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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>Version 2004-02-10</subtitle>
26
27 <authorgroup>
28 <author>
29 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig</surname>
31 </author>
32 </authorgroup>
33
34 <copyright>
35 <year>2004</year>
36 <holder>
37 Lawrence Lessig.
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
45 </holder>
46 </copyright>
47
48 <abstract>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
50 <para>
51 LAWRENCE LESSIG
52 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
66 Appeals.
67 </para>
68 </abstract>
69 </bookinfo>
70
71 <chapter id="c-info">
72 <title>Info</title>
73 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
74
75 <para>
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
77 </para>
78 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
79 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
83 </itemizedlist>
84 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
85
86 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
87 <para>
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
89 <sbr/>The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
90 in a Connected World
91 <sbr/>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
92 </para>
93
94 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
95 <para>
96 THE PENGUIN PRESS
97 <sbr/>NEW YORK
98 </para>
99
100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
101 <para>
102 FREE CULTURE
103 </para>
104
105 <para>
106 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
107 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
108 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
109 </para>
110
111 <para>
112 LAWRENCE LESSIG
113 </para>
114
115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
116 <para>
117 THE PENGUIN PRESS
118 <sbr/>a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
119 York, New York
120 <sbr/>Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
121 <sbr/>All rights reserved
122 <sbr/>Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
123 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
124 Reprinted with permission.
125 <sbr/>Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
126 <sbr/>All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
127 <sbr/>Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
128 <sbr/>Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
129 <sbr/>Lessig, Lawrence.
130 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
131 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
132 <sbr/>p. cm.
133 <sbr/>Includes index.
134 <sbr/>ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
135 <sbr/>1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
136 <sbr/>3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
137 <sbr/>KF2979.L47
138 <sbr/>343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
139 <sbr/>This book is printed on acid-free paper.
140 <sbr/>Printed in the United States of America
141 <sbr/>1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
142 <sbr/>Designed by Marysarah Quinn
143 </para>
144
145 <para>
146 &translationblock;
147 </para>
148
149 <para>
150 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
151 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
152 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
153 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
154 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
155 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
156 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
157 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
158 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
159 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
160 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
161 </para>
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
163
164 <para>
165 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
166 it continues still.
167 </para>
168
169 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
170 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
171 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
172 </figure>
173
174 <toc id="toc"></toc>
175
176 <lot>
177 <title>List of figures</title>
178 </lot>
179
180 <!--
181 c PREFACE xiii
182 c INTRODUCTION
183 c "PIRACY"
184 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
185 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
186 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
187 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
188 2 Film
189 2 Recorded Music
190 2 Radio
191 2 Cable TV
192 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
193 2 Piracy I
194 2 Piracy II
195 c "PROPERTY"
196 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
197 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
198 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
199 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
200 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
201 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
202 2 Beginnings
203 2 Law: Duration
204 2 Law: Scope
205 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
206 2 Architecture and Law: Force
207 2 Market: Concentration
208 2 Together
209 c PUZZLES
210 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
211 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
212 2 Constraining Creators
213 2 Constraining Innovators
214 2 Corrupting Citizens
215 c BALANCES
216 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
217 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
218 c CONCLUSION
219 c AFTERWORD
220 1 Us, Now
221 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
222 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
223 1 Them, Soon
224 2 1. More Formalities
225 3 Registration and Renewal
226 3 Marking
227 2 2. Shorter Terms
228 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
229 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
230 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
231 c NOTES
232 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
233 c INDEX
234 -->
235
236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
237
238 </chapter>
239 <chapter id="c-preface">
240 <title>PREFACE</title>
241 <para>
242 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
243 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
244 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
245 </para>
246 <blockquote>
247 <para>
248 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
249 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
250 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
251 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
252 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
253 </para></footnote>
254 </para>
255 </blockquote>
256 <para>
257 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
258 software,
259 or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review suggested
260 the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we could always
261 "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a switch and be back
262 home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and any troubles
263 that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
264 </para>
265 <para>
266 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
267 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
268 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
270 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
271 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
272 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
273 </para>
274 <para>
275 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
276 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
277 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
278 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
279 </para>
280 <para>
281 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
282 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
283 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
284 freesoftware movement<footnote>
285 <para>
286 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
287 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
288 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
289 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
290 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
291 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
292 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
293 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
294 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
295 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
296 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
297 or of creators from the past.
298 </para>
299 <para>
300 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
301 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
302 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
303 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
304 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
305 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
306 culture deem fundamental.
307 </para>
308 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
309 <para>
310 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
311 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
312 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
313 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
314 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
315 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
316 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
317 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
318 he asked,
319 </para>
320 <blockquote>
321 <para>
322 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
323 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
324 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
325 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
326 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
327 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
328 </para></footnote>
329 </para>
330 </blockquote>
331 <para>
332 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
333 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
334 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
335 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
336 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
337 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
338 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
339 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
340 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
341 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
342 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
343 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
344 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
345 that this work is "merely" derivative.
346 </para>
347 <para>
348 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
349 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this book
350 than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been its own.
351 Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of values. Like
352 Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And like Stallman,
353 I believe those are values of our past that will need to be defended in
354 our future. A free culture has been our past, but it will only be our
355 future
356 if we change the path we are on right now.
357 xv
358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
359 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
360 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
361 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
362 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
363 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
364 what I advance here.
365 </para>
366 <para>
367 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
368 between
369 anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is filled
370 with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract that get
371 enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its
372 property
373 becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism
374 in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear about our
375 culture
376 today. It is against that extremism that this book is written.
377 </para>
378
379 </chapter>
380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
381
382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
383 <chapter id="c-introduction">
384 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
385 <para>
386 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
387 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
388 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
389 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
390 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
391 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
392 </para>
393 <para>
394 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
395 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
396 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
397 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
398 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
399 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
400 </para></footnote>
401 For many
402 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
403 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
404 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
405 </para>
406 <para>
407 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
408 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
409 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
410 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
411 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
412 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
413 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
414 </para>
415 <para>
416 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
417 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
418 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
419 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
420 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
421 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
422 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
423 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
424 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
425 </para>
426 <para>
427 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
428 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
429 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
430 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
431 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
432 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
433 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
434 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
435 </para>
436 <blockquote>
437 <para>
438 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
439 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
440 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
441 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
442 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
443 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
444 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
445 the public has a just claim.<footnote><para>
446 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find that
447 there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land effectively
448 destroyed
449 the value of the Causbys' land. This example was suggested to me
450 by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty:
451 Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship," Stanford Law
452 Review
453 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul Goldstein, Real Property
454 (Mineola,
455 N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984), 1112&ndash;13.
456 </para></footnote>
457 </para>
458 </blockquote>
459 <para>
460 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
461 </para>
462 <para>
463 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
464 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
465 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
467 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
468 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
469 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
470 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
471 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
472 </para>
473 <para>
474 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
475 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
476 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
477 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
478 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
479 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
480 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
481 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
482 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
483 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
484 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
485 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
486 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
487 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
488 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
489 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
490 </para>
491 <para>
492 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
493 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
494 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
495 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
496 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
497 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
498 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
499 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
500 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
501 understanding of radio.
502 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
503 </para>
504 <para>
505 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
506 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
507 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
508 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
509 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
510 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
511 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
512 much less transmitter power and static.
513 </para>
514 <para>
515 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting
516 of the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in
517 New York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
518 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
519 seventeen
520 miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and then with a
521 clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an electrical
522 device,
523 it produced the sound of an announcer's voice: "This is amateur
524 station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on frequency
525 modulation
526 at two and a half meters."
527 </para>
528 <para>
529 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
530 </para>
531 <blockquote>
532 <para>
533 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
534 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was
535 crumpled and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling
536 forest fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a
537 piano
538 solo and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was
539 projected with a live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
540 "music box."<footnote><para>
541 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
542 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
543 </para></footnote>
544 </para>
545 </blockquote>
546 <para>
547 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a
548 vastly superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention,
549 Armstrong
550 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the
551 then dominant AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio
552 stations across the United States, but the stations in large cities were all
553 owned by a handful of networks.
554 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
555 </para>
556 <para>
557 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
558 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
559 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
560 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
561 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
562 </para>
563 <blockquote>
564 <para>
565 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
566 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a revolution&mdash;
567 start up a whole damn new industry to compete with RCA.<footnote><para>
568 See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," First
569 Electronic
570 Church of America, at www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
571
572 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
573 </para></footnote>
574 </para>
575 </blockquote>
576 <para>
577 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
578 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
579 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
580 described,
581 </para>
582 <blockquote>
583 <para>
584 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
585 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
586 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
587 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
588 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
589 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
590 </para></footnote>
591 </para>
592 </blockquote>
593 <para>
594 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
595 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
596 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
597 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
598 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
599 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
600 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
601 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
602 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
603 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
604 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
605 </para>
606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
607 <blockquote>
608 <para>
609 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
610 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
611 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
612 deviousness.<footnote><para>
613 Lessing, 256.
614 </para></footnote>
615 </para>
616 </blockquote>
617 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
618 <para>
619 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
620 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
621 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
622 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
623 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
624 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
625 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
626 least temporarily.
627 </para>
628 <para>
629 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
630 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
631 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
632 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
633 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
634 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
635 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
636 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
637 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
638 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
639 </para>
640 <para>
641 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
642 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
643 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
644 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
645 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
646 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
647 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
648 course always public spirited; the reality is something
649 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
650 to themselves, would crumble in
651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
652 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
653 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
654 effect
655 of technological change.
656 </para>
657 <para>
658 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good
659 date upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the
660 Internet
661 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
662 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had
663 access
664 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years before.<footnote><para>
665 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look
666 at Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
667 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
668 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
669 </para></footnote>
670 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
671 of 2004.
672 </para>
673 <para>
674 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
675 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
676 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
677 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
678 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
679 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
680 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
681 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
682 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
683 </para>
684 <para>
685 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
686 Internet
687 itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that the
688 Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
689 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as old as
690 the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change, would reject
691 it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet has introduced.
692 </para>
693 <para>
694 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
695 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
696 regulation
697 of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our culture
698 that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By "noncommercial
699 culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around parks or on
700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
701 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
702 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader,"
703 or Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
704 </para>
705 <para>
706 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
707 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
708 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the peace,
709 then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly concerned
710 with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it left this
711 culture
712 "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary individuals shared and
713 transformed their culture&mdash;telling stories, reenacting scenes from plays
714 or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were
715 left alone by the law.
716 </para>
717 <para>
718 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
719 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
720 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
721 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
722 marketplace.<footnote>
723 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
724 <para>
725 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
726 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
727 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
728 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
729 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
730 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
731 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
732 198&ndash;200.
733 </para></footnote>
734 This is also, of
735 course, an important part of creativity and culture, and it has become
736 an increasingly important part in America. But in no sense was it
737 dominant
738 within our tradition. It was instead just one part, a controlled
739 part, balanced with the free.
740 </para>
741 <para>
742 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
743 been erased.<footnote><para>
744 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
745 2001), ch. 13.
746 </para></footnote>
747 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and,
748 pushed by big media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in
749 our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
750 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
751 expanded
752 to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
753 creativity
754 that it never reached before. The technology that preserved the
755 balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were free and
756 uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has been undone.
757 The consequence is that we are less and less a free culture, more and
758 more a permission culture.
759 </para>
760 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
761 <para>
762 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
763 creativity.
764 And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the
765 protectionism that justifies the changes that I will describe below is not
766 the limited and balanced sort that has defined the law in the past. This
767 is not a protectionism to protect artists. It is instead a protectionism
768 to protect certain forms of business. Corporations threatened by the
769 potential of the Internet to change the way both commercial and
770 noncommercial culture are made and shared have united to induce
771 lawmakers to use the law to protect them. It is the story of RCA and
772 Armstrong; it is the dream of the Causbys.
773 </para>
774 <para>
775 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
776 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that
777 reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
778 marketplace
779 for making and cultivating culture generally, and that change
780 in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet is thus to
781 the industries that built and distributed content in the twentieth
782 century
783 what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was to the
784 railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of the end,
785 or at least a substantial transformation. Digital technologies, tied to the
786 Internet, could produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market
787 for building and cultivating culture; that market could include a much
788 wider and more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce
789 and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending
790 upon a few important factors, those creators could earn more on average
791 from this system than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our
792 day don't use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
793 </para>
794 <para>
795 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
796 happening
797 in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the early
798 twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using their
799 power to get the law to protect them against this new, more efficient,
800 more vibrant technology for building culture. They are succeeding in
801 their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet remakes them.
802 </para>
803 <para>
804 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
805 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
806 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
807 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
808 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
809 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
810 Motion
811 Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
812 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
813 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
814 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
815 Times, 17 January 2002.
816 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
817 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
818 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
819 against it.
820 </para>
821 <para>
822 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
823 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
824 especially
825 in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls "creative
826 property."
827 I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the law, properly tuned,
828 should punish "piracy," whether on or off the Internet.
829 </para>
830 <para>
831 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
832 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
833 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
834 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
835 </para>
836 <para>
837 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
838 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
839 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
840 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
841 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
842 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
843 <para>
844 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
845 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
846 </para></footnote>
847 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
848 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
849 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
850 could cultivate and extend our culture.
851 </para>
852 <para>
853 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
854 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
855 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
856 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
857 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
858 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
859 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
860 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
861 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
862 </para>
863 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26 -->
864 <para>
865 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
866 "centrality
867 of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or
868 otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for
869 neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a
870 morality
871 tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
872 </para>
873 <para>
874 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
875 inspired
876 by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its
877 code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace.
878 There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet
879 technologies
880 to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and
881 culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to
882 understand
883 the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
884 </para>
885 <para>
886 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property."
887 The property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
888 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding this
889 "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
890 sacredness
891 of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
892 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners of
893 "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys, treat
894 these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object when
895 a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to us as it
896 was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are "trespassing"
897 upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to us as it was to
898 them that the law should intervene to stop this trespass.
899 </para>
900 <para>
901 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
902 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
903 Common
904 sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky Causbys,
905 common sense is on the side of the property owners in this war. Unlike
906 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
907 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
908 on its side.
909 </para>
910 <para>
911 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
912 increasingly
913 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
914 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
915 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
916 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
917 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
918 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
919 </para>
920 <para>
921 The puzzle is, Why?
922 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
923 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
924 because
925 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
926 absolute
927 claim was wrong?
928 </para>
929 <para>
930 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
931 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
932 </para>
933 <para>
934 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
935 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
936 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
937 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
938 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
939 </para>
940 <para>
941 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
942 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
943 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
944 Armstrong
945 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
946 more powerful view?
947 </para>
948 <para>
949 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe
950 it was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
951 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt against
952 the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual property."
953 What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a sheriff
954 arresting
955 an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of this silliness will
956 be much more profound.
957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
958 </para>
959 <para>
960 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
961 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
962 ideas.
963 </para>
964 <para>
965 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
966 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
967 obscure
968 French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird sort we
969 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
970 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
971 can be more fully understood.
972 </para>
973 <para>
974 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
975 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
976 government,
977 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
978 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
979 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
980 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
981 threatened
982 by the changes to use their power to change the law&mdash;and more
983 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
984 who we have always been.
985 </para>
986 <para>
987 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
988 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
989 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
990 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
991 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
992 to which most of us remain oblivious.
993 </para>
994 </chapter>
995 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
996 <chapter id="c-piracy">
997 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
998
999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1000 <para>
1001 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
1002 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1003 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1004 capture.
1005 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1006 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1007 </para>
1008 <blockquote>
1009 <para>
1010 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1011 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1012 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1013 <!-- f1 -->
1014 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1015 </para></footnote>
1016 </para>
1017 </blockquote>
1018 <para>
1019 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1020 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1021 efficient
1022 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1023 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1024 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1025 content
1026 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1027 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1028 </para>
1029 <para>
1030 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1031 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1032 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1033 sharing
1034 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1035 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1036 </para>
1037 <para>
1038 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1039 increasingly
1040 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1041 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1042 believe
1043 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1044 piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1045 </para>
1046 <para>
1047 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1048 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1049 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1050 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1051 </para>
1052 <para>
1053 The idea goes something like this:
1054 </para>
1055 <blockquote>
1056 <para>
1057 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1058 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1059 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1060 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1061 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1062 piracy.
1063 </para>
1064 </blockquote>
1065 <para>
1066 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1067 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1068 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1069 <!-- f2 -->
1070 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1071 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1072 </para></footnote>
1073 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1074 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1075 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1076 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1077 <!-- f3 -->
1078 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1079 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1080 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1081 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1082 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1083 </para></footnote>
1084 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1085 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1086 </para>
1087 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1088 <para>
1089 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1090 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1092 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1093 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1094 property.
1095 It has never taken hold within our law.
1096 </para>
1097 <para>
1098 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1099 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1100 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1101 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1102 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1103 </para>
1104 <para>
1105 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1106 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1107 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1108 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1109 copyright law today regulates both.
1110 </para>
1111 <para>
1112 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1113 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1114 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1115 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1116 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1117 more expense of doing business.
1118 </para>
1119 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1120 <para>
1121 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1122 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1123 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1124 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1125 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1126 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1127 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1128 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1129 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1130 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1131 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1132 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1133 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1134 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1135 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1137 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1138 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1139 <para>
1140 <!-- f4 -->
1141 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1142 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1143 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1144 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1145 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1146 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1147 enabled are much more tenuous.
1148 </para></footnote>
1149 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1150 this creative class.
1151 </para>
1152 <para>
1153 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1154 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1155 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1156 </para>
1157
1158 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1159 <sect1 id="creators">
1160 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1161 <para>
1162 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1163 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1164 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1165 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1166 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1167 </para>
1168 <para>
1169 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1170 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1171 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1172 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1173 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1174 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1175 </para>
1176 <blockquote>
1177 <para>
1178 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1179 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1180 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1181 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1183 </para>
1184 <para>
1185 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1186 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1187 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1188 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1189 synchronization was pretty close.
1190 </para>
1191 <para>
1192 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1193 electric.
1194 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1195 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1196 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1197 wonderful! And it was something new!<footnote><para>
1198 <!-- f1 -->
1199 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1200 Cartoons
1201 (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1202 </para></footnote>
1203 </para>
1204 </blockquote>
1205 <para>
1206 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1207 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1208 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1209 </para>
1210 <para>
1211 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1212 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1213 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1214 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1215 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1216 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1217 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1218 </para>
1219 <para>
1220 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1221 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1222 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1223 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1224 </para>
1225 <para>
1226 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1227 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1228 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1229 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1230 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1231 genre.
1232 </para>
1233 <para>
1234 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1236 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1237 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1238 <!-- f2 -->
1239 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1240 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1241 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1242 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1243 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1244 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1245 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1246 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1247 </para></footnote>
1248 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1249 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1250 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1251 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1252 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1253 Mouse.
1254 </para>
1255 <para>
1256 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1257 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1258 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1259 <!-- f3 -->
1260 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1261 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1262 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1263 </para></footnote>
1264 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1265 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1266 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1267 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1268 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1269 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1270 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1271 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1272 old.
1273 </para>
1274 <para>
1275 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1276 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1277 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1278 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1279 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1280 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1281 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1282 </para>
1283 <para>
1284 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1285 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1286 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1287 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1288 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1289 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1290 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937),
1291 Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of
1292 the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin
1293 Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1295 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1296 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1297 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1298 Treasure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1299 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1300 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1301 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1302 </para>
1303 <para>
1304 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1305 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1306 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1307 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1308 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1309 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1310 culture around us and makes it something different.
1311 </para>
1312 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1313 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1314 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1315 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1316 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1317 <!-- f4 -->
1318 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1319 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1320 determining
1321 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1322 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1323 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1324 average
1325 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1326 Web site associated with this book, available at
1327 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1328 </para></footnote>
1329 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1330 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1331 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1332 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1333 </para>
1334 <para>
1335 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1336 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1337 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1338 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1339 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1340 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1341 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1342 </para>
1343 <para>
1344 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1345 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1346 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1347 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1348
1349 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1350 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1351 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1352 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1353 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1354 content from before the Great Depression.
1355 </para>
1356 <para>
1357 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1358 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1359 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1360 universal.
1361 </para>
1362 <para>
1363 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1364 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1365 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1366 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1367 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1368 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1369 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1370 </para>
1371 <para>
1372 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1373 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1374 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1375 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1376 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1377 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1378 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1379 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1380 interestingly different way.
1381 </para>
1382 <para>
1383 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1384 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1385 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1386 </para>
1387 <para>
1388 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1389 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1390 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1391 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1393 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1394 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1395 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1396 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1397 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1398 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1399 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1400 </para>
1401 <para>
1402 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1403 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1404 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1405 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1406 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1407 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1408 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1409 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1410 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1411 </para>
1412 <para>
1413 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1414 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1415 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1416 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1417 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1418 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1419 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1420 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1421 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1422 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1423 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1424 original copyright owner's permission.
1425 </para>
1426 <para>
1427 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1428 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1429 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1430 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1431 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1432
1433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1434 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1435 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1436 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1437 <!-- f5 -->
1438 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1439 York: Perennial, 2000).
1440 </para></footnote>
1441 </para>
1442 <para>
1443 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1444 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1445 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1446 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1447 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1448 which are fifty years old."
1449 </para>
1450 <para>
1451 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1452 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1453 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1454 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1455 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1456 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1457 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1458 <!-- f6 -->
1459 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1460 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1461 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1462 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1463 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1464 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1465 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1466 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1467 </para></footnote>
1468 </para>
1469 <para>
1470 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1471 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1472 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1473 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1474 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1475 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1476 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1477 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1478 culture?
1479 </para>
1480 <para>
1481 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1482 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1483 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1484 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1485 to prosecute cases like this."
1486 </para>
1487 <para>
1488 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1489 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1490 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1491 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1492 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1493 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1494 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1495 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1496 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1497 their clients or hurt them?
1498 Let's pause for a moment.
1499 </para>
1500 <para>
1501 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1502 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1503 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1504 </para>
1505 <para>
1506 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1507 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1508 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1509 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1510 <!-- f7 -->
1511 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1512 Vaidhyanathan,
1513 Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1514 University
1515 Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1516 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately describes a set of
1517 "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the
1518 nature of those rights is very different.
1519 </para></footnote>
1520 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1521 property;
1522 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1523 intellectual property.
1524 </para>
1525 <para>
1526 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1527 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1528 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1529 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1530 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1531 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1532 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1533 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1534 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1535 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1536 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1537 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1538 the public domain.
1539 </para>
1540 <para>
1541 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1542 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1543 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1544
1545 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1546 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1547 freedom is good.
1548 </para>
1549 <para>
1550 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1551 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1552 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1553 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1554 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1555 form, whether large or small.
1556 </para>
1557 <para>
1558 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1559 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1560 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1561 particular find it hard to say why.
1562 </para>
1563 <para>
1564 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1565 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1566 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1567 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1568 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1569 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1570 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1571 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1572 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1573 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1574 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster
1575 films in 1997.
1576 </para>
1577 <para>
1578 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1579 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1580 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1581 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1582 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1583 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1584 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1585 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1586 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1587 </para>
1588 <para>
1589 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1590 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1591 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1592 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1593 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1594 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1595 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1596 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1597 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1598 </para>
1599 <para>
1600 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1601 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1602 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1603 </para>
1604
1605 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1606 </sect1>
1607 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1608 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1609 <para>
1610 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1611 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1612 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1613 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1614 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1615 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1616 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1617 </para>
1618 <para>
1619 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1620 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1621 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1622 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1623 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1624 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1625 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1626 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1627 amateurs.
1628 </para>
1629 <para>
1630 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1631 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1633 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1634 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1635 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1636 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1637 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1638 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1639 population of photographers.
1640 </para>
1641 <para>
1642 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1643 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1644 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1645 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1646 <!-- f1 -->
1647 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1648 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1649 </para>
1650 <blockquote>
1651 <para>
1652 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1653 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1654 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1655 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1656 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1657 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1658 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1659 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1660 chemicals.<footnote>
1661 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1662 <para>
1663 <!-- f2 -->
1664 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1665 1977), 53.
1666 </para></footnote>
1667 </para>
1668 </blockquote>
1669 <para>
1670 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1671 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1672 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1673 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1674 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1675 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1676 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1677 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1678 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1679 percent.<footnote><para>
1680 <!-- f3 -->
1681 Jenkins, 177.
1682 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1683 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1684 <!-- f4 -->
1685 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1686 </para></footnote>
1687 </para>
1688 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1689 <para>
1690
1691 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1692 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1693 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1694 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1695 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1696 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1697 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1698 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1699 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1700 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1701 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1702 <!-- f5 -->
1703 Coe, 58.
1704 </para></footnote>
1705 </para>
1706 <para>
1707 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1708 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1709 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1710 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1711 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1712 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1713 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1714 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1715 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1716 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1717 have before.
1718 </para>
1719 <para>
1720 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1721 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1722 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1723 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1724 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1725 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1726 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1727 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1728 <!-- f6 -->
1729 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1730 </para></footnote>
1731 </para>
1732 <para>
1733 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1734 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1735 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1736 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1737 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1738 draw
1739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1740 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1741 that they thought valuable.
1742 </para>
1743 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1744 <para>
1745 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1746 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1747 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1748 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1749 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1750 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1751 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1752 <para>
1753 <!-- f7 -->
1754 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1755 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1756 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1757 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1758 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1759 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1760 </para>
1761 <para>
1762 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1763 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1764 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1765 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1766 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1767 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1768 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1769 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1770 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1771 <!-- f8 -->
1772 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1773 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1774 Review 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1775 Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1776 (1993).
1777 </para></footnote>)
1778 </para>
1779 <para>
1780 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1781 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1782 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1783 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1784 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1785 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1786 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1787 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1788 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1789 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1790 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1791 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1792 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1793 </para>
1794 <para>
1795
1796 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1797 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1798 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1799 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1800 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1801 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1802 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1803 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1804 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1805 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1806 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1807 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1808 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1809 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1810 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1811 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1812 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1813 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1814 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1815 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1816 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1817 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1818 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1819 learn.
1820 </para>
1821 <para>
1822 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1823 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1824 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1825 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1826 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1827 <!-- f9 -->
1828 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1829 Software
1830 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1831 February 2002, available at
1832 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1833 </para></footnote>
1834 These buses are filled with technology that
1835 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1836 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1837 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1838 teachers call "media literacy."
1839 </para>
1840 <para>
1841 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1842 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1843 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1844 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1845 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1846 the way people access it."
1847 </para>
1848 <para>
1849 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1850 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1851 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1852 about.
1853 </para>
1854 <para>
1855 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1856 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1857 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1858 <!-- f10 -->
1859 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1860 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1861 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1862 </para></footnote>
1863 it is increasingly important to understand the
1864 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1865 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1866 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1867 constructing
1868 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1869 </para>
1870 <para>
1871 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1872 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1873 written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult it is to
1874 sequence
1875 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1876 understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1877 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1878 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1879 emotion or builds suspense.
