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
2922 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
2923 </para>
2924 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2925 <para>
2926 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2927 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
2928 of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
2929 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
2930 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
2931 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
2932 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
2933 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2934 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2935 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
2936 stifle
2937 follow-on creativity.<footnote><para>
2938 <!-- f10 -->
2939 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2940 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2941 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2942 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2943 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2944 </para></footnote>
2945 </para>
2946 <para>
2947 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2948 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2949 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2950 relates,
2951 </para>
2952 <blockquote>
2953 <para>
2954 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2956 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2957 industry
2958 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2959 importance
2960 in the United States and throughout the world; records
2961 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
2962 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
2963 access
2964 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
2965 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
2966 before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
2967 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
2968 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
2969 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
2970 improved
2971 quality, and a greater choice.<footnote><para>
2972 <!-- f11 -->
2973 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
2974 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
2975 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
2976 this report.</para></footnote>
2977 </para>
2978 </blockquote>
2979 <para>
2980 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
2981 creative
2982 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2983 </para>
2984 </sect2>
2985 <sect2 id="radio">
2986 <title>Radio</title>
2987 <para>
2988 Radio was also born of piracy.
2989 </para>
2990 <para>
2991 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
2992 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
2993 <!-- f12 -->
2994 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning, record
2995 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
2996 messages
2997 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
2998 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
2999 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
3000 Manufacturing
3001 Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.
3002 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
3003 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
3004 Review 70 (2003): 281.
3005 </para></footnote>
3006 As I described above,
3007 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3008 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3009 composer
3010 money for that performance.
3011 </para>
3012 <para>
3013 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3014 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3015 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3016 Birthday"
3017 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3018 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3019 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3020 station.
3021 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3022 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3023 composer
3024 of the music for his work.
3025
3026 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3027 </para>
3028 <para>
3029 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3030 radio
3031 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3032 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3033 something
3034 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3035 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3036 playing the song.
3037 </para>
3038 <para>
3039 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3040 music.
3041 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3042 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3043 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3044 </para>
3045 <para>
3046 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3047 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3048 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3049 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3050 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3051 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3052 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3053 </para>
3054 <para>
3055 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3056 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3057 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3058 ordinarily
3059 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3060 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3061 something for nothing.
3062 </para>
3063 </sect2>
3064 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3065 <title>Cable TV</title>
3066 <para>
3067
3068 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3069 </para>
3070 <para>
3071 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with
3072 cable television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the
3073 content
3074 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable
3075 companies
3076 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3077 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3078 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3079 broadcasters'
3080 content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever did&mdash;
3081 Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to give away.
3082 </para>
3083 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3084 <para>
3085 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3086 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3087 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3088 <!-- f13 -->
3089 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the Subcommittee
3090 on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
3091 on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966) (statement of
3092 Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
3093 </para></footnote>
3094 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3095 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3096 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3097 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3098 <!-- f14 -->
3099 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3100 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3101 </para></footnote>
3102 As another broadcaster put it,
3103 </para>
3104 <blockquote>
3105 <para>
3106 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3107 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3108 paid for.<footnote><para>
3109 <!-- f15 -->
3110 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3111 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3112 </para></footnote>
3113 </para>
3114 </blockquote>
3115 <para>
3116 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable
3117 enough:
3118 </para>
3119 <blockquote>
3120 <para>
3121 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3122 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3123 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3124 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3125 <!-- f16 -->
3126 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3127 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3128 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3129 </para></footnote>
3130 </para>
3131 </blockquote>
3132 <para>
3133 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president
3134 Charlton
3135 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of compensation."<footnote><para>
3136 <!-- f17 -->
3137 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3138 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3139 </para></footnote>
3140 </para>
3141 <para>
3142 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant
3143 Attorney
3144 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3145 </para>
3146 <blockquote>
3147 <para>
3148 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have
3149 any copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether
3150 copyright
3151 holders who are already compensated, who already have a
3152 monopoly, should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3153
3154 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3155 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3156 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3157 <!-- f18 -->
3158 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3159 Zimmerman,
3160 acting assistant attorney general).
3161 </para></footnote>
3162 </para>
3163 </blockquote>
3164 <para>
3165 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the
3166 Supreme Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright
3167 owners nothing.
3168 </para>
3169 <para>
3170 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3171 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3172 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3173 resolved
3174 the question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable
3175 companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but
3176 the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright owner.
3177 The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto
3178 power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable companies thus
3179 built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value created by
3180 broadcasters'
3181 content.
3182 </para>
3183 <para>
3184 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy"
3185 means using value from someone else's creative property without
3186 permission
3187 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described today<footnote><para>
3188 <!-- f19 -->
3189 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3190 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3191 Information, available at
3192 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3193 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3194 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3195 </para></footnote>
3196 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3197 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3198 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3199 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3200 generation&mdash;until now.
3201 </para>
3202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3203 </sect2>
3204 </sect1>
3205 <sect1 id="piracy">
3206 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3207 <para>
3208
3209 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy
3210 comes in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3211 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3212 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its defense,
3213 this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should
3214 stop it.
3215 </para>
3216 <para>
3217 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3218 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3219 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3220 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3221 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3222 outright
3223 copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has
3224 so often done in the past.
3225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3226 </para>
3227 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3228 <title>Piracy I</title>
3229 <para>
3230 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3231 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3232 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3233 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3234 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3235 <!-- f1 -->
3236 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3237 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3238
3239 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3240 Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3241 </para></footnote>
3242 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3243 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually
3244 worldwide to piracy.
3245 </para>
3246 <para>
3247 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3248 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3249 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3250 This piracy is wrong.
3251 </para>
3252 <para>
3253 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3254 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3255 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3256 foreign
3257 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3258 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3259 developing
3260 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3261 existence, treated as right.
3262 </para>
3263 <para>
3264 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3265 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3266 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3267 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3268 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3269 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3270 violate
3271 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3272 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3273 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3274 </para>
3275 <para>
3276 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3277 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3279 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3280 pirate
3281 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3282 childhood.
3283 </para>
3284 <para>
3285 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3286 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3287 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3288 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3289 <!-- f2 -->
3290 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3291 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3292 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3293 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3294 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3295 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3296 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3297 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3298 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3299 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3300 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3301 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3302 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3303 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3304 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3305 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3306 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3307 is wrong.
3308 </para>
3309 <para>
3310 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3311 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3312 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3313 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3314 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3315 <!-- f3 -->
3316 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3317 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3318 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3319 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3320 instance
3321 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3322 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3323 </para></footnote>
3324 </para>
3325 <para>
3326 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3327 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3328 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3329 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3330 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3331 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3332 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3333 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3334 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3335 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3336 piracy of the tangible.
3337 </para>
3338 <para>
3339 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3340 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3341 property
3342 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3343 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3344 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3345 licenses
3346 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3347 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3348 copyrighted
3349 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3350
3351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3352 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3353 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3354 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3355 technology
3356 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3357 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3358 </para>
3359 <para>
3360 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3361 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3362 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3363 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3364 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3365 nation
3366 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3367 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3368 benefit
3369 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3370 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3371 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3372 Microsoft.
3373 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3374 </para>
3375 <para>
3376 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3377 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3378 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3379 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3380 become
3381 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3382 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3383 </para>
3384 <para>
3385 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3386 alcoholic
3387 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3388 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3389 ordinarily
3390 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3391 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3392 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3393 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3394 giving
3395 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what&mdash;at
3396 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3397 copyright
3398 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3399 wrong.
3400 </para>
3401 <para>
3402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3403 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3404 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3405 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3406 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3407 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3408 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3409 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3410 is flat out wrong.
3411 </para>
3412 <para>
3413 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3414 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3415 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3416 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3417 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3418 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3419 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3420 </para>
3421 <para>
3422 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3423 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3424 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3425 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3426 </para>
3427 <para>
3428 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3429 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3430 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3431 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3432 </para>
3433 <para>
3434 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3435 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3436 sharing
3437 to survive.
3438 </para>
3439 </sect2>
3440 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3441 <title>Piracy II</title>
3442 <para>
3443 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3444 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3445 <!-- f4 -->
3446 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3447 </para></footnote>
3448 This means we must determine whether
3449 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3450 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3451 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3452 author of his profit.
3453 </para>
3454 <para>
3455 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors
3456 of the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3457 innovations.
3458 Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and,
3459 arguably,
3460 off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3461 <!-- f5 -->
3462 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3463 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3464 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3465 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
3466 up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.
3467 This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing
3468 technology
3469 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see
3470 Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3471 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3472 put together components that had been developed independently.
3473 </para>
3474 <para>
3475 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3476 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3477 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3478 system.<footnote><para>
3479 <!-- f6 -->
3480 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3481 San Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3482 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3483 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3484 "Napster's
3485 Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3486 "Hollywood
3487 at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3488 </para></footnote>
3489 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3490 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3491 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3492 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3493 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3494 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3495 or your 20,000 best friends.
3496 </para>
3497 <para>
3498 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3499 Americans
3500 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3501 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3502 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3503 <!-- f7 -->
3504 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3505 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3506 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3507 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3508 </para></footnote>
3509 A survey by the NPD
3510 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens
3511 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3512 <!-- f8 -->
3513 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3514 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3515 </para></footnote>
3516 The vast
3517 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3518 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3519 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3520 enjoy
3521 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3522 </para>
3523 <para>
3524 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3525 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3526 infringement,
3527 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3528 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more carefully
3529 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do&mdash;the kinds of
3530 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3531 </para>
3532 <para>
3533 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3534 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3535 different kinds into four types.
3536 </para>
3537 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3538 <listitem><para>
3539 <!-- A. -->
3540 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3541 purchasing
3542 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3543 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3544 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3545 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3546 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3547 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3548 instead
3549 of purchasing.
3550 </para></listitem>
3551 <listitem><para>
3552 <!-- B. -->
3553 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3554 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3555 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3556 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3557 succeed.
3558 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3559 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3560 recommendations
3561 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3562 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3563 </para></listitem>
3564 <listitem><para>
3565 <!-- C. -->
3566 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3567 copyrighted
3568 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3569 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3570 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3571 rewarding
3572 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3573 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3574 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3575 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3576 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3577 available.)
3578 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3579 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3580 content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same harm
3581 that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3582 a local collector.
3583 </para></listitem>
3584 <listitem><para>
3585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3586 <!-- D. -->
3587 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3588 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3589 wants to give away.
3590 </para></listitem>
3591 </orderedlist>
3592 <para>
3593 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3594 </para>
3595 <para>
3596 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3597 perspective
3598 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3599 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<footnote><para>
3600 <!-- f9 -->
3601 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3602 </para></footnote>
3603 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3604 illegal,
3605 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3606 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3607 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer&mdash;and
3608 certainly
3609 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3610 suggests.
3611 </para>
3612 <para>
3613 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3614 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3615 Hollywood,
3616 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3617 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3618 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3619 that is "devastating" the industry.
3620 </para>
3621 <para>
3622 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3623 harmful
3624 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3625 practice
3626 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3627 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp;
3628 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3629 labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3630 <!-- f10 -->
3631 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3632 Industry's
3633 Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music
3634 industry's
3635 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3636 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3637 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3638 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3639 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent
3640 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3641 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3642 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3643 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&ndash;56.
3644 </para></footnote>
3645 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3646 album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the
3647 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3648 problem,
3649 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3650 </para>
3651 <para>
3652 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3653 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3654 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3655 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3657 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3658 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3659 <!-- f11 -->
3660 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3661 </para></footnote>
3662 </para>
3663 <para>
3664 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3665 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3666 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3667 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3668 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3669 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3670 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3671 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3672 </para>
3673 <para>
3674 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3675 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3676 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3677 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3678 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3679 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3680 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3681 </para>
3682 <para>
3683 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3684 because
3685 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3686 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3687 </para>
3688 <para>
3689 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3690 percent,
3691 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3692 <!-- f12 -->
3693 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3694 available at
3695 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3696 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3697 25 June 2003, available at
3698 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3699 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3700 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3701 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3702 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3703 music
3704 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3705 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3706 </para></footnote>
3707 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3708 Internet
3709 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3710 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3711 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3712 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3713 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3714 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3715 <!-- f13 -->
3716 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3717 <para>
3718 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3719 February 2003, available at
3720 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3721 </para>
3722 </footnote>
3723 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3724 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3725 High Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie
3726 [on DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3727 <!-- f14 -->
3728 Ibid.
3729 </para></footnote>
3730 </para>
3731 <para>
3732
3733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3734 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3735 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3736 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3737 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3738 although
3739 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3740 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3741 </para>
3742 <para>
3743 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3744 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3745 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3746 between
3747 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3748 numbers
3749 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3750 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3751 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3752 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3753 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3754 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3755 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3756 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3757 between
3758 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3759 </para>
3760 <para>
3761 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3762 assume,
3763 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3764 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3765 costs?
3766 </para>
3767 <para>
3768 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3769 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3770 available.
3771 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3772 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3773 <!-- f15 -->
3774 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3775 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3776 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3777 Committee
3778 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3779 statement
3780 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3781 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3782 </para></footnote>
3783 And while it's
3784 conceivable
3785 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3786 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3787 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3788 distributor
3789 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3790 make it available.
3791 </para>
3792 <para>
3793 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3795 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3796 thousands
3797 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3798 <!-- f16 -->
3799 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3800 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3801 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3802 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3803 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3804 National
3805 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3806 Results,"
3807 available at
3808 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3809 </para></footnote>
3810 These
3811 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3812 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3813 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3814 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3815 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3816 companies
3817 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3818 owner for the content they sell.
3819 </para>
3820 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3821 <para>
3822 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3823 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3824 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3825 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3826 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3827 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3828 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3829 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3830 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3831 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3832 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3833 </para>
3834 <para>
3835 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3836 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3837 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3838 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3839 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3840 shut as well?
3841 </para>
3842 <para>
3843 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3844 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3845 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3846 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3847 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3848 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3849
3850 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3851 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3852 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3853 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3854 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3855 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3856 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3857 great book!)
3858 </para>
3859 <para>
3860 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3861 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3862 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3863 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3864 </para>
3865 <para>
3866 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3867 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3868 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3869 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3870 unavailable?"
3871 </para>
3872 <para>
3873 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3874 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3875 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
3876 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3877 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3878 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3879 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3880 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3881 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3882 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3883 found only with time.
3884 </para>
3885 <para>
3886 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3887 just what you call type A sharing?"
3888 </para>
3889 <para>
3890 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3891 effect
3892 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3893 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3894 Napster
3895 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3896 developed
3897 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3898 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3899 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3900 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3901 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3902 <!-- f17 -->
3903 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3904 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3905 MHP, available at
3906 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3907 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3908 Fanning's
3909 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3910 </para></footnote>
3911 </para>
3912 <para>
3913 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3914 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3915 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3916 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3917 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3918 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3919 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3920 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3921 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3922 </para>
3923 <para>
3924 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3925 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3926 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3927 content
3928 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3929 technology.
3930 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3931 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3932 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3933 </para>
3934 <para>
3935 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3936 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3937 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3938 composers,
3939 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3940 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3941 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3942 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3943 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3944 broadcast),
3945 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3946 </para>
3947 <para>
3948 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3949 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3950 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3951 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3952 companies
3953 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3954 </para>
3955 <para>
3956
3957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3958 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3959 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
3960 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3961 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3962 Second,
3963 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3964 content
3965 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3966 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3967 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3968 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3969 Congress
3970 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3971 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3972 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3973 control
3974 over the future (cable).
3975 </para>
3976 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
3977 <para>
3978 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3979 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3980 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3981 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3982 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3983 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3984 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3985 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3986 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3987 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3988 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3989 </para>
3990 <para>
3991 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3992 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3993 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3994 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3995 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
3996 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
3997 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
3998 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
3999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4000 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4001 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4002 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4003 for the architecture it chose.
4004 </para>
4005 <para>
4006 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4007 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4008 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4009 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4010 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4011 copyright."<footnote><para>
4012 <!-- f18 -->
4013 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4014 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4015 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4016 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4017 </para></footnote>
4018 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4019 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4020 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4021 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4022 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4023 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4024 <!-- f19 -->
4025 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4026 </para></footnote>
4027 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4028 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4029 <!-- f20 -->
4030 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4031 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4032 </para></footnote>
4033 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4034 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4035 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4036 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4037 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4038 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4039 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4040 <!-- f21 -->
4041 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4042 of Jack Valenti).
4043 </para></footnote>
4044 </para>
4045 <para>
4046 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4047 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4048 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4049 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4050 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4051 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4052 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4053 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4054 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4055 technology.<footnote><para>
4056 <!-- f22 -->
4057 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4058 1981).
4059 </para></footnote>
4060 </para>
4061 <para>
4062 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4063
4064 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4065 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4066 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4067 Court wrote,
4068 </para>
4069 <blockquote>
4070 <para>
4071 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4072 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4073 market
4074 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4075 authority
4076 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4077 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4078 implicated
4079 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4080 <!-- f23 -->
4081 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4082 </para></footnote>
4083 </para>
4084 </blockquote>
4085 <para>
4086 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4087 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4088 Congress
4089 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4090 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4091 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4092 </para>
4093
4094 <table id="t1">
4095 <title>Table</title>
4096 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4097 <thead>
4098 <row>
4099 <entry>CASE</entry>
4100 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4101 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4102 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4103 </row>
4104 </thead>
4105 <tbody>
4106 <row>
4107 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4108 <entry>Composers</entry>
4109 <entry>No protection</entry>
4110 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4111 </row>
4112 <row>
4113 <entry>Radio</entry>
4114 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4115 <entry>N/A</entry>
4116 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4117 </row>
4118 <row>
4119 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4120 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4121 <entry>No protection</entry>
4122 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4123 </row>
4124 <row>
4125 <entry>VCR</entry>
4126 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4127 <entry>No protection</entry>
4128 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4129 </row>
4130 </tbody>
4131 </tgroup>
4132 </table>
4133
4134 <para>
4135 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4136 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4137 <!-- f24 -->
4138 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4139 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4140 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4141 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4142 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4143 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4144 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4145 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4146 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4147 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4148 </para></footnote>
4149 In each case, throughout our history,
4150 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4151 work.
4152 </para>
4153 <para>
4154 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4155 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4156 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4157 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4158 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4159 legitimacy
4160 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4161 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4162 the interests at stake.
4163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4164 </para>
4165 <para>
4166 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4167 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4168 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4169 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4170 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4171 regulated?
4172 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4173 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4174 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4175 permission to record a song?
4176 </para>
4177 <para>
4178 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4179 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4180 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4181 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4182 <!-- f25 -->
4183 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4184 (1984).
4185 </para></footnote>
4186 Instead, the particular uses that the
4187 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4188 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4189 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4190 technology
4191 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4192 the distribution of content.
4193 </para>
4194 <para>
4195 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4196 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4197 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4198 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4199 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4200 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4201 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4202 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4203 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4204 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4205 protection
4206 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4207 continue.
4208 </para>
4209 <para>
4210
4211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4212 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4213 superior
4214 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4215 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4216 network.
4217 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4218 efficient.
4219 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4220 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4221 <!-- f26 -->
4222 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4223 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4224 </para></footnote>
4225 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4226 warriors
4227 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4228 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4229 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4230 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4231 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4232 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4233 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4234 </para>
4235 <para>
4236 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4237 just as any other property is protected."
4238 </para>
4239 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4240 </sect2>
4241 </sect1>
4242 </chapter>
4243 <chapter id="c-property">
4244 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4245 <para>
4246
4247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4248 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4249 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4250 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4251 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4252 the price she can get.
4253 </para>
4254 <para>
4255 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4256 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4257 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4258 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4259 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4260 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4261 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4262 going
4263 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4264 thing I am taking then?
4265 </para>
4266 <para>
4267 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4268 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4270 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4271 narrow
4272 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4273 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4274 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4275 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4276 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4277 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4278 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4279 <!-- f1 -->
4280 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4281 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4282 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4283 </para></footnote>
4284 </para>
4285 <para>
4286 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4287 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4288 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4289 expression
4290 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4291 property.
4292 </para>
4293 <para>
4294 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4295 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4296 turning
4297 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4298 "property"
4299 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4300 <!-- f2 -->
4301 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4302 intangible.
4303 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4304 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4305 physical
4306 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4307 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4308 Property?
4309 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4310 373, 429 n. 241.
4311 </para></footnote>
4312 </para>
4313 <para>
4314 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4315 preceding
4316 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4317 material
4318 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4319 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4320 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4321 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4322 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4323 us draw.
4324 </para>
4325
4326 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4327 <sect1 id="founders">
4328 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4329 <para>
4330 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4331 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4332 Shakespeare
4333 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4334 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4335 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4336 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4337 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4338 adaptation
4339 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4340 </para>
4341 <para>
4342 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4343 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4344 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4345 <!-- f1 -->
4346 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4347 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4348 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4349 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4350 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4351 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4352 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4353 </para></footnote>
4354 Tonson was the
4355 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4356 <!-- f2 -->
4357 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4358 Vanderbilt
4359 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4360 </para></footnote>
4361 who
4362 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4363 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4364 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4365 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4366 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4367 copyright.
4368 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4369 produce
4370 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4371 </para>
4372 <para>
4373 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4374 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4375 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4376 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4377 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4378 renewable
4379 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4380 published
4381 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4382 <!-- f3 -->
4383 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4384 "copyright
4385 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4386 </para></footnote>
4387 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4388 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4389 </para>
4390 <para>
4391 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4392 "copyright"
4393 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4394 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4395 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4396 expired
4397 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4398 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4399 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4400 publishers,
4401 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4402 </para>
4403 <para>
4404 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4405 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4406 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4407 govern
4408 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4409 "positive
4410 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4411 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4412 legislature,
4413 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4414 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4415 expired
4416 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4417 independent
4418 of any positive law.
4419 </para>
4420 <para>
4421 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4422 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4423 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4424 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4425
4426 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4427 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4428 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4429 ultimately
4430 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4431 </para>
4432 <para>
4433 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4434 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4435 however,
4436 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4437 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4438 "expired,"
4439 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4440 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4441 </para>
4442 <para>
4443 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4444 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4445 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4446 </para>
4447 <para>
4448 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4449 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4450 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4451 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4452 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4453 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4454 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4455 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4456 reason
4457 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4458 </para>
4459 <para>
4460 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4461 special
4462 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4463 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4464 "booksellers."
4465 </para>
4466 <para>
4467 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4468 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4469 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4470 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4471 others
4472 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4473 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4474 beyond
4475 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4477 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4478 restrictions
4479 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4480 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4481 perform, and so on.
4482 </para>
4483 <para>
4484 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4485 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4486 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4487 permission
4488 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4489 anything,
4490 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4491 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4492 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4493 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4494 </para>
4495 <para>
4496 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4497 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4498 especially
4499 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4500 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4501 monopolies&mdash;especially
4502 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4503 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4504 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4505 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4506 Monopolies,
4507 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4508 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4509 publishing.
