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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>Version 2004-02-10</subtitle>
26
27 <authorgroup>
28 <author>
29 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig</surname>
31 </author>
32 </authorgroup>
33
34 <copyright>
35 <year>2004</year>
36 <holder>
37 Lawrence Lessig.
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
45 </holder>
46 </copyright>
47
48 <abstract>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
50 <para>
51 LAWRENCE LESSIG
52 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
66 Appeals.
67 </para>
68 </abstract>
69 </bookinfo>
70
71 <chapter id="c-info">
72 <title>Info</title>
73 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
74
75 <para>
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
77 </para>
78 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
79 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
83 </itemizedlist>
84 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
85
86 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
87 <para>
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
89 <sbr/>The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
90 in a Connected World
91 <sbr/>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
92 </para>
93
94 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
95 <para>
96 THE PENGUIN PRESS
97 <sbr/>NEW YORK
98 </para>
99
100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
101 <para>
102 FREE CULTURE
103 </para>
104
105 <para>
106 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
107 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
108 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
109 </para>
110
111 <para>
112 LAWRENCE LESSIG
113 </para>
114
115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
116 <para>
117 THE PENGUIN PRESS
118 <sbr/>a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
119 York, New York
120 <sbr/>Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
121 <sbr/>All rights reserved
122 <sbr/>Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
123 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
124 Reprinted with permission.
125 <sbr/>Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
126 <sbr/>All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
127 <sbr/>Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
128 <sbr/>Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
129 <sbr/>Lessig, Lawrence.
130 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
131 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
132 <sbr/>p. cm.
133 <sbr/>Includes index.
134 <sbr/>ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
135 <sbr/>1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
136 <sbr/>3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
137 <sbr/>KF2979.L47
138 <sbr/>343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
139 <sbr/>This book is printed on acid-free paper.
140 <sbr/>Printed in the United States of America
141 <sbr/>1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
142 <sbr/>Designed by Marysarah Quinn
143 </para>
144
145 <para>
146 &translationblock;
147 </para>
148
149 <para>
150 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
151 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
152 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
153 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
154 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
155 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
156 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
157 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
158 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
159 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
160 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
161 </para>
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
163
164 <para>
165 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
166 it continues still.
167 </para>
168
169 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
170 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
171 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
172 </figure>
173
174 <toc id="toc"></toc>
175
176 <lot>
177 <title>List of figures</title>
178 </lot>
179
180 <!--
181 c PREFACE xiii
182 c INTRODUCTION
183 c "PIRACY"
184 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
185 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
186 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
187 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
188 2 Film
189 2 Recorded Music
190 2 Radio
191 2 Cable TV
192 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
193 2 Piracy I
194 2 Piracy II
195 c "PROPERTY"
196 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
197 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
198 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
199 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
200 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
201 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
202 2 Beginnings
203 2 Law: Duration
204 2 Law: Scope
205 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
206 2 Architecture and Law: Force
207 2 Market: Concentration
208 2 Together
209 c PUZZLES
210 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
211 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
212 2 Constraining Creators
213 2 Constraining Innovators
214 2 Corrupting Citizens
215 c BALANCES
216 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
217 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
218 c CONCLUSION
219 c AFTERWORD
220 1 Us, Now
221 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
222 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
223 1 Them, Soon
224 2 1. More Formalities
225 3 Registration and Renewal
226 3 Marking
227 2 2. Shorter Terms
228 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
229 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
230 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
231 c NOTES
232 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
233 c INDEX
234 -->
235
236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
237
238 </chapter>
239 <chapter id="c-preface">
240 <title>PREFACE</title>
241 <para>
242 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
243 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
244 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
245 </para>
246 <blockquote>
247 <para>
248 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
249 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
250 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
251 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
252 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
253 </para></footnote>
254 </para>
255 </blockquote>
256 <para>
257 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
258 software,
259 or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review suggested
260 the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we could always
261 "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a switch and be back
262 home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and any troubles
263 that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
264 </para>
265 <para>
266 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
267 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
268 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
270 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
271 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
272 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
273 </para>
274 <para>
275 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
276 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
277 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
278 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
279 </para>
280 <para>
281 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
282 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
283 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
284 freesoftware movement<footnote>
285 <para>
286 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
287 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
288 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
289 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
290 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
291 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
292 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
293 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
294 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
295 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
296 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
297 or of creators from the past.
298 </para>
299 <para>
300 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
301 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
302 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
303 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
304 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
305 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
306 culture deem fundamental.
307 </para>
308 <para>
309 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
310 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
311 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
312 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
313 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
314 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
315 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
316 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
317 he asked,
318 </para>
319 <blockquote>
320 <para>
321 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
322 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
323 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
324 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
325 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
326 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
327 </para></footnote>
328 </para>
329 </blockquote>
330 <para>
331 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
332 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
333 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
334 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
335 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
336 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
337 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
338 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
339 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
340 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
341 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
342 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
343 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
344 that this work is "merely" derivative.
345 </para>
346 <para>
347 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
348 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this book
349 than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been its own.
350 Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of values. Like
351 Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And like Stallman,
352 I believe those are values of our past that will need to be defended in
353 our future. A free culture has been our past, but it will only be our
354 future
355 if we change the path we are on right now.
356 xv
357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
358 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
359 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
360 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
361 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
362 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
363 what I advance here.
364 </para>
365 <para>
366 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
367 between
368 anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is filled
369 with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract that get
370 enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its
371 property
372 becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism
373 in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear about our
374 culture
375 today. It is against that extremism that this book is written.
376 </para>
377
378 </chapter>
379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
380
381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
382 <chapter id="c-introduction">
383 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
384 <para>
385 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
386 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
387 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
388 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
389 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
390 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
391 </para>
392 <para>
393 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
394 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
395 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
396 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
397 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
398 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
399 </para></footnote>
400 For many
401 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
402 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
403 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
404 </para>
405 <para>
406 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
407 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
408 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
409 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
410 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
411 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
412 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
413 </para>
414 <para>
415 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
416 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
417 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
418 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
419 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
420 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
421 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
422 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
423 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
424 </para>
425 <para>
426 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
427 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
428 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
429 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
430 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
431 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
432 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
433 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
434 </para>
435 <blockquote>
436 <para>
437 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
438 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
439 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
440 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
441 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
442 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
443 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
444 the public has a just claim.<footnote><para>
445 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find that
446 there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land effectively
447 destroyed
448 the value of the Causbys' land. This example was suggested to me
449 by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty:
450 Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship," Stanford Law
451 Review
452 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul Goldstein, Real Property
453 (Mineola,
454 N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984), 1112&ndash;13.
455 </para></footnote>
456 </para>
457 </blockquote>
458 <para>
459 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
460 </para>
461 <para>
462 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
463 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
464 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
466 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
467 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
468 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
469 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
470 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
471 </para>
472 <para>
473 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
474 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
475 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
476 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
477 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
478 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
479 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
480 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
481 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
482 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
483 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
484 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
485 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
486 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
487 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
488 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
489 </para>
490 <para>
491 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
492 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
493 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
494 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
495 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
496 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
497 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
498 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
499 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
500 understanding of radio.
501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
502 </para>
503 <para>
504 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
505 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
506 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
507 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
508 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
509 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
510 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
511 much less transmitter power and static.
512 </para>
513 <para>
514 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting
515 of the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in
516 New York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
517 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
518 seventeen
519 miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and then with a
520 clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an electrical
521 device,
522 it produced the sound of an announcer's voice: "This is amateur
523 station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on frequency
524 modulation
525 at two and a half meters."
526 </para>
527 <para>
528 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
529 </para>
530 <blockquote>
531 <para>
532 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
533 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was
534 crumpled and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling
535 forest fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a
536 piano
537 solo and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was
538 projected with a live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
539 "music box."<footnote><para>
540 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
541 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
542 </para></footnote>
543 </para>
544 </blockquote>
545 <para>
546 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a
547 vastly superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention,
548 Armstrong
549 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the
550 then dominant AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio
551 stations across the United States, but the stations in large cities were all
552 owned by a handful of networks.
553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
554 </para>
555 <para>
556 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
557 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
558 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
559 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
560 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
561 </para>
562 <blockquote>
563 <para>
564 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
565 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a revolution&mdash;
566 start up a whole damn new industry to compete with RCA.<footnote><para>
567 See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," First
568 Electronic
569 Church of America, at www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
570
571 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
572 </para></footnote>
573 </para>
574 </blockquote>
575 <para>
576 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
577 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
578 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
579 described,
580 </para>
581 <blockquote>
582 <para>
583 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
584 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
585 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
586 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
587 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
588 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
589 </para></footnote>
590 </para>
591 </blockquote>
592 <para>
593 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
594 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
595 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
596 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
597 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
598 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
599 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
600 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
601 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
602 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
603 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
604 </para>
605 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
606 <blockquote>
607 <para>
608 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
609 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
610 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
611 deviousness.<footnote><para>
612 Lessing, 256.
613 </para></footnote>
614 </para>
615 </blockquote>
616 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
617 <para>
618 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
619 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
620 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
621 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
622 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
623 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
624 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
625 least temporarily.
626 </para>
627 <para>
628 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
629 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
630 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
631 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
632 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
633 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
634 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
635 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
636 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
637 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
638 </para>
639 <para>
640 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
641 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
642 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
643 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
644 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
645 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
646 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
647 course always public spirited; the reality is something
648 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
649 to themselves, would crumble in
650 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
651 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
652 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
653 effect
654 of technological change.
655 </para>
656 <para>
657 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good
658 date upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the
659 Internet
660 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
661 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had
662 access
663 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years before.<footnote><para>
664 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look
665 at Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
666 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
667 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
668 </para></footnote>
669 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
670 of 2004.
671 </para>
672 <para>
673 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
674 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
675 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
676 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
677 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
678 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
679 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
680 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
681 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
682 </para>
683 <para>
684 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
685 Internet
686 itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that the
687 Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
688 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as old as
689 the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change, would reject
690 it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet has introduced.
691 </para>
692 <para>
693 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
694 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
695 regulation
696 of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our culture
697 that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By "noncommercial
698 culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around parks or on
699 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
700 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
701 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader,"
702 or Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
703 </para>
704 <para>
705 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
706 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
707 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the peace,
708 then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly concerned
709 with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it left this
710 culture
711 "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary individuals shared and
712 transformed their culture&mdash;telling stories, reenacting scenes from plays
713 or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were
714 left alone by the law.
715 </para>
716 <para>
717 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
718 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
719 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
720 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
721 marketplace.<footnote>
722 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
723 <para>
724 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
725 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
726 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
727 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
728 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
729 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
730 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
731 198&ndash;200.
732 </para></footnote>
733 This is also, of
734 course, an important part of creativity and culture, and it has become
735 an increasingly important part in America. But in no sense was it
736 dominant
737 within our tradition. It was instead just one part, a controlled
738 part, balanced with the free.
739 </para>
740 <para>
741 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
742 been erased.<footnote><para>
743 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
744 2001), ch. 13.
745 </para></footnote>
746 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and,
747 pushed by big media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in
748 our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
749 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
750 expanded
751 to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
752 creativity
753 that it never reached before. The technology that preserved the
754 balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were free and
755 uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has been undone.
756 The consequence is that we are less and less a free culture, more and
757 more a permission culture.
758 </para>
759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
760 <para>
761 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
762 creativity.
763 And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the
764 protectionism that justifies the changes that I will describe below is not
765 the limited and balanced sort that has defined the law in the past. This
766 is not a protectionism to protect artists. It is instead a protectionism
767 to protect certain forms of business. Corporations threatened by the
768 potential of the Internet to change the way both commercial and
769 noncommercial culture are made and shared have united to induce
770 lawmakers to use the law to protect them. It is the story of RCA and
771 Armstrong; it is the dream of the Causbys.
772 </para>
773 <para>
774 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
775 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that
776 reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
777 marketplace
778 for making and cultivating culture generally, and that change
779 in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet is thus to
780 the industries that built and distributed content in the twentieth
781 century
782 what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was to the
783 railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of the end,
784 or at least a substantial transformation. Digital technologies, tied to the
785 Internet, could produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market
786 for building and cultivating culture; that market could include a much
787 wider and more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce
788 and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending
789 upon a few important factors, those creators could earn more on average
790 from this system than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our
791 day don't use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
792 </para>
793 <para>
794 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
795 happening
796 in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the early
797 twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using their
798 power to get the law to protect them against this new, more efficient,
799 more vibrant technology for building culture. They are succeeding in
800 their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet remakes them.
801 </para>
802 <para>
803 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
804 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
805 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
806 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
807 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
808 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
809 Motion
810 Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
811 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
812 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
813 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
814 Times, 17 January 2002.
815 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
816 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
817 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
818 against it.
819 </para>
820 <para>
821 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
822 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
823 especially
824 in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls "creative
825 property."
826 I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the law, properly tuned,
827 should punish "piracy," whether on or off the Internet.
828 </para>
829 <para>
830 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
831 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
832 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
833 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
834 </para>
835 <para>
836 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
837 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
838 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
839 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
840 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote><para>
841 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
842 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
843 </para></footnote>
844 copyright law,
845 properly
846 balanced, protected creators against private control. Our tradition
847 was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of patrons. It instead carved out
848 a wide berth within which creators could cultivate and extend our culture.
849 </para>
850 <para>
851 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
852 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the effective
853 regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or critique the
854 culture
855 around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like, for permission first.
856 Permission is, of course, often granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to
857 the critical or the independent. We have built a kind of cultural
858 nobility;
859 those within the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it
860 is nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
861 </para>
862 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26 -->
863 <para>
864 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
865 "centrality
866 of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or
867 otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for
868 neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a
869 morality
870 tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
871 </para>
872 <para>
873 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
874 inspired
875 by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its
876 code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace.
877 There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet
878 technologies
879 to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and
880 culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to
881 understand
882 the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
883 </para>
884 <para>
885 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property."
886 The property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
887 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding this
888 "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
889 sacredness
890 of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
891 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners of
892 "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys, treat
893 these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object when
894 a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to us as it
895 was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are "trespassing"
896 upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to us as it was to
897 them that the law should intervene to stop this trespass.
898 </para>
899 <para>
900 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
901 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
902 Common
903 sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky Causbys,
904 common sense is on the side of the property owners in this war. Unlike
905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
906 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
907 on its side.
908 </para>
909 <para>
910 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
911 increasingly
912 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
913 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
914 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
915 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
916 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
917 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
918 </para>
919 <para>
920 The puzzle is, Why?
921 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
922 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
923 because
924 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
925 absolute
926 claim was wrong?
927 </para>
928 <para>
929 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
930 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
931 </para>
932 <para>
933 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
934 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
935 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
936 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
937 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
938 </para>
939 <para>
940 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
941 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
942 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
943 Armstrong
944 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
945 more powerful view?
946 </para>
947 <para>
948 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe
949 it was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
950 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt against
951 the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual property."
952 What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a sheriff
953 arresting
954 an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of this silliness will
955 be much more profound.
956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
957 </para>
958 <para>
959 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
960 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
961 ideas.
962 </para>
963 <para>
964 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
965 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
966 obscure
967 French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird sort we
968 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
969 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
970 can be more fully understood.
971 </para>
972 <para>
973 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
974 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
975 government,
976 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
977 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
978 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
979 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
980 threatened
981 by the changes to use their power to change the law&mdash;and more
982 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
983 who we have always been.
984 </para>
985 <para>
986 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
987 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
988 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
989 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
990 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
991 to which most of us remain oblivious.
992 </para>
993 </chapter>
994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
995 <chapter id="c-piracy">
996 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
997
998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
999 <para>
1000 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
1001 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1002 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1003 capture.
1004 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1005 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1006 </para>
1007 <blockquote>
1008 <para>
1009 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1010 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1011 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1012 <!-- f1 -->
1013 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1014 </para></footnote>
1015 </para>
1016 </blockquote>
1017 <para>
1018 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1019 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1020 efficient
1021 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1022 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1023 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1024 content
1025 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1026 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1027 </para>
1028 <para>
1029 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1030 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1031 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1032 sharing
1033 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1034 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1035 </para>
1036 <para>
1037 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1038 increasingly
1039 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1040 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1041 believe
1042 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1043 piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1044 </para>
1045 <para>
1046 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1047 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1048 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1049 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1050 </para>
1051 <para>
1052 The idea goes something like this:
1053 </para>
1054 <blockquote>
1055 <para>
1056 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1057 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1058 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1059 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1060 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1061 piracy.
1062 </para>
1063 </blockquote>
1064 <para>
1065 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1066 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1067 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1068 <!-- f2 -->
1069 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1070 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1071 </para></footnote>
1072 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1073 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1074 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1075 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1076 <!-- f3 -->
1077 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1078 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1079 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1080 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1081 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1082 </para></footnote>
1083 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1084 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1085 </para>
1086 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1087 <para>
1088 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1089 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1091 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1092 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1093 property.
1094 It has never taken hold within our law.
1095 </para>
1096 <para>
1097 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1098 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1099 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1100 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1101 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1102 </para>
1103 <para>
1104 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1105 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1106 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1107 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1108 copyright law today regulates both.
1109 </para>
1110 <para>
1111 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1112 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1113 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1114 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1115 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1116 more expense of doing business.
1117 </para>
1118 <para>
1119 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1120 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1121 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1122 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1123 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1124 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1125 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1126 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1127 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1128 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1129 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1130 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1131 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1132 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1133 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1135 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote><para>
1136 <!-- f4 -->
1137 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1138 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1139 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1140 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1141 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1142 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1143 enabled are much more tenuous.
1144 </para></footnote>
1145 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1146 this creative class.
1147 </para>
1148 <para>
1149 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1150 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1151 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1152 </para>
1153
1154 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1155 <sect1 id="creators">
1156 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1157 <para>
1158 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1159 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1160 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1161 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1162 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1163 </para>
1164 <para>
1165 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1166 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1167 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1168 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1169 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1170 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1171 </para>
1172 <blockquote>
1173 <para>
1174 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1175 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1176 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1177 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1178 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1179 </para>
1180 <para>
1181 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1182 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1183 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1184 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1185 synchronization was pretty close.
1186 </para>
1187 <para>
1188 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1189 electric.
1190 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1191 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1192 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1193 wonderful! And it was something new!<footnote><para>
1194 <!-- f1 -->
1195 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1196 Cartoons
1197 (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1198 </para></footnote>
1199 </para>
1200 </blockquote>
1201 <para>
1202 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1203 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1204 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1205 </para>
1206 <para>
1207 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1208 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1209 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1210 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1211 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1212 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1213 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1214 </para>
1215 <para>
1216 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1217 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1218 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1219 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1220 </para>
1221 <para>
1222 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1223 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1224 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1225 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1226 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1227 genre.
1228 </para>
1229 <para>
1230 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1232 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1233 direct
1234 cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1235 <!-- f2 -->
1236 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1237 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1238 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1239 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1240 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1241 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1242 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1243 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1244 </para></footnote>
1245 and both are built upon a
1246 common
1247 song as a source. It is not just from the invention of synchronized
1248 sound in The Jazz Singer that we get Steamboat Willie. It is also from
1249 Buster Keaton's invention of Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the
1250 song "Steamboat Bill," that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from
1251 Steamboat Willie, Mickey Mouse.
1252 </para>
1253 <para>
1254 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1255 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1256 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1257 <!-- f3 -->
1258 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1259 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1260 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1261 </para></footnote>
1262 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1263 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1264 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1265 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1266 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1267 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1268 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1269 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1270 old.
1271 </para>
1272 <para>
1273 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1274 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1275 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1276 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1277 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1278 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1279 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1280 </para>
1281 <para>
1282 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1283 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1284 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1285 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1286 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1287 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1288 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937),
1289 Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of
1290 the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin
1291 Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1293 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1294 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1295 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1296 Treasure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1297 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1298 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1299 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1300 </para>
1301 <para>
1302 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1303 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1304 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1305 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1306 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1307 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1308 culture around us and makes it something different.
1309 </para>
1310 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1311 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1312 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1313 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1314 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1315 <!-- f4 -->
1316 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1317 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1318 determining
1319 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1320 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1321 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1322 average
1323 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1324 Web site associated with this book, available at
1325 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1326 </para></footnote>
1327 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1328 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1329 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1330 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1331 </para>
1332 <para>
1333 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1334 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1335 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1336 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1337 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1338 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1339 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1340 </para>
1341 <para>
1342 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1343 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1344 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1345 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1346
1347 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1348 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1349 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1350 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1351 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1352 content from before the Great Depression.
1353 </para>
1354 <para>
1355 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1356 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1357 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1358 universal.
1359 </para>
1360 <para>
1361 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1362 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1363 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1364 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1365 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1366 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1367 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1368 </para>
1369 <para>
1370 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1371 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1372 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1373 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1374 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1375 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1376 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1377 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1378 interestingly different way.
1379 </para>
1380 <para>
1381 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1382 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1383 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1384 </para>
1385 <para>
1386 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1387 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1388 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1389 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1391 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1392 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1393 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1394 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1395 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1396 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1397 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1398 </para>
1399 <para>
1400 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1401 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1402 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1403 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1404 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1405 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1406 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1407 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1408 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1409 </para>
1410 <para>
1411 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1412 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1413 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1414 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1415 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1416 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1417 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1418 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1419 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1420 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1421 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1422 original copyright owner's permission.
1423 </para>
1424 <para>
1425 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1426 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1427 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1428 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1429 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1430
1431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1432 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1433 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1434 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1435 <!-- f5 -->
1436 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1437 York: Perennial, 2000).
1438 </para></footnote>
1439 </para>
1440 <para>
1441 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1442 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1443 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1444 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1445 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1446 which are fifty years old."
1447 </para>
1448 <para>
1449 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1450 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1451 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1452 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1453 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1454 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1455 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1456 <!-- f6 -->
1457 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1458 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1459 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1460 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1461 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1462 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1463 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1464 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1465 </para></footnote>
1466 </para>
1467 <para>
1468 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1469 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1470 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1471 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1472 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1473 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1474 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1475 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1476 culture?
1477 </para>
1478 <para>
1479 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1480 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1481 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1482 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1483 to prosecute cases like this."
1484 </para>
1485 <para>
1486 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1487 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1488 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1489 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1490 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1491 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1492 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1493 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1494 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1495 their clients or hurt them?
1496 Let's pause for a moment.
1497 </para>
1498 <para>
1499 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1500 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1501 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1502 </para>
1503 <para>
1504 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1505 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1506 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1507 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1508 <!-- f7 -->
1509 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1510 Vaidhyanathan,
1511 Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1512 University
1513 Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1514 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately describes a set of
1515 "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the
1516 nature of those rights is very different.
1517 </para></footnote>
1518 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1519 property;
1520 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1521 intellectual property.
1522 </para>
1523 <para>
1524 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1525 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1526 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1527 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1528 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1529 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1530 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1531 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1532 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1533 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1534 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1535 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1536 the public domain.
1537 </para>
1538 <para>
1539 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1540 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1541 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1542
1543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1544 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1545 freedom is good.
1546 </para>
1547 <para>
1548 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1549 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1550 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1551 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1552 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1553 form, whether large or small.
1554 </para>
1555 <para>
1556 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1557 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1558 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1559 particular find it hard to say why.
1560 </para>
1561 <para>
1562 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1563 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1564 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1565 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1566 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1567 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1568 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1569 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1570 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1571 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1572 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster
1573 films in 1997.
1574 </para>
1575 <para>
1576 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1577 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1578 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1579 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1580 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1581 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1582 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1583 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1584 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1585 </para>
1586 <para>
1587 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1588 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1589 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1590 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1591 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1592 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1593 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1594 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1595 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1596 </para>
1597 <para>
1598 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1599 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1600 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1601 </para>
1602
1603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1604 </sect1>
1605 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1606 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1607 <para>
1608 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1609 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1610 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1611 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1612 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1613 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1614 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1615 </para>
1616 <para>
1617 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1618 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1619 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1620 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1621 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1622 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1623 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1624 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1625 amateurs.
1626 </para>
1627 <para>
1628 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1629 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1630 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1631 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1632 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1633 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1634 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1635 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1636 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1637 population of photographers.
1638 </para>
1639 <para>
1640 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1641 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1642 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1643 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1644 <!-- f1 -->
1645 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1646 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1647 </para>
1648 <blockquote>
1649 <para>
1650 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1651 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1652 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1653 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1654 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1655 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1656 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1657 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1658 chemicals.<footnote>
1659 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1660 <para>
1661 <!-- f2 -->
1662 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1663 1977), 53.
1664 </para></footnote>
1665 </para>
1666 </blockquote>
1667 <para>
1668 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1669 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1670 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1671 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1672 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1673 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1674 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1675 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1676 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1677 percent.<footnote><para>
1678 <!-- f3 -->
1679 Jenkins, 177.
1680 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1681 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1682 <!-- f4 -->
1683 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1684 </para></footnote>
1685 </para>
1686 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1687 <para>
1688
1689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1690 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1691 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1692 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1693 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1694 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1695 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1696 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1697 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1698 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1699 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1700 <!-- f5 -->
1701 Coe, 58.
1702 </para></footnote>
1703 </para>
1704 <para>
1705 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1706 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1707 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1708 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1709 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1710 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1711 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1712 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1713 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1714 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1715 have before.
1716 </para>
1717 <para>
1718 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1719 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1720 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1721 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1722 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1723 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1724 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1725 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1726 <!-- f6 -->
1727 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1728 </para></footnote>
1729 </para>
1730 <para>
1731 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1732 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1733 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1734 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1735 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1736 draw
1737 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1738 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1739 that they thought valuable.
1740 </para>
1741 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1742 <para>
1743 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1744 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1745 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1746 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1747 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1748 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1749 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1750 <para>
1751 <!-- f7 -->
1752 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1753 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1754 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1755 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1756 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1757 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1758 </para>
1759 <para>
1760 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1761 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1762 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1763 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1764 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1765 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1766 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1767 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1768 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1769 <!-- f8 -->
1770 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1771 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1772 Review 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1773 Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1774 (1993).
1775 </para></footnote>)
1776 </para>
1777 <para>
1778 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1779 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1780 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1781 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1782 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1783 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1784 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1785 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1786 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1787 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1788 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1789 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1790 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1791 </para>
1792 <para>
1793
1794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1795 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1796 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1797 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1798 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1799 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1800 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1801 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1802 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1803 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1804 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1805 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1806 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1807 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1808 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1809 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1810 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1811 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1812 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1813 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1814 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1815 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1816 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1817 learn.
1818 </para>
1819 <para>
1820 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1821 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1822 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1823 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1824 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1825 <!-- f9 -->
1826 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1827 Software
1828 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1829 February 2002, available at
1830 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1831 </para></footnote>
1832 These buses are filled with technology that
1833 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1834 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1835 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1836 teachers call "media literacy."
1837 </para>
1838 <para>
1839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1840 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1841 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1842 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1843 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1844 the way people access it."
1845 </para>
1846 <para>
1847 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1848 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1849 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1850 about.
1851 </para>
1852 <para>
1853 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1854 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1855 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1856 <!-- f10 -->
1857 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1858 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1859 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1860 </para></footnote>
1861 it is increasingly important to understand the
1862 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1863 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1864 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1865 constructing
1866 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1867 </para>
1868 <para>
1869 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1870 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1871 written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult it is to
1872 sequence
1873 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1874 understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1875 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1876 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1877 emotion or builds suspense.
1878 </para>
1879 <para>
1880 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1881 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1882 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1883 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1884 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1885 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1886 </para>
1887 <para>
1888 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just
1889 film, as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of
1890 Southern
1891 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1892
1893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1894 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1895 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1896 texture."<footnote>
1897 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1898 <para>
1899 <!-- f11 -->
1900 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1901 2002.
1902 </para></footnote>
1903 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1904 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1905 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1906 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1907 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1908 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1909 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1910 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1911 <!-- f12 -->
1912 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1913 November 2000, available at
1914 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1915 available at
1916 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1917 </para></footnote>
1918 </para>
1919 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1920 <para>
1921 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1922 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1923 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1924 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1925 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1926 </para>
1927 <para>
1928 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1929 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1930 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1931 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1932 </para>
1933 <blockquote>
1934 <para>
1935 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1936 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1937 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1938 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1939 being read-only.
1940 </para>
1941 </blockquote>
1942 <para>
1943 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1944 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1945 twentieth century.
1946 </para>
1947 <para>
1948 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1949 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1950 understanding
1951 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1952 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1953 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1954 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1955 appropriate
1956 language for what they need to create or express."<footnote>
1957 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1958 <para>
1959 <!-- f13 -->
1960 Interview with Daley and Barish.
1961 </para></footnote> It is to enable
1962 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
1963 <!-- f14 -->
1964 Ibid.
1965 </para></footnote>
1966 </para>
1967 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1968 <para>
1969 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
1970 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
1971 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
1972 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
1973 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
1974 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
1975 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
1976 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
1977 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
1978 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
1979 </para>
1980 <para>
1981 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
1982 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
1983 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
1984 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
1985 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
1986 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
1987 </para>
1988 <para>
1989 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
1990 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
1991 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
1992 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
1993 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
1994 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
1995 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
1996 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
1997 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
1998 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
1999 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2000 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2001 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2002 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2003 to this form of expression.
