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19 <book id=
"index" lang=
"en">
21 <title>Free Culture
</title>
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
25 <subtitle>Version
2004-
02-
10</subtitle>
29 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
52 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz
25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "
50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
78 <itemizedlist mark=
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79 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B
&N
</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin
</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
91 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
95 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
112 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
113 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
114 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
126 a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
130 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig,
136 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
137 The New York Times, January
16,
2003. Copyright
© 2003 by The New York Times Co.
138 Reprinted with permission.
141 Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page
159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
144 All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
147 Diagram on page
164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
150 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
154 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
155 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
164 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
167 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
170 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
176 343.7309'
9—dc22
179 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
182 Printed in the United States of America
188 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
196 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
197 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
198 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
199 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
200 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
201 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
202 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
203 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
204 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
205 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
206 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
211 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
215 <figure id=
"CreativeCommons">
216 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</title>
217 <graphic fileref=
"images/cc.png"></graphic>
223 <title>List of figures
</title>
230 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
231 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
232 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
233 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
238 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
242 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
243 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
244 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
245 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
246 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
247 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
251 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
252 2 Architecture and Law: Force
253 2 Market: Concentration
256 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
257 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
258 2 Constraining Creators
259 2 Constraining Innovators
260 2 Corrupting Citizens
262 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
263 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
267 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
268 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
270 2 1. More Formalities
271 3 Registration and Renewal
274 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
275 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
276 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
285 <chapter id=
"c-preface">
286 <title>PREFACE
</title>
288 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
289 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
290 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
294 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
295 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
296 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
297 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
298 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times,
30 January
2000.
303 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
304 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
305 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
306 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
307 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
308 any troubles that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
311 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
312 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
313 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
315 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
316 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
317 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
320 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
321 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
322 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
323 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
326 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
327 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"
—not
328 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
329 free software movement
<footnote>
331 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies
57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
332 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
333 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
334 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
335 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
336 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
337 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
338 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
339 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
340 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"
—a culture in
341 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
342 or of creators from the past.
345 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
346 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
347 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
348 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
349 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
350 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
351 culture deem fundamental.
353 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
355 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
356 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
357 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
358 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
359 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
360 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
361 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
362 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
367 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
368 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
369 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
370 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
371 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
372 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times,
22 May
2003.
377 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
378 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
379 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
380 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
381 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
382 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
383 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
384 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
385 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
386 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
387 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
388 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
389 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
390 that this work is "merely" derivative.
393 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
394 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
395 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
396 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
397 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
398 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
399 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
400 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
403 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
404 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
405 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
406 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
407 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
411 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
412 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
413 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
414 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
415 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
416 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
417 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
425 <chapter id=
"c-introduction">
426 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
428 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
429 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
430 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
431 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
432 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
433 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
436 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
437 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
438 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
439 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."
<footnote><para>
440 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries
3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
441 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
444 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
445 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
446 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
449 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
450 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
451 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
452 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
453 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
454 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
455 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
457 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
458 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
460 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
461 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
462 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
463 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
464 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
465 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
466 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
467 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
468 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
470 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
471 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
473 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
474 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
475 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
476 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
477 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
478 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
479 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
480 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
484 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
485 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
486 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
487 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
488 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
489 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
490 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
491 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
493 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
494 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
495 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
496 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
497 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
498 Authorship," Stanford Law Review
48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
499 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
501 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
502 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
507 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
510 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
511 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
512 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
514 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
515 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
516 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
517 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
518 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
520 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
521 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
523 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
524 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
525 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
526 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
527 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
528 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
529 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
530 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
531 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
532 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
533 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
534 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
535 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
536 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else
—the power of
537 "common sense"
—would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
538 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
541 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
542 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
543 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
544 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
545 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
546 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
547 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
548 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
549 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
550 understanding of radio.
551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
552 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
555 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
556 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
557 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
558 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
559 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
560 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
561 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
562 much less transmitter power and static.
565 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
566 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
567 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
568 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
569 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
570 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
571 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
572 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
573 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
576 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
580 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
581 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
582 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
583 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
584 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
585 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
586 box."
<footnote><para>
587 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
588 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
593 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
594 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
595 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
596 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
597 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
598 a handful of networks.
599 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
602 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
603 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
604 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
605 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
606 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
610 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
611 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
612 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
613 RCA.
<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
614 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
615 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
617 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
622 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
623 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
624 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
629 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
630 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
631 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
632 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
633 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
634 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
639 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
640 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
641 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
642 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
643 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
644 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
645 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
646 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
647 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
648 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
649 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
654 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
655 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
656 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
657 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
662 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
664 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
665 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
666 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
667 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
668 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
669 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
670 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
674 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
675 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
676 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
677 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
678 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
679 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
680 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
681 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
682 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
683 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
686 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
687 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
688 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
689 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
690 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
691 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
692 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
693 course always public spirited; the reality is something
694 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
695 to themselves, would crumble in
696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
697 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
698 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
699 effect of technological change.
702 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
703 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
704 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
705 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
706 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
707 before.
<footnote><para>
708 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
709 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
710 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
711 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
713 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
717 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
718 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
719 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
720 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
721 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
722 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
723 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
724 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
725 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
728 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
729 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
730 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
731 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
732 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
733 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
737 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
738 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
739 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
740 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
741 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
743 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
744 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
745 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
746 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
749 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
750 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
751 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
752 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
753 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
754 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
755 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
756 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
757 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
760 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
761 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
762 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
763 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
764 marketplace.
<footnote>
766 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
767 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
768 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
769 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
770 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
771 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
772 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
774 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
776 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
777 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
778 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
779 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
782 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
783 been erased.
<footnote><para>
784 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
787 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
788 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
789 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
790 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
791 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
792 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
793 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
794 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
795 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
796 culture, more and more a permission culture.
798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
800 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
801 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
802 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
803 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
804 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
805 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
806 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
807 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
808 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
809 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
813 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
814 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
815 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
816 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
817 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
818 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
819 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
820 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
821 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
822 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
823 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
824 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
825 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
826 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
827 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
828 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
829 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
832 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
833 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
834 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
835 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
836 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
837 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
841 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
843 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
844 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether "piracy" will
845 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
846 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
847 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
848 calls his "own terrorist war"
<footnote><para>
849 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
850 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
851 Times,
17 January
2002.
852 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
853 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
854 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
858 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
859 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
860 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
861 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
862 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
866 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
867 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
868 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
869 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
872 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
873 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
874 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
875 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
876 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
878 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
879 Journal
106 (
1996):
283.
880 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
882 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
883 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
884 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
885 could cultivate and extend our culture.
888 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
889 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
890 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
891 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
892 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
893 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
894 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
895 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
896 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
898 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26 -->
900 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
902 of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or
903 otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for
904 neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a
906 tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
909 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
911 by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its
912 code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace.
913 There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet
915 to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and
916 culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to
918 the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
920 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
921 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
923 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
924 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
925 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
926 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
927 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
928 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
929 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
930 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
931 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
932 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
933 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
934 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
937 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
938 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
940 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
941 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
942 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
943 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
946 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
950 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
952 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
953 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
954 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
955 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
956 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
957 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
961 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
962 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
964 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
969 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
970 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
973 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
974 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
975 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
976 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
977 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
980 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
981 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
982 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
984 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
987 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
988 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
990 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
991 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
992 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
993 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
994 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
995 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
996 this silliness will be much more profound.
997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1000 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1001 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1005 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1006 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1008 French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird sort we
1009 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
1010 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
1011 can be more fully understood.
1014 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1015 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1017 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1018 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1019 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1020 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1022 by the changes to use their power to change the law
—and more
1023 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
1024 who we have always been.
1027 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1028 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1029 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1030 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1031 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1032 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1036 <chapter id=
"c-piracy">
1037 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1041 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
1042 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1043 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1045 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1046 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1050 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1051 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1052 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1054 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1059 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1060 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1062 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1063 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1064 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1066 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1070 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1071 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1072 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1074 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1075 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1078 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1080 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1081 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1083 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1084 piercing
—our kids are becoming thieves!
1087 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1088 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1089 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1090 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1093 The idea goes something like this:
1097 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1098 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1099 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1100 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1101 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1105 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1107 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1108 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1109 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1111 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1112 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review
65 (
1990):
397.
1114 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1115 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1116 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1117 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1119 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1120 Up," Wall Street Journal,
21 August
1996, available at
1121 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1122 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1123 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe,
24 November
2002.
1125 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1126 "right"
—even against the Girl Scouts.
1128 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1130 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1131 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1133 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1134 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1136 It has never taken hold within our law.
1139 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1140 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1141 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1142 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1143 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1146 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1147 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1148 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1149 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1150 copyright law today regulates both.
1153 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1154 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1155 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1156 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1157 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1158 more expense of doing business.
1160 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1162 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1163 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1164 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1165 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1166 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1167 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1168 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1169 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1170 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1171 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1172 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1173 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1174 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1175 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1176 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1178 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."
<footnote>
1181 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books,
2002),
1182 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1183 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1184 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1185 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1186 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1187 enabled are much more tenuous.
1188 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1190 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1191 this creative class.
1194 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1195 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1196 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1200 <sect1 id=
"creators">
1201 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1203 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1204 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1205 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1206 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1207 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1210 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1211 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1212 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1213 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1214 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1215 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1219 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1220 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1221 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1222 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1226 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1227 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1228 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1229 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1230 synchronization was pretty close.
1233 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1235 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1236 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1237 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1238 wonderful! And it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1240 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1242 (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1247 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1248 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1249 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1250 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1253 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1254 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1255 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1256 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1257 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1258 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1259 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1262 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also
1263 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1264 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1265 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1268 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of
1269 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1270 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1271 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1272 The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular and among the best of its
1276 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1278 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1279 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1281 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1282 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1283 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1284 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1285 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No.
1"
1286 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1287 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1288 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1290 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1291 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1292 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1293 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1294 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1298 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1299 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1300 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1302 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1303 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1304 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1306 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1307 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1308 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1309 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1310 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1311 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1312 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1313 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1317 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1318 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1319 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1320 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1321 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1322 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1323 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1326 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1327 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1328 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1329 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1330 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1331 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1332 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (
1937),
1333 Fantasia (
1940), Pinocchio (
1940), Dumbo (
1941), Bambi (
1942), Song of
1334 the South (
1946), Cinderella (
1950), Alice in Wonderland (
1951), Robin
1335 Hood (
1952), Peter Pan (
1953), Lady and the Tramp
1336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1337 (
1955), Mulan (
1998), Sleeping Beauty (
1959),
101 Dalmatians (
1961),
1338 The Sword in the Stone (
1963), and The Jungle Book (
1967)
—not to
1339 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1340 Treasure Planet (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1341 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1342 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1343 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1346 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1347 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1348 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1349 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1350 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1351 creativity"
—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1352 culture around us and makes it something different.