4510 </para>
4511 <para>
4512 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4513 naturally
4514 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4515 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4516 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4517 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4518 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4519 specialinterest
4520 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4521 </para>
4522 <para>
4523 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4524 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4525 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4526 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4528 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4529 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4530 themselves
4531 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4532 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4533 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4534 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4535 <!-- f4 -->
4536 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4537 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4538 </para></footnote>
4539 </para>
4540 <para>
4541 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4542 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4543 Enlightenment
4544 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4545 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4546 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4547 that idea.
4548 </para>
4549 <para>
4550 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4551 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4552 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4553 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4554 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4555 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4556 compromise
4557 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4558 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4559 construction and spread of culture.
4560 </para>
4561 <para>
4562 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4563 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4564 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4565 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4566 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4567 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4568 they said; they needed more time.
4569 </para>
4570 <para>
4571 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4572 words that echo today,
4573 </para>
4574 <blockquote>
4575 <para>
4576 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4577 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4579 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4580 establishing
4581 a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in
4582 the Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a
4583 Discouragement
4584 to Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general
4585 Tax on the Publick; and all this only to increase the private Gain
4586 of the Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4587 <!-- f5 -->
4588 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4589 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4590 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4591 Encouragement
4592 of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
4593 Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4594 mentioned
4595 (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al., 8,
4596 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4597 </para></footnote>
4598 </para>
4599 </blockquote>
4600 <para>
4601 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in
4602 a series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4603 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4604 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4605 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4606 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4607 creative
4608 "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of Anne,
4609 the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just because the
4610 protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't mean the
4611 protections
4612 of the common law expired: Under the common law they had
4613 the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its Statute of Anne
4614 copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only way to protect
4615 authors.
4616 </para>
4617 <para>
4618 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some
4619 of the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4620 chutzpah.
4621 Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it, "The
4622 publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle rancher has
4623 for cattle."<footnote><para>
4624 <!-- f6 -->
4625 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4626 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4627 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4628 </para></footnote>
4629 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the
4630 author.
4631 His concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4632 </para>
4633 <para>
4634 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4635 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4636 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4637 <!-- f7 -->
4638 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4639 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4640 </para></footnote>
4641 </para>
4642 <para>
4643 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4644 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4645 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4646 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4647 <!-- f8 -->
4648 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4649 1993), 92.
4650 </para></footnote>
4651 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4653 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4654 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4655 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4656 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4657 <!-- f9 -->
4658 Ibid., 93.
4659 </para></footnote>
4660 </para>
4661 <para>
4662 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's
4663 shop in Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where
4664 he sold inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in
4665 defiance
4666 of the supposed common law right of Literary Property."<footnote><para>
4667 <!-- f10 -->
4668 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4669 Borwell).
4670 </para></footnote>
4671 His
4672 books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he rested
4673 his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of Anne,
4674 the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4675 </para>
4676 <para>
4677 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4678 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4679 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4680 </para>
4681 <para>
4682 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to
4683 James Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the
4684 requirements
4685 of the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full
4686 protection
4687 of the statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor
4688 began printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual
4689 common law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4690 <!-- f11 -->
4691 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright
4692 Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law
4693 Review
4694 29 (1983): 1152.
4695 </para></footnote>
4696 </para>
4697 <para>
4698 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in
4699 English
4700 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4701 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4702 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the
4703 common law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4704 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4705 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That
4706 common
4707 law rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4708 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4709 </para>
4710 <para>
4711 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if justice
4712 were just a matter of logical deduction from first principles&mdash;Mansfield's
4713 conclusion might make some sense. But what it ignored was the larger
4714 issue that Parliament had struggled with in 1710: How best to limit
4715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4716 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4717 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4718 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4719 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4720 believed,
4721 Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4722 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4723 </para>
4724 <para>
4725 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4726 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4727 </para>
4728 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4729 <para>
4730 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4731 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4732 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4733 <!-- f12 -->
4734 Ibid., 1156.
4735 </para></footnote>
4736 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4737 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4738 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4739 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4740 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4741 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4742 </para>
4743 <para>
4744 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4745 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4746 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4747 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4748 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4749 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4750 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4751 statute were no longer protected.
4752 </para>
4753 <para>
4754 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4755 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4756 members
4757 of special legal distinction who functioned much like the Justices
4758 in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the House of
4759 Lords generally voted.
4760 </para>
4761 <para>
4762 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4763 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4765 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4766 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4767 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4768 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4769 passed into the public domain.
4770 </para>
4771 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4772 <para>
4773 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4774 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4775 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4776 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4777 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4778 and the greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of
4779 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of
4780 legal restraint.
4781 </para>
4782 <para>
4783 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4784 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4785 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people celebrated
4786 the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser reported, "No
4787 private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the public, and
4788 none has been tried before the House of Lords in the decision of
4789 which so many individuals were interested." "Great rejoicing in
4790 Edinburgh
4791 upon victory over literary property: bonfires and
4792 illuminations."<footnote><para>
4793 <!-- f13 -->
4794 Rose, 97.
4795 </para></footnote>
4796 </para>
4797 <para>
4798 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4799 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4800 reported:
4801 </para>
4802 <blockquote>
4803 <para>
4804 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what
4805 was honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday
4806 thought property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of
4807 London and Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses
4808 to purchase Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who
4809 after many years industry thought they had acquired a
4810 competency
4811 to provide for their families now find themselves without a
4812 shilling to devise to their successors.<footnote><para>
4813 <!-- f14 -->
4814 Ibid.
4815 </para></footnote>
4816 </para>
4817 </blockquote>
4818 <para>
4819 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4820 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4821 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4822 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4823 England
4824 would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter free.
4825 Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of course,
4826 for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller had an
4827 exclusive
4828 right to control the publication of that book. And not in the
4829 sense that books could be stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you
4830 still had to buy the book from someone. But free in the sense that the
4831 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4832 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free culture
4833 would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English culture
4834 would develop as the many English readers chose to let it develop&mdash;
4835 chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the memes they
4836 repeated and endorsed. Chose in a competitive context, not a context
4837 in which the choices about what culture is available to people and
4838 how they get access to it are made by the few despite the wishes of
4839 the many.
4840 </para>
4841 <para>
4842 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4843 antimonopoly,
4844 resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a world
4845 where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4846 protected.
4847 </para>
4848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4849 </sect1>
4850 <sect1 id="recorders">
4851 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4852 <para>
4853 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4854 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4855 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4856 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4857 He was their god.)
4858 </para>
4859 <para>
4860 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4861 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4862 today.
4863 </para>
4864 <para>
4865 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4866 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4867 Stagehands
4868 are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4869 During
4870 a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and in
4871 the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the stage.
4872 </para>
4873 <para>
4874 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some
4875 stagehands
4876 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4877 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers and
4878 the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4880 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4881 about the scene.
4882 </para>
4883 <para>
4884 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4885 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4886 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4887 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4888 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4889 </para>
4890 <para>
4891 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get
4892 permission.
4893 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a
4894 four-and-a-halfsecond
4895 image on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How
4896 could it hurt? Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told
4897 Else to contact Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4898 </para>
4899 <para>
4900 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4901 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4902 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4903 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4904 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4905 </para>
4906 <para>
4907 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we
4908 discovered
4909 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at least
4910 that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation." And
4911 second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us to use
4912 this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited Simpsons which
4913 was in the corner of the shot."
4914 </para>
4915 <para>
4916 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to
4917 someone he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca
4918 Herrera.
4919 He explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . .
4920 We're asking for your educational rate on this." That was the
4921 educational
4922 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4923 confirm what he had been told.
4924 </para>
4925 <para>
4926 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes,
4927 you have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4928 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film about
4929
4930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4931 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4932 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant to
4933 Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want the
4934 money."
4935 </para>
4936 <para>
4937 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was
4938 playing
4939 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4940 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the very
4941 last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally replaced the
4942 shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on, The Day After
4943 Trinity, from ten years before.
4944 </para>
4945 <para>
4946 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox,
4947 owns the copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property.
4948 To use that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the
4949 permission
4950 of the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4951 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4952 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4953 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner of
4954 the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law says the
4955 owner gets to control.
4956 </para>
4957 <para>
4958 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that
4959 the copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4960 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4961 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the
4962 copyright
4963 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4964 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set by
4965 the law.
4966 </para>
4967 <para>
4968 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4969 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4970 <!-- f1 -->
4971 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that lawyers don't
4972 permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard A. Posner with William
4973 F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred " (draft on
4974 file with author), University of Chicago Law School, 5 August 2003.
4975 </para></footnote>
4976 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot
4977 of a Simpsons episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use
4978 does not require the permission of anyone.
4979 </para>
4980 <para>
4981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4982 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4983 </para>
4984 <blockquote>
4985 <para>
4986 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf
4987 between
4988 what lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and
4989 what is crushingly relevant in practice to those of us actually
4990 trying to make and broadcast documentaries. I never had any
4991 doubt that it was "clearly fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But
4992 I couldn't rely on the concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4993 </para>
4994 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
4995 <listitem><para>
4996 <!-- 1. -->
4997 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires
4998 that we buy Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers
4999 require
5000 a detailed "visual cue sheet" listing the source and
5001 licensing
5002 status of each shot in the film. They take a dim view of
5003 "fair use," and a claim of "fair use" can grind the application
5004 process to a halt.
5005 </para></listitem>
5006 <listitem><para>
5007 <!-- 2. -->
5008 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the
5009 first place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a
5010 history of tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons
5011 usage, just as George Lucas had a very high profile litigating
5012 Star Wars usage. So I decided to play by the book, thinking
5013 that we would be granted free or cheap license to four seconds
5014 of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working to
5015 exhaustion
5016 on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk legal
5017 trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5018 principle.
5019 </para></listitem>
5020 <listitem><para>
5021 <!-- 3. -->
5022 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford
5023 Law School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also
5024 confirmed that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within
5025 an inch of your life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He
5026 made clear that it would boil down to who had the bigger
5027 legal
5028 department and the deeper pockets, me or them.
5029 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5030 </para></listitem>
5031 <listitem><para>
5032 <!-- 4. -->
5033 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5034 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5035 money.
5036 </para></listitem>
5037 </orderedlist>
5038 </blockquote>
5039 <para>
5040 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory
5041 therefore
5042 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture.
5043 But in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5044 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means
5045 that the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law
5046 has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5047 </para>
5048 <para>
5049 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5050 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5051 publishers'
5052 profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has matured
5053 into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or not.
5054 </para>
5055 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5056 </sect1>
5057 <sect1 id="transformers">
5058 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5059 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5060 <para>
5061 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5062 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5063 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5064 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5065 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5066 </para>
5067 <para>
5068 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5069 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5070 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very difficult.
5071 In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to build
5072 retrospectives
5073 on the work of particular actors. The first actor chosen was
5074 Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5075 Eastwood,
5076 with clips from his films and interviews with figures important
5077 to his career.
5078 </para>
5079 <para>
5080 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor
5081 and as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with
5082 Eastwood,
5083 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5084 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5085 </para>
5086 <para>
5087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5088 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5089 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5090 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5091 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5092 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5093 </para>
5094 <para>
5095 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5096 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5097 Eastwood's
5098 films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem arose. "No
5099 one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No one had
5100 ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an actor's
5101 career."
5102 </para>
5103 <para>
5104 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5105 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5106 </para>
5107 <para>
5108 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5109 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5110 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5111 for it."<footnote>
5112 <indexterm>
5113 <primary>artists</primary>
5114 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5115 </indexterm>
5116 <para>
5117 <!-- f1 -->
5118 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5119 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5120 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5121 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5122 </para></footnote>
5123 </para>
5124 <para>
5125 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5126 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5127 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5128 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5129 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5130 </para>
5131 <para>
5132 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5133 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5134 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5135 </para>
5136 <blockquote>
5137 <para>
5138 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips.
5139 We made some artistic decisions about what film clips to
5140 include&mdash;of
5141 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip
5142 from Dirty Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground
5143 who's wiggling under the gun and you need to get his
5144 permission.
5145 And then you have to decide what you are going to pay
5146 him.
5147 </para>
5148 <para>
5149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5150 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the
5151 dayplayer
5152 rate for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking
5153 about a clip of less than a minute, but to reuse that performance
5154 in the CD-ROM the rate at the time was about $600.
5155 So we had to identify the people&mdash;some of them were hard to
5156 identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
5157 crashing through the glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman?
5158 And then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some
5159 others, and we just started calling people.
5160 </para>
5161 </blockquote>
5162 <para>
5163 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5164 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5165 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5166 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5167 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5168 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5169 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5170 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5171 career.
5172 </para>
5173 <para>
5174 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5175 were totally in the clear."
5176 </para>
5177 <para>
5178 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5179 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5180 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5181 </para>
5182 <blockquote>
5183 <para>
5184 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up
5185 their hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many
5186 copyrights,
5187 there's the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director,
5188 there's the actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into
5189 its constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this
5190 many directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it
5191 very systematically and cleared the rights.
5192 </para>
5193 </blockquote>
5194 <para>
5195
5196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5197 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5198 loved it, and it sold very well.
5199 </para>
5200 <para>
5201 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5202 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done this
5203 efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5204 nothing
5205 so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at
5206 all."<footnote><para>
5207 <!-- f2 -->
5208 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5209 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5210 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5211 </para></footnote>
5212 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5213 has to be made?
5214 </para>
5215 <para>
5216 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5217 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5218 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5219 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5220 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5221 </para>
5222 <blockquote>
5223 <para>
5224 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5225 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5226 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5227 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5228 compensated for that.
5229 </para>
5230 </blockquote>
5231 <para>
5232 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5233 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license that
5234 someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips like this?
5235 Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would have to track
5236 down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit permission
5237 from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of the
5238 creative
5239 process could be made to be more clean?
5240 </para>
5241 <blockquote>
5242 <para>
5243 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5244 mechanism&mdash;where
5245 you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5246 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5247 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5248 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5249 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it
5250 with lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost
5251 as the producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of
5252 paying
5253 X dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a
5254 known cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes
5255 this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have
5256 a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me
5257 X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get
5258 investments
5259 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you
5260 say, "Oh, I want a hundred minutes of something and I have no
5261 idea what it's going to cost me, and a certain number of people are
5262 going to hold me up for money," then it becomes difficult to put
5263 one of these things together.
5264 </para>
5265 </blockquote>
5266 <para>
5267 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some
5268 of the richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and
5269 access that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him
5270 a year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity
5271 is never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5272 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5273 Republican
5274 hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5275 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5276 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea
5277 that land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing
5278 flythrough
5279 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5280 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5281 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5282 regulationminimizing
5283 Republican should look at the rights and ask, "Does this
5284 still make sense?"
5285 </para>
5286 <para>
5287 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5288 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5289 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5290 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5291
5292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5293 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5294 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5295 </para>
5296 <para>
5297 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5298 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5299 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5300 judges loved every minute of it.
5301 </para>
5302 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5303 <para>
5304 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5305 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5306 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5307 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5308 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5309 were just violated in this room?"
5310 </para>
5311 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5312 <para>
5313 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5314 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5315 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5316 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5317 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5318 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5319 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5320 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5321 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5322 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5323 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5324 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5325 couldn't easily do them legally.
5326 </para>
5327 <para>
5328 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5329 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5330 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5331 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5332 planted in your presentation.
5333 </para>
5334 <para>
5335 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5337 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5338 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5339 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5340 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5341 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5342 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5343 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5344 </para>
5345 <para>
5346 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5347 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5348 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5349 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5350 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5351 </para>
5352 <para>
5353 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5354 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5355 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5356 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5357 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5358 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5359 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5360 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5361 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5362 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5363 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5364 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5365 registers the work.
5366 </para>
5367 <para>
5368 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5369 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5370 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5371 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5372 </para>
5373 <para>
5374 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5375 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5377 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5378 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5379 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5380 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5381 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5382 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5383 entertainment."
5384 </para>
5385 <para>
5386 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5387 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5388 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5389 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5390 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5391 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5392 new audiences, it is Mike."
5393 </para>
5394 <para>
5395 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5396 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5397 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5398 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5399 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5400 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5401 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5402 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5403 </para>
5404 <para>
5405 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5406 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5407 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5408 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5409 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5410 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5411 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5412 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5413 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5414 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5415 curse, reserved for the few.
5416 </para>
5417 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5418 </sect1>
5419 <sect1 id="collectors">
5420 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5421 <para>
5422 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5423 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5424 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5425 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5426 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5427 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5428 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5429 </para>
5430 <para>
5431 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5432 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive
5433 that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the
5434 world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5435 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as well
5436 as when those pages changed.
5437 </para>
5438 <para>
5439 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5440 appreciated.
5441 In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5442 constantly
5443 updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved
5444 of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
5445 </para>
5446 <para>
5447 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5448 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5449 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5450 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5451 </para>
5452 <para>
5453 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5454 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5455 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5456 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5457 library&mdash;constantly
5458 updated, without any reliable memory.
5459 </para>
5460 <para>
5461 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back
5462 Machine,
5463 and the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the
5464 Internet was. You have the power to see what you remember. More
5465 importantly, perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't
5466 remember and what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5467 <!-- f1 -->
5468 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5469 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003, press
5470 release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later
5471 changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended."
5472 E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5473 </para></footnote>
5474 </para>
5475 <para>
5476 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we
5477 remember
5478 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the
5479 reaction
5480 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965,
5481 or to Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5482 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5483 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5484 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what it is
5485 convenient to remember, but remember something close to the truth.
5486 </para>
5487 <para>
5488 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5489 repeat
5490 it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is whether
5491 we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More directly, the
5492 key is whether an objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do
5493 that, by collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5494 researchers,
5495 for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5496 </para>
5497 <para>
5498 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the
5499 Internet
5500 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5501 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5502 important
5503 in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5505 important
5506 to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to think that
5507 we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns around the
5508 world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the one kept by the
5509 Internet
5510 Archive.
5511 </para>
5512 <para>
5513 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5514 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5515 researcher.
5516 In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5517 success.
5518 It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
5519 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5520 Internet
5521 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie
5522 of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10 billion
5523 pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5524 </para>
5525 <para>
5526 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge
5527 in human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5528 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the Library of
5529 Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set
5530 out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been
5531 constructing
5532 the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more
5533 ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture
5534 was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of that
5535 culture
5536 is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news are
5537 recorded
5538 each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a specific
5539 exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and is available
5540 to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that, [television] is almost
5541 unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were Barbara Walters you could get
5542 access to [the archives], but if you are just a graduate student?" As Kahle
5543 put it,
5544 </para>
5545 <blockquote>
5546 <para>
5547 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with
5548 Murphy
5549 Brown? Remember that back and forth surreal experience of
5550 a politician interacting with a fictional television character? If you
5551 were a graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to
5552 get those original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5553
5554 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5555 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5556 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5557 </para>
5558 </blockquote>
5559 <para>
5560 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5561 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5562 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5563 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5564 nineteenthcentury
5565 America will have an easier time than researchers trying to
5566 understand
5567 the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5568 </para>
5569 <para>
5570 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5571 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5572 libraries.
5573 These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
5574 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once
5575 the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
5576 </para>
5577 <para>
5578 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library of
5579 Congress
5580 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long
5581 as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5582 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In 1915
5583 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed back."
5584 Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any
5585 library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at all&mdash;in the library archive of the
5586 film company.<footnote><para>
5587 <!-- f2 -->
5588 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
5589 Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3 (1980): 5;
5590 Anthony
5591 Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the United
5592 States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp; Co., 1992), 36.
5593 </para></footnote>
5594 </para>
5595 <para>
5596 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5597 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5598 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5599 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5600 required
5601 they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5602 "copyrighted."
5603 But those copies were simply kept by the broadcasters. No
5604 library had any right to them; the government didn't demand them.
5605 The content of this part of American culture is practically invisible to
5606 anyone who would look.
5607 </para>
5608 <para>
5609 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5610 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5611 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5612 stations
5613 from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5614 September
5615 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations
5616 from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made their
5617 coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5618 Anyone
5619 could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5620 events of that day.
5621 </para>
5622 <para>
5623 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger,
5624 whose archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films"
5625 (meaning films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never
5626 copyrighted), Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle
5627 digitize 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet
5628 to be downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5629 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5630 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock footage
5631 sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the material they
5632 wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made films on
5633 their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to be made.
5634 Either way, the archive enabled access to this important part of our
5635 culture.
5636 Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film that instructed
5637 children how to save themselves in the middle of nuclear attack? Go to
5638 archive.org, and you can download the film in a few minutes&mdash;for free.
5639 </para>
5640 <para>
5641 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that
5642 we otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
5643 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law
5644 doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in
5645 an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
5646 </para>
5647 <para>
5648 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to
5649 this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His
5650 aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part of our
5651 culture.
5652 Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but
5653 during
5654 a second life that all creative property has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5655 </para>
5656 <para>
5657 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5658 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
5659
5660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5661 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5662 market
5663 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
5664 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
5665 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial
5666 market,
5667 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5668 </para>
5669 <para>
5670 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5671 tradition
5672 has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers
5673 the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is
5674 used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive
5675 of knowledge about our history. In this second life, the content can
5676 continue to inform even if that information is no longer sold.
5677 </para>
5678 <para>
5679 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of
5680 print very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5681 <!-- f3 -->
5682 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5683 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5684 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5685 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese, "The
5686 First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston College Law
5687 Review
5688 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5689 </para></footnote>). After it is
5690 out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the copyright
5691 owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many get to read
5692 the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are thus the
5693 second
5694 life of a book. That second life is extremely important to the
5695 spread and stability of culture.
5696 </para>
5697 <para>
5698 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5699 creative
5700 property does not hold true with the most important components
5701 of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
5702 these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the Internet&mdash;there is no
5703 guarantee
5704 of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've replaced
5705 libraries with Barnes &amp; Noble superstores. With this culture, what's
5706 accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
5707 Beyond
5708 that, culture disappears.
5709 </para>
5710 <para>
5711 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5712 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5713 accessible
5714 all television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is
5715 extraordinarily
5716 high. So even though the law in principle would have
5717 restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5718 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5719 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly difficult
5720 to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had little
5721 practical
5722 effect.
5723 </para>
5724 <para>
5725 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution
5726 is that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
5727 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or
5728 distributed
5729 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
5730 books published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an
5731 archive of all moving images and sound.
5732 </para>
5733 <para>
5734 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never
5735 imagined
5736 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it;
5737 but we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5738 Kahle describes,
5739 </para>
5740 <blockquote>
5741 <para>
5742 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of
5743 music.
5744 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases
5745 of movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed]
5746 during the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million
5747 different titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that
5748 would fit in this room and be able to be afforded by a small
5749 company.