2004 </para>
2005 <para>
2006
2007 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2008 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2009 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2010 Daley
2011 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2012 meaning."
2013 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2014 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&mdash;and
2015 increasingly,
2016 not the most powerful part&mdash;of constructing meaning. As Daley
2017 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2018 </para>
2019 <blockquote>
2020 <para>
2021 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2022 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2023 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2024 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2025 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2026 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2027 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2028 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2029 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2030 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2031 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2032 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2033 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2034 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2035 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2036 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2037 about the topic. . . .
2038 </para>
2039 <para>
2040 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2041 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2042 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2043 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2044 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2045 </para>
2046 <para>
2047 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2048 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2049 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2050 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2051 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2052 had a lot of power with this language."
2053 </para>
2054 </blockquote>
2055 <para>
2056 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2057 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2058 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2059 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2060 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2061 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2062 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2063 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2064 world would be watching.
2065 </para>
2066 <para>
2067 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2068 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2069 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2070 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2071 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2072 entertainment is tragedy.
2073 </para>
2074 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2075 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2076 <para>
2077 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2078 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2079 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2080 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2081 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2082 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2083 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2084 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2085 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2086 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2087 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2088 was also the Internet.
2089 </para>
2090 <para>
2091 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2092 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2093 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2094 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2095 movie
2096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2097 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2098 with sound or text.
2099 </para>
2100 <para>
2101 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2102 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2103 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2104 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2105 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2106 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2107 spread practically instantaneously.
2108 </para>
2109 <para>
2110 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2111 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2112 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2113 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2114 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2115 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2116 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2117 </para>
2118 <para>
2119 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2120 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2121 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2122 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2123 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2124 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2125 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2126 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2127 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2128 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2129 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2130 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2131 </para>
2132 <para>
2133 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2134 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2135 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2136 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2137 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2138 people vote
2139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2140 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2141 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2142 </para>
2143 <para>
2144 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2145 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2146 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2147 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2148 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2149 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2150 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2151 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2152 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2153 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2154 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2155 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2156 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2157 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2158 <!-- f15 -->
2159 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2160 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2161 </para></footnote>
2162 </para>
2163 <para>
2164 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2165 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2166 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2167 <!-- f16 -->
2168 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2169 Political
2170 Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2171 </para></footnote>
2172 And in some towns in
2173 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2174 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2175 deliberation"
2176 to occur.
2177 </para>
2178 <para>
2179 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2180 occur.
2181 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2182 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2183 politics
2184 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2185 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2186 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2187 <!-- f17 -->
2188 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2189 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2190 </para></footnote> We say what our
2191 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2192 </para>
2193 <para>
2194 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2195 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2196 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2197 Technologies
2198 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2199 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2200
2201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2202 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2203 place.
2204 </para>
2205 <para>
2206 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2207 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2208 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2209 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2210 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2211 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2212 </para>
2213 <para>
2214 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2215 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential
2216 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2217 reading
2218 is having an effect.
2219 </para>
2220 <para>
2221 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2222 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2223 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2224 praising
2225 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2226 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2227 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2228 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2229 instances
2230 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2231 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2232 as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2233 <!-- f18 -->
2234 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2235 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2236 </para></footnote>
2237 </para>
2238 <para>
2239 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial
2240 pressures
2241 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2242 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2243 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move on.
2244 </para>
2245 <para>
2246 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2247 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2248 particularly
2249 interesting story, more and more people link to that story. And as
2250 the number of links to a particular story increases, it rises in the ranks
2251 of stories. People read what is popular; what is popular has been
2252 selected
2253 by a very democratic process of peer-generated rankings.
2254 </para>
2255 <para>
2256 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2257 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2258 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2259 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2260 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2261 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2262 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2263 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2264 get it out of the way."
2265 </para>
2266 <para>
2267 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2268 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide
2269 more from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN
2270 admitted it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the
2271 consequences
2272 to its own employees.<footnote><para>
2273 <!-- f19 -->
2274 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2275 </para></footnote>
2276 It also needs to sustain a more
2277 coherent
2278 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the
2279 Internet from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite
2280 uplink
2281 with a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the
2282 reporter over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She
2283 needed to offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that
2284 wasn't warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2285 </para>
2286 <para>
2287 Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the debate&mdash;"amateur" not
2288 in the sense of inexperienced, but in the sense of an Olympic athlete,
2289 meaning not paid by anyone to give their reports. It allows for a much
2290 broader range of input into a story, as reporting on the Columbia
2291 disaster
2292 revealed, when hundreds from across the southwest United States
2293 turned to the Internet to retell what they had seen.<footnote><para>
2294 <!-- f20 -->
2295 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2296 Information
2297 Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci D. Kramer,
2298 "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall," Online
2299 Journalism
2300 Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2301 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2302 </para></footnote>
2303 And it drives
2304 readers to read across the range of accounts and "triangulate," as Winer
2305 puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are "communicating directly with
2306 our constituency, and the middle man is out of it"&mdash;with all the
2307 benefits,
2308 and costs, that might entail.
2309 </para>
2310 <para>
2311 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected with
2312 blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts, for
2313 public
2314 figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's not clear that
2315 "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists have been told to
2316 curtail their blogging.<footnote><para>
2317 <!-- f21 -->
2318 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2319 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2320 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2321 correspondent
2322 in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the war on March 9,
2323 stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses' request. Last year Steve
2324 Olafson,
2325 a Houston Chronicle reporter, was fired for keeping a personal Web log,
2326 published under a pseudonym, that dealt with some of the issues and
2327 people he was covering.")
2328 </para></footnote>
2329 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2330
2331 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2332 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2333 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2334 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2335 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2336 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2337 </para>
2338 <para>
2339 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2340 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2341 gatekeeper."
2342 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2343 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2344 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2345 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2346 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2347 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2348 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2349 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2350 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2351 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2352 extraordinary
2353 to report.
2354 </para>
2355 <para>
2356 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2357 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2358 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2359 </para>
2360 <para>
2361 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2362 differently
2363 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2364 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2365 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2366 </para>
2367 <para>
2368 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2369 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2370 lawnmower
2371 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2372 technologies
2373 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2374 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2375 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2377 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2378 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2379 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2380 tinkering of many others.
2381 </para>
2382 <para>
2383 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2384 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2385 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2386 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2387 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2388 </para>
2389 <para>
2390 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2391 platform,"
2392 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2393 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2394 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2395 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2396 becomes
2397 a major apprenticeship platform."
2398 </para>
2399 <para>
2400 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2401 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2402 abstract,
2403 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2404 doing
2405 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2406 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2407 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2408 </para>
2409 <para>
2410 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2411 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2412 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2413 multiple
2414 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2415 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2416 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2417 artistic,
2418 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2419 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2420 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2421 </para>
2422 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2423 <para>
2424 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2425 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2426
2427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2428 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2429 of recognition.
2430 </para>
2431 <para>
2432 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2433 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2434 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2435 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2436 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2437 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2438 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2439 </para>
2440 <para>
2441 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2442 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2443 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2444 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2445 general.<footnote><para>
2446 <!-- f22 -->
2447 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2448 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2449 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2450 </para></footnote>
2451 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2452 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2453 </para>
2454 <para>
2455 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2456 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2457 and want to learn."
2458 </para>
2459 <para>
2460 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2461 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2462 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2463 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2464 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2465 </para>
2466 <para>
2467 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2468 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2469 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2470 the law to close down that technology.
2471 </para>
2472 <para>
2473 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2474 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2475 </para>
2476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2477 </sect1>
2478 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2479 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2480 <para>
2481 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2482 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2483 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2484 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2485 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2486 </para>
2487 <para>
2488 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2489 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2490 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2491 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2492 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2493 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2494 </para>
2495 <para>
2496 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2497 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2498 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2499 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2500 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2501 </para>
2502 <para>
2503 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2505 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2506 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2507 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2508 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2509 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2510 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2511 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2512 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2513 </para>
2514 <para>
2515 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2516 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2517 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2518 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2519 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2520 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2521 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2522 </para>
2523 <para>
2524 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2525 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2526 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2527 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2528 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2529 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2530 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2531 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2532 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2533 on-line.
2534 </para>
2535 <para>
2536 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2537 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2538 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2539 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2540 be on users' computers.
2541 </para>
2542 <para>
2543 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2544 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2545 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2546 students
2547 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2549 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2550 computer.
2551 </para>
2552 <para>
2553 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2554 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2555 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2556 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2557 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2558 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2559 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2560 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2561 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2562 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2563 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2564 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2565 supposed to do.
2566 </para>
2567 <para>
2568 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2569 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2570 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2571 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2572 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2573 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2574 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2575 </para>
2576 <para>
2577 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2578 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2579 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2580 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2581 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2582 easier to use"&mdash;again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2583 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2584 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2585 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2586 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2587 </para>
2588 <para>
2589 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2590 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2591 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2592 demanded
2593 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2594 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2595 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2596 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2597 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2598 that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2599 </para>
2600 <para>
2601 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2602 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2603 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2604 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2605 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2606 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2607 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2608 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2609 <!-- f1 -->
2610 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2611 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2612 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2613 </para></footnote>
2614 </para>
2615 <para>
2616 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2617 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2618 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2619 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2620 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2621 </para>
2622 <para>
2623 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2624 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2625 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2626 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2627 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2628 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2629 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2630 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2631 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2632 </para>
2633 <para>
2634 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2635 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2636 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2637 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2638 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2639 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2640 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2641 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2642 </para>
2643 <para>
2644 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2645 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2646 </para>
2647 <para>
2648 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2649 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2650 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2651 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2652 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2653 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2654 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2655 <!-- f2 -->
2656 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2657 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2658 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2659 </para></footnote>
2660 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2661 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2662 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2663 <!-- f3 -->
2664 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2665 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2666 </para></footnote>
2667 </para>
2668 <para>
2669 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2670 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2671 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2672 activist:
2673 </para>
2674 <blockquote>
2675 <para>
2676 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2677 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2678 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2679 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2680 </para>
2681 </blockquote>
2682 <para>
2683 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2684 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2685 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2686 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2687 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2688 </para>
2689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2690 </sect1>
2691 <sect1 id="pirates">
2692 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2693 <para>
2694 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2695 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2696 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2697 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2698 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2699 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2700 </para>
2701 <sect2 id="film">
2702 <title>Film</title>
2703 <para>
2704 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2705 <!-- f1 -->
2706 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2707 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2708 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2709 </para></footnote>
2710 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2711 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2712 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2713 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2714 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2715 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2716 this creative property
2717 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2718 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2719 </para>
2720 <para>
2721 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2722 </para>
2723 <blockquote>
2724 <para>
2725 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2726 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2727 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2728 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2729 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2730 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2731 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2732 </para>
2733 <para>
2734 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2735 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2736 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2737 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2738 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2739 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2740 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2741 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2742 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2743 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2744 <!-- f2 -->
2745 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2746 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2747 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2748 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2749 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2750 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2751 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2752 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2753 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2754 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2755 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2756 </para>
2757 </blockquote>
2758 <para>
2759 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2760 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2761 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2762 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2763 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2764 <!-- f3 -->
2765 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2766 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2767 </para></footnote>
2768 That led the independents to flee the East
2769 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2770 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2771 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2772 did just that.
2773 </para>
2774 <para>
2775 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2776 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2777 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2778
2779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2780 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2781 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2782 Edison's creative property.
2783 </para>
2784 </sect2>
2785 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2786 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2787 <para>
2788 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2789 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2790 </para>
2791 <para>
2792 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2793 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2794 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2795 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2796 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2797 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2798 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2799 right to perform it publicly.
2800 </para>
2801 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2802 <para>
2803 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2804 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2805 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2806 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2807 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2808 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2809 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2810 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2811 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2812 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2813 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2814 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2815 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2816 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2817 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2818 its composer anything.
2819 </para>
2820 <para>
2821 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2823 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2824 put it,
2825 </para>
2826 <blockquote>
2827 <para>
2828 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2829 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2830 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2831 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2832 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2833 rights.<footnote><para>
2834 <!-- f4 -->
2835 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2836 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2837 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2838 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2839 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2840 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2841 </para></footnote>
2842 </para>
2843 </blockquote>
2844 <para>
2845 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2846 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2847 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2848 <!-- f5 -->
2849 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2850 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2851 </para></footnote>
2852 and the "music publishing industry"
2853 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2854 <!-- f6 -->
2855 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2856 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2857 </para></footnote>
2858 As John Philip
2859 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2860 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2861 <!-- f7 -->
2862 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2863 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2864 </para></footnote>
2865 </para>
2866 <para>
2867 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2868 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2869 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2870 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2871 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2872 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2873 <!-- f8 -->
2874 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2875 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2876 Perforating
2877 Company of New York).
2878 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2879 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2880 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2881 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2882 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2883 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."<footnote><para>
2884 <!-- f9 -->
2885 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376
2886 (prepared
2887 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2888 American
2889 Graphophone Company Association).
2890 </para></footnote>
2891 </para>
2892 <para>
2893 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2894 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2895 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2896 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2897 control
2898 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2899 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2900 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2901
2902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2903 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2904 authorizes
2905 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2906 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2907 </para>
2908 <para>
2909 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2910 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2911 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2912 Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2913 recordings
2914 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2915 by the statute.
2916 </para>
2917 <para>
2918 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2919 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
2920 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
2921 whatever
2922 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
2923 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
2924 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
2925 </para>
2926 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2927 <para>
2928 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2929 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
2930 of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
2931 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
2932 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
2933 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
2934 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
2935 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2936 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2937 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
2938 stifle
2939 follow-on creativity.<footnote><para>
2940 <!-- f10 -->
2941 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2942 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2943 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2944 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2945 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2946 </para></footnote>
2947 </para>
2948 <para>
2949 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2950 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2951 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2952 relates,
2953 </para>
2954 <blockquote>
2955 <para>
2956 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2958 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2959 industry
2960 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2961 importance
2962 in the United States and throughout the world; records
2963 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
2964 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
2965 access
2966 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
2967 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
2968 before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
2969 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
2970 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
2971 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
2972 improved
2973 quality, and a greater choice.<footnote><para>
2974 <!-- f11 -->
2975 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House
2976 Committee
2977 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83,
2978 (8 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention
2979 to this report.
2980 </para></footnote>
2981 </para>
2982 </blockquote>
2983 <para>
2984 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
2985 creative
2986 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2987 </para>
2988 </sect2>
2989 <sect2 id="radio">
2990 <title>Radio</title>
2991 <para>
2992 Radio was also born of piracy.
2993 </para>
2994 <para>
2995 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
2996 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
2997 <!-- f12 -->
2998 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning, record
2999 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3000 messages
3001 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
3002 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
3003 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
3004 Manufacturing
3005 Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.
3006 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
3007 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
3008 Review 70 (2003): 281.
3009 </para></footnote>
3010 As I described above,
3011 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3012 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3013 composer
3014 money for that performance.
3015 </para>
3016 <para>
3017 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3018 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3019 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3020 Birthday"
3021 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3022 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3023 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3024 station.
3025 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3026 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3027 composer
3028 of the music for his work.
3029
3030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3031 </para>
3032 <para>
3033 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3034 radio
3035 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3036 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3037 something
3038 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3039 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3040 playing the song.
3041 </para>
3042 <para>
3043 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3044 music.
3045 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3046 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3047 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3048 </para>
3049 <para>
3050 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3051 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3052 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3053 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3054 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3055 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3056 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3057 </para>
3058 <para>
3059 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3060 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3061 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3062 ordinarily
3063 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3064 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3065 something for nothing.
3066 </para>
3067 </sect2>
3068 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3069 <title>Cable TV</title>
3070 <para>
3071
3072 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3073 </para>
3074 <para>
3075 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with
3076 cable television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the
3077 content
3078 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable
3079 companies
3080 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3081 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3082 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3083 broadcasters'
3084 content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever did&mdash;
3085 Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to give away.
3086 </para>
3087 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3088 <para>
3089 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3090 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3091 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3092 <!-- f13 -->
3093 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the Subcommittee
3094 on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
3095 on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966) (statement of
3096 Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
3097 </para></footnote>
3098 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3099 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3100 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3101 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3102 <!-- f14 -->
3103 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3104 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3105 </para></footnote>
3106 As another broadcaster put it,
3107 </para>
3108 <blockquote>
3109 <para>
3110 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3111 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3112 paid for.<footnote><para>
3113 <!-- f15 -->
3114 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3115 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3116 </para></footnote>
3117 </para>
3118 </blockquote>
3119 <para>
3120 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable
3121 enough:
3122 </para>
3123 <blockquote>
3124 <para>
3125 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3126 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3127 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3128 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3129 <!-- f16 -->
3130 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3131 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3132 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3133 </para></footnote>
3134 </para>
3135 </blockquote>
3136 <para>
3137 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president
3138 Charlton
3139 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of compensation."<footnote><para>
3140 <!-- f17 -->
3141 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3142 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3143 </para></footnote>
3144 </para>
3145 <para>
3146 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant
3147 Attorney
3148 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3149 </para>
3150 <blockquote>
3151 <para>
3152 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have
3153 any copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether
3154 copyright
3155 holders who are already compensated, who already have a
3156 monopoly, should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3157
3158 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3159 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3160 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3161 <!-- f18 -->
3162 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3163 Zimmerman,
3164 acting assistant attorney general).
3165 </para></footnote>
3166 </para>
3167 </blockquote>
3168 <para>
3169 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the
3170 Supreme Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright
3171 owners nothing.
3172 </para>
3173 <para>
3174 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3175 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3176 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3177 resolved
3178 the question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable
3179 companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but
3180 the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright owner.
3181 The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto
3182 power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable companies thus
3183 built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value created by
3184 broadcasters'
3185 content.
3186 </para>
3187 <para>
3188 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy"
3189 means using value from someone else's creative property without
3190 permission
3191 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described today<footnote><para>
3192 <!-- f19 -->
3193 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3194 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3195 Information, available at
3196 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3197 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3198 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3199 </para></footnote>
3200 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3201 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3202 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3203 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3204 generation&mdash;until now.
3205 </para>
3206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3207 </sect2>
3208 </sect1>
3209 <sect1 id="piracy">
3210 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3211 <para>
3212
3213 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy
3214 comes in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3215 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3216 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its defense,
3217 this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should
3218 stop it.
3219 </para>
3220 <para>
3221 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3222 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3223 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3224 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3225 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3226 outright
3227 copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has
3228 so often done in the past.
3229 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3230 </para>
3231 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3232 <title>Piracy I</title>
3233 <para>
3234 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3235 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3236 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3237 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3238 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3239 <!-- f1 -->
3240 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3241 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3242
3243 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3244 Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3245 </para></footnote>
3246 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3247 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually
3248 worldwide to piracy.
3249 </para>
3250 <para>
3251 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3252 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3253 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3254 This piracy is wrong.
3255 </para>
3256 <para>
3257 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3258 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3259 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3260 foreign
3261 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3262 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3263 developing
3264 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3265 existence, treated as right.
3266 </para>
3267 <para>
3268 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3269 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3270 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3271 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3272 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3273 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3274 violate
3275 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3276 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3277 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3278 </para>
3279 <para>
3280 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3281 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3283 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3284 pirate
3285 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3286 childhood.
3287 </para>
3288 <para>
3289 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3290 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3291 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3292 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3293 <!-- f2 -->
3294 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3295 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3296 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3297 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3298 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3299 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3300 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3301 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3302 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3303 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3304 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3305 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3306 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3307 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3308 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3309 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3310 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3311 is wrong.
3312 </para>
3313 <para>
3314 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3315 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3316 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3317 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3318 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3319 <!-- f3 -->
3320 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3321 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3322 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3323 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3324 instance
3325 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3326 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3327 </para></footnote>
3328 </para>
3329 <para>
3330 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3331 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3332 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3333 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3334 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3335 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3336 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3337 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3338 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3339 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3340 piracy of the tangible.
3341 </para>
3342 <para>
3343 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3344 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3345 property
3346 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3347 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3348 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3349 licenses
3350 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3351 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3352 copyrighted
3353 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3354
3355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3356 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3357 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3358 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3359 technology
3360 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3361 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3362 </para>
3363 <para>
3364 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3365 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3366 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3367 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3368 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3369 nation
3370 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3371 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3372 benefit
3373 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3374 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3375 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3376 Microsoft.
3377 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3378 </para>
3379 <para>
3380 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3381 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3382 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3383 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3384 become
3385 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3386 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3387 </para>
3388 <para>
3389 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3390 alcoholic
3391 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3392 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3393 ordinarily
3394 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3395 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3396 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3397 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3398 giving
3399 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what&mdash;at
3400 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3401 copyright
3402 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3403 wrong.
3404 </para>
3405 <para>
3406 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3407 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3408 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3409 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3410 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3411 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3412 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3413 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3414 is flat out wrong.
3415 </para>
3416 <para>
3417 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3418 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3419 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3420 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3421 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3422 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3423 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3424 </para>
3425 <para>
3426 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3427 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3428 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3429 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3430 </para>
3431 <para>
3432 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3433 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3434 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3435 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3436 </para>
3437 <para>
3438 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3439 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3440 sharing
3441 to survive.
3442 </para>
3443 </sect2>
3444 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3445 <title>Piracy II</title>
3446 <para>
3447 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3448 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3449 <!-- f4 -->
3450 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3451 </para></footnote>
3452 This means we must determine whether
3453 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3455 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3456 author of his profit.
3457 </para>
3458 <para>
3459 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors
3460 of the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3461 innovations.
3462 Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and,
3463 arguably,
3464 off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3465 <!-- f5 -->
3466 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3467 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3468 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3469 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
3470 up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.
3471 This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing
3472 technology
3473 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see
3474 Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3475 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3476 put together components that had been developed independently.
3477 </para>
3478 <para>
3479 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3480 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3481 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3482 system.<footnote><para>
3483 <!-- f6 -->
3484 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3485 San Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3486 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3487 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3488 "Napster's
3489 Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3490 "Hollywood
3491 at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3492 </para></footnote>
3493 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3494 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3495 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3496 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3497 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3498 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3499 or your 20,000 best friends.
3500 </para>
3501 <para>
3502 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3503 Americans
3504 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3505 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3506 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3507 <!-- f7 -->
3508 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3509 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3510 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3511 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3512 </para></footnote>
3513 A survey by the NPD
3514 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens
3515 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3516 <!-- f8 -->
3517 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3518 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3519 </para></footnote>
3520 The vast
3521 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3522 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3523 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3524 enjoy
3525 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3526 </para>
3527 <para>
3528 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3529 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3530 infringement,
3531 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3532 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more carefully
3533 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do&mdash;the kinds of
3534 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3535 </para>
3536 <para>
3537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3538 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3539 different kinds into four types.
3540 </para>
3541 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3542 <listitem><para>
3543 <!-- A. -->
3544 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3545 purchasing
3546 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3547 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3548 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3549 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3550 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3551 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3552 instead
3553 of purchasing.
3554 </para></listitem>
3555 <listitem><para>
3556 <!-- B. -->
3557 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3558 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3559 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3560 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3561 succeed.
3562 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3563 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3564 recommendations
3565 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3566 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3567 </para></listitem>
3568 <listitem><para>
3569 <!-- C. -->
3570 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3571 copyrighted
3572 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3573 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3574 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3575 rewarding
3576 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3577 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3578 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3579 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3580 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3581 available.)
3582 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3583 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3584 content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same harm
3585 that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3586 a local collector.
3587 </para></listitem>
3588 <listitem><para>
3589 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3590 <!-- D. -->
3591 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3592 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3593 wants to give away.
3594 </para></listitem>
3595 </orderedlist>
3596 <para>
3597 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3598 </para>
3599 <para>
3600 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3601 perspective
3602 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3603 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<footnote><para>
3604 <!-- f9 -->
3605 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3606 </para></footnote>
3607 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3608 illegal,
3609 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3610 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3611 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer&mdash;and
3612 certainly
3613 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3614 suggests.
3615 </para>
3616 <para>
3617 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3618 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3619 Hollywood,
3620 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3621 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3622 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3623 that is "devastating" the industry.
3624 </para>
3625 <para>
3626 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3627 harmful
3628 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3629 practice
3630 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3631 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp;
3632 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3633 labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3634 <!-- f10 -->
3635 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3636 Industry's
3637 Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music
3638 industry's
3639 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3640 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3641 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3642 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3643 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent
3644 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3645 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3646 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3647 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&ndash;56.
3648 </para></footnote>
3649 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3650 album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the
3651 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3652 problem,
3653 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3654 </para>
3655 <para>
3656 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3657 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3658 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3659 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3661 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3662 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3663 <!-- f11 -->
3664 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3665 </para></footnote>
3666 </para>
3667 <para>
3668 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3669 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3670 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3671 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3672 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3673 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3674 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3675 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3676 </para>
3677 <para>
3678 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3679 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3680 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3681 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3682 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3683 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3684 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3685 </para>
3686 <para>
3687 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3688 because
3689 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3690 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3691 </para>
3692 <para>
3693 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3694 percent,
3695 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3696 <!-- f12 -->
3697 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3698 available at
3699 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3700 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3701 25 June 2003, available at
3702 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3703 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3704 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3705 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3706 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3707 music
3708 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3709 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3710 </para></footnote>
3711 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3712 Internet
3713 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3714 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3715 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3716 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3717 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3718 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote><para>
3719 <!-- f13 -->
3720 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3721 February
3722 2003, available at
3723 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3724 </para></footnote>
3725 Competition
3726 from other forms of media could also account for some of the decline.
3727 As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film High
3728 Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie [on
3729 DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3730 <!-- f14 -->
3731 Ibid.
3732 </para></footnote>
3733 </para>
3734 <para>
3735
3736 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3737 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3738 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3739 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3740 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3741 although
3742 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3743 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3744 </para>
3745 <para>
3746 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3747 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3748 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3749 between
3750 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3751 numbers
3752 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3753 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3754 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3755 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3756 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3757 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3758 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3759 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3760 between
3761 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3762 </para>
3763 <para>
3764 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3765 assume,
3766 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3767 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3768 costs?
3769 </para>
3770 <para>
3771 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3772 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3773 available.
3774 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3775 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3776 <!-- f15 -->
3777 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3778 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3779 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3780 Committee
3781 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3782 statement
3783 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3784 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3785 </para></footnote>
3786 And while it's
3787 conceivable
3788 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3789 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3790 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3791 distributor
3792 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3793 make it available.
3794 </para>
3795 <para>
3796 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3797 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3798 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3799 thousands
3800 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3801 <!-- f16 -->
3802 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3803 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3804 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3805 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3806 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3807 National
3808 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3809 Results,"
3810 available at
3811 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3812 </para></footnote>
3813 These
3814 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3815 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3816 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3817 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3818 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3819 companies
3820 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3821 owner for the content they sell.
3822 </para>
3823 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3824 <para>
3825 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3826 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3827 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3828 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3829 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3830 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3831 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3832 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3833 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3834 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3835 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3836 </para>
3837 <para>
3838 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3839 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3840 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3841 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3842 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3843 shut as well?
3844 </para>
3845 <para>
3846 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3847 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3848 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3849 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3850 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3851 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3852
3853 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3854 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3855 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3856 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3857 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3858 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3859 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3860 great book!)
3861 </para>
3862 <para>
3863 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3864 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3865 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3866 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3867 </para>
3868 <para>
3869 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3870 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3871 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3872 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3873 unavailable?"
3874 </para>
3875 <para>
3876 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3877 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3878 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
3879 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3880 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3881 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3882 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3883 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3884 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3885 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3886 found only with time.
3887 </para>
3888 <para>
3889 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3890 just what you call type A sharing?"
3891 </para>
3892 <para>
3893 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3894 effect
3895 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3896 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3897 Napster
3898 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3899 developed
3900 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3901 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3902 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3903 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3904 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3905 <!-- f17 -->
3906 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3907 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3908 MHP, available at
3909 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3910 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3911 Fanning's
3912 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3913 </para></footnote>
3914 </para>
3915 <para>
3916 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3917 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3918 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3919 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3920 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3921 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3922 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3923 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3924 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3925 </para>
3926 <para>
3927 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3928 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3929 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3930 content
3931 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3932 technology.
3933 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3934 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3935 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3936 </para>
3937 <para>
3938 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3939 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3940 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3941 composers,
3942 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3943 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3944 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3945 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3946 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3947 broadcast),
3948 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3949 </para>
3950 <para>
3951 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3952 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3953 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3954 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3955 companies
3956 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3957 </para>
3958 <para>
3959
3960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3961 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3962 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
3963 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3964 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3965 Second,
3966 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3967 content
3968 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3969 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3970 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3971 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3972 Congress
3973 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3974 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3975 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3976 control
3977 over the future (cable).
3978 </para>
3979 <para>
3980 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3981 producers
3982 and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against another
3983 technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to them today,
3984 VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and Universal's
3985 claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a device,
3986 Disney
3987 and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage in
3988 copyright
3989 infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a "record"
3990 button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies and
3991 shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright infringement
3992 of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and Universal claimed, be
3993 partially liable for that infringement.
