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19 <book id=
"index" lang=
"en">
21 <title>Free Culture
</title>
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
25 <subtitle>Version
2004-
02-
10</subtitle>
29 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
52 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz
25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "
50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
78 <itemizedlist mark=
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79 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url=
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&N
</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin
</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
89 <sbr/>The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
91 <sbr/>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
103 <sbr/>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
104 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
105 LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
106 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
108 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
109 <sbr/>LAWRENCE LESSIG
112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
115 <sbr/>a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
117 <sbr/>Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig,
118 <sbr/>All rights reserved
119 <sbr/>Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
120 The New York Times, January
16,
2003. Copyright
© 2003 by The New York Times Co.
121 Reprinted with permission.
122 <sbr/>Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page
159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
123 <sbr/>All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
124 <sbr/>Diagram on page
164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
125 <sbr/>Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
126 <sbr/>Lessig, Lawrence.
127 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
128 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
130 <sbr/>Includes index.
131 <sbr/>ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
132 <sbr/>1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
133 <sbr/>3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
135 <sbr/>343.7309'
9—dc22
136 <sbr/>This book is printed on acid-free paper.
137 <sbr/>Printed in the United States of America
138 <sbr/>1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
139 <sbr/>Designed by Marysarah Quinn
143 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
144 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
145 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
146 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
147 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
148 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
149 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
150 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
151 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
152 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
153 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
158 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
162 <para>&translationblock;</para>
164 <figure id=
"CreativeCommons">
165 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</title>
166 <graphic fileref=
"images/cc.png"></graphic>
172 <title>List of figures
</title>
179 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
180 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
181 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
182 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
187 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
191 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
192 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
193 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
194 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
195 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
196 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
200 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
201 2 Architecture and Law: Force
202 2 Market: Concentration
205 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
206 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
207 2 Constraining Creators
208 2 Constraining Innovators
209 2 Corrupting Citizens
211 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
212 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
216 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
217 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
219 2 1. More Formalities
220 3 Registration and Renewal
223 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
224 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
225 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
234 <chapter id=
"c-preface">
235 <title>PREFACE
</title>
237 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
238 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
239 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
243 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
244 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
245 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
246 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
247 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times,
30 January
2000.
252 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
254 or "code," functioned as a kind of law
—and his review suggested
255 the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we could always
256 "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a switch and be back
257 home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and any troubles
258 that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
261 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
262 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
263 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
265 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
266 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
267 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
270 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
271 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
272 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
273 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
276 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
277 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"
—not
278 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
279 freesoftware movement
<footnote>
281 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies
57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
282 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
283 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
284 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
285 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
286 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
287 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
288 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
289 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
290 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"
—a culture in
291 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
292 or of creators from the past.
295 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
296 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
297 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
298 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
299 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
300 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
301 culture deem fundamental.
304 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
305 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
306 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
307 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
308 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
309 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
310 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
311 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
316 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
317 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
318 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
319 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
320 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
321 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times,
22 May
2003.
326 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
327 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
328 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
329 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
330 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
331 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
332 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
333 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
334 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
335 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
336 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
337 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
338 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
339 that this work is "merely" derivative.
342 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
343 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this book
344 than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been its own.
345 Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of values. Like
346 Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And like Stallman,
347 I believe those are values of our past that will need to be defended in
348 our future. A free culture has been our past, but it will only be our
350 if we change the path we are on right now.
352 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
353 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
354 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
355 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
356 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
357 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
361 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
363 anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is filled
364 with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract that get
365 enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its
367 becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism
368 in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear about our
370 today. It is against that extremism that this book is written.
374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
377 <chapter id=
"c-introduction">
378 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
380 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
381 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
382 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
383 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
384 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
385 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
388 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
389 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
390 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
391 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."
<footnote><para>
392 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries
3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
393 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
396 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
397 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
398 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
401 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
402 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
403 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
404 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
405 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
406 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
407 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
410 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
411 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
412 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
413 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
414 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
415 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
416 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
417 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
418 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
421 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
422 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
423 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
424 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
425 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
426 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
427 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
428 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
432 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
433 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
434 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
435 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
436 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
437 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
438 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
439 the public has a just claim.
<footnote><para>
440 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find that
441 there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land effectively
443 the value of the Causbys' land. This example was suggested to me
444 by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty:
445 Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship," Stanford Law
447 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul Goldstein, Real Property
449 N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
1112–13.
454 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
457 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
458 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
459 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
460 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
461 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
462 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
463 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
464 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
465 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
468 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
469 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
470 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
471 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
472 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
473 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
474 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
475 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
476 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
477 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
478 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
479 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
480 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
481 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else
—the power of
482 "common sense"
—would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
483 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
486 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
487 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
488 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
489 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
490 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
491 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
492 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
493 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
494 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
495 understanding of radio.
496 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
499 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
500 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
501 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
502 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
503 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
504 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
505 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
506 much less transmitter power and static.
509 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting
510 of the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in
511 New York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
512 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
514 miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and then with a
515 clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an electrical
517 it produced the sound of an announcer's voice: "This is amateur
518 station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on frequency
520 at two and a half meters."
523 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
527 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
528 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was
529 crumpled and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling
530 forest fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a
532 solo and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was
533 projected with a live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
534 "music box."
<footnote><para>
535 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
536 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
541 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a
542 vastly superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention,
544 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the
545 then dominant AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio
546 stations across the United States, but the stations in large cities were all
547 owned by a handful of networks.
548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
551 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
552 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
553 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
554 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
555 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
559 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
560 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a revolution
—
561 start up a whole damn new industry to compete with RCA.
<footnote><para>
562 See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," First
564 Church of America, at www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
566 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
571 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
572 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
573 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
578 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
579 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
580 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
581 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
582 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
583 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
588 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
589 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
590 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
591 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
592 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
593 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
594 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
595 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
596 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
597 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
598 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
603 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
604 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
605 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
606 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
611 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
613 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
614 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
615 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
616 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
617 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
618 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
619 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
623 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
624 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
625 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
626 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
627 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
628 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
629 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
630 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
631 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
632 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
635 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
636 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
637 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
638 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
639 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
640 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
641 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
642 course always public spirited; the reality is something
643 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
644 to themselves, would crumble in
645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
646 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
647 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
649 of technological change.
652 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good
653 date upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the
655 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
656 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had
658 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years before.
<footnote><para>
659 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look
660 at Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
661 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
662 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
664 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
668 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
669 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
670 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
671 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
672 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
673 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
674 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
675 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
676 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
679 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
681 itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that the
682 Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
683 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as old as
684 the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change, would reject
685 it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet has introduced.
688 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
689 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
691 of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our culture
692 that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By "noncommercial
693 culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around parks or on
694 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
695 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
696 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader,"
697 or Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
700 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
701 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
702 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the peace,
703 then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly concerned
704 with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it left this
706 "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary individuals shared and
707 transformed their culture
—telling stories, reenacting scenes from plays
708 or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were
709 left alone by the law.
712 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
713 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
714 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
715 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
716 marketplace.
<footnote><para>
717 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
718 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
719 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
720 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
721 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
722 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
723 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
727 course, an important part of creativity and culture, and it has become
728 an increasingly important part in America. But in no sense was it
730 within our tradition. It was instead just one part, a controlled
731 part, balanced with the free.
734 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
735 been erased.
<footnote><para>
736 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
739 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and,
740 pushed by big media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in
741 our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
742 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
744 to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
746 that it never reached before. The technology that preserved the
747 balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were free and
748 uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has been undone.
749 The consequence is that we are less and less a free culture, more and
750 more a permission culture.
752 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
754 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
756 And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the
757 protectionism that justifies the changes that I will describe below is not
758 the limited and balanced sort that has defined the law in the past. This
759 is not a protectionism to protect artists. It is instead a protectionism
760 to protect certain forms of business. Corporations threatened by the
761 potential of the Internet to change the way both commercial and
762 noncommercial culture are made and shared have united to induce
763 lawmakers to use the law to protect them. It is the story of RCA and
764 Armstrong; it is the dream of the Causbys.
767 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
768 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that
769 reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
771 for making and cultivating culture generally, and that change
772 in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet is thus to
773 the industries that built and distributed content in the twentieth
775 what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was to the
776 railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of the end,
777 or at least a substantial transformation. Digital technologies, tied to the
778 Internet, could produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market
779 for building and cultivating culture; that market could include a much
780 wider and more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce
781 and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending
782 upon a few important factors, those creators could earn more on average
783 from this system than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our
784 day don't use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
787 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
789 in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the early
790 twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using their
791 power to get the law to protect them against this new, more efficient,
792 more vibrant technology for building culture. They are succeeding in
793 their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet remakes them.
796 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
797 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
798 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
799 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether "piracy" will
800 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
801 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
803 Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
804 calls his "own terrorist war"
<footnote><para>
805 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
806 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
807 Times,
17 January
2002.
808 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
809 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
810 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
814 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
815 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
817 in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls "creative
819 I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the law, properly tuned,
820 should punish "piracy," whether on or off the Internet.
823 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
824 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
825 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
826 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
829 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
830 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
831 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
832 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
833 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote><para>
834 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
835 Journal
106 (
1996):
283.
839 balanced, protected creators against private control. Our tradition
840 was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of patrons. It instead carved out
841 a wide berth within which creators could cultivate and extend our culture.
844 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
845 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the effective
846 regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or critique the
848 around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like, for permission first.
849 Permission is, of course, often granted
—but it is not often granted to
850 the critical or the independent. We have built a kind of cultural
852 those within the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it
853 is nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
855 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26 -->
857 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
859 of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or
860 otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for
861 neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a
863 tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
866 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
868 by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its
869 code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace.
870 There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet
872 to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and
873 culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to
875 the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
878 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property."
879 The property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
880 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding this
881 "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
883 of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
884 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners of
885 "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys, treat
886 these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object when
887 a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to us as it
888 was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are "trespassing"
889 upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to us as it was to
890 them that the law should intervene to stop this trespass.
893 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
894 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
896 sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky Causbys,
897 common sense is on the side of the property owners in this war. Unlike
898 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
899 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
903 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
905 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
906 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
907 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
908 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
909 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
910 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
914 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
915 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
917 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
922 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
923 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
926 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
927 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
928 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
929 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
930 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
933 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
934 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
935 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
937 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
941 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe
942 it was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
943 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt against
944 the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual property."
945 What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a sheriff
947 an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of this silliness will
948 be much more profound.
949 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
952 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
953 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
957 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
958 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
960 French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird sort we
961 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
962 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
963 can be more fully understood.
966 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
967 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
969 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
970 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
971 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
972 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
974 by the changes to use their power to change the law
—and more
975 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
976 who we have always been.
979 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
980 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
981 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
982 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
983 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
984 to which most of us remain oblivious.
987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
988 <chapter id=
"c-piracy">
989 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
993 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
994 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
995 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
997 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
998 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1002 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1003 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1004 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1006 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1011 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1012 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1014 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1015 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1016 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1018 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1022 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1023 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1024 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1026 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1027 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1030 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1032 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1033 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1035 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1036 piercing
—our kids are becoming thieves!
1039 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1040 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1041 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1042 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1045 The idea goes something like this:
1049 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1050 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1051 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1052 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1053 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1058 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1059 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1060 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1062 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1063 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review
65 (
1990):
397.
1065 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1066 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1067 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1068 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1070 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1071 Up," Wall Street Journal,
21 August
1996, available at
1072 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1073 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1074 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe,
24 November
2002.
1076 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1077 "right"
—even against the Girl Scouts.
1079 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1081 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1082 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1083 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1084 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1085 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1087 It has never taken hold within our law.
1090 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1091 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1092 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1093 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1094 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1097 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1098 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1099 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1100 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1101 copyright law today regulates both.
1104 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1105 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1106 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1107 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1108 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1109 more expense of doing business.
1112 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1113 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1114 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1115 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1116 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1117 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1118 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1119 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1120 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1121 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1122 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1123 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1124 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1125 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1126 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1127 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1128 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."
<footnote><para>
1130 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books,
2002),
1131 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1132 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1133 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1134 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1135 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1136 enabled are much more tenuous.
1138 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1139 this creative class.
1142 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1143 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1144 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1148 <sect1 id=
"creators">
1149 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1151 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1152 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1153 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1154 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1155 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1158 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1159 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1160 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1161 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1162 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1163 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1167 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1168 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1169 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1170 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1171 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1174 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1175 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1176 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1177 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1178 synchronization was pretty close.
1181 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1183 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1184 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1185 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1186 wonderful! And it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1188 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1190 (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1195 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1196 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1197 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1200 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1201 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1202 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1203 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1204 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1205 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1206 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1209 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also
1210 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1211 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1212 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1215 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of
1216 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1217 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1218 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1219 The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular and among the best of its
1223 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1225 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1227 cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1229 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1230 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1231 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1232 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1233 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No.
1"
1234 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1235 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1236 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1238 and both are built upon a
1240 song as a source. It is not just from the invention of synchronized
1241 sound in The Jazz Singer that we get Steamboat Willie. It is also from
1242 Buster Keaton's invention of Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the
1243 song "Steamboat Bill," that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from
1244 Steamboat Willie, Mickey Mouse.
1247 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1248 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1249 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1251 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1252 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1253 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1255 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1256 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1257 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1258 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1259 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1260 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1261 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1262 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1266 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1267 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1268 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1269 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1270 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1271 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1272 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1275 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1276 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1277 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1278 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1279 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1280 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1281 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (
1937),
1282 Fantasia (
1940), Pinocchio (
1940), Dumbo (
1941), Bambi (
1942), Song of
1283 the South (
1946), Cinderella (
1950), Alice in Wonderland (
1951), Robin
1284 Hood (
1952), Peter Pan (
1953), Lady and the Tramp
1285 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1286 (
1955), Mulan (
1998), Sleeping Beauty (
1959),
101 Dalmatians (
1961),
1287 The Sword in the Stone (
1963), and The Jungle Book (
1967)
—not to
1288 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1289 Treasure Planet (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1290 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1291 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1292 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1295 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1296 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1297 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1298 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1299 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1300 creativity"
—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1301 culture around us and makes it something different.
1303 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1304 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1305 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1306 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1307 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1309 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1310 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1312 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1313 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1314 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1316 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1317 Web site associated with this book, available at
1318 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1320 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1321 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1322 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1323 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1326 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1327 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1328 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1329 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1330 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1331 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1332 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1335 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1336 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1337 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1338 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1340 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1341 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1342 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1343 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1344 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1345 content from before the Great Depression.
1348 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1349 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1350 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1354 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1355 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1356 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1357 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1358 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1359 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1360 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1363 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1364 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1365 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1366 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1367 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1368 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1369 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1370 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1371 interestingly different way.
1374 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1375 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1376 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1379 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1380 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1381 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1382 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1383 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1384 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1385 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1386 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1387 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1388 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1389 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1390 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1393 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1394 huge. More than
33,
000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1395 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1396 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1397 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1398 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1399 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1400 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1401 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1404 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1405 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1406 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1407 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1408 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1409 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1410 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1411 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1412 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1413 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1414 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1415 original copyright owner's permission.
1418 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1419 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1420 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1421 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1422 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1425 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1426 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1427 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1429 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1430 York: Perennial,
2000).
1434 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1435 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1436 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1437 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1438 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1439 which are fifty years old."
1442 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1443 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1444 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1445 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1446 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1447 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1448 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1450 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1451 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1452 Review
55 (
2002):
155,
182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1453 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1454 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1455 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1456 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1457 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1461 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1462 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1463 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1464 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1465 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1466 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1467 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1468 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1472 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1473 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1474 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1475 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1476 to prosecute cases like this."
1479 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1480 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1481 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1482 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1483 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1484 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1485 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1486 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1487 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1488 their clients or hurt them?
1489 Let's pause for a moment.
1492 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1493 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1494 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1497 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1498 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1499 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1500 "intellectual property."
<footnote><para>
1502 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1504 Copyrights and Copywrongs,
11 (New York: New York
1506 Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1507 Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately describes a set of
1508 "property" rights
—copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret
—but the
1509 nature of those rights is very different.
1511 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1513 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1514 intellectual property.
1517 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1518 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1519 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1520 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1521 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1522 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1523 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1524 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1525 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1526 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1527 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1528 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1532 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1533 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1534 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1536 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1537 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1541 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1542 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1543 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1544 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1545 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1546 form, whether large or small.
1549 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1550 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1551 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1552 particular find it hard to say why.
1555 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1556 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1557 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1558 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1559 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1560 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1561 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1562 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1563 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1564 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1565 movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s; two volcano disaster
1569 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1570 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1571 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1572 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1573 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1574 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1575 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1576 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1577 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1580 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1581 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1582 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1583 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1584 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1585 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1586 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1587 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1588 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1591 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1592 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1593 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1596 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1598 <sect1 id=
"mere-copyists">
1599 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
</title>
1601 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1602 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1603 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1604 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1605 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1606 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1607 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1610 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1611 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1612 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1613 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1614 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1615 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1616 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1617 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1621 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1622 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1624 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1625 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1626 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1627 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1628 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1629 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1630 population of photographers.
1633 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1634 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1635 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1636 do the rest."
<footnote><para>
1638 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1639 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1643 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1644 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1645 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1646 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1647 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1648 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1649 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1650 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1651 chemicals.
<footnote><para>
1653 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1659 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1660 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1661 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1662 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1663 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1664 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1665 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1666 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1667 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1668 percent.
<footnote><para>
1671 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1672 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1674 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1680 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1681 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1682 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1683 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1684 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1685 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1686 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1687 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1688 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1689 interpretation or bias."
<footnote><para>
1695 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1696 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1697 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1698 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1699 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1700 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1701 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1702 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1703 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1704 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1708 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1709 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1710 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1711 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1712 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1713 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1714 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1715 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1717 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co.,
50 S.E.
1721 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1722 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1723 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1724 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1725 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1727 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1728 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1729 that they thought valuable.
1732 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1733 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1734 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1735 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1736 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote><para>
1738 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1740 Law Review
4 (
1890):
193.
1741 </para></footnote>) It may be
1742 that this means that the photographer gets something for nothing. Just
1743 as Disney could take inspiration from Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the
1745 Grimm, the photographer should be free to capture an image
1747 compensating the source.
1750 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1751 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no permission
1752 would be required before an image could be captured and shared with
1753 others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the default.
1754 (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous people:
1756 photographers who snap pictures of famous people for
1758 purposes have more restrictions than the rest of us. But in the
1759 ordinary case, the image can be captured without clearing the rights to
1760 do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1762 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1763 Problems
19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1765 48 (
1960)
398–407; White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,
971 F.
1766 2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951 (
1993).
1770 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1771 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1772 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1773 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1774 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1775 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1776 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1777 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1778 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1779 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1780 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1781 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1782 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1787 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1788 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1789 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1790 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1791 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1792 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1793 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1794 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1795 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1796 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1797 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1798 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1799 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1800 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1801 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1802 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1803 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1804 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1805 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1806 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1807 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1808 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1812 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1813 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1814 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1815 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1816 professional quality for $
595."
<footnote><para>
1818 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1820 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1821 February
2002, available at
1822 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1824 These buses are filled with technology that
1825 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1826 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1827 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1828 teachers call "media literacy."
1831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1832 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1833 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1834 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1835 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1836 the way people access it."
1839 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1840 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1841 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1845 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1846 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1847 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
1849 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1850 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1851 Study," Denver Post,
25 May
1997, B6.
1853 it is increasingly important to understand the
1854 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1855 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1856 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1858 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1861 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1862 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1863 written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult it is to
1865 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1866 understandable
—few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1867 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1868 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1869 emotion or builds suspense.
1872 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1873 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1874 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1875 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1876 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1877 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1880 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just
1881 film, as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of
1883 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1885 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1886 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1887 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1888 texture."
<footnote><para>
1890 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
1893 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1894 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1895 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1896 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1897 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1898 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1899 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1900 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
1902 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4
1903 November
2000, available at
1904 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>; "Timeline,"
22 November
2000,
1906 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
1909 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
1911 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1913 "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1914 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1915 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1916 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1919 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text to
1920 include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better film
1922 The aim is not to improve the profession of filmmaking at all.
1923 Instead, as Daley explained,
1927 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1928 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1929 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1930 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1935 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1936 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1940 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1941 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1943 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1944 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1946 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1948 language for what they need to create or express."
<footnote><para>
1950 Interview with Daley and Barish.
1951 </para></footnote> It is to enable
1952 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."
<footnote><para>
1958 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some
1959 than to others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who
1961 in written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
1963 for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe one
1964 particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high school.
1965 The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles school. In all
1966 the traditional measures of success, this school was a failure. But Daley
1967 and Barish ran a program that gave kids an opportunity to use film
1968 to express meaning about something the students know something
1969 about
—gun violence.