5750 So we're at a turning point in our history. Universal access is
5751 the goal. And the opportunity of leading a different life, based on
5752 this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind
5753 would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria,
5754 putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
5755 press.
5756 </para>
5757 </blockquote>
5758 <para>
5759 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5760 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5761 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5762 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5763 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5764 remains
5765 perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand it;
5766 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5767 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
5768 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
5769 become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a future for our past. The
5770 technology of digital arts could make the dream of the Library of
5771 Alexandria real again.
5772 </para>
5773 <para>
5774 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building
5775 such an archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might
5776 like to call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might
5777 seem, the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5778 someone's
5779 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that
5780 Kahle and others would exercise.
5781 </para>
5782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5783 </sect1>
5784 <sect1 id="property-i">
5785 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5786 <para>
5787 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture
5788 Association
5789 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C.,
5790 with Lyndon Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture
5791 of Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5792 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5793 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5794 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5795 </para>
5796 <para>
5797 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion
5798 Picture Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose
5799 goal was to defend American movies against increasing domestic
5800 criticism.
5801 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but
5802 producers
5803 and distributors of entertainment for television, video, and
5804 cable. Its board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven
5805 major producers and distributors of motion picture and television
5806 programs
5807 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures
5808 Entertainment,
5809 MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal
5810 Studios, and Warner Brothers.
5811 </para>
5812 <para>
5813 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5814 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president
5815 before him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5816 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most
5817 important
5818 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5819 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays
5820 the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5821 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5822 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5823 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5824 Washingtonian way.
5825 </para>
5826 <para>
5827 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5828 culture
5829 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5830 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5831 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5832 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5833 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine
5834 the meaning of "creative property."
5835 </para>
5836 <para>
5837 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5838 perfectly:
5839 </para>
5840 <blockquote>
5841 <para>
5842 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges
5843 and the counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting,
5844 reasonable men and women will keep returning to the
5845 fundamental
5846 issue, the central theme which animates this entire debate:
5847 Creative
5848 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protection
5849 resident in all other property owners in the nation. That is the issue.
5850 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5851 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5852 <!-- f1 -->
5853 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5854 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5855 Subcommittee
5856 on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
5857 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th
5858 Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
5859 </para></footnote>
5860 </para>
5861 </blockquote>
5862 <para>
5863 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5864 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5865 "central
5866 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this:
5867 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5868 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5869 protections
5870 resident in all other property owners in the nation." There are
5871 no second-class citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should
5872 be no second-class property owners.
5873 </para>
5874 <para>
5875 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5876 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5877 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a
5878 claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this claim of
5879 Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is perhaps
5880 the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and scope
5881 of "creative property." His views have no reasonable connection to our
5882 actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has
5883 slowly redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5884 </para>
5885 <para>
5886 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5887 precise
5888 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5889 <!-- f2 -->
5890 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
5891 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
5892 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
5893 right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
5894 ordinary
5895 meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private
5896 Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977),
5897 26&ndash;27.
5898 </para></footnote> it has never been the
5899 case, nor should it be, that "creative property owners" have been
5900 "accorded
5901 the same rights and protection resident in all other property
5902 owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were given the same rights
5903 as all other property owners, that would effect a radical, and radically
5904 undesirable, change in our tradition.
5905 </para>
5906 <para>
5907 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat
5908 for our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5909 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5910 overturned
5911 in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a
5912 powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5913 culture would develop.
5914 </para>
5915 <para>
5916 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5917 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to
5918 convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5919 history.
5920 We have always treated rights in creative property differently
5921 from the rights resident in all other property owners. They have never
5922 been the same. And they should never be the same, because, however
5923 counterintuitive this may seem, to make them the same would be to
5924
5925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5926 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5927 Creativity
5928 depends upon the owners of creativity having less than perfect
5929 control.
5930 </para>
5931 <para>
5932 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most
5933 powerful of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5934 notwithstanding,
5935 in assuring that the new can displace them. No organization
5936 does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what's
5937 good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A society that
5938 defends the ideals of free culture must preserve precisely the
5939 opportunity
5940 for new creativity to threaten the old.
5941 To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5942 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5943 Constitution itself.
5944 </para>
5945 <para>
5946 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so
5947 strongly did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5948 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if it
5949 condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm&mdash;it is
5950 required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you
5951 "just compensation" for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees
5952 that property is, in a certain sense, sacred. It cannot ever be taken from
5953 the property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5954 </para>
5955 <para>
5956 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5957 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5958 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that after
5959 a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has granted and
5960 set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
5961 Congress
5962 does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
5963 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not
5964 have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking."
5965 Instead,
5966 the same Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5968 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5969 compensation
5970 at all.
5971 </para>
5972 <para>
5973 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5974 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be
5975 treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in
5976 our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be
5977 accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is
5978 effectively
5979 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
5980 </para>
5981 <para>
5982 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5983 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5984 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5985 appointed
5986 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college
5987 to produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it
5988 did in 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be
5989 the first to admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected
5990 some of those mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should
5991 reject as well. So my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did
5992 it, we should, too.
5993 </para>
5994 <para>
5995 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5996 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5997 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given the
5998 same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5999 creative
6000 property there must be a public domain?
6001 </para>
6002 <para>
6003 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6004 history
6005 of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
6006 enabled.
6007 Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6008 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that should
6009 be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property should be
6010 protected,
6011 but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights the law gives to
6012 creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights ought to
6013 be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether institutions designed
6014 to assure that artists get paid need also control how culture develops.
6015 </para>
6016 <para>
6017
6018 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6019 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6020 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6021 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
6022 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6023 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6024 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6025 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6026 </para>
6027 <figure id="fig-1331">
6028 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
6029 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6030 </figure>
6031 <para>
6032 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6033 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each
6034 case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.
6035 For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals
6036 represent
6037 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated&mdash;
6038 either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious
6039 constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening
6040 punishments
6041 after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for
6042 example,
6043 you willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song
6044 from her latest CD and posting it on the Web, you can be punished
6045 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6046 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6047 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6048 </para>
6049 <para>
6050 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6051 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6052 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6053 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6054 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6055 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6056 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6057 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6058 the source of the enforcement.
6059 </para>
6060 <para>
6061 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6062 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6063 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6064 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it is to
6065 be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But
6066 given a set of norms, and a background of property and contract law,
6067 the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or
6068 group might behave.
6069 </para>
6070 <para>
6071 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6072 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a constraint on
6073 behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across
6074 a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community to
6075 integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
6076 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as
6077 with the market, architecture effects its constraint through
6078 simultaneous conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts
6079 enforcing contracts, or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by
6080 "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law
6081 of gravity that enforces this constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket
6082 stands between you and a flight to New York, it is the market that
6083 enforces this constraint.
6084 </para>
6085 <para>
6086
6087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6088 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6089 obvious:
6090 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced
6091 by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by
6092 another.
6093 </para>
6094 <para>
6095 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6096 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6097 particular
6098 thing, we have to consider how these four modalities interact.
6099 Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well be; my
6100 claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most
6101 significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must
6102 consider how these four in particular interact.
6103 </para>
6104 <para>
6105 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6106 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say
6107 how fast you can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in
6108 part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most
6109 rational
6110 drivers; governors in buses, as another example, set the
6111 maximum
6112 rate at which the driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted
6113 by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of
6114 gasoline indirectly constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a
6115 community
6116 may or may not constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at 50
6117 mph by a school in your own neighborhood and you're likely to be
6118 punished by the neighbors. The same norm wouldn't be as effective in
6119 a different town, or at night.
6120 </para>
6121 <para>
6122 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6123 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6124 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6125 <!-- f3 -->
6126 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6127 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6128 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right self-consciously to
6129 change the other three. The right of the other three is more timidly
6130 expressed.
6131 See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New
6132 York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95; Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago
6133 School," Journal of Legal Studies, June 1998.
6134 </para></footnote>
6135 The law, in other words, sometimes
6136 operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality.
6137 Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to
6138 increase
6139 the incentives to drive more slowly. The law might be used to
6140 mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty of driving
6141 rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless
6142 driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be more
6143 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6144 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed limit, for
6145 example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast driving.
6146 </para>
6147 <figure id="fig-1361">
6148 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6149 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6150 </figure>
6151 <para>
6152 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6153 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6154 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6155 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6156 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6157 another.<footnote><para>
6158 <!-- f4 -->
6159 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6160 because
6161 their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6162 particular
6163 moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the government. For
6164 instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people think it is meaningless
6165 to say that one's liberty has been restrained. A bridge has washed out, and
6166 it's harder to get from one place to another. To talk about this as a loss of
6167 freedom, they say, is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of
6168 ordinary
6169 life.
6170 I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which depends
6171 upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue against any
6172 insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view of liberty. As I
6173 argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of political thought with a
6174 broader focus than the narrow question of what the government did when.
6175 John Stuart Mill defended freedom of speech, for example, from the
6176 tyranny of narrow minds, not from the fear of government prosecution;
6177 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19.
6178 John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of labor
6179 from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, "The Right
6180 to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds., John R.
6181 Commons: Selected Essays (London: Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans
6182 with Disabilities Act increases the liberty of people with physical
6183 disabilities
6184 by changing the architecture of certain public places, thereby making
6185 access to those places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000).
6186 Each of these interventions to change existing conditions changes the
6187 liberty of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6188 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each of these
6189 groups might face.
6190 </para></footnote>
6191 </para>
6192 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6193 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6194 <para>
6195
6196 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6197 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6198 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6199 rallying makes sense.
6200 </para>
6201 <para>
6202 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6203 Internet:
6204 </para>
6205 <figure id="fig-1371">
6206 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6207 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6208 </figure>
6209 <para>
6210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6211 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The
6212 law limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties
6213 on those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6214 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture)
6215 and expensive to copy and share content (market). Finally, those
6216 penalties
6217 are mitigated by norms we all recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping
6218 other kids' records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be
6219 infringement,
6220 but the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least)
6221 had no problem with this form of infringement.
6222 </para>
6223 <para>
6224 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s
6225 and p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes
6226 dramatically,
6227 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6228 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6229 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6230 becomes
6231 an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6232 </para>
6233 <para>
6234 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6235 Technology
6236 has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change,
6237 when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of
6238 protection
6239 for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is Iraq
6240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6241 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6242 looting that results.
6243 </para>
6244 <figure id="fig-1381">
6245 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6246 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6247 </figure>
6248 <para>
6249 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6250 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6251 Department
6252 (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6253 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6254 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6255 Internet
6256 had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6257 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6258 innovative
6259 marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to develop
6260 code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should educate
6261 kids to better protect copyright.
6262 </para>
6263 <para>
6264 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6265 preserve
6266 the particular balance that existed before the change induced by
6267 the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content industry
6268 to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life
6269 you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if
6270 something
6271 comes along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a
6272
6273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6274 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6275 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6276 property
6277 (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government to
6278 bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions
6279 have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when
6280 imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6281 </para>
6282 <para>
6283 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6284 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6285 technological
6286 innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the
6287 changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the
6288 content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown
6289 describes
6290 it, its "architecture of revenue."
6291 </para>
6292 <para>
6293 But just because a particular interest asks for government support,
6294 it doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6295 technology
6296 has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6297 follow
6298 that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6299 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6300 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6301 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6302 <!-- f5 -->
6303 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6304 BusinessWeek
6305 online, 2 August 1999, available at
6306 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more recent
6307 analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana R. Schoenberger, "Can
6308 Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6 October 2003,
6309 available
6310 at
6311 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6312 </para></footnote>
6313 Does anyone believe the government should ban
6314 digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have weakened the
6315 freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks
6316 from roads for the purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the
6317 subject
6318 of this book, remote channel changers have weakened the
6319 "stickiness"
6320 of television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the
6321 TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this
6322 change has weakened the television advertising market. But does
6323 anyone
6324 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial
6325 television?
6326 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to
6327 switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6328 </para>
6329 <para>
6330 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6331 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6332 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6334 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6335 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6336 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6337 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6338 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6339 <!-- f6 -->
6340 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6341 </para></footnote>
6342 And relative to a
6343 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6344 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6345 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6346 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6347 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6348 Brezhnev.
6349 </para>
6350 <para>
6351 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6352 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6353 government
6354 for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6355 guarantee
6356 that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the
6357 duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they
6358 create, in response to the request of those hurt by changing technology,
6359 are changes that preserve the incentives and opportunities for
6360 innovation
6361 and change.
6362 </para>
6363 <para>
6364 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include, obviously,
6365 copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the industry
6366 complaining
6367 about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in
6368 a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be
6369 especially
6370 wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government
6371 to get into the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and
6372 dangers of that game are precisely why our framers created the First
6373 Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . .
6374 abridging the freedom of speech." So when Congress is being asked to
6375 pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom of speech, it should ask&mdash;
6376 carefully&mdash;whether such regulation is justified.
6377 </para>
6378 <para>
6379 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6381 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6382 "justified."
6383 My argument is about their effect. For before we get to the
6384 question
6385 of justification, a hard question that depends a great deal upon
6386 your values, we should first ask whether we understand the effect of the
6387 changes the content industry wants.
6388 </para>
6389 <para>
6390 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6391 </para>
6392 <para>
6393 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6394 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6395 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6396 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6397 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6398 </para>
6399 <para>
6400 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6401 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6402 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6403 </para>
6404 <para>
6405 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued
6406 that DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6407 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6408 reproduce.
6409 Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6410 </para>
6411 <para>
6412 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly
6413 did not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of
6414 problems
6415 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse
6416 than the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately,
6417 the problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at
6418 least when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways
6419 to solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6420 </para>
6421 <para>
6422 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6423 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6424 culture.<footnote><para>
6425 <!-- f7 -->
6426 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6427 Environmentalism
6428 for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6429 </para></footnote>
6430 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of
6431 this chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that
6432 authors
6433 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given
6434 away "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6435 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6436 environment,
6437 much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6439 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6440 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6441 protecting
6442 copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors.
6443 It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware
6444 of our actions' effects on the environment.
6445 </para>
6446 <para>
6447 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6448 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6449 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6450 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6451 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6452 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6453 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6454 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6455 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6456 </para>
6457 <para>
6458 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6459 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6460 be lost.
6461 </para>
6462 </sect2>
6463 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6464 <title>Beginnings</title>
6465 <para>
6466 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and
6467 improved
6468 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
6469 "creative property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the
6470 English
6471 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6472 </para>
6473 <para>
6474 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6475 Congress
6476 in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I,
6477 section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6478 </para>
6479 <para>
6480 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6481 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6482 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6483
6484 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6485 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause does
6486 not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant "creative
6487 property
6488 rights." It says that Congress has the power to promote progress. The
6489 grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the
6490 purpose of enriching publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of
6491 rewarding
6492 authors.
6493 </para>
6494 <para>
6495 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we
6496 saw in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6497 assure
6498 that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over culture
6499 by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume
6500 the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike
6501 the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6502 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6503 </para>
6504 <para>
6505 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6506 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built
6507 structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built
6508 a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them
6509 short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the
6510 federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6511 concentrating
6512 power in the federal government, they built structures to reinforce
6513 the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose members were
6514 at the time selected by the states, and an electoral college, also selected
6515 by the states, to select the president. In each case, a structure built
6516 checks and balances into the constitutional frame, structured to
6517 prevent
6518 otherwise inevitable concentrations of power.
6519 </para>
6520 <para>
6521 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call
6522 "copyright"
6523 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they
6524 ever considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put
6525 our "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
6526 210 years since they first struck its design.
6527 </para>
6528 <para>
6529 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6530 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6531 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6532 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6533 started here:
6534 </para>
6535 <figure id="fig-1441">
6536 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6537 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6538 </figure>
6539 <para>
6540 We will end here:
6541 </para>
6542 <figure id="fig-1442">
6543 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6544 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6545 </figure>
6546 <para>
6547 Let me explain how.
6548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6549 </para>
6550 </sect2>
6551 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6552 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6553 <para>
6554 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6555 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6556 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6557 protecting
6558 creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6559 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6560 authorship.<footnote><para>
6561 <!-- f8 -->
6562 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
6563 United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1, 485&ndash;86:
6564 "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme Law of the Land,'
6565 the perpetual rights which authors had, or were supposed by some to have, under
6566 the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6567 </para></footnote>
6568 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in
6569 the United States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the
6570 common
6571 law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work
6572 published
6573 in the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England,
6574 this lingering uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely
6575 upon a public domain to reprint and distribute works.
6576 </para>
6577 <para>
6578 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6579 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
6580 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections.
6581 Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the
6582 copyrights
6583 for all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any
6584 state copyrights expired as well.
6585 </para>
6586 <para>
6587 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6588 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6589 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6590 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6591 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6592 </para>
6593 <para>
6594 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6595 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6596 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6597 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6598 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6599 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6600 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6601 <!-- f9 -->
6602 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6603 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6604 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6605 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6606 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6607 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6608 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6609 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6610 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6611 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6612 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6613 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6614 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6615 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6616 </para>
6617 <para>
6618 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6619 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6621 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6622 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6623 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6624 copyright, either.
6625 </para>
6626 <para>
6627 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6628 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6629 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6630 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6631 domain.<footnote><para>
6632 <!-- f10 -->
6633 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6634 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6635 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6636 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6637 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6638 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6639 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6640 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6641 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6642 </para>
6643 <para>
6644 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6645 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6646 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6647 <!-- f11 -->
6648 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6649 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6650 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6651 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6652 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6653 effectively free.
6654 </para>
6655 <para>
6656 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6657 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6658 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6659 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6660 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6661 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6662 </para>
6663 <para>
6664 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6665 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6666 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6667 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6668 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6669 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6670 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6671 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6672 </para>
6673 <para>
6674 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6675 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6676 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6677 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6678
6679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6680 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6681 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6682 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6683 </para>
6684 <para>
6685 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6686 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6687 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6688 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6689 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6690 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6691 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6692 value.
6693 </para>
6694 <para>
6695 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6696 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6697 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6698 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6699 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6700 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6701 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6702 was ninety-five years.
6703 </para>
6704 <para>
6705 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6706 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6707 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6708 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6709 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6710 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6711 them.
6712 </para>
6713 <para>
6714 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6715 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6716 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6717 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6718 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6719 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6720 years.<footnote><para>
6721 <!-- f12 -->
6722 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6723 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6724 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6725 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6726 </para></footnote>
6727 </para>
6728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6729 </sect2>
6730 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6731 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6732 <para>
6733 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6734 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6735 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6736 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6737 </para>
6738 <para>
6739 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6740 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6741 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6742 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6743 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6744 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6745 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6746 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6747 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6748 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6749 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6750 </para>
6751 <para>
6752 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6753 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6754 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6755 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6756 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6757 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6758 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6759 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6760 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6761 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6762 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6763 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6764 on the initial creative work.
6765 </para>
6766 <para>
6767 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6768 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6769 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6770 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6771 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6772 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6773 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6774 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6775 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6776 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6777 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6778 </para>
6779 <para>
6780 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6781 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6782 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6783 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6784 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6785 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6786 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6787 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6788 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6789 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6790 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6791 original author.
6792 </para>
6793 <para>
6794 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6795 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6796 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6797 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6798 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6799 copy available for others to copy.
6800 </para>
6801 <para>
6802 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6803 differences.
6804 </para>
6805 <para>
6806 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6807 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6808 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6809 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6810 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6811 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6812 <!-- f13 -->
6813 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6814 Creation
6815 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6816 International
6817 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6818 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6819 </para></footnote>
6820 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6821 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6822 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6823 </para>
6824 <para>
6825 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6826 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6827 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6828 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6829 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6830 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6831 creative
6832 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6833 restrained.
6834 </para>
6835 <para>
6836 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6837 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6838 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6839 reduced
6840 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6841 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6842 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6843 </para>
6844 <para>
6845 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6846 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6847 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6848 </para>
6849 <para>
6850 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6851 control
6852 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6853 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6854 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6855 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6856 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6857 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6858 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6859 exclusive
6860 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6861 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6862 </para>
6863 <para>
6864 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6865 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6866 expansion
6867 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6868 copyright.
6869 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6870 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6871 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6872 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6873 </para>
6874 <para>
6875
6876 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6877 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6878 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6879 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6880 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6881 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6882 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6883 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6884 protect
6885 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6886 <!-- f14 -->
6887 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6888 2003, available at
6889 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6890 </para></footnote>
6891 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6892 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6893 the wrong of direct piracy.
6894 </para>
6895 <para>
6896 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6897 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6898 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6899 transformative
6900 use of my book.<footnote><para>
6901 <!-- f15 -->
6902 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6903 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6904 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6905 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6906 Constitutionality,"
6907 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6908 </para></footnote>
6909 These two different uses of my creative work are
6910 treated the same.
6911 </para>
6912 <para>
6913 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6914 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6915 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6916 creates
6917 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6918 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6919 originally created?
6920 </para>
6921 <para>
6922 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6923 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6924 simply
6925 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6926 rights originally granted.
6927 </para>
6928 </sect2>
6929 <sect2 id="lawreach">
6930 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6931 <para>
6932 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6933 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6934 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6935 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6936 <!-- f16 -->
6937 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6938 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
6939 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6940 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
6941 sometimes
6942 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
6943 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
6944 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6945 </para></footnote>
6946 </para>
6947 <para>
6948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6949 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6950 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6951 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6952 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6953 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6954 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6955 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6956 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6957 trigger for copyright law.
6958 </para>
6959 <para>
6960 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6961 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6962 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6963 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6964 <!-- f17 -->
6965 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6966 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6967 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6968 basis
6969 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6970 </para></footnote>
6971 because it is clear that the
6972 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6973 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6974 </para>
6975 <para>
6976 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6977 empty circle.
6978 </para>
6979 <figure id="fig-1521">
6980 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6981 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6982 </figure>
6983 <para>
6984 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6985 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6986 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6987 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6988 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6989 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6990 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6991 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6992 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6993 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6994 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6995 not make a copy.
6996 </para>
6997 <figure id="fig-1531">
6998 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6999 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
7000 </figure>
7001 <para>
7002 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7003 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7004 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7005 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7006 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7007 diagram on next page).
7008 </para>
7009 <para>
7010 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7011 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
7012 </para>
7013 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7014 <figure id="fig-1541">
7015 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
7016 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
7017 </figure>
7018 <para>
7019 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
7020 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7021 unregulated.