3994 </para>
3995 <para>
3996 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3997 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3998 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3999 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4000 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4001 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4002 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4003 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4004 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4005 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4006 system
4007 to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4008 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4009 for the architecture it chose.
4010 </para>
4011 <para>
4012 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4013 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When
4014 there are 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be
4015 invaded
4016 by millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and
4017 essence of the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4018 copyright."<footnote><para>
4019 <!-- f18 -->
4020 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4021 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4022 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4023 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4024 </para></footnote>
4025 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing
4026 and creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the
4027 devastation
4028 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of
4029 millions
4030 of tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4031 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4032 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4033 <!-- f19 -->
4034 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4035 </para></footnote>
4036 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4037 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4038 <!-- f20 -->
4039 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4040 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4041 </para></footnote>
4042 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4043 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4044 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4045 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4046 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4047 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4048 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4049 <!-- f21 -->
4050 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4051 of Jack Valenti).
4052 </para></footnote>
4053 </para>
4054 <para>
4055 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4056 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4057 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4058 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4059 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4060 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4061 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4062 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4063 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4064 technology.<footnote><para>
4065 <!-- f22 -->
4066 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4067 1981).
4068 </para></footnote>
4069 </para>
4070 <para>
4071 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4072
4073 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4074 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4075 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4076 Court wrote,
4077 </para>
4078 <blockquote>
4079 <para>
4080 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4081 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4082 market
4083 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4084 authority
4085 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4086 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4087 implicated
4088 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4089 <!-- f23 -->
4090 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4091 </para></footnote>
4092 </para>
4093 </blockquote>
4094 <para>
4095 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4096 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4097 Congress
4098 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4099 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4100 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4101 </para>
4102
4103 <table id="t1">
4104 <title>Table</title>
4105 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4106 <thead>
4107 <row>
4108 <entry>CASE</entry>
4109 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4110 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4111 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4112 </row>
4113 </thead>
4114 <tbody>
4115 <row>
4116 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4117 <entry>Composers</entry>
4118 <entry>No protection</entry>
4119 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4120 </row>
4121 <row>
4122 <entry>Radio</entry>
4123 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4124 <entry>N/A</entry>
4125 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4126 </row>
4127 <row>
4128 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4129 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4130 <entry>No protection</entry>
4131 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4132 </row>
4133 <row>
4134 <entry>VCR</entry>
4135 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4136 <entry>No protection</entry>
4137 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4138 </row>
4139 </tbody>
4140 </tgroup>
4141 </table>
4142
4143 <para>
4144 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4145 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4146 <!-- f24 -->
4147 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4148 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4149 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4150 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4151 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4152 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4153 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4154 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4155 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4156 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4157 </para></footnote>
4158 In each case, throughout our history,
4159 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4160 work.
4161 </para>
4162 <para>
4163 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4164 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4165 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4166 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4167 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4168 legitimacy
4169 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4170 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4171 the interests at stake.
4172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4173 </para>
4174 <para>
4175 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4176 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4177 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4178 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4179 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4180 regulated?
4181 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4182 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4183 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4184 permission to record a song?
4185 </para>
4186 <para>
4187 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4188 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4189 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4190 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4191 <!-- f25 -->
4192 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4193 (1984).
4194 </para></footnote>
4195 Instead, the particular uses that the
4196 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4197 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4198 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4199 technology
4200 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4201 the distribution of content.
4202 </para>
4203 <para>
4204 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4205 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4206 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4207 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4208 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4209 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4210 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4211 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4212 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4213 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4214 protection
4215 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4216 continue.
4217 </para>
4218 <para>
4219
4220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4221 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4222 superior
4223 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4224 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4225 network.
4226 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4227 efficient.
4228 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4229 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4230 <!-- f26 -->
4231 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4232 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4233 </para></footnote>
4234 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4235 warriors
4236 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4237 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4238 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4239 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4240 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4241 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4242 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4243 </para>
4244 <para>
4245 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4246 just as any other property is protected."
4247 </para>
4248 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4249 </sect2>
4250 </sect1>
4251 </chapter>
4252 <chapter id="c-property">
4253 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4254 <para>
4255
4256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4257 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4258 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4259 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4260 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4261 the price she can get.
4262 </para>
4263 <para>
4264 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4265 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4266 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4267 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4268 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4269 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4270 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4271 going
4272 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4273 thing I am taking then?
4274 </para>
4275 <para>
4276 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4277 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4279 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4280 narrow
4281 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4282 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4283 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4284 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4285 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4286 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4287 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4288 <!-- f1 -->
4289 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4290 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4291 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4292 </para></footnote>
4293 </para>
4294 <para>
4295 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4296 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4297 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4298 expression
4299 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4300 property.
4301 </para>
4302 <para>
4303 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4304 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4305 turning
4306 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4307 "property"
4308 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4309 <!-- f2 -->
4310 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4311 intangible.
4312 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4313 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4314 physical
4315 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4316 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4317 Property?
4318 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4319 373, 429 n. 241.
4320 </para></footnote>
4321 </para>
4322 <para>
4323 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4324 preceding
4325 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4326 material
4327 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4328 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4329 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4330 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4331 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4332 us draw.
4333 </para>
4334
4335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4336 <sect1 id="founders">
4337 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4338 <para>
4339 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4340 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4341 Shakespeare
4342 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4343 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4344 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4345 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4346 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4347 adaptation
4348 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4349 </para>
4350 <para>
4351 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4352 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4353 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4354 <!-- f1 -->
4355 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4356 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4357 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4358 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4359 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4360 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4361 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4362 </para></footnote>
4363 Tonson was the
4364 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4365 <!-- f2 -->
4366 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4367 Vanderbilt
4368 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4369 </para></footnote>
4370 who
4371 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4372 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4373 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4375 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4376 copyright.
4377 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4378 produce
4379 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4380 </para>
4381 <para>
4382 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4383 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4384 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4385 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4386 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4387 renewable
4388 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4389 published
4390 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4391 <!-- f3 -->
4392 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4393 "copyright
4394 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4395 </para></footnote>
4396 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4397 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4398 </para>
4399 <para>
4400 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4401 "copyright"
4402 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4403 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4404 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4405 expired
4406 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4407 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4408 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4409 publishers,
4410 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4411 </para>
4412 <para>
4413 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4414 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4415 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4416 govern
4417 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4418 "positive
4419 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4420 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4421 legislature,
4422 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4423 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4424 expired
4425 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4426 independent
4427 of any positive law.
4428 </para>
4429 <para>
4430 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4431 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4432 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4433 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4434
4435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4436 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4437 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4438 ultimately
4439 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4440 </para>
4441 <para>
4442 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4443 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4444 however,
4445 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4446 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4447 "expired,"
4448 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4449 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4450 </para>
4451 <para>
4452 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4453 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4454 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4455 </para>
4456 <para>
4457 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4458 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4459 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4460 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4461 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4462 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4463 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4464 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4465 reason
4466 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4467 </para>
4468 <para>
4469 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4470 special
4471 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4472 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4473 "booksellers."
4474 </para>
4475 <para>
4476 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4477 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4478 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4479 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4480 others
4481 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4482 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4483 beyond
4484 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4485 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4486 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4487 restrictions
4488 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4489 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4490 perform, and so on.
4491 </para>
4492 <para>
4493 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4494 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4495 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4496 permission
4497 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4498 anything,
4499 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4500 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4501 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4502 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4503 </para>
4504 <para>
4505 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4506 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4507 especially
4508 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4509 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4510 monopolies&mdash;especially
4511 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4512 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4513 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4514 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4515 Monopolies,
4516 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4517 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4518 publishing.
4519 </para>
4520 <para>
4521 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4522 naturally
4523 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4524 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4525 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4526 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4527 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4528 specialinterest
4529 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4530 </para>
4531 <para>
4532 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4533 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4534 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4535 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4536 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4537 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4538 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4539 themselves
4540 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4541 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4542 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4543 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4544 <!-- f4 -->
4545 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4546 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4547 </para></footnote>
4548 </para>
4549 <para>
4550 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4551 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4552 Enlightenment
4553 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4554 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4555 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4556 that idea.
4557 </para>
4558 <para>
4559 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4560 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4561 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4562 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4563 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4564 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4565 compromise
4566 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4567 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4568 construction and spread of culture.
4569 </para>
4570 <para>
4571 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4572 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4573 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4574 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4575 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4576 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4577 they said; they needed more time.
4578 </para>
4579 <para>
4580 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4581 words that echo today,
4582 </para>
4583 <blockquote>
4584 <para>
4585 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4586 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4587 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4588 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4589 establishing
4590 a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in
4591 the Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a
4592 Discouragement
4593 to Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general
4594 Tax on the Publick; and all this only to increase the private Gain
4595 of the Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4596 <!-- f5 -->
4597 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4598 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4599 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4600 Encouragement
4601 of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
4602 Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4603 mentioned
4604 (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al., 8,
4605 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4606 </para></footnote>
4607 </para>
4608 </blockquote>
4609 <para>
4610 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in
4611 a series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4612 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4613 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4614 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4615 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4616 creative
4617 "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of Anne,
4618 the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just because the
4619 protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't mean the
4620 protections
4621 of the common law expired: Under the common law they had
4622 the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its Statute of Anne
4623 copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only way to protect
4624 authors.
4625 </para>
4626 <para>
4627 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some
4628 of the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4629 chutzpah.
4630 Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it, "The
4631 publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle rancher has
4632 for cattle."<footnote><para>
4633 <!-- f6 -->
4634 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4635 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4636 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4637 </para></footnote>
4638 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the
4639 author.
4640 His concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4641 </para>
4642 <para>
4643 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4644 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4645 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4646 <!-- f7 -->
4647 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4648 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4649 </para></footnote>
4650 </para>
4651 <para>
4652 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4653 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4654 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4655 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4656 <!-- f8 -->
4657 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4658 1993), 92.
4659 </para></footnote>
4660 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4661 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4662 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4663 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4664 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4665 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4666 <!-- f9 -->
4667 Ibid., 93.
4668 </para></footnote>
4669 </para>
4670 <para>
4671 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's
4672 shop in Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where
4673 he sold inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in
4674 defiance
4675 of the supposed common law right of Literary Property."<footnote><para>
4676 <!-- f10 -->
4677 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4678 Borwell).
4679 </para></footnote>
4680 His
4681 books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he rested
4682 his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of Anne,
4683 the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4684 </para>
4685 <para>
4686 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4687 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4688 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4689 </para>
4690 <para>
4691 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to
4692 James Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the
4693 requirements
4694 of the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full
4695 protection
4696 of the statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor
4697 began printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual
4698 common law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4699 <!-- f11 -->
4700 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright
4701 Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law
4702 Review
4703 29 (1983): 1152.
4704 </para></footnote>
4705 </para>
4706 <para>
4707 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in
4708 English
4709 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4710 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4711 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the
4712 common law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4713 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4714 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That
4715 common
4716 law rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4717 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4718 </para>
4719 <para>
4720 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if justice
4721 were just a matter of logical deduction from first principles&mdash;Mansfield's
4722 conclusion might make some sense. But what it ignored was the larger
4723 issue that Parliament had struggled with in 1710: How best to limit
4724 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4725 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4726 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4727 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4728 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4729 believed,
4730 Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4731 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4732 </para>
4733 <para>
4734 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4735 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4736 </para>
4737 <para>
4738 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4739 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4740 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4741 <!-- f12 -->
4742 Ibid., 1156.
4743 </para></footnote>
4744 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4745 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4746 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4747 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4748 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4749 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4750 </para>
4751 <para>
4752 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4753 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4754 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4755 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4756 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4757 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4758 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4759 statute were no longer protected.
4760 </para>
4761 <para>
4762 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4763 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4764 members
4765 of special legal distinction who functioned much like the Justices
4766 in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the House of
4767 Lords generally voted.
4768 </para>
4769 <para>
4770 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4771 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4772 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4773 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4774 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4775 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4776 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4777 passed into the public domain.
4778 </para>
4779 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4780 <para>
4781 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4782 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4783 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4784 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4785 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4786 and the greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of
4787 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of
4788 legal restraint.
4789 </para>
4790 <para>
4791 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4792 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4793 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people celebrated
4794 the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser reported, "No
4795 private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the public, and
4796 none has been tried before the House of Lords in the decision of
4797 which so many individuals were interested." "Great rejoicing in
4798 Edinburgh
4799 upon victory over literary property: bonfires and
4800 illuminations."<footnote><para>
4801 <!-- f13 -->
4802 Rose, 97.
4803 </para></footnote>
4804 </para>
4805 <para>
4806 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4807 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4808 reported:
4809 </para>
4810 <blockquote>
4811 <para>
4812 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what
4813 was honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday
4814 thought property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of
4815 London and Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses
4816 to purchase Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who
4817 after many years industry thought they had acquired a
4818 competency
4819 to provide for their families now find themselves without a
4820 shilling to devise to their successors.<footnote><para>
4821 <!-- f14 -->
4822 Ibid.
4823 </para></footnote>
4824 </para>
4825 </blockquote>
4826 <para>
4827 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4828 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4829 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4830 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4831 England
4832 would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter free.
4833 Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of course,
4834 for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller had an
4835 exclusive
4836 right to control the publication of that book. And not in the
4837 sense that books could be stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you
4838 still had to buy the book from someone. But free in the sense that the
4839 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4840 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free culture
4841 would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English culture
4842 would develop as the many English readers chose to let it develop&mdash;
4843 chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the memes they
4844 repeated and endorsed. Chose in a competitive context, not a context
4845 in which the choices about what culture is available to people and
4846 how they get access to it are made by the few despite the wishes of
4847 the many.
4848 </para>
4849 <para>
4850 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4851 antimonopoly,
4852 resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a world
4853 where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4854 protected.
4855 </para>
4856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4857 </sect1>
4858 <sect1 id="recorders">
4859 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4860 <para>
4861 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4862 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4863 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4864 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4865 He was their god.)
4866 </para>
4867 <para>
4868 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4869 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4870 today.
4871 </para>
4872 <para>
4873 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4874 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4875 Stagehands
4876 are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4877 During
4878 a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and in
4879 the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the stage.
4880 </para>
4881 <para>
4882 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some
4883 stagehands
4884 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4885 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers and
4886 the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4887 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4888 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4889 about the scene.
4890 </para>
4891 <para>
4892 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4893 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4894 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4895 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4896 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4897 </para>
4898 <para>
4899 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get
4900 permission.
4901 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a
4902 four-and-a-halfsecond
4903 image on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How
4904 could it hurt? Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told
4905 Else to contact Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4906 </para>
4907 <para>
4908 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4909 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4910 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4911 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4912 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4913 </para>
4914 <para>
4915 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we
4916 discovered
4917 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at least
4918 that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation." And
4919 second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us to use
4920 this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited Simpsons which
4921 was in the corner of the shot."
4922 </para>
4923 <para>
4924 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to
4925 someone he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca
4926 Herrera.
4927 He explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . .
4928 We're asking for your educational rate on this." That was the
4929 educational
4930 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4931 confirm what he had been told.
4932 </para>
4933 <para>
4934 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes,
4935 you have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4936 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film about
4937
4938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4939 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4940 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant to
4941 Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want the
4942 money."
4943 </para>
4944 <para>
4945 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was
4946 playing
4947 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4948 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the very
4949 last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally replaced the
4950 shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on, The Day After
4951 Trinity, from ten years before.
4952 </para>
4953 <para>
4954 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox,
4955 owns the copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property.
4956 To use that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the
4957 permission
4958 of the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4959 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4960 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4961 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner of
4962 the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law says the
4963 owner gets to control.
4964 </para>
4965 <para>
4966 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that
4967 the copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4968 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4969 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the
4970 copyright
4971 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4972 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set by
4973 the law.
4974 </para>
4975 <para>
4976 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4977 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4978 <!-- f1 -->
4979 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that lawyers don't
4980 permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard A. Posner with William
4981 F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred " (draft on
4982 file with author), University of Chicago Law School, 5 August 2003.
4983 </para></footnote>
4984 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot
4985 of a Simpsons episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use
4986 does not require the permission of anyone.
4987 </para>
4988 <para>
4989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4990 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4991 </para>
4992 <blockquote>
4993 <para>
4994 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf
4995 between
4996 what lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and
4997 what is crushingly relevant in practice to those of us actually
4998 trying to make and broadcast documentaries. I never had any
4999 doubt that it was "clearly fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But
5000 I couldn't rely on the concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5001 </para>
5002 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
5003 <listitem><para>
5004 <!-- 1. -->
5005 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires
5006 that we buy Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers
5007 require
5008 a detailed "visual cue sheet" listing the source and
5009 licensing
5010 status of each shot in the film. They take a dim view of
5011 "fair use," and a claim of "fair use" can grind the application
5012 process to a halt.
5013 </para></listitem>
5014 <listitem><para>
5015 <!-- 2. -->
5016 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the
5017 first place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a
5018 history of tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons
5019 usage, just as George Lucas had a very high profile litigating
5020 Star Wars usage. So I decided to play by the book, thinking
5021 that we would be granted free or cheap license to four seconds
5022 of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working to
5023 exhaustion
5024 on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk legal
5025 trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5026 principle.
5027 </para></listitem>
5028 <listitem><para>
5029 <!-- 3. -->
5030 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford
5031 Law School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also
5032 confirmed that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within
5033 an inch of your life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He
5034 made clear that it would boil down to who had the bigger
5035 legal
5036 department and the deeper pockets, me or them.
5037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5038 </para></listitem>
5039 <listitem><para>
5040 <!-- 4. -->
5041 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5042 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5043 money.
5044 </para></listitem>
5045 </orderedlist>
5046 </blockquote>
5047 <para>
5048 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory
5049 therefore
5050 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture.
5051 But in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5052 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means
5053 that the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law
5054 has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5055 </para>
5056 <para>
5057 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5058 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5059 publishers'
5060 profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has matured
5061 into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or not.
5062 </para>
5063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5064 </sect1>
5065 <sect1 id="transformers">
5066 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5067 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5068 <para>
5069 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5070 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5071 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5072 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5073 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5074 </para>
5075 <para>
5076 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5077 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5078 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very difficult.
5079 In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to build
5080 retrospectives
5081 on the work of particular actors. The first actor chosen was
5082 Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5083 Eastwood,
5084 with clips from his films and interviews with figures important
5085 to his career.
5086 </para>
5087 <para>
5088 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor
5089 and as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with
5090 Eastwood,
5091 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5092 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5093 </para>
5094 <para>
5095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5096 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5097 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5098 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5099 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5100 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5101 </para>
5102 <para>
5103 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5104 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5105 Eastwood's
5106 films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem arose. "No
5107 one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No one had
5108 ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an actor's
5109 career."
5110 </para>
5111 <para>
5112 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5113 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5114 </para>
5115 <para>
5116 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5117 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5118 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5119 for it."<footnote>
5120 <indexterm>
5121 <primary>artists</primary>
5122 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5123 </indexterm>
5124 <para>
5125 <!-- f1 -->
5126 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5127 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5128 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5129 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5130 </para></footnote>
5131 </para>
5132 <para>
5133 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5134 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5135 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5136 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5137 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5138 </para>
5139 <para>
5140 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5141 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5142 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5143 </para>
5144 <blockquote>
5145 <para>
5146 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips.
5147 We made some artistic decisions about what film clips to
5148 include&mdash;of
5149 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip
5150 from Dirty Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground
5151 who's wiggling under the gun and you need to get his
5152 permission.
5153 And then you have to decide what you are going to pay
5154 him.
5155 </para>
5156 <para>
5157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5158 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the
5159 dayplayer
5160 rate for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking
5161 about a clip of less than a minute, but to reuse that performance
5162 in the CD-ROM the rate at the time was about $600.
5163 So we had to identify the people&mdash;some of them were hard to
5164 identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
5165 crashing through the glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman?
5166 And then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some
5167 others, and we just started calling people.
5168 </para>
5169 </blockquote>
5170 <para>
5171 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5172 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5173 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5174 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5175 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5176 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5177 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5178 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5179 career.
5180 </para>
5181 <para>
5182 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5183 were totally in the clear."
5184 </para>
5185 <para>
5186 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5187 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5188 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5189 </para>
5190 <blockquote>
5191 <para>
5192 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up
5193 their hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many
5194 copyrights,
5195 there's the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director,
5196 there's the actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into
5197 its constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this
5198 many directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it
5199 very systematically and cleared the rights.
5200 </para>
5201 </blockquote>
5202 <para>
5203
5204 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5205 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5206 loved it, and it sold very well.
5207 </para>
5208 <para>
5209 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5210 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done this
5211 efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5212 nothing
5213 so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at
5214 all."<footnote><para>
5215 <!-- f2 -->
5216 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5217 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5218 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5219 </para></footnote>
5220 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5221 has to be made?
5222 </para>
5223 <para>
5224 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5225 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5226 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5227 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5228 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5229 </para>
5230 <blockquote>
5231 <para>
5232 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5233 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5234 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5235 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5236 compensated for that.
5237 </para>
5238 </blockquote>
5239 <para>
5240 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5241 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license that
5242 someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips like this?
5243 Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would have to track
5244 down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit permission
5245 from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of the
5246 creative
5247 process could be made to be more clean?
5248 </para>
5249 <blockquote>
5250 <para>
5251 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5252 mechanism&mdash;where
5253 you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5254 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5255 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5257 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it
5258 with lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost
5259 as the producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of
5260 paying
5261 X dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a
5262 known cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes
5263 this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have
5264 a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me
5265 X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get
5266 investments
5267 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you
5268 say, "Oh, I want a hundred minutes of something and I have no
5269 idea what it's going to cost me, and a certain number of people are
5270 going to hold me up for money," then it becomes difficult to put
5271 one of these things together.
5272 </para>
5273 </blockquote>
5274 <para>
5275 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some
5276 of the richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and
5277 access that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him
5278 a year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity
5279 is never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5280 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5281 Republican
5282 hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5283 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5284 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea
5285 that land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing
5286 flythrough
5287 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5288 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5289 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5290 regulationminimizing
5291 Republican should look at the rights and ask, "Does this
5292 still make sense?"
5293 </para>
5294 <para>
5295 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5296 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5297 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5298 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5299
5300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5301 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5302 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5303 </para>
5304 <para>
5305 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5306 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5307 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5308 judges loved every minute of it.
5309 </para>
5310 <para>
5311 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5312 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5313 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5314 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5315 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5316 were just violated in this room?"
5317 </para>
5318 <para>
5319 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5320 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5321 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the law.
5322 Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be prosecuted for
5323 this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle of federal
5324 marshals
5325 notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an important point:
5326 A year before anyone would have heard of the word Napster, and two
5327 years before another member of our panel, David Boies, would defend
5328 Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Nimmer was
5329 trying
5330 to get the judges to see that the law would not be friendly to the
5331 capacities that this technology would enable. Technology means you
5332 can now do amazing things easily; but you couldn't easily do them
5333 legally.
5334 </para>
5335 <para>
5336 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5337 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5338 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5339 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5340 planted in your presentation.
5341 </para>
5342 <para>
5343 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5344 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5345 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound never
5346 before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of clips on
5347 computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden takes
5348 images of politicians and blends them with music to create biting
5349 political
5350 commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced some of
5351 the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is through
5352 the mixing of Flash! and music.
5353 </para>
5354 <para>
5355 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5356 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5357 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5358 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5359 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5360 </para>
5361 <para>
5362 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5363 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add or
5364 mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5365 necessarily
5366 requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer." Instead, the
5367 system
5368 could simply make it easy for follow-on creators to compensate
5369 artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come along: a rule, for
5370 example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright owner of an
5371 unregistered
5372 work for the derivative reuse of his work will be a flat 1 percent
5373 of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the copyright owner." Under
5374 this rule, the copyright owner could benefit from some royalty, but he
5375 would not have the benefit of a full property right (meaning the right
5376 to name his own price) unless he registers the work.
5377 </para>
5378 <para>
5379 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5380 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5381 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5382 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5383 </para>
5384 <para>
5385 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an
5386 agreement
5387 with Mike Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5388 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5389 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and
5390 Dream-Works
5391 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under
5392 the agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5393 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use of
5394 stateof-the-art
5395 digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other actors into the
5396 film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of entertainment."
5397 </para>
5398 <para>
5399 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers
5400 explained,
5401 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on
5402 existing films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5403 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5404 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5405 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to new
5406 audiences, it is Mike."
5407 </para>
5408 <para>
5409 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5410 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5411 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5412 remains
5413 under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5414 announcement
5415 is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5416 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5417 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5418 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5419 </para>
5420 <para>
5421 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5422 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5423 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5424 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5425 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5426 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5427 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5428 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5429 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5430 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5431 curse, reserved for the few.
5432 </para>
5433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5434 </sect1>
5435 <sect1 id="collectors">
5436 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5437 <para>
5438 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5439 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5440 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5441 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5442 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5443 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5444 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5445 </para>
5446 <para>
5447 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5448 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive
5449 that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the
5450 world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5451 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as well
5452 as when those pages changed.
5453 </para>
5454 <para>
5455 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5456 appreciated.
5457 In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5458 constantly
5459 updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved
5460 of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
5461 </para>
5462 <para>
5463 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5464 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5465 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5466 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5467 </para>
5468 <para>
5469 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5470 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5471 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5472 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5473 library&mdash;constantly
5474 updated, without any reliable memory.
5475 </para>
5476 <para>
5477 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back
5478 Machine,
5479 and the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the
5480 Internet was. You have the power to see what you remember. More
5481 importantly, perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't
5482 remember and what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5483 <!-- f1 -->
5484 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5485 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003, press
5486 release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later
5487 changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended."
5488 E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5489 </para></footnote>
5490 </para>
5491 <para>
5492 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we
5493 remember
5494 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the
5495 reaction
5496 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965,
5497 or to Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5498 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5499 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5500 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what it is
5501 convenient to remember, but remember something close to the truth.
5502 </para>
5503 <para>
5504 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5505 repeat
5506 it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is whether
5507 we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More directly, the
5508 key is whether an objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do
5509 that, by collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5510 researchers,
5511 for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5512 </para>
5513 <para>
5514 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the
5515 Internet
5516 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5517 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5518 important
5519 in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5521 important
5522 to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to think that
5523 we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns around the
5524 world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the one kept by the
5525 Internet
5526 Archive.
5527 </para>
5528 <para>
5529 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5530 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5531 researcher.
5532 In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5533 success.
5534 It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
5535 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5536 Internet
5537 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie
5538 of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10 billion
5539 pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5540 </para>
5541 <para>
5542 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge
5543 in human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5544 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the Library of
5545 Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set
5546 out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been
5547 constructing
5548 the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more
5549 ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture
5550 was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of that
5551 culture
5552 is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news are
5553 recorded
5554 each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a specific
5555 exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and is available
5556 to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that, [television] is almost
5557 unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were Barbara Walters you could get
5558 access to [the archives], but if you are just a graduate student?" As Kahle
5559 put it,
5560 </para>
5561 <blockquote>
5562 <para>
5563 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with
5564 Murphy
5565 Brown? Remember that back and forth surreal experience of
5566 a politician interacting with a fictional television character? If you
5567 were a graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to
5568 get those original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5569
5570 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5571 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5572 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5573 </para>
5574 </blockquote>
5575 <para>
5576 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5577 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5578 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5579 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5580 nineteenthcentury
5581 America will have an easier time than researchers trying to
5582 understand
5583 the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5584 </para>
5585 <para>
5586 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5587 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5588 libraries.
5589 These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
5590 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once
5591 the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
5592 </para>
5593 <para>
5594 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library of
5595 Congress
5596 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long
5597 as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5598 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In 1915
5599 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed back."
5600 Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any
5601 library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at all&mdash;in the library archive of the
5602 film company.<footnote><para>
5603 <!-- f2 -->
5604 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
5605 Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3 (1980): 5;
5606 Anthony
5607 Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the United
5608 States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp; Co., 1992), 36.
5609 </para></footnote>
5610 </para>
5611 <para>
5612 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5613 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5614 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5615 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5616 required
5617 they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5618 "copyrighted."
5619 But those copies were simply kept by the broadcasters. No
5620 library had any right to them; the government didn't demand them.
5621 The content of this part of American culture is practically invisible to
5622 anyone who would look.
5623 </para>
5624 <para>
5625 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5626 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5627 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5628 stations
5629 from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5630 September
5631 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations
5632 from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made their
5633 coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5634 Anyone
5635 could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5636 events of that day.
5637 </para>
5638 <para>
5639 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger,
5640 whose archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films"
5641 (meaning films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never
5642 copyrighted), Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle
5643 digitize 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet
5644 to be downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5645 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5646 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock footage
5647 sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the material they
5648 wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made films on
5649 their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to be made.
5650 Either way, the archive enabled access to this important part of our
5651 culture.