1880 </para>
1881 <para>
1882 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1883 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1884 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1885 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1886 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1887 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1888 </para>
1889 <para>
1890 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just
1891 film, as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of
1892 Southern
1893 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1894
1895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1896 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1897 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1898 texture."<footnote>
1899 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1900 <para>
1901 <!-- f11 -->
1902 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1903 2002.
1904 </para></footnote>
1905 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1906 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1907 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1908 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1909 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1910 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1911 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1912 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1913 <!-- f12 -->
1914 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1915 November 2000, available at
1916 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1917 available at
1918 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1919 </para></footnote>
1920 </para>
1921 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1922 <para>
1923 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1924 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1925 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1926 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1927 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1928 </para>
1929 <para>
1930 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1931 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1932 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1933 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1934 </para>
1935 <blockquote>
1936 <para>
1937 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1938 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1939 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1940 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1941 being read-only.
1942 </para>
1943 </blockquote>
1944 <para>
1945 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1946 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1947 twentieth century.
1948 </para>
1949 <para>
1950 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1951 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1952 understanding
1953 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1954 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1956 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1957 appropriate
1958 language for what they need to create or express."<footnote>
1959 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1960 <para>
1961 <!-- f13 -->
1962 Interview with Daley and Barish.
1963 </para></footnote> It is to enable
1964 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
1965 <!-- f14 -->
1966 Ibid.
1967 </para></footnote>
1968 </para>
1969 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1970 <para>
1971 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
1972 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
1973 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
1974 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
1975 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
1976 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
1977 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
1978 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
1979 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
1980 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
1981 </para>
1982 <para>
1983 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
1984 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
1985 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
1986 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
1987 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
1988 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
1989 </para>
1990 <para>
1991 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
1992 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
1993 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
1994 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
1995 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
1996 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
1997 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
1998 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
1999 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2000 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2001 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2002 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2003 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2004 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2005 to this form of expression.
2006 </para>
2007 <para>
2008
2009 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2010 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2011 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2012 Daley
2013 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2014 meaning."
2015 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2016 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&mdash;and
2017 increasingly,
2018 not the most powerful part&mdash;of constructing meaning. As Daley
2019 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2020 </para>
2021 <blockquote>
2022 <para>
2023 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2024 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2025 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2026 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2027 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2028 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2029 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2030 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2031 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2032 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2033 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2034 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2035 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2036 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2037 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2038 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2039 about the topic. . . .
2040 </para>
2041 <para>
2042 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2043 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2044 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2045 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2046 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2047 </para>
2048 <para>
2049 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2050 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2051 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2052 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2053 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2054 had a lot of power with this language."
2055 </para>
2056 </blockquote>
2057 <para>
2058 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2059 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2060 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2061 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2062 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2063 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2064 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2065 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2066 world would be watching.
2067 </para>
2068 <para>
2069 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2070 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2071 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2072 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2073 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2074 entertainment is tragedy.
2075 </para>
2076 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2077 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2078 <para>
2079 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2080 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2081 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2082 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2083 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2084 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2085 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2086 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2087 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2088 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2089 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2090 was also the Internet.
2091 </para>
2092 <para>
2093 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2094 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2095 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2096 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2097 movie
2098 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2099 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2100 with sound or text.
2101 </para>
2102 <para>
2103 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2104 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2105 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2106 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2107 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2108 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2109 spread practically instantaneously.
2110 </para>
2111 <para>
2112 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2113 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2114 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2115 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2116 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2117 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2118 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2119 </para>
2120 <para>
2121 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2122 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2123 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2124 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2125 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2126 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2127 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2128 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2129 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2130 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2131 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2132 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2133 </para>
2134 <para>
2135 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2136 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2137 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2138 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2139 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2140 people vote
2141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2142 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2143 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2144 </para>
2145 <para>
2146 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2147 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2148 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2149 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2150 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2151 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2152 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2153 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2154 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2155 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2156 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2157 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2158 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2159 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2160 <!-- f15 -->
2161 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2162 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2163 </para></footnote>
2164 </para>
2165 <para>
2166 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2167 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2168 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2169 <!-- f16 -->
2170 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2171 Political
2172 Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2173 </para></footnote>
2174 And in some towns in
2175 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2176 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2177 deliberation"
2178 to occur.
2179 </para>
2180 <para>
2181 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2182 occur.
2183 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2184 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2185 politics
2186 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2187 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2188 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2189 <!-- f17 -->
2190 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2191 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2192 </para></footnote> We say what our
2193 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2194 </para>
2195 <para>
2196 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2197 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2198 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2199 Technologies
2200 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2201 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2202
2203 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2204 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2205 place.
2206 </para>
2207 <para>
2208 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2209 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2210 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2211 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2212 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2213 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2214 </para>
2215 <para>
2216 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2217 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential
2218 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2219 reading
2220 is having an effect.
2221 </para>
2222 <para>
2223 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2224 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2225 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2226 praising
2227 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2228 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2229 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2230 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2231 instances
2232 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2233 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2234 as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2235 <!-- f18 -->
2236 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2237 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2238 </para></footnote>
2239 </para>
2240 <para>
2241 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2242 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2243 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2244 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2245 on.
2246 </para>
2247 <para>
2248 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2249 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2250 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2251 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2252 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2253 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2254 peer-generated rankings.
2255 </para>
2256 <para>
2257 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2258 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2259 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2260 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2261 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2262 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2263 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2264 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2265 get it out of the way."
2266 </para>
2267 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2268 <para>
2269 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2270 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2271 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2272 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2273 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2274 <!-- f19 -->
2275 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2276 </para></footnote>
2277 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2278 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2279 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2280 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2281 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2282 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2283 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2284 </para>
2285 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2286 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2287 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2288 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2289 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2290 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2291 had seen.<footnote><para>
2292 <!-- f20 -->
2293 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2294 Information Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2295 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2296 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2297 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2298 </para></footnote>
2299 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2300 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2301 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2302 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2303 </para>
2304 <para>
2305 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2306 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2307 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2308 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2309 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2310 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2311 <para>
2312 <!-- f21 -->
2313 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2314 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2315 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2316 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2317 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2318 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2319 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2320 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2321 </para></footnote>
2322 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2323
2324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2325 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2326 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2327 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2328 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2329 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2330 </para>
2331 <para>
2332 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2333 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2334 gatekeeper."
2335 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2336 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2337 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2338 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2339 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2340 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2341 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2342 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2343 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2344 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2345 extraordinary
2346 to report.
2347 </para>
2348 <para>
2349 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2350 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2351 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2352 </para>
2353 <para>
2354 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2355 differently
2356 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2357 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2358 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2359 </para>
2360 <para>
2361 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2362 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2363 lawnmower
2364 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2365 technologies
2366 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2367 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2368 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2369 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2370 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2371 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2372 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2373 tinkering of many others.
2374 </para>
2375 <para>
2376 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2377 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2378 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2379 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2380 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2381 </para>
2382 <para>
2383 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2384 platform,"
2385 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2386 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2387 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2388 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2389 becomes
2390 a major apprenticeship platform."
2391 </para>
2392 <para>
2393 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2394 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2395 abstract,
2396 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2397 doing
2398 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2399 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2400 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2401 </para>
2402 <para>
2403 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2404 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2405 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2406 multiple
2407 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2408 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2409 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2410 artistic,
2411 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2412 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2413 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2414 </para>
2415 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2416 <para>
2417 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2418 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2419
2420 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2421 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2422 of recognition.
2423 </para>
2424 <para>
2425 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2426 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2427 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2428 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2429 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2430 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2431 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2432 </para>
2433 <para>
2434 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2435 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2436 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2437 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2438 general.<footnote><para>
2439 <!-- f22 -->
2440 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2441 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2442 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2443 </para></footnote>
2444 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2445 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2446 </para>
2447 <para>
2448 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2449 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2450 and want to learn."
2451 </para>
2452 <para>
2453 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2454 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2455 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2456 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2457 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2458 </para>
2459 <para>
2460 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2461 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2462 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2463 the law to close down that technology.
2464 </para>
2465 <para>
2466 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2467 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2468 </para>
2469 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2470 </sect1>
2471 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2472 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2473 <para>
2474 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2475 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2476 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2477 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2478 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2479 </para>
2480 <para>
2481 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2482 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2483 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2484 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2485 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2486 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2487 </para>
2488 <para>
2489 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2490 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2491 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2492 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2493 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2494 </para>
2495 <para>
2496 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2498 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2499 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2500 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2501 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2502 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2503 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2504 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2505 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2506 </para>
2507 <para>
2508 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2509 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2510 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2511 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2512 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2513 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2514 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2515 </para>
2516 <para>
2517 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2518 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2519 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2520 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2521 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2522 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2523 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2524 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2525 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2526 on-line.
2527 </para>
2528 <para>
2529 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2530 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2531 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2532 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2533 be on users' computers.
2534 </para>
2535 <para>
2536 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2537 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2538 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2539 students
2540 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2541 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2542 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2543 computer.
2544 </para>
2545 <para>
2546 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2547 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2548 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2549 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2550 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2551 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2552 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2553 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2554 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2555 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2556 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2557 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2558 supposed to do.
2559 </para>
2560 <para>
2561 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2562 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2563 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2564 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2565 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2566 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2567 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2568 </para>
2569 <para>
2570 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2571 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2572 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2573 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2574 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2575 easier to use"&mdash;again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2576 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2577 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2578 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2579 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2580 </para>
2581 <para>
2582 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2583 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2584 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2585 demanded
2586 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2587 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2588 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2589 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2590 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2591 that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2592 </para>
2593 <para>
2594 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2595 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2596 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2597 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2598 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2599 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2600 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2601 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2602 <!-- f1 -->
2603 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2604 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2605 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2606 </para></footnote>
2607 </para>
2608 <para>
2609 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2610 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2611 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2612 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2613 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2614 </para>
2615 <para>
2616 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2617 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2618 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2619 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2620 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2621 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2622 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2623 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2624 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2625 </para>
2626 <para>
2627 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2628 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2629 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2630 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2631 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2633 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2634 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2635 </para>
2636 <para>
2637 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2638 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2639 </para>
2640 <para>
2641 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2642 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2643 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2644 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2645 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2646 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2647 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2648 <!-- f2 -->
2649 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2650 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2651 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2652 </para></footnote>
2653 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2654 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2655 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2656 <!-- f3 -->
2657 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2658 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2659 </para></footnote>
2660 </para>
2661 <para>
2662 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2663 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2664 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2665 activist:
2666 </para>
2667 <blockquote>
2668 <para>
2669 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2670 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2671 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2672 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2673 </para>
2674 </blockquote>
2675 <para>
2676 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2677 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2678 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2679 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2680 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2681 </para>
2682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2683 </sect1>
2684 <sect1 id="pirates">
2685 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2686 <para>
2687 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2688 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2689 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2690 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2691 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2692 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2693 </para>
2694 <sect2 id="film">
2695 <title>Film</title>
2696 <para>
2697 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2698 <!-- f1 -->
2699 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2700 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2701 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2702 </para></footnote>
2703 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2704 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2705 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2706 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2707 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2708 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2709 this creative property
2710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2711 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2712 </para>
2713 <para>
2714 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2715 </para>
2716 <blockquote>
2717 <para>
2718 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2719 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2720 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2721 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2722 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2723 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2724 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2725 </para>
2726 <para>
2727 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2728 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2729 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2730 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2731 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2732 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2733 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2734 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2735 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2736 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2737 <!-- f2 -->
2738 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2739 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2740 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2741 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2742 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2743 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2744 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2745 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2746 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2747 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2748 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2749 </para>
2750 </blockquote>
2751 <para>
2752 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2753 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2754 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2755 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2756 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2757 <!-- f3 -->
2758 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2759 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2760 </para></footnote>
2761 That led the independents to flee the East
2762 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2763 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2764 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2765 did just that.
2766 </para>
2767 <para>
2768 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2769 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2770 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2771
2772 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2773 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2774 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2775 Edison's creative property.
2776 </para>
2777 </sect2>
2778 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2779 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2780 <para>
2781 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2782 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2783 </para>
2784 <para>
2785 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2786 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2787 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2788 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2789 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2790 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2791 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2792 right to perform it publicly.
2793 </para>
2794 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2795 <para>
2796 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2797 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2798 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2799 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2800 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2801 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2802 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2803 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2804 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2805 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2806 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2807 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2808 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2809 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2810 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2811 its composer anything.
2812 </para>
2813 <para>
2814 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2815 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2816 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2817 put it,
2818 </para>
2819 <blockquote>
2820 <para>
2821 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2822 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2823 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2824 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2825 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2826 rights.<footnote><para>
2827 <!-- f4 -->
2828 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2829 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2830 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2831 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2832 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2833 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2834 </para></footnote>
2835 </para>
2836 </blockquote>
2837 <para>
2838 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2839 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2840 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2841 <!-- f5 -->
2842 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2843 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2844 </para></footnote>
2845 and the "music publishing industry"
2846 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2847 <!-- f6 -->
2848 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2849 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2850 </para></footnote>
2851 As John Philip
2852 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2853 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2854 <!-- f7 -->
2855 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2856 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2857 </para></footnote>
2858 </para>
2859 <para>
2860 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2861 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2862 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2863 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2864 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2865 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2866 <!-- f8 -->
2867 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2868 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2869 Perforating
2870 Company of New York).
2871 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2872 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2873 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2874 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2875 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2876 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."<footnote><para>
2877 <!-- f9 -->
2878 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376
2879 (prepared
2880 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2881 American
2882 Graphophone Company Association).
2883 </para></footnote>
2884 </para>
2885 <para>
2886 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2887 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2888 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2889 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2890 control
2891 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2892 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2893 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2894
2895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2896 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2897 authorizes
2898 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2899 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2900 </para>
2901 <para>
2902 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2903 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2904 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2905 Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2906 recordings
2907 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2908 by the statute.
2909 </para>
2910 <para>
2911 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2912 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
2913 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
2914 whatever
2915 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
2916 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
2917 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
2918 </para>
2919 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2920 <para>
2921 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2922 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
2923 of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
2924 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
2925 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
2926 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
2927 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
2928 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2929 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2930 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
2931 stifle
2932 follow-on creativity.<footnote><para>
2933 <!-- f10 -->
2934 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2935 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2936 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2937 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2938 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2939 </para></footnote>
2940 </para>
2941 <para>
2942 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2943 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2944 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2945 relates,
2946 </para>
2947 <blockquote>
2948 <para>
2949 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2951 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2952 industry
2953 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2954 importance
2955 in the United States and throughout the world; records
2956 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
2957 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
2958 access
2959 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
2960 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
2961 before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
2962 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
2963 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
2964 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
2965 improved
2966 quality, and a greater choice.<footnote><para>
2967 <!-- f11 -->
2968 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
2969 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
2970 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
2971 this report.</para></footnote>
2972 </para>
2973 </blockquote>
2974 <para>
2975 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
2976 creative
2977 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2978 </para>
2979 </sect2>
2980 <sect2 id="radio">
2981 <title>Radio</title>
2982 <para>
2983 Radio was also born of piracy.
2984 </para>
2985 <para>
2986 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
2987 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
2988 <!-- f12 -->
2989 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning, record
2990 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
2991 messages
2992 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
2993 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
2994 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
2995 Manufacturing
2996 Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.
2997 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
2998 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
2999 Review 70 (2003): 281.
3000 </para></footnote>
3001 As I described above,
3002 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3003 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3004 composer
3005 money for that performance.
3006 </para>
3007 <para>
3008 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3009 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3010 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3011 Birthday"
3012 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3013 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3014 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3015 station.
3016 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3017 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3018 composer
3019 of the music for his work.
3020
3021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3022 </para>
3023 <para>
3024 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3025 radio
3026 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3027 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3028 something
3029 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3030 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3031 playing the song.
3032 </para>
3033 <para>
3034 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3035 music.
3036 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3037 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3038 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3039 </para>
3040 <para>
3041 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3042 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3043 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3044 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3045 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3046 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3047 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3048 </para>
3049 <para>
3050 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3051 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3052 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3053 ordinarily
3054 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3055 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3056 something for nothing.
3057 </para>
3058 </sect2>
3059 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3060 <title>Cable TV</title>
3061 <para>
3062
3063 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3064 </para>
3065 <para>
3066 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3067 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3068 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3069 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3070 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3071 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3072 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3073 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3074 give away.
3075 </para>
3076 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3077 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3078 <para>
3079 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3080 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3081 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3082 <!-- f13 -->
3083 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3084 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3085 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3086 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3087 Commission).
3088 </para></footnote>
3089 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3090 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3091 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3092 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3093 <!-- f14 -->
3094 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3095 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3096 </para></footnote>
3097 As another broadcaster put it,
3098 </para>
3099 <blockquote>
3100 <para>
3101 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3102 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3103 paid for.<footnote><para>
3104 <!-- f15 -->
3105 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3106 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3107 </para></footnote>
3108 </para>
3109 </blockquote>
3110 <para>
3111 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable
3112 enough:
3113 </para>
3114 <blockquote>
3115 <para>
3116 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3117 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3118 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3119 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3120 <!-- f16 -->
3121 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3122 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3123 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3124 </para></footnote>
3125 </para>
3126 </blockquote>
3127 <para>
3128 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president
3129 Charlton
3130 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of compensation."<footnote><para>
3131 <!-- f17 -->
3132 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3133 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3134 </para></footnote>
3135 </para>
3136 <para>
3137 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant
3138 Attorney
3139 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3140 </para>
3141 <blockquote>
3142 <para>
3143 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have
3144 any copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether
3145 copyright
3146 holders who are already compensated, who already have a
3147 monopoly, should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3148
3149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3150 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3151 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3152 <!-- f18 -->
3153 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3154 Zimmerman,
3155 acting assistant attorney general).
3156 </para></footnote>
3157 </para>
3158 </blockquote>
3159 <para>
3160 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the
3161 Supreme Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright
3162 owners nothing.
3163 </para>
3164 <para>
3165 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3166 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3167 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3168 resolved
3169 the question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable
3170 companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but
3171 the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright owner.
3172 The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto
3173 power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable companies thus
3174 built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value created by
3175 broadcasters'
3176 content.
3177 </para>
3178 <para>
3179 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy"
3180 means using value from someone else's creative property without
3181 permission
3182 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described today<footnote><para>
3183 <!-- f19 -->
3184 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3185 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3186 Information, available at
3187 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3188 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3189 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3190 </para></footnote>
3191 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3192 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3193 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3194 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3195 generation&mdash;until now.
3196 </para>
3197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3198 </sect2>
3199 </sect1>
3200 <sect1 id="piracy">
3201 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3202 <para>
3203
3204 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy
3205 comes in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3206 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3207 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its defense,
3208 this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should
3209 stop it.
3210 </para>
3211 <para>
3212 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3213 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3214 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3215 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3216 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3217 outright
3218 copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has
3219 so often done in the past.
3220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3221 </para>
3222 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3223 <title>Piracy I</title>
3224 <para>
3225 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3226 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3227 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3228 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3229 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3230 <!-- f1 -->
3231 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3232 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3233
3234 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3235 Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3236 </para></footnote>
3237 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3238 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually
3239 worldwide to piracy.
3240 </para>
3241 <para>
3242 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3243 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3244 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3245 This piracy is wrong.
3246 </para>
3247 <para>
3248 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3249 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3250 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3251 foreign
3252 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3253 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3254 developing
3255 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3256 existence, treated as right.
3257 </para>
3258 <para>
3259 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3260 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3261 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3262 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3263 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3264 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3265 violate
3266 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3267 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3268 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3269 </para>
3270 <para>
3271 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3272 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3274 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3275 pirate
3276 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3277 childhood.
3278 </para>
3279 <para>
3280 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3281 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3282 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3283 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3284 <!-- f2 -->
3285 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3286 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3287 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3288 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3289 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3290 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3291 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3292 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3293 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3294 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3295 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3296 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3297 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3298 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3299 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3300 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3301 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3302 is wrong.
3303 </para>
3304 <para>
3305 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3306 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3307 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3308 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3309 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3310 <!-- f3 -->
3311 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3312 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3313 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3314 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3315 instance
3316 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3317 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3318 </para></footnote>
3319 </para>
3320 <para>
3321 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3322 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3323 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3324 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3325 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3326 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3327 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3328 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3329 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3330 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3331 piracy of the tangible.
3332 </para>
3333 <para>
3334 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3335 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3336 property
3337 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3338 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3339 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3340 licenses
3341 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3342 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3343 copyrighted
3344 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3345
3346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3347 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3348 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3349 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3350 technology
3351 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3352 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3353 </para>
3354 <para>
3355 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3356 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3357 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3358 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3359 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3360 nation
3361 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3362 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3363 benefit
3364 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3365 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3366 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3367 Microsoft.
3368 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3369 </para>
3370 <para>
3371 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3372 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3373 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3374 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3375 become
3376 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3377 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3378 </para>
3379 <para>
3380 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3381 alcoholic
3382 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3383 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3384 ordinarily
3385 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3386 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3387 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3388 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3389 giving
3390 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what&mdash;at
3391 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3392 copyright
3393 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3394 wrong.
3395 </para>
3396 <para>
3397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3398 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3399 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3400 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3401 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3402 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3403 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3404 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3405 is flat out wrong.
3406 </para>
3407 <para>
3408 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3409 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3410 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3411 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3412 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3413 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3414 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3415 </para>
3416 <para>
3417 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3418 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3419 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3420 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3421 </para>
3422 <para>
3423 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3424 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3425 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3426 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3427 </para>
3428 <para>
3429 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3430 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3431 sharing
3432 to survive.
3433 </para>
3434 </sect2>
3435 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3436 <title>Piracy II</title>
3437 <para>
3438 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3439 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3440 <!-- f4 -->
3441 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3442 </para></footnote>
3443 This means we must determine whether
3444 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3445 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3446 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3447 author of his profit.
3448 </para>
3449 <para>
3450 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors
3451 of the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3452 innovations.
3453 Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and,
3454 arguably,
3455 off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3456 <!-- f5 -->
3457 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3458 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3459 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3460 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
3461 up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.
3462 This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing
3463 technology
3464 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see
3465 Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3466 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3467 put together components that had been developed independently.
3468 </para>
3469 <para>
3470 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3471 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3472 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3473 system.<footnote><para>
3474 <!-- f6 -->
3475 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3476 San Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3477 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3478 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3479 "Napster's
3480 Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3481 "Hollywood
3482 at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3483 </para></footnote>
3484 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3485 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3486 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3487 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3488 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3489 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3490 or your 20,000 best friends.
3491 </para>
3492 <para>
3493 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3494 Americans
3495 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3496 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3497 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3498 <!-- f7 -->
3499 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3500 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3501 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3502 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3503 </para></footnote>
3504 A survey by the NPD
3505 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens
3506 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3507 <!-- f8 -->
3508 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3509 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3510 </para></footnote>
3511 The vast
3512 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3513 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3514 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3515 enjoy
3516 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3517 </para>
3518 <para>
3519 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3520 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3521 infringement,
3522 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3523 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more carefully
3524 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do&mdash;the kinds of
3525 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3526 </para>
3527 <para>
3528 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3529 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3530 different kinds into four types.
3531 </para>
3532 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3533 <listitem><para>
3534 <!-- A. -->
3535 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3536 purchasing
3537 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3538 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3539 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3540 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3541 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3542 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3543 instead
3544 of purchasing.
3545 </para></listitem>
3546 <listitem><para>
3547 <!-- B. -->
3548 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3549 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3550 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3551 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3552 succeed.
3553 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3554 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3555 recommendations
3556 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3557 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3558 </para></listitem>
3559 <listitem><para>
3560 <!-- C. -->
3561 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3562 copyrighted
3563 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3564 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3565 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3566 rewarding
3567 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3568 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3569 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3570 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3571 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3572 available.)
3573 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3574 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3575 content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same harm
3576 that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3577 a local collector.
3578 </para></listitem>
3579 <listitem><para>
3580 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3581 <!-- D. -->
3582 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3583 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3584 wants to give away.
3585 </para></listitem>
3586 </orderedlist>
3587 <para>
3588 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3589 </para>
3590 <para>
3591 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3592 perspective
3593 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3594 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<footnote><para>
3595 <!-- f9 -->
3596 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3597 </para></footnote>
3598 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3599 illegal,
3600 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3601 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3602 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer&mdash;and
3603 certainly
3604 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3605 suggests.
3606 </para>
3607 <para>
3608 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3609 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3610 Hollywood,
3611 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3612 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3613 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3614 that is "devastating" the industry.
3615 </para>
3616 <para>
3617 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3618 harmful
3619 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3620 practice
3621 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3622 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp;
3623 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3624 labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3625 <!-- f10 -->
3626 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3627 Industry's
3628 Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music
3629 industry's
3630 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3631 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3632 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3633 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3634 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent
3635 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3636 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3637 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3638 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&ndash;56.
3639 </para></footnote>
3640 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3641 album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the
3642 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3643 problem,
3644 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3645 </para>
3646 <para>
3647 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3648 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3649 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3650 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3652 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3653 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3654 <!-- f11 -->
3655 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3656 </para></footnote>
3657 </para>
3658 <para>
3659 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3660 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3661 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3662 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3663 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3664 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3665 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3666 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3667 </para>
3668 <para>
3669 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3670 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3671 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3672 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3673 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3674 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3675 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3676 </para>
3677 <para>
3678 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3679 because
3680 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3681 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3682 </para>
3683 <para>
3684 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3685 percent,
3686 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3687 <!-- f12 -->
3688 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3689 available at
3690 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3691 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3692 25 June 2003, available at
3693 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3694 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3695 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3696 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3697 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3698 music
3699 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3700 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3701 </para></footnote>
3702 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3703 Internet
3704 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3705 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3706 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3707 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3708 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3709 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3710 <!-- f13 -->
3711 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3712 <para>
3713 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3714 February 2003, available at
3715 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3716 </para>
3717 </footnote>
3718 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3719 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3720 High Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie
3721 [on DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3722 <!-- f14 -->
3723 Ibid.
3724 </para></footnote>
3725 </para>
3726 <para>
3727
3728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3729 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3730 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3731 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3732 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3733 although
3734 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3735 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3736 </para>
3737 <para>
3738 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3739 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3740 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3741 between
3742 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3743 numbers
3744 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3745 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3746 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3747 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3748 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3749 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3750 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3751 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3752 between
3753 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3754 </para>
3755 <para>
3756 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3757 assume,
3758 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3759 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3760 costs?
3761 </para>
3762 <para>
3763 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3764 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3765 available.
3766 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3767 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3768 <!-- f15 -->
3769 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3770 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3771 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3772 Committee
3773 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3774 statement
3775 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3776 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3777 </para></footnote>
3778 And while it's
3779 conceivable
3780 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3781 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3782 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3783 distributor
3784 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3785 make it available.
3786 </para>
3787 <para>
3788 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3789 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3790 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3791 thousands
3792 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3793 <!-- f16 -->
3794 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3795 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3796 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3797 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3798 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3799 National
3800 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3801 Results,"
3802 available at
3803 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3804 </para></footnote>
3805 These
3806 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3807 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3808 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3809 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3810 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3811 companies
3812 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3813 owner for the content they sell.