7022 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
7023 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
7024 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
7025 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
7026 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
7027 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7028 </para>
7029 <figure id="fig-1542">
7030 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
7031 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
7032 </figure>
7033 <para> </para>
7034 <figure id="fig-1551">
7035 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
7036 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
7037 </figure>
7038 <para>
7039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7040 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7041 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
7042 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7043 </para>
7044 <para>
7045 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
7046 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
7047 <!-- f18 -->
7048 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
7049 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
7050 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
7051 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
7052 </para></footnote>
7053 And because of this single,
7054 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
7055 category
7056 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
7057 unregulated
7058 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
7059 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
7060 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
7061 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
7062 category
7063 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
7064 copyrighted
7065 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
7066 burden of this shift.
7067 </para>
7068 <para>
7069 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7070 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
7071 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
7072 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
7073 nothing
7074 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
7075 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7076 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
7077 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
7078 produced
7079 a copy.
7080 </para>
7081 <para>
7082 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
7083 different
7084 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7085 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
7086 copyright
7087 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
7088 accidental
7089 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
7090 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
7091 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
7092 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
7093 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
7094 </para>
7095 <para>
7096 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7097 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7098 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7099 points also become clear:
7100 </para>
7101 <para>
7102 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7103 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7104 presumptively
7105 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7106 evidence
7107 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7108 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7109 free culture before the Internet.
7110 </para>
7111 <para>
7112 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7113 transformative
7114 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7115 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7116 transformation
7117 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7118 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7119 releasing
7120 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7121 justification.
7122 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7123 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7124 transformative
7125 uses of creative work.
7126 </para>
7127 <para>
7128 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7129
7130 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7131 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7132 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7133 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7134 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7135 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7136 Internet,
7137 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7138 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7139 protected
7140 before because reading was not regulated.
7141 </para>
7142 <para>
7143 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7144 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7145 depend
7146 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
7147 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7148 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7149 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7150 protections
7151 of fair use are not enough.
7152 </para>
7153 <para>
7154 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7155 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7156 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7157 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7158 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7159 </para>
7160 <para>
7161 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7162 began
7163 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7164 previews.
7165 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7166 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7167 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7168 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7169 before
7170 you bought it.
7171 </para>
7172 <para>
7173 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7174 distributors
7175 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7176 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7177 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7178 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7179 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7180 business
7181 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7182 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7183 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7184 immediately.
7185 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7186 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7187 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7188 </para>
7189 <para>
7190 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7191 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7192 infringed"
7193 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7194 willful
7195 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7196 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7197 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7198 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7199 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7200 </para>
7201 <para>
7202 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7203 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7204 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7205 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7206 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7207 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7208 Disney's permission.
7209 </para>
7210 <para>
7211 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7212 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7213 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7214 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7215 marketplace,
7216 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7217 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7218 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7219 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7220 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7221 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7222 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7223 </para>
7224 <para>
7225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7226 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7227 control
7228 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7229 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7230 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7231 Noble
7232 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7233 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7234 argument
7235 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7236 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7237 exercising
7238 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7239 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7240 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7241 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7242 </para>
7243 <para>
7244 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7245 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7246 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7247 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7248 owners
7249 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7250 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7251 </para>
7252 </sect2>
7253 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7254 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7255 <para>
7256 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7257 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7258 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7259 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7260 </para>
7261 <para>
7262 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7263 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7264 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7265 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7266 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7267 your freedom.
7268 </para>
7269 <para>
7270 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7271 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7273 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7274 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7275 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7276 <!-- f19 -->
7277 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7278 Contemporary
7279 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7280 </para></footnote>
7281 </para>
7282 <para>
7283 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7284 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7285 you were."<footnote><para>
7286 <!-- f20 -->
7287 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7288 </para></footnote>
7289 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7290 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7291 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7292 </para>
7293 <para>
7294 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7295 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7296 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7297 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7298 </para>
7299 <para>
7300 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7301 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7302 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7303 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7304 copyrighted
7305 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7306 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7307 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7308 that is not at all funny.
7309 </para>
7310 <para>
7311 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7312 </para>
7313 <para>
7314 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7315 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7316 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7317 technology,
7318 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7319 </para>
7320 <para>
7321 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7322 Reader.
7323 </para>
7324 <para>
7325 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7326 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7327 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7328 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7329 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7330 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7331 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7332 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7333 called Permissions.
7334 </para>
7335 <figure id="fig-1611">
7336 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7337 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7338 </figure>
7339 <para>
7340 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7341 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7342 </para>
7343 <figure id="fig-1612">
7344 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7345 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7346 </figure>
7347 <para>
7348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7349 According to my eBook
7350 Reader, I have the permission
7351 to copy to the clipboard of the
7352 computer ten text selections
7353 every ten days. (So far, I've
7354 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7355 I also have the permission to
7356 print ten pages from the book
7357 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7358 the permission to use the Read
7359 Aloud button to hear
7360 Middlemarch
7361 read aloud through the
7362 computer.
7363 </para>
7364 <para>
7365 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7366 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7367 </para>
7368 <figure id="fig-1621">
7369 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7370 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7371 </figure>
7372 <para>
7373 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7374 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7375 the book.
7376 </para>
7377 <figure id="fig-1622">
7378 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7379 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7380 </figure>
7381 <para>
7382 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7383 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7384 </para>
7385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7386 <figure id="fig-1631">
7387 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7388 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7389 </figure>
7390 <para>
7391 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7392 </para>
7393 <para>
7394 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7395 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7396 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7397 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7398 under
7399 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7400 <!-- f21 -->
7401 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7402 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7403 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7404 obligation
7405 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7406 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7407 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7408 </para></footnote>
7409 When my e-book of
7410 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7411 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7412 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7413 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7414 </para>
7415 <para>
7416 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7417 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7418 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7419 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7420 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7421 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7422 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7423 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7424 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7425 restrictions:
7426 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7427 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7428 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7429 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7430 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7431 </para>
7432 <para>
7433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7434 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7435 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7436 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7437 </para>
7438 <para>
7439 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7440 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7441 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7442 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7443 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7444 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7445 </para>
7446 <para>
7447 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7448 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7449 technologies
7450 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7451 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7452 protections as well?
7453 </para>
7454 <para>
7455 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7456 eBook Reader.
7457 </para>
7458 <para>
7459 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7460 public
7461 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7462 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7463 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7464 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7465 </para>
7466 <figure id="fig-1641">
7467 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7468 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7469 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7470 </figure>
7471 <para>
7472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7473 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7474 allowed
7475 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7476 "permissions"
7477 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7478 </para>
7479 <para>
7480 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7481 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7482 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7483 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7484 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7485 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7486 </para>
7487 <para>
7488 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7489 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7490 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7491 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7492 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7493 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7494 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7495 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7496 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7497 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7498 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7499 </para>
7500 <para>
7501 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7502 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7503 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7504 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7505 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7506 often crazy.
7507 </para>
7508 <para>
7509 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7510 story of mine that makes the same point.
7511 </para>
7512 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7513 <para>
7514 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7515 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7516 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7517 </para>
7518 <para>
7519 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7520 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7521 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7523 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7524 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7525 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7526 </para>
7527 <para>
7528 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7529 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7530 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7531 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7532 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7533 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7534 </para>
7535 <para>
7536 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7537 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7538 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7539 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7540 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7541 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7542 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7543 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7544 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7545 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7546 </para>
7547 <para>
7548 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7549 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7550 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7551 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7552 ethically.
7553 </para>
7554 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7555 <para>
7556 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7557 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7558 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7559 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7560 than Sony had built.
7561 </para>
7562 <para>
7563 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7564 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7565 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7566 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7567 the
7568
7569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7570 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7571 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7572 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7573 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7574 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7575 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7576 dog to dance?
7577 </para>
7578 <para>
7579 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7580 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7581 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7582 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7583 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7584 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7585 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7586 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7587 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7588 </para>
7589 <para>
7590 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7591 <!-- f22 -->
7592 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7593 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7594 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7595 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7596 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7597 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7598 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7599 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7600 Questions
7601 about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7602 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7603 </para></footnote>
7604 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7605 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7606 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7607 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7608 </para>
7609 <para>
7610 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7611 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7612 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7613 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7614 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7615 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7616 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7617 Internet much more.
7618 </para>
7619 <para>
7620 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7621 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7622 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7623 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7624 </para>
7625 <para>
7626 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7627 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7628 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7629 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7630 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7631 </para>
7632 <para>
7633 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7634 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7635 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7636 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7637 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7638 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7639 </para>
7640 <para>
7641 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7642 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7643 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7644 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7645 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7646 constituted, succeed.
7647 </para>
7648 <para>
7649 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7650 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7651 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7652 wrote:
7653 </para>
7654 <blockquote>
7655 <para>
7656 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7657 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7658 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7659 </para>
7660 </blockquote>
7661 <para>
7662 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7663 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7664 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7665 </para>
7666 <blockquote>
7667 <para>
7668 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7670 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7671 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7672 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7673 </para>
7674 </blockquote>
7675 <para>
7676 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7677 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7678 spreading such information an offense.
7679 </para>
7680 <para>
7681 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7682 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7683 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7684 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7685 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7686 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7687 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7688 </para>
7689 <para>
7690 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7691 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7692 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7693 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7694 </para>
7695 <para>
7696 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7697 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7698 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7699 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7700 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7701 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7702 have been a copyright violation.
7703 </para>
7704 <para>
7705 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7706 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7707 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7708 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7709 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7710 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7711 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7712 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7713 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7714 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7715 </para>
7716 <para>
7717 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7718 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7719 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7720 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7721 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7722 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7723 </para>
7724 <para>
7725 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7726 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7727 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7728 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7729 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7730 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7731 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7732 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7733 </para>
7734 <blockquote>
7735 <para>
7736 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7737 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7738 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7739 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7740 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7741 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7742 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7743 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7744 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7745 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7746 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7747 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7748 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7749 important.<footnote><para>
7750 <!-- f23 -->
7751 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7752 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7753 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7754 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7755 </para></footnote>
7756 </para>
7757 </blockquote>
7758 <para>
7759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7760 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7761 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7762 the VCR responsible.
7763 </para>
7764 <para>
7765 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7766 the DMCA.
7767 </para>
7768 <para>
7769 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7770 </para>
7771 <para>
7772 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7773 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7774 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7775 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7776 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7777 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7778 </para>
7779 <para>
7780 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7781 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7782 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7783 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7784 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7785 and bad uses.
7786 </para>
7787 <figure id="fig-1711">
7788 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7789 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7790 </figure>
7791 <para>
7792 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7793 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7794 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7795 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7796 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7797 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7798 </para>
7799 <para>
7800 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7801 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7802 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7803 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7804 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7805 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7806 </para>
7807 <para>
7808 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7809 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7810 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7811 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7812 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7813 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7814 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7815 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7816 </para>
7817 <para>
7818 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7819 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7820 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7821 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7822 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7823 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7824 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7825 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7826 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7827 </para>
7828 <para>
7829
7830 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7831 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7832 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7833 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7834 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7835 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7836 <!-- f24 -->
7837 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7838 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7839 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7840 </para></footnote>
7841 </para>
7842 <para>
7843 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7844 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7845 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7846 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7847 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7848 </para>
7849 <para>
7850 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7851 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7852 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7853 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7854 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7855 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7856 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7857 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7858 </para>
7859 <para>
7860 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7861 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7862 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7863 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7864 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7865 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7866 </para>
7867 </sect2>
7868 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
7869 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7870 <para>
7871 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7872 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7873 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7874 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7875 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7876 find better ways
7877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7878 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7879 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7880 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7881 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7882 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7883 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7884 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7885 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7886 control.
7887 </para>
7888 <para>
7889 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7890 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7891 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7892 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7893 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7894 </para>
7895 <para>
7896 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7897 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7898 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7899 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7900 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7901 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7902 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7903 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7904 of the media.
7905 </para>
7906 <para>
7907 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7908 nature.
7909 </para>
7910 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7911 <para>
7912 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7913 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7914 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7915 <!-- f25 -->
7916 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7917 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7918 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7919 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7920 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7921 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7922 <!-- f26 -->
7923 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7924 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
7925 </para></footnote>
7926 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7927 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7928 <!-- f27 -->
7929 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7930 31 May 2003.
7931 </para></footnote>
7932 </para>
7933 <para>
7934 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7935 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7936 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7937 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
7938 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7939 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7940 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
7941 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
7942 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7943 </para>
7944 <para>
7945 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7946 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7947 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7948 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7949 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7950 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7951 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7952 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7953 protected&mdash; by the market.
7954 </para>
7955 <para>
7956 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7957 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7958 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7959 </para>
7960 <blockquote>
7961 <para>
7962 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7963 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7964 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7965 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7966 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7967 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7968 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7969 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7970 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7971 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7972 <!-- f28 -->
7973 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7974 2003): 89.
7975 </para></footnote>
7976 </para>
7977 </blockquote>
7978 <para>
7979 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7980 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7981 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7982 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7983 </para>
7984 <figure id="fig-1761">
7985 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7986 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7987 </figure>
7988 <para>
7989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7990 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7991 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7992 distribute content?
7993 </para>
7994 <para>
7995 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7996 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7997 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7998 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7999 </para>
8000 <para>
8001 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8002 integration may matter.
8003 </para>
8004 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
8005 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8006 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8007 <para>
8008 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
8009 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8010 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8011 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8012 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8013 </para>
8014 <para>
8015 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8016 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8017 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8018 control.<footnote><para>
8019 <!-- f29 -->
8020 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8021 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
8022 Missouri,
8023 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8024 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
8025 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8026 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
8027 </para></footnote>
8028 </para>
8029 <para>
8030
8031 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8032 The network did not control those copyrights because the law
8033 forbade
8034 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The
8035 law required a separation between the networks and the content
8036 producers;
8037 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
8038 1992, because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8039 television&mdash;75
8040 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the networks.
8041 </para>
8042 <para>
8043 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this
8044 independence.
8045 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.
8046 In 1985, there were twenty-five independent television production
8047 studios;
8048 in 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
8049 1992, only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a
8050 company it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8051 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992,
8052 16 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control,
8053 last year there was one."<footnote><para>
8054 <!-- f30 -->
8055 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on
8056 Media Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th
8057 Cong., 1st sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of
8058 Consumers
8059 Union and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8060 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of
8061 America, West, in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond,
8062 Virginia, 27 February 2003.
8063 </para></footnote>
8064 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television
8065 was owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
8066 1992 and 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week
8067 produced by network studios increased over 200%, whereas the
8068 number
8069 of prime time television hours per week produced by independent
8070 studios decreased 63%."<footnote><para>
8071 <!-- f31 -->
8072 Ibid.
8073 </para></footnote>
8074 </para>
8075 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8076 <para>
8077 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
8078 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8079 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8080 owned by the network.
8081 </para>
8082 <para>
8083 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the
8084 ownership
8085 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller
8086 few. As Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8087 </para>
8088 <blockquote>
8089 <para>
8090 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8091 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8092 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8093 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8095 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent
8096 production
8097 companies producing television programs. Now you have less
8098 than a handful.<footnote><para>
8099 <!-- f32 -->
8100 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
8101 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8102 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8103 </para></footnote>
8104 </para>
8105 </blockquote>
8106 <para>
8107 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of
8108 such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8109 Increasingly
8110 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from
8111 networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the network
8112 wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from the
8113 inside,
8114 it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question
8115 without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment to Siberia,
8116 but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are
8117 quashed. This is not the environment for a democracy.
8118 </para>
8119 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8120 <para>
8121 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8122 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8123 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8124 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8125 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8126 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8127 <!-- f33 -->
8128 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
8129 National
8130 Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard
8131 Business School Press, 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was
8132 first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of
8133 Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
8134 Research Policy 14 (1985): 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard
8135 Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are
8136 Built to Last Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform
8137 Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001).
8138 </para></footnote>
8139
8140 Lumbering
8141 giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the field is
8142 only open to the giants, there will be far too little sprinting.
8143 </para>
8144 <para>
8145 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8146 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8147 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8148 measure.
8149 </para>
8150 <para>
8151 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8152 suggest the concern.
8153 </para>
8154 <para>
8155 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8156 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8157 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8158 </para>
8159 <para>
8160 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8161 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8162 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8163
8164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8165 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were all
8166 quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8167 collateral
8168 damage from it is so great as to make waging the war insane.
8169 When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice system, the
8170 desperation of generations of kids whose only real economic
8171 opportunities
8172 are as drug warriors, the queering of constitutional protections
8173 because
8174 of the constant surveillance this war requires, and, most profoundly,
8175 the total destruction of the legal systems of many South American
8176 nations
8177 because of the power of the local drug cartels, I find it impossible
8178 to believe that the marginal benefit in reduced drug consumption by
8179 Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
8180 </para>
8181 <para>
8182 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and
8183 it is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8184 depend
8185 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8186 these issues.
8187 </para>
8188 <para>
8189 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
8190 launched a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The
8191 campaign
8192 produced scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal
8193 drugs. In one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar,
8194 discussing the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the
8195 collateral damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of
8196 drug legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8197 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes his
8198 mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on
8199 the pro-legalization campaign.
8200 </para>
8201 <para>
8202 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8203 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8204 </para>
8205 <para>
8206 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8207 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8208 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the
8209 drug war. Can you do it?
8210 </para>
8211 <para>
8212 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8213 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8214 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8215 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8216 message
8217 will be heard then?
8218 </para>
8219 <para>
8220 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of
8221 avoiding
8222 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8223 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
8224 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First
8225 Amendment,
8226 but the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to
8227 choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media
8228 will refuse one side of a crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.
8229 And the courts will defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8230 <!-- f34 -->
8231 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads that
8232 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
8233 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
8234 policy."
8235 The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
8236 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
8237 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and
8238 returned
8239 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine, 15 October 2003.
8240 These restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for
8241 example,
8242 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with
8243 Rejection from TV Networks," New York Times, 13 March 2003, C4.
8244 Outside
8245 of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC or the
8246 courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general overview,
8247 see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
8248 Advertising
8249 on Television and Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988):
8250 449&ndash;79, and for a more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the
8251 courts, see Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d
8252 872 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8253 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
8254 transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel buses. Phillip
8255 Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni Rejects
8256 Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8257 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground was
8258 that the criticism was "too controversial."
8259 </para></footnote>
8260 </para>
8261 <para>
8262 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived in
8263 a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media
8264 throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control
8265 access
8266 to the media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which
8267 political positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in
8268 an obvious and important way, concentration matters. You might like
8269 the positions the handful of companies selects. But you should not like
8270 a world in which a mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us
8271 get to know about.
8272
8273 </para>
8274 </sect2>
8275 <sect2 id="together">
8276 <title>Together</title>
8277 <para>
8278 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8279 copyright
8280 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In
8281 the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No
8282 sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8283 </para>
8284 <para>
8285 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8286 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology
8287 and markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8288 cultivate
8289 our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins to seem
8290
8291 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8292 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8293 supplement
8294 the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated markets
8295 to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing the
8296 massively
8297 expanded "property" rights granted by copyright fundamentally
8298 changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and build upon our
8299 past, then we have to ask whether this property should be redefined.
8300 </para>
8301 <para>
8302 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8303 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8304 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8305 our culture today.
8306 </para>
8307 <para>
8308 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8309 notwithstanding.
8310 And these massive shifts in the effective power of copyright
8311 regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content industry and
8312 resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly enable control
8313 over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether another
8314 adjustment
8315 is called for. Not an adjustment that increases copyright's
8316 power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
8317 adjustment
8318 to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
8319 regulation&mdash;a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8320 </para>
8321 <para>
8322 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8323 constant
8324 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8325 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8326 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8327 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8328 copyright
8329 holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8330 technology
8331 suggest that we may well need similar changes in the future. And
8332 these changes have to be reductions in the scope of copyright, in
8333 response
8334 to the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the
8335 market enable.
8336 </para>
8337 <para>
8338 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8339 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8340 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8341 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8342 changing
8343 technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8344 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the
8345 development
8346 of our culture than now.
8347 </para>
8348 <para>
8349 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8350 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when only
8351 publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much more
8352 diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for even
8353 then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers were
8354 independent
8355 of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a wide
8356 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
8357 remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny
8358 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a
8359 massive
8360 regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
8361 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into
8362 the most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8363 known.<footnote><para>
8364 <!-- f35 -->
8365 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8366 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8367 </para></footnote>
8368 </para>
8369 <para>
8370 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8371 </para>
8372 <para>
8373 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8374 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8375 distinguished
8376 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8377 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8378 that copyright law has undergone.
8379 In 1790, the law looked like this:
8380 </para>
8381
8382 <table id="t2">
8383 <title></title>
8384 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8385 <thead>
8386 <row>
8387 <entry></entry>
8388 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8389 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8390 </row>
8391 </thead>
8392 <tbody>
8393 <row>
8394 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8395 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8396 <entry>Free</entry>
8397 </row>
8398 <row>
8399 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8400 <entry>Free</entry>
8401 <entry>Free</entry>
8402 </row>
8403 </tbody>
8404 </tgroup>
8405 </table>
8406
8407 <para>
8408 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8409 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8410 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8411
8412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8413 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8414 noncommercial work was also free.
8415 </para>
8416 <para>
8417 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8418 </para>
8419
8420 <table id="t3">
8421 <title></title>
8422 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8423 <thead>
8424 <row>
8425 <entry></entry>
8426 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8427 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8428 </row>
8429 </thead>
8430 <tbody>
8431 <row>
8432 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8433 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8434 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8435 </row>
8436 <row>
8437 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8438 <entry>Free</entry>
8439 <entry>Free</entry>
8440 </row>
8441 </tbody>
8442 </tgroup>
8443 </table>
8444
8445 <para>
8446 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8447 published,
8448 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8449 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8450 transformation were still essentially free.
8451 </para>
8452 <para>
8453 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and
8454 after
8455 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8456 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8457 expanded.
8458 Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more
8459 common,
8460 we could say the law began to look like this:
8461 </para>
8462
8463 <table id="t4">
8464 <title></title>
8465 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8466 <thead>
8467 <row>
8468 <entry></entry>
8469 <entry>COPY</entry>
8470 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8471 </row>
8472 </thead>
8473 <tbody>
8474 <row>
8475 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8476 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8477 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8478 </row>
8479 <row>
8480 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8481 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8482 <entry>Free</entry>
8483 </row>
8484 </tbody>
8485 </tgroup>
8486 </table>
8487
8488 <para>
8489 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through,
8490 say, copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the
8491 commercial
8492 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of
8493 digital technologies, especially in the context of a digital network,
8494 means that the law now looks like this:
8495 </para>
8496
8497 <table id="t5">
8498 <title></title>
8499 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8500 <thead>
8501 <row>
8502 <entry></entry>
8503 <entry>COPY</entry>
8504 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8505 </row>
8506 </thead>
8507 <tbody>
8508 <row>
8509 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8510 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8511 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8512 </row>
8513 <row>
8514 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8515 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8516 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8517 </row>
8518 </tbody>
8519 </tgroup>
8520 </table>
8521
8522 <para>
8523 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8524 creativity
8525 was not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity&mdash;
8526 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8527 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules designed
8528 to regulate commercial publishers.