1354 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1355 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1356 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1357 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1358 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1360 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1361 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1363 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1364 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1365 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1367 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1368 Web site associated with this book, available at
1369 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1371 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1372 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1373 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1374 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1377 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1378 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1379 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1380 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1381 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1382 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1383 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1386 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1387 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1388 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1389 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1392 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1393 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1394 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1395 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1396 content from before the Great Depression.
1399 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1400 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1401 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1405 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1406 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1407 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1408 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1409 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1410 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1411 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1414 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1415 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1416 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1417 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1418 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1419 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1420 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1421 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1422 interestingly different way.
1425 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1426 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1427 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1430 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1431 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1432 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1433 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1435 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1436 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1437 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1438 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1439 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1440 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1441 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1444 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1445 huge. More than
33,
000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1446 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1447 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1448 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1449 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1450 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1451 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1452 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1455 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1456 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1457 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1458 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1459 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1460 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1461 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1462 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1463 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1464 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1465 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1466 original copyright owner's permission.
1469 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1470 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1471 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1472 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1473 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1476 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1477 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1478 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1480 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1481 York: Perennial,
2000).
1485 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1486 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1487 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1488 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1489 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1490 which are fifty years old."
1493 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1494 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1495 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1496 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1497 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1498 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1499 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1501 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1502 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1503 Review
55 (
2002):
155,
182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1504 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1505 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1506 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1507 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1508 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1512 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1513 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1514 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1515 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1516 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1517 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1518 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1519 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1523 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1524 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1525 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1526 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1527 to prosecute cases like this."
1530 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1531 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1532 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1533 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1535 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1536 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1537 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1538 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1539 their clients or hurt them?
1540 Let's pause for a moment.
1543 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1544 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1545 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1548 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1549 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1550 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1551 "intellectual property."
<footnote><para>
1553 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1555 Copyrights and Copywrongs,
11 (New York: New York
1557 Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1558 Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately describes a set of
1559 "property" rights
—copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret
—but the
1560 nature of those rights is very different.
1562 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1564 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1565 intellectual property.
1568 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1569 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1570 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1571 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1572 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1573 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1574 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1575 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1576 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1577 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1578 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1579 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1583 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1584 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1585 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1587 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1588 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1592 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1593 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1594 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1595 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1596 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1597 form, whether large or small.
1600 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1601 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1602 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1603 particular find it hard to say why.
1606 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1607 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1608 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1609 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1610 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1611 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1612 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1613 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1614 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1615 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1616 movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s; two volcano disaster
1620 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1621 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1622 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1623 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1624 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1625 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1626 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1627 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1631 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1632 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1633 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1634 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1635 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1636 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1637 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1638 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1639 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1642 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1643 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1644 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1649 <sect1 id=
"mere-copyists">
1650 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
</title>
1651 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1653 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1654 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1655 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1656 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1657 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1658 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1659 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1662 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1663 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1664 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1665 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1666 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1667 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1668 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1669 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1673 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1674 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1676 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1677 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1678 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1679 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1680 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1681 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1682 population of photographers.
1685 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1686 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1687 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1688 do the rest."
<footnote><para>
1690 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1691 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1695 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1696 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1697 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1698 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1699 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1700 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1701 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1702 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1703 chemicals.
<footnote>
1706 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1708 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1713 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1714 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1715 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1716 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1717 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1718 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1719 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1720 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1721 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1722 percent.
<footnote><para>
1725 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1726 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1728 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1731 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1735 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1736 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1737 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1738 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1739 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1740 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1741 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1742 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1743 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1744 interpretation or bias."
<footnote><para>
1750 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1751 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1752 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1753 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1754 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1755 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1756 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1757 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1758 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1759 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1763 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1764 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1765 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1766 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1767 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1768 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1769 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1770 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1772 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co.,
50 S.E.
1776 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1777 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1778 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1779 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1780 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1783 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1784 that they thought valuable.
1786 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1788 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1789 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1790 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1791 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1792 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1795 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1796 Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193.
1797 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1798 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1799 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1800 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1801 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1802 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1805 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1806 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1807 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1808 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1809 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1810 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1811 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1812 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1813 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1815 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1816 Problems
19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1817 Review
48 (
1960)
398–407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1818 Inc.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1823 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1824 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1825 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1826 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1827 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1828 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1829 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1830 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1831 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1832 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1833 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1834 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1835 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1840 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1841 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1842 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1843 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1844 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1845 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1846 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1847 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1848 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1849 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1850 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1851 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1852 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1853 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1854 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1855 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1856 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1857 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1858 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1859 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1860 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1861 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1865 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1866 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1867 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1868 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1869 professional quality for $
595."
<footnote><para>
1871 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1873 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1874 February
2002, available at
1875 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1877 These buses are filled with technology that
1878 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1879 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1880 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1881 teachers call "media literacy."
1884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1885 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1886 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1887 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1888 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1889 the way people access it."
1892 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1893 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1894 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1898 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1899 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1900 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
1902 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1903 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1904 Study," Denver Post,
25 May
1997, B6.
1906 it is increasingly important to understand the
1907 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1908 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1909 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1911 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1914 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1915 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1916 written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult it is to
1918 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1919 understandable
—few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1920 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1921 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1922 emotion or builds suspense.
1925 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1926 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1927 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1928 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1929 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1930 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1932 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
1934 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1935 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1936 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1939 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1940 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1944 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
1946 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
1947 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
1949 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1950 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1951 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1952 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1953 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1954 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1955 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1956 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
1958 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4
1959 November
2000, available at
1960 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>; "Timeline,"
22 November
2000,
1962 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
1965 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
1967 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1968 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1969 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1970 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1971 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1974 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
1975 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
1976 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1977 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1981 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1982 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1983 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1984 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1989 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1990 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1994 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1995 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1997 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1998 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2000 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2002 language for what they need to create or express."
<footnote>
2005 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2006 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2007 </para></footnote> It is to enable
2008 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."
<footnote><para>
2013 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2015 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2016 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2017 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2018 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2019 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2020 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2021 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2022 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2023 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2024 students know something about
—gun violence.
2027 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2028 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2029 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2030 away. The "kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,"
2031 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2032 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2035 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2036 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2037 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2038 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2039 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2040 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2041 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2042 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2043 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2044 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2045 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2046 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2047 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2048 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2049 to this form of expression.
2053 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2054 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2055 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2057 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2059 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2060 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part
—and
2062 not the most powerful part
—of constructing meaning. As Daley
2063 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2067 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2068 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2069 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2070 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2071 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2072 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2073 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2074 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2075 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2076 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2077 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2078 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2079 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2080 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2081 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2082 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2083 about the topic. . . .
2086 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2087 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2088 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2089 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2090 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2093 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2094 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2095 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2097 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2098 had a lot of power with this language."
2102 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2103 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2104 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2105 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2106 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2107 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2108 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2109 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2110 world would be watching.
2113 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2114 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2115 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2116 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2117 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2118 entertainment is tragedy.
2120 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2121 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2123 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2124 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2125 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2126 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2127 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2128 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2129 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2130 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2131 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2132 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2133 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2134 was also the Internet.
2137 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2138 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2139 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2140 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2142 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2143 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2147 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2148 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2149 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2150 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2151 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2152 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2153 spread practically instantaneously.
2156 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2157 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2158 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2159 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2160 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2161 records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2162 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2165 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2166 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2167 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2168 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2169 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2170 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2171 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2172 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2173 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2174 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2175 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2176 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2179 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2180 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2181 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2182 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2183 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2185 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2186 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2187 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2190 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2191 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2192 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2193 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2194 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2195 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2196 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2197 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2198 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2199 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2200 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2201 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2202 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2203 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2205 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk.
1, trans.
2206 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2210 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2211 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2212 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2214 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2216 Philosophy
10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2218 And in some towns in
2219 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2220 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2225 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2227 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2228 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2230 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2231 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2232 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2234 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2235 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2236 </para></footnote> We say what our
2237 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2240 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2241 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2242 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2244 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2245 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2248 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2252 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2253 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2254 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2255 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2256 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2257 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2260 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2261 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential
2262 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2264 is having an effect.
2267 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2268 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2269 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2271 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2272 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2273 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2274 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2276 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2277 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2278 as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2280 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2281 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2285 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2286 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2287 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2288 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2292 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2293 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2294 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2295 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2296 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2297 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2298 peer-generated rankings.
2301 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2302 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2303 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2304 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2305 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2306 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2307 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2308 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2309 get it out of the way."
2311 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2313 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2314 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2315 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2316 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2317 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2319 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2321 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2322 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2323 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2324 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2325 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2326 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2327 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2329 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2330 debate
—"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2331 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2332 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2333 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2334 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2335 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2337 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2338 Information Online," New York Times,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2339 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2340 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2341 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2343 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2344 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2345 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2346 out of it"
—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2349 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2350 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2351 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2352 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this
—some journalists
2353 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2356 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2357 York Times,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2358 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2359 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2360 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2361 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2362 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2363 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2364 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2366 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2369 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2370 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2371 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2372 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2373 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2376 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2377 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2379 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2380 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2381 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2382 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2383 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2384 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2385 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2386 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2387 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2388 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2393 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2394 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2395 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2398 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2400 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2401 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2402 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2405 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2406 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2408 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2410 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2411 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2412 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2413 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2414 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2415 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2416 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2417 tinkering of many others.
2420 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2421 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2422 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2423 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2424 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2427 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2429 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2430 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2431 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2432 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2434 a major apprenticeship platform."
2437 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2438 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2440 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2442 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2443 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2444 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2447 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2448 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2449 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2451 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2452 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2453 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2455 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2456 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2457 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2459 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2461 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2462 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2464 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2465 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2469 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2470 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2471 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2472 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2473 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2474 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2475 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2478 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2479 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2480 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2481 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2482 general.
<footnote><para>
2484 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2485 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2486 of the Association for Computer Machinery
43 (
2000):
9.
2488 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2489 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2492 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2493 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2497 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2498 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2499 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2500 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2501 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2504 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2505 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2506 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2507 the law to close down that technology.