5652 Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film that instructed
5653 children how to save themselves in the middle of nuclear attack? Go to
5654 archive.org, and you can download the film in a few minutes&mdash;for free.
5655 </para>
5656 <para>
5657 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that
5658 we otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
5659 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law
5660 doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in
5661 an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
5662 </para>
5663 <para>
5664 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to
5665 this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His
5666 aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part of our
5667 culture.
5668 Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but
5669 during
5670 a second life that all creative property has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5671 </para>
5672 <para>
5673 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5674 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
5675
5676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5677 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5678 market
5679 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
5680 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
5681 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial
5682 market,
5683 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5684 </para>
5685 <para>
5686 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5687 tradition
5688 has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers
5689 the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is
5690 used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive
5691 of knowledge about our history. In this second life, the content can
5692 continue to inform even if that information is no longer sold.
5693 </para>
5694 <para>
5695 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of
5696 print very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5697 <!-- f3 -->
5698 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5699 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5700 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5701 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese, "The
5702 First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston College Law
5703 Review
5704 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5705 </para></footnote>). After it is
5706 out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the copyright
5707 owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many get to read
5708 the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are thus the
5709 second
5710 life of a book. That second life is extremely important to the
5711 spread and stability of culture.
5712 </para>
5713 <para>
5714 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5715 creative
5716 property does not hold true with the most important components
5717 of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
5718 these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the Internet&mdash;there is no
5719 guarantee
5720 of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've replaced
5721 libraries with Barnes &amp; Noble superstores. With this culture, what's
5722 accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
5723 Beyond
5724 that, culture disappears.
5725 </para>
5726 <para>
5727 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5728 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5729 accessible
5730 all television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is
5731 extraordinarily
5732 high. So even though the law in principle would have
5733 restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5735 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly difficult
5736 to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had little
5737 practical
5738 effect.
5739 </para>
5740 <para>
5741 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution
5742 is that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
5743 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or
5744 distributed
5745 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
5746 books published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an
5747 archive of all moving images and sound.
5748 </para>
5749 <para>
5750 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never
5751 imagined
5752 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it;
5753 but we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5754 Kahle describes,
5755 </para>
5756 <blockquote>
5757 <para>
5758 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of
5759 music.
5760 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases
5761 of movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed]
5762 during the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million
5763 different titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that
5764 would fit in this room and be able to be afforded by a small
5765 company.
5766 So we're at a turning point in our history. Universal access is
5767 the goal. And the opportunity of leading a different life, based on
5768 this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind
5769 would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria,
5770 putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
5771 press.
5772 </para>
5773 </blockquote>
5774 <para>
5775 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5776 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5777 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5778 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5779 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5780 remains
5781 perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand it;
5782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5783 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
5784 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
5785 become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a future for our past. The
5786 technology of digital arts could make the dream of the Library of
5787 Alexandria real again.
5788 </para>
5789 <para>
5790 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building
5791 such an archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might
5792 like to call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might
5793 seem, the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5794 someone's
5795 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that
5796 Kahle and others would exercise.
5797 </para>
5798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5799 </sect1>
5800 <sect1 id="property-i">
5801 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5802 <para>
5803 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture
5804 Association
5805 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C.,
5806 with Lyndon Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture
5807 of Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5808 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5809 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5810 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5811 </para>
5812 <para>
5813 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion
5814 Picture Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose
5815 goal was to defend American movies against increasing domestic
5816 criticism.
5817 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but
5818 producers
5819 and distributors of entertainment for television, video, and
5820 cable. Its board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven
5821 major producers and distributors of motion picture and television
5822 programs
5823 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures
5824 Entertainment,
5825 MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal
5826 Studios, and Warner Brothers.
5827 </para>
5828 <para>
5829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5830 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president
5831 before him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5832 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most
5833 important
5834 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5835 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays
5836 the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5837 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5838 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5839 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5840 Washingtonian way.
5841 </para>
5842 <para>
5843 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5844 culture
5845 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5846 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5847 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5848 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5849 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine
5850 the meaning of "creative property."
5851 </para>
5852 <para>
5853 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5854 perfectly:
5855 </para>
5856 <blockquote>
5857 <para>
5858 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges
5859 and the counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting,
5860 reasonable men and women will keep returning to the
5861 fundamental
5862 issue, the central theme which animates this entire debate:
5863 Creative
5864 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protection
5865 resident in all other property owners in the nation. That is the issue.
5866 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5867 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5868 <!-- f1 -->
5869 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5870 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5871 Subcommittee
5872 on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
5873 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th
5874 Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
5875 </para></footnote>
5876 </para>
5877 </blockquote>
5878 <para>
5879 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5880 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5881 "central
5882 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this:
5883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5884 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5885 protections
5886 resident in all other property owners in the nation." There are
5887 no second-class citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should
5888 be no second-class property owners.
5889 </para>
5890 <para>
5891 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5892 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5893 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a
5894 claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this claim of
5895 Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is perhaps
5896 the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and scope
5897 of "creative property." His views have no reasonable connection to our
5898 actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has
5899 slowly redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5900 </para>
5901 <para>
5902 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5903 precise
5904 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5905 <!-- f2 -->
5906 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
5907 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
5908 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
5909 right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
5910 ordinary
5911 meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private
5912 Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977),
5913 26&ndash;27.
5914 </para></footnote> it has never been the
5915 case, nor should it be, that "creative property owners" have been
5916 "accorded
5917 the same rights and protection resident in all other property
5918 owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were given the same rights
5919 as all other property owners, that would effect a radical, and radically
5920 undesirable, change in our tradition.
5921 </para>
5922 <para>
5923 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat
5924 for our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5925 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5926 overturned
5927 in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a
5928 powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5929 culture would develop.
5930 </para>
5931 <para>
5932 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5933 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to
5934 convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5935 history.
5936 We have always treated rights in creative property differently
5937 from the rights resident in all other property owners. They have never
5938 been the same. And they should never be the same, because, however
5939 counterintuitive this may seem, to make them the same would be to
5940
5941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5942 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5943 Creativity
5944 depends upon the owners of creativity having less than perfect
5945 control.
5946 </para>
5947 <para>
5948 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most
5949 powerful of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5950 notwithstanding,
5951 in assuring that the new can displace them. No organization
5952 does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what's
5953 good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A society that
5954 defends the ideals of free culture must preserve precisely the
5955 opportunity
5956 for new creativity to threaten the old.
5957 To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5958 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5959 Constitution itself.
5960 </para>
5961 <para>
5962 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so
5963 strongly did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5964 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if it
5965 condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm&mdash;it is
5966 required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you
5967 "just compensation" for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees
5968 that property is, in a certain sense, sacred. It cannot ever be taken from
5969 the property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5970 </para>
5971 <para>
5972 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5973 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5974 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that after
5975 a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has granted and
5976 set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
5977 Congress
5978 does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
5979 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not
5980 have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking."
5981 Instead,
5982 the same Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5984 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5985 compensation
5986 at all.
5987 </para>
5988 <para>
5989 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5990 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be
5991 treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in
5992 our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be
5993 accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is
5994 effectively
5995 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
5996 </para>
5997 <para>
5998 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5999 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6000 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6001 appointed
6002 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college
6003 to produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it
6004 did in 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be
6005 the first to admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected
6006 some of those mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should
6007 reject as well. So my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did
6008 it, we should, too.
6009 </para>
6010 <para>
6011 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6012 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
6013 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given the
6014 same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
6015 creative
6016 property there must be a public domain?
6017 </para>
6018 <para>
6019 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6020 history
6021 of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
6022 enabled.
6023 Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6024 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that should
6025 be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property should be
6026 protected,
6027 but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights the law gives to
6028 creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights ought to
6029 be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether institutions designed
6030 to assure that artists get paid need also control how culture develops.
6031 </para>
6032 <para>
6033
6034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6035 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6036 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6037 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
6038 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6039 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6040 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6041 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6042 </para>
6043 <figure id="fig-1331">
6044 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
6045 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6046 </figure>
6047 <para>
6048 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6049 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each
6050 case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.
6051 For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals
6052 represent
6053 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated&mdash;
6054 either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious
6055 constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening
6056 punishments
6057 after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for
6058 example,
6059 you willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song
6060 from her latest CD and posting it on the Web, you can be punished
6061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6062 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6063 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6064 </para>
6065 <para>
6066 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6067 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6068 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6069 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6070 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6071 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6072 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6073 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6074 the source of the enforcement.
6075 </para>
6076 <para>
6077 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6078 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6079 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6080 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it is to
6081 be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But
6082 given a set of norms, and a background of property and contract law,
6083 the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or
6084 group might behave.
6085 </para>
6086 <para>
6087 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6088 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a constraint on
6089 behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across
6090 a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community to
6091 integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
6092 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as
6093 with the market, architecture effects its constraint through
6094 simultaneous conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts
6095 enforcing contracts, or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by
6096 "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law
6097 of gravity that enforces this constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket
6098 stands between you and a flight to New York, it is the market that
6099 enforces this constraint.
6100 </para>
6101 <para>
6102
6103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6104 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6105 obvious:
6106 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced
6107 by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by
6108 another.
6109 </para>
6110 <para>
6111 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6112 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6113 particular
6114 thing, we have to consider how these four modalities interact.
6115 Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well be; my
6116 claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most
6117 significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must
6118 consider how these four in particular interact.
6119 </para>
6120 <para>
6121 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6122 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say
6123 how fast you can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in
6124 part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most
6125 rational
6126 drivers; governors in buses, as another example, set the
6127 maximum
6128 rate at which the driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted
6129 by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of
6130 gasoline indirectly constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a
6131 community
6132 may or may not constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at 50
6133 mph by a school in your own neighborhood and you're likely to be
6134 punished by the neighbors. The same norm wouldn't be as effective in
6135 a different town, or at night.
6136 </para>
6137 <para>
6138 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6139 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6140 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6141 <!-- f3 -->
6142 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6143 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6144 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right self-consciously to
6145 change the other three. The right of the other three is more timidly
6146 expressed.
6147 See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New
6148 York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95; Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago
6149 School," Journal of Legal Studies, June 1998.
6150 </para></footnote>
6151 The law, in other words, sometimes
6152 operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality.
6153 Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to
6154 increase
6155 the incentives to drive more slowly. The law might be used to
6156 mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty of driving
6157 rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless
6158 driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be more
6159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6160 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed limit, for
6161 example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast driving.
6162 </para>
6163 <figure id="fig-1361">
6164 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6165 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6166 </figure>
6167 <para>
6168 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6169 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6170 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6171 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6172 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6173 another.<footnote><para>
6174 <!-- f4 -->
6175 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6176 because
6177 their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6178 particular
6179 moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the government. For
6180 instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people think it is meaningless
6181 to say that one's liberty has been restrained. A bridge has washed out, and
6182 it's harder to get from one place to another. To talk about this as a loss of
6183 freedom, they say, is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of
6184 ordinary
6185 life.
6186 I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which depends
6187 upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue against any
6188 insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view of liberty. As I
6189 argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of political thought with a
6190 broader focus than the narrow question of what the government did when.
6191 John Stuart Mill defended freedom of speech, for example, from the
6192 tyranny of narrow minds, not from the fear of government prosecution;
6193 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19.
6194 John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of labor
6195 from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, "The Right
6196 to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds., John R.
6197 Commons: Selected Essays (London: Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans
6198 with Disabilities Act increases the liberty of people with physical
6199 disabilities
6200 by changing the architecture of certain public places, thereby making
6201 access to those places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000).
6202 Each of these interventions to change existing conditions changes the
6203 liberty of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6204 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each of these
6205 groups might face.
6206 </para></footnote>
6207 </para>
6208 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6209 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6210 <para>
6211
6212 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6213 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6214 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6215 rallying makes sense.
6216 </para>
6217 <para>
6218 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6219 Internet:
6220 </para>
6221 <figure id="fig-1371">
6222 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6223 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6224 </figure>
6225 <para>
6226 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6227 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The
6228 law limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties
6229 on those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6230 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture)
6231 and expensive to copy and share content (market). Finally, those
6232 penalties
6233 are mitigated by norms we all recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping
6234 other kids' records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be
6235 infringement,
6236 but the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least)
6237 had no problem with this form of infringement.
6238 </para>
6239 <para>
6240 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s
6241 and p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes
6242 dramatically,
6243 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6244 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6245 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6246 becomes
6247 an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6248 </para>
6249 <para>
6250 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6251 Technology
6252 has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change,
6253 when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of
6254 protection
6255 for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is Iraq
6256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6257 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6258 looting that results.
6259 </para>
6260 <figure id="fig-1381">
6261 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6262 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6263 </figure>
6264 <para>
6265 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6266 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6267 Department
6268 (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6269 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6270 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6271 Internet
6272 had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6273 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6274 innovative
6275 marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to develop
6276 code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should educate
6277 kids to better protect copyright.
6278 </para>
6279 <para>
6280 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6281 preserve
6282 the particular balance that existed before the change induced by
6283 the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content industry
6284 to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life
6285 you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if
6286 something
6287 comes along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a
6288
6289 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6290 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6291 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6292 property
6293 (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government to
6294 bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions
6295 have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when
6296 imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6297 </para>
6298 <para>
6299 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6300 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6301 technological
6302 innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the
6303 changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the
6304 content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown
6305 describes
6306 it, its "architecture of revenue."
6307 </para>
6308 <para>
6309 But just because a particular interest asks for government support,
6310 it doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6311 technology
6312 has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6313 follow
6314 that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6315 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6316 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6317 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6318 <!-- f5 -->
6319 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6320 BusinessWeek
6321 online, 2 August 1999, available at
6322 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more recent
6323 analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana R. Schoenberger, "Can
6324 Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6 October 2003,
6325 available
6326 at
6327 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6328 </para></footnote>
6329 Does anyone believe the government should ban
6330 digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have weakened the
6331 freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks
6332 from roads for the purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the
6333 subject
6334 of this book, remote channel changers have weakened the
6335 "stickiness"
6336 of television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the
6337 TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this
6338 change has weakened the television advertising market. But does
6339 anyone
6340 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial
6341 television?
6342 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to
6343 switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6344 </para>
6345 <para>
6346 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6347 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6348 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6349 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6350 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6351 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6352 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6353 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6354 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6355 <!-- f6 -->
6356 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6357 </para></footnote>
6358 And relative to a
6359 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6360 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6361 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6362 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6363 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6364 Brezhnev.
6365 </para>
6366 <para>
6367 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6368 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6369 government
6370 for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6371 guarantee
6372 that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the
6373 duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they
6374 create, in response to the request of those hurt by changing technology,
6375 are changes that preserve the incentives and opportunities for
6376 innovation
6377 and change.
6378 </para>
6379 <para>
6380 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include, obviously,
6381 copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the industry
6382 complaining
6383 about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in
6384 a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be
6385 especially
6386 wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government
6387 to get into the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and
6388 dangers of that game are precisely why our framers created the First
6389 Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . .
6390 abridging the freedom of speech." So when Congress is being asked to
6391 pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom of speech, it should ask&mdash;
6392 carefully&mdash;whether such regulation is justified.
6393 </para>
6394 <para>
6395 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6396 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6397 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6398 "justified."
6399 My argument is about their effect. For before we get to the
6400 question
6401 of justification, a hard question that depends a great deal upon
6402 your values, we should first ask whether we understand the effect of the
6403 changes the content industry wants.
6404 </para>
6405 <para>
6406 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6407 </para>
6408 <para>
6409 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6410 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6411 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6412 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6413 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6414 </para>
6415 <para>
6416 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6417 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6418 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6419 </para>
6420 <para>
6421 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued
6422 that DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6423 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6424 reproduce.
6425 Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6426 </para>
6427 <para>
6428 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly
6429 did not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of
6430 problems
6431 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse
6432 than the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately,
6433 the problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at
6434 least when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways
6435 to solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6436 </para>
6437 <para>
6438 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6439 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6440 culture.<footnote><para>
6441 <!-- f7 -->
6442 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6443 Environmentalism
6444 for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6445 </para></footnote>
6446 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of
6447 this chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that
6448 authors
6449 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given
6450 away "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6451 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6452 environment,
6453 much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6455 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6456 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6457 protecting
6458 copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors.
6459 It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware
6460 of our actions' effects on the environment.
6461 </para>
6462 <para>
6463 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6464 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6465 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6466 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6467 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6468 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6469 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6470 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6471 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6472 </para>
6473 <para>
6474 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6475 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6476 be lost.
6477 </para>
6478 </sect2>
6479 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6480 <title>Beginnings</title>
6481 <para>
6482 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and
6483 improved
6484 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
6485 "creative property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the
6486 English
6487 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6488 </para>
6489 <para>
6490 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6491 Congress
6492 in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I,
6493 section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6494 </para>
6495 <para>
6496 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6497 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6498 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6499
6500 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6501 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause does
6502 not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant "creative
6503 property
6504 rights." It says that Congress has the power to promote progress. The
6505 grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the
6506 purpose of enriching publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of
6507 rewarding
6508 authors.
6509 </para>
6510 <para>
6511 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we
6512 saw in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6513 assure
6514 that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over culture
6515 by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume
6516 the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike
6517 the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6518 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6519 </para>
6520 <para>
6521 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6522 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built
6523 structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built
6524 a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them
6525 short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the
6526 federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6527 concentrating
6528 power in the federal government, they built structures to reinforce
6529 the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose members were
6530 at the time selected by the states, and an electoral college, also selected
6531 by the states, to select the president. In each case, a structure built
6532 checks and balances into the constitutional frame, structured to
6533 prevent
6534 otherwise inevitable concentrations of power.
6535 </para>
6536 <para>
6537 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call
6538 "copyright"
6539 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they
6540 ever considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put
6541 our "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
6542 210 years since they first struck its design.
6543 </para>
6544 <para>
6545 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6546 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6547 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6548 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6549 started here:
6550 </para>
6551 <figure id="fig-1441">
6552 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6553 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6554 </figure>
6555 <para>
6556 We will end here:
6557 </para>
6558 <figure id="fig-1442">
6559 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6560 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6561 </figure>
6562 <para>
6563 Let me explain how.
6564 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6565 </para>
6566 </sect2>
6567 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6568 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6569 <para>
6570 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6571 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6572 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6573 protecting
6574 creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6575 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6576 authorship.<footnote><para>
6577 <!-- f8 -->
6578 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
6579 United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1, 485&ndash;86:
6580 "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme Law of the Land,'
6581 the perpetual rights which authors had, or were supposed by some to have, under
6582 the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6583 </para></footnote>
6584 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in
6585 the United States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the
6586 common
6587 law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work
6588 published
6589 in the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England,
6590 this lingering uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely
6591 upon a public domain to reprint and distribute works.
6592 </para>
6593 <para>
6594 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6595 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
6596 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections.
6597 Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the
6598 copyrights
6599 for all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any
6600 state copyrights expired as well.
6601 </para>
6602 <para>
6603 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6604 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6605 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6606 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6607 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6608 </para>
6609 <para>
6610 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6611 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6612 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6613 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6614 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6615 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6616 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6617 <!-- f9 -->
6618 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6619 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6620 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6621 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6622 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6623 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6624 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6625 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6626 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6627 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6628 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6629 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6630 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6631 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6632 </para>
6633 <para>
6634 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6635 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6636 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6637 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6638 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6639 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6640 copyright, either.
6641 </para>
6642 <para>
6643 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6644 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6645 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6646 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6647 domain.<footnote><para>
6648 <!-- f10 -->
6649 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6650 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6651 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6652 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6653 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6654 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6655 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6656 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6657 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6658 </para>
6659 <para>
6660 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6661 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6662 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6663 <!-- f11 -->
6664 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6665 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6666 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6667 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6668 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6669 effectively free.
6670 </para>
6671 <para>
6672 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6673 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6674 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6675 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6676 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6677 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6678 </para>
6679 <para>
6680 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6681 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6682 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6683 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6684 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6685 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6686 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6687 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6688 </para>
6689 <para>
6690 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6691 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6692 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6693 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6694
6695 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6696 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6697 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6698 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6699 </para>
6700 <para>
6701 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6702 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6703 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6704 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6705 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6706 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6707 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6708 value.
6709 </para>
6710 <para>
6711 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6712 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6713 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6714 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6715 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6716 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6717 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6718 was ninety-five years.
6719 </para>
6720 <para>
6721 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6722 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6723 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6724 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6725 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6726 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6727 them.
6728 </para>
6729 <para>
6730 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6731 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6732 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6733 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6734 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6735 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6736 years.<footnote><para>
6737 <!-- f12 -->
6738 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6739 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6740 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6741 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6742 </para></footnote>
6743 </para>
6744 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6745 </sect2>
6746 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6747 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6748 <para>
6749 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6750 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6751 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6752 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6753 </para>
6754 <para>
6755 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6756 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6757 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6758 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6759 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6760 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6761 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6762 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6763 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6764 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6765 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6766 </para>
6767 <para>
6768 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6769 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6770 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6771 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6772 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6773 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6774 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6775 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6776 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6777 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6778 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6779 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6780 on the initial creative work.
6781 </para>
6782 <para>
6783 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6784 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6785 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6787 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6788 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6789 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6790 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6791 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6792 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6793 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6794 </para>
6795 <para>
6796 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6797 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6798 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6799 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6800 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6801 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6802 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6803 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6804 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6805 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6806 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6807 original author.
6808 </para>
6809 <para>
6810 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6811 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6812 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6813 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6814 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6815 copy available for others to copy.
6816 </para>
6817 <para>
6818 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6819 differences.
6820 </para>
6821 <para>
6822 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6823 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6824 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6825 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6826 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6827 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6828 <!-- f13 -->
6829 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6830 Creation
6831 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6832 International
6833 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6834 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6835 </para></footnote>
6836 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6837 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6838 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6839 </para>
6840 <para>
6841 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6842 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6843 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6844 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6845 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6846 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6847 creative
6848 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6849 restrained.
6850 </para>
6851 <para>
6852 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6853 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6854 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6855 reduced
6856 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6857 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6858 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6859 </para>
6860 <para>
6861 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6862 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6863 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6864 </para>
6865 <para>
6866 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6867 control
6868 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6869 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6870 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6871 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6872 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6873 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6874 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6875 exclusive
6876 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6877 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6878 </para>
6879 <para>
6880 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6881 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6882 expansion
6883 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6884 copyright.
6885 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6886 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6887 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6888 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6889 </para>
6890 <para>
6891
6892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6893 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6894 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6895 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6896 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6897 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6898 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6899 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6900 protect
6901 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6902 <!-- f14 -->
6903 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6904 2003, available at
6905 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6906 </para></footnote>
6907 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6908 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6909 the wrong of direct piracy.
6910 </para>
6911 <para>
6912 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6913 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6914 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6915 transformative
6916 use of my book.<footnote><para>
6917 <!-- f15 -->
6918 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6919 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6920 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6921 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6922 Constitutionality,"
6923 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6924 </para></footnote>
6925 These two different uses of my creative work are
6926 treated the same.
6927 </para>
6928 <para>
6929 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6930 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6931 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6932 creates
6933 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6934 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6935 originally created?
6936 </para>
6937 <para>
6938 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6939 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6940 simply
6941 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6942 rights originally granted.
6943 </para>
6944 </sect2>
6945 <sect2 id="lawreach">
6946 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6947 <para>
6948 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6949 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6950 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6951 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6952 <!-- f16 -->
6953 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6954 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
6955 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6956 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
6957 sometimes
6958 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
6959 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
6960 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6961 </para></footnote>
6962 </para>
6963 <para>
6964 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6965 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6966 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6967 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6968 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6969 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6970 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6971 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6972 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6973 trigger for copyright law.
6974 </para>
6975 <para>
6976 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6977 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6978 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6979 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6980 <!-- f17 -->
6981 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6982 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6983 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6984 basis
6985 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6986 </para></footnote>
6987 because it is clear that the
6988 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6989 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6990 </para>
6991 <para>
6992 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6993 empty circle.
6994 </para>
6995 <figure id="fig-1521">
6996 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6997 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6998 </figure>
6999 <para>
7000 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
7001 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
7002 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
7003 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
7004 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
7005 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
7006 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
7007 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
7008 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
7009 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
7010 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
7011 not make a copy.
7012 </para>
7013 <figure id="fig-1531">
7014 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
7015 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
7016 </figure>
7017 <para>
7018 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7019 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7020 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7021 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7022 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7023 diagram on next page).
7024 </para>
7025 <para>
7026 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7027 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
7028 </para>
7029 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7030 <figure id="fig-1541">
7031 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
7032 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
7033 </figure>
7034 <para>
7035 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
7036 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7037 unregulated.
7038 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
7039 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
7040 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
7041 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
7042 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
7043 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7044 </para>
7045 <figure id="fig-1542">
7046 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
7047 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
7048 </figure>
7049 <para> </para>
7050 <figure id="fig-1551">
7051 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
7052 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
7053 </figure>
7054 <para>
7055 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7056 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7057 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
7058 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7059 </para>
7060 <para>
7061 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
7062 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
7063 <!-- f18 -->
7064 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
7065 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
7066 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
7067 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
7068 </para></footnote>
7069 And because of this single,
7070 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
7071 category
7072 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
7073 unregulated
7074 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
7075 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
7076 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
7077 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
7078 category
7079 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
7080 copyrighted
7081 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
7082 burden of this shift.
7083 </para>
7084 <para>
7085 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7086 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
7087 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
7088 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
7089 nothing
7090 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
7091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7092 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
7093 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
7094 produced
7095 a copy.
7096 </para>
7097 <para>
7098 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
7099 different
7100 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7101 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
7102 copyright
7103 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
7104 accidental
7105 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
7106 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
7107 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
7108 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
7109 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
7110 </para>
7111 <para>
7112 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7113 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7114 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7115 points also become clear:
7116 </para>
7117 <para>
7118 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7119 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7120 presumptively
7121 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7122 evidence
7123 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7124 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7125 free culture before the Internet.
7126 </para>
7127 <para>
7128 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7129 transformative
7130 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7131 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7132 transformation
7133 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7134 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7135 releasing
7136 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7137 justification.
7138 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7139 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7140 transformative
7141 uses of creative work.
7142 </para>
7143 <para>
7144 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7145
7146 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7147 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7148 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7149 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7150 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7151 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7152 Internet,
7153 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7154 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7155 protected
7156 before because reading was not regulated.
7157 </para>
7158 <para>
7159 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7160 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7161 depend
7162 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
7163 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7164 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7165 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7166 protections
7167 of fair use are not enough.
7168 </para>
7169 <para>
7170 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7171 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7172 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7173 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7174 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7175 </para>
7176 <para>
7177 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7178 began
7179 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7180 previews.
7181 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7182 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7183 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7184 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7185 before
7186 you bought it.
7187 </para>
7188 <para>
7189 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7190 distributors
7191 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7192 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7193 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7194 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7195 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7196 business
7197 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7198 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7199 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7200 immediately.
7201 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7202 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7203 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7204 </para>
7205 <para>
7206 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7207 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7208 infringed"
7209 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7210 willful
7211 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7212 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7213 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7214 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7215 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7216 </para>
7217 <para>
7218 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7219 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7220 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7221 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7222 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7223 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7224 Disney's permission.
7225 </para>
7226 <para>
7227 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7228 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7229 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7230 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7231 marketplace,
7232 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7233 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7234 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7235 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7236 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7237 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7238 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7239 </para>
7240 <para>
7241 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7242 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7243 control
7244 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7245 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7246 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7247 Noble
7248 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7249 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7250 argument
7251 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7252 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7253 exercising
7254 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7255 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7256 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7257 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7258 </para>
7259 <para>
7260 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7261 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7262 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7263 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7264 owners
7265 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7266 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7267 </para>
7268 </sect2>
7269 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7270 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7271 <para>
7272 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7273 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7274 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7275 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7276 </para>
7277 <para>
7278 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7279 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7280 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7281 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7282 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7283 your freedom.
7284 </para>
7285 <para>
7286 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7287 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7288 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7289 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7290 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7291 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7292 <!-- f19 -->
7293 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7294 Contemporary
7295 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7296 </para></footnote>
7297 </para>
7298 <para>
7299 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7300 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7301 you were."<footnote><para>
7302 <!-- f20 -->
7303 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7304 </para></footnote>
7305 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7306 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7307 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7308 </para>
7309 <para>
7310 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7311 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7312 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7313 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7314 </para>
7315 <para>
7316 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7317 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7318 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7319 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7320 copyrighted
7321 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7322 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7323 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7324 that is not at all funny.
7325 </para>
7326 <para>
7327 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7328 </para>
7329 <para>
7330 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7331 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7332 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7333 technology,
7334 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7335 </para>
7336 <para>
7337 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7338 Reader.
7339 </para>
7340 <para>
7341 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7342 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7343 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7344 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7345 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7346 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7347 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7348 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7349 called Permissions.