8529 </para>
8530 <para>
8531 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8532 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8533 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8534 these domains actually does any good.
8535 </para>
8536 <para>
8537 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8538 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8539 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8540 especially,
8541 noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8542 reasons
8543 sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8544 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8545 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8546 rights were more sharply restricted.
8547 </para>
8548 <para>
8549 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8550 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8551 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8552 notwithstanding,
8553 historically, this property right (as with all property rights<footnote><para>
8554 <!-- f36 -->
8555 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8556 movement
8557 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance
8558 public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of
8559 Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland Pennock and John W.
8560 Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
8561 </para></footnote>)
8562 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8563 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8564 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8565 technologies.
8566 And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright" did not
8567 control at all the freedom of others to build upon or transform a creative
8568 work. American culture was born free, and for almost 180 years our
8569 country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free culture.
8570 </para>
8571 <para>
8572 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8573 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8574 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8575 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story
8576 of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar
8577 concern
8578 that is increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair
8579 use right become unavoidably high (the story of chapter 7). Adding
8580 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8581 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8582 familiar
8583 limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter 8). And
8584 granting
8585 archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property
8586 notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture
8587 (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But
8588 the nature of the property that builds a free culture is very different
8589 from the extremist vision that dominates the debate today.
8590 </para>
8591 <para>
8592 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8593 response
8594 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
8595 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing
8596 and distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed
8597 in a way that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property
8598 right that is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or
8599 was intended to be. The property right that is copyright has become
8600 unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and
8601 transform becomes weakened in a world in which creation requires
8602 permission and creativity must check with a lawyer.
8603 </para>
8604 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8605 </sect2>
8606 </sect1>
8607 </chapter>
8608 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8609 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8610
8611 <para> </para>
8612
8613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8614 <sect1 id="chimera">
8615 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8616 <para>
8617
8618 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8619 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8620 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8621 <!-- f1. --> H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8622 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8623 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8624 </para></footnote>
8625 The valley is extraordinarily
8626 beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate, slopes of rich
8627 brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent fruit." But the
8628 villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an opportunity. "In the
8629 Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King."
8630 So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a king.
8631 </para>
8632 <para>
8633 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8634 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8635 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8636 Indeed,
8637 as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the sound
8638 of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to control
8639 him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't
8640 understand,'
8641 he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute, and
8642 which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
8643 </para>
8644 <para>
8645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8646 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak)
8647 the virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8648 affection,
8649 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8650 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8651 description
8652 of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies,
8653 and she listened to his description of the stars and the mountains and
8654 her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence."
8655 "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could only half
8656 understand,
8657 but she was mysteriously delighted."
8658 </para>
8659 <para>
8660 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously
8661 delighted"
8662 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8663 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything
8664 right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8665 </para>
8666 <para>
8667 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8668 is affected," he reports.
8669 </para>
8670 <para>
8671 "What affects it?" the father asks.
8672 "Those queer things that are called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in
8673 such a way as to affect his brain."
8674 </para>
8675 <para>
8676 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8677 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple
8678 and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these irritant bodies
8679 [the eyes]."
8680 </para>
8681 <para>
8682 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They
8683 inform
8684 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8685 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8686 believe
8687 in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8688 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8689 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8690 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8691 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8692
8693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8694 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8695 certainty
8696 that she was not the person whose blood was at the scene. . . ."
8697 </para>
8698 <para>
8699 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8700 impossible.
8701 A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of
8702 DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two
8703 individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person
8704 can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of
8705 a "person" should reflect this reality.
8706 </para>
8707 <para>
8708 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright
8709 and culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8710 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8711 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8712 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong.
8713 One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
8714 records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
8715 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
8716 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just
8717 send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant
8718 respects,
8719 just like what every executive in every recording company no
8720 doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8721 </para>
8722 <para>
8723 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8724 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music,
8725 then sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8726 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8727 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8728 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8729 allowed
8730 to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8731 </para>
8732 <para>
8733 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8734 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8735 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally)
8736 releases
8737 a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free
8738 copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.
8739 </para>
8740 <para>
8741
8742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8743 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8744 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take
8745 a CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8746 something
8747 to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note
8748 that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that
8749 might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is $1,000.
8750 According
8751 to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song CD, I'm
8752 liable
8753 for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8754 </para>
8755 <para>
8756 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that
8757 it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It
8758 is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side
8759 asserts,
8760 we need to begin to think about how we should respond to this
8761 chimera. What rules should govern it?
8762 </para>
8763 <para>
8764 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8765 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a
8766 felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages
8767 just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get
8768 universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no
8769 computer
8770 is used to commit this crime. These responses might be extreme,
8771 but each of them has either been proposed or actually implemented.<footnote><para>
8772 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8773 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8774 "Copyright
8775 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available
8776 at
8777 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8778 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8779 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8780 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8781 Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8782 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8783 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8784 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8785 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer,
8786 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.
8787 Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8788 high as $90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8789 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8790 from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8791 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8792 billion
8793 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8794 Elizabeth
8795 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8796 August 2003, available at
8797 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8798 targeting
8799 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8800 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8801 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003,
8802 D3, available at
8803 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8804 </para></footnote>
8805
8806 </para>
8807 <para>
8808 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids
8809 act as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there
8810 be no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8811 copyrighted
8812 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip:
8813 regulated,
8814 if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8815 </para>
8816 <para>
8817 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8818 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8819 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8820 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter
8821 is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance
8822 extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a reasonable
8823 alternative.
8824 But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
8825 of the two extremes.
8826 </para>
8827 <para>
8828
8829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8830 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8831 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land
8832 grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give
8833 content
8834 holders a kind of control over our culture that they have never had
8835 before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8836 innovation
8837 and new creativity will be lost.
8838 </para>
8839 <para>
8840 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8841 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8842 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8843 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8844 innovation
8845 that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the
8846 passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to distribute
8847 content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the vice president
8848 for global public policy at one of these new innovators, eMusic.com,
8849 put it when criticizing the DMCA's added protection for copyrighted
8850 material,
8851 </para>
8852 <blockquote>
8853 <para>
8854 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8855 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8856 </para>
8857 <para>
8858 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8859 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8860 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8861 answer
8862 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8863 well produce a totally different industry model.
8864 </para>
8865 <para>
8866 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8867 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8868 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8869 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8870 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8871 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8872 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8873 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8874 interests.<footnote><para>
8875 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8876 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8877 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8878 Protection,
8879 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
8880 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8881 EMusic.com),
8882 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8883 Congressional
8884 Testimony File.
8885 </para></footnote>
8886 </para>
8887 </blockquote>
8888 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8889 <para>
8890 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8891 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8892 changed.
8893 </para>
8894 <para>
8895 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8896 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8897 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8898 </para>
8899
8900 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8901 </sect1>
8902 <sect1 id="harms">
8903 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8904 <para>
8905
8906 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8907 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8908 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8909 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8910 prohibition,
8911 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8912 </para>
8913 <para>
8914 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8915 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8916 extend
8917 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8918 justified?
8919 </para>
8920 <para>
8921 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8922 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8923 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8924 our history.
8925 </para>
8926 <para>
8927 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still
8928 on the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme
8929 claims of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8930 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8931 </para>
8932 <para>
8933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8934 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8935 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8936 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8937 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8938 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8939 </para>
8940 <sect2 id="constrain">
8941 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8942 <para>
8943 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8944 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8945 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8946 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8947 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8948 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8949 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8950 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8951 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8952 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8953 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8954 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8955 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8956 </para>
8957 <para>
8958 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8959 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8960 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8961 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8962 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8963 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8964 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8965 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8966 the culture all around.
8967 </para>
8968 <para>
8969 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8970 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8971
8972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8973
8974 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8975 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8976 storytelling extended across the globe.
8977 </para>
8978 <para>
8979 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8980 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8981 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8982 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8983 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8984 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8985 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8986 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8987 work is presumptively illegal.
8988 </para>
8989 <para>
8990 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8991 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8992 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8993 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8994 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8995 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8996 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8997 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8998 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8999 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
9000 million.<footnote><para>
9001 <!-- f1. -->
9002 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
9003 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
9004 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9005 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
9006 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
9007 </para></footnote>
9008 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9009 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9010 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
9011 suffering.<footnote><para>
9012 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9013 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
9014 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9015 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
9016 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
9017 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
9018 available at
9019 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9020 recent months.
9021 </para></footnote>
9022 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9023 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9024 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9025 </para>
9026 <para>
9027 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9028 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
9029 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
9030 creative
9031 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
9032 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
9033 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
9034
9035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9036 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
9037 create,
9038 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
9039 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
9040 begin
9041 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
9042 necessarily
9043 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
9044 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
9045 "illegal
9046 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
9047 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
9048 available
9049 at
9050 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9051 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
9052 </para></footnote>
9053 In what does their "illegality" consist?
9054 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9055 critical or reflective.
9056 </para>
9057 <para>
9058 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9059 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
9060 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9061 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9062 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9063 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9064 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9065 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9066 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9067 </para>
9068 <para>
9069 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9070 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9071 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9072 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9073 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9074 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9075 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9076 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9077 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9078 </para>
9079 <para>
9080 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9081 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
9082 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
9083 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
9084 law regulates such a use.
9085 </para>
9086 <para>
9087
9088 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9089 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9090 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9091 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
9092 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9093 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9094 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9095 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9096 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9097 </para>
9098 <para>
9099 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9100 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
9101 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9102 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9103 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9104 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9105 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9106 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9107 comfort themselves.
9108 </para>
9109 <para>
9110 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
9111 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9112 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9113 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9114 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
9115 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9116 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9117 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9118 culture that is free.
9119 </para>
9120 <para>
9121 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9122 </para>
9123 <blockquote>
9124 <para>
9125 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9126 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9127 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9128 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
9129 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9130 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9131 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9132 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9133 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9134 </para>
9135 </blockquote>
9136 </sect2>
9137 <sect2 id="innovators">
9138 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9139 <para>
9140 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9141 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9142 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9143 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9144 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9145 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9146 </para>
9147 <para>
9148 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9149 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9150 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9151 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9152 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9153 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9154 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9155 </para>
9156 <para>
9157 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9158 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9159 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9160 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9161 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9162 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9163 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9164 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9165 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9166 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9167 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9168 </para>
9169 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9170 <para>
9171 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9173 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
9174 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9175 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9176 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9177 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9178 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9179 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9180 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9181 </para>
9182 <para>
9183 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9184 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9185 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9186 </para>
9187 <para>
9188 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9189 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9190 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9191 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9192 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9193 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9194 </para>
9195 <para>
9196 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9197 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9198 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9199 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9200 Raitt. And so on.
9201 </para>
9202 <para>
9203 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9204 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9205 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9206 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9207 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9208 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9209 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9210 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9211 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9212 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9213 </para>
9214 <para>
9215 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9216 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9217
9218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9219 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9220 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9221 the kind of content the users liked.
9222 </para>
9223 <para>
9224 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9225 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9226 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9227 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9228 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9229 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9230 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9231 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9232 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9233 they had already bought.
9234 </para>
9235 <para>
9236 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9237 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9238 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9239 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9240 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9241 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9242 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9243 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9244 </para>
9245 <para>
9246 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9247 </para>
9248 <para>
9249 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9250 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9251 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9252 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9253 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9254 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9255 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9256 demanded.
9257 </para>
9258 <para>
9259 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9260 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9261 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9262 clients in this
9263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9264 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9265 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9266 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9267 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9268 </para>
9269 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9270 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9271 <para>
9272 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9273 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9274 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9275 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9276 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9277 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9278 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9279 innovation
9280 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9281 Revolution
9282 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9283 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9284 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9285 Times, 28 May 2001.
9286 </para></footnote>
9287 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9288 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9289 industry
9290 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9291 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9292 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9293 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9294 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9295 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9296 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9297 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9298 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9299 </para>
9300 <blockquote>
9301 <para>
9302 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9303 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9304 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9305 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9306 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9307 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9308 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote><para>
9309 <!-- f5. -->
9310 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9311 2003, available at
9312 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9313 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9314 </para></footnote>
9315 </para>
9316 </blockquote>
9317 <para>
9318 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9319 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats that the
9320 law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system that will
9321 obviously
9322 and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard enough to start
9323 a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is constantly
9324 threatened
9325 by litigation.
9326 </para>
9327 <para>
9328
9329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9330 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9331 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9332 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9333 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9334 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9335 imposes,
9336 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9337 conservative
9338 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9339 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9340 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9341 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9342 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9343 </para>
9344 <para>
9345 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9346 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9347 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9348 systematically
9349 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9350 industries
9351 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9352 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9353 competition.
9354 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9355 competition.
9356 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9357 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9358 overregulatedregulated
9359 market.
9360 </para>
9361 <para>
9362 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9363 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9364 burden
9365 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&mdash;a
9366 culture
9367 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9368 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9369 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9370 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9371 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9372 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9373 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9374 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9375 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9376 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9377 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9378 creativity.
9379 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9380 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9381 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9382 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9383 technology
9384 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9385 </para>
9386 <para>
9387 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9388 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9389 Internet's
9390 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9391 feature
9392 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9393 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9394 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9395 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9396 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9397 </para>
9398 <para>
9399 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9400 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9401 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9402 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9403 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9404 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9405 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9406 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9407 </para></footnote>
9408
9409 Congress
9410 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9411 "broadcast
9412 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9413 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9414 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9415 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9416 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9417 violators
9418 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9419 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9420 </para></footnote>
9421
9422 </para>
9423 <para>
9424 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9425 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9426 regulation
9427 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9428 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9429
9430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9431 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9432 those requirements.
9433 </para>
9434 <para>
9435 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9436 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9437 impose.<footnote><para>
9438 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9439 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9440 </para></footnote>
9441 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9442 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9443 harm than good.
9444 </para>
9445 <para>
9446 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9447 innovation&mdash;again,
9448 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9449 crowd.
9450 </para>
9451 <para>
9452 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9453 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9454 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9455 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9456 </para>
9457 <para>
9458 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9459 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9460 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9461 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9462 2001).
9463 </para></footnote>
9464 overall this history of copyright
9465 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9466 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9467 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9468 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9469 </para>
9470 <para>
9471 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9472 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9473 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9474 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9475 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9476 </para>
9477 <para>
9478 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9479 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9480 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9481 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9482 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9483 copyright
9484 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9485 music
9486 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9487 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9488 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9489 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9490 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9491 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9492 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9493 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9494 </para></footnote>
9495 It has been
9496 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9497 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9498 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9499 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9500 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9501 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9502 August
9503 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9504 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9505 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9506 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9507 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9508 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9509 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9510 World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34, available at
9511 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9512 </para></footnote>
9513 But there is one
9514 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9515 demise
9516 of Internet radio.
9517 </para>
9518 <para>
9519
9520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9521 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9522 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9523 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9524 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9525 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9526 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9527 copyright
9528 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9529 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9530 </para>
9531 <para>
9532 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9533 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9534 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9535 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9536 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9537 Probably
9538 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9539 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9540 efforts
9541 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9542 </para>
9543 <para>
9544 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9545 technology
9546 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9547 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9548 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9549 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9550 regular
9551 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9552 </para>
9553 <para>
9554 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9555 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9556 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9557 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9558 broadcasters
9559 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9560 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9561 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9562 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9563 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9564 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9565 in to this new form of radio.
9566 </para>
9567 <para>
9568
9569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9570 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9571 improvement
9572 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9573 improvement
9574 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9575 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9576 establish
9577 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9578 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9579 </para>
9580 <blockquote>
9581 <para>
9582 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9583 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9584 radio
9585 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9586 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9587 competition
9588 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9589 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9590 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9591 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9592 communications
9593 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9594 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9595 acquire
9596 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9597 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9598 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.<footnote><para>
9599 <!-- f12. --> Lessing, 239.
9600 </para></footnote>
9601 </para>
9602 </blockquote>
9603 <para>
9604 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not because
9605 Armstrong
9606 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9607 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<footnote><para>
9608 <!-- f13. --> Ibid., 229.
9609 </para></footnote>
9610 to
9611 retard
9612 the growth of this competing technology.
9613 </para>
9614 <para>
9615 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9616 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9617 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9618 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9619 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9620 radio?
9621 </para>
9622 <para>
9623 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9624 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9625
9626 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9627 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9628 phenomenon
9629 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9630 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9631 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9632 hypothetical
9633 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9634 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9635 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9636 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9637 </para>
9638 <para>
9639 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9640 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9641 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9642 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9643 over $1 million a year.<footnote><para>
9644 <!-- f14. --> This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9645 Arbitration
9646 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example
9647 offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw
9648 (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain
9649 submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected.
9650 See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
9651 and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP DTRA 1 and 2,
9652 available at
9653 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9654 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker,
9655 "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution," Antitrust
9656 Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was not confusion, these are just
9657 old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected from
9658 digital
9659 entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the
9660 name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of
9661 powerful
9662 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9663 </para></footnote>
9664 A regular radio station broadcasting the same
9665 content would pay no equivalent fee.
9666 </para>
9667 <para>
9668 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9669 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9670 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9671 </para>
9672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9673 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9674 <listitem><para>
9675 name of the service;
9676 </para></listitem>
9677 <listitem><para>
9678 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9679 </para></listitem>
9680 <listitem><para>
9681 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9682 </para></listitem>
9683 <listitem><para>
9684 date of transmission;
9685 </para></listitem>
9686 <listitem><para>
9687 time of transmission;
9688 </para></listitem>
9689 <listitem><para>
9690 time zone of origination of transmission;
9691 </para></listitem>
9692 <listitem><para>
9693 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9694 </para></listitem>
9695 <listitem><para>
9696 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9697 </para></listitem>
9698 <listitem><para>
9699 sound recording title;
9700 </para></listitem>
9701 <listitem><para>
9702 ISRC code of the recording;
9703 </para></listitem>
9704 <listitem><para>
9705 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9706 </para></listitem>
9707 <listitem><para>
9708 featured recording artist;
9709 </para></listitem>
9710 <listitem><para>
9711 retail album title;
9712 </para></listitem>
9713 <listitem><para>
9714 recording label;
9715 </para></listitem>
9716 <listitem><para>
9717 UPC code of the retail album;
9718 </para></listitem>
9719 <listitem><para>
9720 catalog number;
9721 </para></listitem>
9722 <listitem><para>
9723 copyright owner information;
9724 </para></listitem>
9725 <listitem><para>
9726 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9727 </para></listitem>
9728 <listitem><para>
9729 name of the service or entity;
9730 </para></listitem>
9731 <listitem><para>
9732 channel or program;
9733 </para></listitem>
9734 <listitem><para>
9735 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9736 </para></listitem>
9737 <listitem><para>
9738 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9739 </para></listitem>
9740 <listitem><para>
9741 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9742 </para></listitem>
9743 <listitem><para>
9744 Unique User identifier;
9745 </para></listitem>
9746 <listitem><para>
9747 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9748 </para></listitem>
9749 </orderedlist>
9750
9751 <para>
9752 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9753 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9754 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9755 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9756 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9757 does not.
9758 </para>
9759 <para>
9760 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9761 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9762 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9763 </para>
9764 <para>
9765 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed
9766 obvious
9767 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9768 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9769 </para>
9770 <blockquote>
9771 <para>
9772 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9773 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9774 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9775 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9776 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9777 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9778
9779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9780 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9781 Because
9782 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9783 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9784 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9785 of business. . . ."
9786 </para>
9787 <para>
9788 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9789 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9790 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9791 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9792 </para>
9793 </blockquote>
9794 <para>
9795 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9796 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9797 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9798 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9799 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9800 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9801 effective to prevent it.
9802 </para>
9803 </sect2>
9804 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9805 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9806 <para>
9807 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9808 dinosaurs
9809 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9810 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9811 </para>
9812 <para>
9813 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9814 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9815 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9816 </para>
9817 <para>
9818 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9819 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9820 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9821 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9822 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9823 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9824 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9825 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9826 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9827 </para></footnote>
9828 According to the RIAA,
9829 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9830 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9831
9832 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9833 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9834 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9835 increasingly
9836 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9837 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9838 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9839 extreme
9840 response by the other.
9841 </para>
9842 <para>
9843 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9844 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9845 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9846 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9847 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9848 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9849 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9850 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9851 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9852 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9853 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9854 was.<footnote><para>
9855 <!-- f16. -->
9856 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9857 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9858 </para></footnote>
9859 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9860 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9861 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9862 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9863 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9864 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9865 they oppose.
9866 </para>
9867 <para>
9868 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9869 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9870 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9871 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9872 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9873 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9874 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9875 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9876 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9877 <!-- f17. -->
9878 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9879 Prohibition," American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9880 </para></footnote>
9881 We have
9882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9883 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9884 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9885 <!-- f18. -->
9886 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9887 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9888 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9889 </para></footnote>
9890 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9891 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9892 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9893 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9894 cheat.<footnote><para>
9895 <!-- f19. -->
9896 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9897 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9898 compliance literature).
9899 </para></footnote>
9900 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9901 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9902 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9903 </para>
9904 <para>
9905 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9906 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9907 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9908 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9909 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9910 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9911 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9912 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9913 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9914 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9915 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9916 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9917 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9918 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9919 degree of illegality.
9920 </para>
9921 <para>
9922 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9923 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9924 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9925 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9926 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9927 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9928 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9929 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9930 to consider the alternative.
9931 </para>
9932 <para>
9933
9934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9935 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9936 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9937 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9938 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9939 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9940 </para>
9941 <para>
9942 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9943 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9944 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9945 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9946 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9947 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9948 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9949 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9950 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9951 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9952 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9953 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9954 </para>
9955 <para>
9956 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9957 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9958 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9959 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9960 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9961 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9962 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9963 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9964 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9965 a nation of felons?
9966 </para>
9967 <para>
9968 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9969 </para>
9970 <para>
9971 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9972 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9973 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9974 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9975 used
9976
9977 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9978 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9979 recordings is free.
9980 </para>
9981 <para>
9982 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9983 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9984 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9985 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9986 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9987 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9988 capacities of digital technologies.
9989 </para>
9990 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9991 <para>
9992 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9993 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9994 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9995 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9996 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9997 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9998 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9999 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
10000 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
10001 </para>
10002 <para>
10003 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
10004 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10005 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
10006 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10007 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10008 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10009 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10010 on people's machines.
10011 </para>
10012 <para>
10013 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10014 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10015 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10016 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10017 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10018 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10019
10020 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10021 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10022 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10023 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
10024 management" system.
10025 </para>
10026 <para>
10027 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10028 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10029 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10030 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10031 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10032 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10033 freedom to move content easily?