3814 </para>
3815 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3816 <para>
3817 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3818 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3819 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3820 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3821 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3822 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3823 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3824 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3825 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3826 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3827 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3828 </para>
3829 <para>
3830 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3831 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3832 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3833 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3834 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3835 shut as well?
3836 </para>
3837 <para>
3838 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3839 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3840 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3841 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3842 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3843 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3844
3845 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3846 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3847 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3848 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3849 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3850 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3851 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3852 great book!)
3853 </para>
3854 <para>
3855 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3856 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3857 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3858 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3859 </para>
3860 <para>
3861 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3862 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3863 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3864 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3865 unavailable?"
3866 </para>
3867 <para>
3868 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3869 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3870 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
3871 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3872 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3873 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3874 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3875 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3876 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3877 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3878 found only with time.
3879 </para>
3880 <para>
3881 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3882 just what you call type A sharing?"
3883 </para>
3884 <para>
3885 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3886 effect
3887 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3888 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3889 Napster
3890 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3891 developed
3892 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3894 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3895 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3896 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3897 <!-- f17 -->
3898 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3899 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3900 MHP, available at
3901 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3902 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3903 Fanning's
3904 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3905 </para></footnote>
3906 </para>
3907 <para>
3908 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3909 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3910 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3911 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3912 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3913 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3914 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3915 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3916 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3917 </para>
3918 <para>
3919 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3920 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3921 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3922 content
3923 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3924 technology.
3925 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3926 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3927 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3928 </para>
3929 <para>
3930 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3931 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3932 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3933 composers,
3934 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3935 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3936 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3937 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3938 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3939 broadcast),
3940 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3941 </para>
3942 <para>
3943 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3944 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3945 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3946 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3947 companies
3948 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3949 </para>
3950 <para>
3951
3952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3953 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3954 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
3955 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3956 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3957 Second,
3958 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3959 content
3960 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3961 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3962 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3963 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3964 Congress
3965 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3966 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3967 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3968 control
3969 over the future (cable).
3970 </para>
3971 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
3972 <para>
3973 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3974 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3975 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3976 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3977 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3978 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3979 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3980 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3981 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3982 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3983 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3984 </para>
3985 <para>
3986 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3987 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3988 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3989 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3990 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
3991 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
3992 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
3993 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
3994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
3995 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
3996 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
3997 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
3998 for the architecture it chose.
3999 </para>
4000 <para>
4001 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4002 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4003 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4004 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4005 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4006 copyright."<footnote><para>
4007 <!-- f18 -->
4008 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4009 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4010 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4011 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4012 </para></footnote>
4013 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4014 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4015 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4016 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4017 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4018 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4019 <!-- f19 -->
4020 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4021 </para></footnote>
4022 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4023 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4024 <!-- f20 -->
4025 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4026 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4027 </para></footnote>
4028 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4029 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4030 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4031 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4032 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4033 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4034 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4035 <!-- f21 -->
4036 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4037 of Jack Valenti).
4038 </para></footnote>
4039 </para>
4040 <para>
4041 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4042 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4043 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4044 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4045 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4046 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4047 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4048 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4049 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4050 technology.<footnote><para>
4051 <!-- f22 -->
4052 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4053 1981).
4054 </para></footnote>
4055 </para>
4056 <para>
4057 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4058
4059 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4060 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4061 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4062 Court wrote,
4063 </para>
4064 <blockquote>
4065 <para>
4066 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4067 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4068 market
4069 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4070 authority
4071 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4072 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4073 implicated
4074 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4075 <!-- f23 -->
4076 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4077 </para></footnote>
4078 </para>
4079 </blockquote>
4080 <para>
4081 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4082 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4083 Congress
4084 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4085 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4086 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4087 </para>
4088
4089 <table id="t1">
4090 <title>Table</title>
4091 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4092 <thead>
4093 <row>
4094 <entry>CASE</entry>
4095 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4096 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4097 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4098 </row>
4099 </thead>
4100 <tbody>
4101 <row>
4102 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4103 <entry>Composers</entry>
4104 <entry>No protection</entry>
4105 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4106 </row>
4107 <row>
4108 <entry>Radio</entry>
4109 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4110 <entry>N/A</entry>
4111 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4112 </row>
4113 <row>
4114 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4115 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4116 <entry>No protection</entry>
4117 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4118 </row>
4119 <row>
4120 <entry>VCR</entry>
4121 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4122 <entry>No protection</entry>
4123 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4124 </row>
4125 </tbody>
4126 </tgroup>
4127 </table>
4128
4129 <para>
4130 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4131 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4132 <!-- f24 -->
4133 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4134 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4135 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4136 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4137 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4138 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4139 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4140 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4141 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4142 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4143 </para></footnote>
4144 In each case, throughout our history,
4145 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4146 work.
4147 </para>
4148 <para>
4149 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4150 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4151 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4152 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4153 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4154 legitimacy
4155 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4156 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4157 the interests at stake.
4158 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4159 </para>
4160 <para>
4161 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4162 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4163 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4164 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4165 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4166 regulated?
4167 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4168 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4169 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4170 permission to record a song?
4171 </para>
4172 <para>
4173 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4174 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4175 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4176 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4177 <!-- f25 -->
4178 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4179 (1984).
4180 </para></footnote>
4181 Instead, the particular uses that the
4182 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4183 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4184 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4185 technology
4186 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4187 the distribution of content.
4188 </para>
4189 <para>
4190 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4191 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4192 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4193 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4194 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4195 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4196 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4197 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4198 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4199 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4200 protection
4201 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4202 continue.
4203 </para>
4204 <para>
4205
4206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4207 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4208 superior
4209 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4210 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4211 network.
4212 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4213 efficient.
4214 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4215 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4216 <!-- f26 -->
4217 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4218 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4219 </para></footnote>
4220 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4221 warriors
4222 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4223 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4224 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4225 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4226 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4227 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4228 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4229 </para>
4230 <para>
4231 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4232 just as any other property is protected."
4233 </para>
4234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4235 </sect2>
4236 </sect1>
4237 </chapter>
4238 <chapter id="c-property">
4239 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4240 <para>
4241
4242 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4243 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4244 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4245 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4246 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4247 the price she can get.
4248 </para>
4249 <para>
4250 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4251 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4252 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4253 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4254 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4255 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4256 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4257 going
4258 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4259 thing I am taking then?
4260 </para>
4261 <para>
4262 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4263 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4265 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4266 narrow
4267 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4268 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4269 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4270 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4271 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4272 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4273 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4274 <!-- f1 -->
4275 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4276 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4277 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4278 </para></footnote>
4279 </para>
4280 <para>
4281 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4282 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4283 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4284 expression
4285 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4286 property.
4287 </para>
4288 <para>
4289 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4290 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4291 turning
4292 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4293 "property"
4294 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4295 <!-- f2 -->
4296 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4297 intangible.
4298 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4299 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4300 physical
4301 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4302 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4303 Property?
4304 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4305 373, 429 n. 241.
4306 </para></footnote>
4307 </para>
4308 <para>
4309 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4310 preceding
4311 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4312 material
4313 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4314 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4315 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4316 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4317 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4318 us draw.
4319 </para>
4320
4321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4322 <sect1 id="founders">
4323 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4324 <para>
4325 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4326 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4327 Shakespeare
4328 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4329 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4330 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4331 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4332 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4333 adaptation
4334 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4335 </para>
4336 <para>
4337 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4338 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4339 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4340 <!-- f1 -->
4341 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4342 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4343 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4344 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4345 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4346 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4347 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4348 </para></footnote>
4349 Tonson was the
4350 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4351 <!-- f2 -->
4352 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4353 Vanderbilt
4354 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4355 </para></footnote>
4356 who
4357 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4358 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4359 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4360 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4361 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4362 copyright.
4363 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4364 produce
4365 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4366 </para>
4367 <para>
4368 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4369 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4370 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4371 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4372 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4373 renewable
4374 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4375 published
4376 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4377 <!-- f3 -->
4378 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4379 "copyright
4380 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4381 </para></footnote>
4382 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4383 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4384 </para>
4385 <para>
4386 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4387 "copyright"
4388 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4389 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4390 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4391 expired
4392 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4393 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4394 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4395 publishers,
4396 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4397 </para>
4398 <para>
4399 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4400 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4401 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4402 govern
4403 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4404 "positive
4405 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4406 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4407 legislature,
4408 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4409 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4410 expired
4411 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4412 independent
4413 of any positive law.
4414 </para>
4415 <para>
4416 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4417 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4418 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4419 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4420
4421 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4422 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4423 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4424 ultimately
4425 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4426 </para>
4427 <para>
4428 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4429 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4430 however,
4431 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4432 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4433 "expired,"
4434 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4435 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4436 </para>
4437 <para>
4438 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4439 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4440 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4441 </para>
4442 <para>
4443 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4444 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4445 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4446 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4447 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4448 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4449 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4450 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4451 reason
4452 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4453 </para>
4454 <para>
4455 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4456 special
4457 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4458 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4459 "booksellers."
4460 </para>
4461 <para>
4462 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4463 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4464 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4465 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4466 others
4467 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4468 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4469 beyond
4470 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4471 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4472 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4473 restrictions
4474 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4475 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4476 perform, and so on.
4477 </para>
4478 <para>
4479 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4480 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4481 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4482 permission
4483 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4484 anything,
4485 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4486 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4487 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4488 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4489 </para>
4490 <para>
4491 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4492 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4493 especially
4494 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4495 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4496 monopolies&mdash;especially
4497 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4498 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4499 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4500 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4501 Monopolies,
4502 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4503 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4504 publishing.
4505 </para>
4506 <para>
4507 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4508 naturally
4509 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4510 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4511 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4512 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4513 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4514 specialinterest
4515 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4516 </para>
4517 <para>
4518 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4519 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4520 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4521 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4523 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4524 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4525 themselves
4526 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4527 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4528 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4529 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4530 <!-- f4 -->
4531 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4532 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4533 </para></footnote>
4534 </para>
4535 <para>
4536 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4537 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4538 Enlightenment
4539 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4540 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4541 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4542 that idea.
4543 </para>
4544 <para>
4545 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4546 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4547 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4548 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4549 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4550 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4551 compromise
4552 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4553 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4554 construction and spread of culture.
4555 </para>
4556 <para>
4557 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4558 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4559 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4560 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4561 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4562 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4563 they said; they needed more time.
4564 </para>
4565 <para>
4566 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4567 words that echo today,
4568 </para>
4569 <blockquote>
4570 <para>
4571 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4572 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4574 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4575 establishing
4576 a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in
4577 the Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a
4578 Discouragement
4579 to Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general
4580 Tax on the Publick; and all this only to increase the private Gain
4581 of the Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4582 <!-- f5 -->
4583 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4584 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4585 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4586 Encouragement
4587 of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
4588 Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4589 mentioned
4590 (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al., 8,
4591 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4592 </para></footnote>
4593 </para>
4594 </blockquote>
4595 <para>
4596 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in
4597 a series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4598 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4599 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4600 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4601 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4602 creative
4603 "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of Anne,
4604 the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just because the
4605 protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't mean the
4606 protections
4607 of the common law expired: Under the common law they had
4608 the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its Statute of Anne
4609 copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only way to protect
4610 authors.
4611 </para>
4612 <para>
4613 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some
4614 of the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4615 chutzpah.
4616 Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it, "The
4617 publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle rancher has
4618 for cattle."<footnote><para>
4619 <!-- f6 -->
4620 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4621 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4622 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4623 </para></footnote>
4624 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the
4625 author.
4626 His concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4627 </para>
4628 <para>
4629 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4630 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4631 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4632 <!-- f7 -->
4633 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4634 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4635 </para></footnote>
4636 </para>
4637 <para>
4638 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4639 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4640 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4641 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4642 <!-- f8 -->
4643 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4644 1993), 92.
4645 </para></footnote>
4646 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4648 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4649 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4650 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4651 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4652 <!-- f9 -->
4653 Ibid., 93.
4654 </para></footnote>
4655 </para>
4656 <para>
4657 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's
4658 shop in Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where
4659 he sold inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in
4660 defiance
4661 of the supposed common law right of Literary Property."<footnote><para>
4662 <!-- f10 -->
4663 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4664 Borwell).
4665 </para></footnote>
4666 His
4667 books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he rested
4668 his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of Anne,
4669 the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4670 </para>
4671 <para>
4672 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4673 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4674 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4675 </para>
4676 <para>
4677 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to
4678 James Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the
4679 requirements
4680 of the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full
4681 protection
4682 of the statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor
4683 began printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual
4684 common law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4685 <!-- f11 -->
4686 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright
4687 Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law
4688 Review
4689 29 (1983): 1152.
4690 </para></footnote>
4691 </para>
4692 <para>
4693 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in
4694 English
4695 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4696 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4697 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the
4698 common law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4699 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4700 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That
4701 common
4702 law rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4703 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4704 </para>
4705 <para>
4706 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if justice
4707 were just a matter of logical deduction from first principles&mdash;Mansfield's
4708 conclusion might make some sense. But what it ignored was the larger
4709 issue that Parliament had struggled with in 1710: How best to limit
4710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4711 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4712 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4713 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4714 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4715 believed,
4716 Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4717 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4718 </para>
4719 <para>
4720 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4721 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4722 </para>
4723 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4724 <para>
4725 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4726 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4727 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4728 <!-- f12 -->
4729 Ibid., 1156.
4730 </para></footnote>
4731 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4732 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4733 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4734 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4735 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4736 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4737 </para>
4738 <para>
4739 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4740 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4741 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4742 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4743 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4744 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4745 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4746 statute were no longer protected.
4747 </para>
4748 <para>
4749 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4750 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4751 members
4752 of special legal distinction who functioned much like the Justices
4753 in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the House of
4754 Lords generally voted.
4755 </para>
4756 <para>
4757 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4758 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4760 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4761 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4762 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4763 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4764 passed into the public domain.
4765 </para>
4766 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4767 <para>
4768 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4769 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4770 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4771 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4772 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4773 and the greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of
4774 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of
4775 legal restraint.
4776 </para>
4777 <para>
4778 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4779 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4780 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people celebrated
4781 the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser reported, "No
4782 private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the public, and
4783 none has been tried before the House of Lords in the decision of
4784 which so many individuals were interested." "Great rejoicing in
4785 Edinburgh
4786 upon victory over literary property: bonfires and
4787 illuminations."<footnote><para>
4788 <!-- f13 -->
4789 Rose, 97.
4790 </para></footnote>
4791 </para>
4792 <para>
4793 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4794 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4795 reported:
4796 </para>
4797 <blockquote>
4798 <para>
4799 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what
4800 was honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday
4801 thought property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of
4802 London and Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses
4803 to purchase Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who
4804 after many years industry thought they had acquired a
4805 competency
4806 to provide for their families now find themselves without a
4807 shilling to devise to their successors.<footnote><para>
4808 <!-- f14 -->
4809 Ibid.
4810 </para></footnote>
4811 </para>
4812 </blockquote>
4813 <para>
4814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4815 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4816 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4817 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4818 England
4819 would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter free.
4820 Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of course,
4821 for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller had an
4822 exclusive
4823 right to control the publication of that book. And not in the
4824 sense that books could be stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you
4825 still had to buy the book from someone. But free in the sense that the
4826 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4827 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free culture
4828 would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English culture
4829 would develop as the many English readers chose to let it develop&mdash;
4830 chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the memes they
4831 repeated and endorsed. Chose in a competitive context, not a context
4832 in which the choices about what culture is available to people and
4833 how they get access to it are made by the few despite the wishes of
4834 the many.
4835 </para>
4836 <para>
4837 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4838 antimonopoly,
4839 resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a world
4840 where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4841 protected.
4842 </para>
4843 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4844 </sect1>
4845 <sect1 id="recorders">
4846 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4847 <para>
4848 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4849 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4850 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4851 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4852 He was their god.)
4853 </para>
4854 <para>
4855 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4856 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4857 today.
4858 </para>
4859 <para>
4860 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4861 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4862 Stagehands
4863 are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4864 During
4865 a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and in
4866 the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the stage.
4867 </para>
4868 <para>
4869 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some
4870 stagehands
4871 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4872 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers and
4873 the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4875 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4876 about the scene.
4877 </para>
4878 <para>
4879 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4880 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4881 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4882 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4883 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4884 </para>
4885 <para>
4886 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get
4887 permission.
4888 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a
4889 four-and-a-halfsecond
4890 image on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How
4891 could it hurt? Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told
4892 Else to contact Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4893 </para>
4894 <para>
4895 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4896 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4897 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4898 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4899 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4900 </para>
4901 <para>
4902 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we
4903 discovered
4904 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at least
4905 that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation." And
4906 second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us to use
4907 this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited Simpsons which
4908 was in the corner of the shot."
4909 </para>
4910 <para>
4911 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to
4912 someone he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca
4913 Herrera.
4914 He explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . .
4915 We're asking for your educational rate on this." That was the
4916 educational
4917 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4918 confirm what he had been told.
4919 </para>
4920 <para>
4921 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes,
4922 you have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4923 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film about
4924
4925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4926 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4927 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant to
4928 Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want the
4929 money."
4930 </para>
4931 <para>
4932 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was
4933 playing
4934 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4935 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the very
4936 last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally replaced the
4937 shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on, The Day After
4938 Trinity, from ten years before.
4939 </para>
4940 <para>
4941 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox,
4942 owns the copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property.
4943 To use that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the
4944 permission
4945 of the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4946 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4947 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4948 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner of
4949 the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law says the
4950 owner gets to control.
4951 </para>
4952 <para>
4953 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that
4954 the copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4955 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4956 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the
4957 copyright
4958 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4959 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set by
4960 the law.
4961 </para>
4962 <para>
4963 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4964 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4965 <!-- f1 -->
4966 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that lawyers don't
4967 permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard A. Posner with William
4968 F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred " (draft on
4969 file with author), University of Chicago Law School, 5 August 2003.
4970 </para></footnote>
4971 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot
4972 of a Simpsons episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use
4973 does not require the permission of anyone.
4974 </para>
4975 <para>
4976 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4977 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4978 </para>
4979 <blockquote>
4980 <para>
4981 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf
4982 between
4983 what lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and
4984 what is crushingly relevant in practice to those of us actually
4985 trying to make and broadcast documentaries. I never had any
4986 doubt that it was "clearly fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But
4987 I couldn't rely on the concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4988 </para>
4989 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
4990 <listitem><para>
4991 <!-- 1. -->
4992 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires
4993 that we buy Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers
4994 require
4995 a detailed "visual cue sheet" listing the source and
4996 licensing
4997 status of each shot in the film. They take a dim view of
4998 "fair use," and a claim of "fair use" can grind the application
4999 process to a halt.
5000 </para></listitem>
5001 <listitem><para>
5002 <!-- 2. -->
5003 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the
5004 first place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a
5005 history of tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons
5006 usage, just as George Lucas had a very high profile litigating
5007 Star Wars usage. So I decided to play by the book, thinking
5008 that we would be granted free or cheap license to four seconds
5009 of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working to
5010 exhaustion
5011 on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk legal
5012 trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5013 principle.
5014 </para></listitem>
5015 <listitem><para>
5016 <!-- 3. -->
5017 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford
5018 Law School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also
5019 confirmed that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within
5020 an inch of your life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He
5021 made clear that it would boil down to who had the bigger
5022 legal
5023 department and the deeper pockets, me or them.
5024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5025 </para></listitem>
5026 <listitem><para>
5027 <!-- 4. -->
5028 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5029 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5030 money.
5031 </para></listitem>
5032 </orderedlist>
5033 </blockquote>
5034 <para>
5035 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory
5036 therefore
5037 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture.
5038 But in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5039 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means
5040 that the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law
5041 has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5042 </para>
5043 <para>
5044 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5045 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5046 publishers'
5047 profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has matured
5048 into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or not.
5049 </para>
5050 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5051 </sect1>
5052 <sect1 id="transformers">
5053 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5054 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5055 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5056 <para>
5057 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5058 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5059 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5060 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5061 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5062 </para>
5063 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5064 <para>
5065 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5066 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5067 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5068 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5069 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5070 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5071 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5072 important to his career.
5073 </para>
5074 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5075 <para>
5076 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5077 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5078 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5079 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5080 </para>
5081 <para>
5082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5083 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5084 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5085 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5086 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5087 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5088 </para>
5089 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5090 <para>
5091 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5092 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5093 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5094 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5095 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5096 actor's career."
5097 </para>
5098 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5099 <para>
5100 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5101 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5102 </para>
5103 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5104 <para>
5105 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5106 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5107 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5108 for it."<footnote>
5109 <indexterm>
5110 <primary>artists</primary>
5111 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5112 </indexterm>
5113 <para>
5114 <!-- f1 -->
5115 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5116 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5117 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5118 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5119 </para></footnote>
5120 </para>
5121 <para>
5122 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5123 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5124 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5125 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5126 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5127 </para>
5128 <para>
5129 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5130 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5131 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5132 </para>
5133 <blockquote>
5134 <para>
5135 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5136 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5137 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5138 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5139 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5140 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5141 </para>
5142 <para>
5143 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5144 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the
5145 dayplayer
5146 rate for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking
5147 about a clip of less than a minute, but to reuse that performance
5148 in the CD-ROM the rate at the time was about $600.
5149 So we had to identify the people&mdash;some of them were hard to
5150 identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
5151 crashing through the glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman?
5152 And then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some
5153 others, and we just started calling people.
5154 </para>
5155 </blockquote>
5156 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5157 <para>
5158 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5159 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5160 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5161 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5162 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5163 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5164 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5165 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5166 career.
5167 </para>
5168 <para>
5169 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5170 were totally in the clear."
5171 </para>
5172 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5173 <para>
5174 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5175 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5176 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5177 </para>
5178 <blockquote>
5179 <para>
5180 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5181 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5182 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5183 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5184 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5185 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5186 systematically and cleared the rights.
5187 </para>
5188 </blockquote>
5189 <para>
5190
5191 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5192 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5193 loved it, and it sold very well.
5194 </para>
5195 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5196 <para>
5197 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5198 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5199 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5200 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5201 at all."<footnote><para>
5202 <!-- f2 -->
5203 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5204 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5205 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5206 </para></footnote>
5207 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5208 has to be made?
5209 </para>
5210 <para>
5211 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5212 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5213 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5214 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5215 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5216 </para>
5217 <blockquote>
5218 <para>
5219 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5220 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5221 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5222 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5223 compensated for that.
5224 </para>
5225 </blockquote>
5226 <para>
5227 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5228 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license that
5229 someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips like this?
5230 Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would have to track
5231 down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit permission
5232 from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of the
5233 creative
5234 process could be made to be more clean?
5235 </para>
5236 <blockquote>
5237 <para>
5238 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5239 mechanism&mdash;where
5240 you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5241 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5242 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5244 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it
5245 with lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost
5246 as the producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of
5247 paying
5248 X dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a
5249 known cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes
5250 this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have
5251 a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me
5252 X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get
5253 investments
5254 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you
5255 say, "Oh, I want a hundred minutes of something and I have no
5256 idea what it's going to cost me, and a certain number of people are
5257 going to hold me up for money," then it becomes difficult to put
5258 one of these things together.
5259 </para>
5260 </blockquote>
5261 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5262 <para>
5263 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5264 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5265 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5266 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5267 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5268 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5269 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5270 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5271 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5272 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5273 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5274 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5275 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5276 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5277 "Does this still make sense?"
5278 </para>
5279 <para>
5280 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5281 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5282 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5283 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5284
5285 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5286 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5287 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5288 </para>
5289 <para>
5290 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5291 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5292 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5293 judges loved every minute of it.
5294 </para>
5295 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5296 <para>
5297 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5298 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5299 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5300 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5301 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5302 were just violated in this room?"
5303 </para>
5304 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5305 <para>
5306 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5307 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5308 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5309 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5310 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5311 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5312 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5313 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5314 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5315 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5316 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5317 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5318 couldn't easily do them legally.
5319 </para>
5320 <para>
5321 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5322 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5323 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5324 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5325 planted in your presentation.
5326 </para>
5327 <para>
5328 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5330 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5331 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5332 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5333 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5334 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5335 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5336 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5337 </para>
5338 <para>
5339 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5340 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5341 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5342 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5343 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5344 </para>
5345 <para>
5346 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5347 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5348 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5349 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5350 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5351 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5352 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5353 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5354 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5355 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5356 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5357 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5358 registers the work.
5359 </para>
5360 <para>
5361 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5362 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5363 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5364 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5365 </para>
5366 <para>
5367 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5368 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5369 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5370 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5371 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5372 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5373 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5374 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5375 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5376 entertainment."
5377 </para>
5378 <para>
5379 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5380 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5381 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5382 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5383 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5384 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5385 new audiences, it is Mike."
5386 </para>
5387 <para>
5388 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5389 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5390 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5391 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5392 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5393 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5394 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5395 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5396 </para>
5397 <para>
5398 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5399 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5400 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5401 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5402 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5403 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5404 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5405 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5406 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5407 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5408 curse, reserved for the few.
5409 </para>
5410 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5411 </sect1>
5412 <sect1 id="collectors">
5413 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5414 <para>
5415 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5416 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5417 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5418 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5419 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5420 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5421 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5422 </para>
5423 <para>
5424 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5425 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive
5426 that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the
5427 world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5428 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as well
5429 as when those pages changed.
5430 </para>
5431 <para>
5432 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5433 appreciated.
5434 In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5435 constantly
5436 updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved
5437 of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
5438 </para>
5439 <para>
5440 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5441 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5442 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5443 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5444 </para>
5445 <para>
5446 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5447 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5448 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5449 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5450 library&mdash;constantly
5451 updated, without any reliable memory.
5452 </para>
5453 <para>
5454 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back
5455 Machine,
5456 and the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the
5457 Internet was. You have the power to see what you remember. More
5458 importantly, perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't
5459 remember and what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5460 <!-- f1 -->
5461 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5462 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003, press
5463 release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later
5464 changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended."
5465 E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5466 </para></footnote>
5467 </para>
5468 <para>
5469 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we
5470 remember
5471 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the
5472 reaction
5473 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965,
5474 or to Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5475 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5476 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5477 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what it is
5478 convenient to remember, but remember something close to the truth.
5479 </para>
5480 <para>
5481 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5482 repeat
5483 it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is whether
5484 we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More directly, the
5485 key is whether an objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do
5486 that, by collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5487 researchers,
5488 for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5489 </para>
5490 <para>
5491 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the
5492 Internet
5493 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5494 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5495 important
5496 in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5498 important
5499 to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to think that
5500 we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns around the
5501 world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the one kept by the
5502 Internet
5503 Archive.
5504 </para>
5505 <para>
5506 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5507 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5508 researcher.