7350 </para>
7351 <figure id="fig-1611">
7352 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7353 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7354 </figure>
7355 <para>
7356 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7357 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7358 </para>
7359 <figure id="fig-1612">
7360 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7361 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7362 </figure>
7363 <para>
7364 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7365 According to my eBook
7366 Reader, I have the permission
7367 to copy to the clipboard of the
7368 computer ten text selections
7369 every ten days. (So far, I've
7370 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7371 I also have the permission to
7372 print ten pages from the book
7373 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7374 the permission to use the Read
7375 Aloud button to hear
7376 Middlemarch
7377 read aloud through the
7378 computer.
7379 </para>
7380 <para>
7381 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7382 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7383 </para>
7384 <figure id="fig-1621">
7385 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7386 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7387 </figure>
7388 <para>
7389 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7390 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7391 the book.
7392 </para>
7393 <figure id="fig-1622">
7394 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7395 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7396 </figure>
7397 <para>
7398 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7399 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7400 </para>
7401 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7402 <figure id="fig-1631">
7403 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7404 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7405 </figure>
7406 <para>
7407 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7408 </para>
7409 <para>
7410 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7411 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7412 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7413 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7414 under
7415 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7416 <!-- f21 -->
7417 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7418 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7419 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7420 obligation
7421 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7422 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7423 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7424 </para></footnote>
7425 When my e-book of
7426 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7427 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7428 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7429 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7430 </para>
7431 <para>
7432 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7433 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7434 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7435 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7436 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7437 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7438 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7439 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7440 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7441 restrictions:
7442 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7443 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7444 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7445 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7446 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7447 </para>
7448 <para>
7449 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7450 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7451 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7452 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7453 </para>
7454 <para>
7455 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7456 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7457 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7458 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7459 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7460 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7461 </para>
7462 <para>
7463 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7464 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7465 technologies
7466 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7467 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7468 protections as well?
7469 </para>
7470 <para>
7471 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7472 eBook Reader.
7473 </para>
7474 <para>
7475 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7476 public
7477 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7478 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7479 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7480 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7481 </para>
7482 <figure id="fig-1641">
7483 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7484 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7485 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7486 </figure>
7487 <para>
7488 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7489 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7490 allowed
7491 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7492 "permissions"
7493 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7494 </para>
7495 <para>
7496 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7497 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7498 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7499 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7500 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7501 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7502 </para>
7503 <para>
7504 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7505 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7506 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7507 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7508 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7509 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7510 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7511 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7512 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7513 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7514 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7515 </para>
7516 <para>
7517 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7518 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7519 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7520 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7521 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7522 often crazy.
7523 </para>
7524 <para>
7525 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7526 story of mine that makes the same point.
7527 </para>
7528 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7529 <para>
7530 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7531 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7532 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7533 </para>
7534 <para>
7535 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7536 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7537 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7538 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7539 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7540 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7541 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7542 </para>
7543 <para>
7544 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7545 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7546 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7547 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7548 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7549 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7550 </para>
7551 <para>
7552 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7553 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7554 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7555 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7556 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7557 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7558 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7559 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7560 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7561 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7562 </para>
7563 <para>
7564 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7565 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7566 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7567 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7568 ethically.
7569 </para>
7570 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7571 <para>
7572 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7573 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7574 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7575 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7576 than Sony had built.
7577 </para>
7578 <para>
7579 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7580 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7581 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7582 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7583 the
7584
7585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7586 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7587 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7588 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7589 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7590 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7591 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7592 dog to dance?
7593 </para>
7594 <para>
7595 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7596 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7597 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7598 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7599 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7600 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7601 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7602 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7603 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7604 </para>
7605 <para>
7606 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7607 <!-- f22 -->
7608 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7609 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7610 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7611 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7612 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7613 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7614 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7615 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7616 Questions
7617 about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7618 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7619 </para></footnote>
7620 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7621 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7622 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7623 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7624 </para>
7625 <para>
7626 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7627 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7628 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7629 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7630 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7631 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7632 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7633 Internet much more.
7634 </para>
7635 <para>
7636 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7637 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7638 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7639 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7640 </para>
7641 <para>
7642 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7643 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7644 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7645 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7646 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7647 </para>
7648 <para>
7649 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7650 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7651 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7652 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7653 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7654 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7655 </para>
7656 <para>
7657 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7658 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7659 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7660 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7661 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7662 constituted, succeed.
7663 </para>
7664 <para>
7665 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7666 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7667 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7668 wrote:
7669 </para>
7670 <blockquote>
7671 <para>
7672 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7673 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7674 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7675 </para>
7676 </blockquote>
7677 <para>
7678 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7679 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7680 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7681 </para>
7682 <blockquote>
7683 <para>
7684 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7686 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7687 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7688 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7689 </para>
7690 </blockquote>
7691 <para>
7692 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7693 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7694 spreading such information an offense.
7695 </para>
7696 <para>
7697 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7698 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7699 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7700 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7701 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7702 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7703 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7704 </para>
7705 <para>
7706 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7707 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7708 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7709 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7710 </para>
7711 <para>
7712 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7713 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7714 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7715 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7716 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7717 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7718 have been a copyright violation.
7719 </para>
7720 <para>
7721 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7722 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7723 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7724 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7725 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7726 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7727 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7729 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7730 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7731 </para>
7732 <para>
7733 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7734 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7735 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7736 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7737 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7738 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7739 </para>
7740 <para>
7741 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7742 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7743 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7744 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7745 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7746 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7747 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7748 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7749 </para>
7750 <blockquote>
7751 <para>
7752 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7753 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7754 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7755 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7756 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7757 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7758 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7759 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7760 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7761 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7762 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7763 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7764 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7765 important.<footnote><para>
7766 <!-- f23 -->
7767 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7768 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7769 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7770 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7771 </para></footnote>
7772 </para>
7773 </blockquote>
7774 <para>
7775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7776 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7777 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7778 the VCR responsible.
7779 </para>
7780 <para>
7781 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7782 the DMCA.
7783 </para>
7784 <para>
7785 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7786 </para>
7787 <para>
7788 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7789 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7790 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7791 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7792 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7793 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7794 </para>
7795 <para>
7796 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7797 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7798 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7799 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7800 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7801 and bad uses.
7802 </para>
7803 <figure id="fig-1711">
7804 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7805 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7806 </figure>
7807 <para>
7808 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7809 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7810 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7811 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7812 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7813 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7814 </para>
7815 <para>
7816 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7817 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7818 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7819 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7820 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7821 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7822 </para>
7823 <para>
7824 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7825 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7826 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7827 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7828 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7829 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7830 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7831 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7832 </para>
7833 <para>
7834 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7835 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7836 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7837 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7838 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7839 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7840 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7841 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7842 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7843 </para>
7844 <para>
7845
7846 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7847 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7848 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7849 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7850 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7851 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7852 <!-- f24 -->
7853 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7854 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7855 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7856 </para></footnote>
7857 </para>
7858 <para>
7859 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7860 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7861 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7862 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7863 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7864 </para>
7865 <para>
7866 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7867 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7868 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7869 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7870 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7871 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7872 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7873 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7874 </para>
7875 <para>
7876 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7877 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7878 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7879 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7880 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7881 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7882 </para>
7883 </sect2>
7884 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
7885 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7886 <para>
7887 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7888 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7889 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7890 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7891 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7892 find better ways
7893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7894 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7895 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7896 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7897 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7898 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7899 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7900 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7901 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7902 control.
7903 </para>
7904 <para>
7905 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7906 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7907 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7908 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7909 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7910 </para>
7911 <para>
7912 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7913 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7914 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7915 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7916 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7917 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7918 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7919 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7920 of the media.
7921 </para>
7922 <para>
7923 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7924 nature.
7925 </para>
7926 <para>
7927 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7928 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7929 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7930 <!-- f25 -->
7931 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7932 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7933 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote> The five
7934 recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7935 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7936 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7937 <!-- f26 -->
7938 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7939 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
7940 </para></footnote>
7941 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7942 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7943 <!-- f27 -->
7944 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7945 31 May 2003.
7946 </para></footnote>
7947 </para>
7948 <para>
7949 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7950 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7951 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7952 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
7953 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7954 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7955 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
7956 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
7957 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7958 </para>
7959 <para>
7960 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7961 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7962 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7963 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7964 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7965 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7966 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7967 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7968 protected&mdash; by the market.
7969 </para>
7970 <para>
7971 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7972 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7973 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7974 </para>
7975 <blockquote>
7976 <para>
7977 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7978 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7979 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7980 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7981 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7982 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7983 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7984 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7985 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7986 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7987 <!-- f28 -->
7988 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7989 2003): 89.
7990 </para></footnote>
7991 </para>
7992 </blockquote>
7993 <para>
7994 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7995 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7996 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7997 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7998 </para>
7999 <figure id="fig-1761">
8000 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
8001 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
8002 </figure>
8003 <para>
8004 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8005 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8006 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8007 distribute content?
8008 </para>
8009 <para>
8010 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8011 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8012 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8013 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8014 </para>
8015 <para>
8016 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8017 integration may matter.
8018 </para>
8019 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
8020 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8021 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8022 <para>
8023 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
8024 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8025 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8026 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8027 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8028 </para>
8029 <para>
8030 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8031 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8032 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8033 control.<footnote><para>
8034 <!-- f29 -->
8035 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8036 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
8037 Missouri,
8038 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8039 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
8040 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8041 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
8042 </para></footnote>
8043 </para>
8044 <para>
8045
8046 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8047 The network did not control those copyrights because the law
8048 forbade
8049 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The
8050 law required a separation between the networks and the content
8051 producers;
8052 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
8053 1992, because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8054 television&mdash;75
8055 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the networks.
8056 </para>
8057 <para>
8058 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this
8059 independence.
8060 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.
8061 In 1985, there were twenty-five independent television production
8062 studios;
8063 in 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
8064 1992, only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a
8065 company it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8066 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992,
8067 16 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control,
8068 last year there was one."<footnote><para>
8069 <!-- f30 -->
8070 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on
8071 Media Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th
8072 Cong., 1st sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of
8073 Consumers
8074 Union and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8075 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of
8076 America, West, in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond,
8077 Virginia, 27 February 2003.
8078 </para></footnote>
8079 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television
8080 was owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
8081 1992 and 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week
8082 produced by network studios increased over 200%, whereas the
8083 number
8084 of prime time television hours per week produced by independent
8085 studios decreased 63%."<footnote><para>
8086 <!-- f31 -->
8087 Ibid.
8088 </para></footnote>
8089 </para>
8090 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8091 <para>
8092 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
8093 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8094 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8095 owned by the network.
8096 </para>
8097 <para>
8098 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the
8099 ownership
8100 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller
8101 few. As Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8102 </para>
8103 <blockquote>
8104 <para>
8105 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8106 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8107 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8108 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8109 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8110 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent
8111 production
8112 companies producing television programs. Now you have less
8113 than a handful.<footnote><para>
8114 <!-- f32 -->
8115 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
8116 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8117 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8118 </para></footnote>
8119 </para>
8120 </blockquote>
8121 <para>
8122 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of
8123 such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8124 Increasingly
8125 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from
8126 networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the network
8127 wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from the
8128 inside,
8129 it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question
8130 without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment to Siberia,
8131 but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are
8132 quashed. This is not the environment for a democracy.
8133 </para>
8134 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8135 <para>
8136 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8137 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8138 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8139 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8140 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8141 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8142 <!-- f33 -->
8143 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
8144 National
8145 Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard
8146 Business School Press, 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was
8147 first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of
8148 Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
8149 Research Policy 14 (1985): 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard
8150 Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are
8151 Built to Last Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform
8152 Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001).
8153 </para></footnote>
8154
8155 Lumbering
8156 giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the field is
8157 only open to the giants, there will be far too little sprinting.
8158 </para>
8159 <para>
8160 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8161 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8162 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8163 measure.
8164 </para>
8165 <para>
8166 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8167 suggest the concern.
8168 </para>
8169 <para>
8170 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8171 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8172 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8173 </para>
8174 <para>
8175 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8176 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8177 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8178
8179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8180 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were all
8181 quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8182 collateral
8183 damage from it is so great as to make waging the war insane.
8184 When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice system, the
8185 desperation of generations of kids whose only real economic
8186 opportunities
8187 are as drug warriors, the queering of constitutional protections
8188 because
8189 of the constant surveillance this war requires, and, most profoundly,
8190 the total destruction of the legal systems of many South American
8191 nations
8192 because of the power of the local drug cartels, I find it impossible
8193 to believe that the marginal benefit in reduced drug consumption by
8194 Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
8195 </para>
8196 <para>
8197 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and
8198 it is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8199 depend
8200 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8201 these issues.
8202 </para>
8203 <para>
8204 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
8205 launched a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The
8206 campaign
8207 produced scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal
8208 drugs. In one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar,
8209 discussing the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the
8210 collateral damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of
8211 drug legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8212 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes his
8213 mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on
8214 the pro-legalization campaign.
8215 </para>
8216 <para>
8217 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8218 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8219 </para>
8220 <para>
8221 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8222 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8223 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the
8224 drug war. Can you do it?
8225 </para>
8226 <para>
8227 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8229 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8230 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8231 message
8232 will be heard then?
8233 </para>
8234 <para>
8235 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of
8236 avoiding
8237 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8238 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
8239 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First
8240 Amendment,
8241 but the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to
8242 choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media
8243 will refuse one side of a crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.
8244 And the courts will defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8245 <!-- f34 -->
8246 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads that
8247 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
8248 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
8249 policy."
8250 The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
8251 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
8252 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and
8253 returned
8254 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine, 15 October 2003.
8255 These restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for
8256 example,
8257 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with
8258 Rejection from TV Networks," New York Times, 13 March 2003, C4.
8259 Outside
8260 of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC or the
8261 courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general overview,
8262 see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
8263 Advertising
8264 on Television and Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988):
8265 449&ndash;79, and for a more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the
8266 courts, see Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d
8267 872 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8268 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
8269 transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel buses. Phillip
8270 Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni Rejects
8271 Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8272 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground was
8273 that the criticism was "too controversial."
8274 </para></footnote>
8275 </para>
8276 <para>
8277 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived in
8278 a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media
8279 throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control
8280 access
8281 to the media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which
8282 political positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in
8283 an obvious and important way, concentration matters. You might like
8284 the positions the handful of companies selects. But you should not like
8285 a world in which a mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us
8286 get to know about.
8287
8288 </para>
8289 </sect2>
8290 <sect2 id="together">
8291 <title>Together</title>
8292 <para>
8293 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8294 copyright
8295 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In
8296 the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No
8297 sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8298 </para>
8299 <para>
8300 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8301 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology
8302 and markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8303 cultivate
8304 our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins to seem
8305
8306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8307 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8308 supplement
8309 the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated markets
8310 to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing the
8311 massively
8312 expanded "property" rights granted by copyright fundamentally
8313 changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and build upon our
8314 past, then we have to ask whether this property should be redefined.
8315 </para>
8316 <para>
8317 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8318 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8319 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8320 our culture today.
8321 </para>
8322 <para>
8323 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8324 notwithstanding.
8325 And these massive shifts in the effective power of copyright
8326 regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content industry and
8327 resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly enable control
8328 over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether another
8329 adjustment
8330 is called for. Not an adjustment that increases copyright's
8331 power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
8332 adjustment
8333 to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
8334 regulation&mdash;a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8335 </para>
8336 <para>
8337 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8338 constant
8339 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8340 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8341 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8342 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8343 copyright
8344 holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8345 technology
8346 suggest that we may well need similar changes in the future. And
8347 these changes have to be reductions in the scope of copyright, in
8348 response
8349 to the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the
8350 market enable.
8351 </para>
8352 <para>
8353 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8354 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8356 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8357 changing
8358 technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8359 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the
8360 development
8361 of our culture than now.
8362 </para>
8363 <para>
8364 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8365 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when only
8366 publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much more
8367 diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for even
8368 then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers were
8369 independent
8370 of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a wide
8371 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
8372 remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny
8373 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a
8374 massive
8375 regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
8376 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into
8377 the most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8378 known.<footnote><para>
8379 <!-- f35 -->
8380 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8381 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8382 </para></footnote>
8383 </para>
8384 <para>
8385 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8386 </para>
8387 <para>
8388 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8389 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8390 distinguished
8391 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8392 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8393 that copyright law has undergone.
8394 In 1790, the law looked like this:
8395 </para>
8396
8397 <table id="t2">
8398 <title></title>
8399 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8400 <thead>
8401 <row>
8402 <entry></entry>
8403 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8404 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8405 </row>
8406 </thead>
8407 <tbody>
8408 <row>
8409 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8410 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8411 <entry>Free</entry>
8412 </row>
8413 <row>
8414 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8415 <entry>Free</entry>
8416 <entry>Free</entry>
8417 </row>
8418 </tbody>
8419 </tgroup>
8420 </table>
8421
8422 <para>
8423 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8424 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8425 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8426
8427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8428 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8429 noncommercial work was also free.
8430 </para>
8431 <para>
8432 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8433 </para>
8434
8435 <table id="t3">
8436 <title></title>
8437 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8438 <thead>
8439 <row>
8440 <entry></entry>
8441 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8442 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8443 </row>
8444 </thead>
8445 <tbody>
8446 <row>
8447 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8448 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8449 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8450 </row>
8451 <row>
8452 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8453 <entry>Free</entry>
8454 <entry>Free</entry>
8455 </row>
8456 </tbody>
8457 </tgroup>
8458 </table>
8459
8460 <para>
8461 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8462 published,
8463 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8464 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8465 transformation were still essentially free.
8466 </para>
8467 <para>
8468 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and
8469 after
8470 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8471 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8472 expanded.
8473 Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more
8474 common,
8475 we could say the law began to look like this:
8476 </para>
8477
8478 <table id="t4">
8479 <title></title>
8480 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8481 <thead>
8482 <row>
8483 <entry></entry>
8484 <entry>COPY</entry>
8485 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8486 </row>
8487 </thead>
8488 <tbody>
8489 <row>
8490 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8491 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8492 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8493 </row>
8494 <row>
8495 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8496 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8497 <entry>Free</entry>
8498 </row>
8499 </tbody>
8500 </tgroup>
8501 </table>
8502
8503 <para>
8504 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through,
8505 say, copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the
8506 commercial
8507 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of
8508 digital technologies, especially in the context of a digital network,
8509 means that the law now looks like this:
8510 </para>
8511
8512 <table id="t5">
8513 <title></title>
8514 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8515 <thead>
8516 <row>
8517 <entry></entry>
8518 <entry>COPY</entry>
8519 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8520 </row>
8521 </thead>
8522 <tbody>
8523 <row>
8524 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8525 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8526 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8527 </row>
8528 <row>
8529 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8530 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8531 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8532 </row>
8533 </tbody>
8534 </tgroup>
8535 </table>
8536
8537 <para>
8538 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8539 creativity
8540 was not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity&mdash;
8541 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8542 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules designed
8543 to regulate commercial publishers.
8544 </para>
8545 <para>
8546 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8547 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8548 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8549 these domains actually does any good.
8550 </para>
8551 <para>
8552 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8553 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8554 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8555 especially,
8556 noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8557 reasons
8558 sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8559 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8560 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8561 rights were more sharply restricted.
8562 </para>
8563 <para>
8564 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8565 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8566 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8567 notwithstanding,
8568 historically, this property right (as with all property rights<footnote><para>
8569 <!-- f36 -->
8570 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8571 movement
8572 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance
8573 public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of
8574 Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland Pennock and John W.
8575 Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
8576 </para></footnote>)
8577 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8578 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8579 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8580 technologies.
8581 And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright" did not
8582 control at all the freedom of others to build upon or transform a creative
8583 work. American culture was born free, and for almost 180 years our
8584 country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free culture.
8585 </para>
8586 <para>
8587 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8588 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8589 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8590 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story
8591 of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar
8592 concern
8593 that is increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair
8594 use right become unavoidably high (the story of chapter 7). Adding
8595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8596 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8597 familiar
8598 limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter 8). And
8599 granting
8600 archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property
8601 notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture
8602 (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But
8603 the nature of the property that builds a free culture is very different
8604 from the extremist vision that dominates the debate today.
8605 </para>
8606 <para>
8607 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8608 response
8609 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
8610 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing
8611 and distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed
8612 in a way that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property
8613 right that is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or
8614 was intended to be. The property right that is copyright has become
8615 unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and
8616 transform becomes weakened in a world in which creation requires
8617 permission and creativity must check with a lawyer.
8618 </para>
8619 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8620 </sect2>
8621 </sect1>
8622 </chapter>
8623 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8624 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8625
8626 <para> </para>
8627
8628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8629 <sect1 id="chimera">
8630 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8631 <para>
8632
8633 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8634 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8635 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8636 <!-- f1. --> H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8637 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8638 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8639 </para></footnote>
8640 The valley is extraordinarily
8641 beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate, slopes of rich
8642 brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent fruit." But the
8643 villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an opportunity. "In the
8644 Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King."
8645 So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a king.
8646 </para>
8647 <para>
8648 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8649 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8650 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8651 Indeed,
8652 as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the sound
8653 of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to control
8654 him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't
8655 understand,'
8656 he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute, and
8657 which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
8658 </para>
8659 <para>
8660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8661 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak)
8662 the virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8663 affection,
8664 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8665 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8666 description
8667 of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies,
8668 and she listened to his description of the stars and the mountains and
8669 her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence."
8670 "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could only half
8671 understand,
8672 but she was mysteriously delighted."
8673 </para>
8674 <para>
8675 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously
8676 delighted"
8677 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8678 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything
8679 right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8680 </para>
8681 <para>
8682 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8683 is affected," he reports.
8684 </para>
8685 <para>
8686 "What affects it?" the father asks.
8687 "Those queer things that are called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in
8688 such a way as to affect his brain."
8689 </para>
8690 <para>
8691 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8692 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple
8693 and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these irritant bodies
8694 [the eyes]."
8695 </para>
8696 <para>
8697 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They
8698 inform
8699 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8700 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8701 believe
8702 in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8703 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8704 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8705 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8706 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8707
8708 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8709 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8710 certainty
8711 that she was not the person whose blood was at the scene. . . ."
8712 </para>
8713 <para>
8714 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8715 impossible.
8716 A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of
8717 DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two
8718 individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person
8719 can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of
8720 a "person" should reflect this reality.
8721 </para>
8722 <para>
8723 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright
8724 and culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8725 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8726 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8727 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong.
8728 One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
8729 records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
8730 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
8731 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just
8732 send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant
8733 respects,
8734 just like what every executive in every recording company no
8735 doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8736 </para>
8737 <para>
8738 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8739 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music,
8740 then sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8741 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8742 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8743 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8744 allowed
8745 to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8746 </para>
8747 <para>
8748 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8749 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8750 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally)
8751 releases
8752 a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free
8753 copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.
8754 </para>
8755 <para>
8756
8757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8758 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8759 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take
8760 a CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8761 something
8762 to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note
8763 that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that
8764 might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is $1,000.
8765 According
8766 to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song CD, I'm
8767 liable
8768 for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8769 </para>
8770 <para>
8771 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that
8772 it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It
8773 is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side
8774 asserts,
8775 we need to begin to think about how we should respond to this
8776 chimera. What rules should govern it?
8777 </para>
8778 <para>
8779 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8780 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a
8781 felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages
8782 just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get
8783 universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no
8784 computer
8785 is used to commit this crime. These responses might be extreme,
8786 but each of them has either been proposed or actually implemented.<footnote><para>
8787 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8788 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8789 "Copyright
8790 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available
8791 at
8792 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8793 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8794 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8795 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8796 Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8797 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8798 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8799 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8800 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer,
8801 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.
8802 Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8803 high as $90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8804 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8805 from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8806 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8807 billion
8808 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8809 Elizabeth
8810 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8811 August 2003, available at
8812 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8813 targeting
8814 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8815 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8816 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003,
8817 D3, available at
8818 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8819 </para></footnote>
8820
8821 </para>
8822 <para>
8823 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids
8824 act as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there
8825 be no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8826 copyrighted
8827 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip:
8828 regulated,
8829 if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8830 </para>
8831 <para>
8832 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8833 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8834 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8835 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter
8836 is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance
8837 extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a reasonable
8838 alternative.
8839 But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
8840 of the two extremes.
8841 </para>
8842 <para>
8843
8844 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8845 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8846 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land
8847 grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give
8848 content
8849 holders a kind of control over our culture that they have never had
8850 before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8851 innovation
8852 and new creativity will be lost.
8853 </para>
8854 <para>
8855 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8856 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8857 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8858 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8859 innovation
8860 that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the
8861 passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to distribute
8862 content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the vice president
8863 for global public policy at one of these new innovators, eMusic.com,
8864 put it when criticizing the DMCA's added protection for copyrighted
8865 material,
8866 </para>
8867 <blockquote>
8868 <para>
8869 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8870 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8871 </para>
8872 <para>
8873 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8874 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8875 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8876 answer
8877 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8878 well produce a totally different industry model.
8879 </para>
8880 <para>
8881 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8882 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8883 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8884 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8885 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8886 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8887 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8888 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8889 interests.<footnote><para>
8890 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8891 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8892 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8893 Protection,
8894 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
8895 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8896 EMusic.com),
8897 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8898 Congressional
8899 Testimony File.
8900 </para></footnote>
8901 </para>
8902 </blockquote>
8903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8904 <para>
8905 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8906 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8907 changed.
8908 </para>
8909 <para>
8910 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8911 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8912 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8913 </para>
8914
8915 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8916 </sect1>
8917 <sect1 id="harms">
8918 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8919 <para>
8920
8921 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8922 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8923 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8924 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8925 prohibition,
8926 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8927 </para>
8928 <para>
8929 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8930 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8931 extend
8932 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8933 justified?
8934 </para>
8935 <para>
8936 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8937 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8938 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8939 our history.
8940 </para>
8941 <para>
8942 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still
8943 on the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme
8944 claims of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8945 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8946 </para>
8947 <para>
8948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8949 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8950 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8951 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8952 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8953 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8954 </para>
8955 <sect2 id="constrain">
8956 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8957 <para>
8958 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8959 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8960 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8961 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8962 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8963 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8964 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8965 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8966 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8967 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8968 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8969 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8970 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8971 </para>
8972 <para>
8973 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8974 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8975 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8976 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8977 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8978 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8979 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8980 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8981 the culture all around.
8982 </para>
8983 <para>
8984 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8985 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8986
8987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8988
8989 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8990 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8991 storytelling extended across the globe.
8992 </para>
8993 <para>
8994 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8995 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8996 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8997 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8998 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8999 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
9000 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
9001 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
9002 work is presumptively illegal.
9003 </para>
9004 <para>
9005 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
9006 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
9007 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
9008 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
9009 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
9010 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
9011 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
9012 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
9013 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
9014 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
9015 million.<footnote><para>
9016 <!-- f1. -->
9017 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
9018 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
9019 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9020 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
9021 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
9022 </para></footnote>
9023 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9024 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9025 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
9026 suffering.<footnote><para>
9027 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9028 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
9029 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9030 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
9031 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
9032 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
9033 available at
9034 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9035 recent months.
9036 </para></footnote>
9037 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9038 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9039 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9040 </para>
9041 <para>
9042 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9043 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
9044 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
9045 creative
9046 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
9047 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
9048 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
9049
9050 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9051 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
9052 create,
9053 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
9054 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
9055 begin
9056 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
9057 necessarily
9058 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
9059 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
9060 "illegal
9061 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
9062 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
9063 available
9064 at
9065 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9066 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
9067 </para></footnote>
9068 In what does their "illegality" consist?
9069 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9070 critical or reflective.
9071 </para>
9072 <para>
9073 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9074 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
9075 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9076 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9077 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9078 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9079 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9080 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9081 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9082 </para>
9083 <para>
9084 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9085 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9086 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9087 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9088 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9089 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9090 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9091 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9092 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9093 </para>
9094 <para>
9095 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9096 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
9097 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
9098 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
9099 law regulates such a use.
9100 </para>
9101 <para>
9102
9103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9104 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9105 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9106 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
9107 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9108 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9109 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9110 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9111 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9112 </para>
9113 <para>
9114 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9115 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
9116 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9117 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9118 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9119 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9120 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9121 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9122 comfort themselves.
9123 </para>
9124 <para>
9125 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
9126 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9127 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9128 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9129 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
9130 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9131 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9132 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9133 culture that is free.
9134 </para>
9135 <para>
9136 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9137 </para>
9138 <blockquote>
9139 <para>
9140 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9141 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9142 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9143 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
9144 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9146 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9147 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9148 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9149 </para>
9150 </blockquote>
9151 </sect2>
9152 <sect2 id="innovators">
9153 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9154 <para>
9155 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9156 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9157 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9158 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9159 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9160 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9161 </para>
9162 <para>
9163 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9164 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9165 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9166 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9167 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9168 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9169 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9170 </para>
9171 <para>
9172 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9173 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9174 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9175 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9176 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9177 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9178 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9179 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9180 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9181 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9182 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9183 </para>
9184 <para>
9185 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9187 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
9188 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9189 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9190 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9191 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9192 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9193 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9194 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9195 </para>
9196 <para>
9197 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9198 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9199 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9200 </para>
9201 <para>
9202 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9203 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9204 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9205 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9206 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9207 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9208 </para>
9209 <para>
9210 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9211 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9212 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9213 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9214 Raitt. And so on.