10034 </para>
10035 <para>
10036 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10037 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10038 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10039 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10040 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10041 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10042 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10043 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10044 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10045 </para>
10046 <para>
10047 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10048 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10049 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10050 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10051 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10052 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10053 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10054 </para>
10055 <para>
10056 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10057 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10058 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10059 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10060 </para>
10061 <para>
10062 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10063 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10064
10065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10066
10067 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10068 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10069 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10070 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10071 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
10072 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
10073 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
10074 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
10075 generally.
10076 </para>
10077 <para>
10078 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
10079 explains,
10080 </para>
10081 <blockquote>
10082 <para>
10083 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10084 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
10085 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10086 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10087 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10088 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
10089 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
10090 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10091 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
10092 </para>
10093 </blockquote>
10094 <para>
10095 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10096 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10097 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10098 </para>
10099 <para>
10100 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
10101 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10102 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10103 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10104 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10105 an Internet user is revealed.
10106 </para>
10107 <para>
10108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10109 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10110 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10111 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10112 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10113 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10114 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10115 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10116 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
10117 <!-- f20. -->
10118 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10119 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10120 Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
10121 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10122 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10123 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
10124 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September
10125 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10126 Fan, Either," New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
10127 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
10128 </para></footnote>
10129
10130 </para>
10131 <para>
10132 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10133 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10134 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10135 <!-- f21. -->
10136 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10137 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10138 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10139 </para></footnote>
10140 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10141 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10142 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10143 </para>
10144 <para>
10145 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10146 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10147 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10148 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10149 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10150 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10151 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10152 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10153 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10154 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10155 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10156 <!-- f22. -->
10157 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10158 Boston Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10159 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10160 Colleges," Washington Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10161 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
10162 Monitor, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10163 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10164 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10165 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News, 30 January
10166 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10167 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
10168 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10169 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10170 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10171 </para></footnote>
10172 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10173 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10174 </para>
10175 <para>
10176 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10177 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10178 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10179 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10180 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10181 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10182 college students
10183
10184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10185 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10186 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10187 Says von Lohmann,
10188 </para>
10189 <blockquote>
10190 <para>
10191 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10192 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10193 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10194 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10195 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10196 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10197 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10198 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10199 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10200 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10201 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10202 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10203 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10204 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10205 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10206 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10207 million of them.
10208 </para>
10209 </blockquote>
10210 <para>
10211 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10212 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10213 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10214 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10215 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10216 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10217 </para>
10218
10219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10220 </sect2>
10221 </sect1>
10222 </chapter>
10223 <chapter id="c-balances">
10224 <title>BALANCES</title>
10225
10226 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10227 <para>
10228 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10229 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10230 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10231 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10232 </para>
10233 <para>
10234 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10235 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10236 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10237 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10238 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10239 everything around.
10240 </para>
10241 <para>
10242 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10243 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10244 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10245 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10246 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10247 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10248 </para>
10249 <para>
10250 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10251 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10252 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10253 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10254 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10255 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10256 made that is happening all around.
10257 </para>
10258 <para>
10259 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10260 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10261 gasoline onto this fire.
10262 </para>
10263 <para>
10264 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10265 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10266 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10267 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10268 </para>
10269 <para>
10270 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10271 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10272 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10273 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10274 success will require.
10275 </para>
10276
10277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10278 <sect1 id="eldred">
10279 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10280 <para>
10281 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10282 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10283 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10284 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10285 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10286 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10287 come alive.
10288 </para>
10289 <para>
10290 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10291 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10292 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10293 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10294 them available for free.
10295 </para>
10296 <para>
10297 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10298 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10299 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10300 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10301 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10302 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10303 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10304 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10305 accessible&mdash;today.
10306 </para>
10307 <para>
10308 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10309 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10310 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10311 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10312 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10313 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10314 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10315 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10316 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10317 commercial publications of public domain works.
10318 </para>
10319 <para>
10320 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10321 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10322 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10323 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10324 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10325 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10326 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10327 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10328 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10329 generally.<footnote><para>
10330 <!-- f1. -->
10331 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10332 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10333 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10334 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10335 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10336 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10337 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10338 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10339 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10340 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10341 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10342 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10343 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10344 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10345 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10346 </para>
10347 <para>
10348 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10349 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10350 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10351 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
10352 in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10353 terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
10354 would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
10355 collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10356 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10357 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
10358 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10359 </para>
10360 <para>
10361
10362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10363 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10364 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10365 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10366 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10367 <!-- f2. -->
10368 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10369 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10370 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10371 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10372 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10373 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10374 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10375 </para></footnote>
10376
10377 </para>
10378 <para>
10379 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10380 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10381 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10382 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10383 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10384 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10385 to undertake.
10386 </para>
10387 <para>
10388 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10389 constitutional
10390 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10391 interpretation.
10392 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10393 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10394 importantly
10395 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10396 </para>
10397 <blockquote>
10398 <para>
10399 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10400 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10401 their . . . Writings. . . .
10402 </para>
10403 </blockquote>
10404 <para>
10405 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10406 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10407 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10408 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10409 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10410 specific&mdash;to
10411 "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that are also specific&mdash;
10412 by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
10413 </para>
10414 <para>
10415 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10416 extending
10417 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10418 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10419 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10420 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10421 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10422 Congress
10423 has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what
10424 the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the installment
10425 plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10426 </para>
10427 <para>
10428 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10429 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10430 consideration
10431 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10432 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10433 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the
10434 practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10435 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10436 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to
10437 keep this gravy train going.
10438 </para>
10439 <para>
10440 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10441 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
10442 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10443 beneficiaries
10444 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce
10445 it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can
10446 do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must do&mdash;and those
10447 things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10448 </para>
10449 <para>
10450 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10451 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10452 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10453 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10454 continues
10455 to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10456 benefits
10457 greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher would
10458 pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be published
10459 by anyone for free.
10460 </para>
10461 <para>
10462 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10463 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10464 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10465 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10466 report:
10467 </para>
10468 <para>
10469 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10470
10471 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10472 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10473 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10474 those works.
10475 </para>
10476 <para>
10477 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10478 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10479 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10480 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10481 </para>
10482 <para>
10483 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10484 about it?"
10485 </para>
10486 <para>
10487 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10488 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10489 they support the bill."
10490 </para>
10491 <para>
10492 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10493 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10494 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10495 much is it worth?"
10496 </para>
10497 <para>
10498 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10499 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10500 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10501 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10502 </para>
10503 <para>
10504 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10505 correct conclusion:
10506 </para>
10507 <para>
10508 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10509 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10510 contributions
10511 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10512 </para>
10513 <para>
10514 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10515 contribute
10516 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10517 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10518 </para>
10519 <para>
10520 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10521 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10522 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10523 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10525 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10526 copyrights
10527 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10528 the copyright term extended.
10529 </para>
10530 <para>
10531 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10532 legislation
10533 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10534 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10535 </para>
10536 <para>
10537 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10538 Copyright
10539 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10540 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10541 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10542 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10543 contributions.<footnote><para>
10544 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10545 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10546 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10547 </para></footnote>
10548 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10549 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10550 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10551 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10552 Age," available at
10553 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10554 </para></footnote>
10555 Disney is estimated to have
10556 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10557 cycle.<footnote><para>
10558 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10559 Congressional
10560 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10561 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10562 </para></footnote>
10563
10564 </para>
10565 <para>
10566 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10567 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10568 reality
10569 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10570 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10571 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10572 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10573 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10574 "limited."
10575 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10576 and again.
10577 </para>
10578 <para>
10579 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10580 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10581 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10582 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10583 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10584 scholars,
10585 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10586
10587 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10588 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10589 guns near schools.
10590 </para>
10591 <para>
10592 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10593 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10594 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10595 "interstate
10596 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10597 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10598 interstate
10599 commerce.
10600 </para>
10601 <para>
10602 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10603 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10604 activity,
10605 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10606 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10607 interpreted
10608 to impose no limit.
10609 </para>
10610 <para>
10611 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10612 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10613 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10614 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10615 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10616 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10617 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10618 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10619 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10620 government
10621 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10622 </para>
10623 <para>
10624 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10625 arguments,"
10626 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10627 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10628 </para></footnote>
10629 If anything Congress says is interstate
10630 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10631 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10632 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10633 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10634 </para></footnote>
10635
10636 </para>
10637 <para>
10638 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10639 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10640 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10641 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10642 context
10643 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10644 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10645 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10646 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10647 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10648 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10649 </para></footnote>
10650 And if it is applied to the
10651 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10652 Congress
10653 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10654 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10655 existing
10656 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10657 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10658 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10659 copyrights
10660 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10661 existing copyrights.
10662 </para>
10663 <para>
10664 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10665 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10666 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10667 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10668 rejected
10669 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10670 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10671 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10672 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10673 boring.
10674 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10675 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10676 </para>
10677 <para>
10678 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10679 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10680 Constitution's
10681 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10682 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10683 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10684 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10685 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10686 already
10687 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10688 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10689 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10690 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10691 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10692 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10693 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10694 </para>
10695 <para>
10696 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10697
10698 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10699 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10700 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10701 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10702 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10703 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10704 </para></footnote>
10705 But
10706 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10707 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10708 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10709 </para>
10710 <para>
10711 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10712 copyright
10713 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10714 influence
10715 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10716 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10717 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10718 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10719 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10720 bought to extend them again.
10721 </para>
10722 <para>
10723 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10724 extended.
10725 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10726 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10727 society
10728 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10729 Disney's.
10730 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10731 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10732 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10733 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10734 exploited,
10735 and no longer available as a result.
10736 </para>
10737 <para>
10738 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10739 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10740 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10741 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10742 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10743 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10744 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10745 Congressional
10746 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10747 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10748 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10749 </para></footnote>
10750
10751 </para>
10752 <para>
10753 Think practically about the consequence of this
10754 extension&mdash;practically,
10755 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10756
10757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10758 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10759 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10760 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10761 remaining
10762 9,873. What would you have to do?
10763 </para>
10764 <para>
10765 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10766 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10767 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10768 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10769 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10770 list of books still under copyright.
10771 </para>
10772 <para>
10773 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10774 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10775 </para>
10776 <para>
10777 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10778 owners
10779 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10780 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10781 being at least a list?
10782 </para>
10783 <para>
10784 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10785 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10786 practically
10787 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10788 thousands
10789 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10790 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10791 </para>
10792 <para>
10793 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10794 apologists
10795 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10796 owners?"
10797 </para>
10798 <para>
10799 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10800 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10801 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10802 suggesting
10803 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10804 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10805 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10806 </para>
10807 <para>
10808 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10809 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10810 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10811
10812 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10813 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10814 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10815 happen
10816 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10817 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10818 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10819 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10820 know quite well who owns what property.
10821 </para>
10822 <para>
10823 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10824 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10825 already
10826 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10827 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10828 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10829 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10830 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10831 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10832 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10833 </para>
10834 <para>
10835 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10836 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10837 consequence
10838 for other creative works is much more dire.
10839 </para>
10840 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10841 <para>
10842 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10843 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10844 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10845 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10846 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10847 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10848 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10849 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10850 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10851 films."<footnote><para>
10852 <!-- f11. -->
10853 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10854 Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10855 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10856 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
10857 </para></footnote>
10858
10859 </para>
10860 <para>
10861 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10862 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10863 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10864 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10865 </para>
10866 <para>
10867 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10868
10869 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10870 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10871 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10872 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10873 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10874 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10875 work available for distribution.
10876 </para>
10877 <para>
10878 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10879 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10880 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10881 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10882 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10883 mm film.<footnote><para>
10884 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10885 Supporting
10886 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
10887 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10888 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10889 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10890 </para></footnote>
10891
10892 </para>
10893 <para>
10894 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10895 important.
10896 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10897 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10898 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10899 locate the copyright owner.
10900 </para>
10901 <para>
10902 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10903 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10904 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10905 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10906 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10907 exceptionally
10908 high.
10909 </para>
10910 <para>
10911 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10912 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10913 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10914 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10915 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10916 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10917 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10918 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10919 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10920 </para>
10921 <para>
10922 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10923
10924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10925 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10926 benefit
10927 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10928 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10929 the copyright expires.
10930 </para>
10931 <para>
10932 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10933 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10934 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10935 canisters
10936 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10937 than dust.
10938 </para>
10939 <para>
10940 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10941 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10942 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10943 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10944 creative
10945 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10946 free expression."
10947 </para>
10948 <para>
10949 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10950 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10951 indicated,
10952 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10953 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10954 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10955 distributors,
10956 the commercial life ends.
10957 </para>
10958 <para>
10959 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10960 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10961 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10962 between
10963 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10964 Friday
10965 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10966 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10967 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10968 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10969 have, we need to have access to this history.
10970 </para>
10971 <para>
10972 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10973
10974 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10975 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10976 this context do no good.
10977 </para>
10978 <para>
10979 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10980 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10981 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10982 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10983 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10984 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10985 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10986 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10987 </para>
10988 <para>
10989 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10990 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10991 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10992 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10993 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10994 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10995 market didn't have more to offer.
10996 </para>
10997 <para>
10998 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10999 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11000 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11001 would not have interfered with anything.
11002 </para>
11003 <para>
11004 But this situation has now changed.
11005 </para>
11006 <para>
11007 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11008 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11009 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11010 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11011 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
11012 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
11013 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
11014 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
11015 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
11016 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
11017 </para>
11018 <para>
11019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11020 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
11021 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
11022 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11023 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11024 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11025 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11026 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11027 written for a radically different context.
11028 </para>
11029 <para>
11030 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11031 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11032 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11033 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
11034 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
11035 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
11036 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
11037 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
11038 expression. Copyright is a brake.
11039 </para>
11040 <para>
11041 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11042 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11043 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11044 culture widely?"
11045 </para>
11046 <para>
11047 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11048 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
11049 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11050 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11051 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
11052 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
11053 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11054 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
11055 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11056 </para>
11057 <para>
11058 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11059 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11060 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11061 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11062
11063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11064 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11065 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11066 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11067 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
11068 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
11069 <!-- f13. -->
11070 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
11071 December 2002, available at
11072 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
11073 </para></footnote>
11074
11075 </para>
11076 <para>
11077 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11078 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11079 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11080 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
11081 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
11082 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11083 </para>
11084 <para>
11085 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11086 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11087 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11088 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11089 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11090 </para>
11091 <para>
11092 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11093 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
11094 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11095 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11096 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11097 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11098 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11099 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11100 power to extend existing terms.
11101 </para>
11102 <para>
11103 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11104 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11105 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11106 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11107 </para>
11108 <para>
11109 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11110 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11111
11112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11113 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11114 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11115 overstepped its bounds.
11116 </para>
11117 <para>
11118 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11119 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11120 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11121 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11122 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11123 </para>
11124 <para>
11125 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11126 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11127 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
11128 briefs and preparing for argument.
11129 </para>
11130 <para>
11131 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11132 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11133 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11134 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11135 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11136 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11137 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11138 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11139 </para>
11140 <para>
11141 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11142 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11143 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11144 mistake lost it.
11145 </para>
11146 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11147 <para>
11148 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11149 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11150 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11151 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11152 heat
11153 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11154 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11155 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11156 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11157 </para>
11158 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11159 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11160 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11161 <para>
11162 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11163 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11164 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11165 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11166 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11167 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11168 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11169 most powerful media companies in the world."
11170 </para>
11171 <para>
11172 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11173 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11174 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11175 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11176 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11177 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11178 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11179 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11180 interpretation
11181 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11182 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11183 unconstitutional,
11184 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11185 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11186 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11187 Constitution,
11188 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11189 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11190 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11191 </para>
11192 <para>
11193 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11194 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11195 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11196 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11197 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11198 why it was unconstitutional.
11199 </para>
11200 <para>
11201 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11202
11203 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11204 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11205 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11206 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11207 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11208 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11209 minority.
11210 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11211 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11212 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11213 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11214 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11215 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11216 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11217 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11218 </para>
11219 <para>
11220 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11221 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11222 beginning.
11223 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11224 November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11225 Republican
11226 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11227 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11228 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11229 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11230 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11231 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11232 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11233 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11234 </para>
11235 <para>
11236 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11237 supporting
11238 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11239 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11240 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11241 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11242 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11243 </para>
11244 <para>
11245 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11246 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11247
11248 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11249 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11250 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11251 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11252 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11253 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11254 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11255 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11256 </para>
11257 <para>
11258 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11259 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11260 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11261 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11262 </para>
11263 <para>
11264 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11265 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11266 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11267 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11268 clear.
11269 </para>
11270 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11271 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11272 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11273 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11274 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11275 <para>
11276 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11277 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11278 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11279 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11280 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11281 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11282 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11283 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11284 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11285 </para>
11286 <para>
11287 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11288 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11289 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11290 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11291 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11292 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11293 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11294 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11295
11296 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11297 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11298 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11299 </para>
11300 <para>
11301 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11302 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11303 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11304 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11305 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11306 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11307 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11308 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11309 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11310 confidence in our argument.
11311 </para>
11312 <para>
11313 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11314 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11315 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11316 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11317 copyright holders.
11318 </para>
11319 <para>
11320 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11321 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11322 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11323 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11324 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11325 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11326 wanted to control.
11327 </para>
11328 <para>
11329 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11330 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11331 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11332 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11333 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11334 pornography."<footnote><para>
11335 <!-- f14. -->
11336 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11337 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11338 </para></footnote>
11339 That was also the motive of
11340 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11341 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11342 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11343 <!-- f15. -->
11344 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11345 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11346 </para></footnote>
11347 That's
11348
11349 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11350 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11351 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11352 </para>
11353 <para>
11354 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11355 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11356 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11357 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11358 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11359 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11360 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11361 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11362 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11363 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11364 </para>
11365 <para>
11366 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11367 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11368 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11369 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11370 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11371 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11372 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11373 </para>
11374 <para>
11375 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11376 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11377 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11378 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11379 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11380 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11381 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11382 powers had limits.
11383 </para>
11384 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11385 <para>
11386 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11387 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11388 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11389 the Constitution
11390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11391 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11392 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11393 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11394 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11395 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11396 </para>
11397 <para>
11398 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11399 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11400 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11401 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11402 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11403 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11404 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11405 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11406 sense.
11407 </para>
11408 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11409 <para>
11410 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11411 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11412 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11413 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11414 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11415 these retrospective extensions.
11416 </para>
11417 <para>
11418 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11419 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11420 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11421 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11422 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11423 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11424 </para>
11425 <para>
11426 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11427 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11428 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11429 overriding
11430 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11431 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11432 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11433 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11434 </para>
11435 <para>
11436 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11437 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11438
11439 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11440 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11441 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11442 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11443 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11444 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11445 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11446 copyright be limited.
11447 </para>
11448 <para>
11449 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11450 Congress
11451 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11452 government
11453 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11454 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11455 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11456 </para>
11457 <para>
11458 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11459 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11460 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11461 existing
11462 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11463 </para>
11464 <para>
11465 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11466 extended
11467 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11468 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11469 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11470 existing
11471 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11472 restraint
11473 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11474 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11475 hesitated
11476 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11477 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11478 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11479 arrived
11480 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11481 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11482
11483 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11484 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11485 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11486 </para>
11487 <para>
11488 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11489 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11490 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11491 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11492 Congress
11493 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11494 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11495 this central idea.
11496 </para>
11497 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11498 <para>
11499 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11500 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11501 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11502 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11503 </para>
11504 <para>
11505 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11506 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11507 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11508 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11509 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11510 </para>
11511 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11512 <para>
11513 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11514 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11515 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11516 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11517 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11518 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11519 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11520 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11521 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11522 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11523 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11524
11525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11526 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11527 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11528 </para>
11529 <para>
11530 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11531 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11532 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11533 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11534 congressmen
11535 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11536 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11537 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11538 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11539 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11540 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11541 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11542 family of the Justices.
11543 </para>
11544 <para>
11545 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11546 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11547 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11548 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11549 </para>
11550 <para>
11551 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11552 The history was bothering her.
11553 </para>
11554 <blockquote>
11555 <para>
11556 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11557 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11558 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11559 practice that began with the very first act.
11560 </para>
11561 </blockquote>
11562 <para>
11563 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11564 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11565 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11566 </para>
11567 <blockquote>
11568 <para>
11569 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11570 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11571 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11572 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11573 is yes.
11574 </para>
11575 </blockquote>
11576 <para>
11577 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11578 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11579 Kennedy, who observed,
11580 </para>
11581 <blockquote>
11582 <para>
11583 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11584 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11585 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11586 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11587 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11588 </para>
11589 </blockquote>
11590 <para>
11591 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11592 student,
11593 I answered,
11594 </para>
11595 <blockquote>
11596 <para>
11597 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11598 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11599 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11600 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11601 effectively
11602 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11603 </para>
11604 </blockquote>
11605 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11606 <para>
11607 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11608 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11609 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11610 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11611 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11612 </para>
11613 <para>
11614 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11615 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11616 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11617 </para>
11618 <para>
11619 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11620 sympathetic.
11621 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11622
11623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11624 </para>
11625 <blockquote>
11626 <para>
11627 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11628 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11629 </para>
11630 <para>
11631 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11632 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11633 domain
11634 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11635 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11636 into the Copyright Clause.
11637 </para>
11638 </blockquote>
11639 <para>
11640 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11641 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11642 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11643 </para>
11644 <blockquote>
11645 <para>
11646 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11647 unlimited
11648 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11649 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11650 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11651 an unlimited time.
11652 </para>
11653 </blockquote>
11654 <para>
11655 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11656 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11657 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11658 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11659 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11660 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11661 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause&mdash;
11662 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11663 specific
11664 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11665 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11666 </para>
11667 <para>
11668 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11669 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11670
11671 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11672 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11673 optimistic.
11674 </para>
11675 <para>
11676 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11677 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11678 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11679 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11680 believed
11681 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11682 Copyright
11683 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11684 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11685 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11686 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11687 Copyright
11688 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11689 believe
11690 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in
11691 particular, the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule
11692 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11693 </para>
11694 <para>
11695 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11696 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11697 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11698 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11699 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11700 </para>
11701 <para>
11702 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11703 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11704 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11705 </para>
11706 <para>
11707 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11708 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11709 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11710 </para>
11711 <para>
11712 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11713 distinguish
11714 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11715 argument
11716 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11717 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11718 in the Court's opinion.
11719 </para>
11720 <para>
11721
11722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11723 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11724 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11725 generally,
11726 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11727 </para>
11728 <para>
11729 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11730 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11731 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11732 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11733 </para>
11734 <para>
11735 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11736 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11737 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11738 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11739 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11740 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11741 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11742 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11743 would not.
11744 </para>
11745 <para>
11746 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11747 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11748 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11749 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11750 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11751 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11752 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11753 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11754 the system we have.