5509 In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5510 success.
5511 It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
5512 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5513 Internet
5514 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie
5515 of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10 billion
5516 pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5517 </para>
5518 <para>
5519 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge
5520 in human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5521 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the Library of
5522 Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set
5523 out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been
5524 constructing
5525 the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more
5526 ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture
5527 was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of that
5528 culture
5529 is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news are
5530 recorded
5531 each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a specific
5532 exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and is available
5533 to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that, [television] is almost
5534 unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were Barbara Walters you could get
5535 access to [the archives], but if you are just a graduate student?" As Kahle
5536 put it,
5537 </para>
5538 <blockquote>
5539 <para>
5540 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with
5541 Murphy
5542 Brown? Remember that back and forth surreal experience of
5543 a politician interacting with a fictional television character? If you
5544 were a graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to
5545 get those original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5546
5547 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5548 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5549 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5550 </para>
5551 </blockquote>
5552 <para>
5553 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5554 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5555 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5556 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5557 nineteenthcentury
5558 America will have an easier time than researchers trying to
5559 understand
5560 the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5561 </para>
5562 <para>
5563 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5564 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5565 libraries.
5566 These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
5567 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once
5568 the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
5569 </para>
5570 <para>
5571 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library of
5572 Congress
5573 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long
5574 as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5575 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In 1915
5576 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed back."
5577 Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any
5578 library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at all&mdash;in the library archive of the
5579 film company.<footnote><para>
5580 <!-- f2 -->
5581 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
5582 Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3 (1980): 5;
5583 Anthony
5584 Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the United
5585 States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp; Co., 1992), 36.
5586 </para></footnote>
5587 </para>
5588 <para>
5589 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5590 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5591 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5592 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5593 required
5594 they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5595 "copyrighted."
5596 But those copies were simply kept by the broadcasters. No
5597 library had any right to them; the government didn't demand them.
5598 The content of this part of American culture is practically invisible to
5599 anyone who would look.
5600 </para>
5601 <para>
5602 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5604 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5605 stations
5606 from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5607 September
5608 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations
5609 from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made their
5610 coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5611 Anyone
5612 could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5613 events of that day.
5614 </para>
5615 <para>
5616 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger,
5617 whose archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films"
5618 (meaning films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never
5619 copyrighted), Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle
5620 digitize 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet
5621 to be downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5622 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5623 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock footage
5624 sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the material they
5625 wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made films on
5626 their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to be made.
5627 Either way, the archive enabled access to this important part of our
5628 culture.
5629 Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film that instructed
5630 children how to save themselves in the middle of nuclear attack? Go to
5631 archive.org, and you can download the film in a few minutes&mdash;for free.
5632 </para>
5633 <para>
5634 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that
5635 we otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
5636 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law
5637 doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in
5638 an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
5639 </para>
5640 <para>
5641 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to
5642 this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His
5643 aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part of our
5644 culture.
5645 Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but
5646 during
5647 a second life that all creative property has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5648 </para>
5649 <para>
5650 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5651 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
5652
5653 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5654 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5655 market
5656 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
5657 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
5658 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial
5659 market,
5660 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5661 </para>
5662 <para>
5663 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5664 tradition
5665 has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers
5666 the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is
5667 used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive
5668 of knowledge about our history. In this second life, the content can
5669 continue to inform even if that information is no longer sold.
5670 </para>
5671 <para>
5672 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of
5673 print very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5674 <!-- f3 -->
5675 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5676 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5677 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5678 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese, "The
5679 First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston College Law
5680 Review
5681 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5682 </para></footnote>). After it is
5683 out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the copyright
5684 owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many get to read
5685 the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are thus the
5686 second
5687 life of a book. That second life is extremely important to the
5688 spread and stability of culture.
5689 </para>
5690 <para>
5691 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5692 creative
5693 property does not hold true with the most important components
5694 of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
5695 these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the Internet&mdash;there is no
5696 guarantee
5697 of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've replaced
5698 libraries with Barnes &amp; Noble superstores. With this culture, what's
5699 accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
5700 Beyond
5701 that, culture disappears.
5702 </para>
5703 <para>
5704 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5705 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5706 accessible
5707 all television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is
5708 extraordinarily
5709 high. So even though the law in principle would have
5710 restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5711 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5712 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly difficult
5713 to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had little
5714 practical
5715 effect.
5716 </para>
5717 <para>
5718 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution
5719 is that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
5720 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or
5721 distributed
5722 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
5723 books published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an
5724 archive of all moving images and sound.
5725 </para>
5726 <para>
5727 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never
5728 imagined
5729 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it;
5730 but we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5731 Kahle describes,
5732 </para>
5733 <blockquote>
5734 <para>
5735 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of
5736 music.
5737 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases
5738 of movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed]
5739 during the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million
5740 different titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that
5741 would fit in this room and be able to be afforded by a small
5742 company.
5743 So we're at a turning point in our history. Universal access is
5744 the goal. And the opportunity of leading a different life, based on
5745 this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind
5746 would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria,
5747 putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
5748 press.
5749 </para>
5750 </blockquote>
5751 <para>
5752 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5753 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5754 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5755 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5756 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5757 remains
5758 perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand it;
5759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5760 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
5761 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
5762 become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a future for our past. The
5763 technology of digital arts could make the dream of the Library of
5764 Alexandria real again.
5765 </para>
5766 <para>
5767 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building
5768 such an archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might
5769 like to call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might
5770 seem, the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5771 someone's
5772 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that
5773 Kahle and others would exercise.
5774 </para>
5775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5776 </sect1>
5777 <sect1 id="property-i">
5778 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5779 <para>
5780 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture
5781 Association
5782 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C.,
5783 with Lyndon Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture
5784 of Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5785 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5786 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5787 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5788 </para>
5789 <para>
5790 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion
5791 Picture Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose
5792 goal was to defend American movies against increasing domestic
5793 criticism.
5794 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but
5795 producers
5796 and distributors of entertainment for television, video, and
5797 cable. Its board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven
5798 major producers and distributors of motion picture and television
5799 programs
5800 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures
5801 Entertainment,
5802 MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal
5803 Studios, and Warner Brothers.
5804 </para>
5805 <para>
5806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5807 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president
5808 before him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5809 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most
5810 important
5811 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5812 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays
5813 the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5814 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5815 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5816 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5817 Washingtonian way.
5818 </para>
5819 <para>
5820 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5821 culture
5822 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5823 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5824 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5825 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5826 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine
5827 the meaning of "creative property."
5828 </para>
5829 <para>
5830 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5831 perfectly:
5832 </para>
5833 <blockquote>
5834 <para>
5835 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges
5836 and the counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting,
5837 reasonable men and women will keep returning to the
5838 fundamental
5839 issue, the central theme which animates this entire debate:
5840 Creative
5841 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protection
5842 resident in all other property owners in the nation. That is the issue.
5843 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5844 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5845 <!-- f1 -->
5846 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5847 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5848 Subcommittee
5849 on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
5850 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th
5851 Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
5852 </para></footnote>
5853 </para>
5854 </blockquote>
5855 <para>
5856 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5857 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5858 "central
5859 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this:
5860 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5861 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5862 protections
5863 resident in all other property owners in the nation." There are
5864 no second-class citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should
5865 be no second-class property owners.
5866 </para>
5867 <para>
5868 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5869 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5870 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a
5871 claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this claim of
5872 Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is perhaps
5873 the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and scope
5874 of "creative property." His views have no reasonable connection to our
5875 actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has
5876 slowly redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5877 </para>
5878 <para>
5879 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5880 precise
5881 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5882 <!-- f2 -->
5883 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
5884 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
5885 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
5886 right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
5887 ordinary
5888 meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private
5889 Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977),
5890 26&ndash;27.
5891 </para></footnote> it has never been the
5892 case, nor should it be, that "creative property owners" have been
5893 "accorded
5894 the same rights and protection resident in all other property
5895 owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were given the same rights
5896 as all other property owners, that would effect a radical, and radically
5897 undesirable, change in our tradition.
5898 </para>
5899 <para>
5900 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat
5901 for our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5902 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5903 overturned
5904 in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a
5905 powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5906 culture would develop.
5907 </para>
5908 <para>
5909 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5910 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to
5911 convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5912 history.
5913 We have always treated rights in creative property differently
5914 from the rights resident in all other property owners. They have never
5915 been the same. And they should never be the same, because, however
5916 counterintuitive this may seem, to make them the same would be to
5917
5918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5919 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5920 Creativity
5921 depends upon the owners of creativity having less than perfect
5922 control.
5923 </para>
5924 <para>
5925 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most
5926 powerful of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5927 notwithstanding,
5928 in assuring that the new can displace them. No organization
5929 does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what's
5930 good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A society that
5931 defends the ideals of free culture must preserve precisely the
5932 opportunity
5933 for new creativity to threaten the old.
5934 To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5935 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5936 Constitution itself.
5937 </para>
5938 <para>
5939 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so
5940 strongly did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5941 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if it
5942 condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm&mdash;it is
5943 required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you
5944 "just compensation" for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees
5945 that property is, in a certain sense, sacred. It cannot ever be taken from
5946 the property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5947 </para>
5948 <para>
5949 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5950 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5951 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that after
5952 a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has granted and
5953 set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
5954 Congress
5955 does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
5956 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not
5957 have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking."
5958 Instead,
5959 the same Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5961 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5962 compensation
5963 at all.
5964 </para>
5965 <para>
5966 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5967 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be
5968 treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in
5969 our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be
5970 accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is
5971 effectively
5972 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
5973 </para>
5974 <para>
5975 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5976 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5977 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5978 appointed
5979 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college
5980 to produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it
5981 did in 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be
5982 the first to admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected
5983 some of those mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should
5984 reject as well. So my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did
5985 it, we should, too.
5986 </para>
5987 <para>
5988 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5989 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5990 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given the
5991 same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5992 creative
5993 property there must be a public domain?
5994 </para>
5995 <para>
5996 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5997 history
5998 of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5999 enabled.
6000 Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6001 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that should
6002 be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property should be
6003 protected,
6004 but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights the law gives to
6005 creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights ought to
6006 be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether institutions designed
6007 to assure that artists get paid need also control how culture develops.
6008 </para>
6009 <para>
6010
6011 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6012 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6013 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6014 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
6015 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6016 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6017 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6018 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6019 </para>
6020 <figure id="fig-1331">
6021 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
6022 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6023 </figure>
6024 <para>
6025 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6026 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each
6027 case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.
6028 For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals
6029 represent
6030 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated&mdash;
6031 either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious
6032 constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening
6033 punishments
6034 after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for
6035 example,
6036 you willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song
6037 from her latest CD and posting it on the Web, you can be punished
6038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6039 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6040 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6041 </para>
6042 <para>
6043 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6044 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6045 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6046 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6047 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6048 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6049 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6050 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6051 the source of the enforcement.
6052 </para>
6053 <para>
6054 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6055 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6056 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6057 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it is to
6058 be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But
6059 given a set of norms, and a background of property and contract law,
6060 the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or
6061 group might behave.
6062 </para>
6063 <para>
6064 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6065 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a constraint on
6066 behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across
6067 a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community to
6068 integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
6069 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as
6070 with the market, architecture effects its constraint through
6071 simultaneous conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts
6072 enforcing contracts, or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by
6073 "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law
6074 of gravity that enforces this constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket
6075 stands between you and a flight to New York, it is the market that
6076 enforces this constraint.
6077 </para>
6078 <para>
6079
6080 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6081 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6082 obvious:
6083 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced
6084 by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by
6085 another.
6086 </para>
6087 <para>
6088 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6089 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6090 particular
6091 thing, we have to consider how these four modalities interact.
6092 Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well be; my
6093 claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most
6094 significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must
6095 consider how these four in particular interact.
6096 </para>
6097 <para>
6098 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6099 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say
6100 how fast you can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in
6101 part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most
6102 rational
6103 drivers; governors in buses, as another example, set the
6104 maximum
6105 rate at which the driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted
6106 by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of
6107 gasoline indirectly constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a
6108 community
6109 may or may not constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at 50
6110 mph by a school in your own neighborhood and you're likely to be
6111 punished by the neighbors. The same norm wouldn't be as effective in
6112 a different town, or at night.
6113 </para>
6114 <para>
6115 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6116 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6117 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6118 <!-- f3 -->
6119 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6120 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6121 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right self-consciously to
6122 change the other three. The right of the other three is more timidly
6123 expressed.
6124 See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New
6125 York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95; Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago
6126 School," Journal of Legal Studies, June 1998.
6127 </para></footnote>
6128 The law, in other words, sometimes
6129 operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality.
6130 Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to
6131 increase
6132 the incentives to drive more slowly. The law might be used to
6133 mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty of driving
6134 rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless
6135 driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be more
6136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6137 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed limit, for
6138 example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast driving.
6139 </para>
6140 <figure id="fig-1361">
6141 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6142 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6143 </figure>
6144 <para>
6145 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6146 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6147 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6148 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6149 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6150 another.<footnote>
6151 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6152 <para>
6153 <!-- f4 -->
6154 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6155 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6156 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6157 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6158 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6159 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6160 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6161 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6162 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6163 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6164 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6165 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6166 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6167 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6168 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6169 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6170 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6171 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6172 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6173 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6174 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6175 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6176 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6177 places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6178 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6179 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6180 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6181 of these groups might face. </para></footnote>
6182 </para>
6183 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6184 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6185 <para>
6186 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6187 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6188 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6189 rallying makes sense.
6190 </para>
6191 <para>
6192 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6193 Internet:
6194 </para>
6195 <figure id="fig-1371">
6196 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6197 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6198 </figure>
6199 <para>
6200 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6201 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6202 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6203 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6204 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6205 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6206 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6207 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6208 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6209 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6210 this form of infringement.
6211 </para>
6212 <para>
6213 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6214 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6215 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6216 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6217 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6218 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6219 </para>
6220 <para>
6221 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6222 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6223 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6224 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6225 Iraq
6226 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6227 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6228 looting that results.
6229 </para>
6230 <figure id="fig-1381">
6231 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6232 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6233 </figure>
6234 <para>
6235 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6236 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6237 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6238 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6239 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6240 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6241 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6242 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6243 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6244 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6245 </para>
6246 <para>
6247 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6248 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6249 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6250 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6251 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6252 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6253 life. Homeowners living in a
6254
6255 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6256 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6257 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6258 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6259 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6260 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6261 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6262 </para>
6263 <para>
6264 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6265 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6266 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6267 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6268 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6269 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6270 </para>
6271 <para>
6272 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6273 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6274 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6275 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6276 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6277 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6278 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6279 <!-- f5 -->
6280 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6281 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6282 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6283 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6284 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6285 October 2003, available at
6286 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6287 </para></footnote>
6288
6289 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6290 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6291 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6292 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6293 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6294 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6295 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6296 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6297 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6298 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6299 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6300 </para>
6301 <para>
6302 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6303 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6304 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6305 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6306 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6307 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6308 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6309 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6310 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6311 <!-- f6 -->
6312 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6313 </para></footnote>
6314 And relative to a
6315 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6316 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6317 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6318 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6319 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6320 Brezhnev.
6321 </para>
6322 <para>
6323 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6324 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6325 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6326 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6327 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6328 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6329 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6330 opportunities for innovation and change.
6331 </para>
6332 <para>
6333 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6334 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6335 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6336 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6337 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6338 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6339 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6340 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6341 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6342 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6343 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6344 regulation is justified.
6345 </para>
6346 <para>
6347 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6349 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6350 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6351 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6352 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6353 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6354 </para>
6355 <para>
6356 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6357 </para>
6358 <para>
6359 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6360 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6361 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6362 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6363 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6364 </para>
6365 <para>
6366 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6367 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6368 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6369 </para>
6370 <para>
6371 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6372 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6373 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6374 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6375 </para>
6376 <para>
6377 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6378 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6379 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6380 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6381 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6382 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6383 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6384 </para>
6385 <para>
6386 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6387 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6388 culture.<footnote><para>
6389 <!-- f7 -->
6390 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6391 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6392 </para></footnote>
6393 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6394 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6395 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6396 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6397 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6398 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6399 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6400 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6401 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6402 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6403 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6404 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6405 </para>
6406 <para>
6407 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6408 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6409 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6410 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6411 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6412 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6413 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6414 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6415 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6416 </para>
6417 <para>
6418 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6419 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6420 be lost.
6421 </para>
6422 </sect2>
6423 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6424 <title>Beginnings</title>
6425 <para>
6426 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6427 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6428 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6429 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6430 </para>
6431 <para>
6432 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6433 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6434 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6435 </para>
6436 <para>
6437 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6438 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6439 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6440
6441 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6442 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6443 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6444 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6445 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6446 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6447 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6448 </para>
6449 <para>
6450 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6451 in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6452 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6453 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6454 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6455 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6456 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6457 </para>
6458 <para>
6459 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6460 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6461 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6462 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6463 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6464 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6465 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6466 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6467 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6468 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6469 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6470 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6471 power.
6472 </para>
6473 <para>
6474 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6475 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6476 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6477 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6478 years since they first struck its design.
6479 </para>
6480 <para>
6481 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6482 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6483 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6484 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6485 started here:
6486 </para>
6487 <figure id="fig-1441">
6488 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6489 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6490 </figure>
6491 <para>
6492 We will end here:
6493 </para>
6494 <figure id="fig-1442">
6495 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6496 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6497 </figure>
6498 <para>
6499 Let me explain how.
6500 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6501 </para>
6502 </sect2>
6503 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6504 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6505 <para>
6506 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6507 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6508 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6509 protecting
6510 creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6511 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6512 authorship.<footnote><para>
6513 <!-- f8 -->
6514 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
6515 United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1, 485&ndash;86:
6516 "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme Law of the Land,'
6517 the perpetual rights which authors had, or were supposed by some to have, under
6518 the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6519 </para></footnote>
6520 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in
6521 the United States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the
6522 common
6523 law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work
6524 published
6525 in the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England,
6526 this lingering uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely
6527 upon a public domain to reprint and distribute works.
6528 </para>
6529 <para>
6530 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6531 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
6532 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections.
6533 Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the
6534 copyrights
6535 for all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any
6536 state copyrights expired as well.
6537 </para>
6538 <para>
6539 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6540 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6541 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6542 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6543 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6544 </para>
6545 <para>
6546 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6547 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6548 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6549 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6550 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6551 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6552 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6553 <!-- f9 -->
6554 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6555 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6556 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6557 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6558 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6559 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6560 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6561 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6562 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6563 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6564 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6565 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6566 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6567 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6568 </para>
6569 <para>
6570 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6571 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6572 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6573 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6574 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6575 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6576 copyright, either.
6577 </para>
6578 <para>
6579 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6580 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6581 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6582 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6583 domain.<footnote><para>
6584 <!-- f10 -->
6585 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6586 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6587 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6588 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6589 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6590 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6591 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6592 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6593 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6594 </para>
6595 <para>
6596 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6597 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6598 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6599 <!-- f11 -->
6600 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6601 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6602 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6603 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6604 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6605 effectively free.
6606 </para>
6607 <para>
6608 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6609 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6610 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6611 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6612 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6613 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6614 </para>
6615 <para>
6616 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6617 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6618 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6619 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6620 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6621 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6622 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6623 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6624 </para>
6625 <para>
6626 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6627 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6628 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6629 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6630
6631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6632 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6633 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6634 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6635 </para>
6636 <para>
6637 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6638 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6639 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6640 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6641 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6642 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6643 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6644 value.
6645 </para>
6646 <para>
6647 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6648 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6649 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6650 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6651 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6652 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6653 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6654 was ninety-five years.
6655 </para>
6656 <para>
6657 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6658 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6659 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6660 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6661 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6662 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6663 them.
6664 </para>
6665 <para>
6666 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6667 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6668 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6669 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6670 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6671 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6672 years.<footnote><para>
6673 <!-- f12 -->
6674 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6675 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6676 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6677 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6678 </para></footnote>
6679 </para>
6680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6681 </sect2>
6682 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6683 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6684 <para>
6685 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6686 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6687 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6688 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6689 </para>
6690 <para>
6691 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6692 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6693 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6694 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6695 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6696 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6697 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6698 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6699 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6700 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6701 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6702 </para>
6703 <para>
6704 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6705 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6706 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6707 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6708 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6709 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6710 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6711 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6712 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6713 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6714 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6715 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6716 on the initial creative work.
6717 </para>
6718 <para>
6719 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6720 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6721 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6723 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6724 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6725 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6726 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6727 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6728 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6729 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6730 </para>
6731 <para>
6732 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6733 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6734 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6735 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6736 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6737 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6738 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6739 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6740 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6741 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6742 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6743 original author.
6744 </para>
6745 <para>
6746 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6747 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6748 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6749 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6750 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6751 copy available for others to copy.
6752 </para>
6753 <para>
6754 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6755 differences.
6756 </para>
6757 <para>
6758 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6759 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6760 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6761 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6762 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6763 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6764 <!-- f13 -->
6765 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6766 Creation
6767 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6768 International
6769 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6770 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6771 </para></footnote>
6772 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6773 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6774 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6775 </para>
6776 <para>
6777 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6778 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6779 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6780 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6781 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6782 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6783 creative
6784 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6785 restrained.
6786 </para>
6787 <para>
6788 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6789 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6790 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6791 reduced
6792 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6793 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6794 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6795 </para>
6796 <para>
6797 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6798 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6799 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6800 </para>
6801 <para>
6802 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6803 control
6804 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6805 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6806 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6807 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6808 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6809 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6810 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6811 exclusive
6812 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6813 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6814 </para>
6815 <para>
6816 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6817 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6818 expansion
6819 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6820 copyright.
6821 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6822 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6823 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6824 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6825 </para>
6826 <para>
6827
6828 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6829 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6830 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6831 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6832 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6833 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6834 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6835 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6836 protect
6837 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6838 <!-- f14 -->
6839 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6840 2003, available at
6841 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6842 </para></footnote>
6843 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6844 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6845 the wrong of direct piracy.
6846 </para>
6847 <para>
6848 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6849 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6850 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6851 transformative
6852 use of my book.<footnote><para>
6853 <!-- f15 -->
6854 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6855 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6856 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6857 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6858 Constitutionality,"
6859 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6860 </para></footnote>
6861 These two different uses of my creative work are
6862 treated the same.
6863 </para>
6864 <para>
6865 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6866 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6867 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6868 creates
6869 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6870 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6871 originally created?
6872 </para>
6873 <para>
6874 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6875 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6876 simply
6877 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6878 rights originally granted.
6879 </para>
6880 </sect2>
6881 <sect2 id="lawreach">
6882 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6883 <para>
6884 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6885 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6886 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6887 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6888 <!-- f16 -->
6889 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6890 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
6891 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6892 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
6893 sometimes
6894 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
6895 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
6896 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6897 </para></footnote>
6898 </para>
6899 <para>
6900 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6901 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6902 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6903 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6904 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6905 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6906 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6907 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6908 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6909 trigger for copyright law.
6910 </para>
6911 <para>
6912 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6913 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6914 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6915 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6916 <!-- f17 -->
6917 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6918 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6919 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6920 basis
6921 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6922 </para></footnote>
6923 because it is clear that the
6924 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6925 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6926 </para>
6927 <para>
6928 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6929 empty circle.
6930 </para>
6931 <figure id="fig-1521">
6932 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6933 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6934 </figure>
6935 <para>
6936 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6937 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6938 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6939 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6940 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6941 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6942 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6943 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6944 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6945 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6946 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6947 not make a copy.
6948 </para>
6949 <figure id="fig-1531">
6950 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6951 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6952 </figure>
6953 <para>
6954 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6955 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6956 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6957 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6958 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6959 diagram on next page).
6960 </para>
6961 <para>
6962 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6963 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6964 </para>
6965 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6966 <figure id="fig-1541">
6967 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6968 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6969 </figure>
6970 <para>
6971 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6972 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6973 unregulated.
6974 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6975 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6976 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6977 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6978 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6979 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6980 </para>
6981 <figure id="fig-1542">
6982 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6983 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6984 </figure>
6985 <para> </para>
6986 <figure id="fig-1551">
6987 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6988 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
6989 </figure>
6990 <para>
6991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6992 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6993 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
6994 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6995 </para>
6996 <para>
6997 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
6998 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
6999 <!-- f18 -->
7000 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
7001 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
7002 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
7003 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
7004 </para></footnote>
7005 And because of this single,
7006 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
7007 category
7008 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
7009 unregulated
7010 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
7011 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
7012 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
7013 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
7014 category
7015 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
7016 copyrighted
7017 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
7018 burden of this shift.
7019 </para>
7020 <para>
7021 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7022 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
7023 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
7024 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
7025 nothing
7026 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
7027 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7028 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
7029 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
7030 produced
7031 a copy.
7032 </para>
7033 <para>
7034 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
7035 different
7036 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7037 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
7038 copyright
7039 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
7040 accidental
7041 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
7042 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
7043 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
7044 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
7045 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
7046 </para>
7047 <para>
7048 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7049 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7050 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7051 points also become clear:
7052 </para>
7053 <para>
7054 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7055 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7056 presumptively
7057 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7058 evidence
7059 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7060 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7061 free culture before the Internet.
7062 </para>
7063 <para>
7064 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7065 transformative
7066 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7067 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7068 transformation
7069 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7070 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7071 releasing
7072 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7073 justification.
7074 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7075 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7076 transformative
7077 uses of creative work.
7078 </para>
7079 <para>
7080 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7081
7082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7083 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7084 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7085 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7086 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7087 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7088 Internet,
7089 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7090 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7091 protected
7092 before because reading was not regulated.
7093 </para>
7094 <para>
7095 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7096 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7097 depend
7098 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
7099 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7100 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7101 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7102 protections
7103 of fair use are not enough.
7104 </para>
7105 <para>
7106 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7107 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7108 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7109 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7110 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7111 </para>
7112 <para>
7113 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7114 began
7115 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7116 previews.
7117 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7118 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7119 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7120 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7121 before
7122 you bought it.
7123 </para>
7124 <para>
7125 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7126 distributors
7127 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7128 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7129 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7130 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7131 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7132 business
7133 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7134 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7135 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7136 immediately.
7137 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7138 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7139 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7140 </para>
7141 <para>
7142 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7143 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7144 infringed"
7145 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7146 willful
7147 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7148 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7149 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7150 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7151 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7152 </para>
7153 <para>
7154 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7155 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7156 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7157 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7158 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7159 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7160 Disney's permission.
7161 </para>
7162 <para>
7163 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7164 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7165 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7166 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7167 marketplace,
7168 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7169 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7170 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7171 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7172 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7173 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7174 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7175 </para>
7176 <para>
7177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7178 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7179 control
7180 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7181 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7182 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7183 Noble
7184 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7185 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7186 argument
7187 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7188 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7189 exercising
7190 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7191 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7192 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7193 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7194 </para>
7195 <para>
7196 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7197 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7198 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7199 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7200 owners
7201 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7202 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7203 </para>
7204 </sect2>
7205 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7206 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7207 <para>
7208 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7209 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7210 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7211 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7212 </para>
7213 <para>
7214 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7215 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7216 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7217 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7218 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7219 your freedom.