9215 </para>
9216 <para>
9217 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9218 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9219 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9220 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9221 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9222 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9223 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9224 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9225 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9226 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9227 </para>
9228 <para>
9229 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9230 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9231
9232 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9233 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9234 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9235 the kind of content the users liked.
9236 </para>
9237 <para>
9238 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9239 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9240 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9241 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9242 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9243 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9244 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9245 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9246 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9247 they had already bought.
9248 </para>
9249 <para>
9250 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9251 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9252 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9253 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9254 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9255 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9256 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9257 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9258 </para>
9259 <para>
9260 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9261 </para>
9262 <para>
9263 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9264 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9265 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9266 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9267 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9268 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9269 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9270 demanded.
9271 </para>
9272 <para>
9273 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9274 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9275 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9276 clients in this
9277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9278 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9279 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9280 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9281 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9282 </para>
9283 <para>
9284 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9285 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9286 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9287 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9288 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9289 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9290 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9291 innovation
9292 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9293 Revolution
9294 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9295 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9296 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9297 Times, 28 May 2001.
9298 </para></footnote>
9299 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9300 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9301 industry
9302 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9303 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9304 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9305 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9306 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9307 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9308 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9309 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9310 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9311 </para>
9312 <blockquote>
9313 <para>
9314 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9315 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9316 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9317 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9318 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9319 forward
9320 for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9321 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote><para>
9322 <!-- f5. --> Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9323 2003, available at
9324 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli
9325 for this example.
9326 </para></footnote>
9327 </para>
9328 </blockquote>
9329 <para>
9330 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9331 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats that the
9332 law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system that will
9333 obviously
9334 and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard enough to start
9335 a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is constantly
9336 threatened
9337 by litigation.
9338 </para>
9339 <para>
9340
9341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9342 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9343 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9344 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9345 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9346 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9347 imposes,
9348 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9349 conservative
9350 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9351 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9352 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9353 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9354 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9355 </para>
9356 <para>
9357 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9358 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9359 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9360 systematically
9361 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9362 industries
9363 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9364 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9365 competition.
9366 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9367 competition.
9368 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9369 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9370 overregulatedregulated
9371 market.
9372 </para>
9373 <para>
9374 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9375 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9376 burden
9377 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&mdash;a
9378 culture
9379 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9380 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9381 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9382 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9383 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9384 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9385 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9386 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9387 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9388 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9389 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9390 creativity.
9391 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9392 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9393 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9394 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9395 technology
9396 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9397 </para>
9398 <para>
9399 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9400 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9401 Internet's
9402 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9403 feature
9404 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9405 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9406 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9407 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9408 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9409 </para>
9410 <para>
9411 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9412 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9413 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9414 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9415 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9416 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9417 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9418 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9419 </para></footnote>
9420
9421 Congress
9422 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9423 "broadcast
9424 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9425 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9426 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9427 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9428 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9429 violators
9430 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9431 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9432 </para></footnote>
9433
9434 </para>
9435 <para>
9436 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9437 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9438 regulation
9439 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9440 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9441
9442 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9443 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9444 those requirements.
9445 </para>
9446 <para>
9447 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9448 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9449 impose.<footnote><para>
9450 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9451 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9452 </para></footnote>
9453 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9454 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9455 harm than good.
9456 </para>
9457 <para>
9458 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9459 innovation&mdash;again,
9460 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9461 crowd.
9462 </para>
9463 <para>
9464 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9465 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9466 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9467 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9468 </para>
9469 <para>
9470 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9471 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9472 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9473 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9474 2001).
9475 </para></footnote>
9476 overall this history of copyright
9477 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9478 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9479 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9480 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9481 </para>
9482 <para>
9483 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9484 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9485 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9486 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9487 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9488 </para>
9489 <para>
9490 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9491 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9492 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9493 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9494 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9495 copyright
9496 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9497 music
9498 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9499 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9500 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9501 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9502 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9503 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9504 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9505 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9506 </para></footnote>
9507 It has been
9508 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9509 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9510 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9511 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9512 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9513 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9514 August
9515 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9516 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9517 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9518 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9519 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9520 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9521 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9522 World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34, available at
9523 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9524 </para></footnote>
9525 But there is one
9526 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9527 demise
9528 of Internet radio.
9529 </para>
9530 <para>
9531
9532 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9533 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9534 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9535 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9536 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9537 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9538 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9539 copyright
9540 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9541 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9542 </para>
9543 <para>
9544 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9545 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9546 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9547 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9548 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9549 Probably
9550 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9551 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9552 efforts
9553 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9554 </para>
9555 <para>
9556 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9557 technology
9558 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9559 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9560 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9561 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9562 regular
9563 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9564 </para>
9565 <para>
9566 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9567 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9568 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9569 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9570 broadcasters
9571 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9572 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9573 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9574 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9575 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9576 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9577 in to this new form of radio.
9578 </para>
9579 <para>
9580
9581 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9582 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9583 improvement
9584 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9585 improvement
9586 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9587 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9588 establish
9589 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9590 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9591 </para>
9592 <blockquote>
9593 <para>
9594 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9595 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9596 radio
9597 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9598 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9599 competition
9600 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9601 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9602 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9603 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9604 communications
9605 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9606 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9607 acquire
9608 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9609 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9610 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.<footnote><para>
9611 <!-- f12. --> Lessing, 239.
9612 </para></footnote>
9613 </para>
9614 </blockquote>
9615 <para>
9616 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not because
9617 Armstrong
9618 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9619 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<footnote><para>
9620 <!-- f13. --> Ibid., 229.
9621 </para></footnote>
9622 to
9623 retard
9624 the growth of this competing technology.
9625 </para>
9626 <para>
9627 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9628 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9629 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9630 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9631 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9632 radio?
9633 </para>
9634 <para>
9635 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9636 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9637
9638 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9639 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9640 phenomenon
9641 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9642 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9643 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9644 hypothetical
9645 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9646 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9647 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9648 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9649 </para>
9650 <para>
9651 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9652 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9653 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9654 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9655 over $1 million a year.<footnote><para>
9656 <!-- f14. --> This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9657 Arbitration
9658 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example
9659 offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw
9660 (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain
9661 submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected.
9662 See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
9663 and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP DTRA 1 and 2,
9664 available at
9665 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9666 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker,
9667 "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution," Antitrust
9668 Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was not confusion, these are just
9669 old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected from
9670 digital
9671 entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the
9672 name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of
9673 powerful
9674 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9675 </para></footnote>
9676 A regular radio station broadcasting the same
9677 content would pay no equivalent fee.
9678 </para>
9679 <para>
9680 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9681 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9682 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9683 </para>
9684 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9685 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9686 <listitem><para>
9687 name of the service;
9688 </para></listitem>
9689 <listitem><para>
9690 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9691 </para></listitem>
9692 <listitem><para>
9693 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9694 </para></listitem>
9695 <listitem><para>
9696 date of transmission;
9697 </para></listitem>
9698 <listitem><para>
9699 time of transmission;
9700 </para></listitem>
9701 <listitem><para>
9702 time zone of origination of transmission;
9703 </para></listitem>
9704 <listitem><para>
9705 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9706 </para></listitem>
9707 <listitem><para>
9708 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9709 </para></listitem>
9710 <listitem><para>
9711 sound recording title;
9712 </para></listitem>
9713 <listitem><para>
9714 ISRC code of the recording;
9715 </para></listitem>
9716 <listitem><para>
9717 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9718 </para></listitem>
9719 <listitem><para>
9720 featured recording artist;
9721 </para></listitem>
9722 <listitem><para>
9723 retail album title;
9724 </para></listitem>
9725 <listitem><para>
9726 recording label;
9727 </para></listitem>
9728 <listitem><para>
9729 UPC code of the retail album;
9730 </para></listitem>
9731 <listitem><para>
9732 catalog number;
9733 </para></listitem>
9734 <listitem><para>
9735 copyright owner information;
9736 </para></listitem>
9737 <listitem><para>
9738 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9739 </para></listitem>
9740 <listitem><para>
9741 name of the service or entity;
9742 </para></listitem>
9743 <listitem><para>
9744 channel or program;
9745 </para></listitem>
9746 <listitem><para>
9747 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9748 </para></listitem>
9749 <listitem><para>
9750 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9751 </para></listitem>
9752 <listitem><para>
9753 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9754 </para></listitem>
9755 <listitem><para>
9756 Unique User identifier;
9757 </para></listitem>
9758 <listitem><para>
9759 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9760 </para></listitem>
9761 </orderedlist>
9762
9763 <para>
9764 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9765 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9766 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9767 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9768 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9769 does not.
9770 </para>
9771 <para>
9772 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9773 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9774 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9775 </para>
9776 <para>
9777 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed
9778 obvious
9779 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9780 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9781 </para>
9782 <blockquote>
9783 <para>
9784 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9785 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9786 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9787 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9788 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9789 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9790
9791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9792 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9793 Because
9794 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9795 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9796 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9797 of business. . . ."
9798 </para>
9799 <para>
9800 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9801 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9802 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9803 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9804 </para>
9805 </blockquote>
9806 <para>
9807 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9808 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9809 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9810 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9811 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9812 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9813 effective to prevent it.
9814 </para>
9815 </sect2>
9816 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9817 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9818 <para>
9819 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9820 dinosaurs
9821 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9822 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9823 </para>
9824 <para>
9825 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9826 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9827 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9828 </para>
9829 <para>
9830 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9831 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9832 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9833 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9834 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9835 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9836 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9837 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9838 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9839 </para></footnote>
9840 According to the RIAA,
9841 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9842 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9843
9844 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9845 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9846 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9847 increasingly
9848 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9849 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9850 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9851 extreme
9852 response by the other.
9853 </para>
9854 <para>
9855 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9856 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9857 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9858 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9859 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9860 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9861 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9862 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9863 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9864 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9865 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9866 was.<footnote><para>
9867 <!-- f16. -->
9868 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9869 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9870 </para></footnote>
9871 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9872 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9873 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9874 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9875 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9876 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9877 they oppose.
9878 </para>
9879 <para>
9880 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9881 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9882 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9883 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9884 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9885 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9886 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9887 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9888 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9889 <!-- f17. -->
9890 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9891 Prohibition," American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9892 </para></footnote>
9893 We have
9894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9895 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9896 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9897 <!-- f18. -->
9898 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9899 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9900 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9901 </para></footnote>
9902 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9903 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9904 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9905 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9906 cheat.<footnote><para>
9907 <!-- f19. -->
9908 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9909 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9910 compliance literature).
9911 </para></footnote>
9912 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9913 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9914 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9915 </para>
9916 <para>
9917 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9918 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9919 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9920 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9921 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9922 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9923 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9924 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9925 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9926 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9927 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9928 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9929 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9930 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9931 degree of illegality.
9932 </para>
9933 <para>
9934 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9935 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9936 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9937 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9938 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9939 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9940 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9941 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9942 to consider the alternative.
9943 </para>
9944 <para>
9945
9946 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9947 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9948 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9949 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9950 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9951 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9952 </para>
9953 <para>
9954 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9955 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9956 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9957 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9958 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9959 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9960 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9961 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9962 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9963 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9964 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9965 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9966 </para>
9967 <para>
9968 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9969 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9970 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9971 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9972 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9973 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9974 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9975 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9976 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9977 a nation of felons?
9978 </para>
9979 <para>
9980 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9981 </para>
9982 <para>
9983 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9984 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9985 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9986 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9987 used
9988
9989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9990 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9991 recordings is free.
9992 </para>
9993 <para>
9994 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9995 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9996 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9997 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9998 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9999 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
10000 capacities of digital technologies.
10001 </para>
10002 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
10003 <para>
10004 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
10005 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
10006 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
10007 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
10008 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
10009 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
10010 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
10011 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
10012 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
10013 </para>
10014 <para>
10015 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
10016 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10017 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
10018 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10019 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10020 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10021 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10022 on people's machines.
10023 </para>
10024 <para>
10025 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10026 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10027 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10028 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10029 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10030 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10031
10032 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10033 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10034 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10035 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
10036 management" system.
10037 </para>
10038 <para>
10039 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10040 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10041 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10042 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10043 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10044 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10045 freedom to move content easily?
10046 </para>
10047 <para>
10048 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10049 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10050 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10051 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10052 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10053 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10054 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10055 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10056 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10057 </para>
10058 <para>
10059 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10060 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10061 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10062 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10063 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10064 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10065 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10066 </para>
10067 <para>
10068 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10069 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10070 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10071 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10072 </para>
10073 <para>
10074 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10075 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10076
10077 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10078
10079 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10080 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10081 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10082 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10083 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
10084 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
10085 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
10086 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
10087 generally.
10088 </para>
10089 <para>
10090 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
10091 explains,
10092 </para>
10093 <blockquote>
10094 <para>
10095 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10096 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
10097 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10098 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10099 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10100 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
10101 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
10102 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10103 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
10104 </para>
10105 </blockquote>
10106 <para>
10107 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10108 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10109 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10110 </para>
10111 <para>
10112 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
10113 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10114 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10115 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10116 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10117 an Internet user is revealed.
10118 </para>
10119 <para>
10120 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10121 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10122 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10123 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10124 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10125 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10126 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10127 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10128 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
10129 <!-- f20. -->
10130 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10131 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10132 Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
10133 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10134 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10135 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
10136 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September
10137 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10138 Fan, Either," New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
10139 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
10140 </para></footnote>
10141
10142 </para>
10143 <para>
10144 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10145 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10146 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10147 <!-- f21. -->
10148 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10149 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10150 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10151 </para></footnote>
10152 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10153 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10154 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10155 </para>
10156 <para>
10157 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10158 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10159 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10160 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10161 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10162 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10163 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10164 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10165 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10166 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10167 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10168 <!-- f22. -->
10169 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10170 Boston Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10171 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10172 Colleges," Washington Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10173 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
10174 Monitor, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10175 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10176 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10177 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News, 30 January
10178 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10179 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
10180 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10181 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10182 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10183 </para></footnote>
10184 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10185 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10186 </para>
10187 <para>
10188 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10189 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10190 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10191 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10192 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10193 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10194 college students
10195
10196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10197 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10198 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10199 Says von Lohmann,
10200 </para>
10201 <blockquote>
10202 <para>
10203 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10204 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10205 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10206 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10207 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10208 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10209 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10210 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10211 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10212 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10213 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10214 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10215 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10216 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10217 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10218 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10219 million of them.
10220 </para>
10221 </blockquote>
10222 <para>
10223 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10224 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10225 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10226 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10227 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10228 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10229 </para>
10230
10231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10232 </sect2>
10233 </sect1>
10234 </chapter>
10235 <chapter id="c-balances">
10236 <title>BALANCES</title>
10237
10238 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10239 <para>
10240 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10241 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10242 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10243 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10244 </para>
10245 <para>
10246 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10247 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10248 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10249 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10250 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10251 everything around.
10252 </para>
10253 <para>
10254 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10255 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10256 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10257 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10258 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10259 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10260 </para>
10261 <para>
10262 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10263 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10264 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10265 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10266 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10267 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10268 made that is happening all around.
10269 </para>
10270 <para>
10271 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10272 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10273 gasoline onto this fire.
10274 </para>
10275 <para>
10276 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10277 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10278 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10279 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10280 </para>
10281 <para>
10282 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10283 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10284 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10285 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10286 success will require.
10287 </para>
10288
10289 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10290 <sect1 id="eldred">
10291 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10292 <para>
10293 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10294 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10295 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10296 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10297 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10298 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10299 come alive.
10300 </para>
10301 <para>
10302 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10303 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10304 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10305 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10306 them available for free.
10307 </para>
10308 <para>
10309 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10310 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10311 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10312 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10313 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10315 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10316 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10317 accessible&mdash;today.
10318 </para>
10319 <para>
10320 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10321 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10322 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10323 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10324 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10325 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10326 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10327 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10328 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10329 commercial publications of public domain works.
10330 </para>
10331 <para>
10332 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10333 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10334 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10335 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10336 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10337 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10338 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10339 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10340 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10341 generally.<footnote><para>
10342 <!-- f1. -->
10343 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10344 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10345 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10346 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10347 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10348 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10349 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10350 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10351 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10352 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10353 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10354 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10355 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10356 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10357 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10358 </para>
10359 <para>
10360 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10361 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10362 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10363 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
10364 in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10365 terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
10366 would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
10367 collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10368 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10369 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
10370 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10371 </para>
10372 <para>
10373
10374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10375 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10376 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10377 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10378 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10379 <!-- f2. -->
10380 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10381 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10382 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10383 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10384 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10385 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10386 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10387 </para></footnote>
10388
10389 </para>
10390 <para>
10391 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10392 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10393 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10394 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10395 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10396 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10397 to undertake.
10398 </para>
10399 <para>
10400 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10401 constitutional
10402 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10403 interpretation.
10404 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10405 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10406 importantly
10407 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10408 </para>
10409 <blockquote>
10410 <para>
10411 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10412 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10413 their . . . Writings. . . .
10414 </para>
10415 </blockquote>
10416 <para>
10417 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10418 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10419 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10420 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10421 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10422 specific&mdash;to
10423 "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that are also specific&mdash;
10424 by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
10425 </para>
10426 <para>
10427 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10428 extending
10429 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10430 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10431 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10433 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10434 Congress
10435 has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what
10436 the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the installment
10437 plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10438 </para>
10439 <para>
10440 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10441 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10442 consideration
10443 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10444 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10445 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the
10446 practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10447 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10448 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to
10449 keep this gravy train going.
10450 </para>
10451 <para>
10452 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10453 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
10454 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10455 beneficiaries
10456 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce
10457 it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can
10458 do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must do&mdash;and those
10459 things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10460 </para>
10461 <para>
10462 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10463 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10464 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10465 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10466 continues
10467 to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10468 benefits
10469 greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher would
10470 pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be published
10471 by anyone for free.
10472 </para>
10473 <para>
10474 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10475 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10476 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10477 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10478 report:
10479 </para>
10480 <para>
10481 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10482
10483 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10484 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10485 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10486 those works.
10487 </para>
10488 <para>
10489 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10490 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10491 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10492 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10493 </para>
10494 <para>
10495 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10496 about it?"
10497 </para>
10498 <para>
10499 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10500 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10501 they support the bill."
10502 </para>
10503 <para>
10504 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10505 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10506 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10507 much is it worth?"
10508 </para>
10509 <para>
10510 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10511 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10512 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10513 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10514 </para>
10515 <para>
10516 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10517 correct conclusion:
10518 </para>
10519 <para>
10520 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10521 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10522 contributions
10523 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10524 </para>
10525 <para>
10526 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10527 contribute
10528 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10529 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10530 </para>
10531 <para>
10532 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10533 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10534 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10535 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10536 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10537 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10538 copyrights
10539 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10540 the copyright term extended.
10541 </para>
10542 <para>
10543 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10544 legislation
10545 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10546 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10547 </para>
10548 <para>
10549 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10550 Copyright
10551 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10552 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10553 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10554 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10555 contributions.<footnote><para>
10556 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10557 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10558 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10559 </para></footnote>
10560 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10561 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10562 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10563 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10564 Age," available at
10565 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10566 </para></footnote>
10567 Disney is estimated to have
10568 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10569 cycle.<footnote><para>
10570 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10571 Congressional
10572 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10573 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10574 </para></footnote>
10575
10576 </para>
10577 <para>
10578 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10579 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10580 reality
10581 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10582 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10583 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10584 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10585 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10586 "limited."
10587 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10588 and again.
10589 </para>
10590 <para>
10591 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10592 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10593 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10594 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10595 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10596 scholars,
10597 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10598
10599 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10600 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10601 guns near schools.
10602 </para>
10603 <para>
10604 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10605 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10606 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10607 "interstate
10608 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10609 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10610 interstate
10611 commerce.
10612 </para>
10613 <para>
10614 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10615 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10616 activity,
10617 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10618 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10619 interpreted
10620 to impose no limit.
10621 </para>
10622 <para>
10623 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10624 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10625 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10626 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10627 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10628 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10629 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10630 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10631 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10632 government
10633 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10634 </para>
10635 <para>
10636 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10637 arguments,"
10638 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10639 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10640 </para></footnote>
10641 If anything Congress says is interstate
10642 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10643 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10644 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10645 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10646 </para></footnote>
10647
10648 </para>
10649 <para>
10650 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10651 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10652 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10653 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10654 context
10655 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10656 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10657 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10658 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10659 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10660 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10661 </para></footnote>
10662 And if it is applied to the
10663 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10664 Congress
10665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10666 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10667 existing
10668 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10669 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10670 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10671 copyrights
10672 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10673 existing copyrights.
10674 </para>
10675 <para>
10676 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10677 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10678 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10679 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10680 rejected
10681 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10682 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10683 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10684 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10685 boring.
10686 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10687 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10688 </para>
10689 <para>
10690 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10691 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10692 Constitution's
10693 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10694 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10695 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10696 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10697 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10698 already
10699 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10700 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10701 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10702 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10703 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10704 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10705 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10706 </para>
10707 <para>
10708 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10709
10710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10711 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10712 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10713 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10714 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10715 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10716 </para></footnote>
10717 But
10718 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10719 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10720 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10721 </para>
10722 <para>
10723 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10724 copyright
10725 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10726 influence
10727 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10728 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10729 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10730 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10731 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10732 bought to extend them again.
10733 </para>
10734 <para>
10735 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10736 extended.
10737 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10738 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10739 society
10740 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10741 Disney's.
10742 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10743 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10744 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10745 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10746 exploited,
10747 and no longer available as a result.
10748 </para>
10749 <para>
10750 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10751 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10752 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10753 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10754 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10755 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10756 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10757 Congressional
10758 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10759 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10760 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10761 </para></footnote>
10762
10763 </para>
10764 <para>
10765 Think practically about the consequence of this
10766 extension&mdash;practically,
10767 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10768
10769 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10770 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10771 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10772 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10773 remaining
10774 9,873. What would you have to do?
10775 </para>
10776 <para>
10777 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10778 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10779 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10780 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10781 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10782 list of books still under copyright.
10783 </para>
10784 <para>
10785 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10786 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10787 </para>
10788 <para>
10789 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10790 owners
10791 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10792 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10793 being at least a list?
10794 </para>
10795 <para>
10796 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10797 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10798 practically
10799 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10800 thousands
10801 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10802 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10803 </para>
10804 <para>
10805 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10806 apologists
10807 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10808 owners?"
10809 </para>
10810 <para>
10811 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10812 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10813 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10814 suggesting
10815 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10816 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10817 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10818 </para>
10819 <para>
10820 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10821 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10822 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10823
10824 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10825 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10826 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10827 happen
10828 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10829 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10830 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10831 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10832 know quite well who owns what property.
10833 </para>
10834 <para>
10835 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10836 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10837 already
10838 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10839 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10840 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10841 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10842 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10843 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10844 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10845 </para>
10846 <para>
10847 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10848 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10849 consequence
10850 for other creative works is much more dire.
10851 </para>
10852 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10853 <para>
10854 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10855 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10856 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10857 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10858 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10859 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10860 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10861 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10862 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10863 films."<footnote><para>
10864 <!-- f11. -->
10865 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10866 Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10867 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10868 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
10869 </para></footnote>
10870
10871 </para>
10872 <para>
10873 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10874 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10875 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10876 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10877 </para>
10878 <para>
10879 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10880
10881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10882 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10883 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10884 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10885 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10886 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10887 work available for distribution.
10888 </para>
10889 <para>
10890 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10891 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10892 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10893 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10894 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10895 mm film.<footnote><para>
10896 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10897 Supporting
10898 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
10899 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10900 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10901 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10902 </para></footnote>
10903
10904 </para>
10905 <para>
10906 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10907 important.
10908 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10909 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10910 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10911 locate the copyright owner.
10912 </para>
10913 <para>
10914 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10915 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10916 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10917 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10918 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10919 exceptionally
10920 high.
10921 </para>
10922 <para>
10923 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10924 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10925 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10926 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10927 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10928 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10929 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10930 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10931 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10932 </para>
10933 <para>
10934 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10935
10936 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10937 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10938 benefit
10939 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10940 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10941 the copyright expires.
10942 </para>
10943 <para>
10944 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10945 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10946 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10947 canisters
10948 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10949 than dust.
10950 </para>
10951 <para>
10952 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10953 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10954 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10955 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10956 creative
10957 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10958 free expression."
10959 </para>
10960 <para>
10961 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10962 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10963 indicated,
10964 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10965 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10966 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10967 distributors,
10968 the commercial life ends.
10969 </para>
10970 <para>
10971 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10972 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10973 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10974 between
10975 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10976 Friday
10977 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10978 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10979 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10980 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10981 have, we need to have access to this history.
10982 </para>
10983 <para>
10984 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10985
10986 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10987 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10988 this context do no good.
10989 </para>
10990 <para>
10991 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10992 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10993 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10994 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10995 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10996 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10997 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10998 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10999 </para>
11000 <para>
11001 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
11002 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
11003 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
11004 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
11005 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
11006 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
11007 market didn't have more to offer.
11008 </para>
11009 <para>
11010 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11011 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11012 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11013 would not have interfered with anything.
11014 </para>
11015 <para>
11016 But this situation has now changed.
11017 </para>
11018 <para>
11019 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11020 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11021 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11022 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11023 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
11024 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
11025 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
11026 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
11027 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
11028 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
11029 </para>
11030 <para>
11031 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11032 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
11033 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
11034 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11035 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11036 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11037 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11038 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11039 written for a radically different context.
11040 </para>
11041 <para>
11042 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11043 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11044 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11045 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
11046 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
11047 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
11048 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
11049 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
11050 expression. Copyright is a brake.
11051 </para>
11052 <para>
11053 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11054 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11055 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11056 culture widely?"
11057 </para>
11058 <para>
11059 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11060 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
11061 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11062 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11063 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
11064 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
11065 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11066 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
11067 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11068 </para>
11069 <para>
11070 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11071 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11072 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11073 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11074
11075 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11076 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11077 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11078 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11079 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
11080 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
11081 <!-- f13. -->
11082 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
11083 December 2002, available at
11084 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
11085 </para></footnote>
11086
11087 </para>
11088 <para>
11089 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11090 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11091 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11092 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
11093 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
11094 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11095 </para>
11096 <para>
11097 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11098 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11099 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11100 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11101 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11102 </para>
11103 <para>
11104 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11105 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
11106 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11107 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11108 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11109 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11110 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11111 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11112 power to extend existing terms.
11113 </para>
11114 <para>
11115 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11116 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11117 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11118 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11119 </para>
11120 <para>
11121 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11122 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11123
11124 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11125 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11126 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11127 overstepped its bounds.
11128 </para>
11129 <para>
11130 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11131 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11132 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11133 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11134 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11135 </para>
11136 <para>
11137 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11138 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11139 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
11140 briefs and preparing for argument.
11141 </para>
11142 <para>
11143 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11144 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11145 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11146 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11147 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11148 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11149 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11150 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11151 </para>
11152 <para>
11153 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11154 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11155 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11156 mistake lost it.
11157 </para>
11158 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11159 <para>
11160 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11161 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11162 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11163 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11164 heat
11165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11166 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11167 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11168 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11169 </para>
11170 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11171 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11172 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11173 <para>
11174 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11175 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11176 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11177 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11178 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11179 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11180 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11181 most powerful media companies in the world."
11182 </para>
11183 <para>
11184 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11185 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11186 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11187 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11188 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11189 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11190 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11191 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11192 interpretation
11193 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11194 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11195 unconstitutional,
11196 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11197 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11198 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11199 Constitution,
11200 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11201 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11202 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11203 </para>
11204 <para>
11205 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11206 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11207 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11208 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11209 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11210 why it was unconstitutional.
11211 </para>
11212 <para>
11213 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11214
11215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11216 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11217 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11218 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11219 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11220 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11221 minority.
11222 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11223 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11224 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11225 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11226 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11227 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11228 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11229 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11230 </para>
11231 <para>
11232 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11233 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11234 beginning.
11235 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11236 November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11237 Republican
11238 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11239 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11240 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11241 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11242 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11243 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11244 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11245 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11246 </para>
11247 <para>
11248 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11249 supporting
11250 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11251 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11252 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11253 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11254 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11255 </para>
11256 <para>
11257 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11258 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11259
11260 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11261 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11262 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11263 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11264 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11265 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11266 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11267 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11268 </para>
11269 <para>
11270 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11271 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11272 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11273 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11274 </para>
11275 <para>
11276 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11277 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11278 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11279 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11280 clear.