2510 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2511 chapter
9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2515 <sect1 id=
"catalogs">
2516 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2518 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2519 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2520 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2521 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2522 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2525 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2526 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2527 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2528 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2529 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2530 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2533 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2534 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2535 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2536 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2537 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2540 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2541 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2542 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2543 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2544 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2545 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2546 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2547 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2548 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2549 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2552 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2553 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2554 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2555 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2556 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2557 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2558 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2561 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2562 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2563 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2564 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2565 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2566 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2567 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2568 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2569 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2573 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2574 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2575 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2576 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2577 be on users' computers.
2580 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2581 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2582 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2584 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2586 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2590 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2591 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2592 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2593 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2594 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2595 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2596 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2597 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2598 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2599 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2600 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2601 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2605 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2606 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2607 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2608 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2609 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2610 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2611 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2614 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2615 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2616 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2617 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2618 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2619 easier to use"
—again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2620 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2621 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2622 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2623 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2626 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2627 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2630 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2631 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2632 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2633 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2634 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2635 that Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2638 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2639 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2640 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2641 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2642 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2643 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2644 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100 billion
—six
2645 times the total profit of the film industry in
2001.
<footnote><para>
2647 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2648 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC
6
2649 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2653 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2654 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2655 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2656 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2657 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2660 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2661 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2662 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2663 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2664 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2665 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2666 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2667 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2668 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2671 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2672 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2673 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2674 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2675 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2677 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2678 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2681 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2682 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2685 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2686 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2687 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2688 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2689 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2690 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2691 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2693 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2694 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2695 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (
2000).
2697 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2698 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2699 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2701 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2702 Wall Street Journal,
10 September
2003, A24.
2706 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2707 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2708 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2713 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2714 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2715 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2716 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2720 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2721 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2722 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2723 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2724 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2728 <sect1 id=
"pirates">
2729 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
</title>
2731 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2732 their permission
—if "if value, then right" is true
—then the history of
2733 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2734 "big media" today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2735 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2736 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2741 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2743 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2744 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
87–93,
2745 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2747 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2748 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2749 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2750 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2751 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2752 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2753 this creative property
2754 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2755 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2758 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2762 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2763 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2764 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2765 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2766 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2767 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2768 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2771 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2772 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2773 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2774 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2775 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2776 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2777 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2778 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2779 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2780 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2782 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2783 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2784 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2785 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2786 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2787 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2788 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2789 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2790 the Propertization of Copyright" (September
2002), University of
2791 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2792 Working Paper No.
159.
</para></footnote>
2796 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2797 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2798 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2799 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2800 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."
<footnote><para>
2802 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2803 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2805 That led the independents to flee the East
2806 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2807 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2808 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2812 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2813 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2814 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2817 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2818 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2819 Edison's creative property.
2822 <sect2 id=
"recordedmusic">
2823 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2825 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2826 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2829 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2830 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2831 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2832 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2833 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2834 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2835 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2836 right to perform it publicly.
2838 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2840 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2841 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2842 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2843 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2844 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2845 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2846 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2847 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2848 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2849 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2850 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2851 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2852 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2853 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2854 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2855 its composer anything.
2858 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2859 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2860 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2865 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2866 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2867 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2868 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2869 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2870 rights.
<footnote><para>
2872 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2873 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2874 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2875 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2876 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2877 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2882 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2883 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2884 genius of American composers,"
<footnote><para>
2886 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2887 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2889 and the "music publishing industry"
2890 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."
<footnote><para>
2892 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2893 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2896 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2897 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."
<footnote><para>
2899 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
2900 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2904 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2905 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2906 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2907 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2908 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2909 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
2911 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
2912 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2914 Company of New York).
2915 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2916 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2917 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2918 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2919 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2920 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."
<footnote><para>
2922 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376
2924 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2926 Graphophone Company Association).
2930 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2931 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2932 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2933 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2935 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2936 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2937 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2940 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2942 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2943 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2946 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2947 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2948 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2949 Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2951 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2955 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2956 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
2957 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
2959 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
2960 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
2961 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
2963 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2965 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2966 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
2967 of piracy
—by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
2968 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
2969 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
2970 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
2971 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
2972 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2973 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2974 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
2976 follow-on creativity.
<footnote><para>
2978 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
2979 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
2980 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2981 in Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2982 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2986 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2987 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2988 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2993 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2995 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2997 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2999 in the United States and throughout the world; records
3000 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
3001 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
3003 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
3004 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
3005 before
1909 and the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
3006 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
3007 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
3008 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
3010 quality, and a greater choice.
<footnote><para>
3012 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3013 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3014 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3015 this report.
</para></footnote>
3019 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3021 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3025 <title>Radio
</title>
3027 Radio was also born of piracy.
3030 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3031 "public performance" of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3033 See
17 United States Code, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning, record
3034 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3036 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
3037 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
3038 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
3040 Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd Cir.
1940). See also Randal C.
3041 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
3042 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
3043 Review
70 (
2003):
281.
3045 As I described above,
3046 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3047 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3049 money for that performance.
3052 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3053 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3054 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3056 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3057 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3058 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3060 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3061 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3063 of the music for his work.
3065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3068 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3070 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3071 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3073 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3074 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3078 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3080 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3081 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3082 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3085 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3086 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3087 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3088 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3089 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3090 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3091 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3094 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3095 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3096 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3098 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3099 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3100 something for nothing.
3103 <sect2 id=
"cabletv">
3104 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3107 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3110 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3111 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3112 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3113 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3114 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3115 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3116 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3117 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3120 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3121 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3123 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3124 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3125 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."
<footnote><para>
3127 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3128 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3129 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3130 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3133 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3134 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3135 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3136 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<footnote><para>
3138 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3139 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3141 As another broadcaster put it,
3145 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3146 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3147 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3149 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3150 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3155 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3159 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3160 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3161 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3162 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3164 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3165 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3166 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3171 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3172 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3173 compensation."
<footnote><para>
3175 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3176 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3180 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3181 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3185 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3186 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3187 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3188 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3190 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3191 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3192 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3194 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3195 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3200 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3201 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3204 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3205 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3206 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3207 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3208 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3209 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3210 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3211 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3212 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3213 created by broadcasters' content.
3216 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3217 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3218 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3219 today
<footnote><para>
3221 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3222 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3223 Information, available at
3224 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>. "The
3225 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3226 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
3228 — then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3229 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3230 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3231 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3232 generation
—until now.
3234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3238 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
</title>
3240 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3241 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3242 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3243 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3244 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3248 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3249 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3250 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3251 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3252 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3253 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3254 has so often done in the past.
3255 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3257 <sect2 id=
"piracy-i">
3258 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3260 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3261 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3262 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3263 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3264 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3266 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3267 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003, July
2003, available at
3269 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3270 Financial Times,
14 February
2003,
11.
3272 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3273 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually
3274 worldwide to piracy.
3277 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3278 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3279 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3280 This piracy is wrong.
3283 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3284 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3285 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3287 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3288 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3290 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3291 existence, treated as right.
3294 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3295 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3296 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3297 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3298 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3299 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3301 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3302 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3303 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3306 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3307 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3308 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3309 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3311 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3315 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3316 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3317 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3318 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3320 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3321 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10–13,
3322 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3323 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3324 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3325 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3326 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3327 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3328 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3329 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3330 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3331 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3332 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3333 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3334 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3335 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3336 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3337 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3341 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3342 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3343 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3344 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3345 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3347 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3348 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3349 144–90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3350 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3352 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3353 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
3357 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3358 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3359 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3360 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3361 "You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3362 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3363 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3364 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3365 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3366 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3367 piracy of the tangible.
3370 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3371 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3373 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3374 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3375 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3377 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3378 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3380 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3383 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3384 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3385 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3387 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3388 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3391 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3392 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3393 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3394 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3395 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3397 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3398 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3400 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3401 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3402 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3404 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3407 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3408 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3409 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3410 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3412 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3413 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3416 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3418 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3419 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3421 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3422 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3423 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3424 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3426 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what
—at
3427 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3429 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3434 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3435 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3436 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3437 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3438 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3439 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3440 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3444 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3445 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3446 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3447 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3448 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3449 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3450 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3453 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3454 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3455 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3456 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3459 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3460 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3461 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3462 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3465 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3466 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3471 <sect2 id=
"piracy-ii">
3472 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3474 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3475 the author of [his] profit."
<footnote><para>
3477 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3479 This means we must determine whether
3480 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3481 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3482 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3483 author of his profit.
3486 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors
3487 of the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3489 Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and,
3491 off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3493 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3494 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3495 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3496 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
3497 up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.
3498 This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing
3500 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see
3501 Lawrence Lessig, Future,
89–92,
139.
3502 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3503 put together components that had been developed independently.
3504 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3507 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3508 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3509 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3510 system.
<footnote><para>
3512 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3513 San Francisco Chronicle,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3514 New Scientist,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3515 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle,
23 May
2003, C1;
3517 Wake-Up Call," Economist,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3519 at War with the Internet" (London) Times,
26 July
2002,
18.
3521 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3522 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3523 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3524 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3525 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3526 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3527 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3530 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3532 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3533 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3534 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3536 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3537 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3538 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3539 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3542 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that
43 million citizens
3543 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3545 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3546 York Times,
6 June
2003, A1.
3549 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3550 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3551 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3553 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3556 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3557 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3559 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3560 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more carefully
3561 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do
—the kinds of
3562 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3566 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3567 different kinds into four types.
3569 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3572 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3574 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3575 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3576 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3577 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3578 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3579 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3585 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3586 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3587 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3588 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3590 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3591 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3593 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3594 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3598 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3600 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3601 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3602 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3604 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3605 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3606 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3607 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3608 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3610 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3611 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3612 content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same harm
3613 that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3617 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3619 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3620 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3625 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3628 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3630 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3631 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.
<footnote><para>
3633 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,
148–49.
3635 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3637 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3638 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3639 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer
—and
3641 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3645 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3646 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3648 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3649 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3650 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3651 that is "devastating" the industry.
3654 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3656 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3658 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3659 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
&
3660 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3661 labels fought it."
<footnote><para>
3663 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3665 Business Model Crisis (
2003),
3. This report describes the music
3667 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3668 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3669 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3670 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3671 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In
1988,
40 percent
3672 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3673 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3674 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3675 Government Printing Office, October
1989),
145–56.
3677 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3678 album unsold, and when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the
3679 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3681 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3684 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3685 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3686 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3687 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3688 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3689 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3690 innovation at the major labels."
<footnote><para>
3692 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying,
4.
3696 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3697 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3698 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3699 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3700 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3701 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3702 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3703 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3706 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3707 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3708 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3709 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3710 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3711 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3712 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3715 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3717 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3718 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3721 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9
3723 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7 percent.