1972 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
1973 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
1974 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
1975 away. The "kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,"
1976 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
1977 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
1980 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively
1982 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
1983 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
1984 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
1985 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool and
1986 empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about it,"
1987 Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating expression
—far more
1988 successfully and powerfully than could have been created using only
1989 text. "If you had said to these students, `you have to do it in text,' they
1990 would've just thrown their hands up and gone and done something
1991 else," Barish described, in part, no doubt, because expressing
1993 in text is not something these students can do well. Yet neither
1994 is text a form in which these ideas can be expressed well. The power of
1995 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
1999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2000 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2001 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2003 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2005 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2006 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part
—and
2008 not the most powerful part
—of constructing meaning. As Daley
2009 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2013 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2014 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2015 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2016 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2017 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2018 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2019 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2020 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2021 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2022 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2023 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2024 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2025 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2026 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2027 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2028 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2029 about the topic. . . .
2032 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2033 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2034 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2035 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2036 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2039 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2040 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2041 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2043 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2044 had a lot of power with this language."
2048 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2049 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2050 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2051 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2052 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2053 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2054 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2055 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2056 world would be watching.
2059 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2060 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2061 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2062 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2063 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2064 entertainment is tragedy.
2066 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2067 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2069 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2070 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2071 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2072 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2073 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2074 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2075 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2076 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2077 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2078 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2079 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2080 was also the Internet.
2083 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2084 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2085 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2086 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2088 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2089 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2093 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2094 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2095 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2096 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2097 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2098 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2099 spread practically instantaneously.
2102 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2103 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2104 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2105 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2106 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2107 records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2108 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2111 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2112 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2113 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2114 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2115 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2116 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2117 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2118 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2119 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2120 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2121 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2122 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2125 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2126 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2127 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2128 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2129 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2132 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2133 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2136 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2137 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2138 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2139 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2140 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2141 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2142 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2143 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2144 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2145 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2146 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2147 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2148 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2149 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2151 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk.
1, trans.
2152 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2156 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2157 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2158 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2160 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2162 Philosophy
10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2164 And in some towns in
2165 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2166 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2171 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2173 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2174 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2176 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2177 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2178 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2180 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2181 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2182 </para></footnote> We say what our
2183 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2186 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2187 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2188 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2190 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2191 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2194 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2198 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2199 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2200 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2201 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2202 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2203 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2206 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2207 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential
2208 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2210 is having an effect.
2213 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2214 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2215 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2217 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2218 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2219 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2220 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2222 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2223 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2224 as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2226 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2227 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2231 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial
2233 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2234 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2235 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move on.
2238 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2239 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2241 interesting story, more and more people link to that story. And as
2242 the number of links to a particular story increases, it rises in the ranks
2243 of stories. People read what is popular; what is popular has been
2245 by a very democratic process of peer-generated rankings.
2248 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2249 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2250 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2251 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2252 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2253 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2254 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2255 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2256 get it out of the way."
2259 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2260 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide
2261 more from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN
2262 admitted it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the
2264 to its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2266 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2268 It also needs to sustain a more
2270 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the
2271 Internet from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite
2273 with a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the
2274 reporter over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She
2275 needed to offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that
2276 wasn't warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2279 Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the debate
—"amateur" not
2280 in the sense of inexperienced, but in the sense of an Olympic athlete,
2281 meaning not paid by anyone to give their reports. It allows for a much
2282 broader range of input into a story, as reporting on the Columbia
2284 revealed, when hundreds from across the southwest United States
2285 turned to the Internet to retell what they had seen.
<footnote><para>
2287 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2289 Online," New York Times,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci D. Kramer,
2290 "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall," Online
2292 Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2293 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2296 readers to read across the range of accounts and "triangulate," as Winer
2297 puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are "communicating directly with
2298 our constituency, and the middle man is out of it"
—with all the
2300 and costs, that might entail.
2303 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected with
2304 blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts, for
2306 figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's not clear that
2307 "journalism" is happy about this
—some journalists have been told to
2308 curtail their blogging.
<footnote><para>
2310 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2311 York Times,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2312 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2314 in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the war on March
9,
2315 stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses' request. Last year Steve
2317 a Houston Chronicle reporter, was fired for keeping a personal Web log,
2318 published under a pseudonym, that dealt with some of the issues and
2319 people he was covering.")
2321 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2324 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2325 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2326 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2327 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2328 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2331 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2332 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2334 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2335 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2336 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2337 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2338 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2339 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2340 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2341 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2342 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2343 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2348 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2349 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2350 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2353 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2355 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2356 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2357 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2360 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2361 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2363 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2365 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2366 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2367 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2369 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2370 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2371 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2372 tinkering of many others.
2375 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2376 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2377 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2378 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2379 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2382 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2384 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2385 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2386 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2387 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2389 a major apprenticeship platform."
2392 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2393 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2395 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2397 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2398 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2399 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2402 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2403 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2404 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2406 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2407 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2408 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2410 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2411 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2412 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2415 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2416 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2418 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2419 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2423 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2425 as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2427 highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2428 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that your
2429 child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all around.
2430 The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a freedom that
2431 technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2434 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and
2436 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in
2438 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2439 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in general.
<footnote><para>
2441 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological
2443 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2444 of the Association for Computer Machinery
43 (
2000):
9.
2446 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2447 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2450 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,"
2451 Brown explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up
2453 think and want to learn."
2456 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2457 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2458 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2460 that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal system that
2461 closes down that part of the brain."
2464 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2465 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2466 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2467 the law to close down that technology.
2470 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2471 chapter
9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2475 <sect1 id=
"catalogs">
2476 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2478 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled
2479 as a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2480 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2482 in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2484 technology that was available on the RPI network.
2487 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research
2489 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and
2491 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five
2492 thousand undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high
2493 school class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience
2494 to imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2497 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration
2498 to one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2500 on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the network
2501 is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet, as well as
2502 more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2505 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2507 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically improving
2508 the quality of search on the network. Specialty search engines can do
2509 this even better. The idea of "intranet" search engines, search engines
2510 that search within the network of a particular institution, is to provide
2511 users of that institution with better access to material from that
2513 Businesses do this all the time, enabling employees to have
2515 to material that people outside the business can't get. Universities
2519 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2521 for example, has a network file system that makes it very easy
2522 for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2524 about the publicly (within that network) available content.
2525 Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this technology. It
2526 used Microsoft's network file system to build an index of all the files
2527 available within the RPI network.
2530 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2532 his engine was a simple modification of engines that others had
2533 built. His single most important improvement over those engines was
2534 to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could cause a
2535 user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed before, if you
2536 tried to access a file through a Windows browser that was on a
2538 that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse modified the
2539 system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that a user could
2540 click to see if the machine holding the file was still on-line.
2543 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2544 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2545 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2546 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2547 be on users' computers.
2550 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2551 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2552 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2554 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2556 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2560 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2561 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that means,
2562 of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this point is
2564 clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to put music files in
2565 their public folders. He did nothing to target the search engine to these
2566 files. He was a kid tinkering with a Google-like technology at a
2568 where he was studying information science, and hence,
2570 was the aim. Unlike Google, or Microsoft, for that matter, he made
2571 no money from this tinkering; he was not connected to any business
2572 that would make any money from this experiment. He was a kid
2574 with technology in an environment where tinkering with
2576 was precisely what he was supposed to do.
2579 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2580 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2581 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2582 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2584 A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from the suit.
2585 As he read these papers and watched the news reports about them, he
2586 was increasingly astonished.
2589 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything wrong. . . .
2590 I don't think there's anything wrong with the search engine that I ran
2591 or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't modified it in any way
2592 that promoted or enhanced the work of pirates. I just modified the
2593 search engine in a way that would make it easier to use"
—again, a
2594 search engine, which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows
2596 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members
2597 of the RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not
2598 himself created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing
2602 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2603 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2604 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2606 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2607 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2608 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2609 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2610 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2611 that Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2614 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2615 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2616 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2617 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2618 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2619 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2620 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100 billion
—six
2621 times the total profit of the film industry in
2001.
<footnote><para>
2623 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2624 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC
6
2625 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2629 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2630 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2631 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2632 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2633 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2636 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2637 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2639 make it impossible for him to work in many fields of technology
2640 for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him understand that this
2641 process of being sued was not going to be pleasant. (As Jesse's father
2642 recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the case, Matt Oppenheimer, told
2643 Jesse, "You don't want to pay another visit to a dentist like me.") And
2644 throughout, the RIAA insisted it would not settle the case until it took
2645 every penny Jesse had saved.
2648 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2649 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2650 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2651 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2652 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2653 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2654 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2655 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2658 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at
2660 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2663 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2664 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2665 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2666 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2667 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2668 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2669 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2671 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2672 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2673 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (
2000).
2675 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2676 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2678 for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2680 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2681 Wall Street Journal,
10 September
2003, A24.
2685 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2686 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2687 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2692 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2693 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2694 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2696 what the RIAA has done.
2700 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2701 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2702 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2703 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2704 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2706 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2708 <sect1 id=
"pirates">
2709 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
</title>
2712 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2713 their permission
—if "if value, then right" is true
—then the history of
2714 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2715 "big media" today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2716 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2717 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2722 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2724 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2726 See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
87–93,
2727 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2730 and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in the early
2731 twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents granted the
2732 inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2734 through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2736 and were based on Thomas Edison's creative property
—patents.
2737 Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights this creative property
2738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2739 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2742 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2746 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2747 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2748 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2749 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2750 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2751 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2752 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2755 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the
2756 number of nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the
2758 movement by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known
2759 as the General Film Company to block the entry of non-licensed
2760 independents. With coercive tactics that have become legendary,
2761 General Film confiscated unlicensed equipment, discontinued
2762 product supply to theaters which showed unlicensed films, and
2763 effectively monopolized distribution with the acquisition of all
2764 U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by the independent
2765 William Fox who defied the Trust even after his license was
2766 revoked.
<footnote><para>
2768 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2769 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2770 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2771 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2772 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2774 of the economic motive behind both these limits and the limits
2775 imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From Edison
2776 to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the
2778 of Copyright" (September
2002), University of Chicago Law
2779 School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper
2785 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2786 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2788 "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and `accidents'
2789 resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and sometimes life
2790 and limb frequently occurred."
<footnote><para>
2792 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2794 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2796 That led the independents to flee the
2797 East Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2799 there could pirate his inventions without fear of the law. And the
2800 leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently, did just that.
2803 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2804 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2805 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2807 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2808 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2809 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2814 <sect2 id=
"recordedmusic">
2815 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2817 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2818 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2821 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2822 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2823 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2824 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2825 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2826 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2827 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2828 right to perform it publicly.
2831 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's
2832 phonograph or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was
2833 clear enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that
2834 I performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2835 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2837 But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a "public
2839 if I recorded the song in my own house (even today, you don't
2840 owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in the shower), or if I
2841 recorded the song from memory (copies in your brain are not
—yet
—
2842 regulated by copyright law). So if I simply sang the song into a
2844 device in the privacy of my own home, it wasn't clear that I owed the
2845 composer anything. And more importantly, it wasn't clear whether I
2846 owed the composer anything if I then made copies of those recordings.
2847 Because of this gap in the law, then, I could effectively pirate someone
2848 else's song without paying its composer anything.
2851 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2853 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2858 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2859 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2860 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and
2862 who cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain
2863 of the composer and publisher without any regard for [their] rights.
<footnote><para>
2865 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2866 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2867 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge, of
2868 South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2869 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2871 N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2876 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2877 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2878 genius of American composers,"
<footnote><para>
2880 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2882 of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2884 and the "music publishing industry"
2885 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."
<footnote><para>
2887 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2889 of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2892 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2893 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."
<footnote><para>
2895 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
2897 of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2901 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So,
2902 too, do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who
2904 the player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2905 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any
2907 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the
2909 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
2911 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
2912 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2914 Company of New York).
2915 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2916 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2917 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2918 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2919 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2920 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."
<footnote><para>
2922 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376
2924 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2926 Graphophone Company Association).
2930 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2931 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2932 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2933 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2935 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2936 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2937 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2940 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2942 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2943 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2946 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2947 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2948 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2949 Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2951 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2955 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2956 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
2957 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
2959 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
2960 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
2961 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
2964 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2965 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
2966 of piracy
—by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
2967 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
2968 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
2969 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
2970 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
2971 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2972 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2973 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
2975 follow-on creativity.
<footnote><para>
2977 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
2978 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
2979 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2980 in Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2981 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2985 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2986 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2987 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2992 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2994 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2996 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2998 in the United States and throughout the world; records
2999 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
3000 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
3002 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
3003 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
3004 before
1909 and the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
3005 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
3006 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
3007 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
3009 quality, and a greater choice.
<footnote><para>
3011 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House
3013 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83,
3014 (
8 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention
3020 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3022 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3026 <title>Radio
</title>
3028 Radio was also born of piracy.
3031 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3032 "public performance" of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3034 See
17 United States Code, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning, record
3035 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3037 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
3038 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
3039 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
3041 Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd Cir.
1940). See also Randal C.
3042 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
3043 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
3044 Review
70 (
2003):
281.
3046 As I described above,
3047 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3048 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3050 money for that performance.
3053 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3054 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3055 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3057 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3058 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3059 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3061 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3062 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3064 of the music for his work.
3066 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3069 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3071 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3072 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3074 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3075 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3079 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3081 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3082 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3083 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3086 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3087 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3088 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3089 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3090 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3091 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3092 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3095 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3096 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3097 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3099 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3100 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3101 something for nothing.
3104 <sect2 id=
"cabletv">
3105 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3108 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3111 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with
3112 cable television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the
3114 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable
3116 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3117 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3118 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3120 content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever did
—
3121 Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to give away.
3123 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3125 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3126 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3127 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."
<footnote><para>
3129 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the Subcommittee
3130 on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
3131 on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966) (statement of
3132 Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
3134 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3135 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3136 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3137 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<footnote><para>
3139 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3140 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3142 As another broadcaster put it,
3146 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3147 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3148 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3150 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3151 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3156 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable
3161 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3162 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3163 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3164 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3166 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3167 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3168 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3173 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president
3175 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of compensation."
<footnote><para>
3177 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3178 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3182 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant
3184 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3188 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have
3189 any copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether
3191 holders who are already compensated, who already have a
3192 monopoly, should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3194 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3195 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3196 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3198 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3200 acting assistant attorney general).
3205 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the
3206 Supreme Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright
3210 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3211 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3212 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3214 the question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable
3215 companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but
3216 the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright owner.
3217 The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto
3218 power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable companies thus
3219 built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value created by
3224 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy"
3225 means using value from someone else's creative property without
3227 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described today
<footnote><para>
3229 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3230 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3231 Information, available at
3232 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>. "The
3233 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3234 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
3236 — then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3237 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3238 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3239 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3240 generation
—until now.
3242 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3246 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
</title>
3249 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy
3250 comes in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3251 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3252 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its defense,
3253 this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should
3257 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3258 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3259 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3260 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3261 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3263 copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has
3264 so often done in the past.
3265 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3267 <sect2 id=
"piracy-i">
3268 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3270 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3271 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3272 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3273 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3274 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3276 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3277 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003, July
2003, available at
3279 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3280 Financial Times,
14 February
2003,
11.
3282 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3283 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually
3284 worldwide to piracy.
3287 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3288 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3289 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3290 This piracy is wrong.
3293 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3294 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3295 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3297 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3298 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3300 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3301 existence, treated as right.
3304 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3305 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3306 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3307 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3308 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3309 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3311 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3312 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3313 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3316 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3317 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3318 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3319 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3321 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3325 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3326 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3327 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3328 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3330 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3331 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10–13,
3332 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3333 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3334 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3335 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3336 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3337 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3338 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3339 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3340 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3341 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3342 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3343 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3344 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3345 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3346 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3350 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3351 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3352 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3353 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3354 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3356 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3357 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3358 144–90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3359 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3361 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3362 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
3366 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3367 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3368 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3369 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3370 "You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3371 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3372 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3373 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3374 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3375 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3376 piracy of the tangible.
3379 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3380 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3382 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3383 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3384 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3386 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3387 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3389 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3392 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3393 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3394 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3396 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3397 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3400 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3401 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3402 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3403 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3404 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3406 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3407 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3409 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3410 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3411 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3413 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3416 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3417 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3418 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3419 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3421 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3422 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3425 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3427 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3428 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3430 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3431 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3432 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3433 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3435 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what
—at
3436 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3438 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3442 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3443 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3444 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3445 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3446 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3447 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3448 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3449 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3453 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3454 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3455 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3456 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3457 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3458 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3459 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3462 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3463 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3464 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3465 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3468 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3469 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3470 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3471 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3474 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3475 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3480 <sect2 id=
"piracy-ii">
3481 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3483 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3484 the author of [his] profit."
<footnote><para>
3486 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3488 This means we must determine whether
3489 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3490 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3491 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3492 author of his profit.
3495 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors
3496 of the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3498 Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and,
3500 off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3502 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3503 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3504 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3505 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
3506 up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.
3507 This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing
3509 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see
3510 Lawrence Lessig, Future,
89–92,
139.
3511 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3512 put together components that had been developed independently.
3515 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3516 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3517 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3518 system.
<footnote><para>
3520 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3521 San Francisco Chronicle,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3522 New Scientist,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3523 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle,
23 May
2003, C1;
3525 Wake-Up Call," Economist,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3527 at War with the Internet" (London) Times,
26 July
2002,
18.
3529 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3530 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3531 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3532 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3533 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3534 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3535 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3538 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3540 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3541 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3542 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3544 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3545 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3546 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3547 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3550 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that
43 million citizens
3551 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3553 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3554 York Times,
6 June
2003, A1.
3557 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3558 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3559 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3561 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3564 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3565 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3567 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3568 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more carefully
3569 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do
—the kinds of
3570 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3574 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3575 different kinds into four types.
3577 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3580 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3582 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3583 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3584 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3585 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3586 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3587 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3593 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3594 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3595 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3596 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3598 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3599 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3601 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3602 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3606 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3608 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3609 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3610 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3612 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3613 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3614 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3615 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3616 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3618 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3619 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3620 content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same harm
3621 that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3627 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3628 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3633 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3636 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3638 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3639 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.
<footnote><para>
3641 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,
148–49.
3643 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3645 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3646 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3647 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer
—and
3649 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3653 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3654 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3656 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3657 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3658 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3659 that is "devastating" the industry.
3662 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3664 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3666 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3667 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
&
3668 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3669 labels fought it."
<footnote><para>
3671 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3673 Business Model Crisis (
2003),
3. This report describes the music
3675 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3676 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3677 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3678 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3679 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In
1988,
40 percent
3680 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3681 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3682 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3683 Government Printing Office, October
1989),
145–56.
3685 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3686 album unsold, and when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the
3687 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3689 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3692 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3693 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3694 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3695 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3697 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3698 innovation at the major labels."
<footnote><para>
3700 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying,
4.
3704 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3705 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3706 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3707 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3708 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3709 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3710 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3711 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3714 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3715 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3716 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3717 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3718 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3719 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3720 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3723 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3725 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3726 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3729 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9
3731 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7 percent.
<footnote><para>
3733 See Recording Industry Association of America,
2002 Yearend Statistics,
3735 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3736 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3737 25 June
2003, available at
3738 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3739 of recorded music have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in
3740 to
860 million units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3741 In terms of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in
3742 to $
12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3744 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3745 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3747 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3749 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3750 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3751 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That
3752 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3753 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average
3754 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<footnote><para>
3756 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13
3759 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3762 from other forms of media could also account for some of the decline.
3763 As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film High
3764 Fidelity has a list price of $
18.98. You could get the whole movie [on
3765 DVD] for $
19.99."
<footnote><para>
3772 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3773 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3774 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3775 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3776 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3778 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3779 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3782 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3783 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3784 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3786 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"
—but their own
3788 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3789 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3790 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3791 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of Kazaa
3792 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"
—then the industry would have
3793 suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7 percent drop. If
2.6
3794 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3795 revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3797 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3800 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3802 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3803 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3807 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that is
3808 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3810 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3811 tracks that are no longer commercially available.
<footnote><para>
3813 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3814 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law
—Coming
3815 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3817 on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
2001) (prepared
3819 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3820 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3824 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3825 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3826 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3828 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3832 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3834 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3836 of used book and used record stores in America today.
<footnote><para>
3838 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3839 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3840 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3841 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (
2002), available at
3842 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3844 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3847 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3850 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3851 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3852 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3853 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3854 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3856 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3857 owner for the content they sell.
3860 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3861 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making the
3862 content available isn't making money from making the content
3864 It is also different, of course, because in real space, when I sell a
3865 record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace, when someone
3866 shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs," I still have
3867 it. That difference would matter economically if the owner of the
3868 copyright were selling the record in competition to my sharing. But
3869 we're talking about the class of content that is not currently
3871 available. The Internet is making it available, through
3873 sharing, without competing with the market.