11755 </para>
11756 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11757 <para>
11758 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11759 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11760 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11761 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11762 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11763 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11764 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11765 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11766 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11767 </para>
11768 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11769 <para>
11770 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11771 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11772 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11773 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11774 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11775 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11776 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11777 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11778 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11779 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11780 </para>
11781 <para>
11782 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11783 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11784 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11785 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11786 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11787 </para>
11788 <para>
11789 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11790 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11791 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11792 </para>
11793 <para>
11794 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11795 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11796 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11797 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11798 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11799 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11800 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11801 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11802 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11803 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11804 "originalism" now?
11805 </para>
11806 <para>
11807 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11808 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11809 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11810 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11811
11812 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11813 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11814 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11815 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11816 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11817 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11818 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11819 own principles.
11820 </para>
11821 <para>
11822 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11823 myself.
11824 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11825 the law as it is.
11826 </para>
11827 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11828 <para>
11829 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11830 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11831 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11832 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11833 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11834 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11835 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11836 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11837 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11838 </para>
11839 <para>
11840 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11841 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11842 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11843 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11844 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11845 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11846 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11847 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11848 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11849 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11850 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11851 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11852 effort to persuade; but I
11853 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11854 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11855 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11856 should decide the issue.
11857 </para>
11858 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11859 <para>
11860 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11861 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11862 Kathleen Sullivan?
11863 </para>
11864 <para>
11865 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11866 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11867 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11868 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11869 </para>
11870 <para>
11871 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11872 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11873 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11874 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11875 have persuaded.
11876 </para>
11877 <para>
11878 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11879 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11880 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11881 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11882 issue should not be raised until it is.
11883 </para>
11884 <para>
11885 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11886 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11887 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11888 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11889 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11890 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11891 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11892 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11893 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11894 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11895 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11896
11897 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11898 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11899 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11900 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11901 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11902 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11903 </para>
11904 <blockquote>
11905 <para>
11906 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11907 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11908 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11909 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11910 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11911 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11912 </para>
11913 </blockquote>
11914 <para>
11915 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11916 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11917 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11918 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11919 in the face felt exactly like that.
11920 </para>
11921 <para>
11922 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11923 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11924 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11925 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11926 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11927 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11928 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11929 </para>
11930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11931 </sect1>
11932 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
11933 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11934 <para>
11935 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11936 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11937 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11938 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11939 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11940 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11941 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11942 </para>
11943 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11944 <para>
11945 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11946 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11947 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11948 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11949 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11950 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11951 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11952 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11953 </para>
11954 <para>
11955 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11956 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11958 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11959 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11960 the work passed into the public domain.
11961 </para>
11962 <para>
11963 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11964 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11965 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11966 </para>
11967 <para>
11968 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11969 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11970 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11971 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11972 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11973 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11974 everything else, let the content go.
11975 </para>
11976 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11977 <para>
11978 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11979 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11980 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11981 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11982 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11983 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11984 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11985 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11986 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11987 the stupid harm of the present system.
11988 </para>
11989 <para>
11990 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11991 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11992 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11993 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11994 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11995 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11996 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11997 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11998 where copyright owners could be identified.
11999 </para>
12000 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12001 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12002 <para>
12003 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12004 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
12005 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
12006 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
12007 <!-- f1. -->
12008 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12009 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12010 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
12011 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
12012 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
12013 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
12014 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
12015 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12016 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12017 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12018 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12019 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12020 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12021 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12022 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12023 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
12024 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
12025 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
12026 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
12027 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12028 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12029 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12030 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12031 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12032 </para>
12033 <para>
12034 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12035 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12036 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12037 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12038 know what's protected and what's not.
12039 </para>
12040 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12041 <para>
12042 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12043 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12044 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12045 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12046 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12047 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12048 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
12049 in the loss of widows' only income.
12050 </para>
12051 <para>
12052 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12053 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12054 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12055 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12056 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12057 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12058 </para>
12059 <para>
12060 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12061 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12062 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12063 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12064 burden
12065 imposed upon creators.
12066 </para>
12067 <para>
12068 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
12069 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12070
12071 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12072 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12073 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12074 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
12075 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12076 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12077 table.
12078 </para>
12079 <para>
12080 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12081 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12082 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12083 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12084 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12085 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12086 spread.
12087 </para>
12088 <para>
12089 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12090 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12091 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12092 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12093 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12094 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
12095 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12096 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12097 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12098 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12099 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12100 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12101 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12102 system of protection for property generally.
12103 </para>
12104 <para>
12105 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12106 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12107 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12108 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12109 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12110 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12111 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12112 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12113
12114 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12115 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
12116 take their place.
12117 </para>
12118 <para>
12119 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12120 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12121 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12122 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12123 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12124 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12125 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12126 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12127 </para>
12128 <para>
12129 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12130 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12131 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12132 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12133 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12134 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12135 seen before because there are no formalities.
12136 </para>
12137 <para>
12138 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12139 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12140 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12141 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12142 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12143 </para>
12144 <para>
12145 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12146 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12147 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12148 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12149 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12150 </para>
12151 <para>
12152 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12153 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12154 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12155 registration?
12156 </para>
12157 <para>
12158 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12159 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12160 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12161
12162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12163 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12164 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12165 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12166 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12167 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12168 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12169 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12170 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
12171 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12172 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12173 </para>
12174 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12175 <para>
12176 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12177 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12178 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12179 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12180 </para>
12181 <para>
12182 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12183 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12184 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12185 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12186 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12187 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12188 something good might happen here.
12189 </para>
12190 <para>
12191 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12192 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12193 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12194 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12195 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12196 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12197 </para>
12198 <para>
12199 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12200 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12201 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12203 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12204 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12205 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12206 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12207 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12208 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12209 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12210 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12211 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12212 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12213 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12214 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12215 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12216 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12217 film is a valid derivative use.
12218 </para>
12219 <para>
12220 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12221 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12222 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12223 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12224 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12225 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12226 </para>
12227 <para>
12228 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12229 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12230 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12231 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12232 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12233 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12234 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12235 threat.
12236 </para>
12237 <para>
12238 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12239 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12240 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12241 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12242 sense?
12243 </para>
12244 <para>
12245
12246 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12247 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12248 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12249 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12250 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12251 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12252 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12253 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12254 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12255 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12256 </para>
12257 <para>
12258 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12259 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12260 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12261 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12262 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12263 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12264 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12265 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12266 </para>
12267 <para>
12268 What does this industry really want?
12269 </para>
12270 <para>
12271 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12272 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12273 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12274 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12275 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12276 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12277 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12278 permission first.
12279 </para>
12280 <para>
12281 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12282 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12283 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12284 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12285 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12286 </para>
12287 <para>
12288 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12289 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12290
12291 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12292 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12293 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12294 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12295 and to share its own creation.
12296 </para>
12297 <para>
12298 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12299 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12300 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12301 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12302 block the progress of others.
12303 </para>
12304 <para>
12305 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12306 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12307 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12308 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12309 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12310 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12311 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12312 </para>
12313 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12314 </sect1>
12315 </chapter>
12316 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12317 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12318 <para>
12319 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12320 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12321 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12322 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12323 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12324 </para>
12325 <para>
12326 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12327 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12328 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12329 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12330 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12331 the disease almost invisible.
12332 </para>
12333 <para>
12334 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12335 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12336 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12337 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12338 population:
12339 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12340 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12341 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12342 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12343 available at
12344 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12345 release
12346 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12347 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12348 </para></footnote>
12349 </para>
12350 <para>
12351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12352 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12353 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12354 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12355 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12356 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12357 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12358 </para>
12359 <para>
12360 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12361 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12362 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12363 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12364 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12365 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12366 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12367 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12368 changes.
12369 </para>
12370 <para>
12371 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12372 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12373 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12374 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12375 costs significantly below the market price.
12376 </para>
12377 <para>
12378 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12379 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12380 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12381 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12382 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12383 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12384 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12385 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12386 <para>
12387 <!-- f2. -->
12388 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12389 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12390 </para></footnote>
12391 </para>
12392 <para>
12393 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12394 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12395 Association
12396 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12397 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12398 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12399 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12400 Prepared
12401 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12402 2000), 14, available at
12403 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12404 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12405 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12406 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12407 (statement of James Love).
12408 </para></footnote>
12409 Through the
12410 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12411 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12412 request,
12413 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12415 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12416 began
12417 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12418 government's
12419 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12420 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12421 companies,
12422 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12423 international
12424 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12425 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12426 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12427 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12428 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12429 <!-- f4. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12430 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12431 Prepared
12432 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12433 2000), 15.
12434 </para></footnote>
12435 </para>
12436 <para>
12437 We should place the intervention by the United States in context.
12438 No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans
12439 don't have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12440 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12441 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their
12442 demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12443 marginal,
12444 there was an effect from our government's intervention to stop
12445 the flow of medications into Africa.
12446 </para>
12447 <para>
12448 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12449 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12450 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12451 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12452 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12453 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12454 </para>
12455 <para>
12456 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12457 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12458 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12459 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12460 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12461 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12462 by U.S. companies.
12463 </para>
12464 <para>
12465 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12466 information,
12467 which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument
12468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12469 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12470 <!-- f5. --> See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12471 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12472 May 1999, A1, available at
12473 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink> ("compulsory licenses and gray
12474 markets
12475 pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property protection");
12476 Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
12477 Access
12478 to Essential Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999),
12479 available at
12480 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink> (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS,
12481 Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
12482 Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a
12483 Synopsis,"
12484 Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12485 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12486 </para></footnote>
12487 It was because "intellectual property"
12488 would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was
12489 a principle about the importance of "intellectual property" that led
12490 these government actors to intervene against the South African
12491 response
12492 to AIDS.
12493 </para>
12494 <para>
12495 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12496 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12497 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12498 direct
12499 cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans, and
12500 whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an idea?
12501 What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results
12502 in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so
12503 many to die for such an abstraction?
12504 </para>
12505 <para>
12506 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12507 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12508 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12509 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12510 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12511 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12512 </para>
12513 <para>
12514 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12515 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to sell their
12516 drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere.
12517 There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn't get
12518 back into the United States, but those are mere problems of
12519 technology.
12520 They could be overcome.
12521 </para>
12522 <para>
12523 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12524 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12525 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12526 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12527 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12528 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12529 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12530 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12531 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12532 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12533 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12534 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12535 idea called "intellectual property."
12536 </para>
12537 <para>
12538 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12539 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12540 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12541 What is the argument?
12542 </para>
12543 <para>
12544 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the
12545 patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly
12546 the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and
12547 strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the
12548 spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could
12549 endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block
12550 the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market
12551 prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12552 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were
12553 balanced in just this sense.
12554 </para>
12555 <para>
12556 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12557 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12558 extremism.
12559 A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our
12560 tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with consequences
12561 more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other
12562 single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12563 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much
12564 happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically
12565 do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice
12566 how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12567 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that
12568 we don't even question when the control of that property removes our
12569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12570 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12571 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12572 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12573 this common sense open its eyes.
12574 </para>
12575 <para>
12576 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12577 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12578 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12579 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12580 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12581 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12582 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12583 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12584 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12585 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12586 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12587 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12588 </para>
12589 <para>
12590 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12591 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12592 meeting.<footnote><para>
12593 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12594 August 2003, E1, available at
12595 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12596 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12597 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12598 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12599 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12600 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12601 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12602 </para></footnote>
12603 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had
12604 decided
12605 to hold a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to
12606 create public goods." These are projects that have been successful in
12607 producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary
12608 use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the
12609 World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of
12610 protocols
12611 in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support
12612 open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science
12613 project
12614 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12615 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12616 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12617 comprised
12618 a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12619 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12621 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12622 Glaxo-SmithKline,
12623 IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included
12624 the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the
12625 early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12626 </para>
12627 <para>
12628 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12629 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12630 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12631 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12632 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12633 </para>
12634 <para>
12635 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12636 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12637 meeting.
12638 </para></footnote>
12639 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12640 noncommercial
12641 work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12642 perspectives.
12643 And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12644 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12645 property issues.
12646 </para>
12647 <para>
12648 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12649 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12650 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information
12651 Society
12652 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked
12653 what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12654 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12655 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12656 interrupted
12657 to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12658 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12659 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12660 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12661 relatively
12662 minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual
12663 property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an
12664 "Information Society" unless one also talked about the range of
12665 information
12666 and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my
12667 immoderate
12668 moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the
12669 scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of
12670 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12671 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12672 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12673 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12674 </para>
12675 <para>
12676 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual
12677 property,
12678 I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and
12679 should. And thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to
12680 create public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO
12681 agenda.
12682 </para>
12683 <para>
12684 But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial,
12685 at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source and free
12686 software."
12687 Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From
12688 its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software
12689 would be like a conference to discuss Apple's operating system. Both
12690 open source and free software compete with Microsoft's software. And
12691 internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements
12692 that they use open source or free software, rather than "proprietary
12693 software," for their own internal uses.
12694 </para>
12695 <para>
12696 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12697 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12698 noncommercial
12699 software. There are many important companies that depend
12700 fundamentally
12701 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12702 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12703 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM is
12704 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12705 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12706 support a mode of software development that is different from
12707 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12708 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12709 sophisticated.
12710 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12711 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12712 opposition
12713 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12714 license
12715 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12716 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12717 Marketplace
12718 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12719 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12720 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2002), 69,
12721 available at
12722 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12723 president,
12724 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12725 Stern School of Business (3 May 2001), available at
12726 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12727 </para></footnote>
12728 </para>
12729 <para>
12730 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12731 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12732 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12733 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12734 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12735 by
12736 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12737 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12738 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12739 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12740 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12741 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12742 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12743 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12744 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12745 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12746 </para>
12747 <para>
12748 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12749 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12750 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12751 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12752 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12753 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12754 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12755 <!-- f9. -->
12756 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12757 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12758 </para></footnote>
12759 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12760 </para>
12761 <para>
12762 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12763 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12764 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12765 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12766 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12767 its lobbying efforts.
12768 </para>
12769 <para>
12770 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12771 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12772 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12773 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12774 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12775 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12776 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12777 goals of WIPO."
12778 </para>
12779 <para>
12780 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12781 </para>
12782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12783 <para>
12784 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12785 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12786 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12787 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12788 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12789 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12790 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12791 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12792 </para>
12793 <para>
12794 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12795 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12796 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12797 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12798 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12799 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12800 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12801 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12802 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12803 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12804 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12805 </para>
12806 <para>
12807 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12808 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12809 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12810 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12811 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12812 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12813 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12814 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12815 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12816 right to decide what to do with their property.
12817 </para>
12818 <para>
12819 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12820 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12821 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12823 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12824 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12825 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12826 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12827 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12828 way possible.
12829 </para>
12830 <para>
12831 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12832 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12833 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12834 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12835 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12836 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12837 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12838 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12839 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12840 that control.
12841 </para>
12842 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12843 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12844 <para>
12845 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12846 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12847 <!-- f10. -->
12848 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
12849 </para></footnote>
12850 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12851 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12852 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12853 </para>
12854 <para>
12855 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12856 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12857 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12858 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12859 </para>
12860 <blockquote>
12861 <para>
12862 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12863 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12864 should be to promote the right balance of intellectualproperty rights,
12865 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12866 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12867 say anything wrong. But in the world
12868 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12869 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12870 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12871 </para>
12872 </blockquote>
12873 <para>
12874 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12875 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12876 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12877 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12878 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12879 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12880 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12881 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12882 </para>
12883 <para>
12884 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12885 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12886 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12887 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12888 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12889 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12890 </para>
12891 <para>
12892 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12893 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12894 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12895 our own country's history).
12896 </para>
12897 <para>
12898 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12899 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12900 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12901 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12902 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12903 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12904 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12905 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12906 democracy in the world, become?
12907 </para>
12908 <para>
12909 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12910 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12911 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12912 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12913 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12914 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12915 </para>
12916 <para>
12917 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12918 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12919 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12920 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12921 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12922 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12923 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12924 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12925 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12926 hearings and a different result.
12927 </para>
12928 <para>
12929 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12930 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12931 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12932 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12933 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12934 concentration in the media.
12935 </para>
12936 <para>
12937 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12938 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12939 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12940 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12941 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12942 </para>
12943 <para>
12944 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12945 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12946 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12947 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12948 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12949 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12950 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12951 </para>
12952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12953 <para>
12954 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12955 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12956 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12957 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12958 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12959 </para>
12960 <para>
12961 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12962 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12963 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12964 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12965 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12966 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12967 </para>
12968 <para>
12969 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12970 of our tragedy.
12971 </para>
12972 <para>
12973 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12974 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12975 <!-- f11. -->
12976 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12977 2003, available at
12978 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12979 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12980 2003, available at
12981 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12982 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12983 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News, 9
12984 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12985 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12986 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12987 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
12988 available at
12989 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12990 </para></footnote>
12991 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12992 music.<footnote><para>
12993 <!-- f12. -->
12994 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12995 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12996 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12997 </para></footnote>
12998 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12999 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
13000 <!-- f13. -->
13001 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13002 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
13003 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
13004 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13005 </para></footnote>
13006 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
13007 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
13008 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
13009 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
13010 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
13011 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
13012 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
13013 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
13014 kids who use a computer to share content.
13015 </para>
13016 <para>
13017 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13018 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
13019 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
13020 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
13021 24 August 2003, available at
13022 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
13023 </para></footnote>
13024 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
13025 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13026 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13027 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13028 country.<footnote><para>
13029 <!-- f15. --> "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August
13030 2003, available at
13031 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
13032 </para></footnote>
13033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13034 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13035 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13036 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13037 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13038 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13039 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13040 day into the Causbys.
13041 </para>
13042 <para>
13043 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13044 potential is ever to be realized.
13045
13046 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13047
13048 </para>
13049 </chapter>
13050 <chapter id="c-afterword">
13051 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
13052 <para>
13053
13054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13055 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
13056 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
13057 maps what might be done.
13058 </para>
13059 <para>
13060 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13061 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13062 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13063 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13064 </para>
13065 <para>
13066 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13067 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13068 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
13069 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13070 is so important.
13071 </para>
13072 <para>
13073 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13074 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13075 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13076 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13077 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13078 </para>
13079 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13080
13081 <sect1 id="usnow">
13082 <title>US, NOW</title>
13083 <para>
13084 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
13085 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
13086 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13087 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13088 </para>
13089 <para>
13090 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13091 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13092 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
13093 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
13094 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
13095 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
13096 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13097 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13098 </para>
13099 <para>
13100 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13101 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13102 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13103 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13104 the
13105
13106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13107 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13108 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13109 unprotected.
13110 </para>
13111 <para>
13112 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13113 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13114 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13115 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13116 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13117 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
13118 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
13119 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13120 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13121 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
13122 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
13123 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13124 </para>
13125 <para>
13126 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither "all
13127 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"&mdash;
13128 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content
13129 as they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of
13130 freedoms
13131 that we could just take for granted before.
13132 </para>
13133
13134 <sect2 id="examples">
13135 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
13136 <para>
13137 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13138 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13139 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13140 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13141 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13142 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13143 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
13144 assured.
13145 </para>
13146 <para>
13147 What made it assured?
13148 </para>
13149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13150 <para>
13151 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13152 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
13153 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13154 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13155 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13156 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13157 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13158 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13159 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13160 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13161 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13162 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13163 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13164 </para>
13165 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13166 <para>
13167 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13168 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13169 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13170 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13171 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13172 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13173 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13174 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13175 </para>
13176 <para>
13177 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13178 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13179 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13180 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13181 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13182 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13183 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13184 disappears.
13185 </para>
13186 <para>
13187 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13188 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13189 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13190 friction did.<footnote><para>
13191 <!-- f1. -->
13192
13193 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13194 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
13195 Law Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13196
13197 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13198 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13199 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13200 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13201 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13202 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13203 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13204
13205 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13206 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13207 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13208 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13209 </para>
13210 <para>
13211 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13212 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13213 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13214 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13215 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13216 care much about controlling their software.
13217 </para>
13218 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13219 <para>
13220 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13221 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13222 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13223 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13224 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13225 people's work.
13226 </para>
13227 <para>
13228 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13229 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13230 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13231 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13232 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13233 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13234 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13235 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13236 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13237 anything else?
13238 </para>
13239 <para>
13240 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13241 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13242 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13243 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13244 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13245 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13246 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13247 </para>
13248 <para>
13249 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13250 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13252 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13253 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13254 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13255 fundamentally weakened.
13256 </para>
13257 <para>
13258 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13259 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13260 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13261 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13262 </para>
13263 <para>
13264 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13265 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13266 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13267 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13268 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13269 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13270 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13271 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13272 byproduct.
13273 </para>
13274 <para>
13275 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13276 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13277 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13278 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13279 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13280 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13281 </para>
13282 <para>
13283 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13284 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13285 scientific journals are produced.
13286 </para>
13287 <para>
13288 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many
13289 that printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending
13290 them to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13291 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13292 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
13293 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
13294 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
13295 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
13296 service.
13297 Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and
13298 anyone
13299 is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free
13300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13301 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13302 Court opinion through their respective services.
13303 </para>
13304 <para>
13305 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability
13306 to charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13307 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13308 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been
13309 allowed
13310 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13311 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13312 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13313 </para>
13314 <para>
13315 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13316 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13317 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13318 </para>
13319 <para>
13320 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13321 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
13322 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to
13323 the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts
13324 because
13325 the library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand
13326 the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks by reading all
13327 available articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a
13328 function of the institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of
13329 paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it was very hard to control
13330 access to a paper journal.
13331 </para>
13332 <para>
13333 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are
13334 demanding
13335 that libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This
13336 means that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries
13337 begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing
13338 technology and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
13339 </para>
13340 <para>
13341 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13342 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13343 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13344 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13346 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13347 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is then
13348 deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13349 available
13350 for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but the
13351 copyright
13352 for the print journal does not inhibit the right of anyone to
13353 redistribute the work for free.
13354 </para>
13355 <para>
13356 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13357 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and
13358 markets.
13359 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the
13360 traditional
13361 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13362 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13363 presumptively
13364 a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge and science.
13365 </para>
13366
13367 </sect2>
13368 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13369 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13370 <para>
13371 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13372 increasing
13373 control effected through law and technology.
13374 </para>
13375 <para>
13376 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a
13377 nonprofit
13378 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13379 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable copyright
13380 on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for
13381 people to build upon other people's work, by making it simple for
13382 creators
13383 to express the freedom for others to take and build upon their
13384 work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to
13385 bulletproof
13386 licenses, make this possible.
13387 </para>
13388 <para>
13389 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer.
13390 By developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13391 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that
13392 can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13393 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13394 automatically
13395 to identify content that can easily be shared. These three
13396 expressions
13397 together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable description, and
13398 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13399 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13400 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone
13401 who accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the
13402 ideal that the person associated with the license believes in something
13403 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13404 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13405 certain
13406 freedoms are given.