<footnote><para>
3725 See Recording Industry Association of America,
2002 Yearend Statistics,
3727 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3728 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3729 25 June
2003, available at
3730 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3731 of recorded music have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in
3732 to
860 million units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3733 In terms of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in
3734 to $
12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3736 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3737 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3739 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3741 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3742 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3743 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That
3744 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3745 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average
3746 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<footnote>
3749 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13
3750 February
2003, available at
3751 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3752 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3755 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3756 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3757 High Fidelity has a list price of $
18.98. You could get the whole movie
3758 [on DVD] for $
19.99."
<footnote><para>
3765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3766 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3767 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3768 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3769 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3771 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3772 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3775 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3776 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3777 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3779 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"
—but their own
3781 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3782 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3783 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3784 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of Kazaa
3785 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"
—then the industry would have
3786 suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7 percent drop. If
2.6
3787 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3788 revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3790 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3793 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3795 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3796 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3800 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that is
3801 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3803 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3804 tracks that are no longer commercially available.
<footnote><para>
3806 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3807 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law
—Coming
3808 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3810 on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
2001) (prepared
3812 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3813 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3817 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3818 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3819 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3821 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3825 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3827 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3829 of used book and used record stores in America today.
<footnote><para>
3831 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3832 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3833 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3834 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (
2002), available at
3835 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3837 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3840 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3843 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3844 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3845 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3846 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3847 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3849 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3850 owner for the content they sell.
3852 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3854 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3855 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3856 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3857 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3858 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3859 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3860 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3861 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3862 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3863 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3864 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3867 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3868 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3869 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3870 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3871 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3875 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3876 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3877 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3878 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3879 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3880 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3883 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3884 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3885 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3886 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3887 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3888 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3892 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3893 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3894 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3895 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3898 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3899 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3900 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3901 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3905 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3906 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3907 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4, much of
3908 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3909 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3910 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3911 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3912 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3913 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3914 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3915 found only with time.
3918 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3919 just what you call type A sharing?"
3922 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3924 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3925 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3927 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3929 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
3930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3931 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
3932 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3933 "down to zero."
<footnote><para>
3935 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
3936 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
3938 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3939 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3941 Napster (New York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
3945 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3946 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3947 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
3948 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
3949 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
3950 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3951 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3952 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3953 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3956 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3957 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3958 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3960 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3962 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3963 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3964 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3967 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3968 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3969 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3971 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3972 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3973 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3974 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3975 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3977 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3980 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3981 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3982 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3983 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3985 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3990 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3991 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals of
3992 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3993 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3995 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3997 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3998 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3999 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
4000 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
4002 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
4003 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
4004 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
4006 over the future (cable).
4008 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4010 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4011 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4012 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4013 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4014 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4015 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4016 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4017 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4018 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4019 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4020 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4023 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4024 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4025 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4026 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4027 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4028 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4029 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4030 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4031 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4032 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4033 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4034 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4035 for the architecture it chose.
4038 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4039 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4040 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4041 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4042 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4043 copyright."
<footnote><para>
4045 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4046 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4047 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4048 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4050 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4051 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4052 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4053 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4054 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4055 and plain common sense."
<footnote><para>
4057 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4059 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4060 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4062 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4065 — a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4066 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4067 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4068 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4069 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4070 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4071 profit from its reproduction."
<footnote><para>
4073 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4078 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4079 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4080 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4081 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"
—held
4082 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4083 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4084 technology
—which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4085 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4086 of the American film industry)
—was an illegal
4087 technology.
<footnote><para>
4089 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4094 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4097 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4098 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4103 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4104 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4106 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4108 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4109 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4111 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4113 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4118 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4119 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4121 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4122 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4123 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4127 <title>Table
</title>
4128 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4132 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</entry>
4133 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4134 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4139 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4140 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4141 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4142 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4145 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4146 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4148 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4151 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4152 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4153 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4154 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4158 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4159 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4160 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4167 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4168 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4170 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4171 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4172 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4173 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4174 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4175 1992 (Title
17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4176 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4177 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4178 Lessig, Future,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4179 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
293–96.
4181 In each case, throughout our history,
4182 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4186 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4187 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4188 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4189 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4190 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4192 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4193 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4194 the interests at stake.
4195 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4198 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4199 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4200 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4201 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4202 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4204 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4205 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4206 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4207 permission to record a song?
4210 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4211 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4212 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4213 over all possible uses of his work."
<footnote><para>
4215 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
4218 Instead, the particular uses that the
4219 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4220 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4221 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4223 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4224 the distribution of content.
4227 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4228 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4229 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4230 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4231 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4232 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4233 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4234 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4235 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4236 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4238 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4244 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4246 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4247 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4249 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4251 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4252 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."
<footnote><para>
4254 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4255 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times,
22 September
2003, C3.
4257 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4259 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4260 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4261 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4262 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4263 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4264 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4265 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4268 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4269 just as any other property is protected."
4271 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4275 <chapter id=
"c-property">
4276 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4279 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4280 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4281 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4282 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4283 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4284 the price she can get.
4287 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4288 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4289 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4290 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4291 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4292 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4293 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard
—by, for example,
4295 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4296 thing I am taking then?
4299 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4300 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4301 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4302 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4304 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4305 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4306 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4307 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4308 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4309 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4310 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<footnote><para>
4312 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4313 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4314 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4318 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4319 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4320 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4322 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4326 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details, in
4327 other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4329 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4331 in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4333 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4335 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4336 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4338 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4339 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4341 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review
45 (
2003):
4346 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4348 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4350 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4351 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4352 significance of this true statement
—"copyright material is property"
—
4353 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4354 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4359 <sect1 id=
"founders">
4360 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4362 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in
1595. The play
4363 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4365 had written. He would continue to write plays through
1613,
4366 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4367 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4368 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4369 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4371 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4374 In
1774, almost
180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4375 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4376 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4378 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4379 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4380 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4381 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4382 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4383 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4384 Bookseller," American Scholar
61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4387 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger
<footnote><para>
4389 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4391 University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4394 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4395 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4396 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4398 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4400 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4402 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4405 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4406 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4407 of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4408 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4409 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4411 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4413 by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.
<footnote><para>
4415 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4417 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
40.
4419 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in
1731. So why
4420 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in
1774?
4423 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4425 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4426 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4427 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4429 in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4430 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4431 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4433 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4436 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4437 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4438 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4440 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4442 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4443 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4445 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4446 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4448 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4450 of any positive law.
4453 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4454 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4455 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4456 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4459 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4460 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4462 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4465 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4466 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4468 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4469 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4471 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4472 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4475 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4476 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4477 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4480 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4481 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4482 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4483 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4484 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4485 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4486 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4487 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4489 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4492 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4494 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4495 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4499 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4500 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4501 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4502 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4504 from reprinting a book. In
1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4505 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4507 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4508 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4509 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4511 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4512 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4516 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4517 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4518 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4520 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4522 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4523 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4524 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4525 to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4528 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4529 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4531 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4532 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4533 monopolies
—especially
4534 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4535 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4536 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4537 against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the Statute of
4539 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4540 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4544 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4546 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4547 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4548 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4549 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4550 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4552 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4555 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4556 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4557 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4558 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4560 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind
—tools of the
4561 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4563 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4564 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4565 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4566 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."
<footnote><para>
4568 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4569 York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4573 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4574 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4576 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4577 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4578 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4582 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4583 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4584 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4585 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4586 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4587 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4589 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4590 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4591 construction and spread of culture.
4594 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4595 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4596 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4597 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4598 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4599 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4600 they said; they needed more time.
4603 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4604 words that echo today,
4608 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4609 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4610 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4611 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4612 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4613 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4614 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4615 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4616 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4618 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4619 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4620 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4621 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4622 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4623 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4624 al.,
8, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4629 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4630 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4631 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4632 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4633 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4634 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4635 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4636 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4637 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4638 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4639 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4640 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4641 way to protect authors.
4644 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4645 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4646 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4647 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4648 rancher has for cattle."
<footnote><para>
4650 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4651 Law Review
40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4652 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4654 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4655 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4658 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4659 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4660 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4662 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4663 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4667 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4668 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4669 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4670 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4672 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4675 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4677 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4678 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4679 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4680 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."
<footnote><para>
4684 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4687 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4688 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4689 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4690 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4691 Property."
<footnote><para>
4693 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective,
167 (quoting
4696 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4697 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4698 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4701 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4702 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4703 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4706 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4707 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4708 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4709 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4710 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4711 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4713 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4714 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review
29
4719 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4720 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4721 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4722 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4723 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4724 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4725 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4726 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4727 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4730 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4731 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4732 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4733 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4734 with in
1710: How best to limit
4735 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4736 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4737 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4738 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4739 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4740 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4741 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4744 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4745 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4747 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4749 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4750 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4751 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4755 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4756 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4757 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4758 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4759 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4760 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4763 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4764 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4765 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4766 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4767 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4768 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4769 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4770 statute were no longer protected.
4773 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4774 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4775 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4776 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4777 House of Lords generally voted.
4780 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4781 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4783 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4784 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4785 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4786 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4787 passed into the public domain.
4790 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4791 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before
1774, there
4792 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4793 After
1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4794 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4795 and the greatest works in English history
—including those of
4796 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan
—were free of
4798 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4799 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4800 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4801 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4802 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4805 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4806 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4807 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4808 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4809 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4810 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4811 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4812 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4813 and illuminations."
<footnote><para>
4819 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4820 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4825 By the above decision . . . near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4826 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4827 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4828 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4829 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4830 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4831 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4832 successors.
<footnote><para>
4839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4840 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4841 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4842 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4843 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4844 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4845 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4846 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4847 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4848 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4849 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4850 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4851 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4852 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4853 readers chose to let it develop
— chose in the books they bought
4854 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4855 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4856 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4857 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4860 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4861 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4862 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4867 <sect1 id=
"recorders">
4868 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4870 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4871 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4872 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4873 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4877 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4878 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4882 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4883 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4884 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4885 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4886 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4890 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4891 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4892 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4893 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4895 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4899 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4900 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4901 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4902 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4903 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4906 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4907 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4908 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4909 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4910 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4913 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4914 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4915 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4916 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4917 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4920 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4921 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
4922 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4923 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4924 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4925 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4928 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4929 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4930 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4931 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4932 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4933 confirm what he had been told.
4936 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4937 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
4938 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4942 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4943 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4944 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4948 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4949 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4950 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4951 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4952 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4953 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4956 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4957 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4958 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4959 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4960 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4961 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4962 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4963 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4964 says the owner gets to control.
4967 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4968 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4969 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4970 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4971 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4972 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
4976 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4977 thought is "fair use."
<footnote><para>
4979 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4980 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4981 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4982 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4983 Law School,
5 August
2003.