3876 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3877 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3878 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3879 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3880 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3884 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3885 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3886 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3887 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3888 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3889 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3891 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3892 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3893 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3894 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3895 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3896 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3897 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3901 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits
3903 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3904 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3905 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3908 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3910 says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask, "How
3911 much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the efficiencies?
3912 What is the content that otherwise would be unavailable?"
3915 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this chapter,
3916 much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly legal and good.
3917 And like the piracy I described in chapter
4, much of this piracy is
3919 by a new way of spreading content caused by changes in the
3920 technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the tradition that
3921 gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and cable TV, the
3922 question we should be asking about file sharing is how best to preserve
3923 its benefits while minimizing (to the extent possible) the wrongful harm
3924 it causes artists. The question is one of balance. The law should seek
3925 that balance, and that balance will be found only with time.
3928 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3929 just what you call type A sharing?"
3932 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3934 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3935 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3937 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3939 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
3940 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3941 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
3942 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3943 "down to zero."
<footnote><para>
3945 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
3946 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
3948 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3949 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3951 Napster (New York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
3955 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3956 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3957 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
3958 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
3959 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
3960 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3961 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3962 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3963 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3966 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3967 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3968 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3970 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3972 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3973 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3974 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3977 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3978 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3979 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3981 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3982 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3983 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3984 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3985 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3987 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3990 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3991 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3992 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3993 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3995 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4000 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4001 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals of
4002 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
4003 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
4005 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
4007 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
4008 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
4009 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
4010 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
4012 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
4013 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
4014 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
4016 over the future (cable).
4019 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4021 and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against another
4022 technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to them today,
4023 VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and Universal's
4024 claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a device,
4026 and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage in
4028 infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a "record"
4029 button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies and
4030 shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright infringement
4031 of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and Universal claimed, be
4032 partially liable for that infringement.
4035 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4036 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4037 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4038 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4039 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4040 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4041 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4042 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4043 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4044 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4046 to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4047 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4048 for the architecture it chose.
4051 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4052 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When
4053 there are
20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be
4055 by millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and
4056 essence of the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4057 copyright."
<footnote><para>
4059 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4060 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4061 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4062 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4064 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing
4065 and creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the
4067 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of
4069 of tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4070 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4071 and plain common sense."
<footnote><para>
4073 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4075 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4076 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4078 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4081 — a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4082 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4083 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4084 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4085 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4086 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4087 profit from its reproduction."
<footnote><para>
4089 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4094 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4095 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4096 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4097 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"
—held
4098 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4099 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4100 technology
—which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4101 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4102 of the American film industry)
—was an illegal
4103 technology.
<footnote><para>
4105 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4110 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4113 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4114 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4119 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4120 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4122 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4124 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4125 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4127 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4129 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4134 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4135 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4137 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4138 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4139 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4143 <title>Table
</title>
4144 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4148 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</entry>
4149 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4150 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4155 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4156 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4157 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4158 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4161 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4162 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4164 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4167 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4168 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4169 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4170 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4174 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4175 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4176 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4183 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4184 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4186 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4187 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4188 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4189 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4190 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4191 1992 (Title
17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4192 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4193 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4194 Lessig, Future,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4195 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
293–96.
4197 In each case, throughout our history,
4198 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4202 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4203 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4204 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4205 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4206 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4208 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4209 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4210 the interests at stake.
4211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4214 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4215 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4216 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4217 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4218 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4220 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4221 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4222 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4223 permission to record a song?
4226 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4227 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4228 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4229 over all possible uses of his work."
<footnote><para>
4231 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
4234 Instead, the particular uses that the
4235 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4236 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4237 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4239 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4240 the distribution of content.
4243 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4244 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4245 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4246 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4247 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4248 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4249 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4250 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4251 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4252 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4254 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4260 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4262 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4263 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4265 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4267 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4268 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."
<footnote><para>
4270 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4271 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times,
22 September
2003, C3.
4273 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4275 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4276 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4277 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4278 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4279 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4280 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4281 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4284 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4285 just as any other property is protected."
4287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4291 <chapter id=
"c-property">
4292 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4295 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4296 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4297 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4298 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4299 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4300 the price she can get.
4303 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4304 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4305 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4306 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4307 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4308 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4309 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard
—by, for example,
4311 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4312 thing I am taking then?
4315 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4316 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4317 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4318 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4320 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4321 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4322 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4323 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4324 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4325 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4326 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<footnote><para>
4328 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4329 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4330 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4334 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4335 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4336 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4338 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4342 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details, in
4343 other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4345 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4347 in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4349 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4351 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4352 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4354 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4355 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4357 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review
45 (
2003):
4362 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4364 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4366 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4367 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4368 significance of this true statement
—"copyright material is property"
—
4369 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4370 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4375 <sect1 id=
"founders">
4376 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4378 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in
1595. The play
4379 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4381 had written. He would continue to write plays through
1613,
4382 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4383 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4384 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4385 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4387 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4390 In
1774, almost
180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4391 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4392 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4394 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4395 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4396 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4397 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4398 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4399 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4400 Bookseller," American Scholar
61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4403 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger
<footnote><para>
4405 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4407 University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4410 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4411 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4412 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4413 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4414 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4416 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4418 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4421 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4422 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4423 of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4424 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4425 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4427 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4429 by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.
<footnote><para>
4431 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4433 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
40.
4435 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in
1731. So why
4436 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in
1774?
4439 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4441 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4442 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4443 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4445 in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4446 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4447 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4449 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4452 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4453 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4454 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4456 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4458 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4459 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4461 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4462 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4464 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4466 of any positive law.
4469 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4470 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4471 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4472 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4475 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4476 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4478 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4481 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4482 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4484 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4485 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4487 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4488 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4491 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4492 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4493 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4496 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4497 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4498 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4499 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4500 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4501 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4502 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4503 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4505 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4508 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4510 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4511 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4515 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4516 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4517 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4518 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4520 from reprinting a book. In
1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4521 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4523 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4525 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4527 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4528 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4532 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4533 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4534 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4536 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4538 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4539 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4540 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4541 to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4544 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4545 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4547 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4548 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4549 monopolies
—especially
4550 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4551 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4552 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4553 against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the Statute of
4555 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4556 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4560 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4562 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4563 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4564 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4565 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4566 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4568 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4571 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4572 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4573 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4574 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4575 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4576 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind
—tools of the
4577 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4579 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4580 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4581 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4582 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."
<footnote><para>
4584 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4585 York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4589 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4590 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4592 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4593 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4594 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4598 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4599 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4600 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4601 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4602 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4603 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4605 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4606 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4607 construction and spread of culture.
4610 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4611 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4612 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4613 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4614 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4615 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4616 they said; they needed more time.
4619 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4620 words that echo today,
4624 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4625 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4626 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4627 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4629 a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in
4630 the Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a
4632 to Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general
4633 Tax on the Publick; and all this only to increase the private Gain
4634 of the Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4636 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4637 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4638 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4640 of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
4641 Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4643 (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al.,
8,
4644 Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4649 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in
4650 a series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4651 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4652 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4653 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4654 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4656 "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of Anne,
4657 the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just because the
4658 protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't mean the
4660 of the common law expired: Under the common law they had
4661 the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its Statute of Anne
4662 copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only way to protect
4666 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some
4667 of the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4669 Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it, "The
4670 publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle rancher has
4671 for cattle."
<footnote><para>
4673 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4674 Law Review
40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4675 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4677 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the
4679 His concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4682 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4683 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4684 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4686 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4687 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4691 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4692 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4693 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4694 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4696 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4699 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4701 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4702 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4703 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4704 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."
<footnote><para>
4710 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's
4711 shop in Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where
4712 he sold inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in
4714 of the supposed common law right of Literary Property."
<footnote><para>
4716 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective,
167 (quoting
4720 books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he rested
4721 his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of Anne,
4722 the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4725 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4726 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4727 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4730 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to
4731 James Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the
4733 of the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full
4735 of the statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor
4736 began printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual
4737 common law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4739 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright
4740 Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law
4746 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in
4748 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4749 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4750 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the
4751 common law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4752 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4753 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That
4755 law rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4756 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4759 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if justice
4760 were just a matter of logical deduction from first principles
—Mansfield's
4761 conclusion might make some sense. But what it ignored was the larger
4762 issue that Parliament had struggled with in
1710: How best to limit
4763 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4764 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4765 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4766 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4767 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4769 Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4770 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4773 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4774 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4777 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4778 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4779 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4783 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4784 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4785 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4786 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4787 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4788 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4791 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4792 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4793 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4794 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4795 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4796 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4797 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4798 statute were no longer protected.
4801 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4802 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4804 of special legal distinction who functioned much like the Justices
4805 in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the House of
4806 Lords generally voted.
4809 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4810 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4812 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4813 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4814 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4815 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4816 passed into the public domain.
4818 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4820 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4821 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before
1774, there
4822 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4823 After
1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4824 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4825 and the greatest works in English history
—including those of
4826 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan
—were free of
4830 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4831 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4832 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people celebrated
4833 the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser reported, "No
4834 private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the public, and
4835 none has been tried before the House of Lords in the decision of
4836 which so many individuals were interested." "Great rejoicing in
4838 upon victory over literary property: bonfires and
4839 illuminations."
<footnote><para>
4845 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4846 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4851 By the above decision . . . near
200,
000 pounds worth of what
4852 was honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday
4853 thought property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of
4854 London and Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses
4855 to purchase Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who
4856 after many years industry thought they had acquired a
4858 to provide for their families now find themselves without a
4859 shilling to devise to their successors.
<footnote><para>
4866 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4867 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4868 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4869 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4871 would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter free.
4872 Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of course,
4873 for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller had an
4875 right to control the publication of that book. And not in the
4876 sense that books could be stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you
4877 still had to buy the book from someone. But free in the sense that the
4878 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4879 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free culture
4880 would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English culture
4881 would develop as the many English readers chose to let it develop
—
4882 chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the memes they
4883 repeated and endorsed. Chose in a competitive context, not a context
4884 in which the choices about what culture is available to people and
4885 how they get access to it are made by the few despite the wishes of
4889 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4891 resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a world
4892 where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4897 <sect1 id=
"recorders">
4898 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4900 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4901 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4902 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4903 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4907 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4908 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4912 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4913 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4915 are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4917 a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and in
4918 the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the stage.
4921 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some
4923 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4924 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers and
4925 the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4926 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4927 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4931 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4932 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4933 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4934 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4935 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4938 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get
4940 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a
4941 four-and-a-halfsecond
4942 image on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How
4943 could it hurt? Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told
4944 Else to contact Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4947 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4948 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4949 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4950 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4951 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4954 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we
4956 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at least
4957 that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation." And
4958 second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us to use
4959 this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited Simpsons which
4960 was in the corner of the shot."
4963 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to
4964 someone he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca
4966 He explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . .
4967 We're asking for your educational rate on this." That was the
4969 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4970 confirm what he had been told.
4973 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes,
4974 you have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
4975 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film about
4977 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4978 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4979 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant to
4980 Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want the
4984 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was
4986 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4987 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the very
4988 last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally replaced the
4989 shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on, The Day After
4990 Trinity, from ten years before.
4993 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox,
4994 owns the copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property.
4995 To use that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the
4997 of the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4998 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4999 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5000 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner of
5001 the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law says the
5002 owner gets to control.
5005 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that
5006 the copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5007 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
5008 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the
5010 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5011 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set by
5015 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5016 thought is "fair use."
<footnote><para>
5018 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that lawyers don't
5019 permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard A. Posner with William
5020 F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred " (draft on
5021 file with author), University of Chicago Law School,
5 August
2003.
5023 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot
5024 of a Simpsons episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons
—and fair use
5025 does not require the permission of anyone.
5028 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5029 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
5033 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf
5035 what lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and
5036 what is crushingly relevant in practice to those of us actually
5037 trying to make and broadcast documentaries. I never had any
5038 doubt that it was "clearly fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But
5039 I couldn't rely on the concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5041 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5044 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires
5045 that we buy Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers
5047 a detailed "visual cue sheet" listing the source and
5049 status of each shot in the film. They take a dim view of
5050 "fair use," and a claim of "fair use" can grind the application
5055 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the
5056 first place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a
5057 history of tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons
5058 usage, just as George Lucas had a very high profile litigating
5059 Star Wars usage. So I decided to play by the book, thinking
5060 that we would be granted free or cheap license to four seconds
5061 of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working to
5063 on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk legal
5064 trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5069 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford
5070 Law School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also
5071 confirmed that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within
5072 an inch of your life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He
5073 made clear that it would boil down to who had the bigger
5075 department and the deeper pockets, me or them.
5076 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5080 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5081 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5087 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory
5089 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture.
5090 But in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5091 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means
5092 that the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law
5093 has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5096 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5097 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5099 profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has matured
5100 into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or not.
5102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5104 <sect1 id=
"transformers">
5105 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5106 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5108 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5109 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5110 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5111 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5112 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5115 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5116 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5117 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very difficult.
5118 In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to build
5120 on the work of particular actors. The first actor chosen was
5121 Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5123 with clips from his films and interviews with figures important
5127 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor
5128 and as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with
5130 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5131 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5135 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5136 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5137 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5138 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5139 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5142 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5143 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5145 films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem arose. "No
5146 one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No one had
5147 ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an actor's
5151 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5152 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5155 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5156 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5157 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5158 for it."
<footnote><para>
5160 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5161 publicity
—rights
5162 an artist has to control the commercial exploitation of his
5164 But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix, Burn" creativity, as this chapter
5169 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5170 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5171 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5172 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5173 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5176 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5177 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5178 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5182 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips.
5183 We made some artistic decisions about what film clips to
5185 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip
5186 from Dirty Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground
5187 who's wiggling under the gun and you need to get his
5189 And then you have to decide what you are going to pay
5193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5194 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the
5196 rate for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking
5197 about a clip of less than a minute, but to reuse that performance
5198 in the CD-ROM the rate at the time was about $
600.
5199 So we had to identify the people
—some of them were hard to
5200 identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
5201 crashing through the glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman?
5202 And then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some
5203 others, and we just started calling people.
5207 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5208 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5209 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5210 "Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5211 know, $
1,
200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5212 to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5213 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5214 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5218 It was one year later
—"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5219 were totally in the clear."
5222 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5223 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5224 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5228 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up
5229 their hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many
5231 there's the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director,
5232 there's the actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into
5233 its constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this
5234 many directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it
5235 very systematically and cleared the rights.
5240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5241 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5242 loved it, and it sold very well.
5245 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5246 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done this
5247 efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5249 so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at
5250 all."
<footnote><para>
5252 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5253 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5254 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5256 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5260 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5261 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5262 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5263 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5264 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5268 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5269 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when
30 seconds of
5270 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5271 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5272 compensated for that.
5276 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5277 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license that
5278 someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips like this?
5279 Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would have to track
5280 down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit permission
5281 from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of the
5283 process could be made to be more clean?
5287 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5288 mechanism
—where
5289 you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5290 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5291 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5293 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it
5294 with lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost
5295 as the producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of
5297 X dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a
5298 known cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes
5299 this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have
5300 a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me
5301 X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get
5303 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you
5304 say, "Oh, I want a hundred minutes of something and I have no
5305 idea what it's going to cost me, and a certain number of people are
5306 going to hold me up for money," then it becomes difficult to put
5307 one of these things together.
5311 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some
5312 of the richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and
5313 access that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him
5314 a year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity
5315 is never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5316 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5318 hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5319 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5320 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea
5321 that land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing
5323 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5324 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5325 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5326 regulationminimizing
5327 Republican should look at the rights and ask, "Does this
5331 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5332 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5333 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5334 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5337 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5338 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5341 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5342 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
60 Minutes episode.
5343 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5344 judges loved every minute of it.
5347 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5348 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5349 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5350 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5351 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5352 were just violated in this room?"
5355 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5356 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5357 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the law.
5358 Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be prosecuted for
5359 this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle of federal
5361 notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an important point:
5362 A year before anyone would have heard of the word Napster, and two
5363 years before another member of our panel, David Boies, would defend
5364 Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Nimmer was
5366 to get the judges to see that the law would not be friendly to the
5367 capacities that this technology would enable. Technology means you
5368 can now do amazing things easily; but you couldn't easily do them
5372 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5373 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5374 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5375 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5376 planted in your presentation.
5379 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5381 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound never
5382 before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of clips on
5383 computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden takes
5384 images of politicians and blends them with music to create biting
5386 commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced some of
5387 the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is through
5388 the mixing of Flash! and music.
5391 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5392 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5393 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5394 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5395 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5398 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5399 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add or
5400 mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5402 requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer." Instead, the
5404 could simply make it easy for follow-on creators to compensate
5405 artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come along: a rule, for
5406 example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright owner of an
5408 work for the derivative reuse of his work will be a flat
1 percent
5409 of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the copyright owner." Under
5410 this rule, the copyright owner could benefit from some royalty, but he
5411 would not have the benefit of a full property right (meaning the right
5412 to name his own price) unless he registers the work.
5415 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5416 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5417 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5418 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5421 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an
5423 with Mike Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5425 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and
5427 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under
5428 the agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5429 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use of
5431 digital technology
—insert Myers and other actors into the
5432 film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of entertainment."
5435 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers
5437 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on
5438 existing films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5439 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5440 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5441 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to new
5442 audiences, it is Mike."
5445 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5446 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5447 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5449 under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5451 is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5452 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5453 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5454 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5457 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5458 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5459 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5460 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5461 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5462 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5463 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5464 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5465 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5466 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5467 curse, reserved for the few.
5469 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5471 <sect1 id=
"collectors">
5472 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5474 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to
5475 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5476 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5477 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5478 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5479 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5480 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5483 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5484 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive
5485 that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the
5486 world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5487 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as well
5488 as when those pages changed.
5491 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5493 In the dystopia described in
1984, old newspapers were
5495 updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved
5496 of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
5499 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5500 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5501 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5502 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5505 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5506 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5507 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5508 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5509 library
—constantly
5510 updated, without any reliable memory.
5513 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back
5515 and the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the
5516 Internet was. You have the power to see what you remember. More
5517 importantly, perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't
5518 remember and what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5520 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5521 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003, press
5522 release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later
5523 changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended."
5524 E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5528 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we
5530 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the
5532 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965,
5533 or to Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5534 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5535 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5536 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what it is
5537 convenient to remember, but remember something close to the truth.
5540 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5542 it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is whether
5543 we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More directly, the
5544 key is whether an objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do
5545 that, by collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5547 for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5550 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the
5552 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5553 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5555 in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5558 to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to think that
5559 we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns around the
5560 world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the one kept by the
5565 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5566 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5568 In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5570 It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
5571 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5573 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie
5574 of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10 billion
5575 pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5578 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge
5579 in human history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5580 terabytes of material"
—and was "ten times larger than the Library of
5581 Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set
5582 out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been
5584 the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more
5585 ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture
5586 was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of that
5588 is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news are
5590 each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a specific
5591 exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and is available
5592 to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that, [television] is almost
5593 unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were Barbara Walters you could get
5594 access to [the archives], but if you are just a graduate student?" As Kahle
5599 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with
5601 Brown? Remember that back and forth surreal experience of
5602 a politician interacting with a fictional television character? If you
5603 were a graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to
5604 get those original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5607 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5608 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5612 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5613 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5614 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5615 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5617 America will have an easier time than researchers trying to
5619 the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5622 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5623 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5625 These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
5626 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once
5627 the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
5630 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library of
5632 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long
5633 as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5634 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
1915
5635 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed back."
5636 Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any
5637 library. The copy exists
—if it exists at all
—in the library archive of the
5638 film company.
<footnote><para>
5640 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
5641 Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly
13 nos.
2–3 (
1980):
5;
5643 Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the United
5644 States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
& Co.,
1992),
36.
5648 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5649 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5650 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5651 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5653 they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5655 But those copies were simply kept by the broadcasters. No
5656 library had any right to them; the government didn't demand them.
5657 The content of this part of American culture is practically invisible to
5658 anyone who would look.
5661 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5662 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5663 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5665 from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5667 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations
5668 from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made their
5669 coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5671 could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5675 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger,
5676 whose archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films"
5677 (meaning films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never
5678 copyrighted), Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle
5679 digitize
1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet
5680 to be downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5681 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5682 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock footage
5683 sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the material they
5684 wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made films on
5685 their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to be made.
5686 Either way, the archive enabled access to this important part of our
5688 Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film that instructed
5689 children how to save themselves in the middle of nuclear attack? Go to
5690 archive.org, and you can download the film in a few minutes
—for free.
5693 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that
5694 we otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
5695 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law
5696 doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in
5697 an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
5700 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to
5701 this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His
5702 aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part of our
5704 Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but
5706 a second life that all creative property has
—a noncommercial life.