7220 </para>
7221 <para>
7222 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7223 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7225 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7226 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7227 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7228 <!-- f19 -->
7229 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7230 Contemporary
7231 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7232 </para></footnote>
7233 </para>
7234 <para>
7235 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7236 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7237 you were."<footnote><para>
7238 <!-- f20 -->
7239 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7240 </para></footnote>
7241 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7242 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7243 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7244 </para>
7245 <para>
7246 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7247 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7248 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7249 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7250 </para>
7251 <para>
7252 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7253 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7254 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7255 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7256 copyrighted
7257 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7258 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7259 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7260 that is not at all funny.
7261 </para>
7262 <para>
7263 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7264 </para>
7265 <para>
7266 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7267 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7268 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7269 technology,
7270 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7271 </para>
7272 <para>
7273 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7274 Reader.
7275 </para>
7276 <para>
7277 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7278 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7279 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7280 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7281 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7282 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7283 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7284 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7285 called Permissions.
7286 </para>
7287 <figure id="fig-1611">
7288 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7289 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7290 </figure>
7291 <para>
7292 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7293 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7294 </para>
7295 <figure id="fig-1612">
7296 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7297 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7298 </figure>
7299 <para>
7300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7301 According to my eBook
7302 Reader, I have the permission
7303 to copy to the clipboard of the
7304 computer ten text selections
7305 every ten days. (So far, I've
7306 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7307 I also have the permission to
7308 print ten pages from the book
7309 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7310 the permission to use the Read
7311 Aloud button to hear
7312 Middlemarch
7313 read aloud through the
7314 computer.
7315 </para>
7316 <para>
7317 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7318 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7319 </para>
7320 <figure id="fig-1621">
7321 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7322 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7323 </figure>
7324 <para>
7325 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7326 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7327 the book.
7328 </para>
7329 <figure id="fig-1622">
7330 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7331 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7332 </figure>
7333 <para>
7334 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7335 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7336 </para>
7337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7338 <figure id="fig-1631">
7339 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7340 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7341 </figure>
7342 <para>
7343 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7344 </para>
7345 <para>
7346 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7347 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7348 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7349 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7350 under
7351 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7352 <!-- f21 -->
7353 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7354 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7355 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7356 obligation
7357 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7358 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7359 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7360 </para></footnote>
7361 When my e-book of
7362 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7363 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7364 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7365 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7366 </para>
7367 <para>
7368 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7369 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7370 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7371 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7372 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7373 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7374 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7375 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7376 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7377 restrictions:
7378 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7379 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7380 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7381 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7382 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7383 </para>
7384 <para>
7385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7386 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7387 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7388 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7389 </para>
7390 <para>
7391 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7392 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7393 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7394 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7395 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7396 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7397 </para>
7398 <para>
7399 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7400 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7401 technologies
7402 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7403 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7404 protections as well?
7405 </para>
7406 <para>
7407 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7408 eBook Reader.
7409 </para>
7410 <para>
7411 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7412 public
7413 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7414 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7415 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7416 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7417 </para>
7418 <figure id="fig-1641">
7419 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7420 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7421 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7422 </figure>
7423 <para>
7424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7425 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7426 allowed
7427 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7428 "permissions"
7429 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7430 </para>
7431 <para>
7432 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7433 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7434 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7435 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7436 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7437 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7438 </para>
7439 <para>
7440 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7441 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7442 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7443 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7444 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7445 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7446 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7447 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7448 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7449 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7450 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7451 </para>
7452 <para>
7453 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7454 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7455 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7456 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7457 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7458 often crazy.
7459 </para>
7460 <para>
7461 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7462 story of mine that makes the same point.
7463 </para>
7464 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7465 <para>
7466 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7467 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7468 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7469 </para>
7470 <para>
7471 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7472 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7473 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7475 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7476 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7477 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7478 </para>
7479 <para>
7480 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7481 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7482 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7483 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7484 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7485 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7486 </para>
7487 <para>
7488 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7489 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7490 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7491 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7492 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7493 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7494 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7495 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7496 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7497 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7498 </para>
7499 <para>
7500 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7501 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7502 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7503 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7504 ethically.
7505 </para>
7506 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7507 <para>
7508 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7509 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7510 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7511 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7512 than Sony had built.
7513 </para>
7514 <para>
7515 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7516 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7517 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7518 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7519 the
7520
7521 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7522 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7523 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7524 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7525 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7526 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7527 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7528 dog to dance?
7529 </para>
7530 <para>
7531 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7532 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7533 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7534 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7535 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7536 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7537 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7538 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7539 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7540 </para>
7541 <para>
7542 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7543 <!-- f22 -->
7544 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7545 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7546 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7547 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7548 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7549 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7550 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7551 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7552 Questions
7553 about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7554 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7555 </para></footnote>
7556 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7557 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7558 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7559 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7560 </para>
7561 <para>
7562 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7563 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7564 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7565 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7566 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7567 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7568 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7569 Internet much more.
7570 </para>
7571 <para>
7572 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7573 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7574 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7575 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7576 </para>
7577 <para>
7578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7579 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7580 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7581 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7582 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7583 </para>
7584 <para>
7585 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7586 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7587 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7588 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7589 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7590 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7591 </para>
7592 <para>
7593 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7594 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7595 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7596 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7597 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7598 constituted, succeed.
7599 </para>
7600 <para>
7601 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7602 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7603 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7604 wrote:
7605 </para>
7606 <blockquote>
7607 <para>
7608 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7609 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7610 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7611 </para>
7612 </blockquote>
7613 <para>
7614 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7615 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7616 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7617 </para>
7618 <blockquote>
7619 <para>
7620 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7621 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7622 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7623 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7624 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7625 </para>
7626 </blockquote>
7627 <para>
7628 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7629 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7630 spreading such information an offense.
7631 </para>
7632 <para>
7633 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7634 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7635 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7636 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7637 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7638 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7639 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7640 </para>
7641 <para>
7642 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7643 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7644 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7645 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7646 </para>
7647 <para>
7648 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7649 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7650 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7651 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7652 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7653 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7654 have been a copyright violation.
7655 </para>
7656 <para>
7657 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7658 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7659 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7660 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7661 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7662 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7663 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7664 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7665 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7666 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7667 </para>
7668 <para>
7669 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7670 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7671 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7672 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7673 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7674 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7675 </para>
7676 <para>
7677 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7678 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7679 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7680 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7681 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7682 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7683 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7684 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7685 </para>
7686 <blockquote>
7687 <para>
7688 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7689 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7690 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7691 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7692 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7693 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7694 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7695 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7696 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7697 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7698 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7699 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7700 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7701 important.<footnote><para>
7702 <!-- f23 -->
7703 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7704 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7705 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7706 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7707 </para></footnote>
7708 </para>
7709 </blockquote>
7710 <para>
7711 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7712 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7713 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7714 the VCR responsible.
7715 </para>
7716 <para>
7717 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7718 the DMCA.
7719 </para>
7720 <para>
7721 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7722 </para>
7723 <para>
7724 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7725 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7726 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7727 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7728 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7729 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7730 </para>
7731 <para>
7732 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7734 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7735 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7736 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7737 and bad uses.
7738 </para>
7739 <figure id="fig-1711">
7740 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7741 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7742 </figure>
7743 <para>
7744 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7745 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7746 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7747 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7748 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7749 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7750 </para>
7751 <para>
7752 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7753 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7754 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7755 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7756 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7757 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7758 </para>
7759 <para>
7760 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7761 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7762 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7763 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7764 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7765 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7766 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7767 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7768 </para>
7769 <para>
7770 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7771 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7772 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7773 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7774 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7775 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7776 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7777 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7778 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7779 </para>
7780 <para>
7781
7782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7783 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7784 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7785 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7786 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7787 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7788 <!-- f24 -->
7789 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7790 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7791 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7792 </para></footnote>
7793 </para>
7794 <para>
7795 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7796 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7797 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7798 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7799 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7800 </para>
7801 <para>
7802 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7803 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7804 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7805 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7806 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7807 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7808 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7809 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7810 </para>
7811 <para>
7812 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7813 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7814 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7815 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7816 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7817 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7818 </para>
7819 </sect2>
7820 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
7821 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7822 <para>
7823 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7824 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7825 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7826 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7827 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7828 find better ways
7829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7830 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7831 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7832 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7833 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7834 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7835 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7836 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7837 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7838 control.
7839 </para>
7840 <para>
7841 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7842 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7843 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7844 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7845 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7846 </para>
7847 <para>
7848 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7849 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7850 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7851 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7852 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7853 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7854 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7855 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7856 of the media.
7857 </para>
7858 <para>
7859 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7860 nature.
7861 </para>
7862 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7863 <para>
7864 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7865 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7866 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7867 <!-- f25 -->
7868 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7869 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7870 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7871 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7872 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7873 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7874 <!-- f26 -->
7875 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7876 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
7877 </para></footnote>
7878 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7879 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7880 <!-- f27 -->
7881 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7882 31 May 2003.
7883 </para></footnote>
7884 </para>
7885 <para>
7886 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7887 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7888 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7889 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
7890 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7891 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7892 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
7893 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
7894 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7895 </para>
7896 <para>
7897 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7898 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7899 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7900 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7901 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7902 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7903 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7904 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7905 protected&mdash; by the market.
7906 </para>
7907 <para>
7908 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7909 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7910 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7911 </para>
7912 <blockquote>
7913 <para>
7914 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7915 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7916 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7917 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7918 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7919 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7920 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7921 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7922 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7923 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7924 <!-- f28 -->
7925 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7926 2003): 89.
7927 </para></footnote>
7928 </para>
7929 </blockquote>
7930 <para>
7931 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7932 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7933 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7934 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7935 </para>
7936 <figure id="fig-1761">
7937 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7938 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7939 </figure>
7940 <para>
7941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7942 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7943 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7944 distribute content?
7945 </para>
7946 <para>
7947 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7948 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7949 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7950 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7951 </para>
7952 <para>
7953 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7954 integration may matter.
7955 </para>
7956 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7957 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7958 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7959 <para>
7960 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7961 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7962 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7963 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7964 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7965 </para>
7966 <para>
7967 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7968 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7969 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7970 control.<footnote><para>
7971 <!-- f29 -->
7972 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7973 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7974 Missouri,
7975 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7976 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7977 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7978 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7979 </para></footnote>
7980 </para>
7981 <para>
7982
7983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7984 The network did not control those copyrights because the law
7985 forbade
7986 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The
7987 law required a separation between the networks and the content
7988 producers;
7989 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
7990 1992, because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7991 television&mdash;75
7992 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the networks.
7993 </para>
7994 <para>
7995 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this
7996 independence.
7997 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.
7998 In 1985, there were twenty-five independent television production
7999 studios;
8000 in 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
8001 1992, only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a
8002 company it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8003 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992,
8004 16 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control,
8005 last year there was one."<footnote><para>
8006 <!-- f30 -->
8007 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on
8008 Media Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th
8009 Cong., 1st sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of
8010 Consumers
8011 Union and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8012 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of
8013 America, West, in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond,
8014 Virginia, 27 February 2003.
8015 </para></footnote>
8016 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television
8017 was owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
8018 1992 and 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week
8019 produced by network studios increased over 200%, whereas the
8020 number
8021 of prime time television hours per week produced by independent
8022 studios decreased 63%."<footnote><para>
8023 <!-- f31 -->
8024 Ibid.
8025 </para></footnote>
8026 </para>
8027 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8028 <para>
8029 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
8030 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8031 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8032 owned by the network.
8033 </para>
8034 <para>
8035 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the
8036 ownership
8037 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller
8038 few. As Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8039 </para>
8040 <blockquote>
8041 <para>
8042 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8043 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8044 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8045 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8046 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8047 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent
8048 production
8049 companies producing television programs. Now you have less
8050 than a handful.<footnote><para>
8051 <!-- f32 -->
8052 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
8053 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8054 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8055 </para></footnote>
8056 </para>
8057 </blockquote>
8058 <para>
8059 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of
8060 such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8061 Increasingly
8062 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from
8063 networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the network
8064 wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from the
8065 inside,
8066 it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question
8067 without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment to Siberia,
8068 but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are
8069 quashed. This is not the environment for a democracy.
8070 </para>
8071 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8072 <para>
8073 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8074 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8075 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8076 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8077 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8078 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8079 <!-- f33 -->
8080 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
8081 National
8082 Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard
8083 Business School Press, 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was
8084 first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of
8085 Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
8086 Research Policy 14 (1985): 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard
8087 Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are
8088 Built to Last Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform
8089 Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001).
8090 </para></footnote>
8091
8092 Lumbering
8093 giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the field is
8094 only open to the giants, there will be far too little sprinting.
8095 </para>
8096 <para>
8097 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8098 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8099 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8100 measure.
8101 </para>
8102 <para>
8103 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8104 suggest the concern.
8105 </para>
8106 <para>
8107 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8108 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8109 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8110 </para>
8111 <para>
8112 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8113 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8114 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8115
8116 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8117 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were all
8118 quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8119 collateral
8120 damage from it is so great as to make waging the war insane.
8121 When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice system, the
8122 desperation of generations of kids whose only real economic
8123 opportunities
8124 are as drug warriors, the queering of constitutional protections
8125 because
8126 of the constant surveillance this war requires, and, most profoundly,
8127 the total destruction of the legal systems of many South American
8128 nations
8129 because of the power of the local drug cartels, I find it impossible
8130 to believe that the marginal benefit in reduced drug consumption by
8131 Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
8132 </para>
8133 <para>
8134 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and
8135 it is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8136 depend
8137 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8138 these issues.
8139 </para>
8140 <para>
8141 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
8142 launched a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The
8143 campaign
8144 produced scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal
8145 drugs. In one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar,
8146 discussing the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the
8147 collateral damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of
8148 drug legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8149 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes his
8150 mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on
8151 the pro-legalization campaign.
8152 </para>
8153 <para>
8154 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8155 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8156 </para>
8157 <para>
8158 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8159 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8160 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the
8161 drug war. Can you do it?
8162 </para>
8163 <para>
8164 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8166 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8167 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8168 message
8169 will be heard then?
8170 </para>
8171 <para>
8172 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of
8173 avoiding
8174 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8175 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
8176 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First
8177 Amendment,
8178 but the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to
8179 choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media
8180 will refuse one side of a crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.
8181 And the courts will defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8182 <!-- f34 -->
8183 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads that
8184 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
8185 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
8186 policy."
8187 The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
8188 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
8189 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and
8190 returned
8191 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine, 15 October 2003.
8192 These restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for
8193 example,
8194 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with
8195 Rejection from TV Networks," New York Times, 13 March 2003, C4.
8196 Outside
8197 of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC or the
8198 courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general overview,
8199 see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
8200 Advertising
8201 on Television and Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988):
8202 449&ndash;79, and for a more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the
8203 courts, see Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d
8204 872 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8205 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
8206 transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel buses. Phillip
8207 Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni Rejects
8208 Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8209 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground was
8210 that the criticism was "too controversial."
8211 </para></footnote>
8212 </para>
8213 <para>
8214 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived in
8215 a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media
8216 throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control
8217 access
8218 to the media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which
8219 political positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in
8220 an obvious and important way, concentration matters. You might like
8221 the positions the handful of companies selects. But you should not like
8222 a world in which a mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us
8223 get to know about.
8224
8225 </para>
8226 </sect2>
8227 <sect2 id="together">
8228 <title>Together</title>
8229 <para>
8230 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8231 copyright
8232 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In
8233 the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No
8234 sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8235 </para>
8236 <para>
8237 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8238 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology
8239 and markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8240 cultivate
8241 our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins to seem
8242
8243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8244 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8245 supplement
8246 the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated markets
8247 to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing the
8248 massively
8249 expanded "property" rights granted by copyright fundamentally
8250 changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and build upon our
8251 past, then we have to ask whether this property should be redefined.
8252 </para>
8253 <para>
8254 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8255 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8256 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8257 our culture today.
8258 </para>
8259 <para>
8260 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8261 notwithstanding.
8262 And these massive shifts in the effective power of copyright
8263 regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content industry and
8264 resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly enable control
8265 over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether another
8266 adjustment
8267 is called for. Not an adjustment that increases copyright's
8268 power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
8269 adjustment
8270 to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
8271 regulation&mdash;a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8272 </para>
8273 <para>
8274 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8275 constant
8276 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8277 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8278 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8279 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8280 copyright
8281 holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8282 technology
8283 suggest that we may well need similar changes in the future. And
8284 these changes have to be reductions in the scope of copyright, in
8285 response
8286 to the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the
8287 market enable.
8288 </para>
8289 <para>
8290 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8291 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8293 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8294 changing
8295 technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8296 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the
8297 development
8298 of our culture than now.
8299 </para>
8300 <para>
8301 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8302 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when only
8303 publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much more
8304 diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for even
8305 then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers were
8306 independent
8307 of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a wide
8308 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
8309 remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny
8310 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a
8311 massive
8312 regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
8313 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into
8314 the most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8315 known.<footnote><para>
8316 <!-- f35 -->
8317 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8318 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8319 </para></footnote>
8320 </para>
8321 <para>
8322 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8323 </para>
8324 <para>
8325 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8326 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8327 distinguished
8328 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8329 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8330 that copyright law has undergone.
8331 In 1790, the law looked like this:
8332 </para>
8333
8334 <table id="t2">
8335 <title></title>
8336 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8337 <thead>
8338 <row>
8339 <entry></entry>
8340 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8341 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8342 </row>
8343 </thead>
8344 <tbody>
8345 <row>
8346 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8347 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8348 <entry>Free</entry>
8349 </row>
8350 <row>
8351 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8352 <entry>Free</entry>
8353 <entry>Free</entry>
8354 </row>
8355 </tbody>
8356 </tgroup>
8357 </table>
8358
8359 <para>
8360 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8361 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8362 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8363
8364 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8365 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8366 noncommercial work was also free.
8367 </para>
8368 <para>
8369 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8370 </para>
8371
8372 <table id="t3">
8373 <title></title>
8374 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8375 <thead>
8376 <row>
8377 <entry></entry>
8378 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8379 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8380 </row>
8381 </thead>
8382 <tbody>
8383 <row>
8384 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8385 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8386 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8387 </row>
8388 <row>
8389 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8390 <entry>Free</entry>
8391 <entry>Free</entry>
8392 </row>
8393 </tbody>
8394 </tgroup>
8395 </table>
8396
8397 <para>
8398 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8399 published,
8400 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8401 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8402 transformation were still essentially free.
8403 </para>
8404 <para>
8405 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and
8406 after
8407 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8408 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8409 expanded.
8410 Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more
8411 common,
8412 we could say the law began to look like this:
8413 </para>
8414
8415 <table id="t4">
8416 <title></title>
8417 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8418 <thead>
8419 <row>
8420 <entry></entry>
8421 <entry>COPY</entry>
8422 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8423 </row>
8424 </thead>
8425 <tbody>
8426 <row>
8427 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8428 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8429 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8430 </row>
8431 <row>
8432 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8433 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8434 <entry>Free</entry>
8435 </row>
8436 </tbody>
8437 </tgroup>
8438 </table>
8439
8440 <para>
8441 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through,
8442 say, copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the
8443 commercial
8444 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of
8445 digital technologies, especially in the context of a digital network,
8446 means that the law now looks like this:
8447 </para>
8448
8449 <table id="t5">
8450 <title></title>
8451 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8452 <thead>
8453 <row>
8454 <entry></entry>
8455 <entry>COPY</entry>
8456 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8457 </row>
8458 </thead>
8459 <tbody>
8460 <row>
8461 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8462 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8463 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8464 </row>
8465 <row>
8466 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8467 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8468 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8469 </row>
8470 </tbody>
8471 </tgroup>
8472 </table>
8473
8474 <para>
8475 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8476 creativity
8477 was not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity&mdash;
8478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8479 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules designed
8480 to regulate commercial publishers.
8481 </para>
8482 <para>
8483 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8484 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8485 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8486 these domains actually does any good.
8487 </para>
8488 <para>
8489 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8490 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8491 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8492 especially,
8493 noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8494 reasons
8495 sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8496 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8497 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8498 rights were more sharply restricted.
8499 </para>
8500 <para>
8501 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8502 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8503 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8504 notwithstanding,
8505 historically, this property right (as with all property rights<footnote><para>
8506 <!-- f36 -->
8507 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8508 movement
8509 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance
8510 public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of
8511 Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland Pennock and John W.
8512 Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
8513 </para></footnote>)
8514 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8515 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8516 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8517 technologies.
8518 And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright" did not
8519 control at all the freedom of others to build upon or transform a creative
8520 work. American culture was born free, and for almost 180 years our
8521 country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free culture.
8522 </para>
8523 <para>
8524 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8525 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8526 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8527 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story
8528 of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar
8529 concern
8530 that is increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair
8531 use right become unavoidably high (the story of chapter 7). Adding
8532 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8533 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8534 familiar
8535 limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter 8). And
8536 granting
8537 archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property
8538 notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture
8539 (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But
8540 the nature of the property that builds a free culture is very different
8541 from the extremist vision that dominates the debate today.
8542 </para>
8543 <para>
8544 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8545 response
8546 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
8547 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing
8548 and distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed
8549 in a way that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property
8550 right that is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or
8551 was intended to be. The property right that is copyright has become
8552 unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and
8553 transform becomes weakened in a world in which creation requires
8554 permission and creativity must check with a lawyer.
8555 </para>
8556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8557 </sect2>
8558 </sect1>
8559 </chapter>
8560 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8561 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8562
8563 <para> </para>
8564
8565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8566 <sect1 id="chimera">
8567 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8568 <para>
8569
8570 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8571 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8572 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8573 <!-- f1. --> H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8574 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8575 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8576 </para></footnote>
8577 The valley is extraordinarily
8578 beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate, slopes of rich
8579 brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent fruit." But the
8580 villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an opportunity. "In the
8581 Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King."
8582 So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a king.
8583 </para>
8584 <para>
8585 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8586 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8587 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8588 Indeed,
8589 as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the sound
8590 of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to control
8591 him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't
8592 understand,'
8593 he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute, and
8594 which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
8595 </para>
8596 <para>
8597 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8598 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak)
8599 the virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8600 affection,
8601 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8602 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8603 description
8604 of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies,
8605 and she listened to his description of the stars and the mountains and
8606 her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence."
8607 "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could only half
8608 understand,
8609 but she was mysteriously delighted."
8610 </para>
8611 <para>
8612 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously
8613 delighted"
8614 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8615 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything
8616 right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8617 </para>
8618 <para>
8619 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8620 is affected," he reports.
8621 </para>
8622 <para>
8623 "What affects it?" the father asks.
8624 "Those queer things that are called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in
8625 such a way as to affect his brain."
8626 </para>
8627 <para>
8628 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8629 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple
8630 and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these irritant bodies
8631 [the eyes]."
8632 </para>
8633 <para>
8634 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They
8635 inform
8636 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8637 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8638 believe
8639 in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8640 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8641 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8642 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8643 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8644
8645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8646 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8647 certainty
8648 that she was not the person whose blood was at the scene. . . ."
8649 </para>
8650 <para>
8651 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8652 impossible.
8653 A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of
8654 DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two
8655 individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person
8656 can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of
8657 a "person" should reflect this reality.
8658 </para>
8659 <para>
8660 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright
8661 and culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8662 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8663 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8664 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong.
8665 One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
8666 records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
8667 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
8668 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just
8669 send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant
8670 respects,
8671 just like what every executive in every recording company no
8672 doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8673 </para>
8674 <para>
8675 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8676 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music,
8677 then sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8678 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8679 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8680 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8681 allowed
8682 to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8683 </para>
8684 <para>
8685 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8686 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8687 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally)
8688 releases
8689 a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free
8690 copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.
8691 </para>
8692 <para>
8693
8694 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8695 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8696 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take
8697 a CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8698 something
8699 to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note
8700 that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that
8701 might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is $1,000.
8702 According
8703 to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song CD, I'm
8704 liable
8705 for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8706 </para>
8707 <para>
8708 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that
8709 it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It
8710 is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side
8711 asserts,
8712 we need to begin to think about how we should respond to this
8713 chimera. What rules should govern it?
8714 </para>
8715 <para>
8716 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8717 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a
8718 felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages
8719 just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get
8720 universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no
8721 computer
8722 is used to commit this crime. These responses might be extreme,
8723 but each of them has either been proposed or actually implemented.<footnote><para>
8724 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8725 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8726 "Copyright
8727 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available
8728 at
8729 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8730 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8731 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8732 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8733 Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8734 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8735 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8736 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8737 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer,
8738 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.
8739 Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8740 high as $90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8741 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8742 from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8743 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8744 billion
8745 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8746 Elizabeth
8747 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8748 August 2003, available at
8749 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8750 targeting
8751 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8752 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8753 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003,
8754 D3, available at
8755 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8756 </para></footnote>
8757
8758 </para>
8759 <para>
8760 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids
8761 act as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there
8762 be no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8763 copyrighted
8764 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip:
8765 regulated,
8766 if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8767 </para>
8768 <para>
8769 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8770 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8771 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8772 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter
8773 is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance
8774 extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a reasonable
8775 alternative.
8776 But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
8777 of the two extremes.
8778 </para>
8779 <para>
8780
8781 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8782 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8783 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land
8784 grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give
8785 content
8786 holders a kind of control over our culture that they have never had
8787 before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8788 innovation
8789 and new creativity will be lost.
8790 </para>
8791 <para>
8792 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8793 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8794 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8795 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8796 innovation
8797 that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the
8798 passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to distribute
8799 content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the vice president
8800 for global public policy at one of these new innovators, eMusic.com,
8801 put it when criticizing the DMCA's added protection for copyrighted
8802 material,
8803 </para>
8804 <blockquote>
8805 <para>
8806 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8807 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8808 </para>
8809 <para>
8810 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8811 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8812 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8813 answer
8814 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8815 well produce a totally different industry model.
8816 </para>
8817 <para>
8818 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8819 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8820 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8821 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8822 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8823 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8824 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8825 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8826 interests.<footnote><para>
8827 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8828 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8829 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8830 Protection,
8831 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
8832 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8833 EMusic.com),
8834 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8835 Congressional
8836 Testimony File.
8837 </para></footnote>
8838 </para>
8839 </blockquote>
8840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8841 <para>
8842 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8843 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8844 changed.
8845 </para>
8846 <para>
8847 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8848 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8849 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8850 </para>
8851
8852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8853 </sect1>
8854 <sect1 id="harms">
8855 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8856 <para>
8857
8858 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8859 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8860 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8861 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8862 prohibition,
8863 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8864 </para>
8865 <para>
8866 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8867 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8868 extend
8869 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8870 justified?
8871 </para>
8872 <para>
8873 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8874 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8875 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8876 our history.
8877 </para>
8878 <para>
8879 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still
8880 on the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme
8881 claims of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8882 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8883 </para>
8884 <para>
8885 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8886 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8887 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8888 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8889 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8890 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8891 </para>
8892 <sect2 id="constrain">
8893 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8894 <para>
8895 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8896 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8897 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8898 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8899 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8900 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8901 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8902 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8903 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8904 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8905 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8906 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8907 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8908 </para>
8909 <para>
8910 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8911 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8912 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8913 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8914 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8915 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8916 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8917 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8918 the culture all around.