4985 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4986 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons
—and fair use does
4987 not require the permission of anyone.
4990 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4991 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4995 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4996 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4997 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4998 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4999 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5000 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5002 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5005 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5006 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5007 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
5008 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
5009 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
5013 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5014 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5015 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
5016 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
5017 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5018 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
5019 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5020 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5025 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5026 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5027 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5028 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5029 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5030 pockets, me or them.
5031 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5035 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5036 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5042 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5043 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5044 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5045 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5046 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5047 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5050 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5051 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5052 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5053 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5058 <sect1 id=
"transformers">
5059 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5060 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5061 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5063 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5064 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5065 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5066 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5067 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5069 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5071 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5072 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5073 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5074 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5075 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5076 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5077 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5078 important to his career.
5080 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5082 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5083 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5084 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5085 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5088 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5089 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5090 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5091 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5092 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5093 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5095 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5097 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5098 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5099 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5100 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5101 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5104 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5106 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5107 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5109 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5111 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5112 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5113 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5117 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5118 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5119 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5120 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5122 <primary>artists
</primary>
5123 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5128 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5129 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5130 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5131 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5132 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5135 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5136 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5137 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5141 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5142 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5143 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5144 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5145 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5146 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5150 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5151 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5152 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5153 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5154 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5155 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5156 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5157 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5158 started calling people.
5161 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5163 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5164 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5165 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5166 "Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5167 know, $
1,
200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5168 to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5169 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5170 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5174 It was one year later
—"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5175 were totally in the clear."
5177 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5179 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5180 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5181 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5185 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5186 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5187 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5188 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5189 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5190 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5191 systematically and cleared the rights.
5196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5197 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5198 loved it, and it sold very well.
5200 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5201 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5203 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5204 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5205 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5206 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5207 at all."
<footnote><para>
5209 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5210 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5211 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5213 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5217 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5218 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5219 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5220 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5221 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5225 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5226 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when
30 seconds of
5227 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5228 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5229 compensated for that.
5233 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5234 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license
5235 that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips
5236 like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
5237 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get
5238 explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the
5239 legal part of the creative process could be made to be more clean?
5243 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5244 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5245 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5246 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5248 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5249 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5250 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5251 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5252 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5253 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5254 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5255 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5256 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5257 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5258 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5259 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5262 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5264 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5265 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5266 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5267 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5268 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5269 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5270 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5271 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5272 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5273 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5274 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5275 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5276 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5277 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5278 "Does this still make sense?"
5281 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5282 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5283 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5284 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5286 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5287 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5288 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5291 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5292 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
60 Minutes episode.
5293 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5294 judges loved every minute of it.
5296 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5298 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5299 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5300 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5301 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5302 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5303 were just violated in this room?"
5305 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5307 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5308 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5309 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5310 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5311 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5312 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5313 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5314 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5315 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5316 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5317 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5318 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5319 couldn't easily do them legally.
5322 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5323 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5324 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5325 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5326 planted in your presentation.
5329 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5330 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5331 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5332 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5333 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5334 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5335 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5336 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5337 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5340 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5341 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5342 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5343 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5344 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5347 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5348 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5349 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5350 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5351 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5352 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5353 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5354 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5355 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5356 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5357 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5358 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5362 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5363 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5364 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5365 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5368 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5369 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5370 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5371 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5372 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5373 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5374 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5375 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5376 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5380 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5381 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5382 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5383 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5384 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5385 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5386 new audiences, it is Mike."
5389 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5390 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5391 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5392 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5393 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5394 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5395 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5396 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5399 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5400 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5401 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5402 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5403 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5404 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5405 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5406 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5407 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5408 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5409 curse, reserved for the few.
5411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5413 <sect1 id=
"collectors">
5414 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5416 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to
5417 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5418 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5419 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5420 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5421 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5422 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5425 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5426 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5427 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5428 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5429 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5430 well as when those pages changed.
5433 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5434 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
1984, old newspapers were
5435 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5436 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5440 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5441 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5442 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5443 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5446 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5447 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5448 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5449 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5450 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5453 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5454 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5455 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5456 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5457 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5459 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5460 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5461 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5462 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5463 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5467 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5468 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5469 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to
5470 Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5471 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5472 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5473 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what
5474 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5478 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5479 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is
5480 whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More
5481 directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
5482 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it,
5483 for schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society
5484 presumes this knowedge.
5487 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5488 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5489 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5490 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5492 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5493 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5494 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5495 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5498 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5499 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5500 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5501 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5502 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5503 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5504 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5505 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5508 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5509 human history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5510 terabytes of material"
—and was "ten times larger than the
5511 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5512 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5513 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5514 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5515 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5516 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5517 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5518 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5519 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5520 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5521 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5522 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5526 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5527 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5528 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5529 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5530 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5532 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5533 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5534 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5538 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5539 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5540 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5541 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5542 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5543 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5546 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5547 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5548 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5549 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5550 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5554 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5555 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5556 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5557 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5558 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed
5559 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5560 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5561 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5563 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5564 the Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly
13 nos.
2–3
5565 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5566 Preservation in the United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5571 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5572 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5573 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5574 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5575 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5576 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5577 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5578 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5579 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5582 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5584 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5585 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5586 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5587 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5588 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5589 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5593 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5594 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5595 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5596 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5597 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5598 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5599 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5600 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5601 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5602 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5603 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5604 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5605 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5606 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5607 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5608 few minutes
—for free.
5611 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5612 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5613 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5614 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5615 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5619 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5620 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5621 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5622 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5623 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5624 has
—a noncommercial life.
5627 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5628 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5632 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5633 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5634 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5635 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5636 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5639 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5640 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5641 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5642 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5643 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5644 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5648 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5649 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5651 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5652 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5653 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5654 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5655 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston
5656 College Law Review
44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5657 </para></footnote>). After
5658 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5659 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5660 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5661 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5662 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5665 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5666 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5667 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5668 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5669 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5670 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5671 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5672 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5676 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5677 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5678 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5679 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5680 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5683 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5684 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5685 little practical effect.
5688 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5689 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5690 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5691 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5692 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5693 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5696 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5697 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5698 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5703 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5704 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5705 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5706 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5707 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5708 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5709 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5710 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5711 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5712 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5713 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5717 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5718 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5719 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5720 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5721 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5722 remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
5724 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5725 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5726 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5727 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5728 future for our past. The technology of digital arts could make the
5729 dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5732 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5733 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5734 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5735 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5736 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5737 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5741 <sect1 id=
"property-i">
5742 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
</title>
5744 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5745 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5746 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5747 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5748 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5749 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5750 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5751 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5754 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5755 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5756 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5757 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5758 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5759 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5760 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5761 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5762 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5766 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5767 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5768 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5769 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5770 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5771 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5772 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5773 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5774 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5775 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5779 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5780 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5781 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5782 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5783 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5784 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5785 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5788 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5793 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5794 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5795 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5796 theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must
5797 be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other
5798 property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the
5799 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
5800 debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5802 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5803 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5804 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5805 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5806 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5812 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5813 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5814 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5817 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5818 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5819 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5820 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5823 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5824 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5825 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5826 extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this
5827 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant,
5828 is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature
5829 and scope of "creative property." His views have no reasonable
5830 connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of
5831 his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
5835 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5836 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5838 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5839 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5840 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5841 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5842 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5843 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the
5844 Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5845 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5846 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5847 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5848 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5849 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5853 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5854 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5855 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5856 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5857 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5858 culture would develop.
5861 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5862 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5863 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5864 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5865 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5866 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5867 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5868 the same would be to
5870 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5871 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5872 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5876 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5877 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5878 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5879 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5880 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5881 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5882 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5883 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5884 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5885 Constitution itself.
5888 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5889 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5890 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
5891 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5892 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5893 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5894 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5895 sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the
5896 government pays for the privilege.
5899 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5900 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5901 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that
5902 after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
5903 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet
5904 when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term
5905 "takes" your copyright and turns it over to the public domain,
5906 Congress does not have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for
5907 this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that requires
5908 compensation for your land
5909 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5910 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5911 compensation at all.
5914 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5915 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5916 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5917 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5918 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5919 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5923 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5924 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5925 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5926 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5927 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5928 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
5929 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5930 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5931 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5932 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5935 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5936 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5937 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given
5938 the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5939 creative property there must be a public domain?
5942 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5943 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5944 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5945 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5946 should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property
5947 should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights
5948 the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix
5949 of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether
5950 institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
5951 control how culture develops.
5955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5956 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5957 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5958 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5959 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5960 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5961 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5962 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5964 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
5965 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
5966 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
5969 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5970 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5971 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5972 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5973 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5974 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5975 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5976 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5977 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5978 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5979 Web, you can be punished
5980 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5981 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5982 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5985 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5986 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5987 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5988 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5989 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5990 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5991 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5992 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5993 the source of the enforcement.
5996 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5997 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5998 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5999 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6000 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6001 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6002 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6003 individual or group might behave.
6006 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6007 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6008 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6009 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6010 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6011 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6012 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6013 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6014 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6015 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
500-pound boulder
6016 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6017 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6018 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6023 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6024 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6025 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6026 undermined by another.
6029 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6030 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6031 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6032 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6033 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6034 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6035 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6037 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
6038 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6041 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6042 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6043 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6044 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6045 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6046 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6047 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6048 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6049 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6050 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6051 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6052 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6055 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6056 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6057 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6059 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6060 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6061 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6062 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6063 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And
6064 Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6065 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies,
6068 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6069 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6070 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6071 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6072 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6073 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6074 used to require that other laws be more
6075 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6076 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6077 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6080 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6082 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6083 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6084 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6087 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6088 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6089 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6090 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6091 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6095 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6096 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6097 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6098 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6099 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6100 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6101 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6102 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6103 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6104 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6105 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6106 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6107 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6108 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6109 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6110 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6111 Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended
6112 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6113 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6114 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6115 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6116 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6117 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6118 places easier;
42 United States Code, section
12101 (
2000). Each of
6119 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6120 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6121 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6122 of these groups might face.
6123 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6126 <sect2 id=
"hollywood">
6127 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6129 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6130 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6131 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6132 rallying makes sense.
6135 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6138 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6139 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6140 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6143 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6144 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6145 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6146 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6147 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6148 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6149 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6150 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6151 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6152 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6153 this form of infringement.
6156 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6157 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6158 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6159 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6160 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6161 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6164 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6165 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6166 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6167 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6169 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6170 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6171 looting that results.