13407 </para>
13408 <para>
13409 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13410 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13411 creator
13412 can choose a license that permits any use, so long as attribution is
13413 given. She can choose a license that permits only noncommercial use.
13414 She can choose a license that permits any use so long as the same
13415 freedoms
13416 are given to other uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so
13417 long as no derivative use is made. Or any use at all within developing
13418 nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full copies are not made. Or
13419 lastly, any educational use.
13420 </para>
13421 <para>
13422 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default
13423 of copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13424 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13425 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13426 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13427 governed
13428 by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13429 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13430 content
13431 available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a
13432 public
13433 domain.
13434 </para>
13435 <para>
13436 This is just one project among many within the Creative
13437 Commons.
13438 And of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization
13439 pursuing such freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative
13440 Commons from many is that we are not interested only in talking
13441 about a public domain or in getting legislators to help build a public
13442 domain. Our aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13443 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13444 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13445 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13446 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13447 </para>
13448 <para>
13449 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is
13450 to complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a
13451 culture
13452 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws
13453 written centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could
13454 have imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a
13455 background
13456 of technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense
13457 against the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with
13458 different
13459 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can
13460 use them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way
13461 effectively
13462 to begin to build those rules.
13463 </para>
13464 <para>
13465 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13466 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example,
13467 is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in the Magic
13468 Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13469 Commons
13470 license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13471 </para>
13472 <para>
13473 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13474 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1) those
13475 who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (2)
13476 those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for
13477 free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download Cory's book
13478 instead
13479 of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2) will download
13480 Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (2)-goods.
13481 If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the strategy of releasing
13482 Cory's book free on-line will probably increase sales of Cory's book.
13483 </para>
13484 <para>
13485 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13486 conclusion.
13487 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13488 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was
13489 a total success.
13490 </para>
13491 <para>
13492 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree
13493 content
13494 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13496 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13497 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13498 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13499 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13500 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13501 well.
13502 </para>
13503 <para>
13504 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13505 proprietary
13506 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13507 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13508 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13509 anything
13510 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others
13511 are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content
13512 from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13513 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13514 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the legal costs of sampling
13515 are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy,
13516 which was born sampling the music of others, has stated that he does
13517 not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs
13518 are so high<footnote><para>
13519 <!-- f2. --> Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real Culture Wars
13520 (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg Hittelman, a Fiat
13521 Lucre
13522 production, available at
13523 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13524 </para></footnote>),
13525 these artists release into the creative environment content
13526 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13527 </para>
13528 <para>
13529 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative
13530 Commons license just because they want to express to others the
13531 importance
13532 of balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system
13533 as it is, you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13534 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13535 appropriate
13536 that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate
13537 description of how most creators view the rights associated with their
13538 content. The Creative Commons license expresses this notion of "Some
13539 Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to say it to others.
13540 </para>
13541 <para>
13542 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13543 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13544 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13545 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13546
13547 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13548 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13549 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13550 </para>
13551 <para>
13552 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13553 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13554 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13555 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13556 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13557 steps are possible.
13558 </para>
13559 <para>
13560 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13561 individuals
13562 and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the
13563 creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13564 complements
13565 it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it
13566 easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and
13567 cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread
13568 more easily.
13569 </para>
13570
13571 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13572 </sect2>
13573 </sect1>
13574 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13575 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13576 <para>
13577 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13578 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13579 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13580 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13581 changes that we need.
13582 </para>
13583 <para>
13584 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13585 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13586 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13587 to our end.
13588 </para>
13589
13590 <sect2 id="formalities">
13591 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13592 <para>
13593 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13594 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13595 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13596 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13597 </para>
13598 <para>
13599 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13600 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13601 requirements
13602 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
13603 </para>
13604 <para>
13605 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13606 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13607 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13608 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13609 </para>
13610 <para>
13611 Why?
13612 </para>
13613 <para>
13614 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13615 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13616 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13617 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13618 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13619 formalities
13620 were getting in the way.
13621 </para>
13622 <para>
13623 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13624 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13625 burdens
13626 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what,
13627 or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13628 creative
13629 work of others. There are no records, there is no system to trace&mdash;
13630 there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the
13631 massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is
13632 a necessary step for any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
13633 lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could
13634 speak.
13635 </para>
13636 <para>
13637 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13638 <!-- f1. --> The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13639 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
13640 by other countries as well.
13641 </para></footnote>&mdash;but it should
13642 not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We should
13643 require
13644 formalities, but we should establish a system that will create the
13645 incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13646 </para>
13647 <para>
13648 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13649 registering
13650 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally,
13651 the first of these three was something the copyright owner did; the
13652 second
13653 two were something the government did. But a revised system of
13654 formalities would banish the government from the process, except for
13655 the sole purpose of approving standards developed by others.
13656 </para>
13657
13658 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13659
13660 <sect3 id="registration">
13661 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13662 <para>
13663 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with
13664 the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
13665 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
13666 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the
13667 burden of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.
13668 And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of government
13669 policymaking,
13670 the office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus,
13671 when people who know something about the process hear this idea
13672 about formalities, their first reaction is panic&mdash;nothing could be worse
13673 than forcing people to deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13674 </para>
13675 <para>
13676 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a
13677 tradition
13678 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13679 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13680 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't
13681 follow that the government must actually administer the role. Instead,
13682 we should be creating incentives for private parties to serve the public,
13683 subject to standards that the government sets.
13684 </para>
13685 <para>
13686 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13687 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13688 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13689 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13690 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13691 performed
13692 by many competing registrars. That competition drives the cost
13693 of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease with which
13694 registration occurs up.
13695 </para>
13696 <para>
13697 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13698 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry,
13699 but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should
13700 establish
13701 a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
13702 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete
13703 with one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for
13704 registering
13705 and renewing copyrights. That competition would
13706 substantially
13707 lower the burden of this formality&mdash;while producing a database
13708 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13709 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13710 </para>
13711
13712 </sect3>
13713 <sect3 id="marking">
13714 <title>MARKING</title>
13715 <para>
13716 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
13717 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13718 punishment
13719 for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to imposing
13720 the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.
13721 Here again, there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be
13722 enforced in this way. And more importantly, there is no reason a
13723 marking
13724 requirement needs to be enforced uniformly across all media.
13725 </para>
13726 <para>
13727 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13728 copyrighted
13729 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also
13730 makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use
13731 the work.
13732 </para>
13733 <para>
13734 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13735 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13736 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13737 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13738 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13739 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13740 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13741 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13742 </para>
13743 <para>
13744 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13745 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13746 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13747 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13748 copyright
13749 owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13750 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13751 <!-- f2. --> There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13752 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13753 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13754 </para></footnote>
13755 The meaning of an unmarked work would
13756 therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
13757 complain,
13758 then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
13759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13760 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13761 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13762 their work.
13763 </para>
13764 <para>
13765 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13766 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13767 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13768 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13769 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13770 </para>
13771 <para>
13772 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13773 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13774 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13775 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13776 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13777 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13778 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13779 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13780 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13781 </para>
13782 <para>
13783 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13784 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13785 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13786 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13787 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13788 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13789 </para>
13790 <para>
13791 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13792 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13793 make things unclear.
13794 </para>
13795 <para>
13796 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13797 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13798 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13799 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13800 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13801 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13802 </para>
13803
13804 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13805 </sect3>
13806 </sect2>
13807 <sect2 id="shortterms">
13808 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13809 <para>
13810 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13811 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13812 natural authors.
13813 </para>
13814 <para>
13815 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13816 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five years.
13817 That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost Eldred v.
13818 Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The Economist
13819 endorsed
13820 a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright term.<footnote><para>
13821 <!-- f3. --> "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15, available
13822 at
13823 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13824 </para></footnote>
13825 Others have
13826 proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13827 </para>
13828 <para>
13829 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13830 copyright's
13831 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four
13832 principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
13833 </para>
13834 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13835 <listitem><para>
13836 <!-- (1) -->
13837 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to
13838 give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very
13839 strong protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim
13840 rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13841 derivative
13842 works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13843 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an
13844 author.
13845 </para></listitem>
13846 <listitem><para>
13847 <!-- (2) -->
13848 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and
13849 protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13850 fuzziness
13851 of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13852 "expression."
13853 That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13854 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus
13855 unprotected.
13856 The value of short terms is that there is little need to
13857 build exceptions into copyright when the term itself is kept
13858 short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13859 complexities
13860 of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13861 navigate.
13862 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13863 </para></listitem>
13864 <listitem><para>
13865 <!-- (3) -->
13866 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed.
13867 Especially
13868 if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13869 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the
13870 protection continued. This need not be an onerous burden,
13871 but there is no reason this monopoly protection has to be
13872 granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13873 veteran
13874 to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
13875 <!-- f4. --> Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13876 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13877 available at
13878 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13879 </para></footnote>
13880 If we make veterans suffer that
13881 burden, I don't see why we couldn't require authors to spend
13882 ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
13883 </para></listitem>
13884 <listitem><para>
13885 <!-- (4) -->
13886 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should
13887 be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term
13888 once given should not be extended. It might have been a
13889 mistake
13890 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year
13891 term. I don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then
13892 the consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
13893 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct that
13894 mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do
13895 today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13896 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who
13897 write now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden
13898 that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
13899 increasing
13900 their reward will not increase their creativity in 1923.
13901 What's not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do
13902 about that now.
13903 </para></listitem>
13904 </orderedlist>
13905 <para>
13906 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13907 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
13908 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13909 </para>
13910 <para>
13911 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13912 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13913 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13914 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13915 </para>
13916
13917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13918
13919 </sect2>
13920 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
13921 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13922 <para>
13923 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13924 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13925 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13926 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13927 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13928 the emergence of that new technology.
13929 </para>
13930 <para>
13931 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
13932 "exclusive
13933 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13934 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that
13935 are sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
13936 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the
13937 right to release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
13938 </para>
13939 <para>
13940 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13941 expanded
13942 the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control
13943 translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13944 <!-- f5. --> Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13945 University Press, 1967), 32.
13946 </para></footnote>
13947 The courts have expanded
13948 it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This expansion has
13949 been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
13950 Benjamin
13951 Kaplan.
13952 </para>
13953 <blockquote>
13954 <para>
13955 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13956 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13957 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13958 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13959 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13960 </para></footnote>
13961 </para>
13962 </blockquote>
13963 <para>
13964 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13965 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13966 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13967 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13968 Consider each limitation in turn.
13969 </para>
13970 <para>
13971 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13972 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13973
13974 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13975 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13976 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13977 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13978 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13979 after the creative work is done.
13980 </para>
13981 <para>
13982 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13983 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13984 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13985 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13986 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13987 perhaps
13988 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer
13989 makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the
13990 creative
13991 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine
13992 pouring
13993 molasses into the machines. That's what this general requirement
13994 of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13995 </para>
13996 <para>
13997 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of
13998 the Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation
13999 for foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
14000 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
14001 negotiation
14002 for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make much
14003 more sense.
14004 </para>
14005 <para>
14006 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14007 protected,
14008 and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14009 protected.
14010 This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague Paul
14011 Goldstein.<footnote><para>
14012 <!-- f7. --> Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14013 Jukebox
14014 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
14015 </para></footnote>
14016 His view is that the law should be written so that expanded
14017 protections follow expanded uses.
14018 </para>
14019 <para>
14020 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the
14021 legal
14022 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14023 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14024 incentives
14025 to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with a
14026 strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14027 </para>
14028 <para>
14029 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14031 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14032 certain
14033 statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free a great
14034 deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory rights
14035 regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14036 </para>
14037 </sect2>
14038
14039 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
14040 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
14041 <para>
14042 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it wouldn't
14043 be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that is, to most
14044 people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other policy issue that
14045 better
14046 teaches the lessons of this book than the battles around the sharing
14047 of music.
14048 </para>
14049 <para>
14050 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14051 Internet's
14052 growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14053 powerfully
14054 than any other single application. It was the Internet's killer
14055 app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was the
14056 application
14057 that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the application
14058 that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill innovation on
14059 the network.
14060 </para>
14061 <para>
14062 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music
14063 in particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14064 performed,
14065 and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14066 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14067 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14068 </para>
14069 <para>
14070 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
14071 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
14072 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
14073 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
14074 </para>
14075 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
14076 <listitem><para>
14077 <!-- A. -->
14078 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14079 for purchasing CDs.
14080 </para></listitem>
14081 <listitem><para>
14082 <!-- B. -->
14083 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14084 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14085 </para></listitem>
14086 <listitem><para>
14087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14088 <!-- C. -->
14089 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get
14090 access
14091 to content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright
14092 or that would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14093 </para></listitem>
14094 <listitem><para>
14095 <!-- D. -->
14096 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get
14097 access
14098 to content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the
14099 copyright owner plainly endorses.
14100 </para></listitem>
14101 </orderedlist>
14102 <para>
14103 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14104 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14105 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14106 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14107 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14108 significantly weakened.
14109 </para>
14110 <para>
14111 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14112 controversial.
14113 For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is
14114 real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is significantly
14115 greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing networks.
14116 </para>
14117 <para>
14118 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14119 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14120 should respond.
14121 </para>
14122 <para>
14123 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is addictive
14124 today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a broad range of
14125 content.
14126 It won't be the easiest way to get access to a broad range of content
14127 in ten years. Today, access to the Internet is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we
14128 in the United States are lucky to have broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and
14129 very rarely do we get service at that speed both up and down. Although
14130 wireless access is growing, most of us still get access across wires. Most
14131 only gain access through a machine with a keyboard. The idea of the
14132 always
14133 on, always connected Internet is mainly just an idea.
14134 </para>
14135 <para>
14136 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14137 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14138 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14140 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14141 question
14142 should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this world?
14143 The question should be, what law will we require when the network
14144 becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is one in
14145 which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net; where
14146 everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the Rockies&mdash;you can
14147 instantaneously be connected to the Internet. Imagine the Internet as
14148 ubiquitous as the best cell-phone service, where with the flip of a
14149 device,
14150 you are connected.
14151 </para>
14152 <para>
14153 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14154 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio, content
14155 that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here, then, is the
14156 critical point: When it is extremely easy to connect to services that give
14157 access to content, it will be easier to connect to services that give you
14158 access to content than it will be to download and store content on the
14159 many devices you will have for playing content. It will be easier, in other
14160 words, to subscribe than it will be to be a database manager, as
14161 everyone
14162 in the download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies
14163 essentially
14164 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if
14165 the services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14166 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over cell
14167 phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14168 paying
14169 for this content even though "free" content is available in the form
14170 of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
14171 <!-- f8. --> See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
14172 3 April 2002, available at
14173 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
14174 </para></footnote>
14175
14176 </para>
14177 <para>
14178 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14179 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14180 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
14181 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14182 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14183 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14184 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14185 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14186 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14187 artists get paid, during
14188
14189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14190 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14191 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14192 </para>
14193 <para>
14194 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14195 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14196 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14197 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14198 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14199 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14200 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14201 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14202 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14203 </para>
14204 <para>
14205 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14206 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14207 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14208 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14209 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14210 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14211 way that returns something to the artist.
14212 </para>
14213 <para>
14214 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14215 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14216 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14217 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14218 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14219 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14220 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14221 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14222 </para>
14223 <para>
14224 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply
14225 deem out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make
14226 copies of the music available for sale, then commercial and
14227 noncommercial
14228 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14229 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would
14230 be incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing
14231 has ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14232 </para>
14233 <para>
14234
14235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14236 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14237 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14238 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14239 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14240 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14241 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14242 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14243 trade.
14244 </para>
14245 <para>
14246 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14247 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14248 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14249 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14250 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14251 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14252 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14253 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14254 </para>
14255 <para>
14256 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14257 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14258 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14259 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14260 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14261 delivering and accessing content.
14262 </para>
14263 <para>
14264 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14265 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14266 </para>
14267 <para>
14268 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14269 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14270 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14271 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14272 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14273 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14274 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14275 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14276 </para>
14277 <para>
14278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14279 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14280 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14281 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14282 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14283 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14284 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14285 </para>
14286 <para>
14287 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14288 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote><para>
14289 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14290 10 October 2000), available at
14291 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14292 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14293 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
14294 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14295 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14296 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14297 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14298 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14299 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14300 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14301 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14302 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14303 available at
14304 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14305 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14306 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14307 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14308 2002, available at
14309 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14310 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14311 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14312 McCullagh,
14313 "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14314 2002, available at
14315 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14316 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14317 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14318 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14319 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14320 debate
14321 by about a decade. See
14322 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14323 </para></footnote>
14324 Fisher suggests a
14325 very clever way around the current impasse of the Internet. Under his
14326 plan, all content capable of digital transmission would (1) be marked
14327 with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to evade
14328 these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once the
14329 content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to
14330 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the
14331 basis
14332 of those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The
14333 compensation
14334 would be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
14335 </para>
14336 <para>
14337 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14338 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14339 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14340 simple:
14341 Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14342 system.
14343 I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of the
14344 proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
14345 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14346 facilitating
14347 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal
14348 after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free
14349 exchange
14350 of content, supported through a taxation system, then it can be
14351 continued. If this form of protection is no longer necessary, then the
14352 system could lapse into the old system of controlling access.
14353 </para>
14354 <para>
14355 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His
14356 aim is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the
14357 system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But
14358 the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes
14359 I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the limits on derivative
14360
14361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14362 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14363 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14364 allowed
14365 to do with the content itself.
14366 </para>
14367 <para>
14368 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14369 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14370 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14371 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14372 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14373 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14374 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14375 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14376 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14377 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14378 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14379 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14380 on-line.
14381 </para>
14382 <para>
14383 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14384 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14385 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14386 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14387 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14388 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14389 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14390 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14391 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14392 finding ways to compete with "free."
14393 </para>
14394 <para>
14395 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14396 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14397 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14398 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14399 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14400 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14401 the law.
14402 </para>
14403 <para>
14404 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14405 </para>
14406 <para>
14407
14408 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14409 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14410 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14411 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14412 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14413 create.
14414 </para>
14415 <para>
14416 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14417 by
14418 </para>
14419 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14420 <listitem><para>
14421 <!-- 1. -->
14422 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14423 </para></listitem>
14424 <listitem><para>
14425 <!-- 2. -->
14426 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14427 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14428 statute;
14429 </para></listitem>
14430 <listitem><para>
14431 <!-- 3. -->
14432 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14433 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14434 </para></listitem>
14435 </orderedlist>
14436 <para>
14437 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a
14438 competitive
14439 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14440 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14441 something then?
14442 </para>
14443 <para>
14444 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14445 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But
14446 the real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract.
14447 The real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14448 technology
14449 that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x, or
14450 (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14451 market
14452 of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14453 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14454 authorized
14455 sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14456 compensation
14457 without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then it
14458 may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty pirates.
14459 </para>
14460 <para>
14461 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14462 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not be
14463 on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14464
14465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14466 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting the
14467 space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14468 </para>
14469 </sect2>
14470
14471 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14472 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14473 <para>
14474 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14475 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14476 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14477 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14478 </para>
14479 <para>
14480 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14481 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it is
14482 my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client. And
14483 in a world where the rich clients have one strong view, the
14484 unwillingness
14485 of the profession to question or counter that one strong view queers
14486 the law.
14487 </para>
14488 <para>
14489 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14490 "radical"
14491 by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14492 advocating
14493 are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate and
14494 significant figures in the history of this branch of the law. Many, for
14495 example,
14496 thought crazy the challenge that we brought to the Copyright
14497 Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the dominant scholar
14498 and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville Nimmer, thought it
14499 obvious.<footnote><para>
14500 <!-- f10. --> Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14501 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14502 </para></footnote>
14503
14504 </para>
14505 <para>
14506 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14507 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14508 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14509 </para>
14510 <para>
14511 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and
14512 benefits.
14513 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the
14514 legal system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction
14515 costs of the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14516 <!-- f11. --> A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is to
14517 be commended for his careful review of data about infringement, leading
14518 him to question his own publicly stated position&mdash;twice. He initially
14519 predicted
14520 that downloading would substantially harm the industry. He then
14521 revised his view in light of the data, and he has since revised his view again.
14522 Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True
14523 Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002),
14524 (reviewing his original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J.
14525 Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper,
14526 June 2003, available at
14527 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14528 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14529 effect
14530 of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he underestimates the
14531 costs of the legal system. See, for example, Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14532 </para></footnote>
14533 They see a system that has been
14534 around for hundreds of years, and they assume it works the way their
14535 elementary school civics class taught them it works.
14536 </para>
14537 <para>
14538 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14539 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't
14540 work for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14541 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal level, at
14542 least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of our legal
14543 system
14544 are so astonishingly high that justice can practically never be done.
14545 </para>
14546 <para>
14547 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14548 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14549 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14550 obscure
14551 strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality: very
14552 little.
14553 The law depended upon the careful articulation and development
14554 of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development of legal
14555 doctrine
14556 depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work costs too much,
14557 except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14558 </para>
14559 <para>
14560 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14561 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14562 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14563 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14564 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14565 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14566 </para>
14567 <para>
14568 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the
14569 law away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is
14570 precisely
14571 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left
14572 to its review.
14573 </para>
14574 <para>
14575 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with
14576 digital technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or
14577 think about the amazing things your community could facilitate with
14578 digital technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change
14579 something.
14580 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold
14581 molasses poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that
14582 requires
14583 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's
14584 Russia.
14585 </para>
14586 <para>
14587 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14588 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14589
14590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14591 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14592 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14593 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14594 </para>
14595 <para>
14596 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14597 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14598 keep your lawyers away.
14599 </para>
14600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14601 </sect2>
14602 </sect1>
14603 </chapter>
14604 <chapter id="c-notes">
14605 <title>NOTES</title>
14606 <para>
14607 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14608 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14609 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14610 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14611 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14612 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14613 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14614 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14615 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14616 the material.
14617 </para>
14618 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14619
14620 </chapter>
14621 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14622 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14623 <para>
14624 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14625 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14626 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14627 to him that this book is dedicated.
14628 </para>
14629 <para>
14630 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14631 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14632 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14633 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14634 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14635 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14636 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14637 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14638 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14639 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14640 critical eye on much of this.
14641 </para>
14642 <para>
14643 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14644 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14645 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14646 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14648 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14649 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14650 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14651 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14652 </para>
14653 <para>
14654 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14655 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14656 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14657 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14658 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14659 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14660 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14661 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14662 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14663 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14664 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14665 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14666 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14667 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14668 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14669 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14670 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14671 a bunch of great replies.)
14672 </para>
14673 <para>
14674 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14675 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14676 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14677 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14678 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14679 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14680 throughout this book.
14681 </para>
14682 <para>
14683 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14684 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14685 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14686 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14687 </para>
14688 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14689
14690 </chapter>
14691 </book>