8919 </para>
8920 <para>
8921 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8922 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8923
8924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8925
8926 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8927 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8928 storytelling extended across the globe.
8929 </para>
8930 <para>
8931 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8932 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8933 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8934 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8935 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8936 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8937 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8938 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8939 work is presumptively illegal.
8940 </para>
8941 <para>
8942 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8943 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8944 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8945 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8946 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8947 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8948 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8949 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8950 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8951 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8952 million.<footnote><para>
8953 <!-- f1. -->
8954 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8955 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8956 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8957 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8958 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8959 </para></footnote>
8960 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8961 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8962 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8963 suffering.<footnote><para>
8964 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8965 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8966 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8967 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8968 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8969 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8970 available at
8971 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8972 recent months.
8973 </para></footnote>
8974 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8975 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8976 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8977 </para>
8978 <para>
8979 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8980 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8981 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8982 creative
8983 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8984 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8985 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8986
8987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8988 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8989 create,
8990 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8991 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8992 begin
8993 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
8994 necessarily
8995 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8996 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8997 "illegal
8998 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
8999 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
9000 available
9001 at
9002 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9003 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
9004 </para></footnote>
9005 In what does their "illegality" consist?
9006 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9007 critical or reflective.
9008 </para>
9009 <para>
9010 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9011 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
9012 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9013 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9014 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9015 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9016 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9017 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9018 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9019 </para>
9020 <para>
9021 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9022 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9023 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9024 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9025 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9026 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9027 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9028 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9029 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9030 </para>
9031 <para>
9032 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9033 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
9034 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
9035 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
9036 law regulates such a use.
9037 </para>
9038 <para>
9039
9040 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9041 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9042 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9043 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
9044 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9045 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9046 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9047 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9048 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9049 </para>
9050 <para>
9051 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9052 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
9053 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9054 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9055 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9056 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9057 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9058 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9059 comfort themselves.
9060 </para>
9061 <para>
9062 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
9063 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9064 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9065 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9066 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
9067 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9068 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9069 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9070 culture that is free.
9071 </para>
9072 <para>
9073 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9074 </para>
9075 <blockquote>
9076 <para>
9077 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9078 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9079 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9080 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
9081 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9083 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9084 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9085 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9086 </para>
9087 </blockquote>
9088 </sect2>
9089 <sect2 id="innovators">
9090 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9091 <para>
9092 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9093 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9094 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9095 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9096 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9097 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9098 </para>
9099 <para>
9100 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9101 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9102 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9103 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9104 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9105 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9106 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9107 </para>
9108 <para>
9109 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9110 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9111 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9112 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9113 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9114 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9115 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9116 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9117 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9118 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9119 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9120 </para>
9121 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9122 <para>
9123 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9124 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9125 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
9126 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9127 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9128 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9129 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9130 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9131 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9132 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9133 </para>
9134 <para>
9135 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9136 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9137 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9138 </para>
9139 <para>
9140 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9141 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9142 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9143 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9144 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9145 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9146 </para>
9147 <para>
9148 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9149 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9150 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9151 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9152 Raitt. And so on.
9153 </para>
9154 <para>
9155 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9156 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9157 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9158 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9159 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9160 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9161 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9162 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9163 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9164 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9165 </para>
9166 <para>
9167 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9168 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9169
9170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9171 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9172 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9173 the kind of content the users liked.
9174 </para>
9175 <para>
9176 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9177 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9178 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9179 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9180 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9181 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9182 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9183 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9184 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9185 they had already bought.
9186 </para>
9187 <para>
9188 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9189 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9190 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9191 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9192 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9193 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9194 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9195 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9196 </para>
9197 <para>
9198 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9199 </para>
9200 <para>
9201 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9202 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9203 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9204 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9205 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9206 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9207 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9208 demanded.
9209 </para>
9210 <para>
9211 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9212 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9213 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9214 clients in this
9215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9216 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9217 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9218 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9219 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9220 </para>
9221 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9222 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9223 <para>
9224 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9225 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9226 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9227 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9228 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9229 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9230 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9231 innovation
9232 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9233 Revolution
9234 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9235 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9236 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9237 Times, 28 May 2001.
9238 </para></footnote>
9239 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9240 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9241 industry
9242 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9243 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9244 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9245 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9246 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9247 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9248 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9249 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9250 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9251 </para>
9252 <blockquote>
9253 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9254 <para>
9255 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9256 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9257 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9258 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9259 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9260 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9261 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote>
9262 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9263 <para>
9264 <!-- f5. -->
9265 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9266 2003, available at
9267 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9268 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9269 </para></footnote>
9270 </para>
9271 </blockquote>
9272 <para>
9273 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9274 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9275 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9276 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9277 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9278 constantly threatened by litigation.
9279 </para>
9280 <para>
9281
9282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9283 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9284 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9285 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9286 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9287 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9288 imposes,
9289 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9290 conservative
9291 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9292 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9293 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9294 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9295 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9296 </para>
9297 <para>
9298 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9299 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9300 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9301 systematically
9302 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9303 industries
9304 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9305 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9306 competition.
9307 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9308 competition.
9309 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9310 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9311 overregulatedregulated
9312 market.
9313 </para>
9314 <para>
9315 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9316 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9317 burden
9318 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&mdash;a
9319 culture
9320 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9321 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9322 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9323 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9324 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9325 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9326 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9327 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9328 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9329 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9330 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9331 creativity.
9332 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9333 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9334 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9335 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9336 technology
9337 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9338 </para>
9339 <para>
9340 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9341 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9342 Internet's
9343 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9344 feature
9345 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9346 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9347 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9348 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9349 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9350 </para>
9351 <para>
9352 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9353 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9354 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9355 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9356 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9357 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9358 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9359 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9360 </para></footnote>
9361
9362 Congress
9363 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9364 "broadcast
9365 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9366 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9367 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9368 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9369 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9370 violators
9371 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9372 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9373 </para></footnote>
9374
9375 </para>
9376 <para>
9377 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9378 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9379 regulation
9380 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9381 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9382
9383 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9384 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9385 those requirements.
9386 </para>
9387 <para>
9388 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9389 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9390 impose.<footnote><para>
9391 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9392 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9393 </para></footnote>
9394 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9395 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9396 harm than good.
9397 </para>
9398 <para>
9399 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9400 innovation&mdash;again,
9401 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9402 crowd.
9403 </para>
9404 <para>
9405 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9406 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9407 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9408 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9409 </para>
9410 <para>
9411 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9412 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9413 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9414 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9415 2001).
9416 </para></footnote>
9417 overall this history of copyright
9418 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9419 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9420 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9421 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9422 </para>
9423 <para>
9424 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9425 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9426 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9427 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9428 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9429 </para>
9430 <para>
9431 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9432 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9433 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9434 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9435 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9436 copyright
9437 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9438 music
9439 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9440 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9441 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9442 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9443 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9444 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9445 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9446 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9447 </para></footnote>
9448 It has been
9449 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9450 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9451 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9452 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9453 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9454 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9455 August
9456 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9457 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9458 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9459 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9460 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9461 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9462 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9463 World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34, available at
9464 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9465 </para></footnote>
9466 But there is one
9467 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9468 demise
9469 of Internet radio.
9470 </para>
9471 <para>
9472
9473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9474 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9475 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9476 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9477 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9478 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9479 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9480 copyright
9481 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9482 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9483 </para>
9484 <para>
9485 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9486 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9487 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9488 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9489 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9490 Probably
9491 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9492 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9493 efforts
9494 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9495 </para>
9496 <para>
9497 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9498 technology
9499 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9500 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9501 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9502 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9503 regular
9504 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9505 </para>
9506 <para>
9507 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9508 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9509 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9510 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9511 broadcasters
9512 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9513 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9514 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9515 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9516 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9517 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9518 in to this new form of radio.
9519 </para>
9520 <para>
9521
9522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9523 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9524 improvement
9525 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9526 improvement
9527 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9528 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9529 establish
9530 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9531 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9532 </para>
9533 <blockquote>
9534 <para>
9535 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9536 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9537 radio
9538 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9539 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9540 competition
9541 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9542 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9543 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9544 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9545 communications
9546 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9547 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9548 acquire
9549 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9550 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9551 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.<footnote><para>
9552 <!-- f12. --> Lessing, 239.
9553 </para></footnote>
9554 </para>
9555 </blockquote>
9556 <para>
9557 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not because
9558 Armstrong
9559 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9560 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<footnote><para>
9561 <!-- f13. --> Ibid., 229.
9562 </para></footnote>
9563 to
9564 retard
9565 the growth of this competing technology.
9566 </para>
9567 <para>
9568 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9569 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9570 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9571 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9572 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9573 radio?
9574 </para>
9575 <para>
9576 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9577 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9578
9579 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9580 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9581 phenomenon
9582 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9583 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9584 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9585 hypothetical
9586 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9587 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9588 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9589 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9590 </para>
9591 <para>
9592 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9593 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9594 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9595 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9596 over $1 million a year.<footnote><para>
9597 <!-- f14. --> This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9598 Arbitration
9599 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example
9600 offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw
9601 (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain
9602 submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected.
9603 See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
9604 and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP DTRA 1 and 2,
9605 available at
9606 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9607 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker,
9608 "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution," Antitrust
9609 Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was not confusion, these are just
9610 old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected from
9611 digital
9612 entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the
9613 name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of
9614 powerful
9615 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9616 </para></footnote>
9617 A regular radio station broadcasting the same
9618 content would pay no equivalent fee.
9619 </para>
9620 <para>
9621 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9622 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9623 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9624 </para>
9625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9626 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9627 <listitem><para>
9628 name of the service;
9629 </para></listitem>
9630 <listitem><para>
9631 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9632 </para></listitem>
9633 <listitem><para>
9634 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9635 </para></listitem>
9636 <listitem><para>
9637 date of transmission;
9638 </para></listitem>
9639 <listitem><para>
9640 time of transmission;
9641 </para></listitem>
9642 <listitem><para>
9643 time zone of origination of transmission;
9644 </para></listitem>
9645 <listitem><para>
9646 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9647 </para></listitem>
9648 <listitem><para>
9649 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9650 </para></listitem>
9651 <listitem><para>
9652 sound recording title;
9653 </para></listitem>
9654 <listitem><para>
9655 ISRC code of the recording;
9656 </para></listitem>
9657 <listitem><para>
9658 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9659 </para></listitem>
9660 <listitem><para>
9661 featured recording artist;
9662 </para></listitem>
9663 <listitem><para>
9664 retail album title;
9665 </para></listitem>
9666 <listitem><para>
9667 recording label;
9668 </para></listitem>
9669 <listitem><para>
9670 UPC code of the retail album;
9671 </para></listitem>
9672 <listitem><para>
9673 catalog number;
9674 </para></listitem>
9675 <listitem><para>
9676 copyright owner information;
9677 </para></listitem>
9678 <listitem><para>
9679 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9680 </para></listitem>
9681 <listitem><para>
9682 name of the service or entity;
9683 </para></listitem>
9684 <listitem><para>
9685 channel or program;
9686 </para></listitem>
9687 <listitem><para>
9688 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9689 </para></listitem>
9690 <listitem><para>
9691 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9692 </para></listitem>
9693 <listitem><para>
9694 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9695 </para></listitem>
9696 <listitem><para>
9697 Unique User identifier;
9698 </para></listitem>
9699 <listitem><para>
9700 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9701 </para></listitem>
9702 </orderedlist>
9703
9704 <para>
9705 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9706 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9707 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9708 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9709 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9710 does not.
9711 </para>
9712 <para>
9713 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9714 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9715 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9716 </para>
9717 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9718 <para>
9719 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9720 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9721 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9722 </para>
9723 <blockquote>
9724 <para>
9725 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9726 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9727 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9728 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9729 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9730 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9731
9732 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9733 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9734 Because
9735 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9736 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9737 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9738 of business. . . ."
9739 </para>
9740 <para>
9741 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9742 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9743 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9744 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9745 </para>
9746 </blockquote>
9747 <para>
9748 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9749 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9750 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9751 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9752 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9753 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9754 effective to prevent it.
9755 </para>
9756 </sect2>
9757 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9758 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9759 <para>
9760 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9761 dinosaurs
9762 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9763 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9764 </para>
9765 <para>
9766 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9767 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9768 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9769 </para>
9770 <para>
9771 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9772 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9773 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9774 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9775 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9776 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9777 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9778 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9779 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9780 </para></footnote>
9781 According to the RIAA,
9782 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9783 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9784
9785 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9786 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9787 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9788 increasingly
9789 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9790 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9791 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9792 extreme
9793 response by the other.
9794 </para>
9795 <para>
9796 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9797 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9798 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9799 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9800 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9801 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9802 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9803 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9804 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9805 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9806 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9807 was.<footnote><para>
9808 <!-- f16. -->
9809 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9810 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9811 </para></footnote>
9812 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9813 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9814 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9815 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9816 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9817 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9818 they oppose.
9819 </para>
9820 <para>
9821 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9822 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9823 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9824 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9825 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9826 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9827 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9828 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9829 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9830 <!-- f17. -->
9831 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9832 Prohibition," American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9833 </para></footnote>
9834 We have
9835 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9836 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9837 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9838 <!-- f18. -->
9839 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9840 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9841 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9842 </para></footnote>
9843 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9844 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9845 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9846 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9847 cheat.<footnote><para>
9848 <!-- f19. -->
9849 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9850 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9851 compliance literature).
9852 </para></footnote>
9853 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9854 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9855 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9856 </para>
9857 <para>
9858 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9859 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9860 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9861 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9862 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9863 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9864 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9865 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9866 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9867 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9868 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9869 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9870 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9871 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9872 degree of illegality.
9873 </para>
9874 <para>
9875 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9876 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9877 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9878 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9879 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9880 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9881 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9882 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9883 to consider the alternative.
9884 </para>
9885 <para>
9886
9887 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9888 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9889 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9890 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9891 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9892 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9893 </para>
9894 <para>
9895 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9896 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9897 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9898 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9899 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9900 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9901 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9902 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9903 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9904 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9905 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9906 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9907 </para>
9908 <para>
9909 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9910 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9911 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9912 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9913 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9914 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9915 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9916 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9917 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9918 a nation of felons?
9919 </para>
9920 <para>
9921 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9922 </para>
9923 <para>
9924 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9925 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9926 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9927 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9928 used
9929
9930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9931 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9932 recordings is free.
9933 </para>
9934 <para>
9935 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9936 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9937 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9938 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9939 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9940 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9941 capacities of digital technologies.
9942 </para>
9943 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9944 <para>
9945 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9946 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9947 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9948 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9949 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9950 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9951 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9952 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9953 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9954 </para>
9955 <para>
9956 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9957 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9958 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9959 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9960 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9961 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9962 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9963 on people's machines.
9964 </para>
9965 <para>
9966 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9967 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9968 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9969 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9970 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9971 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9972
9973 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9974 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9975 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9976 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9977 management" system.
9978 </para>
9979 <para>
9980 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9981 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9982 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9983 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9984 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9985 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9986 freedom to move content easily?
9987 </para>
9988 <para>
9989 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9990 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9991 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9992 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9993 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9994 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9995 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9996 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9997 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9998 </para>
9999 <para>
10000 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10001 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10002 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10003 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10004 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10005 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10006 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10007 </para>
10008 <para>
10009 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10010 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10011 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10012 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10013 </para>
10014 <para>
10015 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10016 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10017
10018 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10019
10020 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10021 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10022 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10023 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10024 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
10025 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
10026 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
10027 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
10028 generally.
10029 </para>
10030 <para>
10031 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
10032 explains,
10033 </para>
10034 <blockquote>
10035 <para>
10036 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10037 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
10038 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10039 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10040 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10041 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
10042 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
10043 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10044 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
10045 </para>
10046 </blockquote>
10047 <para>
10048 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10049 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10050 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10051 </para>
10052 <para>
10053 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
10054 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10055 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10056 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10057 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10058 an Internet user is revealed.
10059 </para>
10060 <para>
10061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10062 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10063 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10064 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10065 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10066 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10067 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10068 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10069 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
10070 <!-- f20. -->
10071 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10072 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10073 Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
10074 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10075 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10076 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
10077 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September
10078 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10079 Fan, Either," New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
10080 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
10081 </para></footnote>
10082
10083 </para>
10084 <para>
10085 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10086 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10087 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10088 <!-- f21. -->
10089 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10090 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10091 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10092 </para></footnote>
10093 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10094 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10095 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10096 </para>
10097 <para>
10098 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10099 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10100 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10101 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10102 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10103 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10104 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10105 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10106 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10107 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10108 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10109 <!-- f22. -->
10110 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10111 Boston Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10112 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10113 Colleges," Washington Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10114 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
10115 Monitor, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10116 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10117 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10118 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News, 30 January
10119 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10120 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
10121 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10122 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10123 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10124 </para></footnote>
10125 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10126 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10127 </para>
10128 <para>
10129 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10130 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10131 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10132 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10133 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10134 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10135 college students
10136
10137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10138 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10139 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10140 Says von Lohmann,
10141 </para>
10142 <blockquote>
10143 <para>
10144 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10145 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10146 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10147 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10148 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10149 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10150 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10151 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10152 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10153 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10154 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10155 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10156 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10157 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10158 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10159 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10160 million of them.
10161 </para>
10162 </blockquote>
10163 <para>
10164 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10165 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10166 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10167 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10168 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10169 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10170 </para>
10171
10172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10173 </sect2>
10174 </sect1>
10175 </chapter>
10176 <chapter id="c-balances">
10177 <title>BALANCES</title>
10178
10179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10180 <para>
10181 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10182 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10183 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10184 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10185 </para>
10186 <para>
10187 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10188 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10189 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10190 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10191 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10192 everything around.
10193 </para>
10194 <para>
10195 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10196 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10197 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10198 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10199 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10200 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10201 </para>
10202 <para>
10203 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10204 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10205 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10206 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10207 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10208 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10209 made that is happening all around.
10210 </para>
10211 <para>
10212 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10213 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10214 gasoline onto this fire.
10215 </para>
10216 <para>
10217 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10218 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10219 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10220 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10221 </para>
10222 <para>
10223 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10224 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10225 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10226 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10227 success will require.
10228 </para>
10229
10230 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10231 <sect1 id="eldred">
10232 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10233 <para>
10234 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10235 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10236 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10237 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10238 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10239 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10240 come alive.
10241 </para>
10242 <para>
10243 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10244 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10245 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10246 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10247 them available for free.
10248 </para>
10249 <para>
10250 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10251 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10252 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10253 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10254 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10255 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10256 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10257 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10258 accessible&mdash;today.
10259 </para>
10260 <para>
10261 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10262 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10263 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10264 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10265 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10266 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10267 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10268 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10269 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10270 commercial publications of public domain works.
10271 </para>
10272 <para>
10273 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10274 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10275 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10276 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10277 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10278 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10279 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10280 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10281 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10282 generally.<footnote><para>
10283 <!-- f1. -->
10284 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10285 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10286 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10287 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10288 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10289 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10290 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10291 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10292 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10293 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10294 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10295 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10296 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10297 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10298 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10299 </para>
10300 <para>
10301 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10302 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10303 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10304 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
10305 in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10306 terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
10307 would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
10308 collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10309 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10310 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
10311 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10312 </para>
10313 <para>
10314
10315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10316 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10317 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10318 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10319 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10320 <!-- f2. -->
10321 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10322 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10323 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10324 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10325 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10326 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10327 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10328 </para></footnote>
10329
10330 </para>
10331 <para>
10332 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10333 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10334 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10335 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10336 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10337 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10338 to undertake.
10339 </para>
10340 <para>
10341 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10342 constitutional
10343 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10344 interpretation.
10345 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10346 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10347 importantly
10348 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10349 </para>
10350 <blockquote>
10351 <para>
10352 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10353 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10354 their . . . Writings. . . .
10355 </para>
10356 </blockquote>
10357 <para>
10358 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10359 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10360 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10361 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10362 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10363 specific&mdash;to
10364 "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that are also specific&mdash;
10365 by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
10366 </para>
10367 <para>
10368 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10369 extending
10370 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10371 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10372 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10373 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10374 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10375 Congress
10376 has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what
10377 the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the installment
10378 plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10379 </para>
10380 <para>
10381 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10382 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10383 consideration
10384 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10385 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10386 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the
10387 practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10388 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10389 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to
10390 keep this gravy train going.
10391 </para>
10392 <para>
10393 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10394 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
10395 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10396 beneficiaries
10397 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce
10398 it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can
10399 do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must do&mdash;and those
10400 things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10401 </para>
10402 <para>
10403 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10404 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10405 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10406 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10407 continues
10408 to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10409 benefits
10410 greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher would
10411 pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be published
10412 by anyone for free.
10413 </para>
10414 <para>
10415 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10416 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10417 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10418 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10419 report:
10420 </para>
10421 <para>
10422 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10423
10424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10425 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10426 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10427 those works.
10428 </para>
10429 <para>
10430 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10431 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10432 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10433 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10434 </para>
10435 <para>
10436 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10437 about it?"
10438 </para>
10439 <para>
10440 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10441 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10442 they support the bill."
10443 </para>
10444 <para>
10445 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10446 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10447 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10448 much is it worth?"
10449 </para>
10450 <para>
10451 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10452 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10453 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10454 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10455 </para>
10456 <para>
10457 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10458 correct conclusion:
10459 </para>
10460 <para>
10461 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10462 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10463 contributions
10464 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10465 </para>
10466 <para>
10467 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10468 contribute
10469 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10470 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10471 </para>
10472 <para>
10473 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10474 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10475 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10476 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10478 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10479 copyrights
10480 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10481 the copyright term extended.
10482 </para>
10483 <para>
10484 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10485 legislation
10486 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10487 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10488 </para>
10489 <para>
10490 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10491 Copyright
10492 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10493 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10494 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10495 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10496 contributions.<footnote><para>
10497 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10498 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10499 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10500 </para></footnote>
10501 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10502 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10503 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10504 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10505 Age," available at
10506 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10507 </para></footnote>
10508 Disney is estimated to have
10509 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10510 cycle.<footnote><para>
10511 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10512 Congressional
10513 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10514 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10515 </para></footnote>
10516
10517 </para>
10518 <para>
10519 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10520 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10521 reality
10522 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10523 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10524 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10525 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10526 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10527 "limited."
10528 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10529 and again.
10530 </para>
10531 <para>
10532 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10533 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10534 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10535 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10536 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10537 scholars,
10538 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10539
10540 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10541 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10542 guns near schools.
10543 </para>
10544 <para>
10545 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10546 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10547 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10548 "interstate
10549 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10550 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10551 interstate
10552 commerce.
10553 </para>
10554 <para>
10555 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10556 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10557 activity,
10558 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10559 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10560 interpreted
10561 to impose no limit.
10562 </para>
10563 <para>
10564 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10565 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10566 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10567 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10568 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10569 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10570 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10571 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10572 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10573 government
10574 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10575 </para>
10576 <para>
10577 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10578 arguments,"
10579 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10580 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10581 </para></footnote>
10582 If anything Congress says is interstate
10583 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10584 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10585 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10586 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10587 </para></footnote>
10588
10589 </para>
10590 <para>
10591 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10592 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10593 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10594 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10595 context
10596 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10597 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10598 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10599 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10600 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10601 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10602 </para></footnote>
10603 And if it is applied to the
10604 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10605 Congress
10606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10607 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10608 existing
10609 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10610 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10611 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10612 copyrights
10613 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10614 existing copyrights.
10615 </para>
10616 <para>
10617 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10618 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10619 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10620 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10621 rejected
10622 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10623 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10624 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10625 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10626 boring.
10627 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10628 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10629 </para>
10630 <para>
10631 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10632 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10633 Constitution's
10634 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10635 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10636 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10637 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10638 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10639 already
10640 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10641 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10642 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10643 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10644 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10645 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10646 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10647 </para>
10648 <para>
10649 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10650
10651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10652 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10653 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10654 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10655 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10656 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10657 </para></footnote>
10658 But
10659 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10660 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10661 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10662 </para>
10663 <para>
10664 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10665 copyright
10666 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10667 influence
10668 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10669 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10670 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10671 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10672 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10673 bought to extend them again.
10674 </para>
10675 <para>
10676 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10677 extended.
10678 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10679 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10680 society
10681 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10682 Disney's.
10683 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10684 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10685 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10686 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10687 exploited,
10688 and no longer available as a result.
10689 </para>
10690 <para>
10691 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10692 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10693 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10694 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10695 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10696 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10697 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10698 Congressional
10699 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10700 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10701 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10702 </para></footnote>
10703
10704 </para>
10705 <para>
10706 Think practically about the consequence of this
10707 extension&mdash;practically,
10708 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10709
10710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10711 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10712 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10713 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10714 remaining
10715 9,873. What would you have to do?
10716 </para>
10717 <para>
10718 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10719 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10720 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10721 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10722 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10723 list of books still under copyright.
10724 </para>
10725 <para>
10726 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10727 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10728 </para>
10729 <para>
10730 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10731 owners
10732 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10733 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10734 being at least a list?
10735 </para>
10736 <para>
10737 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10738 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10739 practically
10740 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10741 thousands
10742 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10743 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10744 </para>
10745 <para>
10746 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10747 apologists
10748 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10749 owners?"
10750 </para>
10751 <para>
10752 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10753 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10754 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10755 suggesting
10756 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10757 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10758 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10759 </para>
10760 <para>
10761 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10762 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10763 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10764
10765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10766 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10767 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10768 happen
10769 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10770 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10771 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10772 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10773 know quite well who owns what property.
10774 </para>
10775 <para>
10776 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10777 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10778 already
10779 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10780 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10781 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10782 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10783 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10784 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10785 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10786 </para>
10787 <para>
10788 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10789 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10790 consequence
10791 for other creative works is much more dire.
10792 </para>
10793 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10794 <para>
10795 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10796 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10797 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10798 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10799 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10800 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10801 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10802 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10803 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10804 films."<footnote><para>
10805 <!-- f11. -->
10806 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10807 Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10808 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10809 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
10810 </para></footnote>
10811
10812 </para>
10813 <para>
10814 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10815 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10816 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10817 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10818 </para>
10819 <para>
10820 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10821
10822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10823 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10824 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10825 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10826 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10827 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10828 work available for distribution.
10829 </para>
10830 <para>
10831 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10832 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10833 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10834 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10835 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10836 mm film.<footnote><para>
10837 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10838 Supporting
10839 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
10840 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10841 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10842 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10843 </para></footnote>
10844
10845 </para>
10846 <para>
10847 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10848 important.
10849 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10850 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10851 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10852 locate the copyright owner.
10853 </para>
10854 <para>
10855 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10856 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10857 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10858 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10859 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10860 exceptionally
10861 high.
10862 </para>
10863 <para>
10864 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10865 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10866 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10867 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10868 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10869 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10870 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10871 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10872 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10873 </para>
10874 <para>
10875 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10876
10877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10878 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10879 benefit
10880 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10881 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10882 the copyright expires.