5709 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5710 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
5712 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5713 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5715 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
5716 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
5717 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial
5719 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5722 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5724 has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers
5725 the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is
5726 used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive
5727 of knowledge about our history. In this second life, the content can
5728 continue to inform even if that information is no longer sold.
5731 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of
5732 print very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5734 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5735 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5736 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5737 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese, "The
5738 First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston College Law
5740 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5741 </para></footnote>). After it is
5742 out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the copyright
5743 owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many get to read
5744 the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are thus the
5746 life of a book. That second life is extremely important to the
5747 spread and stability of culture.
5750 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5752 property does not hold true with the most important components
5753 of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
5754 these
—television, movies, music, radio, the Internet
—there is no
5756 of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've replaced
5757 libraries with Barnes
& Noble superstores. With this culture, what's
5758 accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
5760 that, culture disappears.
5763 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5764 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5766 all television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is
5768 high. So even though the law in principle would have
5769 restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5770 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5771 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly difficult
5772 to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had little
5777 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution
5778 is that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
5779 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or
5781 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
5782 books published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an
5783 archive of all moving images and sound.
5786 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never
5788 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it;
5789 but we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5794 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of
5796 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases
5797 of movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed]
5798 during the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million
5799 different titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that
5800 would fit in this room and be able to be afforded by a small
5802 So we're at a turning point in our history. Universal access is
5803 the goal. And the opportunity of leading a different life, based on
5804 this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind
5805 would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria,
5806 putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
5811 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5812 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5813 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5814 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5815 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5817 perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand it;
5818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5819 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
5820 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
5821 become unimaginable for much of our past
—a future for our past. The
5822 technology of digital arts could make the dream of the Library of
5823 Alexandria real again.
5826 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building
5827 such an archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might
5828 like to call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might
5829 seem, the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5831 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that
5832 Kahle and others would exercise.
5834 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5836 <sect1 id=
"property-i">
5837 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
</title>
5839 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture
5841 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C.,
5842 with Lyndon Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture
5843 of Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5844 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5845 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5846 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5849 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion
5850 Picture Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose
5851 goal was to defend American movies against increasing domestic
5853 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but
5855 and distributors of entertainment for television, video, and
5856 cable. Its board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven
5857 major producers and distributors of motion picture and television
5859 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures
5861 MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal
5862 Studios, and Warner Brothers.
5865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5866 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president
5867 before him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5868 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most
5870 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5871 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays
5872 the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5873 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5874 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5875 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5879 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5881 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5882 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5883 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5884 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5885 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine
5886 the meaning of "creative property."
5889 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5894 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges
5895 and the counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting,
5896 reasonable men and women will keep returning to the
5898 issue, the central theme which animates this entire debate:
5900 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protection
5901 resident in all other property owners in the nation. That is the issue.
5902 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5903 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5905 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5906 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5908 on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
5909 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
97th
5910 Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
5915 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5916 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5918 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this:
5919 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5920 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5922 resident in all other property owners in the nation." There are
5923 no second-class citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should
5924 be no second-class property owners.
5927 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5928 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5929 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a
5930 claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this claim of
5931 Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is perhaps
5932 the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and scope
5933 of "creative property." His views have no reasonable connection to our
5934 actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has
5935 slowly redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5938 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5940 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5942 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
5943 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
5944 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
5945 right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
5947 meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private
5948 Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
5950 </para></footnote> it has never been the
5951 case, nor should it be, that "creative property owners" have been
5953 the same rights and protection resident in all other property
5954 owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were given the same rights
5955 as all other property owners, that would effect a radical, and radically
5956 undesirable, change in our tradition.
5959 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat
5960 for our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5961 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5963 in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a
5964 powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5965 culture would develop.
5968 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5969 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to
5970 convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5972 We have always treated rights in creative property differently
5973 from the rights resident in all other property owners. They have never
5974 been the same. And they should never be the same, because, however
5975 counterintuitive this may seem, to make them the same would be to
5977 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5978 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5980 depends upon the owners of creativity having less than perfect
5984 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most
5985 powerful of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5987 in assuring that the new can displace them. No organization
5988 does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what's
5989 good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A society that
5990 defends the ideals of free culture must preserve precisely the
5992 for new creativity to threaten the old.
5993 To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5994 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5995 Constitution itself.
5998 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so
5999 strongly did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
6000 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if it
6001 condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm
—it is
6002 required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you
6003 "just compensation" for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees
6004 that property is, in a certain sense, sacred. It cannot ever be taken from
6005 the property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
6008 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
6009 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
6010 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that after
6011 a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has granted and
6012 set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
6014 does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
6015 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not
6016 have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking."
6018 the same Constitution that requires compensation for your land
6019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
6020 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
6025 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
6026 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be
6027 treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in
6028 our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be
6029 accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is
6031 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
6034 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
6035 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6036 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6038 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college
6039 to produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it
6040 did in
1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be
6041 the first to admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected
6042 some of those mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should
6043 reject as well. So my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did
6047 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6048 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
6049 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given the
6050 same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
6052 property there must be a public domain?
6055 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6057 of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
6059 Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6060 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that should
6061 be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property should be
6063 but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights the law gives to
6064 creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights ought to
6065 be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether institutions designed
6066 to assure that artists get paid need also control how culture develops.
6070 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6071 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6072 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6073 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
6074 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6075 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6076 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6077 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6079 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
6080 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
6081 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6084 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6085 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each
6086 case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.
6087 For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals
6089 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated
—
6090 either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious
6091 constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening
6093 after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for
6095 you willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song
6096 from her latest CD and posting it on the Web, you can be punished
6097 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6098 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6099 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6102 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6103 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6104 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6105 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6106 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6107 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6108 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6109 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6110 the source of the enforcement.
6113 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6114 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6115 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6116 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it is to
6117 be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But
6118 given a set of norms, and a background of property and contract law,
6119 the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or
6123 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6124 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a constraint on
6125 behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across
6126 a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community to
6127 integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
6128 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as
6129 with the market, architecture effects its constraint through
6130 simultaneous conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts
6131 enforcing contracts, or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by
6132 "architecture." If a
500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law
6133 of gravity that enforces this constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket
6134 stands between you and a flight to New York, it is the market that
6135 enforces this constraint.
6139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6140 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6142 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced
6143 by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by
6147 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6148 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6150 thing, we have to consider how these four modalities interact.
6151 Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well be; my
6152 claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most
6153 significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must
6154 consider how these four in particular interact.
6157 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6158 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say
6159 how fast you can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in
6160 part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most
6162 drivers; governors in buses, as another example, set the
6164 rate at which the driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted
6165 by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of
6166 gasoline indirectly constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a
6168 may or may not constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at
50
6169 mph by a school in your own neighborhood and you're likely to be
6170 punished by the neighbors. The same norm wouldn't be as effective in
6171 a different town, or at night.
6174 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6175 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6176 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6178 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6179 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6180 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right self-consciously to
6181 change the other three. The right of the other three is more timidly
6183 See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New
6184 York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95; Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago
6185 School," Journal of Legal Studies, June
1998.
6187 The law, in other words, sometimes
6188 operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality.
6189 Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to
6191 the incentives to drive more slowly. The law might be used to
6192 mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty of driving
6193 rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless
6194 driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be more
6195 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6196 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed limit, for
6197 example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast driving.
6199 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6200 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6201 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6204 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6205 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6206 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6207 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6208 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6209 another.
<footnote><para>
6211 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6213 their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6215 moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the government. For
6216 instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people think it is meaningless
6217 to say that one's liberty has been restrained. A bridge has washed out, and
6218 it's harder to get from one place to another. To talk about this as a loss of
6219 freedom, they say, is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of
6222 I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which depends
6223 upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue against any
6224 insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view of liberty. As I
6225 argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of political thought with a
6226 broader focus than the narrow question of what the government did when.
6227 John Stuart Mill defended freedom of speech, for example, from the
6228 tyranny of narrow minds, not from the fear of government prosecution;
6229 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19.
6230 John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of labor
6231 from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, "The Right
6232 to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds., John R.
6233 Commons: Selected Essays (London: Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans
6234 with Disabilities Act increases the liberty of people with physical
6236 by changing the architecture of certain public places, thereby making
6237 access to those places easier;
42 United States Code, section
12101 (
2000).
6238 Each of these interventions to change existing conditions changes the
6239 liberty of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6240 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each of these
6244 <sect2 id=
"hollywood">
6245 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6248 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6249 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6250 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6251 rallying makes sense.
6254 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6257 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6258 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6259 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6262 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6263 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The
6264 law limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties
6265 on those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6266 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture)
6267 and expensive to copy and share content (market). Finally, those
6269 are mitigated by norms we all recognize
—kids, for example, taping
6270 other kids' records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be
6272 but the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least)
6273 had no problem with this form of infringement.
6276 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s
6277 and p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes
6279 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6280 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6281 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6283 an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6286 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6288 has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change,
6289 when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of
6291 for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is Iraq
6292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6293 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6294 looting that results.
6296 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6297 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6298 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6301 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6302 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6304 (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6305 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6306 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6308 had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6309 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6311 marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to develop
6312 code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should educate
6313 kids to better protect copyright.
6316 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6318 the particular balance that existed before the change induced by
6319 the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content industry
6320 to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life
6321 you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if
6323 comes along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a
6325 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6326 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6327 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6329 (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government to
6330 bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions
6331 have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when
6332 imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6335 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6336 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6338 innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the
6339 changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the
6340 content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown
6342 it, its "architecture of revenue."
6345 But just because a particular interest asks for government support,
6346 it doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6348 has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6350 that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6351 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6352 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6353 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6355 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6357 online,
2 August
1999, available at
6358 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more recent
6359 analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana R. Schoenberger, "Can
6360 Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6 October
2003,
6363 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6365 Does anyone believe the government should ban
6366 digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have weakened the
6367 freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks
6368 from roads for the purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the
6370 of this book, remote channel changers have weakened the
6372 of television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the
6373 TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this
6374 change has weakened the television advertising market. But does
6376 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial
6378 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to
6379 switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6382 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6383 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6384 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6386 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6387 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6388 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6389 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6390 have an interest in excluding future competitors."
<footnote><para>
6392 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6395 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6396 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6397 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6398 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6399 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6403 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6404 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6406 for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6408 that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the
6409 duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they
6410 create, in response to the request of those hurt by changing technology,
6411 are changes that preserve the incentives and opportunities for
6416 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include, obviously,
6417 copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the industry
6419 about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in
6420 a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be
6422 wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government
6423 to get into the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and
6424 dangers of that game are precisely why our framers created the First
6425 Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . .
6426 abridging the freedom of speech." So when Congress is being asked to
6427 pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom of speech, it should ask
—
6428 carefully
—whether such regulation is justified.
6431 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6433 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6435 My argument is about their effect. For before we get to the
6437 of justification, a hard question that depends a great deal upon
6438 your values, we should first ask whether we understand the effect of the
6439 changes the content industry wants.
6442 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6445 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6446 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6447 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6448 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6449 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6452 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6453 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6454 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6457 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued
6458 that DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6459 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6461 Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6464 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly
6465 did not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of
6467 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse
6468 than the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately,
6469 the problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at
6470 least when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways
6471 to solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6474 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6475 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6476 culture.
<footnote><para>
6478 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6480 for the Net?" Duke Law Journal
47 (
1997):
87.
6482 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of
6483 this chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that
6485 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given
6486 away "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6487 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6489 much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6490 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6491 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6492 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6494 copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors.
6495 It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware
6496 of our actions' effects on the environment.
6499 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6500 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6501 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6502 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6503 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6504 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6505 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6506 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6507 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6510 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6511 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6515 <sect2 id=
"beginnings">
6516 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6518 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and
6520 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
6521 "creative property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the
6523 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6526 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6528 in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I,
6529 section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6532 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6533 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6534 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6536 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6537 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause does
6538 not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant "creative
6540 rights." It says that Congress has the power to promote progress. The
6541 grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the
6542 purpose of enriching publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of
6547 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we
6548 saw in chapter
6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6550 that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over culture
6551 by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume
6552 the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike
6553 the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6554 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6557 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6558 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built
6559 structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built
6560 a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them
6561 short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the
6562 federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6564 power in the federal government, they built structures to reinforce
6565 the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose members were
6566 at the time selected by the states, and an electoral college, also selected
6567 by the states, to select the president. In each case, a structure built
6568 checks and balances into the constitutional frame, structured to
6570 otherwise inevitable concentrations of power.
6573 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call
6575 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they
6576 ever considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put
6577 our "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
6578 210 years since they first struck its design.
6581 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6582 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6584 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6587 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6588 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6589 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6594 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6595 <title>"Copyright
" today.
</title>
6596 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6603 <sect2 id=
"lawduration">
6604 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6606 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6607 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6608 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6610 creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6611 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6612 authorship.
<footnote><para>
6614 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
6615 United States (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
485–86:
6616 "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme Law of the Land,'
6617 the perpetual rights which authors had, or were supposed by some to have, under
6618 the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6620 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in
6621 the United States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the
6623 law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work
6625 in the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England,
6626 this lingering uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely
6627 upon a public domain to reprint and distribute works.
6630 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6631 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
6632 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections.
6633 Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the
6635 for all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any
6636 state copyrights expired as well.
6639 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6640 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6641 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6642 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6643 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6646 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6647 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6648 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6649 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6650 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6651 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6652 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6654 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6655 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6656 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol.
1, The Creation
6657 of an Industry,
1630–1865 (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6658 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6659 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6660 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context,
7–10 (
2002),
6661 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6662 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6663 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6664 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6665 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6666 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6667 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6670 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6671 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6673 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6674 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6675 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6679 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6680 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6681 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6682 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6683 domain.
<footnote><para>
6685 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6686 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6687 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6688 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6689 Studies on Copyright, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6690 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6691 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6692 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6693 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6696 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6697 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6698 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6700 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6701 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6702 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6703 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6704 books; that use
—because it does not involve publication
—is
6708 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6709 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6710 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6711 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6712 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6713 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6716 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6717 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6718 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6719 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6720 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6721 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6722 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6723 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6726 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6727 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6728 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6729 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6732 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6733 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6734 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6737 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6738 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6739 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6740 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6741 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6742 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6743 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6747 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6748 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6749 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6750 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6751 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6752 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6753 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6754 was ninety-five years.
6757 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6758 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6759 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6760 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6761 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6762 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6766 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6767 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6768 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6769 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6770 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6771 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6772 years.
<footnote><para>
6774 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6775 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6776 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6777 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6782 <sect2 id=
"lawscope">
6783 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6785 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6786 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6787 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6788 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6791 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6792 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6793 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6794 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6795 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6796 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6797 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6798 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6799 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6800 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6801 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6804 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6805 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6806 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6807 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6808 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6809 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6810 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6811 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6812 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6813 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6814 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6815 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6816 on the initial creative work.
6819 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6820 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6821 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6823 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6824 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6825 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6826 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6827 famous
© or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6828 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6829 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6832 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6833 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6834 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6835 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6836 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6837 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6838 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6839 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6840 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6841 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6842 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6846 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6847 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6848 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6849 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6850 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6851 copy available for others to copy.
6854 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6858 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6859 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6860 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6861 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6862 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6863 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6865 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6867 of American Literature,"
29 New York University Journal of
6869 Law and Politics
255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6870 Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6872 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6873 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6874 the United States
—publishers.
6877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6878 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6879 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6880 act was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and
6881 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6882 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6884 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6888 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6889 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6890 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6892 to a tangible form
—all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6893 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6894 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6897 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6898 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6899 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6902 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6904 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6905 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6906 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6907 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6908 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6909 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6910 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6912 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6913 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6916 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6917 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6919 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6921 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6922 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6923 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6924 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6929 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6930 a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6931 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6932 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6933 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6934 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6935 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6937 derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6939 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6941 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6943 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6944 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6945 the wrong of direct piracy.
6948 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6949 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6950 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6952 use of my book.
<footnote><para>
6954 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6955 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6956 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6957 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6959 Yale Law Journal
112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially pp.
53–59).
6961 These two different uses of my creative work are
6965 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6966 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6967 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6969 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6970 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6974 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6975 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6977 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6978 rights originally granted.
6981 <sect2 id=
"lawreach">
6982 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6984 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6985 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6986 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6987 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6989 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6990 regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a copyrighted
6991 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6992 make a copy;
17 United States Code, section
106(
4). And it certainly
6994 doesn't regulate a "copy";
17 United States Code, section
112(a). But
6995 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;"
17
6996 United States Code, section
102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
7000 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
7001 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
7002 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
7003 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
7004 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
7005 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
7006 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
7007 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
7008 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
7009 trigger for copyright law.
7012 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
7013 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
7014 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
7015 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
7017 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
7018 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
7019 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
7021 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
7023 because it is clear that the
7024 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
7025 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
7028 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
7031 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
7032 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
7033 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
7036 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
7037 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
7038 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
7039 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
7040 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
7041 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
7042 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
7043 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
7044 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
7045 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
7046 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
7049 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
7050 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
7051 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
7054 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7055 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7056 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7057 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7058 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7059 diagram on next page).
7062 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7063 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
7065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7066 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
7067 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
7068 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
7071 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
7072 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7074 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
7075 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
7076 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
7077 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
7078 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
7079 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7081 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
7082 <title>Unregulated copying considered
"fair uses.
"</title>
7083 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
7086 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
7087 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
7088 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
7091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7092 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7093 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
7094 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7097 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
7098 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
7100 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
7101 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
7102 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
7103 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
7105 And because of this single,
7106 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
7108 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
7110 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
7111 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
7112 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
7113 because each use also makes a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into
7115 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
7117 work must look exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the
7118 burden of this shift.
7121 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7122 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
7123 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
7124 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
7126 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
7127 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7128 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use
—reading
—
7129 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
7134 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
7136 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7137 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
7139 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
7141 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
7142 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
7143 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
7144 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
7145 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
7148 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7149 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7150 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7151 points also become clear:
7154 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7155 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7157 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7159 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7160 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7161 free culture before the Internet.
7164 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7166 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7167 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7169 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7170 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7172 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7174 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7175 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7177 uses of creative work.
7180 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7183 burden on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7184 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7185 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7186 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7187 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7189 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7190 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7192 before because reading was not regulated.
7195 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7196 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7198 upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question about
7199 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7200 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7201 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7203 of fair use are not enough.
7206 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7207 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7208 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7209 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7210 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7213 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it
7215 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7217 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7218 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7219 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7220 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7225 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7227 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7228 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7229 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7230 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7231 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7233 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7234 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7235 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7237 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7238 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7239 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7242 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7243 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7245 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7247 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7248 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7249 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7250 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7251 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7254 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7255 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7256 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7257 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7258 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7259 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7260 Disney's permission.
7263 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7264 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7265 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7266 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7268 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7269 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7270 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7271 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7272 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7273 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7274 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7278 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7280 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the right to say
7281 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7282 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes
&
7284 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7285 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7287 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7288 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7290 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7291 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7292 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7293 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7296 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7297 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7298 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7299 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7301 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7302 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7305 <sect2 id=
"lawforce">
7306 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7308 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7309 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7310 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7311 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7314 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7315 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7316 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7317 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7318 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7322 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7323 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7325 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7326 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7327 if they went forward with their plan.
<footnote><para>
7329 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7331 Problems
44 (
1981):
172–73.
7335 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7336 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7337 you were."
<footnote><para>
7339 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
1–3.
7341 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7342 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7343 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7346 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7347 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7348 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7349 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7352 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7353 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7354 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7355 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7357 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7358 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7359 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7360 that is not at all funny.
7363 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7366 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7367 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7368 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7370 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7373 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7377 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7378 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7379 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7380 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7381 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7382 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7383 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7384 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7387 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7388 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7389 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7392 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7393 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7395 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7396 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7397 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7401 According to my eBook
7402 Reader, I have the permission
7403 to copy to the clipboard of the
7404 computer ten text selections
7405 every ten days. (So far, I've
7406 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7407 I also have the permission to
7408 print ten pages from the book
7409 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7410 the permission to use the Read
7411 Aloud button to hear
7413 read aloud through the
7417 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7418 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7420 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7421 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
"Politics
"</title>
7422 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7425 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7426 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7429 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7430 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
"Politics
".
</title>
7431 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7434 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7435 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7437 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7438 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7439 <title>List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas
".
</title>
7440 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7443 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7446 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"
—
7447 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7448 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7449 the power
—up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7451 copyright, there is no such copyright power.
