Wrap long lines.

diff --git a/freeculture.xml b/freeculture.xml
index d8b33c80f8d424c7c19b3dad572de5e62eca0569..3875f5308b3df1593e5cedceb3fbe3c2fb4050c9 100644 (file)
--- a/freeculture.xml
+++ b/freeculture.xml
@@ -13568,51 +13568,47 @@ the sole purpose of approving standards developed by others.
 <sect3 id="registration">
 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
 <para>
 <sect3 id="registration">
 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
 <para>

-Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with
-the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
-registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
-agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the
-burden of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.
-And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of government 
-               policymaking,
-the office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus,
-when people who know something about the process hear this idea
-about formalities, their first reaction is panic&mdash;nothing could be worse
-than forcing people to deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
-</para>
-<para>
-Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a 
-               tradition
+Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
+with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
+filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
+government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
+minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
+minimize the fee.  And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
+government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
+underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
+hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
+panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
+the mess that is the Copyright Office.
+</para>
+<para>
+Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition

 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.

-Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't
-follow that the government must actually administer the role. Instead,
-we should be creating incentives for private parties to serve the public,
-subject to standards that the government sets.
+Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
+doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
+role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
+serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.

 </para>
 <para>
 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
 </para>
 <para>
 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),

-there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however, 
-               performed
-by many competing registrars. That competition drives the cost
-of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease with which
-registration occurs up.
+there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
+performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
+cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
+with which registration occurs up.

 </para>
 <para>
 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
 </para>
 <para>
 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of

-copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry,
-but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should 
-               establish
-a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
-registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete
-with one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for 
-               registering
-and renewing copyrights. That competition would 
-               substantially
-lower the burden of this formality&mdash;while producing a database
+copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
+registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
+should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
+should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
+would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
+simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
+competition would substantially lower the burden of this
+formality&mdash;while producing a database

 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
 </para>
 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
 </para>


@@ -13621,22 +13617,20 @@ of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
 <sect3 id="marking">
 <title>MARKING</title>
 <para>
 <sect3 id="marking">
 <title>MARKING</title>
 <para>

-It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
-work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh 
-               punishment
-for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to imposing
-the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.
-Here again, there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be
-enforced in this way. And more importantly, there is no reason a 
-               marking
-requirement needs to be enforced uniformly across all media.
+It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
+creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
+punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
+imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
+creative rights.  Here again, there is no reason that a marking
+requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
+there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
+uniformly across all media.

 </para>
 <para>
 </para>
 <para>

-The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is 
-               copyrighted
-and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also
-makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use
-the work.
+The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
+copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
+also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
+use the work.

 </para>
 <para>
 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
 </para>
 <para>
 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was


@@ -13652,18 +13646,17 @@ loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could

-instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the 
-               copyright
-owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
+instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
+copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he

 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>

-<!-- f2. --> There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
+<!-- f2. -->
+There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not

 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
 </para></footnote>
 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
 </para></footnote>

- The meaning of an unmarked work would
-therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does 
-               complain,
-then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
+The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
+complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
+stop using the work in any new

 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark


@@ -13721,94 +13714,79 @@ natural authors.
 </para>
 <para>
 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
 </para>
 <para>
 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted

-in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five years.
-That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost Eldred v.
-Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The Economist 
-               endorsed
-a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright term.<footnote><para>
-<!-- f3. --> "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15, available
-at 
+in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
+years.  That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
+Eldred v.  Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
+Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
+term.<footnote><para>
+<!-- f3. -->
+"A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
+available at

 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
 </para></footnote>
 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
 </para></footnote>

- Others have
-proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
+Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.

 </para>
 <para>
 </para>
 <para>

-I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in 
-               copyright's
-term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four
-principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
+I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
+copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
+are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
+terms.

 </para>
 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
 <listitem><para>
 <!-- (1) -->
 </para>
 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
 <listitem><para>
 <!-- (1) -->

-Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to
-give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very
-strong protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim
-rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not 
-               derivative
-works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
-work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an
-author.
-</para></listitem>
+Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
+incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
+protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
+publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
+extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
+regulations when it no longer benefits an author.  </para></listitem>

 <listitem><para>
 <!-- (2) -->
 <listitem><para>
 <!-- (2) -->

-Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and
-protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the 
-               fuzziness
-of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and 
-               "expression."
-That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
-framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus 
-               unprotected.
-The value of short terms is that there is little need to
-build exceptions into copyright when the term itself is kept
-short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the 
-               complexities
-of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
+Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
+content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
+and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression."  That kind of
+law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
+mind: protected versus unprotected.  The value of short terms is that
+there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
+itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
+complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to

 navigate.
 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
 </para></listitem>
 <listitem><para>
 <!-- (3) -->
 navigate.
 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
 </para></listitem>
 <listitem><para>
 <!-- (3) -->

-Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. 
-               Especially
-if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
-should be required to signal periodically that he wants the
-protection continued. This need not be an onerous burden,
-but there is no reason this monopoly protection has to be
-granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a 
-               veteran
-to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
-<!-- f4. --> Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
+Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed.  Especially if the
+maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
+periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
+an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
+to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
+veteran to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
+<!-- f4. -->
+Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation

 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
 available at 
 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
 </para></footnote>
 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
 available at 
 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
 </para></footnote>

- If we make veterans suffer that
-burden, I don't see why we couldn't require authors to spend
-ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
+If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
+require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
+single form.

 </para></listitem>
 <listitem><para>
 <!-- (4) -->
 </para></listitem>
 <listitem><para>
 <!-- (4) -->

-Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should
-be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term
-once given should not be extended. It might have been a 
-               mistake
-in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year
-term. I don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then
-the consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
-1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct that
-mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do
-today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
-in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who
-write now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden
-that smothers many works that are today invisible). But 
-               increasing
-their reward will not increase their creativity in 1923.
-What's not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do
-about that now.
-</para></listitem>
+Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
+clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
+not be extended. It might have been a mistake in 1923 for the law to
+offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
+possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
+fewer authors to create in 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
+can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
+what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
+in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
+now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
+many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
+not increase their creativity in 1923.  What's not done is not done,
+and there's nothing we can do about that now.  </para></listitem>

 </orderedlist>
 <para>
 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
 </orderedlist>
 <para>
 These changes together should produce an average copyright term


@@ -13836,27 +13814,25 @@ challenge.  It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
 the emergence of that new technology.
 </para>
 <para>
 the emergence of that new technology.
 </para>
 <para>

-Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors 
-               "exclusive
+Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive

 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive

-right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that
-are sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
-and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the
-right to release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
+right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
+others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
+work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
+have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
+though that movie is not "my writing."

 </para>
 <para>
 </para>
 <para>

-Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it 
-               expanded
-the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control
-translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
-<!-- f5. --> Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
+Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
+expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
+control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
+<!-- f5. -->
+Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia

 University Press, 1967), 32.
 </para></footnote>
 University Press, 1967), 32.
 </para></footnote>

- The courts have expanded
-it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This expansion has
-been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge 
-               Benjamin
-Kaplan.
+The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
+ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
+greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.

 </para>
 <blockquote>
 <para>
 </para>
 <blockquote>
 <para>