6173 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6174 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6175 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6178 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6179 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6180 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6181 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6182 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6183 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6184 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6185 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6186 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6187 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6190 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6191 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6192 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6193 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6194 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6195 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6196 life. Homeowners living in a
6198 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6199 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6200 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6201 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6202 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6203 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6204 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6207 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6208 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6209 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6210 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6211 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6212 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6215 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6216 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6217 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6218 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6219 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6220 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6221 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6223 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6224 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6225 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6226 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6227 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6
6228 October
2003, available at
6229 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6232 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6233 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6234 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6235 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6236 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6237 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6238 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6239 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6240 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6241 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6242 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6245 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6246 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6247 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6248 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6249 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6250 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6251 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6252 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6253 have an interest in excluding future competitors."
<footnote><para>
6255 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6258 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6259 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6260 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6261 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6262 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6266 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6267 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6268 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6269 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6270 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6271 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6272 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6273 opportunities for innovation and change.
6276 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6277 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6278 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6279 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6280 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6281 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6282 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6283 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6284 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6285 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6286 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6287 regulation is justified.
6290 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6291 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6292 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6293 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6294 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6295 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6296 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6299 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6302 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6303 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6304 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6305 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6306 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6309 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6310 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6311 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6313 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6315 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6316 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6317 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6318 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6321 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6322 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6323 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6324 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6325 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6326 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6327 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6330 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6331 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6332 culture.
<footnote><para>
6334 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6335 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal
47 (
1997):
87.
6337 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6338 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6339 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6340 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6341 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6342 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6344 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6345 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6346 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6347 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6348 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6351 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6352 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6353 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6354 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6355 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6356 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6357 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6358 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6359 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6362 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6363 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6367 <sect2 id=
"beginnings">
6368 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6370 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6371 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6372 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6373 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6376 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6377 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6378 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6381 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6382 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6383 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6386 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6387 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6388 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6389 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6390 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6391 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6394 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6395 in chapter
6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6396 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6397 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6398 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6399 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6400 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6403 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6404 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6405 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6406 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6407 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6408 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6409 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6410 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6411 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6412 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6413 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6414 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6418 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6419 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6420 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6421 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6422 years since they first struck its design.
6425 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6426 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6428 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6431 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6432 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6433 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6438 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6439 <title>"Copyright
" today.
</title>
6440 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6447 <sect2 id=
"lawduration">
6448 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6450 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6451 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6452 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6453 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6454 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6455 authorship.
<footnote>
6458 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6459 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6460 485–86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6461 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6462 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6463 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.
</primary></indexterm>
6465 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6466 States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6467 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6468 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6469 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6470 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6473 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6474 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6475 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6476 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6477 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6478 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6481 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6482 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6483 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6484 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6485 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6488 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6489 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6490 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6491 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6492 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6493 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6494 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6496 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6497 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6498 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol.
1, The Creation
6499 of an Industry,
1630–1865 (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6500 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6501 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6502 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context,
7–10 (
2002),
6503 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6504 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6505 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6506 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6507 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6508 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6509 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6512 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6513 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6515 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6516 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6517 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6521 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6522 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6523 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6524 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6525 domain.
<footnote><para>
6527 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6528 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6529 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6530 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6531 Studies on Copyright, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6532 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6533 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6534 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6535 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6538 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6539 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6540 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6542 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6543 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6544 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6545 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6546 books; that use
—because it does not involve publication
—is
6550 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6551 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6552 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6553 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6554 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6555 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6558 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6559 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6560 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6561 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6562 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6563 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6564 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6565 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6568 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6569 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6570 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6571 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6574 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6575 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6576 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6579 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6580 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6581 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6582 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6583 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6584 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6585 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6589 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6590 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6591 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6592 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6593 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6594 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6595 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6596 was ninety-five years.
6599 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6600 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6601 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6602 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6603 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6604 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6608 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6609 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6610 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6611 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6612 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6613 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6614 years.
<footnote><para>
6616 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6617 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6618 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6619 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6622 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6624 <sect2 id=
"lawscope">
6625 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6627 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6628 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6629 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6630 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6633 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6634 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6635 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6636 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6637 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6638 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6639 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6640 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6641 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6642 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6643 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6646 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6647 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6648 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6649 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6650 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6651 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6652 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6653 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6654 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6655 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6656 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6657 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6658 on the initial creative work.
6661 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6662 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6663 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6664 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6665 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6666 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6667 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6668 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6669 famous
© or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6670 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6671 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6674 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6675 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6676 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6677 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6678 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6679 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6680 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6681 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6682 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6683 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6684 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6688 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6689 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6690 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6691 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6692 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6693 copy available for others to copy.
6696 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6700 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6701 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6702 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6703 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6704 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6705 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6707 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6709 of American Literature,"
29 New York University Journal of
6711 Law and Politics
255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6712 Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6714 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6715 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6716 the United States
—publishers.
6719 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6720 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6721 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6722 act was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and
6723 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6724 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6726 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6730 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6731 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6732 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6734 to a tangible form
—all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6735 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6736 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6739 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6740 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6741 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6744 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6746 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6747 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6748 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6749 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6750 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6751 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6752 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6754 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6755 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6758 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6759 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6761 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6763 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6764 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6765 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6766 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6770 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6771 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6772 a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6773 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6774 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6775 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6776 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6777 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6779 derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6781 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6783 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6785 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6786 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6787 the wrong of direct piracy.
6790 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6791 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6792 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6794 use of my book.
<footnote><para>
6796 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6797 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6798 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6799 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6801 Yale Law Journal
112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially pp.
53–59).
6803 These two different uses of my creative work are
6807 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6808 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6809 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6811 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6812 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6816 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6817 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6819 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6820 rights originally granted.
6823 <sect2 id=
"lawreach">
6824 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6826 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6827 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6828 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6829 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6831 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6832 regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a copyrighted
6833 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6834 make a copy;
17 United States Code, section
106(
4). And it certainly
6836 doesn't regulate a "copy";
17 United States Code, section
112(a). But
6837 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;"
17
6838 United States Code, section
102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6843 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6844 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6845 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6846 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6847 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6848 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6849 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6850 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6851 trigger for copyright law.
6854 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6855 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6856 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6857 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
6859 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6860 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6861 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6863 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6865 because it is clear that the
6866 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6867 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6870 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6873 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
6874 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
6875 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
6878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6879 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6880 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6881 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6882 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6883 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6884 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6885 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6886 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6887 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6888 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6891 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
6892 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
6893 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
6896 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6897 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6898 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6899 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6900 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6901 diagram on next page).
6904 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6905 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6908 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
6909 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
6910 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
6913 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6914 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6916 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6917 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6918 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6919 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6920 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6921 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6923 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
6924 <title>Unregulated copying considered
"fair uses.
"</title>
6925 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
6928 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
6929 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
6930 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
6933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6934 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6935 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
6936 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6939 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
6940 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
6942 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6943 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6944 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6945 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6947 And because of this single,
6948 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6950 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6952 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6953 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6954 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6955 because each use also makes a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into
6957 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6959 work must look exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the
6960 burden of this shift.
6963 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6964 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
6965 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
6966 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
6968 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
6969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6970 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use
—reading
—
6971 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6976 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
6978 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6979 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
6981 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
6983 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
6984 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
6985 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
6986 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
6987 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
6990 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6991 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6992 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6993 points also become clear:
6996 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6997 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6999 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7001 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7002 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7003 free culture before the Internet.
7006 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7008 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7009 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7011 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7012 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7014 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7016 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7017 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7019 uses of creative work.
7022 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7025 burden on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7026 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7027 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7028 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7029 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7031 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7032 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7034 before because reading was not regulated.
7037 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7038 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7040 upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question about
7041 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7042 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7043 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7045 of fair use are not enough.
7048 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7049 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7050 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7051 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7052 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7055 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it
7057 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7059 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7060 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7061 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7062 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7067 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7069 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7070 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7071 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7073 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7075 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7076 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7077 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7079 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7080 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7081 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7084 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7085 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7087 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7089 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7090 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7091 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7092 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7093 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7096 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7097 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7098 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7099 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7100 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7101 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7102 Disney's permission.
7105 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7106 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7107 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7108 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7110 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7111 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7112 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7113 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7114 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7115 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7116 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7119 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7120 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7122 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the right to say
7123 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7124 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes
&
7126 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7127 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7129 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7130 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7132 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7133 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7134 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7135 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7138 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7139 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7140 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7141 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7143 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7144 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7147 <sect2 id=
"lawforce">
7148 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7150 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7151 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7152 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7153 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7156 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7157 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7158 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7159 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7160 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7163 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7165 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7166 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7167 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7168 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7169 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7170 if they went forward with their plan.
<footnote><para>
7172 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7174 Problems
44 (
1981):
172–73.
7178 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7179 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7180 you were."
<footnote><para>
7182 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
1–3.
7184 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7185 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7186 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7189 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7190 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7191 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7192 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7195 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7196 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7197 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7198 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7200 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7201 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7202 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7203 that is not at all funny.
7206 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7209 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7210 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7211 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7213 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7216 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7220 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7221 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7222 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7223 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7224 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7225 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7226 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7227 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7230 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7231 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7232 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7235 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7236 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7238 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7239 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7240 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7244 According to my eBook
7245 Reader, I have the permission
7246 to copy to the clipboard of the
7247 computer ten text selections
7248 every ten days. (So far, I've
7249 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7250 I also have the permission to
7251 print ten pages from the book
7252 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7253 the permission to use the Read
7254 Aloud button to hear
7256 read aloud through the
7260 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7261 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7263 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7264 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
"Politics
"</title>
7265 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7268 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7269 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7272 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7273 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
"Politics
".
</title>
7274 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7277 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7278 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7280 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7281 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7282 <title>List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas
".
</title>
7283 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7286 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7289 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"
—
7290 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7291 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7292 the power
—up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7294 copyright, there is no such copyright power.
<footnote><para>
7296 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7297 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7298 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7300 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7301 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7302 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7305 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7306 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7307 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7308 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7311 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7312 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7313 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7314 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7315 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till
2 A.M., but
7316 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7317 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7318 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7319 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7321 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7322 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7323 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud
—it's not that the company
7324 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7325 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7328 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7329 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7330 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7331 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7334 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7335 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7336 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7337 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7338 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7339 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7342 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7343 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7345 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7346 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7347 protections as well?
7350 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7354 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7356 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7357 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7358 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7359 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7361 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7362 <title>List of the permissions for
"Alice's Adventures in
7363 Wonderland
".
</title>
7364 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7367 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7368 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7370 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7372 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7375 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7376 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7377 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7378 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7379 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7380 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7383 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7384 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7385 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7386 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7387 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7388 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7389 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7390 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7391 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7392 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7393 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7396 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7397 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7398 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7399 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7400 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7404 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7405 story of mine that makes the same point.