<footnote><para>
7453 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7454 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7455 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7457 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7458 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7459 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7462 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7463 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7464 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7465 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7468 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7469 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7470 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7471 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7472 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till
2 A.M., but
7473 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7474 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7475 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7476 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7478 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7479 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7480 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud
—it's not that the company
7481 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7482 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7485 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7486 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7487 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7488 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7491 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7492 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7493 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7494 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7495 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7496 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7499 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7500 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7502 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7503 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7504 protections as well?
7507 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7511 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7513 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7514 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7515 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7516 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7518 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7519 <title>List of the permissions for
"Alice's Adventures in
7520 Wonderland
".
</title>
7521 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7525 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7527 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7529 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7532 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7533 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7534 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7535 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7536 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7537 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7540 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7541 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7542 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7543 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7544 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7545 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7546 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7547 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7548 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7549 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7550 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7553 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7554 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7555 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7556 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7557 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7561 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7562 story of mine that makes the same point.
7564 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7566 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7567 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7568 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7571 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7572 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7573 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7574 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7575 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7576 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7577 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7580 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7581 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7582 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7583 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7584 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7585 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7588 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7589 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7590 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7591 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7592 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7593 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7594 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7595 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7596 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7597 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7600 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7601 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7602 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7603 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7606 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7608 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7609 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7610 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7611 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7612 than Sony had built.
7615 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7616 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7617 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7618 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7621 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7622 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7623 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7624 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7625 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7626 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7627 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7631 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7632 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7633 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7634 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7635 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7636 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7637 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7638 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7639 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7642 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7644 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7645 Science
293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7646 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7647 January
2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7648 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter,
11 December
2001; Bill
7649 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7650 May
2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7651 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7653 about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7654 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7656 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7657 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7658 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7659 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7662 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7663 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7664 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7665 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7666 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7667 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7668 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7672 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7673 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7674 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7675 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7679 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7680 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7681 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7682 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7685 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7686 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7687 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7688 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7689 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7690 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7693 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7694 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7695 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7696 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7697 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7698 constituted, succeed.
7701 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7702 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7703 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7708 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7709 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7710 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7714 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7715 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7716 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7720 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7721 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7722 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7723 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7724 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7728 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7729 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7730 spreading such information an offense.
7733 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7734 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7735 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7736 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies
—
7737 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7738 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7739 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7742 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7743 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7744 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7745 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7748 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7749 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7750 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7751 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7752 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7753 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7754 have been a copyright violation.
7757 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7758 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7759 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7760 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7761 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7762 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7763 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7765 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7766 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7769 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7770 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7771 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7772 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7773 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7774 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7777 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7778 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7779 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7780 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7781 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7782 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7783 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7784 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7788 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7789 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7790 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7791 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7792 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7793 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7794 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7795 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7796 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7797 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7798 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7799 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7800 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7801 important.
<footnote><para>
7803 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
7804 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7805 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7806 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7812 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7813 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7814 the VCR responsible.
7817 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7821 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7824 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7825 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7826 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7827 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7828 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7829 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7832 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7834 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7835 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7836 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7839 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7840 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7841 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7844 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7845 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7846 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7847 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7848 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7849 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7852 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7853 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7854 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7855 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7856 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7857 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7860 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7861 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7862 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law
—increasing its
7863 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7864 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7865 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7866 owners effect
—at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7867 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7870 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7871 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7872 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7873 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7874 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7875 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7876 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7877 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7878 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7883 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7884 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7885 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7886 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7887 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7889 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7890 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7891 Entertainment Law Journal
17 (
1997):
651.
7895 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7896 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7897 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7898 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7899 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7902 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7903 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7904 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7905 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7906 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7907 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7908 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7909 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7912 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7913 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7914 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7915 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7916 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7917 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7920 <sect2 id=
"marketconcentration">
7921 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7923 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7924 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7925 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7926 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7927 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7929 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7930 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7931 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7932 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7933 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7934 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7935 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7936 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7937 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7941 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7942 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7943 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7944 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7945 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7948 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7949 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7950 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7951 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7952 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7953 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7954 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7955 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7959 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7963 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7964 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7965 ownership, "five companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<footnote><para>
7967 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7968 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
7969 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote> The five
7970 recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7971 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
7972 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
7974 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7975 Slide," New York Times,
23 December
2002.
7977 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7978 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."
<footnote><para>
7980 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7985 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7986 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7988 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than
1,
200
7989 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7990 radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7991 largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that market's
7992 revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of the
7993 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7996 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7997 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7998 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7999 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
8000 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
8001 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
8002 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
8003 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
8004 protected
— by the market.
8007 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
8008 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
8009 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
8013 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
8014 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
8015 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
8016 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
8017 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
8018 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
8019 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
8020 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
8021 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
8022 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
8024 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
8030 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8031 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8032 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8033 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8035 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
8036 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
8037 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
8040 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8041 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8042 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8046 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8047 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8048 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8049 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8052 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8053 integration may matter.
8055 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
8056 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8057 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8059 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
8060 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8061 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8062 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8063 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8066 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8067 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8068 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8069 control.
<footnote><para>
8071 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8072 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
8074 3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8075 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
8076 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8077 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
8082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8083 The network did not control those copyrights because the law
8085 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The
8086 law required a separation between the networks and the content
8088 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
8089 1992, because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8091 percent of it
—was "independent" of the networks.
8094 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this
8096 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.
8097 In
1985, there were twenty-five independent television production
8099 in
2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
8100 1992, only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a
8101 company it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8102 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
8103 16 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control,
8104 last year there was one."
<footnote><para>
8106 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on
8107 Media Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th
8108 Cong.,
1st sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of
8110 Union and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8111 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of
8112 America, West, in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond,
8113 Virginia,
27 February
2003.
8115 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television
8116 was owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
8117 1992 and
2002, the number of prime time television hours per week
8118 produced by network studios increased over
200%, whereas the
8120 of prime time television hours per week produced by independent
8121 studios decreased
63%."
<footnote><para>
8126 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8128 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
8129 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8130 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8131 owned by the network.
8134 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the
8136 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller
8137 few. As Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8141 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8142 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8143 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8144 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8146 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent
8148 companies producing television programs. Now you have less
8149 than a handful.
<footnote><para>
8151 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
8152 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
8153 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
8158 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of
8159 such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8161 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from
8162 networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the network
8163 wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from the
8165 it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question
8166 without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment to Siberia,
8167 but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are
8168 quashed. This is not the environment for a democracy.
8171 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8172 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8173 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8174 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8175 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8176 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8178 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
8180 Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard
8181 Business School Press,
1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was
8182 first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of
8183 Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
8184 Research Policy
14 (
1985):
235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard
8185 Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are
8186 Built to Last Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform
8187 Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
8191 giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the field is
8192 only open to the giants, there will be far too little sprinting.
8195 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8196 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8197 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8201 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8202 suggest the concern.
8205 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8206 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8207 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8210 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8211 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8212 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8215 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were all
8216 quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8218 damage from it is so great as to make waging the war insane.
8219 When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice system, the
8220 desperation of generations of kids whose only real economic
8222 are as drug warriors, the queering of constitutional protections
8224 of the constant surveillance this war requires, and, most profoundly,
8225 the total destruction of the legal systems of many South American
8227 because of the power of the local drug cartels, I find it impossible
8228 to believe that the marginal benefit in reduced drug consumption by
8229 Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
8232 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and
8233 it is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8235 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8239 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
8240 launched a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The
8242 produced scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal
8243 drugs. In one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar,
8244 discussing the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the
8245 collateral damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of
8246 drug legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8247 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes his
8248 mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on
8249 the pro-legalization campaign.
8252 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8253 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8256 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8257 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8258 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the
8259 drug war. Can you do it?
8262 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8264 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8265 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8270 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of
8272 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8273 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
8274 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First
8276 but the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to
8277 choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media
8278 will refuse one side of a crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.
8279 And the courts will defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8281 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads that
8282 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
8283 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
8285 The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
8286 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
8287 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and
8289 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine,
15 October
2003.
8290 These restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for
8292 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with
8293 Rejection from TV Networks," New York Times,
13 March
2003, C4.
8295 of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC or the
8296 courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general overview,
8297 see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
8299 on Television and Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review
6 (
1988):
8300 449–79, and for a more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the
8301 courts, see Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC,
184 F.
3d
8302 872 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8303 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
8304 transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel buses. Phillip
8305 Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni Rejects
8306 Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8307 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground was
8308 that the criticism was "too controversial."
8312 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived in
8313 a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media
8314 throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control
8316 to the media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which
8317 political positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in
8318 an obvious and important way, concentration matters. You might like
8319 the positions the handful of companies selects. But you should not like
8320 a world in which a mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us
8325 <sect2 id=
"together">
8326 <title>Together
</title>
8328 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8330 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In
8331 the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No
8332 sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8335 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
—
8336 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology
8337 and markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8339 our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins to seem
8341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8342 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8344 the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated markets
8345 to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing the
8347 expanded "property" rights granted by copyright fundamentally
8348 changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and build upon our
8349 past, then we have to ask whether this property should be redefined.
8352 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8353 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8354 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8358 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8360 And these massive shifts in the effective power of copyright
8361 regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content industry and
8362 resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly enable control
8363 over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether another
8365 is called for. Not an adjustment that increases copyright's
8366 power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
8368 to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
8369 regulation
—a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8372 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8374 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8375 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8376 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8377 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8379 holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8381 suggest that we may well need similar changes in the future. And
8382 these changes have to be reductions in the scope of copyright, in
8384 to the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the
8388 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8389 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8391 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8393 technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8394 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the
8396 of our culture than now.
8399 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8400 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when only
8401 publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much more
8402 diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for even
8403 then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers were
8405 of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a wide
8406 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
8407 remotely as long. This form of regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny
8408 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a
8410 regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
8411 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into
8412 the most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8413 known.
<footnote><para>
8415 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8416 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8420 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8423 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8424 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8426 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8427 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8428 that copyright law has undergone.
8429 In
1790, the law looked like this:
8434 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8438 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8439 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8444 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8445 <entry>©</entry>
8449 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8458 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8459 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8460 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8463 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8464 noncommercial work was also free.
8467 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8472 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8476 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8477 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8482 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8483 <entry>©</entry>
8484 <entry>©</entry>
8487 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8496 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8498 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8499 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8500 transformation were still essentially free.
8503 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and
8505 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8506 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8508 Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more
8510 we could say the law began to look like this:
8515 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8520 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8525 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8526 <entry>©</entry>
8527 <entry>©</entry>
8530 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8531 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8539 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through,
8540 say, copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the
8542 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of
8543 digital technologies, especially in the context of a digital network,
8544 means that the law now looks like this:
8549 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8554 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8559 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8560 <entry>©</entry>
8561 <entry>©</entry>
8564 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8565 <entry>©</entry>
8566 <entry>©</entry>
8573 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8575 was not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity
—
8576 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8577 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules designed
8578 to regulate commercial publishers.
8581 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8582 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8583 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8584 these domains actually does any good.
8587 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8588 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8589 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8591 noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8593 sketched especially in chapters
7 and
8, one might well wonder
8594 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8595 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8596 rights were more sharply restricted.
8599 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8600 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8601 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8603 historically, this property right (as with all property rights
<footnote><para>
8605 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8607 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance
8608 public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of
8609 Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland Pennock and John W.
8610 Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press,
1980).
8612 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8613 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8614 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8616 And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright" did not
8617 control at all the freedom of others to build upon or transform a creative
8618 work. American culture was born free, and for almost
180 years our
8619 country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free culture.
8622 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8623 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8624 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8625 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story
8626 of chapter
6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar
8628 that is increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair
8629 use right become unavoidably high (the story of chapter
7). Adding
8630 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8631 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8633 limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8). And
8635 archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property
8636 notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture
8637 (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But
8638 the nature of the property that builds a free culture is very different
8639 from the extremist vision that dominates the debate today.
8642 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8644 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
8645 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing
8646 and distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed
8647 in a way that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property
8648 right that is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or
8649 was intended to be. The property right that is copyright has become
8650 unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and
8651 transform becomes weakened in a world in which creation requires
8652 permission and creativity must check with a lawyer.
8654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8658 <chapter id=
"c-puzzles">
8659 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8664 <sect1 id=
"chimera">
8665 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8668 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8669 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8670 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8671 <!-- f1. --> H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8672 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8673 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8675 The valley is extraordinarily
8676 beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate, slopes of rich
8677 brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent fruit." But the
8678 villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an opportunity. "In the
8679 Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King."
8680 So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a king.
8683 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8684 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8685 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8687 as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the sound
8688 of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to control
8689 him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't
8691 he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute, and
8692 which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
8695 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8696 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak)
8697 the virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8699 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8700 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8702 of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies,
8703 and she listened to his description of the stars and the mountains and
8704 her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence."
8705 "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could only half
8707 but she was mysteriously delighted."
8710 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously
8712 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8713 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything
8714 right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8717 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8718 is affected," he reports.
8721 "What affects it?" the father asks.
8722 "Those queer things that are called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in
8723 such a way as to affect his brain."
8726 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8727 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple
8728 and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these irritant bodies
8732 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They
8734 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8735 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8737 in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8738 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8739 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8740 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8741 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8743 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8744 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8746 that she was not the person whose blood was at the scene. . . ."
8749 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8751 A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of
8752 DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two
8753 individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person
8754 can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of
8755 a "person" should reflect this reality.
8758 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright
8759 and culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8760 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8761 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8762 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong.
8763 One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
8764 records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
8765 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
8766 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just
8767 send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant
8769 just like what every executive in every recording company no
8770 doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8773 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8774 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music,
8775 then sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8776 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8777 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8778 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8780 to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8783 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8784 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8785 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally)
8787 a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free
8788 copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.
8792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8793 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8794 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take
8795 a CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8797 to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note
8798 that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that
8799 might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is $
1,
000.
8801 to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song CD, I'm
8803 for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8806 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that
8807 it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It
8808 is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side
8810 we need to begin to think about how we should respond to this
8811 chimera. What rules should govern it?
8814 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8815 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a
8816 felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages
8817 just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get
8818 universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no
8820 is used to commit this crime. These responses might be extreme,
8821 but each of them has either been proposed or actually implemented.
<footnote><para>
8822 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8823 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8825 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003, available
8827 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8828 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8829 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8830 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8831 Los Angeles Times,
17 July
2003, available at
8832 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8833 currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8834 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8835 user accused of sharing more than
600 songs through a family computer,
8836 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services),
240 F.
8837 Supp.
2d
24 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8838 high as $
90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8839 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8840 from $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8841 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8843 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8845 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8846 August
2003, available at
8847 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8849 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8850 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8851 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe,
8 August
2003,
8853 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8858 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids
8859 act as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there
8860 be no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8862 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip:
8864 if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8867 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8868 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8869 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8870 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter
8871 is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance
8872 extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a reasonable
8874 But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
8875 of the two extremes.
8879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8880 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8881 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land
8882 grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give
8884 holders a kind of control over our culture that they have never had
8885 before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8887 and new creativity will be lost.
8890 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8891 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8892 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8893 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8895 that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the
8896 passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to distribute
8897 content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the vice president
8898 for global public policy at one of these new innovators, eMusic.com,
8899 put it when criticizing the DMCA's added protection for copyrighted
8904 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8905 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8908 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8909 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8910 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8912 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8913 well produce a totally different industry model.
8916 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8917 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8918 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8919 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8920 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8921 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8922 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8923 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8924 interests.
<footnote><para>
8925 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8926 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8927 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8929 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement
8930 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8932 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8940 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8941 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8945 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8946 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8947 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8953 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8956 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8957 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8958 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8959 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8961 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8964 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8965 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8967 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8971 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8972 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8973 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8977 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still
8978 on the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme
8979 claims of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8980 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8984 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8985 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8986 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8987 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8988 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8990 <sect2 id=
"constrain">
8991 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
8993 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8994 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8995 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8996 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8997 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8998 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8999 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
9000 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
9001 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
9002 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
9003 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
9004 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
9005 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
9008 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
9009 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
9010 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
9011 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
9012 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
9013 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
9014 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
9015 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
9016 the culture all around.
9019 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
9020 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
9022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
9024 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
9025 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
9026 storytelling extended across the globe.
9029 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
9030 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
9031 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
9032 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
9033 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
9034 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
9035 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
9036 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
9037 work is presumptively illegal.
9040 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
9041 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
9042 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
9043 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
9044 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
9045 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
9046 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
9047 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
9048 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
9049 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
9050 million.
<footnote><para>
9052 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
9053 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
9054 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9055 Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
9056 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
9058 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9059 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9060 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
9061 suffering.
<footnote><para>
9062 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9063 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
9064 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9065 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
9066 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
9067 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
9069 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9072 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9073 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9074 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9077 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9078 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
9079 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
9081 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
9082 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
9083 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
9085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9086 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
9088 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
9089 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
9091 to see a world of underground art
—not because the message is
9093 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
9094 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
9096 art" tour the United States.
<footnote><para>
9097 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired,
7 July
2003,
9100 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9101 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
9103 In what does their "illegality" consist?
9104 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9105 critical or reflective.
9108 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9109 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
10. But an
9110 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9111 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9112 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9113 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9114 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9115 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9116 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9119 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9120 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9121 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9122 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9123 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9124 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9125 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9126 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9127 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9130 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9131 described in chapter
7, in response to the story about documentary
9132 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
9133 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
9134 law regulates such a use.
9138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9139 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9140 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9141 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
9142 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9143 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9144 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9145 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9146 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9149 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9150 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
9151 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9152 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9153 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9154 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9155 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9156 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9160 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
9161 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9162 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9163 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9164 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
9165 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9166 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9167 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9168 culture that is free.
9171 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9175 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9176 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9177 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9178 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
9179 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9180 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9181 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9182 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9183 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9187 <sect2 id=
"innovators">
9188 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
9190 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9191 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9192 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9193 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9194 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9195 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9198 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9199 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9200 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9201 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9202 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9203 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9204 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9207 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9208 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9209 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9210 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9211 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9212 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9213 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9214 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9215 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9216 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9217 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9220 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9221 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9222 strategy that I described in chapter
10. The consequence of this
9223 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9224 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9225 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9226 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9227 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9228 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9229 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9232 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9233 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9234 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9237 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9238 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9239 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9240 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9241 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9242 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9245 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9246 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9247 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9248 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9252 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9253 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9254 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9255 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9256 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9257 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9258 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9259 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9260 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9261 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9264 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9265 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9267 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9268 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9269 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9270 the kind of content the users liked.
9273 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9274 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9275 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9276 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9277 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9278 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9279 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9280 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9281 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9282 they had already bought.
9285 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9286 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9287 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9288 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9289 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9290 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9291 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9292 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9295 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9298 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9299 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9300 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9301 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9302 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9303 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9304 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9308 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9309 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9310 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9313 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9314 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9315 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9316 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9319 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9320 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9321 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9322 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9323 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9324 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9325 Times,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9327 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9329 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available at
9330 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9331 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9334 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9335 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9337 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9338 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9339 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9340 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9341 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9342 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9343 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9344 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9345 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9349 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9350 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9351 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9352 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9353 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9355 for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9356 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . .
<footnote><para>
9357 <!-- f5. --> Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business
2.0,
16 June
9359 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli
9365 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with "your money or your
9366 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats that the
9367 law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system that will
9369 and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard enough to start
9370 a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is constantly
9376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9377 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9378 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9379 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9380 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9381 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9383 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9385 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9386 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9387 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9388 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9389 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9392 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9393 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9394 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9396 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9398 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9399 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9401 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9403 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9404 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9405 overregulatedregulated
9409 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9410 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9412 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture
—a
9414 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9415 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9416 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9417 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9418 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9419 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9420 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9421 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9423 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9424 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9426 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9427 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9428 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9429 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9431 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9434 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9435 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9437 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9439 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9440 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9441 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9442 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9443 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9446 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9447 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9448 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9449 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9450 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9451 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9452 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9453 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9457 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9459 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9460 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9461 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9462 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9463 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9465 and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9466 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2,
26–27.
9471 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9472 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9474 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9475 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9478 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9482 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9483 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9484 impose.
<footnote><para>
9485 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9486 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9488 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9489 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9493 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9494 innovation
—again,
9495 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9499 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9500 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9501 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9502 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9505 As I described in chapter
10, despite this feature of copyright as
9506 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9507 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,
<footnote><para>
9508 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9511 overall this history of copyright
9512 is not bad. As chapter
10 details, when new technologies have come
9513 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9514 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9515 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9518 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9519 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9520 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9521 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9522 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9525 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9526 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9527 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
180 F.
3d
1072 (
9th
9528 Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9529 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9531 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9533 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9534 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9535 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9537 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
1029 (C.D.
9538 Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9539 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9540 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9543 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9544 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.
