Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001).
</para></footnote>
- Lumbering
-giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the field is
-only open to the giants, there will be far too little sprinting.
+Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
+field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
+sprinting.
</para>
<para>
I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
<!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
-wrecked by drugs—though the drugs that wrecked my family were all
-quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
- collateral
-damage from it is so great as to make waging the war insane.
-When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice system, the
-desperation of generations of kids whose only real economic
- opportunities
-are as drug warriors, the queering of constitutional protections
- because
-of the constant surveillance this war requires, and, most profoundly,
-the total destruction of the legal systems of many South American
- nations
-because of the power of the local drug cartels, I find it impossible
-to believe that the marginal benefit in reduced drug consumption by
-Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
-</para>
-<para>
-You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and
-it is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
- depend
-fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
+wrecked by drugs—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
+all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
+collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
+insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
+system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
+economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
+constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
+war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
+systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
+local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
+benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
+outweigh these costs.
+</para>
+<para>
+You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
+is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
+depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
these issues.
</para>
<para>
-Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
-launched a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The
- campaign
-produced scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal
-drugs. In one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar,
-discussing the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the
-collateral damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of
-drug legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
-against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes his
-mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on
-the pro-legalization campaign.
+Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
+a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
+scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
+one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
+the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
+damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
+legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
+against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
+his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
+attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
</para>
<para>
Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
<para>
But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
-demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the
-drug war. Can you do it?
+demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
+war. Can you do it?
</para>
<para>
Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
<!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
-the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
- message
-will be heard then?
+the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
+message will be heard then?
</para>
<para>
-No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of
- avoiding
+No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
"controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
-uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
-This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First
- Amendment,
-but the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to
-choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media
-will refuse one side of a crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.
-
And the courts will defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
+uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
+controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
+the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
+the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
+commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
+opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
+rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
<!-- f34 -->
-The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads that
-directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
-Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
- policy."
-The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
-them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
-accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and
- returned
-the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine, 15 October 2003.
-These restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for
- example,
-Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with
-Rejection from TV Networks," New York Times, 13 March 2003, C4.
- Outside
-of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC or the
-courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general overview,
-see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
- Advertising
-on Television and Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988):
-449–79, and for a more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the
-courts, see Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d
-872 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
-the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
-transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel buses. Phillip
-Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni Rejects
-Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
-<ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground was
-that the criticism was "too controversial."
-</para></footnote>
-</para>
-<para>
-I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well—if we lived in
-a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media
-throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control
- access
-to the media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which
-political positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in
-an obvious and important way, concentration matters. You might like
-the positions the handful of companies selects. But you should not like
-a world in which a mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us
-get to know about.
-
+The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
+that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
+the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
+[their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
+without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
+agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
+not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
+Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
+limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
+an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
+York Times, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
+there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
+even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
+Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
+Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 449–79, and for a
+more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
+Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d 872
+(D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
+the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
+Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
+diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
+After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
+<ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
+was that the criticism was "too controversial."
+/para></footnote>
+</para>
+<para>
+I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well—if we lived
+in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
+media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
+control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
+decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
+channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
+matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
+selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
+decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="together">
<title>Together</title>
<para>
-There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
- copyright
-warriors that the government should "protect my property." In
-the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No
-sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
+There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
+copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
+In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
+harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
</para>
<para>
But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed—
-when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology
-and markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
- cultivate
-our culture is dramatically different—the claim begins to seem
+when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
+markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
+cultivate our culture is dramatically different—the claim begins
+to seem
<!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
-less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
- supplement
-the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated markets
-to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing the
- massively
-expanded "property" rights granted by copyright fundamentally
-changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and build upon our
-past, then we have to ask whether this property should be redefined.
+less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
+supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
+markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
+the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
+fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
+build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
+be redefined.
</para>
<para>
Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
our culture today.
</para>
<para>
-But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
- notwithstanding.
-And these massive shifts in the effective power of copyright
-regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content industry and
-resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly enable control
-over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether another
- adjustment
-is called for. Not an adjustment that increases copyright's
-power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
- adjustment
-to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
-regulation—a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
+But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
+notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
+copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
+industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
+enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
+whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
+increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
+term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
+traditionally defined copyright's regulation—a weakening of that
+regulation, to strengthen creativity.
</para>
<para>
-Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
- constant
-commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
+Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
+constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
-have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
- copyright
-holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
- technology
-suggest that we may well need similar changes in the future. And
-these changes have to be reductions in the scope of copyright, in
- response
-to the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the
-market enable.
+have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
+copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
+technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
+future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
+copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
+technology and the market enable.
</para>
<para>
For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
<!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
- changing
-technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
-Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the
- development
-of our culture than now.
-</para>
-<para>
-Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
-perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when only
-publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much more
-diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for even
-then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers were
- independent
-of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a wide
-range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
-remotely as long. This form of regulation—a tiny regulation of a tiny
-part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding—is now a
- massive
-regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
-the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into
-the most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
-known.<footnote><para>
+changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
+Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
+the development of our culture than now.
+</para>
+<para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
+perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
+only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
+more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
+even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
+were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
+wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
+that was remotely as long. This form of regulation—a tiny
+regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
+founding—is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
+process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
+historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
+culture that our free society has known.<footnote><para>
<!-- f35 -->
Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159–60.
</para>
<para>
At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
-noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
- distinguished
-between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
+noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
+distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
-that copyright law has undergone.
-In 1790, the law looked like this:
+that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
</para>
<table id="t2">
</table>
<para>
-Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law—if
- published,
-which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
+Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law—if
+published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
transformation were still essentially free.
</para>
<para>
-In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and
- after
+In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
-technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
- expanded.
-Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more
- common,
+technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
+expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
we could say the law began to look like this:
</para>
projects / text-free-culture-lessig.git / commitdiff