7407 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7409 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7410 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7411 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7414 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7415 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7416 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7417 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7418 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7419 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7420 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7423 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7424 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7425 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7426 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7427 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7428 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7431 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7432 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7433 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7434 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7435 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7436 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7437 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7438 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7439 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7440 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7443 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7444 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7445 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7446 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7449 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7451 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7452 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7453 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7454 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7455 than Sony had built.
7458 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7459 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7460 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7461 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7464 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7465 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7466 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7467 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7468 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7469 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7470 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7474 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7475 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7476 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7477 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7478 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7479 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7480 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7481 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7482 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7485 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7487 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7488 Science
293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7489 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7490 January
2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7491 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter,
11 December
2001; Bill
7492 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7493 May
2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7494 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7495 Questions about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7496 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7497 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7499 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7500 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7501 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7502 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7505 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7506 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7507 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7508 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7509 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7510 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7511 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7515 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7516 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7517 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7518 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7521 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7522 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7523 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7524 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7525 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7528 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7529 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7530 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7531 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7532 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7533 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7536 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7537 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7538 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7539 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7540 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7541 constituted, succeed.
7544 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7545 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7546 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7551 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7552 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7553 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7557 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7558 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7559 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7563 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7564 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7565 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7566 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7567 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7571 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7572 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7573 spreading such information an offense.
7576 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7577 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7578 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7579 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies
—
7580 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7581 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7582 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7585 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7586 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7587 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7588 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7591 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7592 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7593 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7594 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7595 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7596 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7597 have been a copyright violation.
7600 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7601 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7602 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7603 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7604 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7605 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7606 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7608 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7609 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7612 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7613 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7614 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7615 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7616 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7617 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7620 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7621 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7622 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7623 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7624 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7625 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7626 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7627 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7631 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7632 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7633 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7634 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7635 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7636 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7637 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7638 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7639 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7640 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7641 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7642 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7643 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7644 important.
<footnote><para>
7646 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
7647 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7648 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7649 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7655 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7656 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7657 the VCR responsible.
7660 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7664 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7667 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7668 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7669 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7670 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7671 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7672 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7675 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7677 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7678 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7679 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7682 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7683 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7684 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7687 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7688 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7689 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7690 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7691 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7692 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7695 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7696 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7697 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7698 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7699 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7700 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7703 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7704 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7705 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law
—increasing its
7706 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7707 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7708 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7709 owners effect
—at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7710 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7713 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7714 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7715 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7716 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7717 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7718 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7719 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7720 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7721 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7726 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7727 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7728 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7729 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7730 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7732 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7733 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7734 Entertainment Law Journal
17 (
1997):
651.
7738 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7739 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7740 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7741 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7742 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7745 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7746 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7747 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7748 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7749 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7750 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7751 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7752 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7755 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7756 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7757 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7758 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7759 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7760 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7763 <sect2 id=
"marketconcentration">
7764 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7766 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7767 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7768 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7769 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7770 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7772 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7773 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7774 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7775 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7776 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7777 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7778 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7779 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7780 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7784 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7785 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7786 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7787 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7788 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7791 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7792 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7793 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7794 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7795 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7796 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7797 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7798 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7802 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7805 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
7807 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7808 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7809 ownership, "five companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<footnote><para>
7811 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7812 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
7813 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
7814 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7815 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
7816 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
7818 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7819 Slide," New York Times,
23 December
2002.
7821 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7822 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."
<footnote><para>
7824 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7829 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7830 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7832 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than
1,
200
7833 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7834 radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7835 largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that market's
7836 revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of the
7837 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7840 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7841 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7842 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7843 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7844 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
7845 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
7846 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7847 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7848 protected
— by the market.
7851 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7852 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7853 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7854 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7858 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7859 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
7860 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7861 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7862 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7863 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7864 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7865 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7866 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7867 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7869 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7871 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7876 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7877 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7878 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7879 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7881 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
7882 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
7883 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
7886 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7887 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7888 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7892 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7893 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7894 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7895 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7898 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7899 integration may matter.
7901 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
7902 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
7903 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7905 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7906 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7907 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7908 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7909 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7912 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7913 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7914 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7915 control.
<footnote><para>
7917 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7918 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7920 3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7921 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
7922 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7923 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
7928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7929 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7930 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7931 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7932 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
7933 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7934 television
—75 percent of it
—was "independent" of the
7938 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7939 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
7940 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7941 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
1992,
7942 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7943 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7944 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
16
7945 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7946 year there was one."
<footnote><para>
7948 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7949 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
7950 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7951 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7952 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7953 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7954 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
7957 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7958 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
7959 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7960 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7961 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7962 63%."
<footnote><para>
7967 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7969 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
7970 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7971 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7972 owned by the network.
7975 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7976 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7977 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7981 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7982 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7983 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7984 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7985 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7986 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7987 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7988 handful.
<footnote><para>
7990 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
7991 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
7992 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
7997 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
7998 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
7999 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8000 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8001 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8002 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8003 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
8004 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8005 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8008 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8010 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8011 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8012 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8013 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8014 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8015 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8017 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8018 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
8019 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
8020 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8021 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8022 Concepts in Technological Evolution," Research Policy
14 (
1985):
8023 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8024 Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8025 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
8026 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
8028 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8029 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8033 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8034 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8035 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8039 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8040 suggest the concern.
8043 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8044 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8045 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8048 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8049 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8050 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8052 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8053 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8054 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8055 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8056 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8057 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8058 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8059 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8060 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8061 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8062 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8063 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8064 outweigh these costs.
8067 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8068 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8069 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8073 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8074 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8075 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8076 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8077 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8078 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8079 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8080 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8081 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8082 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8085 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8086 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8089 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8090 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8091 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8095 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8097 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8098 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8099 message will be heard then?
8102 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8103 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8104 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8105 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8106 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8107 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8108 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8109 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8110 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8112 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8113 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8114 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8115 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8116 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8117 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8118 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8119 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8120 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8121 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8122 York Times,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8123 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8124 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8125 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8126 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review
6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8127 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8128 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC,
184 F.
3d
872
8129 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8130 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8131 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8132 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8133 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8134 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8135 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8139 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8140 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8141 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8142 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8143 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8144 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8145 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8146 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8147 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8150 <sect2 id=
"together">
8151 <title>Together
</title>
8153 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8154 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8155 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8156 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8159 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
—
8160 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8161 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8162 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8166 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8167 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8168 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8169 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8170 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8171 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8175 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8176 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8177 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8181 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8182 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8183 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8184 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8185 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8186 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8187 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8188 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8189 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8190 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8193 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8194 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8195 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8196 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8197 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8198 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8199 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8200 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8201 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8202 technology and the market enable.
8205 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8206 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8208 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8209 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8210 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8211 the development of our culture than now.
8213 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8214 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8215 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8216 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8217 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8218 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8219 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8220 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation
—a tiny
8221 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8222 founding
—is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8223 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8224 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8225 culture that our free society has known.
<footnote><para>
8227 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8228 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8232 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8235 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8236 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8237 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8238 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8239 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8244 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8248 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8249 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8254 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8255 <entry>©</entry>
8259 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8268 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8269 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8270 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8273 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8274 noncommercial work was also free.
8277 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8282 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8286 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8287 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8292 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8293 <entry>©</entry>
8294 <entry>©</entry>
8297 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8306 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8307 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8308 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8309 transformation were still essentially free.
8312 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8313 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8314 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8315 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8316 we could say the law began to look like this:
8321 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8326 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8331 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8332 <entry>©</entry>
8333 <entry>©</entry>
8336 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8337 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8345 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8346 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8347 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8348 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8349 that the law now looks like this:
8354 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8359 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8364 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8365 <entry>©</entry>
8366 <entry>©</entry>
8369 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8370 <entry>©</entry>
8371 <entry>©</entry>
8378 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8379 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8382 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8383 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8386 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8387 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8388 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8389 these domains actually does any good.
8392 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8393 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8394 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8395 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8396 reasons sketched especially in chapters
7 and
8, one might well wonder
8397 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8398 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8399 rights were more sharply restricted.
8402 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8403 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8404 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8405 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8406 property rights
<footnote><para>
8408 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8409 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8410 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8411 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8412 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8415 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8416 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8417 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8418 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8419 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8420 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8421 almost
180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8425 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8426 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8427 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8428 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8429 story of chapter
6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8430 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8431 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8434 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8435 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8436 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8437 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8438 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8439 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8440 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8441 dominates the debate today.
8444 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8445 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8446 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8447 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8448 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8449 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8450 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8451 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8452 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8453 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8456 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8460 <chapter id=
"c-puzzles">
8461 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8463 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8464 <sect1 id=
"chimera">
8465 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8466 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8467 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8469 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8470 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8472 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8473 <primary>"Country of the Blind, The
" (Wells)
</primary>
8477 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8478 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8479 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8481 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8482 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8483 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8485 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8486 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8487 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8488 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8489 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8490 villagers to explore life as a king.
8493 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8494 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8495 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8496 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8497 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8498 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8499 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8500 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8505 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8506 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8507 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8508 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8509 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8510 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8511 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8512 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8513 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8516 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8517 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8518 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8519 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8522 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8523 is affected," he reports.
8526 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8527 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8531 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8532 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8533 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8534 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8537 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8538 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8539 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8540 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8541 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8542 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8543 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8544 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8547 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8548 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8551 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8552 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8554 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8555 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8556 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8557 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8558 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8559 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8562 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8563 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8564 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8565 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8566 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8567 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8568 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8569 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8570 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8571 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8572 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8573 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8576 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8577 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8578 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8579 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8580 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8581 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8582 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8585 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8586 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8587 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8588 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8589 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8594 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8595 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8596 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8597 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8598 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8599 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8600 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8601 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8602 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8605 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8606 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8607 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8608 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8609 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8612 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8613 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8614 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8615 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8616 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8617 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8618 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8619 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8620 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8621 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8623 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003, available
8625 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8626 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8627 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8628 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8629 Los Angeles Times,
17 July
2003, available at
8630 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8631 currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8632 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8633 user accused of sharing more than
600 songs through a family computer,
8634 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services),
240 F.
8635 Supp.
2d
24 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8636 high as $
90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8637 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8638 from $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8639 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8641 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8643 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8644 August
2003, available at
8645 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8647 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8648 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8649 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe,
8 August
2003,
8651 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8655 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8657 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8658 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8659 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8660 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8661 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8664 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8665 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8666 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8667 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8668 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8669 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a
8670 reasonable alternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution
8671 would be the worse of the two extremes.