<footnote><para>
9545 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9546 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9547 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9548 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9550 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9551 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9552 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9553 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9554 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9555 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9556 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9557 World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34, available at
9558 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9561 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9567 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9568 As I described in chapter
4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9569 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9570 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9571 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous
9572 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9573 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9575 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9576 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9579 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9580 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9581 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9582 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9583 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9585 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9586 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9588 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9591 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9593 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9594 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9595 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9596 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9598 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9601 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9602 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9603 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9604 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9606 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9607 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9608 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9609 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9610 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9611 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9612 in to this new form of radio.
9616 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9617 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9619 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9621 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9622 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9624 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9625 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9629 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9630 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9632 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9633 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9635 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9636 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9637 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9638 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9640 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9641 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9643 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9644 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9645 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.
<footnote><para>
9646 <!-- f12. --> Lessing,
239.
9651 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not because
9653 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9654 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"
<footnote><para>
9655 <!-- f13. --> Ibid.,
229.
9659 the growth of this competing technology.
9662 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9663 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9664 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9665 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9666 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9670 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9671 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9673 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9674 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9676 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9677 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9678 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9680 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9681 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9682 neutral toward Internet radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio
9683 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9686 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9687 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed
9689 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9690 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9691 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote><para>
9692 <!-- f14. --> This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9694 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example
9695 offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw
9696 (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain
9697 submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected.
9698 See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
9699 and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP DTRA
1 and
2,
9701 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9702 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker,
9703 "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution," Antitrust
9704 Bulletin (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was not confusion, these are just
9705 old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected from
9707 entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the
9708 name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of
9710 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9712 A regular radio station broadcasting the same
9713 content would pay no equivalent fee.
9716 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9717 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9718 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9721 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9723 name of the service;
9726 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9729 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9732 date of transmission;
9735 time of transmission;
9738 time zone of origination of transmission;
9741 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9744 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9747 sound recording title;
9750 ISRC code of the recording;
9753 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9756 featured recording artist;
9765 UPC code of the retail album;
9771 copyright owner information;
9774 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9777 name of the service or entity;
9783 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9786 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9789 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9792 Unique User identifier;
9795 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9800 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9801 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9802 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9803 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9804 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9808 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9809 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9810 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9813 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed
9815 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9816 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9820 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9821 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9822 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9823 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9824 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9825 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9827 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9828 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9830 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9831 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9832 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9836 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9837 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9838 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9839 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9843 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9844 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9845 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9846 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9847 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9848 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9849 effective to prevent it.
9852 <sect2 id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9853 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9855 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9857 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9858 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9861 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9862 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9863 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9866 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9867 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9868 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times,
43 million
9869 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9870 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9871 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9872 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9873 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9874 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9876 According to the RIAA,
9877 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9878 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9881 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9882 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9884 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9885 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9886 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9888 response by the other.
9891 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9892 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9893 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9894 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9895 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9896 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9897 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9898 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9899 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9900 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9901 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9902 was.
<footnote><para>
9903 <!-- f16. --> Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9904 Angeles Times,
10 September
2003, Business.
9906 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to
9908 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9909 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9910 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9911 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9912 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9916 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9917 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9919 with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9921 of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war against
9922 drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent of its
9923 preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition, consumption was
9924 up to
70 percent of the preprohibition level. Americans were drinking
9925 just about as much, but now, a vast number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9926 <!-- f17. --> Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9928 American Economic Review
81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9933 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of
9935 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9936 <!-- f18. --> National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9937 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9938 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9941 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of the
9942 population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9944 of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9945 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly cheat.
<footnote><para>
9946 <!-- f19. --> See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9948 Journal of Economic Literature
36 (
1998):
818 (survey of compliance
9952 pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of ordinary
9953 behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a huge
9955 of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9958 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9959 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law students
9960 about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie Nesson told
9961 a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands of students
9962 who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed alcohol and
9963 sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes, illegally driven
9964 cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is increasingly the
9965 norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to teach them how
9966 to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or keep client funds
9968 or honor a demand to disclose a document that will mean that
9969 your case is over. Generations of Americans
—more significantly in
9970 some parts of America than in others, but still, everywhere in America
9971 today
—can't live their lives both normally and legally, since "normally"
9972 entails a certain degree of illegality.
9975 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9976 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn how
9977 to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9979 in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9981 and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended and
9982 collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be changed.
9983 Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much greater than
9984 the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason to consider the
9989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9990 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9991 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9992 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9993 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9994 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9997 My point is instead one that democracies understood for
9999 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law
10000 depends upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more
10002 we as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect
10003 the law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
10004 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law or
10005 not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care whether
10006 my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law sow
10008 disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they impose.
10009 Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
10011 this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to call these
10012 twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
10015 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from
10016 the Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
10017 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
10019 is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should be
10020 whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to achieve
10021 the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another way to
10022 assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three million
10023 Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other ways to
10024 assure that artists get paid without transforming America into a nation
10028 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
10031 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These
10032 pieces of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought.
10033 The law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
10035 infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a used
10037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
10038 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
10039 recordings is free.
10042 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
10043 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
10044 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
10045 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
10046 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
10047 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
10048 capacities of digital technologies.
10050 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
10052 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
10053 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
10054 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
10055 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
10056 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
10057 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
10058 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
10059 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
10060 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
10063 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
10064 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10065 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
10066 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10067 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10068 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10069 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10070 on people's machines.
10073 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10074 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10075 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10076 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10077 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10078 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10080 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10081 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10082 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10083 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
10084 management" system.
10087 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10088 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10089 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10090 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10091 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10092 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10093 freedom to move content easily?
10096 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10097 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10098 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10099 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10100 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10101 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10102 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10103 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10104 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10107 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10109 forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient feature
10110 of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different market for
10111 producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few, who today
10112 control the vast majority of the distribution of content in the world,
10113 would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather, they would go
10114 the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10117 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already
10118 saddled Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against
10119 this new form of competition. For them the choice is between
10121 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10124 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10126 why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10128 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10129 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10131 as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10132 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10134 to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10136 As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von Lohmann
10137 describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises whenever you turn
10138 a very large percentage of the population into criminals." This is the
10139 collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
10142 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
10147 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10149 to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright infringer,
10150 how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a copyright
10151 infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of your
10152 computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10153 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh,
10154 well, but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this
10155 campaign against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable
10157 of the American Internet-using population into
10162 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10163 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10164 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10167 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the
10168 RIAA launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn
10169 over the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating
10170 copyright law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple
10172 to a judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the
10173 identity of an Internet user is revealed.
10177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10178 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general
10179 strategy to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10180 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10181 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10183 computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music, the
10184 family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop the
10185 RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10186 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
10187 <!-- f20. --> See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10188 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10190 Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents Pull
10191 Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on File
10192 Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid Being
10193 Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson Graham,
10194 "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today,
15 September
2003,
4D;
10195 John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop Fan, Either,"
10196 New York Times,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is Brianna a
10197 Criminal?" Toronto Star,
18 September
2003, P7.
10202 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10203 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10204 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
10205 <!-- f21. --> See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry
10207 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10208 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
10210 Using a sophisticated
10211 hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in effect a fingerprint of
10212 every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of one of those MP3s will
10213 have the same "fingerprint."
10216 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10217 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just like the
10218 cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and neither does
10219 your daughter, where these songs came from. But she copies these
10220 songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to college and
10221 connects it to a college network, and if the college network is
10223 with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't properly protected
10224 her content from the network (do you know how to do that yourself ?),
10225 then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter as a "criminal."
10226 And under the rules that universities are beginning to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10227 <!-- f22. --> See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent," Boston
10228 Globe,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens, "Four Students Sued
10229 over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at Colleges,"
10231 Post,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong, "Students `Rip, Mix,
10232 Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science Monitor,
2 September
2003,
10233 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music Pirate Hunt Turns to
10235 Two Students Names Are Handed Over; Lawsuit Possible," Chicago
10236 Tribune,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA Trains Antipiracy Guns on
10237 Universities," Internet News,
30 January
2003, available at
10238 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
48</ulink>; Benny
10239 Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman Orientation This Fall to
10240 Include Record Industry Warnings Against File Sharing," San Francisco
10241 Chronicle,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid, Letters Are Weapons at
10243 USA Today,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10246 daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer network.
10247 She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10250 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10251 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can plead
10252 that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or that
10253 they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university believes
10254 her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat this
10256 as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of college students
10258 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10259 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10260 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10265 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10266 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10267 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10268 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog
10269 where you could randomly choose any person off the street and be
10270 confident that they were committing an unlawful act that could
10271 put them on the hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of
10272 millions of dollars of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but
10273 speeding isn't the kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit
10274 civil liberties. Some people use drugs, and I think that's the
10276 analog, [but] many have noted that the war against drugs has
10277 eroded all of our civil liberties because it's treated so many
10279 as criminals. Well, I think it's fair to say that file sharing
10280 is an order of magnitude larger number of Americans than drug
10281 use. . . . If forty to sixty million Americans have become
10283 then we're really on a slippery slope to lose a lot of civil
10284 liberties for all forty to sixty million of them.
10288 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals"
10289 under the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10290 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being considered
10291 "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law? Which is
10293 a constant war on our own people or a concerted effort through
10294 our democracy to change our law?
10297 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10301 <chapter id=
"c-balances">
10302 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10304 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10306 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10307 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10308 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10309 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10312 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10313 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to stop
—or
10315 she understands just why she should stop
—the bucket is in the air.
10316 The gasoline is about to hit the blazing car. And the fire that gasoline
10317 will ignite is about to ignite everything around.
10320 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on the
10321 wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10323 No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies change.
10324 The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use technology
10325 to protect themselves against the current threats of the Internet. This
10326 is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10330 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10331 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to eliminate
10332 the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is not the real
10333 threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small fire in the
10335 there is a massive change in the way culture is made that is
10340 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more
10342 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to
10343 avoid pouring gasoline onto this fire.
10346 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a
10348 binary view. However much many people push to frame this
10350 more broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We
10351 rubberneck to look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on
10355 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10356 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small brace
10357 of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this debate. We must
10358 understand these failures if we're to understand what success will
10362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10363 <sect1 id=
"eldred">
10364 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10367 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to like
10368 Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at least
10369 one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10371 living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10372 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10373 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10377 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10379 any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment gave
10380 birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build a
10381 library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10382 them available for free.
10385 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10386 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10387 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10388 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10389 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10391 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne,
10392 and many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10393 accessible
—today.
10396 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the
10397 same source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10398 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10400 of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10401 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10402 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10403 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10404 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10405 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10407 publications of public domain works.
10410 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications
10411 of public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are
10413 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world
10414 have discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share
10415 works that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we
10416 might call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10417 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10419 causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10421 and groups dedicated to spreading culture generally.
<footnote><para>
10422 <!-- f1. --> There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to describe, but
10423 it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet created was a world
10424 of noncommercial pornographers
—people who were distributing porn
10425 but were not making money directly or indirectly from that distribution.
10426 Such a class didn't exist before the Internet came into being because the
10427 costs of distributing porn were so high. Yet this new class of distributors
10428 got special attention in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down
10429 the Communications Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the
10430 burden on noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed
10431 Congress's power. The same point could have been made about
10433 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10434 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it at
10435 least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to protect
10442 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10443 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10444 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public library.
10445 But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter
10, in
1998, for
10446 the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the terms of
10448 copyrights
—this time by twenty years. Eldred would not be free to
10449 add any works more recent than
1923 to his collection until
2019.
10451 no copyrighted work would pass into the public domain until
10452 that year (and not even then, if Congress extends the term again). By
10453 contrast, in the same period, more than
1 million patents will pass into
10458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10459 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10460 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10461 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10463 should be forever."
<footnote><para>
10464 <!-- f2. --> The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection to
10465 last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
10466 Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our
10468 laws in all of the ways available to us. As you know, there is also Jack
10469 Valenti's proposal for a term to last forever less one day. Perhaps the
10471 may look at that next Congress,"
144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2
10477 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10478 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10479 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10480 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10481 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10482 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10486 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10488 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10490 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10491 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10493 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10497 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10498 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10499 their . . . Writings. . . .
10503 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10504 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10505 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10506 something
—for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10507 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10509 "promote . . . Progress"
—through means that are also specific
—
10510 by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
10513 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10515 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10516 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10517 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10518 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10519 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10521 has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what
10522 the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms "on the installment
10523 plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10526 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10527 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10529 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10530 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10531 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the
10532 practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10533 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10534 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to
10535 keep this gravy train going.
10538 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10539 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
10540 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10542 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce
10543 it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can
10544 do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must do
—and those
10545 things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10548 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10549 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10550 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10551 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10553 to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10555 greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher would
10556 pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be published
10557 by anyone for free.
10560 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10561 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10562 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10563 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10567 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10570 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10571 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10575 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10576 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10577 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10578 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10581 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10585 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10586 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10587 they support the bill."
10590 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10591 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10592 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10596 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10597 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10598 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10599 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
10602 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10603 correct conclusion:
10606 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10607 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10609 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10612 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10614 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10615 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
10618 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10619 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10620 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10621 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10622 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10623 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10625 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10626 the copyright term extended.
10629 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10631 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10632 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10635 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10637 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10638 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10639 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10640 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10641 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10642 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10643 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
10644 Chicago Tribune,
17 October
1998,
22.
10646 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10647 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10648 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10649 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10651 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10653 Disney is estimated to have
10654 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10655 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10656 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10658 Quarterly This Week,
8 August
1990, available at
10659 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10664 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10665 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10667 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10668 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10669 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10670 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10671 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10673 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10677 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10678 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10679 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10680 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10681 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10683 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10686 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10690 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10691 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10692 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10694 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10695 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10700 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10701 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10703 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10704 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10706 to impose no limit.
10709 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10710 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10711 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10712 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10713 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10714 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10715 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10716 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10717 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10719 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10722 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10724 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10725 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10727 If anything Congress says is interstate
10728 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10729 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10730 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.
<footnote><para>
10731 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10736 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10737 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10738 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10739 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10741 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10742 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10743 commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10744 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10745 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10746 to regulate copyrights
—the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10748 And if it is applied to the
10749 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10751 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10752 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10754 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10755 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10756 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10758 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10759 existing copyrights.
10762 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10763 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics
—a conservative
10764 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10765 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10767 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10768 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10769 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10770 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10772 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10773 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10776 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10777 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10779 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10780 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy
—piracy of
10781 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10782 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10783 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10785 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10786 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10787 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10788 work. But now these entities were using their power
—expressed
10789 through the power of lobbyists' money
—to get another twenty-year
10790 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10791 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10794 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10796 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10797 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10798 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<footnote><para>
10799 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
10800 186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available at
10801 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10804 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10805 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10806 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10809 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10811 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10813 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10814 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10815 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10816 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10817 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10818 bought to extend them again.
10821 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10823 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10824 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10826 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10828 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10829 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10830 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10831 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10833 and no longer available as a result.
10836 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10837 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10838 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10839 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10840 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10841 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10842 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10844 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10845 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
7, available at
10846 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10851 Think practically about the consequence of this
10852 extension
—practically,
10853 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10855 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10856 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10857 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10858 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10860 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10863 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10864 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10865 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10866 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10867 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10868 list of books still under copyright.
10871 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10872 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10875 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10877 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10878 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10879 being at least a list?
10882 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10883 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10885 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10887 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10888 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10891 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10893 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10897 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10898 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10899 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10901 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10902 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10903 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10906 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10907 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10908 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10910 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10911 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10912 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10914 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10915 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10916 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10917 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10918 know quite well who owns what property.
10921 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10922 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10924 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10925 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10926 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10927 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10928 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10929 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10930 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10933 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10934 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10936 for other creative works is much more dire.
10938 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
10940 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10941 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10942 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10943 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10944 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10945 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10946 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10947 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
10948 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10949 films."
<footnote><para>
10951 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10952 Los Angeles Times,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10953 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10954 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
9 October
2002.
10959 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10960 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10961 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10962 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10965 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10968 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10969 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10970 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10971 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10972 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10973 work available for distribution.
10976 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10977 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10978 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10979 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10980 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10981 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10982 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10984 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
10985 618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10986 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10987 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10992 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10994 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10995 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10996 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10997 locate the copyright owner.
11000 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
11001 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
11002 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
11003 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
11004 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
11009 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
11010 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
11011 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
11012 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
11013 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
11014 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
11015 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
11016 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
11017 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
11020 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
11022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
11023 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
11025 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
11026 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
11027 the copyright expires.
11030 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
11031 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
11032 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
11034 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
11038 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
11039 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
11040 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
11041 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
11043 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
11047 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
11048 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
11050 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
11051 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
11052 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
11054 the commercial life ends.
11057 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
11058 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
11059 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
11061 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
11063 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
11064 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
11065 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
11066 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
11067 have, we need to have access to this history.
11070 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
11072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
11073 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
11074 this context do no good.
11077 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
11078 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
11079 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
11080 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
11081 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used book
11082 store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the copyright
11083 owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its commercial
11084 life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
11087 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
11088 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were so high, it
11089 was never at all feasible to preserve or restore film. Like the remains of
11090 a great dinner, when it's over, it's over. Once a film passed out of its
11091 commercial life, it may have been archived for a bit, but that was the
11092 end of its life so long as the market didn't have more to offer.
11095 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11096 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11097 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11098 would not have interfered with anything.
11101 But this situation has now changed.
11104 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11105 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11106 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11107 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11108 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone, forever. Once
11109 a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it and make it
11111 to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give new life to
11113 material after it passes out of its commercial life. It is now
11114 possible to preserve and assure universal access to this knowledge and
11115 culture, whereas before it was not.
11118 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11119 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of
11121 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right of
11122 copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11124 of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any other
11125 aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make these
11126 things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who just want
11127 to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were written for a
11132 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms:
11133 Now that technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria,
11134 the law gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11135 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
11137 market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about culture
11138 after it has lived its commercial life. In this context, copyright is
11140 no purpose at all related to the spread of knowledge. In this
11142 copyright is not an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11145 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11146 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11147 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11151 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest
11152 that publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
11153 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11155 the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role of a
11157 is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you think the
11158 role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its role is to archive
11159 culture, whether there's a demand for any particular bit of that culture
11160 or not
—then we can't count on the commercial market to do our
11165 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11166 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11167 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11168 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11171 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11173 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11174 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11175 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure to
11176 provide that value.
<footnote><para>
11177 <!-- f13. --> Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20
11180 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
11185 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in
11187 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11188 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11189 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
11191 the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that
11193 terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11196 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11198 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11200 our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11201 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11202 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11205 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11206 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
11207 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11208 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11209 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11210 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had to
11211 interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11213 Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11214 power to extend existing terms.
11217 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11218 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11219 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11220 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11223 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11224 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11226 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11227 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11228 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11233 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11234 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11235 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11236 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11237 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11240 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11241 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11242 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
11243 briefs and preparing for argument.
11246 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still astonishingly
11247 hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you know that we
11248 lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just the
11250 you probably think there was no way this case could have been
11251 won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives by
11252 well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11253 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11255 to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11258 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11259 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11260 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11264 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the
11265 very end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11267 lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had moved
11268 to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of heat
11269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11270 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11272 this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11273 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11275 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11277 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11278 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11279 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11280 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11281 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11282 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11283 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11284 most powerful media companies in the world."
11287 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11288 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11289 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11290 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11291 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11292 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11293 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11294 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11296 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11297 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11299 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11300 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11301 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11303 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11304 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11305 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11308 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11309 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11310 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11311 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11312 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11313 why it was unconstitutional.
11316 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11318 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11319 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11320 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11321 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11322 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11323 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11325 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11326 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11327 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11328 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11329 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11330 gather the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11331 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11332 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11335 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11336 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11338 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11339 November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11341 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11342 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11343 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11344 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11345 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11346 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11347 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11348 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11351 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11353 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11354 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11355 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11356 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11357 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11360 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse
11361 as it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11363 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11364 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/
11365 Linux possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11367 by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11369 scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11370 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11372 of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief by
11373 Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11376 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11377 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11378 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11379 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11382 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11384 I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued that
11385 unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film would
11386 disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely clear.
11388 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11389 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11391 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11392 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11393 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11394 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11395 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11396 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11397 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11398 nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the fancy term economists use
11399 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11402 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we
11404 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been
11405 with us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court,
11406 we added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court:
11407 Alan Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group
11408 that had made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories
11409 in the Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and
11410 dean, Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11413 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11415 former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11418 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11419 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11420 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11421 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand
11422 up for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief
11423 lawyer in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11424 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11425 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11427 disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of confidence in
11431 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11432 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11433 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11434 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11438 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to
11439 gain from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11440 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11442 such power induced. And of course it was not surprising that the
11443 copyright holders would defend the idea that they should continue to
11444 have the right to control who did what with content they wanted to
11448 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11449 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11450 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11451 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11452 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11453 pornography."