10883 </para>
10884 <para>
10885 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10886 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10887 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10888 canisters
10889 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10890 than dust.
10891 </para>
10892 <para>
10893 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10894 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10895 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10896 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10897 creative
10898 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10899 free expression."
10900 </para>
10901 <para>
10902 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10903 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10904 indicated,
10905 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10906 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10907 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10908 distributors,
10909 the commercial life ends.
10910 </para>
10911 <para>
10912 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10913 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10914 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10915 between
10916 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10917 Friday
10918 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10919 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10920 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10921 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10922 have, we need to have access to this history.
10923 </para>
10924 <para>
10925 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10926
10927 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10928 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10929 this context do no good.
10930 </para>
10931 <para>
10932 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10933 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10934 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10935 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10936 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10937 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10938 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10939 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10940 </para>
10941 <para>
10942 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10943 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10944 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10945 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10946 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10947 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10948 market didn't have more to offer.
10949 </para>
10950 <para>
10951 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10952 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10953 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10954 would not have interfered with anything.
10955 </para>
10956 <para>
10957 But this situation has now changed.
10958 </para>
10959 <para>
10960 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10961 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10962 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10963 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10964 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10965 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10966 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10967 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10968 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10969 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10970 </para>
10971 <para>
10972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10973 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10974 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10975 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10976 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10977 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10978 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10979 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10980 written for a radically different context.
10981 </para>
10982 <para>
10983 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10984 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10985 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10986 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10987 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10988 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10989 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10990 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10991 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10992 </para>
10993 <para>
10994 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10995 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10996 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10997 culture widely?"
10998 </para>
10999 <para>
11000 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11001 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
11002 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11003 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11004 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
11005 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
11006 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11007 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
11008 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11009 </para>
11010 <para>
11011 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11012 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11013 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11014 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11015
11016 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11017 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11018 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11019 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11020 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
11021 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
11022 <!-- f13. -->
11023 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
11024 December 2002, available at
11025 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
11026 </para></footnote>
11027
11028 </para>
11029 <para>
11030 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11031 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11032 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11033 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
11034 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
11035 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11036 </para>
11037 <para>
11038 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11039 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11040 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11041 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11042 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11043 </para>
11044 <para>
11045 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11046 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
11047 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11048 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11049 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11050 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11051 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11052 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11053 power to extend existing terms.
11054 </para>
11055 <para>
11056 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11057 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11058 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11059 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11060 </para>
11061 <para>
11062 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11063 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11064
11065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11066 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11067 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11068 overstepped its bounds.
11069 </para>
11070 <para>
11071 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11072 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11073 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11074 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11075 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11076 </para>
11077 <para>
11078 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11079 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11080 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
11081 briefs and preparing for argument.
11082 </para>
11083 <para>
11084 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11085 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11086 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11087 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11088 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11089 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11090 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11091 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11092 </para>
11093 <para>
11094 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11095 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11096 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11097 mistake lost it.
11098 </para>
11099 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11100 <para>
11101 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11102 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11103 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11104 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11105 heat
11106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11107 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11108 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11109 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11110 </para>
11111 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11112 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11113 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11114 <para>
11115 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11116 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11117 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11118 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11119 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11120 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11121 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11122 most powerful media companies in the world."
11123 </para>
11124 <para>
11125 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11126 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11127 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11128 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11129 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11130 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11131 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11132 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11133 interpretation
11134 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11135 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11136 unconstitutional,
11137 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11138 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11139 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11140 Constitution,
11141 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11142 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11143 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11144 </para>
11145 <para>
11146 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11147 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11148 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11149 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11150 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11151 why it was unconstitutional.
11152 </para>
11153 <para>
11154 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11155
11156 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11157 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11158 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11159 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11160 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11161 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11162 minority.
11163 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11164 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11165 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11166 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11167 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11168 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11169 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11170 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11171 </para>
11172 <para>
11173 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11174 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11175 beginning.
11176 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11177 November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11178 Republican
11179 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11180 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11181 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11182 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11183 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11184 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11185 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11186 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11187 </para>
11188 <para>
11189 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11190 supporting
11191 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11192 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11193 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11194 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11195 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11196 </para>
11197 <para>
11198 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11199 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11200
11201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11202 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11203 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11204 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11205 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11206 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11207 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11208 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11209 </para>
11210 <para>
11211 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11212 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11213 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11214 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11215 </para>
11216 <para>
11217 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11218 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11219 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11220 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11221 clear.
11222 </para>
11223 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11224 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11225 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11226 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11227 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11228 <para>
11229 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11230 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11231 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11232 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11233 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11234 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11235 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11236 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11237 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11238 </para>
11239 <para>
11240 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11241 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11242 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11243 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11244 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11245 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11246 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11247 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11248
11249 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11250 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11251 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11252 </para>
11253 <para>
11254 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11255 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11256 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11257 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11258 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11259 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11260 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11261 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11262 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11263 confidence in our argument.
11264 </para>
11265 <para>
11266 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11267 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11268 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11269 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11270 copyright holders.
11271 </para>
11272 <para>
11273 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11274 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11275 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11276 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11277 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11278 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11279 wanted to control.
11280 </para>
11281 <para>
11282 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11283 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11284 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11285 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11286 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11287 pornography."<footnote><para>
11288 <!-- f14. -->
11289 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11290 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11291 </para></footnote>
11292 That was also the motive of
11293 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11294 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11295 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11296 <!-- f15. -->
11297 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11298 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11299 </para></footnote>
11300 That's
11301
11302 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11303 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11304 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11305 </para>
11306 <para>
11307 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11308 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11309 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11310 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11311 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11312 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11313 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11314 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11315 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11316 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11317 </para>
11318 <para>
11319 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11320 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11321 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11322 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11323 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11324 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11325 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11326 </para>
11327 <para>
11328 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11329 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11330 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11331 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11332 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11333 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11334 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11335 powers had limits.
11336 </para>
11337 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11338 <para>
11339 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11340 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11341 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11342 the Constitution
11343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11344 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11345 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11346 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11347 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11348 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11349 </para>
11350 <para>
11351 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11352 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11353 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11354 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11355 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11356 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11357 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11358 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11359 sense.
11360 </para>
11361 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11362 <para>
11363 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11364 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11365 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11366 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11367 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11368 these retrospective extensions.
11369 </para>
11370 <para>
11371 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11372 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11373 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11374 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11375 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11376 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11377 </para>
11378 <para>
11379 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11380 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11381 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11382 overriding
11383 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11384 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11385 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11386 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11387 </para>
11388 <para>
11389 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11390 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11391
11392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11393 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11394 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11395 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11396 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11397 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11398 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11399 copyright be limited.
11400 </para>
11401 <para>
11402 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11403 Congress
11404 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11405 government
11406 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11407 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11408 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11409 </para>
11410 <para>
11411 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11412 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11413 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11414 existing
11415 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11416 </para>
11417 <para>
11418 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11419 extended
11420 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11421 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11422 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11423 existing
11424 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11425 restraint
11426 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11427 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11428 hesitated
11429 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11430 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11431 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11432 arrived
11433 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11434 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11435
11436 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11437 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11438 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11439 </para>
11440 <para>
11441 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11442 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11443 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11444 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11445 Congress
11446 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11447 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11448 this central idea.
11449 </para>
11450 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11451 <para>
11452 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11453 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11454 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11455 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11456 </para>
11457 <para>
11458 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11459 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11460 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11461 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11462 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11463 </para>
11464 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11465 <para>
11466 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11467 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11468 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11469 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11470 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11471 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11472 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11473 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11474 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11475 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11476 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11477
11478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11479 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11480 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11481 </para>
11482 <para>
11483 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11484 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11485 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11486 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11487 congressmen
11488 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11489 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11490 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11491 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11492 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11493 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11494 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11495 family of the Justices.
11496 </para>
11497 <para>
11498 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11499 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11500 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11501 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11502 </para>
11503 <para>
11504 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11505 The history was bothering her.
11506 </para>
11507 <blockquote>
11508 <para>
11509 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11510 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11511 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11512 practice that began with the very first act.
11513 </para>
11514 </blockquote>
11515 <para>
11516 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11517 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11518 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11519 </para>
11520 <blockquote>
11521 <para>
11522 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11523 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11525 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11526 is yes.
11527 </para>
11528 </blockquote>
11529 <para>
11530 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11531 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11532 Kennedy, who observed,
11533 </para>
11534 <blockquote>
11535 <para>
11536 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11537 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11538 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11539 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11540 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11541 </para>
11542 </blockquote>
11543 <para>
11544 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11545 student,
11546 I answered,
11547 </para>
11548 <blockquote>
11549 <para>
11550 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11551 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11552 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11553 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11554 effectively
11555 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11556 </para>
11557 </blockquote>
11558 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11559 <para>
11560 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11561 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11562 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11563 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11564 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11565 </para>
11566 <para>
11567 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11568 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11569 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11570 </para>
11571 <para>
11572 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11573 sympathetic.
11574 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11575
11576 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11577 </para>
11578 <blockquote>
11579 <para>
11580 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11581 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11582 </para>
11583 <para>
11584 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11585 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11586 domain
11587 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11588 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11589 into the Copyright Clause.
11590 </para>
11591 </blockquote>
11592 <para>
11593 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11594 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11595 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11596 </para>
11597 <blockquote>
11598 <para>
11599 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11600 unlimited
11601 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11602 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11603 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11604 an unlimited time.
11605 </para>
11606 </blockquote>
11607 <para>
11608 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11609 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11610 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11611 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11612 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11613 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11614 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause&mdash;
11615 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11616 specific
11617 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11618 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11619 </para>
11620 <para>
11621 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11622 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11623
11624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11625 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11626 optimistic.
11627 </para>
11628 <para>
11629 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11630 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11631 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11632 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11633 believed
11634 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11635 Copyright
11636 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11637 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11638 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11639 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11640 Copyright
11641 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11642 believe
11643 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in
11644 particular, the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule
11645 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11646 </para>
11647 <para>
11648 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11649 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11650 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11651 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11652 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11653 </para>
11654 <para>
11655 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11656 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11657 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11658 </para>
11659 <para>
11660 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11661 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11662 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11663 </para>
11664 <para>
11665 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11666 distinguish
11667 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11668 argument
11669 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11670 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11671 in the Court's opinion.
11672 </para>
11673 <para>
11674
11675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11676 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11677 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11678 generally,
11679 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11680 </para>
11681 <para>
11682 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11683 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11684 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11685 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11686 </para>
11687 <para>
11688 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11689 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11690 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11691 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11692 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11693 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11694 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11695 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11696 would not.
11697 </para>
11698 <para>
11699 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11700 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11701 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11702 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11703 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11704 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11705 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11706 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11707 the system we have.
11708 </para>
11709 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11710 <para>
11711 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11712 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11713 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11714 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11715 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11716 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11717 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11718 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11719 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11720 </para>
11721 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11722 <para>
11723 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11724 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11725 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11726 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11727 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11728 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11729 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11730 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11731 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11732 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11733 </para>
11734 <para>
11735 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11736 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11737 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11738 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11739 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11740 </para>
11741 <para>
11742 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11743 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11744 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11745 </para>
11746 <para>
11747 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11748 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11749 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11750 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11751 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11752 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11753 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11754 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11755 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11756 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11757 "originalism" now?
11758 </para>
11759 <para>
11760 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11761 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11762 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11763 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11764
11765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11766 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11767 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11768 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11769 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11770 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11771 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11772 own principles.
11773 </para>
11774 <para>
11775 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11776 myself.
11777 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11778 the law as it is.
11779 </para>
11780 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11781 <para>
11782 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11783 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11784 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11785 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11786 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11787 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11788 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11789 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11790 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11791 </para>
11792 <para>
11793 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11794 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11795 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11796 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11797 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11798 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11799 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11800 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11801 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11802 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11803 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11804 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11805 effort to persuade; but I
11806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11807 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11808 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11809 should decide the issue.
11810 </para>
11811 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11812 <para>
11813 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11814 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11815 Kathleen Sullivan?
11816 </para>
11817 <para>
11818 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11819 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11820 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11821 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11822 </para>
11823 <para>
11824 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11825 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11826 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11827 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11828 have persuaded.
11829 </para>
11830 <para>
11831 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11832 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11833 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11834 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11835 issue should not be raised until it is.
11836 </para>
11837 <para>
11838 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11839 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11840 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11841 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11842 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11843 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11844 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11845 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11846 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11847 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11848 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11849
11850 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11851 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11852 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11853 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11854 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11855 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11856 </para>
11857 <blockquote>
11858 <para>
11859 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11860 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11861 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11862 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11863 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11864 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11865 </para>
11866 </blockquote>
11867 <para>
11868 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11869 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11870 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11871 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11872 in the face felt exactly like that.
11873 </para>
11874 <para>
11875 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11876 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11877 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11878 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11879 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11880 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11881 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11882 </para>
11883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11884 </sect1>
11885 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
11886 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11887 <para>
11888 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11889 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11890 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11891 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11892 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11893 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11894 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11895 </para>
11896 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11897 <para>
11898 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11899 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11900 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11901 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11902 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11903 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11904 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11905 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11906 </para>
11907 <para>
11908 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11909 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11910 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11911 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11912 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11913 the work passed into the public domain.
11914 </para>
11915 <para>
11916 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11917 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11918 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11919 </para>
11920 <para>
11921 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11922 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11923 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11924 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11925 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11926 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11927 everything else, let the content go.
11928 </para>
11929 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11930 <para>
11931 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11932 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11933 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11934 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11935 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11936 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11937 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11938 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11939 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11940 the stupid harm of the present system.
11941 </para>
11942 <para>
11943 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11944 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11945 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11946 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11947 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11948 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11949 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11950 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11951 where copyright owners could be identified.
11952 </para>
11953 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11954 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11955 <para>
11956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11957 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
11958 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11959 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11960 <!-- f1. -->
11961 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11962 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11963 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11964 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11965 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11966 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11967 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11968 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11969 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11970 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11971 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11972 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11973 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11974 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11975 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11976 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11977 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11978 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11979 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11980 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11981 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11982 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11983 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11984 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11985 </para>
11986 <para>
11987 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11988 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11989 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11990 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11991 know what's protected and what's not.
11992 </para>
11993 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11994 <para>
11995 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11996 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11997 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11998 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11999 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12000 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12001 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
12002 in the loss of widows' only income.
12003 </para>
12004 <para>
12005 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12006 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12007 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12008 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12009 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12010 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12011 </para>
12012 <para>
12013 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12014 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12015 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12016 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12017 burden
12018 imposed upon creators.
12019 </para>
12020 <para>
12021 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
12022 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12023
12024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12025 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12026 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12027 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
12028 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12029 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12030 table.
12031 </para>
12032 <para>
12033 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12034 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12035 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12036 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12037 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12038 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12039 spread.
12040 </para>
12041 <para>
12042 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12043 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12044 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12045 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12046 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12047 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
12048 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12049 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12050 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12051 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12052 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12053 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12054 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12055 system of protection for property generally.
12056 </para>
12057 <para>
12058 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12059 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12060 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12061 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12062 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12063 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12064 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12065 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12066
12067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12068 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
12069 take their place.
12070 </para>
12071 <para>
12072 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12073 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12074 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12075 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12076 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12077 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12078 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12079 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12080 </para>
12081 <para>
12082 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12083 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12084 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12085 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12086 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12087 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12088 seen before because there are no formalities.
12089 </para>
12090 <para>
12091 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12092 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12093 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12094 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12095 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12096 </para>
12097 <para>
12098 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12099 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12100 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12101 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12102 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12103 </para>
12104 <para>
12105 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12106 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12107 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12108 registration?
12109 </para>
12110 <para>
12111 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12112 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12113 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12114
12115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12116 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12117 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12118 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12119 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12120 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12121 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12122 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12123 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
12124 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12125 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12126 </para>
12127 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12128 <para>
12129 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12130 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12131 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12132 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12133 </para>
12134 <para>
12135 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12136 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12137 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12138 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12139 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12140 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12141 something good might happen here.
12142 </para>
12143 <para>
12144 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12145 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12146 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12147 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12148 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12149 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12150 </para>
12151 <para>
12152 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12153 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12154 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12156 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12157 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12158 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12159 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12160 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12161 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12162 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12163 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12164 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12165 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12166 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12167 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12168 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12169 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12170 film is a valid derivative use.
12171 </para>
12172 <para>
12173 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12174 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12175 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12176 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12177 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12178 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12179 </para>
12180 <para>
12181 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12182 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12183 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12184 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12185 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12186 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12187 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12188 threat.
12189 </para>
12190 <para>
12191 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12192 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12193 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12194 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12195 sense?
12196 </para>
12197 <para>
12198
12199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12200 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12201 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12202 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12203 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12204 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12205 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12206 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12207 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12208 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12209 </para>
12210 <para>
12211 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12212 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12213 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12214 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12215 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12216 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12217 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12218 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12219 </para>
12220 <para>
12221 What does this industry really want?
12222 </para>
12223 <para>
12224 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12225 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12226 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12227 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12228 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12229 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12230 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12231 permission first.
12232 </para>
12233 <para>
12234 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12235 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12236 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12237 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12238 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12239 </para>
12240 <para>
12241 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12242 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12243
12244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12245 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12246 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12247 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12248 and to share its own creation.
12249 </para>
12250 <para>
12251 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12252 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12253 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12254 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12255 block the progress of others.
12256 </para>
12257 <para>
12258 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12259 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12260 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12261 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12262 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12263 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12264 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12265 </para>
12266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12267 </sect1>
12268 </chapter>
12269 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12270 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12271 <para>
12272 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12273 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12274 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12275 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12276 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12277 </para>
12278 <para>
12279 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12280 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12281 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12282 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12283 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12284 the disease almost invisible.
12285 </para>
12286 <para>
12287 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12288 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12289 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12290 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12291 population:
12292 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12293 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12294 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12295 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12296 available at
12297 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12298 release
12299 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12300 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12301 </para></footnote>
12302 </para>
12303 <para>
12304 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12305 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12306 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12307 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12308 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12309 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12310 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12311 </para>
12312 <para>
12313 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12314 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12315 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12316 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12317 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12318 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12319 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12320 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12321 changes.
12322 </para>
12323 <para>
12324 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12325 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12326 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12327 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12328 costs significantly below the market price.
12329 </para>
12330 <para>
12331 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12332 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12333 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12334 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12335 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12336 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12337 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12338 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12339 <para>
12340 <!-- f2. -->
12341 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12342 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12343 </para></footnote>
12344 </para>
12345 <para>
12346 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12347 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12348 Association
12349 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12350 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12351 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12352 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12353 Prepared
12354 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12355 2000), 14, available at
12356 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12357 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12358 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12359 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12360 (statement of James Love).
12361 </para></footnote>
12362 Through the
12363 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12364 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12365 request,
12366 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12367 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12368 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12369 began
12370 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12371 government's
12372 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12373 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12374 companies,
12375 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12376 international
12377 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12378 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12379 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12380 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12381 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12382 <!-- f4. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12383 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12384 Prepared
12385 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12386 2000), 15.
12387 </para></footnote>
12388 </para>
12389 <para>
12390 We should place the intervention by the United States in context.
12391 No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans
12392 don't have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12393 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12394 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their
12395 demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12396 marginal,
12397 there was an effect from our government's intervention to stop
12398 the flow of medications into Africa.
12399 </para>
12400 <para>
12401 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12402 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12403 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12404 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12405 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12406 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12407 </para>
12408 <para>
12409 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12410 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12411 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12412 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12413 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12414 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12415 by U.S. companies.
12416 </para>
12417 <para>
12418 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12419 information,
12420 which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument
12421 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12422 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12423 <!-- f5. --> See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12424 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12425 May 1999, A1, available at
12426 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink> ("compulsory licenses and gray
12427 markets
12428 pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property protection");
12429 Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
12430 Access
12431 to Essential Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999),
12432 available at
12433 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink> (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS,
12434 Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
12435 Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a
12436 Synopsis,"
12437 Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12439 </para></footnote>
12440 It was because "intellectual property"
12441 would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was
12442 a principle about the importance of "intellectual property" that led
12443 these government actors to intervene against the South African
12444 response
12445 to AIDS.
12446 </para>
12447 <para>
12448 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12449 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12450 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12451 direct
12452 cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans, and
12453 whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an idea?
12454 What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results
12455 in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so
12456 many to die for such an abstraction?
12457 </para>
12458 <para>
12459 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12460 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12461 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12462 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12463 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12464 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12465 </para>
12466 <para>
12467 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12468 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to sell their
12469 drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere.
12470 There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn't get
12471 back into the United States, but those are mere problems of
12472 technology.
12473 They could be overcome.
12474 </para>
12475 <para>
12476 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12477 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12478 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12479 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12480 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12481 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12482 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12483 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12484 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12485 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12486 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12487 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12488 idea called "intellectual property."
12489 </para>
12490 <para>
12491 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12492 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12493 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12494 What is the argument?
12495 </para>
12496 <para>
12497 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the
12498 patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly
12499 the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and
12500 strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the
12501 spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could
12502 endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block
12503 the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market
12504 prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12505 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were
12506 balanced in just this sense.
12507 </para>
12508 <para>
12509 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12510 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12511 extremism.
12512 A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our
12513 tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with consequences
12514 more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other
12515 single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12516 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much
12517 happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically
12518 do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice
12519 how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12520 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that
12521 we don't even question when the control of that property removes our
12522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12523 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12524 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12525 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12526 this common sense open its eyes.
12527 </para>
12528 <para>
12529 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12530 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12531 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12532 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12533 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12534 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12535 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12536 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12537 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12538 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12539 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12540 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12541 </para>
12542 <para>
12543 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12544 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12545 meeting.<footnote><para>
12546 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12547 August 2003, E1, available at
12548 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12549 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12550 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12551 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12552 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12553 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12554 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12555 </para></footnote>
12556 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had
12557 decided
12558 to hold a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to
12559 create public goods." These are projects that have been successful in
12560 producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary
12561 use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the
12562 World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of
12563 protocols
12564 in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support
12565 open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science
12566 project
12567 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12568 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12569 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12570 comprised
12571 a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12572 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12574 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12575 Glaxo-SmithKline,
12576 IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included
12577 the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the
12578 early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12579 </para>
12580 <para>
12581 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12582 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12583 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12584 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12585 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12586 </para>
12587 <para>
12588 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12589 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12590 meeting.
12591 </para></footnote>
12592 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12593 noncommercial
12594 work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12595 perspectives.
12596 And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12597 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12598 property issues.
12599 </para>
12600 <para>
12601 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12602 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12603 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information
12604 Society
12605 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked
12606 what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12607 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12608 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12609 interrupted
12610 to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12611 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12612 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12613 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12614 relatively
12615 minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual
12616 property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an
12617 "Information Society" unless one also talked about the range of
12618 information
12619 and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my
12620 immoderate
12621 moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the
12622 scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of
12623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12624 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12625 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12626 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12627 </para>
12628 <para>
12629 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual
12630 property,
12631 I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and
12632 should. And thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to
12633 create public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO
12634 agenda.
12635 </para>
12636 <para>
12637 But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial,
12638 at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source and free
12639 software."
12640 Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From
12641 its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software
12642 would be like a conference to discuss Apple's operating system. Both
12643 open source and free software compete with Microsoft's software. And
12644 internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements
12645 that they use open source or free software, rather than "proprietary
12646 software," for their own internal uses.
12647 </para>
12648 <para>
12649 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12650 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12651 noncommercial
12652 software. There are many important companies that depend
12653 fundamentally
12654 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12655 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12656 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM is
12657 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12658 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12659 support a mode of software development that is different from
12660 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12661 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12662 sophisticated.
12663 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12664 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12665 opposition
12666 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12667 license
12668 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12669 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12670 Marketplace
12671 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12672 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12673 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2002), 69,
12674 available at
12675 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12676 president,
12677 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12678 Stern School of Business (3 May 2001), available at
12679 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12680 </para></footnote>
12681 </para>
12682 <para>
12683 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12684 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12685 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12686 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12687 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12688 by
12689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12690 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12691 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12692 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12693 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12694 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12695 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12696 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12697 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12698 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12699 </para>
12700 <para>
12701 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12702 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12703 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12704 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12705 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12706 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12707 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12708 <!-- f9. -->
12709 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12710 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12711 </para></footnote>
12712 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12713 </para>
12714 <para>
12715 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12716 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12717 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12718 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12719 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12720 its lobbying efforts.
12721 </para>
12722 <para>
12723 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12724 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12725 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12726 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12727 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12728 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12729 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12730 goals of WIPO."
12731 </para>
12732 <para>
12733 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12734 </para>
12735 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12736 <para>
12737 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12738 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12739 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12740 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12741 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12742 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12743 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12744 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12745 </para>
12746 <para>
12747 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12748 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12749 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12750 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12751 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12752 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12753 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12754 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12755 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12756 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12757 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12758 </para>
12759 <para>
12760 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12761 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12762 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12763 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12764 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12765 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12766 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12767 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12768 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12769 right to decide what to do with their property.
12770 </para>
12771 <para>
12772 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12773 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12774 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12776 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12777 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12778 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12779 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12780 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12781 way possible.
12782 </para>
12783 <para>
12784 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12785 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12786 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12787 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12788 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12789 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12790 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12791 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12792 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12793 that control.
12794 </para>
12795 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12796 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12797 <para>
12798 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12799 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12800 <!-- f10. -->
12801 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
12802 </para></footnote>
12803 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12804 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12805 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12806 </para>
12807 <para>
12808 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12809 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12810 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12811 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12812 </para>
12813 <blockquote>
12814 <para>
12815 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12816 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12817 should be to promote the right balance of intellectualproperty rights,
12818 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12819 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12820 say anything wrong. But in the world
12821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12822 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12823 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12824 </para>
12825 </blockquote>
12826 <para>
12827 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12828 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12829 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12830 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12831 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12832 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12833 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12834 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12835 </para>
12836 <para>
12837 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12838 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12839 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12840 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12841 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12842 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12843 </para>
12844 <para>
12845 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12846 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12847 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12848 our own country's history).
12849 </para>
12850 <para>
12851 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12852 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12853 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12854 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12855 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12856 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12857 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12858 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12859 democracy in the world, become?
12860 </para>
12861 <para>
12862 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12863 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12864 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12866 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12867 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12868 </para>
12869 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12870 <para>
12871 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12872 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12873 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12874 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12875 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12876 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12877 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12878 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12879 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12880 hearings and a different result.
12881 </para>
12882 <para>
12883 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12884 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12885 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12886 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12887 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12888 concentration in the media.
12889 </para>
12890 <para>
12891 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12892 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12893 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12894 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12895 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12896 </para>
12897 <para>
12898 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12899 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12900 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12901 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12902 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12903 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12904 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12905 </para>
12906 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12907 <para>
12908 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12909 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12910 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12911 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12912 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12913 </para>
12914 <para>
12915 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12916 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12917 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12918 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12919 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12920 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12921 </para>
12922 <para>
12923 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12924 of our tragedy.