11281 </para>
11282 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11283 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11284 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11285 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11286 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11287 <para>
11288 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11289 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11290 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11291 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11292 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11293 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11294 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11295 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11296 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11297 </para>
11298 <para>
11299 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11300 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11301 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11302 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11303 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11304 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11305 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11306 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11307
11308 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11309 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11310 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11311 </para>
11312 <para>
11313 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11314 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11315 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11316 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11317 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11318 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11319 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11320 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11321 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11322 confidence in our argument.
11323 </para>
11324 <para>
11325 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11326 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11327 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11328 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11329 copyright holders.
11330 </para>
11331 <para>
11332 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11333 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11334 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11335 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11336 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11337 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11338 wanted to control.
11339 </para>
11340 <para>
11341 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11342 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11343 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11344 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11345 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11346 pornography."<footnote><para>
11347 <!-- f14. -->
11348 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11349 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11350 </para></footnote>
11351 That was also the motive of
11352 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11353 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11354 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11355 <!-- f15. -->
11356 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11357 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11358 </para></footnote>
11359 That's
11360
11361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11362 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11363 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11364 </para>
11365 <para>
11366 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11367 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11368 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11369 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11370 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11371 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11372 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11373 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11374 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11375 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11376 </para>
11377 <para>
11378 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11379 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11380 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11381 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11382 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11383 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11384 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11385 </para>
11386 <para>
11387 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11388 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11389 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11390 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11391 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11392 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11393 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11394 powers had limits.
11395 </para>
11396 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11397 <para>
11398 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11399 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11400 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11401 the Constitution
11402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11403 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11404 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11405 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11406 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11407 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11408 </para>
11409 <para>
11410 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11411 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11412 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11413 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11414 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11415 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11416 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11417 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11418 sense.
11419 </para>
11420 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11421 <para>
11422 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11423 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11424 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11425 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11426 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11427 these retrospective extensions.
11428 </para>
11429 <para>
11430 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11431 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11432 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11433 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11434 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11435 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11436 </para>
11437 <para>
11438 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11439 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11440 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11441 overriding
11442 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11443 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11444 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11445 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11446 </para>
11447 <para>
11448 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11449 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11450
11451 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11452 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11453 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11454 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11455 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11456 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11457 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11458 copyright be limited.
11459 </para>
11460 <para>
11461 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11462 Congress
11463 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11464 government
11465 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11466 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11467 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11468 </para>
11469 <para>
11470 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11471 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11472 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11473 existing
11474 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11475 </para>
11476 <para>
11477 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11478 extended
11479 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11480 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11481 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11482 existing
11483 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11484 restraint
11485 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11486 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11487 hesitated
11488 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11489 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11490 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11491 arrived
11492 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11493 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11494
11495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11496 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11497 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11498 </para>
11499 <para>
11500 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11501 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11502 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11503 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11504 Congress
11505 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11506 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11507 this central idea.
11508 </para>
11509 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11510 <para>
11511 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11512 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11513 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11514 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11515 </para>
11516 <para>
11517 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11518 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11519 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11520 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11521 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11522 </para>
11523 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11524 <para>
11525 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11526 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11527 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11528 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11529 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11530 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11531 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11532 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11533 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11534 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11535 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11536
11537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11538 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11539 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11540 </para>
11541 <para>
11542 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11543 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11544 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11545 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11546 congressmen
11547 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11548 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11549 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11550 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11551 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11552 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11553 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11554 family of the Justices.
11555 </para>
11556 <para>
11557 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11558 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11559 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11560 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11561 </para>
11562 <para>
11563 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11564 The history was bothering her.
11565 </para>
11566 <blockquote>
11567 <para>
11568 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11569 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11570 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11571 practice that began with the very first act.
11572 </para>
11573 </blockquote>
11574 <para>
11575 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11576 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11577 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11578 </para>
11579 <blockquote>
11580 <para>
11581 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11582 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11584 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11585 is yes.
11586 </para>
11587 </blockquote>
11588 <para>
11589 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11590 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11591 Kennedy, who observed,
11592 </para>
11593 <blockquote>
11594 <para>
11595 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11596 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11597 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11598 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11599 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11600 </para>
11601 </blockquote>
11602 <para>
11603 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11604 student,
11605 I answered,
11606 </para>
11607 <blockquote>
11608 <para>
11609 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11610 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11611 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11612 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11613 effectively
11614 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11615 </para>
11616 </blockquote>
11617 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11618 <para>
11619 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11620 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11621 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11622 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11623 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11624 </para>
11625 <para>
11626 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11627 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11628 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11629 </para>
11630 <para>
11631 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11632 sympathetic.
11633 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11634
11635 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11636 </para>
11637 <blockquote>
11638 <para>
11639 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11640 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11641 </para>
11642 <para>
11643 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11644 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11645 domain
11646 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11647 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11648 into the Copyright Clause.
11649 </para>
11650 </blockquote>
11651 <para>
11652 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11653 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11654 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11655 </para>
11656 <blockquote>
11657 <para>
11658 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11659 unlimited
11660 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11661 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11662 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11663 an unlimited time.
11664 </para>
11665 </blockquote>
11666 <para>
11667 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11668 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11669 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11670 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11671 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11672 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11673 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause&mdash;
11674 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11675 specific
11676 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11677 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11678 </para>
11679 <para>
11680 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11681 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11682
11683 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11684 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11685 optimistic.
11686 </para>
11687 <para>
11688 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11689 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11690 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11691 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11692 believed
11693 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11694 Copyright
11695 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11696 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11697 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11698 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11699 Copyright
11700 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11701 believe
11702 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in
11703 particular, the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule
11704 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11705 </para>
11706 <para>
11707 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11708 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11709 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11710 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11711 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11712 </para>
11713 <para>
11714 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11715 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11716 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11717 </para>
11718 <para>
11719 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11720 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11721 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11722 </para>
11723 <para>
11724 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11725 distinguish
11726 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11727 argument
11728 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11729 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11730 in the Court's opinion.
11731 </para>
11732 <para>
11733
11734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11735 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11736 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11737 generally,
11738 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11739 </para>
11740 <para>
11741 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11742 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11743 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11744 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11745 </para>
11746 <para>
11747 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11748 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11749 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11750 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11751 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11752 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11753 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11754 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11755 would not.
11756 </para>
11757 <para>
11758 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11759 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11760 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11761 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11762 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11763 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11764 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11765 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11766 the system we have.
11767 </para>
11768 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11769 <para>
11770 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11771 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11772 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11773 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11774 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11775 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11776 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11777 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11778 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11779 </para>
11780 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11781 <para>
11782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11783 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11784 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11785 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11786 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11787 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11788 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11789 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11790 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11791 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11792 </para>
11793 <para>
11794 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11795 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11796 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11797 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11798 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11799 </para>
11800 <para>
11801 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11802 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11803 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11804 </para>
11805 <para>
11806 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11807 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11808 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11809 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11810 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11811 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11812 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11813 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11814 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11815 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11816 "originalism" now?
11817 </para>
11818 <para>
11819 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11820 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11821 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11822 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11823
11824 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11825 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11826 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11827 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11828 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11829 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11830 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11831 own principles.
11832 </para>
11833 <para>
11834 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11835 myself.
11836 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11837 the law as it is.
11838 </para>
11839 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11840 <para>
11841 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11842 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11843 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11844 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11845 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11846 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11847 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11848 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11849 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11850 </para>
11851 <para>
11852 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11853 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11854 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11855 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11856 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11857 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11858 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11859 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11860 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11861 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11862 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11863 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11864 effort to persuade; but I
11865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11866 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11867 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11868 should decide the issue.
11869 </para>
11870 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11871 <para>
11872 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11873 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11874 Kathleen Sullivan?
11875 </para>
11876 <para>
11877 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11878 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11879 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11880 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11881 </para>
11882 <para>
11883 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11884 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11885 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11886 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11887 have persuaded.
11888 </para>
11889 <para>
11890 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11891 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11892 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11893 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11894 issue should not be raised until it is.
11895 </para>
11896 <para>
11897 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11898 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11899 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11900 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11901 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11902 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11903 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11904 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11905 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11906 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11907 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11908
11909 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11910 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11911 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11912 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11913 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11914 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11915 </para>
11916 <blockquote>
11917 <para>
11918 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11919 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11920 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11921 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11922 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11923 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11924 </para>
11925 </blockquote>
11926 <para>
11927 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11928 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11929 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11930 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11931 in the face felt exactly like that.
11932 </para>
11933 <para>
11934 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11935 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11936 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11937 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11938 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11939 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11940 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11941 </para>
11942 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11943 </sect1>
11944 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
11945 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11946 <para>
11947 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11948 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11949 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11950 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11951 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11952 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11953 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11954 </para>
11955 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11956 <para>
11957 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11958 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11959 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11960 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11961 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11962 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11963 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11964 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11965 </para>
11966 <para>
11967 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11968 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11970 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11971 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11972 the work passed into the public domain.
11973 </para>
11974 <para>
11975 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11976 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11977 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11978 </para>
11979 <para>
11980 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11981 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11982 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11983 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11984 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11985 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11986 everything else, let the content go.
11987 </para>
11988 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11989 <para>
11990 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11991 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11992 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11993 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11994 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11995 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11996 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11997 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11998 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11999 the stupid harm of the present system.
12000 </para>
12001 <para>
12002 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12003 requirement.
12004 For one of the hardest things about the current system for
12005 people who want to license content is that there is no obvious place to
12006 look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is not
12007 required,
12008 since marking content is not required, since no formality at all
12009 is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate copyright owners to ask
12010 permission to use or license their work. This system would lower these
12011 costs, by establishing at least one registry where copyright owners
12012 could be identified.
12013 </para>
12014 <para>
12015 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12016 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
12017 removed
12018 in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by
12019 abandoning
12020 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
12021 <!-- f1. --> Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12022 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12023 formalities
12024 such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of the
12025 author's
12026 claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act, every text
12027 of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the exercise" of
12028 rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject to any
12029 formality."
12030 The prohibition against formalities is presently embodied in Article
12031 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne Convention. Many countries continue
12032 to impose some form of deposit or registration requirement, albeit not as
12033 a condition of copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of
12034 copies of works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12035 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12036 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12037 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12038 anonymous
12039 or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International Intellectual
12040 Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation Press, 2001),
12041 153&ndash;54.
12042 </para></footnote>
12043 The
12044 Europeans
12045 are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural rights
12046 don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12047 tradition
12048 that required copyright owners to follow form if their rights were
12049 to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly respect the
12050 dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my creativity, not
12051 upon the special favor of the government.
12052 </para>
12053 <para>
12054 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12055 absurd
12056 copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because a
12057 world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12058 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12059 know what's protected and what's not.
12060 </para>
12061 <para>
12062 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in Berlin
12063 in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12064 Convention
12065 in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty years, as well as
12066 the abolition of copyright formalities. The formalities were hated
12067 because
12068 the stories of inadvertent loss were increasingly common. It was
12069 as if a Charles Dickens character ran all copyright offices, and the
12070 failure
12071 to dot an i or cross a t resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12072 </para>
12073 <para>
12074 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12075 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law should
12076 always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no reason
12077 copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning formalities
12078 totally,
12079 the response in Berlin should have been to embrace a more
12080 equitable
12081 system of registration.
12082 </para>
12083 <para>
12084 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12085 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12086 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12087 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12088 burden
12089 imposed upon creators.
12090 </para>
12091 <para>
12092 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
12093 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12094
12095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12096 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a table,
12097 his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with the
12098 government.
12099 He has a property right over the table "naturally," and he can
12100 assert that right against anyone who would steal the table, whether or
12101 not he has informed the government of his ownership of the table.
12102 </para>
12103 <para>
12104 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For
12105 the argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12106 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12107 formalities
12108 turns upon the special problems that creative property
12109 presents.
12110 The law of formalities responds to the special physics of creative
12111 property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly spread.
12112 </para>
12113 <para>
12114 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12115 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land is
12116 to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property just
12117 because you must register the car with the state and tag it with a
12118 license.
12119 In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an important
12120 reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes the markets more
12121 efficient and because it better secures the rights of the owner. Without
12122 a registration system for land, landowners would perpetually have to
12123 guard their property. With registration, they can simply point the
12124 police
12125 to a deed. Without a registration system for cars, auto theft would
12126 be much easier. With a registration system, the thief has a high burden
12127 to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is placed on the property owner, but
12128 those burdens produce a much better system of protection for property
12129 generally.
12130 </para>
12131 <para>
12132 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12133 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12134 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12135 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12136 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12137 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12138 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12139 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12140
12141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12142 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
12143 take their place.
12144 </para>
12145 <para>
12146 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12147 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12148 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12149 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12150 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12151 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12152 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12153 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12154 </para>
12155 <para>
12156 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12157 inability
12158 to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes a
12159 huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12160 library
12161 can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12162 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the copyright
12163 system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been seen before
12164 because there are no formalities.
12165 </para>
12166 <para>
12167 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12168 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12169 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12170 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12171 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12172 </para>
12173 <para>
12174 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12175 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12176 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12177 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12178 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12179 </para>
12180 <para>
12181 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12182 registering
12183 the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the hassle
12184 worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with registration?
12185 </para>
12186 <para>
12187 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12188 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12189 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12190
12191 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12192 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12193 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12194 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12195 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12196 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12197 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12198 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12199 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
12200 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12201 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12202 </para>
12203 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12204 <para>
12205 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12206 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12207 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12208 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12209 </para>
12210 <para>
12211 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12212 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12213 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12214 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12215 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12216 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12217 something good might happen here.
12218 </para>
12219 <para>
12220 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12221 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12222 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12223 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12224 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12225 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12226 </para>
12227 <para>
12228 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12229 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12230 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12232 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12233 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12234 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12235 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12236 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12237 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12238 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12239 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12240 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12241 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12242 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12243 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12244 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12245 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12246 film is a valid derivative use.
12247 </para>
12248 <para>
12249 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12250 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12251 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12252 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12253 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12254 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12255 </para>
12256 <para>
12257 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12258 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12259 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12260 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12261 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12262 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12263 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12264 threat.
12265 </para>
12266 <para>
12267 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12268 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12269 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12270 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12271 sense?
12272 </para>
12273 <para>
12274
12275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12276 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12277 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12278 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12279 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12280 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12281 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12282 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12283 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12284 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12285 </para>
12286 <para>
12287 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12288 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12289 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12290 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12291 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12292 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12293 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12294 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12295 </para>
12296 <para>
12297 What does this industry really want?
12298 </para>
12299 <para>
12300 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12301 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12302 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12303 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12304 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12305 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12306 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12307 permission first.
12308 </para>
12309 <para>
12310 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12311 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12312 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12313 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12314 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12315 </para>
12316 <para>
12317 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12318 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12319
12320 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12321 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12322 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12323 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12324 and to share its own creation.
12325 </para>
12326 <para>
12327 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12328 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12329 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12330 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12331 block the progress of others.
12332 </para>
12333 <para>
12334 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12335 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12336 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12337 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12338 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12339 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12340 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12341 </para>
12342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12343 </sect1>
12344 </chapter>
12345 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12346 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12347 <para>
12348 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12349 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12350 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12351 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12352 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12353 </para>
12354 <para>
12355 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12356 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12357 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12358 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12359 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12360 the disease almost invisible.
12361 </para>
12362 <para>
12363 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12364 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12365 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12366 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12367 population:
12368 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12369 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12370 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12371 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12372 available at
12373 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12374 release
12375 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12376 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12377 </para></footnote>
12378 </para>
12379 <para>
12380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12381 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12382 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12383 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12384 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12385 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12386 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12387 </para>
12388 <para>
12389 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12390 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12391 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12392 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12393 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12394 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12395 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12396 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12397 changes.
12398 </para>
12399 <para>
12400 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12401 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12402 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12403 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12404 costs significantly below the market price.
12405 </para>
12406 <para>
12407 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12408 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12409 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12410 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12411 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12412 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12413 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12414 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12415 <para>
12416 <!-- f2. -->
12417 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12418 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12419 </para></footnote>
12420 </para>
12421 <para>
12422 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12423 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12424 Association
12425 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12426 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12427 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12428 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12429 Prepared
12430 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12431 2000), 14, available at
12432 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12433 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12434 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12435 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12436 (statement of James Love).
12437 </para></footnote>
12438 Through the
12439 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12440 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12441 request,
12442 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12443 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12444 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12445 began
12446 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12447 government's
12448 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12449 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12450 companies,
12451 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12452 international
12453 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12454 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12455 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12456 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12457 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12458 <!-- f4. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12459 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12460 Prepared
12461 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12462 2000), 15.
12463 </para></footnote>
12464 </para>
12465 <para>
12466 We should place the intervention by the United States in context.
12467 No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans
12468 don't have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12469 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12470 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their
12471 demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12472 marginal,
12473 there was an effect from our government's intervention to stop
12474 the flow of medications into Africa.
12475 </para>
12476 <para>
12477 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12478 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12479 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12480 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12481 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12482 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12483 </para>
12484 <para>
12485 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12486 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12487 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12488 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12489 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12490 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12491 by U.S. companies.
12492 </para>
12493 <para>
12494 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12495 information,
12496 which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument
12497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12498 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12499 <!-- f5. --> See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12500 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12501 May 1999, A1, available at
12502 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink> ("compulsory licenses and gray
12503 markets
12504 pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property protection");
12505 Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
12506 Access
12507 to Essential Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999),
12508 available at
12509 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink> (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS,
12510 Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
12511 Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a
12512 Synopsis,"
12513 Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12515 </para></footnote>
12516 It was because "intellectual property"
12517 would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was
12518 a principle about the importance of "intellectual property" that led
12519 these government actors to intervene against the South African
12520 response
12521 to AIDS.
12522 </para>
12523 <para>
12524 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12525 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12526 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12527 direct
12528 cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans, and
12529 whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an idea?
12530 What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results
12531 in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so
12532 many to die for such an abstraction?
12533 </para>
12534 <para>
12535 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12536 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12537 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12538 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12539 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12540 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12541 </para>
12542 <para>
12543 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12544 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to sell their
12545 drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere.
12546 There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn't get
12547 back into the United States, but those are mere problems of
12548 technology.
12549 They could be overcome.
12550 </para>
12551 <para>
12552 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12553 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12554 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12555 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12556 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12557 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12558 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12559 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12560 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12561 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12562 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12563 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12564 idea called "intellectual property."
12565 </para>
12566 <para>
12567 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12568 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12569 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12570 What is the argument?
12571 </para>
12572 <para>
12573 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the
12574 patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly
12575 the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and
12576 strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the
12577 spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could
12578 endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block
12579 the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market
12580 prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12581 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were
12582 balanced in just this sense.
12583 </para>
12584 <para>
12585 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12586 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12587 extremism.
12588 A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our
12589 tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with consequences
12590 more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other
12591 single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12592 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much
12593 happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically
12594 do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice
12595 how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12596 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that
12597 we don't even question when the control of that property removes our
12598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12599 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12600 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12601 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12602 this common sense open its eyes.
12603 </para>
12604 <para>
12605 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12606 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12607 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12608 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12609 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12610 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12611 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12612 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12613 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12614 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12615 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12616 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12617 </para>
12618 <para>
12619 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12620 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12621 meeting.<footnote><para>
12622 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12623 August 2003, E1, available at
12624 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12625 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12626 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12627 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12628 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12629 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12630 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12631 </para></footnote>
12632 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had
12633 decided
12634 to hold a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to
12635 create public goods." These are projects that have been successful in
12636 producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary
12637 use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the
12638 World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of
12639 protocols
12640 in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support
12641 open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science
12642 project
12643 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12644 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12645 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12646 comprised
12647 a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12648 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12649 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12650 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12651 Glaxo-SmithKline,
12652 IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included
12653 the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the
12654 early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12655 </para>
12656 <para>
12657 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12658 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12659 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12660 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12661 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12662 </para>
12663 <para>
12664 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12665 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12666 meeting.
12667 </para></footnote>
12668 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12669 noncommercial
12670 work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12671 perspectives.
12672 And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12673 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12674 property issues.
12675 </para>
12676 <para>
12677 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12678 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12679 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information
12680 Society
12681 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked
12682 what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12683 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12684 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12685 interrupted
12686 to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12687 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12688 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12689 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12690 relatively
12691 minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual
12692 property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an
12693 "Information Society" unless one also talked about the range of
12694 information
12695 and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my
12696 immoderate
12697 moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the
12698 scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of
12699 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12700 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12701 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12702 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12703 </para>
12704 <para>
12705 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual
12706 property,
12707 I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and
12708 should. And thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to
12709 create public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO
12710 agenda.
12711 </para>
12712 <para>
12713 But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial,
12714 at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source and free
12715 software."
12716 Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From
12717 its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software
12718 would be like a conference to discuss Apple's operating system. Both
12719 open source and free software compete with Microsoft's software. And
12720 internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements
12721 that they use open source or free software, rather than "proprietary
12722 software," for their own internal uses.
12723 </para>
12724 <para>
12725 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12726 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12727 noncommercial
12728 software. There are many important companies that depend
12729 fundamentally
12730 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12731 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12732 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM is
12733 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12734 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12735 support a mode of software development that is different from
12736 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12737 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12738 sophisticated.
12739 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12740 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12741 opposition
12742 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12743 license
12744 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12745 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12746 Marketplace
12747 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12748 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12749 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2002), 69,
12750 available at
12751 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12752 president,
12753 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12754 Stern School of Business (3 May 2001), available at
12755 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12756 </para></footnote>
12757 </para>
12758 <para>
12759 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12760 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12761 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12762 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12763 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12764 by
12765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12766 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12767 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12768 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12769 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12770 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12771 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12772 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12773 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12774 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12775 </para>
12776 <para>
12777 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12778 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12779 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12780 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12781 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12782 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12783 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12784 <!-- f9. -->
12785 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12786 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12787 </para></footnote>
12788 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12789 </para>
12790 <para>
12791 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12792 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12793 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12794 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12795 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12796 its lobbying efforts.
12797 </para>
12798 <para>
12799 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12800 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12801 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12802 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12803 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12804 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12805 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12806 goals of WIPO."
12807 </para>
12808 <para>
12809 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12810 </para>
12811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12812 <para>
12813 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12814 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12815 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12816 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12817 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12818 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12819 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12820 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12821 </para>
12822 <para>
12823 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12824 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12825 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12826 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12827 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12828 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12829 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12830 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12831 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12832 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12833 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12834 </para>
12835 <para>
12836 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12837 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12838 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12839 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12840 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12841 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12842 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12843 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12844 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12845 right to decide what to do with their property.
12846 </para>
12847 <para>
12848 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12849 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12850 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12852 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12853 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12854 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12855 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12856 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12857 way possible.
12858 </para>
12859 <para>
12860 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12861 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12862 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12863 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12864 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12865 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12866 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12867 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12868 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12869 that control.
12870 </para>
12871 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12872 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12873 <para>
12874 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12875 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12876 <!-- f10. -->
12877 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
12878 </para></footnote>
12879 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12880 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12881 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12882 </para>
12883 <para>
12884 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12885 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12886 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12887 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12888 </para>
12889 <blockquote>
12890 <para>
12891 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12892 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12893 should be to promote the right balance of intellectualproperty rights,
12894 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12895 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12896 say anything wrong. But in the world
12897 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12898 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12899 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12900 </para>
12901 </blockquote>
12902 <para>
12903 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12904 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12905 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12906 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12907 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12908 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12909 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12910 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12911 </para>
12912 <para>
12913 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12914 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12915 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12916 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12917 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12918 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12919 </para>
12920 <para>
12921 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12922 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12923 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12924 our own country's history).
12925 </para>
12926 <para>
12927 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12928 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12929 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12930 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12931 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12932 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12933 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12934 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12935 democracy in the world, become?
12936 </para>
12937 <para>
12938 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12939 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12940 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12942 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12943 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12944 </para>
12945 <para>
12946 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon.
12947 There are moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that
12948 surprise. When the FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules,
12949 which would thereby further increase the concentration in media
12950 ownership,
12951 an extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this
12952 change. For perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the
12953 NRA, the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and
12954 CodePink Women for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC
12955 policy. An astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC,
12956 demanding
12957 more hearings and a different result.
12958 </para>
12959 <para>
12960 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad
12961 coalition
12962 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile
12963 hearings
12964 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement
12965 had become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision,
12966 and there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12967 concentration
12968 in the media.
12969 </para>
12970 <para>
12971 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12972 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12973 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12974 players.
12975 The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not mean
12976 that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12977 </para>
12978 <para>
12979 The danger in media concentration comes not from the
12980 concentration,
12981 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12982 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12983 powerful
12984 companies that control an ever expanding slice of the media. It
12985 is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated range of
12986 rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme form&mdash;that makes
12987 their bigness bad.
12988 </para>
12989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12990 <para>
12991 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12992 competition
12993 and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood as being
12994 about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We Americans have a
12995 long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That we could be
12996 motivated
12997 to fight "big" again is not something new.
12998 </para>
12999 <para>
13000 It would be something new, and something very important, if an
13001 equal number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built
13002 within the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien
13003 to our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
13004 because
13005 the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything called
13006 "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
13007 </para>
13008 <para>
13009 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
13010 of our tragedy.
13011 </para>
13012 <para>
13013 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
13014 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
13015 <!-- f11. --> John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com,
13016 September 2003, available at
13017 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul R. La Monica, "Music
13018 Industry
13019 Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September 2003, available at
13020 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a
13021 Song, N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily
13022 News, 9 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet
13023 Surprised
13024 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13025 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13026 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
13027 available
13028 at
13029 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
13030 </para></footnote>
13031
13032 Eminem
13033 has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's music.<footnote><para>
13034 <!-- f12. --> Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady," mtv.com,
13035 17 September 2003, available at
13036 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
13037 </para></footnote>
13038 The
13039 story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
13040 finished
13041 making the rounds.<footnote><para>
13042 <!-- f13. --> Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13043 Dylan
13044 Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
13045 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
13046 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13047 </para></footnote>
13048 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists
13049 he must remain anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with
13050 these studio guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd
13051 love to use but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've
13052 got scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but
13053 it would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
13054 talking
13055 about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers thought
13056 to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for kids who
13057 use a computer to share content.
13058 </para>
13059 <para>
13060 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13061 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
13062 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
13063 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
13064 24 August 2003, available at
13065 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
13066 </para></footnote>
13067 And in Brazil, the
13068 culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero of Brazilian music,
13069 has joined with Creative Commons to release content and free licenses
13070 in that Latin American country.<footnote><para>
13071 <!-- f15. --> "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August
13072 2003, available at
13073 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
13074 </para></footnote>
13075 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13076 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13077 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13078 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13079 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13080 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13081 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13082 day into the Causbys.
13083 </para>
13084 <para>
13085 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13086 potential is ever to be realized.
13087
13088 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13089
13090 </para>
13091 </chapter>
13092 <chapter id="c-afterword">
13093 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
13094 <para>
13095
13096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13097 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that
13098 something
13099 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of
13100 this book maps what might be done.
13101 </para>
13102 <para>
13103 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13104 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13105 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13106 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13107 </para>
13108 <para>
13109 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must
13110 recruit
13111 a significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13112 authors,
13113 musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this story in their
13114 own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle is so important.
13115 </para>
13116 <para>
13117 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13118 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13119 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13120 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13121 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13122 </para>
13123 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13124
13125 <sect1 id="usnow">
13126 <title>US, NOW</title>
13127 <para>
13128 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so
13129 far has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
13130 property
13131 or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If that
13132 really
13133 is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13134 </para>
13135 <para>
13136 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13137 extremes
13138 in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there is. There
13139 are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights Reserved"&mdash;
13140 and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights Reserved." The "All
13141 Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask permission before
13142 you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No Rights Reserved"
13143 sorts believe you should be able to do with content as you wish,
13144 regardless
13145 of whether you have permission or not.
13146 </para>
13147 <para>
13148 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13149 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13150 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13151 regardless
13152 of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under the
13153
13154 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13155 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13156 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13157 unprotected.
13158 </para>
13159 <para>
13160 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13161 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13162 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13163 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13164 character
13165 of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13166 architecture
13167 made the effective default "no rights reserved," the future
13168 architecture will make the effective default "all rights reserved." The
13169 architecture
13170 and law that surround the Internet's design will increasingly
13171 produce an environment where all use of content requires permission.
13172 The "cut and paste" world that defines the Internet today will become
13173 a "get permission to cut and paste" world that is a creator's nightmare.
13174 </para>
13175 <para>
13176 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither "all
13177 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"&mdash;
13178 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content
13179 as they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of
13180 freedoms
13181 that we could just take for granted before.
13182 </para>
13183
13184 <sect2 id="examples">
13185 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
13186 <para>
13187 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13188 recognize
13189 this problem from other contexts. Think about privacy. Before
13190 the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much about data about
13191 our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you walked into a bookstore
13192 and browsed through some of the works of Karl Marx, you didn't need
13193 to worry about explaining your browsing habits to your neighbors or
13194 boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was assured.
13195 </para>
13196 <para>
13197 What made it assured?
13198 </para>
13199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13200 <para>
13201 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13202 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13203 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13204 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13205 Korea,
13206 working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be assured.