<footnote><para>
11455 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537
11456 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11458 That was also the motive of
11459 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11460 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11461 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11463 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11464 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times,
28 March
1998, B7.
11468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11469 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11470 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11473 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11475 When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11477 Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will favor.
11478 Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin estate
11479 and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years to
11481 the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do better
11482 with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward the
11483 popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11485 gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way, that's just
11486 what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11489 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the
11490 CTEA mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11491 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market; it
11492 would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11494 through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11495 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond
11496 preparing for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11499 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11500 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11501 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11502 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11503 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11504 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11505 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11509 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11510 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice
11511 Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that the
11513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11514 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to
11516 its powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the
11517 Court's role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11518 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11519 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11522 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11523 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11524 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11526 of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11528 and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11529 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11530 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11532 to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little sense.
11535 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also
11536 viewed as unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter
11537 strongly favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both
11538 were also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11540 there was a very important free speech argument against these
11541 retrospective extensions.
11544 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11545 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11546 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11547 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11548 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11549 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11552 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11553 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11554 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11556 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11557 most important jurisprudential innovation
—the argument that Judge
11558 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11559 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11562 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11563 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11566 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11567 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11568 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11569 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11570 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11571 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11572 copyright be limited.
11575 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11577 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11579 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11580 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11581 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11584 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11585 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11586 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11588 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11591 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11593 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11594 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11595 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11597 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11599 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11600 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11602 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11603 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11604 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11606 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11607 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11609 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11610 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11611 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11614 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11615 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11616 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11617 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11619 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11620 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11623 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11625 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11626 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11627 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11628 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11631 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11632 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11633 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11634 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11635 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11637 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11639 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11640 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11641 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11642 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11643 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11644 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11645 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11646 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11647 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11648 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11649 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11652 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11653 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11656 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11657 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11658 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11659 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11661 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11662 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11663 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11664 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11665 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11666 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11667 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11668 family of the Justices.
11671 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11672 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11673 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11674 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11677 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11678 The history was bothering her.
11682 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11683 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11684 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11685 practice that began with the very first act.
11689 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11690 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11691 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11695 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11696 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11697 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11698 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11703 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11704 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11705 Kennedy, who observed,
11709 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11710 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11711 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11712 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11713 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11717 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11723 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11724 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11725 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11726 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11728 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11731 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11733 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11734 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11735 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11736 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11737 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11740 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11741 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11742 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11745 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11747 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11749 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11753 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11754 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11757 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11758 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11760 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11761 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11762 into the Copyright Clause.
11766 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11767 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11768 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11772 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11774 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11775 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11776 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11781 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11782 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11783 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11784 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11785 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11786 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11787 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause
—
11788 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11790 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11791 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11794 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11795 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11797 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11798 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11802 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11803 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11804 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11805 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11807 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11809 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11810 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11811 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11812 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11814 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11816 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in
11817 particular, the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule
11818 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11821 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11822 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11823 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11824 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11825 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11828 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11829 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11830 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11833 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11834 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11835 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11838 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11840 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11842 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11843 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11844 in the Court's opinion.
11848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11849 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11850 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11852 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11855 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11856 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11857 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11858 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11861 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11862 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11863 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11864 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11865 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11866 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11867 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11868 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11872 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers'
11874 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent five
—get to
11875 select the part of the Constitution they would enforce based on the
11877 they thought important? We were right back to the argument that
11878 I said I hated at the start: I had failed to convince them that the issue
11879 here was important, and I had failed to recognize that however much I
11880 might hate a system in which the Court gets to pick the constitutional
11881 values that it will respect, that is the system we have.
11884 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11885 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition of
11886 intellectual property law should not support this unjustified extension
11887 of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that had
11889 in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of the Court
11890 discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the very same words
11891 in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally different things
11893 upon whether the words were about patents or copyrights.
11894 The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11898 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11899 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11901 was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11903 has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had said
11904 that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8 percent of
11905 the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong, that the
11907 number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either way, the
11908 point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be "limited," and
11909 the existing term was so long as to be effectively unlimited, then it was
11913 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11914 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11915 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11916 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11917 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11920 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11921 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11922 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11925 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11926 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11927 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11929 I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having tried
11930 to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of integrity.
11931 These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the proper mode
11932 of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to first understand
11933 the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in light of the structure
11934 of the Constitution. That method had produced Lopez and many other
11935 "originalist" rulings. Where was their "originalism" now?
11938 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11939 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11940 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11941 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11943 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11944 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11945 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11946 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11948 to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11949 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that they
11950 liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their own
11954 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11956 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11959 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11961 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11962 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11963 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11964 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11965 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11966 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11967 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11968 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11969 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11972 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11973 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11975 in different directions, where the truth about the harm that
11976 this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to this
11977 Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I, idiotically,
11978 corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith wanted to be shown
11979 the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher, reframed the
11981 to make the logical point. I had shown them how they could strike
11982 this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a hundred places
11983 where I could have helped them want to, yet my stubbornness, my
11985 to give in, stopped me. I have stood before hundreds of audiences
11986 trying to persuade; I have used passion in that effort to persuade; but I
11987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11988 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11990 I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court should
11993 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11995 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11996 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
12000 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
12001 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
12002 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
12003 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
12006 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
12007 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
12008 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
12009 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
12013 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
12014 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
12016 property professors stated publicly that my bringing this case was
12017 a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this issue should
12018 not be raised until it is.
12021 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
12022 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
12023 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
12024 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
12025 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
12026 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
12027 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
12028 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
12029 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
12030 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
12031 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
12033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
12034 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
12036 of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good thing,
12037 even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision was attacked,
12038 it was attacked because it left standing a silly and harmful law. The New
12039 York Times wrote in its editorial,
12043 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
12044 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
12045 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand
12047 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw
12048 freely on the entire creative output of humanity is one of the
12050 we live in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
12054 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
12056 images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from my view
12057 of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page. The
12058 "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch in the face felt
12062 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
12063 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
12064 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
12065 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had in
12066 our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
12068 the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
12069 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
12071 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
12073 <sect1 id=
"eldred-ii">
12074 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
12076 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
12077 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
12078 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
12079 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
12080 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
12081 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
12082 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
12084 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
12086 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
12087 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
12088 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
12089 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
12090 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
12091 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
12092 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
12093 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
12096 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
12097 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
12098 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
12099 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
12100 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
12101 the work passed into the public domain.
12104 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
12105 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
12106 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
12109 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
12110 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
12111 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
12112 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
12113 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
12114 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
12115 everything else, let the content go.
12118 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes
12120 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
12121 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity, people
12122 can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good Republican
12123 might say, here government regulation is simply getting in the way of
12124 innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might say, here the
12125 government is blocking access and the spread of knowledge for no
12126 good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference between Democrats
12127 and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize the stupid harm
12128 of the present system.
12131 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12133 For one of the hardest things about the current system for
12134 people who want to license content is that there is no obvious place to
12135 look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is not
12137 since marking content is not required, since no formality at all
12138 is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate copyright owners to ask
12139 permission to use or license their work. This system would lower these
12140 costs, by establishing at least one registry where copyright owners
12141 could be identified.
12144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12145 As I described in chapter
10, formalities in copyright law were
12147 in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by
12149 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
12150 <!-- f1. --> Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12151 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12153 such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of the
12155 claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act, every text
12156 of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the exercise" of
12157 rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject to any
12159 The prohibition against formalities is presently embodied in Article
12160 5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne Convention. Many countries continue
12161 to impose some form of deposit or registration requirement, albeit not as
12162 a condition of copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of
12163 copies of works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12164 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12165 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12166 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12168 or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International Intellectual
12169 Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation Press,
2001),
12174 are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural rights
12175 don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12177 that required copyright owners to follow form if their rights were
12178 to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly respect the
12179 dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my creativity, not
12180 upon the special favor of the government.
12183 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12185 copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because a
12186 world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12187 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12188 know what's protected and what's not.
12191 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in Berlin
12192 in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12194 in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty years, as well as
12195 the abolition of copyright formalities. The formalities were hated
12197 the stories of inadvertent loss were increasingly common. It was
12198 as if a Charles Dickens character ran all copyright offices, and the
12200 to dot an i or cross a t resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12203 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12204 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law should
12205 always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no reason
12206 copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning formalities
12208 the response in Berlin should have been to embrace a more
12210 system of registration.
12213 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12214 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12215 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12216 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12218 imposed upon creators.
12221 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
12222 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12225 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a table,
12226 his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with the
12228 He has a property right over the table "naturally," and he can
12229 assert that right against anyone who would steal the table, whether or
12230 not he has informed the government of his ownership of the table.
12233 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For
12234 the argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12235 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12237 turns upon the special problems that creative property
12239 The law of formalities responds to the special physics of creative
12240 property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly spread.
12243 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12244 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land is
12245 to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property just
12246 because you must register the car with the state and tag it with a
12248 In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an important
12249 reason to secure registration
—both because it makes the markets more
12250 efficient and because it better secures the rights of the owner. Without
12251 a registration system for land, landowners would perpetually have to
12252 guard their property. With registration, they can simply point the
12254 to a deed. Without a registration system for cars, auto theft would
12255 be much easier. With a registration system, the thief has a high burden
12256 to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is placed on the property owner, but
12257 those burdens produce a much better system of protection for property
12261 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12262 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12263 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12264 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12265 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12266 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12267 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12268 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12271 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
12275 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12276 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12277 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12278 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12279 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12280 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12281 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12282 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12285 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12287 to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes a
12288 huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12290 can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12291 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the copyright
12292 system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been seen before
12293 because there are no formalities.
12296 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12297 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12298 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12299 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12300 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12303 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12304 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12305 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12306 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12307 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12310 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12312 the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the hassle
12313 worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with registration?
12316 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12317 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12318 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12320 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12321 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12322 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12323 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12324 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12325 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12326 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12327 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12328 historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of commercial
12329 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12330 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12333 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12334 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12335 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12336 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12339 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12340 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12341 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12342 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12343 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12344 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12345 something good might happen here.
12348 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12349 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12350 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12351 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12352 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12353 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12356 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12357 concept in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That
12358 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12359 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12360 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12361 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12362 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12363 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12364 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12365 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12366 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12367 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12368 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12369 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12370 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12371 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12372 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12373 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12374 film is a valid derivative use.
12377 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12378 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12379 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12380 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12381 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12382 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12385 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12386 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12387 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12388 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12389 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12390 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12391 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12395 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12396 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12397 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12398 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12403 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12404 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12405 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12406 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12407 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12408 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12409 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12410 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12411 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12412 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12415 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12416 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12417 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12418 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12419 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12420 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12421 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12422 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12425 What does this industry really want?
12428 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12429 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12430 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12431 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12432 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12433 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12434 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12438 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12439 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12440 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12441 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12442 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12445 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12446 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12448 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12449 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12450 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12451 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12452 and to share its own creation.
12455 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12456 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12457 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12458 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12459 block the progress of others.
12462 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12463 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12464 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12465 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12466 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12467 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12468 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12473 <chapter id=
"c-conclusion">
12474 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12476 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12477 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12478 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12479 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12480 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12483 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12484 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12485 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12486 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12487 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12488 the disease almost invisible.
12491 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12492 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12493 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12494 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12496 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12497 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12498 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12499 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
12501 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12503 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12504 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12508 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12509 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12510 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12511 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12512 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12513 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12514 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12517 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12518 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12519 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12520 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12521 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12522 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12523 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12524 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12528 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12529 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12530 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12531 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12532 costs significantly below the market price.
12535 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12536 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12537 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12538 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12539 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12540 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12541 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote><para>
12542 <!-- f2. --> See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12543 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12547 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12548 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12550 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12551 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."
<footnote><para>
12552 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12553 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12555 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12556 2000),
14, available at
12557 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12558 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12559 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12560 Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess., Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57
12561 (statement of James Love).
12564 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12565 asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add pressure to that
12567 in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12568 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12569 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12571 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12573 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12574 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12576 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12578 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent
—
12579 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12580 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12581 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12582 of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12583 <!-- f4. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12584 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12586 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12591 We should place the intervention by the United States in context.
12592 No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans
12593 don't have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12594 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12595 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their
12596 demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12598 there was an effect from our government's intervention to stop
12599 the flow of medications into Africa.
12602 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12603 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12604 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12605 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12606 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12607 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12610 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12611 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12612 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12613 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12614 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12615 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12619 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12621 which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument
12622 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12623 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12624 <!-- f5. --> See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12625 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle,
24
12626 May
1999, A1, available at
12627 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink> ("compulsory licenses and gray
12629 pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property protection");
12630 Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
12632 to Essential Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus
4:
23 (August
1999),
12634 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink> (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS,
12635 Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
12636 Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a
12638 Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring
2001):
175.
12639 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12641 It was because "intellectual property"
12642 would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was
12643 a principle about the importance of "intellectual property" that led
12644 these government actors to intervene against the South African
12649 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12650 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12651 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12653 cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans, and
12654 whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an idea?
12655 What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results
12656 in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so
12657 many to die for such an abstraction?
12660 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12661 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12662 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12663 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12664 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12665 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12668 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12669 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to sell their
12670 drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere.
12671 There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn't get
12672 back into the United States, but those are mere problems of
12674 They could be overcome.
12677 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12678 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12679 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12680 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12681 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?" Because there is no "sound
12682 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12683 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12684 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12686 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12687 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12688 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12689 idea called "intellectual property."
12692 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12693 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12694 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12695 What is the argument?
12698 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the
12699 patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly
12700 the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and
12701 strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the
12702 spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could
12703 endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block
12704 the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market
12705 prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12706 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were
12707 balanced in just this sense.
12710 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12711 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12713 A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our
12714 tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with consequences
12715 more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other
12716 single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12717 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much
12718 happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically
12719 do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice
12720 how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12721 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that
12722 we don't even question when the control of that property removes our
12723 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12724 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12725 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12726 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12727 this common sense open its eyes.
12730 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12731 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12732 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12733 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12734 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12735 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12736 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12737 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12738 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12739 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12740 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12741 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12744 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12745 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12746 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12747 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12748 August
2003, E1, available at
12749 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12750 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12751 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12752 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12753 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12754 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12755 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12757 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had
12759 to hold a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to
12760 create public goods." These are projects that have been successful in
12761 producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary
12762 use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the
12763 World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of
12765 in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support
12766 open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science
12768 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12769 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12770 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12772 a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12773 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12774 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12775 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12777 IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included
12778 the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the
12779 early
1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12782 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12783 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12784 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12785 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12786 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12789 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12790 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12793 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12795 work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12797 And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12798 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12802 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12803 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12804 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information
12806 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked
12807 what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12808 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12809 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12811 to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12812 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12813 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12814 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12816 minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual
12817 property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an
12818 "Information Society" unless one also talked about the range of
12820 and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my
12822 moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the
12823 scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of
12824 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12825 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12826 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12827 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12830 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual
12832 I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and
12833 should. And thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to
12834 create public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO
12838 But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial,
12839 at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source and free
12841 Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From
12842 its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software
12843 would be like a conference to discuss Apple's operating system. Both
12844 open source and free software compete with Microsoft's software. And
12845 internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements
12846 that they use open source or free software, rather than "proprietary
12847 software," for their own internal uses.
12850 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12851 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12853 software. There are many important companies that depend
12855 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12856 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12857 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"
—and IBM is
12858 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12859 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12860 support a mode of software development that is different from
12861 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12862 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12864 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12865 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12867 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12869 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12870 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12872 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12873 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12874 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
2002),
69,
12876 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12878 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12879 Stern School of Business (
3 May
2001), available at
12880 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12884 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12885 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12886 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12887 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12888 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12890 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12891 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12892 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12893 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12894 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12895 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12896 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12897 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12898 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12899 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12902 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12903 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12904 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12905 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12906 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12907 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12908 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12910 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at
<ulink
12911 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12913 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12916 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12917 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12918 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12919 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12920 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12921 its lobbying efforts.
12924 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12925 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12926 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12927 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12928 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12929 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12930 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12934 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12936 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12938 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12939 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12940 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12941 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12942 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12943 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12944 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12945 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12948 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12949 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12950 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12951 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12952 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12953 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12954 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12955 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12956 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12957 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12958 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12961 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12962 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12963 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12964 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12965 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12966 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12967 $
20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12968 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12969 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12970 right to decide what to do with their property.
12973 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12974 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12975 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12976 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12977 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12978 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12979 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12980 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12981 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12985 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12986 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12987 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12988 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12989 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12990 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12991 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12992 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12993 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12997 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12998 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12999 <!-- f10. --> See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism,
210–20.
13001 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
13002 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
13003 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
13006 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
13007 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
13008 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
13009 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
13013 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
13014 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
13015 should be to promote the right balance of intellectualproperty rights,
13016 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
13017 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
13018 say anything wrong. But in the world
13019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
13020 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
13021 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
13025 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
13026 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
13027 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
13028 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
13029 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
13030 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
13031 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
13032 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
13035 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
13036 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
13037 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
13038 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
13039 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
13040 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
13043 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
13044 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
13045 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
13046 our own country's history).
13049 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
13050 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
13051 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
13052 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
13053 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
13054 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
13055 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
13056 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
13057 democracy in the world, become?
13060 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
13061 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
13062 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
13063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
13064 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
13065 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
13068 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon.
13069 There are moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that
13070 surprise. When the FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules,
13071 which would thereby further increase the concentration in media
13073 an extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this
13074 change. For perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the
13075 NRA, the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and
13076 CodePink Women for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC
13077 policy. An astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC,
13079 more hearings and a different result.
13082 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad
13084 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile
13086 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement
13087 had become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision,
13088 and there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
13093 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
13094 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
13095 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
13097 The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not mean
13098 that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
13101 The danger in media concentration comes not from the
13103 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
13104 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
13106 companies that control an ever expanding slice of the media. It
13107 is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated range of
13108 rights
—property rights of a historically extreme form
—that makes
13111 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
13113 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
13115 and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood as being
13116 about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We Americans have a
13117 long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That we could be
13119 to fight "big" again is not something new.
13122 It would be something new, and something very important, if an
13123 equal number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built
13124 within the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien
13125 to our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
13127 the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything called
13128 "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
13131 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
13135 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
13136 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
13137 <!-- f11. --> John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com,
13138 September
2003, available at
13139 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul R. La Monica, "Music
13141 Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8 September
2003, available at
13142 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a
13143 Song, N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily
13144 News,
9 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet
13146 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13147 Defendants," Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13148 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News,
10 September
2003,
13151 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
13155 has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's music.
<footnote><para>
13156 <!-- f12. --> Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady," mtv.com,
13157 17 September
2003, available at
13158 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
13161 story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
13163 making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
13164 <!-- f13. --> Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13166 Songs," Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
13167 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
13168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13170 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists
13171 he must remain anonymous
—reports "an amazing conversation with
13172 these studio guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd
13173 love to use but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've
13174 got scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but
13175 it would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
13177 about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers thought
13178 to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for kids who
13179 use a computer to share content.
13182 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13183 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
13184 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
13185 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
13186 24 August
2003, available at
13187 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
13190 culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero of Brazilian music,
13191 has joined with Creative Commons to release content and free licenses
13192 in that Latin American country.
<footnote><para>
13193 <!-- f15. --> "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
13195 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
13197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13198 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13199 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13200 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13201 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13202 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13203 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13204 day into the Causbys.
13207 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13208 potential is ever to be realized.
13210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13214 <chapter id=
"c-afterword">
13215 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
13218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13219 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that
13221 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of
13222 this book maps what might be done.
13225 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13226 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13227 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13228 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13231 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must
13233 a significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13235 musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this story in their
13236 own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle is so important.
13239 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13240 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13241 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13242 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13243 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13248 <title>US, NOW
</title>
13250 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so
13251 far has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
13253 or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If that
13255 is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13258 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13260 in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there is. There
13261 are those who believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights Reserved"
—
13262 and those who reject copyright
—"No Rights Reserved." The "All
13263 Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask permission before
13264 you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No Rights Reserved"
13265 sorts believe you should be able to do with content as you wish,
13267 of whether you have permission or not.
13270 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13271 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13272 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13274 of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under the
13276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13277 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13278 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13282 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13283 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13284 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13285 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13287 of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13289 made the effective default "no rights reserved," the future
13290 architecture will make the effective default "all rights reserved." The
13292 and law that surround the Internet's design will increasingly
13293 produce an environment where all use of content requires permission.
13294 The "cut and paste" world that defines the Internet today will become
13295 a "get permission to cut and paste" world that is a creator's nightmare.
13298 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither "all
13299 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"
—
13300 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content
13301 as they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of
13303 that we could just take for granted before.