12925 </para>
12926 <para>
12927 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12928 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12929 <!-- f11. -->
12930 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12931 2003, available at
12932 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12933 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12934 2003, available at
12935 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12936 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12937 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News, 9
12938 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12939 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12940 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12941 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
12942 available at
12943 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12944 </para></footnote>
12945 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12946 music.<footnote><para>
12947 <!-- f12. -->
12948 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12949 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12950 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12951 </para></footnote>
12952 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12953 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12954 <!-- f13. -->
12955 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12956 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12957 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12959 </para></footnote>
12960 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12961 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12962 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12963 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12964 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12965 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12966 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12967 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12968 kids who use a computer to share content.
12969 </para>
12970 <para>
12971 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12972 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12973 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12974 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12975 24 August 2003, available at
12976 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12977 </para></footnote>
12978 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12979 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12980 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12981 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12982 country.<footnote><para>
12983 <!-- f15. --> "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August
12984 2003, available at
12985 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12986 </para></footnote>
12987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12988 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12989 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12990 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12991 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12992 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12993 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12994 day into the Causbys.
12995 </para>
12996 <para>
12997 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12998 potential is ever to be realized.
12999
13000 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13001
13002 </para>
13003 </chapter>
13004 <chapter id="c-afterword">
13005 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
13006 <para>
13007
13008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13009 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
13010 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
13011 maps what might be done.
13012 </para>
13013 <para>
13014 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13015 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13016 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13017 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13018 </para>
13019 <para>
13020 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13021 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13022 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
13023 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13024 is so important.
13025 </para>
13026 <para>
13027 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13028 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13029 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13030 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13031 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13032 </para>
13033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13034
13035 <sect1 id="usnow">
13036 <title>US, NOW</title>
13037 <para>
13038 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
13039 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
13040 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13041 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13042 </para>
13043 <para>
13044 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13045 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13046 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
13047 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
13048 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
13049 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
13050 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13051 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13052 </para>
13053 <para>
13054 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13055 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13056 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13057 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13058 the
13059
13060 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13061 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13062 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13063 unprotected.
13064 </para>
13065 <para>
13066 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13067 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13068 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13069 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13070 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13071 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
13072 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
13073 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13074 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13075 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
13076 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
13077 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13078 </para>
13079 <para>
13080 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither "all
13081 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"&mdash;
13082 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content
13083 as they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of
13084 freedoms
13085 that we could just take for granted before.
13086 </para>
13087
13088 <sect2 id="examples">
13089 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
13090 <para>
13091 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13092 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13093 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13094 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13095 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13096 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13097 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
13098 assured.
13099 </para>
13100 <para>
13101 What made it assured?
13102 </para>
13103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13104 <para>
13105 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13106 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
13107 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13108 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13109 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13110 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13111 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13112 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13113 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13114 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13115 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13116 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13117 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13118 </para>
13119 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13120 <para>
13121 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13122 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13123 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13124 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13125 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13126 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13127 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13128 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13129 </para>
13130 <para>
13131 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13132 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13133 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13134 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13135 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13136 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13137 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13138 disappears.
13139 </para>
13140 <para>
13141 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13142 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13143 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13144 friction did.<footnote><para>
13145 <!-- f1. -->
13146
13147 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13148 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
13149 Law Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13150
13151 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13152 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13153 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13154 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13155 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13156 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13157 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13158
13159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13160 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13161 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13162 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13163 </para>
13164 <para>
13165 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13166 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13167 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13168 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13169 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13170 care much about controlling their software.
13171 </para>
13172 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13173 <para>
13174 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13175 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13176 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13177 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13178 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13179 people's work.
13180 </para>
13181 <para>
13182 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13183 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13184 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13185 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13186 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13187 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13188 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13189 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13190 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13191 anything else?
13192 </para>
13193 <para>
13194 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13195 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13196 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13197 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13198 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13199 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13200 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13201 </para>
13202 <para>
13203 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13204 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13205 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13206 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13207 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13208 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13209 fundamentally weakened.
13210 </para>
13211 <para>
13212 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13213 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13214 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13215 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13216 </para>
13217 <para>
13218 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13219 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13220 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13221 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13222 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13223 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13224 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13225 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13226 byproduct.
13227 </para>
13228 <para>
13229 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13230 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13231 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13232 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13233 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13234 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13235 </para>
13236 <para>
13237 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13238 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13239 scientific journals are produced.
13240 </para>
13241 <para>
13242 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many
13243 that printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending
13244 them to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13245 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13246 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
13247 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
13248 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
13249 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
13250 service.
13251 Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and
13252 anyone
13253 is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free
13254 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13255 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13256 Court opinion through their respective services.
13257 </para>
13258 <para>
13259 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability
13260 to charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13261 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13262 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been
13263 allowed
13264 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13265 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13266 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13267 </para>
13268 <para>
13269 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13270 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13271 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13272 </para>
13273 <para>
13274 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13275 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
13276 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to
13277 the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts
13278 because
13279 the library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand
13280 the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks by reading all
13281 available articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a
13282 function of the institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of
13283 paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it was very hard to control
13284 access to a paper journal.
13285 </para>
13286 <para>
13287 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are
13288 demanding
13289 that libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This
13290 means that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries
13291 begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing
13292 technology and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
13293 </para>
13294 <para>
13295 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13296 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13297 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13298 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13299 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13300 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13301 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is then
13302 deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13303 available
13304 for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but the
13305 copyright
13306 for the print journal does not inhibit the right of anyone to
13307 redistribute the work for free.
13308 </para>
13309 <para>
13310 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13311 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and
13312 markets.
13313 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the
13314 traditional
13315 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13316 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13317 presumptively
13318 a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge and science.
13319 </para>
13320
13321 </sect2>
13322 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13323 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13324 <para>
13325 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13326 increasing
13327 control effected through law and technology.
13328 </para>
13329 <para>
13330 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13331 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13332 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13333 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13334 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13335 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13336 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13337 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13338 </para>
13339 <para>
13340 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13341 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13342 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13343 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13344 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13345 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13346 three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable
13347 description, and
13348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13349 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13350 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13351 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13352 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13353 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13354 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13355 certain freedoms are given.
13356 </para>
13357 <para>
13358 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13359 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13360 creator
13361 can choose a license that permits any use, so long as attribution is
13362 given. She can choose a license that permits only noncommercial use.
13363 She can choose a license that permits any use so long as the same
13364 freedoms
13365 are given to other uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so
13366 long as no derivative use is made. Or any use at all within developing
13367 nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full copies are not made. Or
13368 lastly, any educational use.
13369 </para>
13370 <para>
13371 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default
13372 of copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13373 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13374 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13375 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13376 governed
13377 by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13378 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13379 content
13380 available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a
13381 public
13382 domain.
13383 </para>
13384 <para>
13385 This is just one project among many within the Creative
13386 Commons.
13387 And of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization
13388 pursuing such freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative
13389 Commons from many is that we are not interested only in talking
13390 about a public domain or in getting legislators to help build a public
13391 domain. Our aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13393 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13394 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13395 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13396 </para>
13397 <para>
13398 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is
13399 to complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a
13400 culture
13401 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws
13402 written centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could
13403 have imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a
13404 background
13405 of technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense
13406 against the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with
13407 different
13408 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can
13409 use them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way
13410 effectively
13411 to begin to build those rules.
13412 </para>
13413 <para>
13414 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13415 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example,
13416 is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in the Magic
13417 Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13418 Commons
13419 license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13420 </para>
13421 <para>
13422 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13423 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1) those
13424 who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (2)
13425 those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for
13426 free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download Cory's book
13427 instead
13428 of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2) will download
13429 Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (2)-goods.
13430 If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the strategy of releasing
13431 Cory's book free on-line will probably increase sales of Cory's book.
13432 </para>
13433 <para>
13434 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13435 conclusion.
13436 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13437 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was
13438 a total success.
13439 </para>
13440 <para>
13441 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree
13442 content
13443 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13445 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13446 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13447 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13448 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13449 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13450 well.
13451 </para>
13452 <para>
13453 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13454 proprietary
13455 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13456 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13457 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13458 anything
13459 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others
13460 are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content
13461 from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13462 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13463 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the legal costs of sampling
13464 are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy,
13465 which was born sampling the music of others, has stated that he does
13466 not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs
13467 are so high<footnote><para>
13468 <!-- f2. --> Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real Culture Wars
13469 (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg Hittelman, a Fiat
13470 Lucre
13471 production, available at
13472 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13473 </para></footnote>),
13474 these artists release into the creative environment content
13475 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13476 </para>
13477 <para>
13478 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative
13479 Commons license just because they want to express to others the
13480 importance
13481 of balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system
13482 as it is, you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13483 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13484 appropriate
13485 that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate
13486 description of how most creators view the rights associated with their
13487 content. The Creative Commons license expresses this notion of "Some
13488 Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to say it to others.
13489 </para>
13490 <para>
13491 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13492 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13493 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13494 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13495
13496 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13497 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13498 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13499 </para>
13500 <para>
13501 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13502 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13503 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13504 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13505 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13506 steps are possible.
13507 </para>
13508 <para>
13509 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13510 individuals
13511 and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the
13512 creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13513 complements
13514 it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it
13515 easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and
13516 cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread
13517 more easily.
13518 </para>
13519
13520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13521 </sect2>
13522 </sect1>
13523 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13524 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13525 <para>
13526 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13527 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13528 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13529 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13530 changes that we need.
13531 </para>
13532 <para>
13533 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13534 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13535 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13536 to our end.
13537 </para>
13538
13539 <sect2 id="formalities">
13540 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13541 <para>
13542 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13543 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13544 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13545 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13546 </para>
13547 <para>
13548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13549 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13550 requirements
13551 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
13552 </para>
13553 <para>
13554 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13555 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13556 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13557 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13558 </para>
13559 <para>
13560 Why?
13561 </para>
13562 <para>
13563 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13564 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13565 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13566 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13567 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13568 formalities
13569 were getting in the way.
13570 </para>
13571 <para>
13572 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13573 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13574 burdens
13575 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what,
13576 or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13577 creative
13578 work of others. There are no records, there is no system to trace&mdash;
13579 there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the
13580 massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is
13581 a necessary step for any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
13582 lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could
13583 speak.
13584 </para>
13585 <para>
13586 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13587 <!-- f1. --> The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13588 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
13589 by other countries as well.
13590 </para></footnote>&mdash;but it should
13591 not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We should
13592 require
13593 formalities, but we should establish a system that will create the
13594 incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13595 </para>
13596 <para>
13597 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13598 registering
13599 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally,
13600 the first of these three was something the copyright owner did; the
13601 second
13602 two were something the government did. But a revised system of
13603 formalities would banish the government from the process, except for
13604 the sole purpose of approving standards developed by others.
13605 </para>
13606
13607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13608
13609 <sect3 id="registration">
13610 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13611 <para>
13612 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with
13613 the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
13614 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
13615 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the
13616 burden of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.
13617 And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of government
13618 policymaking,
13619 the office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus,
13620 when people who know something about the process hear this idea
13621 about formalities, their first reaction is panic&mdash;nothing could be worse
13622 than forcing people to deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13623 </para>
13624 <para>
13625 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a
13626 tradition
13627 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13628 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13629 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't
13630 follow that the government must actually administer the role. Instead,
13631 we should be creating incentives for private parties to serve the public,
13632 subject to standards that the government sets.
13633 </para>
13634 <para>
13635 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13636 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13637 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13638 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13639 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13640 performed
13641 by many competing registrars. That competition drives the cost
13642 of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease with which
13643 registration occurs up.
13644 </para>
13645 <para>
13646 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13647 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry,
13648 but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should
13649 establish
13650 a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
13651 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete
13652 with one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for
13653 registering
13654 and renewing copyrights. That competition would
13655 substantially
13656 lower the burden of this formality&mdash;while producing a database
13657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13658 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13659 </para>
13660
13661 </sect3>
13662 <sect3 id="marking">
13663 <title>MARKING</title>
13664 <para>
13665 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
13666 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13667 punishment
13668 for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to imposing
13669 the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.
13670 Here again, there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be
13671 enforced in this way. And more importantly, there is no reason a
13672 marking
13673 requirement needs to be enforced uniformly across all media.
13674 </para>
13675 <para>
13676 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13677 copyrighted
13678 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also
13679 makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use
13680 the work.
13681 </para>
13682 <para>
13683 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13684 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13685 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13686 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13687 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13688 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13689 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13690 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13691 </para>
13692 <para>
13693 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13694 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13695 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13696 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13697 copyright
13698 owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13699 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13700 <!-- f2. --> There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13701 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13702 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13703 </para></footnote>
13704 The meaning of an unmarked work would
13705 therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
13706 complain,
13707 then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
13708 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13709 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13710 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13711 their work.
13712 </para>
13713 <para>
13714 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13715 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13716 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13717 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13718 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13719 </para>
13720 <para>
13721 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13722 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13723 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13724 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13725 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13726 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13727 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13728 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13729 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13730 </para>
13731 <para>
13732 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13733 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13734 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13735 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13736 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13737 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13738 </para>
13739 <para>
13740 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13741 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13742 make things unclear.
13743 </para>
13744 <para>
13745 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13746 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13747 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13748 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13749 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13750 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13751 </para>
13752
13753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13754 </sect3>
13755 </sect2>
13756 <sect2 id="shortterms">
13757 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13758 <para>
13759 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13760 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13761 natural authors.
13762 </para>
13763 <para>
13764 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13765 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five years.
13766 That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost Eldred v.
13767 Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The Economist
13768 endorsed
13769 a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright term.<footnote><para>
13770 <!-- f3. --> "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15, available
13771 at
13772 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13773 </para></footnote>
13774 Others have
13775 proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13776 </para>
13777 <para>
13778 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13779 copyright's
13780 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four
13781 principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
13782 </para>
13783 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13784 <listitem><para>
13785 <!-- (1) -->
13786 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to
13787 give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very
13788 strong protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim
13789 rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13790 derivative
13791 works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13792 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an
13793 author.
13794 </para></listitem>
13795 <listitem><para>
13796 <!-- (2) -->
13797 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and
13798 protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13799 fuzziness
13800 of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13801 "expression."
13802 That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13803 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus
13804 unprotected.
13805 The value of short terms is that there is little need to
13806 build exceptions into copyright when the term itself is kept
13807 short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13808 complexities
13809 of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13810 navigate.
13811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13812 </para></listitem>
13813 <listitem><para>
13814 <!-- (3) -->
13815 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed.
13816 Especially
13817 if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13818 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the
13819 protection continued. This need not be an onerous burden,
13820 but there is no reason this monopoly protection has to be
13821 granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13822 veteran
13823 to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
13824 <!-- f4. --> Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13825 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13826 available at
13827 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13828 </para></footnote>
13829 If we make veterans suffer that
13830 burden, I don't see why we couldn't require authors to spend
13831 ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
13832 </para></listitem>
13833 <listitem><para>
13834 <!-- (4) -->
13835 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should
13836 be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term
13837 once given should not be extended. It might have been a
13838 mistake
13839 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year
13840 term. I don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then
13841 the consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
13842 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct that
13843 mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do
13844 today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13845 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who
13846 write now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden
13847 that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
13848 increasing
13849 their reward will not increase their creativity in 1923.
13850 What's not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do
13851 about that now.
13852 </para></listitem>
13853 </orderedlist>
13854 <para>
13855 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13856 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
13857 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13858 </para>
13859 <para>
13860 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13861 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13862 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13863 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13864 </para>
13865
13866 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13867
13868 </sect2>
13869 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
13870 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13871 <para>
13872 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13873 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13874 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13875 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13876 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13877 the emergence of that new technology.
13878 </para>
13879 <para>
13880 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
13881 "exclusive
13882 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13883 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that
13884 are sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
13885 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the
13886 right to release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
13887 </para>
13888 <para>
13889 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13890 expanded
13891 the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control
13892 translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13893 <!-- f5. --> Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13894 University Press, 1967), 32.
13895 </para></footnote>
13896 The courts have expanded
13897 it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This expansion has
13898 been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
13899 Benjamin
13900 Kaplan.
13901 </para>
13902 <blockquote>
13903 <para>
13904 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13905 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13906 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13907 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13908 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13909 </para></footnote>
13910 </para>
13911 </blockquote>
13912 <para>
13913 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13914 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13915 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13916 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13917 Consider each limitation in turn.
13918 </para>
13919 <para>
13920 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13921 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13922
13923 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13924 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13925 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13926 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13927 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13928 after the creative work is done.
13929 </para>
13930 <para>
13931 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13932 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13933 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13934 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13935 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13936 perhaps
13937 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer
13938 makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the
13939 creative
13940 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine
13941 pouring
13942 molasses into the machines. That's what this general requirement
13943 of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13944 </para>
13945 <para>
13946 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13947 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13948 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13949 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13950 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13951 much more sense.
13952 </para>
13953 <para>
13954 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13955 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13956 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13957 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13958 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13959 <para>
13960 <!-- f7. -->
13961 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13962 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13963 </para></footnote>
13964 His view is that the law should be written so that
13965 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13966 </para>
13967 <para>
13968 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13969 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13970 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13971 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13972 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13973 </para>
13974 <para>
13975 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13976 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13977 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13978 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13979 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13980 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13981 </para>
13982 </sect2>
13983
13984 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
13985 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13986 <para>
13987 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13988 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13989 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13990 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13991 battles around the sharing of music.
13992 </para>
13993 <para>
13994 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13995 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13996 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13997 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13998 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13999 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14000 innovation on the network.
14001 </para>
14002 <para>
14003 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14004 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14005 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14006 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14007 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14008 </para>
14009 <para>
14010 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
14011 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
14012 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
14013 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
14014 </para>
14015 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
14016 <listitem><para>
14017 <!-- A. -->
14018 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14019 for purchasing CDs.
14020 </para></listitem>
14021 <listitem><para>
14022 <!-- B. -->
14023 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14024 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14025 </para></listitem>
14026 <listitem><para>
14027 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14028 <!-- C. -->
14029 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14030 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14031 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14032 </para></listitem>
14033 <listitem><para>
14034 <!-- D. -->
14035 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14036 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14037 owner plainly endorses.
14038 </para></listitem>
14039 </orderedlist>
14040 <para>
14041 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14042 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14043 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14044 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14045 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14046 significantly weakened.
14047 </para>
14048 <para>
14049 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14050 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14051 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14052 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14053 networks.
14054 </para>
14055 <para>
14056 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14057 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14058 should respond.
14059 </para>
14060 <para>
14061 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14062 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14063 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14064 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14065 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
14066 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14067 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14068 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14069 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14070 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14071 </para>
14072 <para>
14073 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14074 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14075 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14076 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14077 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14078 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14079 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14080 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14081 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14082 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
14083 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
14084 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14085 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14086 </para>
14087 <para>
14088 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
14089 that give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet
14090 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
14091 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
14092 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
14093 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
14094 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
14095 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
14096 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14097 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14098 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14099 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14100 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14101 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14102 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
14103 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
14104 <!-- f8. -->
14105 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
14106 April 2002, available at
14107 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
14108 </para></footnote>
14109
14110 </para>
14111 <para>
14112 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14113 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14114 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
14115 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14116 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14117 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14118 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14119 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14120 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14121 artists get paid, during
14122
14123 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14124 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14125 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14126 </para>
14127 <para>
14128 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14129 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14130 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14131 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14132 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14133 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14134 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14135 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14136 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14137 </para>
14138 <para>
14139 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14140 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14141 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14142 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14143 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14144 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14145 way that returns something to the artist.
14146 </para>
14147 <para>
14148 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14149 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14150 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14151 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14152 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14153 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14154 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14155 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14156 </para>
14157 <para>
14158 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14159 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14160 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14161 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14162 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14163 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14164 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14165 </para>
14166 <para>
14167
14168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14169 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14170 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14171 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14172 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14173 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14174 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14175 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14176 trade.
14177 </para>
14178 <para>
14179 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14180 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14181 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14182 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14183 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14184 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14185 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14186 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14187 </para>
14188 <para>
14189 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14190 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14191 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14192 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14193 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14194 delivering and accessing content.
14195 </para>
14196 <para>
14197 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14198 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14199 </para>
14200 <para>
14201 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14202 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14203 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14204 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14205 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14206 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14207 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14208 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14209 </para>
14210 <para>
14211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14212 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14213 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14214 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14215 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14216 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14217 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14218 </para>
14219 <para>
14220 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14221 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14222 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14223 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14224 <para>
14225 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14226 10 October 2000), available at
14227 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14228 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14229 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
14230 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14231 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14232 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14233 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14234 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14235 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14236 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14237 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14238 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14239 available at
14240 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14241 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14242 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14243 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14244 2002, available at
14245 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14246 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14247 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14248 McCullagh,
14249 "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14250 2002, available at
14251 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14252 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14253 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14254 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14255 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14256 debate
14257 by about a decade. See
14258 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14259 </para></footnote>
14260 Fisher suggests a
14261 very clever way around the current impasse of the Internet. Under his
14262 plan, all content capable of digital transmission would (1) be marked
14263 with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to evade
14264 these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once the
14265 content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to
14266 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the
14267 basis
14268 of those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The
14269 compensation
14270 would be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
14271 </para>
14272 <para>
14273 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14274 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14275 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14276 simple:
14277 Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14278 system.
14279 I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of the
14280 proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
14281 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14282 facilitating
14283 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal
14284 after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free
14285 exchange
14286 of content, supported through a taxation system, then it can be
14287 continued. If this form of protection is no longer necessary, then the
14288 system could lapse into the old system of controlling access.
14289 </para>
14290 <para>
14291 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His
14292 aim is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the
14293 system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But
14294 the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes
14295 I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the limits on derivative
14296
14297 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14298 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14299 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14300 allowed
14301 to do with the content itself.
14302 </para>
14303 <para>
14304 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14305 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14306 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14307 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14308 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14309 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14310 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14311 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14312 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14313 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14314 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14315 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14316 on-line.
14317 </para>
14318 <para>
14319 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14320 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14321 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14322 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14323 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14324 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14325 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14326 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14327 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14328 finding ways to compete with "free."
14329 </para>
14330 <para>
14331 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14332 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14333 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14334 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14335 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14336 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14337 the law.
14338 </para>
14339 <para>
14340 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14341 </para>
14342 <para>
14343
14344 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14345 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14346 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14347 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14348 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14349 create.
14350 </para>
14351 <para>
14352 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14353 by
14354 </para>
14355 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14356 <listitem><para>
14357 <!-- 1. -->
14358 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14359 </para></listitem>
14360 <listitem><para>
14361 <!-- 2. -->
14362 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14363 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14364 statute;
14365 </para></listitem>
14366 <listitem><para>
14367 <!-- 3. -->
14368 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14369 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14370 </para></listitem>
14371 </orderedlist>
14372 <para>
14373 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a
14374 competitive
14375 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14376 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14377 something then?
14378 </para>
14379 <para>
14380 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14381 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But
14382 the real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract.
14383 The real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14384 technology
14385 that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x, or
14386 (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14387 market
14388 of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14389 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14390 authorized
14391 sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14392 compensation
14393 without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then it
14394 may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty pirates.
14395 </para>
14396 <para>
14397 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14398 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not be
14399 on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14400
14401 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14402 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting the
14403 space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14404 </para>
14405 </sect2>
14406
14407 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14408 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14409 <para>
14410 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14411 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14412 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14413 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14414 </para>
14415 <para>
14416 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14417 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it is
14418 my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client. And
14419 in a world where the rich clients have one strong view, the
14420 unwillingness
14421 of the profession to question or counter that one strong view queers
14422 the law.
14423 </para>
14424 <para>
14425 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14426 "radical"
14427 by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14428 advocating
14429 are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate and
14430 significant figures in the history of this branch of the law. Many, for
14431 example,
14432 thought crazy the challenge that we brought to the Copyright
14433 Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the dominant scholar
14434 and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville Nimmer, thought it
14435 obvious.<footnote><para>
14436 <!-- f10. --> Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14437 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14438 </para></footnote>
14439
14440 </para>
14441 <para>
14442 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14443 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14444 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14445 </para>
14446 <para>
14447 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and
14448 benefits.
14449 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the
14450 legal system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction
14451 costs of the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14452 <!-- f11. --> A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is to
14453 be commended for his careful review of data about infringement, leading
14454 him to question his own publicly stated position&mdash;twice. He initially
14455 predicted
14456 that downloading would substantially harm the industry. He then
14457 revised his view in light of the data, and he has since revised his view again.
14458 Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True
14459 Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002),
14460 (reviewing his original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J.
14461 Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper,
14462 June 2003, available at
14463 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14464 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14465 effect
14466 of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he underestimates the
14467 costs of the legal system. See, for example, Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14468 </para></footnote>
14469 They see a system that has been
14470 around for hundreds of years, and they assume it works the way their
14471 elementary school civics class taught them it works.
14472 </para>
14473 <para>
14474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14475 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't
14476 work for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14477 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal level, at
14478 least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of our legal
14479 system
14480 are so astonishingly high that justice can practically never be done.
14481 </para>
14482 <para>
14483 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14484 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14485 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14486 obscure
14487 strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality: very
14488 little.
14489 The law depended upon the careful articulation and development
14490 of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development of legal
14491 doctrine
14492 depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work costs too much,
14493 except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14494 </para>
14495 <para>
14496 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14497 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14498 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14499 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14500 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14501 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14502 </para>
14503 <para>
14504 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the
14505 law away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is
14506 precisely
14507 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left
14508 to its review.
14509 </para>
14510 <para>
14511 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with
14512 digital technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or
14513 think about the amazing things your community could facilitate with
14514 digital technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change
14515 something.
14516 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold
14517 molasses poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that
14518 requires
14519 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's
14520 Russia.
14521 </para>
14522 <para>
14523 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14524 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14525
14526 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14527 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14528 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14529 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14530 </para>
14531 <para>
14532 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14533 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14534 keep your lawyers away.
14535 </para>
14536 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14537 </sect2>
14538 </sect1>
14539 </chapter>
14540 <chapter id="c-notes">
14541 <title>NOTES</title>
14542 <para>
14543 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14544 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14545 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14546 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14547 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14548 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14549 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14550 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14551 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14552 the material.
14553 </para>
14554 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14555
14556 </chapter>
14557 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14558 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14559 <para>
14560 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14561 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14562 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14563 to him that this book is dedicated.
14564 </para>
14565 <para>
14566 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14567 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14568 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14569 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14570 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14571 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14572 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14573 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14574 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14575 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14576 critical eye on much of this.
14577 </para>
14578 <para>
14579 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14580 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14581 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14582 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14584 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14585 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14586 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14587 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14588 </para>
14589 <para>
14590 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14591 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14592 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14593 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14594 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14595 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14596 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14597 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14598 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14599 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14600 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14601 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14602 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14603 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14604 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14605 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14606 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14607 a bunch of great replies.)
14608 </para>
14609 <para>
14610 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14611 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14612 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14613 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14614 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14615 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14616 throughout this book.
14617 </para>
14618 <para>
14619 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14620 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14621 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14622 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14623 </para>
14624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14625
14626 </chapter>
14627 </book>