13207 But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable enough to
13208 spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of us (again,
13209 we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient architecture of
13210 real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount of privacy. That
13211 privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law (there is no law
13212 protecting
13213 "privacy" in public places), and in many places, not by norms
13214 (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead, by the costs that
13215 friction
13216 imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13217 </para>
13218 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13219 <para>
13220 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13221 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13222 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13223 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13224 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13225 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13226 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13227 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13228 </para>
13229 <para>
13230 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13231 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13232 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13233 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13234 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13235 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13236 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13237 disappears.
13238 </para>
13239 <para>
13240 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13241 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13242 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13243 friction
13244 did.<footnote><para>
13245 <!-- f1. --> See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13246 Architecture
13247 of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology Law
13248 Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13249 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink> (describing examples in
13250 which technology defines privacy policy). See also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked
13251 Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age (New York:
13252 Random
13253 House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs between technology and privacy).
13254 </para></footnote>
13255 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the
13256 pattern
13257 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13258
13259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13260 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13261 technology
13262 now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively act
13263 where, before, privacy was given by default.
13264 </para>
13265 <para>
13266 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13267 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13268 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the binaries&mdash;
13269 was free. You couldn't run a program written for a Data General
13270 machine
13271 on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't care much
13272 about controlling their software.
13273 </para>
13274 <para>
13275 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he
13276 was a researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that
13277 developed
13278 when one was free to explore and tinker with the software that
13279 ran on machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented
13280 programmer,
13281 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify
13282 other people's work.
13283 </para>
13284 <para>
13285 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical idea. In
13286 a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a proof that
13287 someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to prove a
13288 theorem,
13289 you could take what someone else did and change it. In a classics
13290 department, if you believed a colleague's translation of a recently
13291 discovered
13292 text was flawed, you were free to improve it. Thus, to Stallman,
13293 it seemed obvious that you should be free to tinker with and improve
13294 the code that ran a machine. This, too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't
13295 it be open for criticism like anything else?
13296 </para>
13297 <para>
13298 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13299 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs
13300 from one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least
13301 in the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13302 companies
13303 started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I could just
13304 take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make it easier for
13305 me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13306 </para>
13307 <para>
13308 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13309 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13310 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13311 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13312 economics
13313 of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about it,
13314 then the freedom to change and share software would be
13315 fundamentally
13316 weakened.
13317 </para>
13318 <para>
13319 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free
13320 operating
13321 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13322 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13323 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13324 </para>
13325 <para>
13326 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13327 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13328 Software
13329 Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless the
13330 source code for that software is made available as well. Thus, anyone
13331 building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings free
13332 as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of code
13333 would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13334 fundamental
13335 goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a byproduct.
13336 </para>
13337 <para>
13338 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13339 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13340 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13341 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13342 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13343 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13344 </para>
13345 <para>
13346 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13347 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13348 scientific journals are produced.
13349 </para>
13350 <para>
13351 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many
13352 that printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending
13353 them to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13354 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13355 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
13356 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
13357 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
13358 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
13359 service.
13360 Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and
13361 anyone
13362 is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free
13363 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13364 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13365 Court opinion through their respective services.
13366 </para>
13367 <para>
13368 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability
13369 to charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13370 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13371 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been
13372 allowed
13373 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13374 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13375 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13376 </para>
13377 <para>
13378 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13379 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13380 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13381 </para>
13382 <para>
13383 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13384 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
13385 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to
13386 the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts
13387 because
13388 the library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand
13389 the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks by reading all
13390 available articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a
13391 function of the institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of
13392 paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it was very hard to control
13393 access to a paper journal.
13394 </para>
13395 <para>
13396 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are
13397 demanding
13398 that libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This
13399 means that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries
13400 begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing
13401 technology and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
13402 </para>
13403 <para>
13404 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13405 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13406 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13407 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13408 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13409 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13410 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is then
13411 deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13412 available
13413 for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but the
13414 copyright
13415 for the print journal does not inhibit the right of anyone to
13416 redistribute the work for free.
13417 </para>
13418 <para>
13419 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13420 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and
13421 markets.
13422 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the
13423 traditional
13424 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13425 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13426 presumptively
13427 a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge and science.
13428 </para>
13429
13430 </sect2>
13431 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13432 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13433 <para>
13434 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13435 increasing
13436 control effected through law and technology.
13437 </para>
13438 <para>
13439 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a
13440 nonprofit
13441 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13442 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable copyright
13443 on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for
13444 people to build upon other people's work, by making it simple for
13445 creators
13446 to express the freedom for others to take and build upon their
13447 work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to
13448 bulletproof
13449 licenses, make this possible.
13450 </para>
13451 <para>
13452 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer.
13453 By developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13454 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that
13455 can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13456 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13457 automatically
13458 to identify content that can easily be shared. These three
13459 expressions
13460 together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable description, and
13461 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13462 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13463 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone
13464 who accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the
13465 ideal that the person associated with the license believes in something
13466 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13467 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13468 certain
13469 freedoms are given.
13470 </para>
13471 <para>
13472 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13473 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13474 creator
13475 can choose a license that permits any use, so long as attribution is
13476 given. She can choose a license that permits only noncommercial use.
13477 She can choose a license that permits any use so long as the same
13478 freedoms
13479 are given to other uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so
13480 long as no derivative use is made. Or any use at all within developing
13481 nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full copies are not made. Or
13482 lastly, any educational use.
13483 </para>
13484 <para>
13485 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default
13486 of copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13487 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13488 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13489 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13490 governed
13491 by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13492 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13493 content
13494 available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a
13495 public
13496 domain.
13497 </para>
13498 <para>
13499 This is just one project among many within the Creative
13500 Commons.
13501 And of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization
13502 pursuing such freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative
13503 Commons from many is that we are not interested only in talking
13504 about a public domain or in getting legislators to help build a public
13505 domain. Our aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13507 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13508 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13509 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13510 </para>
13511 <para>
13512 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is
13513 to complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a
13514 culture
13515 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws
13516 written centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could
13517 have imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a
13518 background
13519 of technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense
13520 against the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with
13521 different
13522 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can
13523 use them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way
13524 effectively
13525 to begin to build those rules.
13526 </para>
13527 <para>
13528 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13529 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example,
13530 is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in the Magic
13531 Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13532 Commons
13533 license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13534 </para>
13535 <para>
13536 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13537 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1) those
13538 who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (2)
13539 those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for
13540 free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download Cory's book
13541 instead
13542 of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2) will download
13543 Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (2)-goods.
13544 If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the strategy of releasing
13545 Cory's book free on-line will probably increase sales of Cory's book.
13546 </para>
13547 <para>
13548 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13549 conclusion.
13550 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13551 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was
13552 a total success.
13553 </para>
13554 <para>
13555 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree
13556 content
13557 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13558 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13559 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13560 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13561 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13562 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13563 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13564 well.
13565 </para>
13566 <para>
13567 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13568 proprietary
13569 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13570 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13571 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13572 anything
13573 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others
13574 are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content
13575 from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13576 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13577 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the legal costs of sampling
13578 are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy,
13579 which was born sampling the music of others, has stated that he does
13580 not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs
13581 are so high<footnote><para>
13582 <!-- f2. --> Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real Culture Wars
13583 (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg Hittelman, a Fiat
13584 Lucre
13585 production, available at
13586 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13587 </para></footnote>),
13588 these artists release into the creative environment content
13589 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13590 </para>
13591 <para>
13592 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative
13593 Commons license just because they want to express to others the
13594 importance
13595 of balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system
13596 as it is, you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13597 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13598 appropriate
13599 that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate
13600 description of how most creators view the rights associated with their
13601 content. The Creative Commons license expresses this notion of "Some
13602 Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to say it to others.
13603 </para>
13604 <para>
13605 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13606 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13607 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13608 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13609
13610 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13611 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13612 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13613 </para>
13614 <para>
13615 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13616 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13617 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13618 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13619 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13620 steps are possible.
13621 </para>
13622 <para>
13623 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13624 individuals
13625 and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the
13626 creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13627 complements
13628 it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it
13629 easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and
13630 cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread
13631 more easily.
13632 </para>
13633
13634 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13635 </sect2>
13636 </sect1>
13637 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13638 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13639 <para>
13640 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13641 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13642 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13643 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13644 changes that we need.
13645 </para>
13646 <para>
13647 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13648 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13649 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13650 to our end.
13651 </para>
13652
13653 <sect2 id="formalities">
13654 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13655 <para>
13656 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13657 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13658 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13659 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13660 </para>
13661 <para>
13662 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13663 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13664 requirements
13665 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
13666 </para>
13667 <para>
13668 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13669 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13670 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13671 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13672 </para>
13673 <para>
13674 Why?
13675 </para>
13676 <para>
13677 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13678 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13679 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13680 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13681 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13682 formalities
13683 were getting in the way.
13684 </para>
13685 <para>
13686 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13687 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13688 burdens
13689 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what,
13690 or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13691 creative
13692 work of others. There are no records, there is no system to trace&mdash;
13693 there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the
13694 massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is
13695 a necessary step for any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
13696 lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could
13697 speak.
13698 </para>
13699 <para>
13700 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13701 <!-- f1. --> The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13702 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
13703 by other countries as well.
13704 </para></footnote>&mdash;but it should
13705 not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We should
13706 require
13707 formalities, but we should establish a system that will create the
13708 incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13709 </para>
13710 <para>
13711 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13712 registering
13713 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally,
13714 the first of these three was something the copyright owner did; the
13715 second
13716 two were something the government did. But a revised system of
13717 formalities would banish the government from the process, except for
13718 the sole purpose of approving standards developed by others.
13719 </para>
13720
13721 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13722
13723 <sect3 id="registration">
13724 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13725 <para>
13726 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with
13727 the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
13728 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
13729 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the
13730 burden of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.
13731 And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of government
13732 policymaking,
13733 the office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus,
13734 when people who know something about the process hear this idea
13735 about formalities, their first reaction is panic&mdash;nothing could be worse
13736 than forcing people to deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13737 </para>
13738 <para>
13739 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a
13740 tradition
13741 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13742 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13743 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't
13744 follow that the government must actually administer the role. Instead,
13745 we should be creating incentives for private parties to serve the public,
13746 subject to standards that the government sets.
13747 </para>
13748 <para>
13749 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13750 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13751 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13752 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13753 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13754 performed
13755 by many competing registrars. That competition drives the cost
13756 of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease with which
13757 registration occurs up.
13758 </para>
13759 <para>
13760 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13761 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry,
13762 but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should
13763 establish
13764 a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
13765 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete
13766 with one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for
13767 registering
13768 and renewing copyrights. That competition would
13769 substantially
13770 lower the burden of this formality&mdash;while producing a database
13771 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13772 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13773 </para>
13774
13775 </sect3>
13776 <sect3 id="marking">
13777 <title>MARKING</title>
13778 <para>
13779 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
13780 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13781 punishment
13782 for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to imposing
13783 the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.
13784 Here again, there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be
13785 enforced in this way. And more importantly, there is no reason a
13786 marking
13787 requirement needs to be enforced uniformly across all media.
13788 </para>
13789 <para>
13790 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13791 copyrighted
13792 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also
13793 makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use
13794 the work.
13795 </para>
13796 <para>
13797 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13798 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13799 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13800 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13801 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13802 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13803 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13804 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13805 </para>
13806 <para>
13807 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13808 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13809 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13810 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13811 copyright
13812 owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13813 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13814 <!-- f2. --> There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13815 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13816 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13817 </para></footnote>
13818 The meaning of an unmarked work would
13819 therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
13820 complain,
13821 then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
13822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13823 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13824 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13825 their work.
13826 </para>
13827 <para>
13828 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13829 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13830 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13831 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13832 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13833 </para>
13834 <para>
13835 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method
13836 for marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13837 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13838 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13839 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13840 consideration
13841 of which method could best be integrated into the registration
13842 and renewal system. We would not count on the government to
13843 innovate;
13844 but we would count on the government to keep the product of
13845 innovation
13846 in line with its other important functions.
13847 </para>
13848 <para>
13849 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13850 requirements.
13851 If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13852 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13853 example,
13854 all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick step. The
13855 aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the system itself
13856 should be kept as simple as possible.
13857 </para>
13858 <para>
13859 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13860 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13861 make things unclear.
13862 </para>
13863 <para>
13864 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13865 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13866 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13867 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13868 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13869 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13870 </para>
13871
13872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13873 </sect3>
13874 </sect2>
13875 <sect2 id="shortterms">
13876 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13877 <para>
13878 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13879 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13880 natural authors.
13881 </para>
13882 <para>
13883 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13884 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five years.
13885 That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost Eldred v.
13886 Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The Economist
13887 endorsed
13888 a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright term.<footnote><para>
13889 <!-- f3. --> "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15, available
13890 at
13891 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13892 </para></footnote>
13893 Others have
13894 proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13895 </para>
13896 <para>
13897 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13898 copyright's
13899 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four
13900 principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
13901 </para>
13902 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13903 <listitem><para>
13904 <!-- (1) -->
13905 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to
13906 give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very
13907 strong protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim
13908 rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13909 derivative
13910 works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13911 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an
13912 author.
13913 </para></listitem>
13914 <listitem><para>
13915 <!-- (2) -->
13916 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and
13917 protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13918 fuzziness
13919 of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13920 "expression."
13921 That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13922 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus
13923 unprotected.
13924 The value of short terms is that there is little need to
13925 build exceptions into copyright when the term itself is kept
13926 short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13927 complexities
13928 of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13929 navigate.
13930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13931 </para></listitem>
13932 <listitem><para>
13933 <!-- (3) -->
13934 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed.
13935 Especially
13936 if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13937 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the
13938 protection continued. This need not be an onerous burden,
13939 but there is no reason this monopoly protection has to be
13940 granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13941 veteran
13942 to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
13943 <!-- f4. --> Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13944 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13945 available at
13946 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13947 </para></footnote>
13948 If we make veterans suffer that
13949 burden, I don't see why we couldn't require authors to spend
13950 ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
13951 </para></listitem>
13952 <listitem><para>
13953 <!-- (4) -->
13954 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should
13955 be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term
13956 once given should not be extended. It might have been a
13957 mistake
13958 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year
13959 term. I don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then
13960 the consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
13961 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct that
13962 mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do
13963 today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13964 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who
13965 write now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden
13966 that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
13967 increasing
13968 their reward will not increase their creativity in 1923.
13969 What's not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do
13970 about that now.
13971 </para></listitem>
13972 </orderedlist>
13973 <para>
13974 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13975 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
13976 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13977 </para>
13978 <para>
13979 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13980 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13981 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13982 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13983 </para>
13984
13985 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13986
13987 </sect2>
13988 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
13989 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13990 <para>
13991 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13992 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13993 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13994 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13995 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13996 the emergence of that new technology.
13997 </para>
13998 <para>
13999 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
14000 "exclusive
14001 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
14002 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that
14003 are sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
14004 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the
14005 right to release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
14006 </para>
14007 <para>
14008 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
14009 expanded
14010 the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control
14011 translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
14012 <!-- f5. --> Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
14013 University Press, 1967), 32.
14014 </para></footnote>
14015 The courts have expanded
14016 it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This expansion has
14017 been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
14018 Benjamin
14019 Kaplan.
14020 </para>
14021 <blockquote>
14022 <para>
14023 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
14024 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
14025 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
14026 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
14027 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
14028 </para></footnote>
14029 </para>
14030 </blockquote>
14031 <para>
14032 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
14033 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
14034 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
14035 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
14036 Consider each limitation in turn.
14037 </para>
14038 <para>
14039 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
14040 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
14041
14042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
14043 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
14044 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
14045 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
14046 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
14047 after the creative work is done.
14048 </para>
14049 <para>
14050 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
14051 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
14052 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
14053 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
14054 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
14055 perhaps
14056 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer
14057 makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the
14058 creative
14059 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine
14060 pouring
14061 molasses into the machines. That's what this general requirement
14062 of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
14063 </para>
14064 <para>
14065 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of
14066 the Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation
14067 for foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
14068 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
14069 negotiation
14070 for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make much
14071 more sense.
14072 </para>
14073 <para>
14074 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14075 protected,
14076 and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14077 protected.
14078 This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague Paul
14079 Goldstein.<footnote><para>
14080 <!-- f7. --> Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14081 Jukebox
14082 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
14083 </para></footnote>
14084 His view is that the law should be written so that expanded
14085 protections follow expanded uses.
14086 </para>
14087 <para>
14088 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the
14089 legal
14090 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14091 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14092 incentives
14093 to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with a
14094 strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14095 </para>
14096 <para>
14097 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14098 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14099 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14100 certain
14101 statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free a great
14102 deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory rights
14103 regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14104 </para>
14105 </sect2>
14106
14107 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
14108 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
14109 <para>
14110 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it wouldn't
14111 be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that is, to most
14112 people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other policy issue that
14113 better
14114 teaches the lessons of this book than the battles around the sharing
14115 of music.
14116 </para>
14117 <para>
14118 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14119 Internet's
14120 growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14121 powerfully
14122 than any other single application. It was the Internet's killer
14123 app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was the
14124 application
14125 that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the application
14126 that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill innovation on
14127 the network.
14128 </para>
14129 <para>
14130 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music
14131 in particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14132 performed,
14133 and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14134 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14135 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14136 </para>
14137 <para>
14138 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
14139 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
14140 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
14141 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
14142 </para>
14143 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
14144 <listitem><para>
14145 <!-- A. -->
14146 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14147 for purchasing CDs.
14148 </para></listitem>
14149 <listitem><para>
14150 <!-- B. -->
14151 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14152 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14153 </para></listitem>
14154 <listitem><para>
14155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14156 <!-- C. -->
14157 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get
14158 access
14159 to content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright
14160 or that would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14161 </para></listitem>
14162 <listitem><para>
14163 <!-- D. -->
14164 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get
14165 access
14166 to content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the
14167 copyright owner plainly endorses.
14168 </para></listitem>
14169 </orderedlist>
14170 <para>
14171 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14172 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14173 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14174 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14175 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14176 significantly weakened.
14177 </para>
14178 <para>
14179 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14180 controversial.
14181 For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is
14182 real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is significantly
14183 greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing networks.
14184 </para>
14185 <para>
14186 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14187 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14188 should respond.
14189 </para>
14190 <para>
14191 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is addictive
14192 today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a broad range of
14193 content.
14194 It won't be the easiest way to get access to a broad range of content
14195 in ten years. Today, access to the Internet is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we
14196 in the United States are lucky to have broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and
14197 very rarely do we get service at that speed both up and down. Although
14198 wireless access is growing, most of us still get access across wires. Most
14199 only gain access through a machine with a keyboard. The idea of the
14200 always
14201 on, always connected Internet is mainly just an idea.
14202 </para>
14203 <para>
14204 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14205 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14206 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14208 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14209 question
14210 should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this world?
14211 The question should be, what law will we require when the network
14212 becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is one in
14213 which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net; where
14214 everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the Rockies&mdash;you can
14215 instantaneously be connected to the Internet. Imagine the Internet as
14216 ubiquitous as the best cell-phone service, where with the flip of a
14217 device,
14218 you are connected.
14219 </para>
14220 <para>
14221 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14222 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio, content
14223 that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here, then, is the
14224 critical point: When it is extremely easy to connect to services that give
14225 access to content, it will be easier to connect to services that give you
14226 access to content than it will be to download and store content on the
14227 many devices you will have for playing content. It will be easier, in other
14228 words, to subscribe than it will be to be a database manager, as
14229 everyone
14230 in the download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies
14231 essentially
14232 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if
14233 the services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14234 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over cell
14235 phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14236 paying
14237 for this content even though "free" content is available in the form
14238 of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
14239 <!-- f8. --> See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
14240 3 April 2002, available at
14241 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
14242 </para></footnote>
14243
14244 </para>
14245 <para>
14246 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14247 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14248 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
14249 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14250 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14251 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14252 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14253 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14254 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14255 artists get paid, during
14256
14257 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14258 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14259 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14260 </para>
14261 <para>
14262 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14263 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14264 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14265 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14266 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14267 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14268 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14269 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14270 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14271 </para>
14272 <para>
14273 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14274 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14275 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14276 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14277 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14278 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14279 way that returns something to the artist.
14280 </para>
14281 <para>
14282 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14283 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14284 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14285 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14286 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14287 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14288 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14289 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14290 </para>
14291 <para>
14292 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply
14293 deem out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make
14294 copies of the music available for sale, then commercial and
14295 noncommercial
14296 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14297 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would
14298 be incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing
14299 has ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14300 </para>
14301 <para>
14302
14303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14304 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14305 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14306 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14307 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14308 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14309 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14310 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14311 trade.
14312 </para>
14313 <para>
14314 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14315 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14316 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14317 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14318 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14319 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14320 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14321 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14322 </para>
14323 <para>
14324 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14325 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14326 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14327 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14328 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14329 delivering and accessing content.
14330 </para>
14331 <para>
14332 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14333 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14334 </para>
14335 <para>
14336 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14337 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14338 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14339 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14340 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14341 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14342 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14343 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14344 </para>
14345 <para>
14346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14347 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14348 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14349 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14350 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14351 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14352 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14353 </para>
14354 <para>
14355 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14356 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote><para>
14357 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14358 10 October 2000), available at
14359 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14360 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14361 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
14362 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14363 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14364 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14365 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14366 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14367 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14368 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14369 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14370 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14371 available at
14372 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14373 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14374 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14375 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14376 2002, available at
14377 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14378 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14379 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14380 McCullagh,
14381 "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14382 2002, available at
14383 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14384 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14385 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14386 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14387 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14388 debate
14389 by about a decade. See
14390 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14391 </para></footnote>
14392 Fisher suggests a
14393 very clever way around the current impasse of the Internet. Under his
14394 plan, all content capable of digital transmission would (1) be marked
14395 with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to evade
14396 these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once the
14397 content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to
14398 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the
14399 basis
14400 of those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The
14401 compensation
14402 would be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
14403 </para>
14404 <para>
14405 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14406 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14407 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14408 simple:
14409 Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14410 system.
14411 I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of the
14412 proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
14413 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14414 facilitating
14415 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal
14416 after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free
14417 exchange
14418 of content, supported through a taxation system, then it can be
14419 continued. If this form of protection is no longer necessary, then the
14420 system could lapse into the old system of controlling access.
14421 </para>
14422 <para>
14423 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His
14424 aim is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the
14425 system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But
14426 the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes
14427 I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the limits on derivative
14428
14429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14430 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14431 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14432 allowed
14433 to do with the content itself.
14434 </para>
14435 <para>
14436 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14437 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14438 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14439 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14440 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14441 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14442 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14443 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14444 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14445 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14446 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14447 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14448 on-line.
14449 </para>
14450 <para>
14451 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14452 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14453 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14454 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14455 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14456 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14457 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14458 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14459 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14460 finding ways to compete with "free."
14461 </para>
14462 <para>
14463 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14464 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14465 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14466 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14467 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14468 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14469 the law.
14470 </para>
14471 <para>
14472 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14473 </para>
14474 <para>
14475
14476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14477 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14478 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14479 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14480 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14481 create.
14482 </para>
14483 <para>
14484 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14485 by
14486 </para>
14487 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14488 <listitem><para>
14489 <!-- 1. -->
14490 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14491 </para></listitem>
14492 <listitem><para>
14493 <!-- 2. -->
14494 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14495 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14496 statute;
14497 </para></listitem>
14498 <listitem><para>
14499 <!-- 3. -->
14500 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14501 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14502 </para></listitem>
14503 </orderedlist>
14504 <para>
14505 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a
14506 competitive
14507 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14508 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14509 something then?
14510 </para>
14511 <para>
14512 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14513 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But
14514 the real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract.
14515 The real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14516 technology
14517 that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x, or
14518 (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14519 market
14520 of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14521 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14522 authorized
14523 sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14524 compensation
14525 without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then it
14526 may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty pirates.
14527 </para>
14528 <para>
14529 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14530 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not be
14531 on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14532
14533 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14534 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting the
14535 space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14536 </para>
14537 </sect2>
14538
14539 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14540 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14541 <para>
14542 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14543 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14544 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14545 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14546 </para>
14547 <para>
14548 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14549 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it is
14550 my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client. And
14551 in a world where the rich clients have one strong view, the
14552 unwillingness
14553 of the profession to question or counter that one strong view queers
14554 the law.
14555 </para>
14556 <para>
14557 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14558 "radical"
14559 by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14560 advocating
14561 are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate and
14562 significant figures in the history of this branch of the law. Many, for
14563 example,
14564 thought crazy the challenge that we brought to the Copyright
14565 Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the dominant scholar
14566 and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville Nimmer, thought it
14567 obvious.<footnote><para>
14568 <!-- f10. --> Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14569 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14570 </para></footnote>
14571
14572 </para>
14573 <para>
14574 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14575 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14576 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14577 </para>
14578 <para>
14579 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and
14580 benefits.
14581 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the
14582 legal system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction
14583 costs of the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14584 <!-- f11. --> A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is to
14585 be commended for his careful review of data about infringement, leading
14586 him to question his own publicly stated position&mdash;twice. He initially
14587 predicted
14588 that downloading would substantially harm the industry. He then
14589 revised his view in light of the data, and he has since revised his view again.
14590 Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True
14591 Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002),
14592 (reviewing his original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J.
14593 Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper,
14594 June 2003, available at
14595 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14596 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14597 effect
14598 of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he underestimates the
14599 costs of the legal system. See, for example, Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14600 </para></footnote>
14601 They see a system that has been
14602 around for hundreds of years, and they assume it works the way their
14603 elementary school civics class taught them it works.
14604 </para>
14605 <para>
14606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14607 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't
14608 work for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14609 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal level, at
14610 least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of our legal
14611 system
14612 are so astonishingly high that justice can practically never be done.
14613 </para>
14614 <para>
14615 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14616 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14617 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14618 obscure
14619 strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality: very
14620 little.
14621 The law depended upon the careful articulation and development
14622 of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development of legal
14623 doctrine
14624 depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work costs too much,
14625 except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14626 </para>
14627 <para>
14628 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14629 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14630 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14631 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14632 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14633 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14634 </para>
14635 <para>
14636 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the
14637 law away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is
14638 precisely
14639 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left
14640 to its review.
14641 </para>
14642 <para>
14643 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with
14644 digital technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or
14645 think about the amazing things your community could facilitate with
14646 digital technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change
14647 something.
14648 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold
14649 molasses poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that
14650 requires
14651 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's
14652 Russia.
14653 </para>
14654 <para>
14655 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14656 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14657
14658 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14659 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14660 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14661 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14662 </para>
14663 <para>
14664 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14665 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14666 keep your lawyers away.
14667 </para>
14668 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14669 </sect2>
14670 </sect1>
14671 </chapter>
14672 <chapter id="c-notes">
14673 <title>NOTES</title>
14674 <para>
14675 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide Web. As
14676 anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be highly unstable. I
14677 have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting readers to the original source
14678 through the Web site associated with this book. For each link below, you can go to
14679 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by clicking on the
14680 number after the # sign. If the original link remains alive, you will be redirected to
14681 that link. If the original link has disappeared, you will be redirected to an
14682 appropriate
14683 reference for the material.
14684 </para>
14685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14686
14687 </chapter>
14688 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14689 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14690 <para>
14691 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14692 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14693 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14694 to him that this book is dedicated.
14695 </para>
14696 <para>
14697 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14698 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard
14699 Posner, Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction
14700 and guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School
14701 and Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden,
14702 James P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert
14703 Hallman,
14704 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum,
14705 Alina Ng, and Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine
14706 Crump and Harry Surden, who helped direct their research, and to
14707 Laura Lynch, who brilliantly managed the army that they assembled,
14708 and provided her own critical eye on much of this.
14709 </para>
14710 <para>
14711 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14712 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14713 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14714 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14716 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14717 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14718 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14719 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14720 </para>
14721 <para>
14722 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly
14723 draw upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible
14724 to receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14725 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice
14726 to requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli,
14727 David Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who
14728 had specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14729 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob
14730 Devine, Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy
14731 Hunsinger, Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James
14732 Lindenschmidt,
14733 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey
14734 McHugh, Evan McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D.
14735 Rezende, Shabbir Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack,
14736 Kragen Sitaker, Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina,
14737 Sean Walsh, Matt Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger
14738 Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz," and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have
14739 missed anyone; with computers come glitches, and a crash of my
14740 e-mail system meant I lost a bunch of great replies.)
14741 </para>
14742 <para>
14743 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book
14744 in draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14745 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14746 regulation
14747 of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an embarrassingly large
14748 number of errors. While my work is in part inspired by Stallman's, he
14749 does not agree with me in important places throughout this book.
14750 </para>
14751 <para>
14752 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14753 insisted
14754 that there would be unending happiness away from these battles,
14755 and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever, grateful for
14756 her perpetual patience and love.
14757 </para>
14758 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14759
14760 </chapter>
14761 </book>