13306 <sect2 id=
"examples">
13307 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
13309 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13311 this problem from other contexts. Think about privacy. Before
13312 the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much about data about
13313 our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you walked into a bookstore
13314 and browsed through some of the works of Karl Marx, you didn't need
13315 to worry about explaining your browsing habits to your neighbors or
13316 boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was assured.
13319 What made it assured?
13321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13323 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13324 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13325 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13326 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13328 working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be assured.
13329 But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable enough to
13330 spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of us (again,
13331 we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient architecture of
13332 real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount of privacy. That
13333 privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law (there is no law
13335 "privacy" in public places), and in many places, not by norms
13336 (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead, by the costs that
13338 imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13340 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13342 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13343 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13344 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13345 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13346 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13347 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13348 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13349 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13352 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13353 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13354 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13355 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13356 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13357 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13358 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13362 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13363 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13364 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13366 did.
<footnote><para>
13367 <!-- f1. --> See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13369 of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology Law
13370 Review
1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13371 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink> (describing examples in
13372 which technology defines privacy policy). See also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked
13373 Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age (New York:
13375 House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs between technology and privacy).
13377 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the
13379 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13382 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13384 now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively act
13385 where, before, privacy was given by default.
13388 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13389 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13390 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the binaries
—
13391 was free. You couldn't run a program written for a Data General
13393 on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't care much
13394 about controlling their software.
13397 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he
13398 was a researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that
13400 when one was free to explore and tinker with the software that
13401 ran on machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented
13403 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify
13404 other people's work.
13407 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical idea. In
13408 a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a proof that
13409 someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to prove a
13411 you could take what someone else did and change it. In a classics
13412 department, if you believed a colleague's translation of a recently
13414 text was flawed, you were free to improve it. Thus, to Stallman,
13415 it seemed obvious that you should be free to tinker with and improve
13416 the code that ran a machine. This, too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't
13417 it be open for criticism like anything else?
13420 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13421 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs
13422 from one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least
13423 in the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13425 started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I could just
13426 take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make it easier for
13427 me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13430 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13431 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13433 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13435 of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about it,
13436 then the freedom to change and share software would be
13441 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free
13443 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13444 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13445 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13448 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13449 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13451 Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless the
13452 source code for that software is made available as well. Thus, anyone
13453 building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings free
13454 as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of code
13455 would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13457 goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a byproduct.
13460 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13461 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13462 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13463 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13464 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13465 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13468 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13469 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13470 scientific journals are produced.
13473 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many
13474 that printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending
13475 them to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13476 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13477 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
13478 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
13479 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
13480 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
13482 Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and
13484 is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free
13485 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13486 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13487 Court opinion through their respective services.
13490 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability
13491 to charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13492 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13493 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been
13495 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13496 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13497 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13500 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13501 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13502 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13505 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13506 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
13507 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to
13508 the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts
13510 the library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand
13511 the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks by reading all
13512 available articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a
13513 function of the institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of
13514 paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it was very hard to control
13515 access to a paper journal.
13518 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are
13520 that libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This
13521 means that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries
13522 begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing
13523 technology and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
13526 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13527 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13528 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13529 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13531 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13532 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is then
13533 deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13535 for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but the
13537 for the print journal does not inhibit the right of anyone to
13538 redistribute the work for free.
13541 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13542 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and
13544 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the
13546 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13547 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13549 a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge and science.
13553 <sect2 id=
"oneidea">
13554 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13556 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13558 control effected through law and technology.
13561 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a
13563 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13564 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable copyright
13565 on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for
13566 people to build upon other people's work, by making it simple for
13568 to express the freedom for others to take and build upon their
13569 work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to
13571 licenses, make this possible.
13574 Simple
—which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer.
13575 By developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13576 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that
13577 can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13578 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13580 to identify content that can easily be shared. These three
13582 together
—a legal license, a human-readable description, and
13583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13584 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13585 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone
13586 who accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the
13587 ideal that the person associated with the license believes in something
13588 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13589 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13591 freedoms are given.
13594 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13595 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13597 can choose a license that permits any use, so long as attribution is
13598 given. She can choose a license that permits only noncommercial use.
13599 She can choose a license that permits any use so long as the same
13601 are given to other uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so
13602 long as no derivative use is made. Or any use at all within developing
13603 nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full copies are not made. Or
13604 lastly, any educational use.
13607 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default
13608 of copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13609 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13610 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13611 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13613 by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13614 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13616 available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a
13621 This is just one project among many within the Creative
13623 And of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization
13624 pursuing such freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative
13625 Commons from many is that we are not interested only in talking
13626 about a public domain or in getting legislators to help build a public
13627 domain. Our aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13629 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13630 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13631 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13634 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is
13635 to complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a
13637 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws
13638 written centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could
13639 have imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a
13641 of technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense
13642 against the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with
13644 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can
13645 use them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way
13647 to begin to build those rules.
13650 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13651 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example,
13652 is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in the Magic
13653 Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13655 license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13658 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13659 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1) those
13660 who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (
2)
13661 those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for
13662 free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download Cory's book
13664 of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2) will download
13665 Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (
2)-goods.
13666 If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the strategy of releasing
13667 Cory's book free on-line will probably increase sales of Cory's book.
13670 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13672 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13673 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was
13677 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree
13679 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13681 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13682 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13683 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13684 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13685 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13689 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13691 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13692 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13693 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13695 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others
13696 are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content
13697 from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13698 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13699 art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the legal costs of sampling
13700 are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy,
13701 which was born sampling the music of others, has stated that he does
13702 not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs
13703 are so high
<footnote><para>
13704 <!-- f2. --> Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real Culture Wars
13705 (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg Hittelman, a Fiat
13707 production, available at
13708 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13709 </para></footnote>),
13710 these artists release into the creative environment content
13711 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13714 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative
13715 Commons license just because they want to express to others the
13717 of balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system
13718 as it is, you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13719 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13721 that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate
13722 description of how most creators view the rights associated with their
13723 content. The Creative Commons license expresses this notion of "Some
13724 Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to say it to others.
13727 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13728 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13729 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13730 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13732 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13733 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13734 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13737 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13738 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13739 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13740 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13741 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13742 steps are possible.
13745 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13747 and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the
13748 creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13750 it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it
13751 easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and
13752 cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread
13756 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13759 <sect1 id=
"themsoon">
13760 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13762 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13763 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13764 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13765 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13766 changes that we need.
13769 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13770 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13771 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13775 <sect2 id=
"formalities">
13776 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13778 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13779 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13780 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13781 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13784 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13785 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13787 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
13790 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13791 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13792 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13793 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13799 As I suggested in chapter
10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13800 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13801 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13802 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13803 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13805 were getting in the way.
13808 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13809 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13811 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what,
13812 or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13814 work of others. There are no records, there is no system to trace
—
13815 there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the
13816 massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is
13817 a necessary step for any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
13818 lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could
13822 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13823 <!-- f1. --> The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13824 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
13825 by other countries as well.
13826 </para></footnote>—but it should
13827 not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We should
13829 formalities, but we should establish a system that will create the
13830 incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13833 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13835 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally,
13836 the first of these three was something the copyright owner did; the
13838 two were something the government did. But a revised system of
13839 formalities would banish the government from the process, except for
13840 the sole purpose of approving standards developed by others.
13843 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13845 <sect3 id=
"registration">
13846 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13848 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with
13849 the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
13850 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
13851 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the
13852 burden of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.
13853 And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of government
13855 the office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus,
13856 when people who know something about the process hear this idea
13857 about formalities, their first reaction is panic
—nothing could be worse
13858 than forcing people to deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13861 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a
13863 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13864 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13865 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't
13866 follow that the government must actually administer the role. Instead,
13867 we should be creating incentives for private parties to serve the public,
13868 subject to standards that the government sets.
13871 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13872 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13873 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13874 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13875 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13877 by many competing registrars. That competition drives the cost
13878 of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease with which
13879 registration occurs up.
13882 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13883 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry,
13884 but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should
13886 a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
13887 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete
13888 with one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for
13890 and renewing copyrights. That competition would
13892 lower the burden of this formality
—while producing a database
13893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13894 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13898 <sect3 id=
"marking">
13899 <title>MARKING
</title>
13901 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
13902 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13904 for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to imposing
13905 the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.
13906 Here again, there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be
13907 enforced in this way. And more importantly, there is no reason a
13909 requirement needs to be enforced uniformly across all media.
13912 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13914 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also
13915 makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use
13919 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13920 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13921 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13922 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13923 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13924 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13925 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13926 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13929 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13930 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13931 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13932 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13934 owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13935 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13936 <!-- f2. --> There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13937 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13938 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13940 The meaning of an unmarked work would
13941 therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
13943 then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
13944 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13945 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13946 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13950 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13951 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13952 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13953 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13954 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13957 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method
13958 for marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13959 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13960 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13961 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13963 of which method could best be integrated into the registration
13964 and renewal system. We would not count on the government to
13966 but we would count on the government to keep the product of
13968 in line with its other important functions.
13971 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13973 If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13974 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13976 all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick step. The
13977 aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the system itself
13978 should be kept as simple as possible.
13981 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13982 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13983 make things unclear.
13986 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13987 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13988 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13989 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13990 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13991 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13997 <sect2 id=
"shortterms">
13998 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
14000 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
14001 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
14005 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
14006 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five years.
14007 That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost Eldred v.
14008 Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The Economist
14010 a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright term.
<footnote><para>
14011 <!-- f3. --> "A Radical Rethink," Economist,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15, available
14013 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
14016 proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
14019 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
14021 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four
14022 principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
14024 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14027 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to
14028 give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very
14029 strong protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim
14030 rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
14032 works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
14033 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an
14038 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and
14039 protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
14041 of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
14043 That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
14044 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus
14046 The value of short terms is that there is little need to
14047 build exceptions into copyright when the term itself is kept
14048 short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
14050 of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
14052 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
14056 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed.
14058 if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
14059 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the
14060 protection continued. This need not be an onerous burden,
14061 but there is no reason this monopoly protection has to be
14062 granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
14064 to apply for a pension.
<footnote><para>
14065 <!-- f4. --> Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
14066 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
14068 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
14070 If we make veterans suffer that
14071 burden, I don't see why we couldn't require authors to spend
14072 ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
14076 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should
14077 be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term
14078 once given should not be extended. It might have been a
14080 in
1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year
14081 term. I don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then
14082 the consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
14083 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct that
14084 mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do
14085 today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
14086 in
1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who
14087 write now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden
14088 that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
14090 their reward will not increase their creativity in
1923.
14091 What's not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do
14096 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
14097 that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976, the average
14098 term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
14101 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
14102 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
14103 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
14104 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
14107 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
14110 <sect2 id=
"freefairuse">
14111 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
14113 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
14114 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
14115 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
14116 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
14117 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
14118 the emergence of that new technology.
14121 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
14123 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
14124 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that
14125 are sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
14126 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the
14127 right to release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
14130 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
14132 the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control
14133 translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
14134 <!-- f5. --> Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
14135 University Press,
1967),
32.
14137 The courts have expanded
14138 it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This expansion has
14139 been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
14145 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
14146 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
14147 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
14148 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
14149 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
14154 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
14155 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
14156 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
14157 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
14158 Consider each limitation in turn.
14161 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
14162 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
14164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
14165 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
14166 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
14167 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
14168 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
14169 after the creative work is done.
14172 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
14173 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
14174 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
14175 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
14176 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
14178 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer
14179 makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the
14181 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine
14183 molasses into the machines. That's what this general requirement
14184 of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
14187 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of
14188 the Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation
14189 for foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
14190 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
14192 for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make much
14196 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14198 and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14200 This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague Paul
14201 Goldstein.
<footnote><para>
14202 <!-- f7. --> Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14204 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
14206 His view is that the law should be written so that expanded
14207 protections follow expanded uses.
14210 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the
14212 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14213 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14215 to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with a
14216 strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14219 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14221 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14223 statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free a great
14224 deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory rights
14225 regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14229 <sect2 id=
"liberatemusic">
14230 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
14232 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it wouldn't
14233 be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that is, to most
14234 people, most pressing
—music. There is no other policy issue that
14236 teaches the lessons of this book than the battles around the sharing
14240 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14242 growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14244 than any other single application. It was the Internet's killer
14245 app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was the
14247 that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the application
14248 that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill innovation on
14252 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music
14253 in particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14255 and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14256 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14257 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14260 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
14261 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
14262 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
14263 chapter
5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
14265 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
14268 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14269 for purchasing CDs.
14273 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14274 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14279 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get
14281 to content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright
14282 or that would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14286 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get
14288 to content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the
14289 copyright owner plainly endorses.
14293 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14294 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14295 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14296 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14297 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14298 significantly weakened.
14301 As I said in chapter
5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14303 For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is
14304 real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is significantly
14305 greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing networks.
14308 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14309 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14313 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is addictive
14314 today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a broad range of
14316 It won't be the easiest way to get access to a broad range of content
14317 in ten years. Today, access to the Internet is cumbersome and slow
—we
14318 in the United States are lucky to have broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and
14319 very rarely do we get service at that speed both up and down. Although
14320 wireless access is growing, most of us still get access across wires. Most
14321 only gain access through a machine with a keyboard. The idea of the
14323 on, always connected Internet is mainly just an idea.
14326 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14327 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14328 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14330 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14332 should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this world?
14333 The question should be, what law will we require when the network
14334 becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is one in
14335 which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net; where
14336 everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the Rockies
—you can
14337 instantaneously be connected to the Internet. Imagine the Internet as
14338 ubiquitous as the best cell-phone service, where with the flip of a
14343 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14344 give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet radio, content
14345 that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here, then, is the
14346 critical point: When it is extremely easy to connect to services that give
14347 access to content, it will be easier to connect to services that give you
14348 access to content than it will be to download and store content on the
14349 many devices you will have for playing content. It will be easier, in other
14350 words, to subscribe than it will be to be a database manager, as
14352 in the download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies
14354 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if
14355 the services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14356 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over cell
14357 phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14359 for this content even though "free" content is available in the form
14360 of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
14361 <!-- f8. --> See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
14362 3 April
2002, available at
14363 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
14368 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14369 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14370 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
14371 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14372 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14373 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14374 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14375 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14376 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14377 artists get paid, during
14379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14380 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14381 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14384 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14385 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
14386 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14387 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14388 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14389 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14390 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14391 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14392 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14395 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14396 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14397 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14398 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14399 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14400 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14401 way that returns something to the artist.
14404 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14405 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14406 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14407 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14408 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14409 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14410 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14411 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14414 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply
14415 deem out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make
14416 copies of the music available for sale, then commercial and
14418 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14419 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would
14420 be incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing
14421 has ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14426 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14427 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14428 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14429 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14430 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14431 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14432 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14436 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14437 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14438 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14439 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14440 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14441 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14442 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14443 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14446 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14447 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14448 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14449 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14450 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14451 delivering and accessing content.
14454 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14455 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14458 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14459 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14460 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14461 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14462 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14463 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14464 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14465 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14469 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14470 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14471 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14472 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14473 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14474 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14477 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14478 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote><para>
14479 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14480 10 October
2000), available at
14481 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14482 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14483 Stanford University Press,
2004), ch.
6, available at
14484 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14485 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14486 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14487 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14488 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14489 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14490 Broadband?" Washington Post,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14491 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14492 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14494 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14495 Use Fee (IPUF),
3 March
2002, available at
14496 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14497 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today,
13 May
14499 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14500 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14501 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14503 "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
14505 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14506 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14507 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14508 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14509 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14511 by about a decade. See
14512 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14515 very clever way around the current impasse of the Internet. Under his
14516 plan, all content capable of digital transmission would (
1) be marked
14517 with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to evade
14518 these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once the
14519 content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (
2) systems to
14520 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the
14522 of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be compensated. The
14524 would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate tax.
14527 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14528 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14529 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14531 Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14533 I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of the
14534 proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
14535 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14537 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal
14538 after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free
14540 of content, supported through a taxation system, then it can be
14541 continued. If this form of protection is no longer necessary, then the
14542 system could lapse into the old system of controlling access.
14545 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His
14546 aim is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the
14547 system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But
14548 the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes
14549 I described were accomplished
—in particular, the limits on derivative
14551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14552 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14553 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14555 to do with the content itself.
14558 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14559 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14560 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14561 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14562 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14563 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14564 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14565 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14566 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14567 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14568 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14569 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14573 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14574 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14575 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14576 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14577 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14578 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14579 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14580 theaters are often luxurious
—with "first class" seats, and meals
14581 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14582 finding ways to compete with "free."
14585 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14586 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14587 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14588 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14589 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14590 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14594 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14599 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14600 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14601 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14602 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14606 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14609 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14612 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14616 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14617 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14622 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14623 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14627 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a
14629 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14630 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14634 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14635 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But
14636 the real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract.
14637 The real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14639 that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size x, or
14640 (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14642 of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14643 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14645 sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14647 without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then it
14648 may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty pirates.
14651 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14652 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not be
14653 on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14655 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14656 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting the
14657 space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14661 <sect2 id=
"firelawyers">
14662 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14664 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14665 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14666 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14667 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14670 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14671 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it is
14672 my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client. And
14673 in a world where the rich clients have one strong view, the
14675 of the profession to question or counter that one strong view queers
14679 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14681 by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14683 are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate and
14684 significant figures in the history of this branch of the law. Many, for
14686 thought crazy the challenge that we brought to the Copyright
14687 Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the dominant scholar
14688 and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville Nimmer, thought it
14689 obvious.
<footnote><para>
14690 <!-- f10. --> Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14691 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review
48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14696 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14697 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14698 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14701 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and
14703 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the
14704 legal system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction
14705 costs of the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14706 <!-- f11. --> A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is to
14707 be commended for his careful review of data about infringement, leading
14708 him to question his own publicly stated position
—twice. He initially
14710 that downloading would substantially harm the industry. He then
14711 revised his view in light of the data, and he has since revised his view again.
14712 Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True
14713 Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom,
2002),
14714 (reviewing his original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J.
14715 Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper,
14716 June
2003, available at
14717 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14718 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14720 of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he underestimates the
14721 costs of the legal system. See, for example, Rethinking,
174–76.
14723 They see a system that has been
14724 around for hundreds of years, and they assume it works the way their
14725 elementary school civics class taught them it works.
14728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14729 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't
14730 work for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14731 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal level, at
14732 least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of our legal
14734 are so astonishingly high that justice can practically never be done.
14737 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14738 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14739 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14741 strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality: very
14743 The law depended upon the careful articulation and development
14744 of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development of legal
14746 depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work costs too much,
14747 except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14750 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14751 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14752 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14753 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14754 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14755 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14758 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the
14759 law away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is
14761 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left
14765 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with
14766 digital technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or
14767 think about the amazing things your community could facilitate with
14768 digital technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change
14770 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold
14771 molasses poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that
14773 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's
14777 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14778 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14781 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14782 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14783 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14786 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14787 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14788 keep your lawyers away.
14790 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14794 <chapter id=
"c-notes">
14795 <title>NOTES
</title>
14797 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide Web. As
14798 anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be highly unstable. I
14799 have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting readers to the original source
14800 through the Web site associated with this book. For each link below, you can go to
14801 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by clicking on the
14802 number after the # sign. If the original link remains alive, you will be redirected to
14803 that link. If the original link has disappeared, you will be redirected to an
14805 reference for the material.
14807 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14810 <chapter id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14811 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14813 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14814 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14815 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14816 to him that this book is dedicated.
14819 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14820 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard
14821 Posner, Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction
14822 and guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School
14823 and Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden,
14824 James P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert
14826 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum,
14827 Alina Ng, and Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine
14828 Crump and Harry Surden, who helped direct their research, and to
14829 Laura Lynch, who brilliantly managed the army that they assembled,
14830 and provided her own critical eye on much of this.
14833 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14834 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14835 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14836 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14838 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14839 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14840 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14841 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14844 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly
14845 draw upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible
14846 to receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14847 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice
14848 to requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli,
14849 David Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who
14850 had specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14851 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob
14852 Devine, Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy
14853 Hunsinger, Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James
14855 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey
14856 McHugh, Evan McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D.
14857 Rezende, Shabbir Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack,
14858 Kragen Sitaker, Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina,
14859 Sean Walsh, Matt Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger
14860 Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz," and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have
14861 missed anyone; with computers come glitches, and a crash of my
14862 e-mail system meant I lost a bunch of great replies.)
14865 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book
14866 in draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14867 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14869 of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an embarrassingly large
14870 number of errors. While my work is in part inspired by Stallman's, he
14871 does not agree with me in important places throughout this book.
14874 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14876 that there would be unending happiness away from these battles,
14877 and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever, grateful for
14878 her perpetual patience and love.
14880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->