8675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8676 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8677 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8678 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8679 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8680 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8681 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8684 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8685 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8686 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8687 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8688 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8689 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8690 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8691 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8692 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8693 protection for copyrighted material,
8697 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8698 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8701 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8702 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8703 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8705 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8706 well produce a totally different industry model.
8709 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8710 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8711 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8712 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8713 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8714 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8715 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8716 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8717 interests.
<footnote><para>
8718 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8719 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8720 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8722 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement
8723 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8725 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8733 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8734 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8738 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8739 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8740 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8743 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8746 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8749 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8750 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8751 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8752 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8754 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8757 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8758 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8760 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8764 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8765 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8766 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8769 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
8770 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
8772 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8773 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8774 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8775 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8779 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8780 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8781 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8782 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8783 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8785 <sect2 id=
"constrain">
8786 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
8788 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8789 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8790 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8791 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8792 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8793 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8794 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8795 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8796 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8797 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8798 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8799 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
8800 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8803 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8804 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8805 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8806 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8807 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8808 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8809 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8810 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8811 the culture all around.
8814 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8815 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8817 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8819 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8820 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8821 storytelling extended across the globe.
8824 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8825 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8826 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8827 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8828 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8829 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8830 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8831 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8832 work is presumptively illegal.
8835 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8836 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8837 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8838 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8839 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8840 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
8841 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8842 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
8843 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8844 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
8845 million.
<footnote><para>
8847 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8848 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
8849 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8850 Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
8851 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
8853 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8854 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8855 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
8856 suffering.
<footnote>
8858 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8859 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
8860 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8861 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
8862 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
8863 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
8865 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8867 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
8869 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8870 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8871 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8874 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8875 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8876 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8878 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8879 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8880 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8883 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8885 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8886 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8888 to see a world of underground art
—not because the message is
8890 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8891 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8893 art" tour the United States.
<footnote><para>
8894 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired,
7 July
2003,
8897 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8898 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
8900 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8901 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8902 critical or reflective.
8905 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8906 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
10. But an
8907 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8908 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8909 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8910 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8911 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8912 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8913 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8916 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8917 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8918 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8919 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8920 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8921 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8922 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8923 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8924 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8927 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8928 described in chapter
7, in response to the story about documentary
8929 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8930 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8931 law regulates such a use.
8935 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8936 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8937 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8938 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
8939 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8940 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8941 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8942 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8943 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8946 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8947 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8948 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8949 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8950 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8951 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8952 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8953 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8957 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
8958 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8959 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8960 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8961 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
8962 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8963 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8964 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8965 culture that is free.
8968 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8972 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8973 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8974 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8975 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8976 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8977 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8978 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8979 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8980 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8984 <sect2 id=
"innovators">
8985 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
8987 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8988 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8989 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8990 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8991 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8992 think there's little in this story to worry you.
8995 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
8996 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
8997 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
8998 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
8999 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9000 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9001 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9004 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9005 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9006 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9007 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9008 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9009 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9010 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9011 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9012 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9013 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9014 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9016 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9018 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9020 strategy that I described in chapter
10. The consequence of this
9021 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9022 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9023 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9024 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9025 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9026 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9027 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9030 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9031 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9032 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9035 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9036 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9037 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9038 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9039 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9040 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9043 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9044 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9045 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9046 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9050 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9051 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9052 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9053 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9054 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9055 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9056 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9057 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9058 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9059 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9062 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9063 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9066 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9067 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9068 the kind of content the users liked.
9071 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9072 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9073 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9074 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9075 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9076 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9077 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9078 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9079 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9080 they had already bought.
9083 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9084 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9085 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9086 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9087 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9088 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9089 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9090 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9093 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9096 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9097 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9098 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9099 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9100 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9101 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9102 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9106 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9107 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9108 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9111 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9112 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9113 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9114 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9116 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9117 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9119 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9120 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9121 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9122 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9123 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9124 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9125 Times,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9127 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9129 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available at
9130 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9131 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9134 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9135 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9137 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9138 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9139 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9140 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9141 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9142 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9143 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9144 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9145 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9148 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9150 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9151 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9152 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9153 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9154 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9155 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9156 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . .
<footnote>
9159 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business
2.0,
16 June
9161 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9162 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9163 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9168 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with "your money or your
9169 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9170 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9171 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9172 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9173 constantly threatened by litigation.
9177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9178 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9179 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9180 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9181 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9182 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9184 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9186 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9187 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9188 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9189 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9190 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9193 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9194 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9195 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9197 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9199 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9200 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9202 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9204 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9205 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9206 overregulatedregulated
9210 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9211 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9213 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture
—a
9215 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9216 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9217 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9218 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9219 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9220 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9221 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9222 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9224 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9225 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9227 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9228 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9229 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9230 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9232 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9235 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9236 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9238 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9240 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9241 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9242 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9243 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9244 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9247 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9248 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9249 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9250 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9251 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9252 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9253 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9254 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9258 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9260 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9261 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9262 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9263 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9264 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9266 and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9267 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2,
26–27.
9272 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9273 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9275 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9276 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9279 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9283 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9284 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9285 impose.
<footnote><para>
9286 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9287 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9289 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9290 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9294 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9295 innovation
—again,
9296 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9300 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9301 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9302 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9303 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9306 As I described in chapter
10, despite this feature of copyright as
9307 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9308 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,
<footnote><para>
9309 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9312 overall this history of copyright
9313 is not bad. As chapter
10 details, when new technologies have come
9314 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9315 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9316 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9319 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9320 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9321 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9322 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9323 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9326 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9327 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9328 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
180 F.
3d
1072 (
9th
9329 Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9330 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9332 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9334 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9335 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9336 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9338 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
1029 (C.D.
9339 Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9340 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9341 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9344 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9345 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.
<footnote><para>
9346 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9347 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9348 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9349 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9351 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9352 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9353 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9354 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9355 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9356 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9357 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9358 World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34, available at
9359 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9362 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9369 As I described in chapter
4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9370 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9371 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9372 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous
9373 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9374 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9376 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9377 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9380 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9381 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9382 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9383 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9384 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9386 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9387 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9389 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9392 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9394 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9395 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9396 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9397 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9399 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9402 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9403 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9404 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9405 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9407 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9408 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9409 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9410 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9411 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9412 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9413 in to this new form of radio.
9417 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9418 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9420 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9422 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9423 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9425 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9426 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9430 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9431 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9433 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9434 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9436 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9437 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9438 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9439 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9441 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9442 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9444 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9445 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9446 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.
<footnote><para>
9447 <!-- f12. --> Lessing,
239.
9452 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not because
9454 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9455 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"
<footnote><para>
9456 <!-- f13. --> Ibid.,
229.
9460 the growth of this competing technology.
9463 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9464 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9465 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9466 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9467 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9471 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9472 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9475 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9477 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9478 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9479 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9481 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9482 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9483 neutral toward Internet radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio
9484 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9487 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9488 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9489 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9490 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9491 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9494 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9495 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9496 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9497 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9498 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9499 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9500 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9501 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9502 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9503 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9504 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9505 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was
9506 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9507 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9508 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9509 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9510 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9511 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9513 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9517 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9518 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9519 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9521 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9522 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9524 name of the service;
9527 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9530 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9533 date of transmission;
9536 time of transmission;
9539 time zone of origination of transmission;
9542 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9545 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9548 sound recording title;
9551 ISRC code of the recording;
9554 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9557 featured recording artist;
9566 UPC code of the retail album;
9572 copyright owner information;
9575 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9578 name of the service or entity;
9584 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9587 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9590 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9593 Unique User identifier;
9596 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9601 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9602 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9603 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9604 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9605 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9609 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9610 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9611 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9613 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
9615 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9616 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9617 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9621 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9622 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9623 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9624 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9625 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9626 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9629 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9631 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9632 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9633 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9637 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9638 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9639 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9640 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9644 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9645 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9646 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9647 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9648 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9649 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9650 effective to prevent it.
9653 <sect2 id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9654 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9656 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9658 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9659 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9662 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9663 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9664 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9667 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9668 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9669 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times,
43 million
9670 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9671 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9672 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9673 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9674 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9675 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9677 According to the RIAA,
9678 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9679 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9681 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9682 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9683 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9685 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9686 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9687 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9689 response by the other.
9692 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9693 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9694 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9695 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9696 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9697 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9698 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9699 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9700 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9701 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9702 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9703 was.
<footnote><para>
9705 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9706 Angeles Times,
10 September
2003, Business.
9708 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9709 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9710 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9711 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9712 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9713 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9717 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9718 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9719 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9720 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9721 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9722 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9723 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9724 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9725 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9727 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9728 Prohibition," American Economic Review
81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9732 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9733 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9735 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9736 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9737 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9739 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9740 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9741 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9742 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9743 cheat.
<footnote><para>
9745 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9746 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature
36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
9747 compliance literature).
9749 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9750 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9751 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9754 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9755 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9756 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9757 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9758 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9759 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9760 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9761 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9762 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
9763 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9764 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9765 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
9766 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
9767 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9768 degree of illegality.
9771 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9772 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9773 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9774 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9775 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9776 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9777 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9778 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9779 to consider the alternative.
9783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9784 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9785 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9786 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9787 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9788 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9791 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9792 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9793 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9794 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9795 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9796 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9797 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9798 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9799 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9800 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9801 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9802 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9805 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9806 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9807 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9808 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9809 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9810 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9811 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9812 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9813 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9817 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9820 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9821 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9822 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9823 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9827 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9831 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9832 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9833 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9834 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9835 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9836 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9837 capacities of digital technologies.
9839 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
9841 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9842 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9843 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9844 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9845 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9846 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9847 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9848 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9849 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9852 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
9853 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9854 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9855 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9856 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9857 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9858 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9859 on people's machines.
9862 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9863 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9864 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9865 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9866 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9867 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9869 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9870 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9871 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9872 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9876 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9877 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9878 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9879 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9880 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9881 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9882 freedom to move content easily?
9885 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9886 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9887 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9888 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9889 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9890 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9891 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9892 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9893 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9896 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9897 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9898 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9899 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9900 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9901 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9902 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9905 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9906 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9907 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9908 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9911 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9912 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9916 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9917 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9918 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9919 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9920 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9921 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9922 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9923 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9925 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
9928 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9933 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9934 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9935 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9936 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9937 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9938 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9939 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9940 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9941 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9945 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9946 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9947 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9950 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
9951 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9952 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9953 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9954 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9955 an Internet user is revealed.
9958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9959 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9960 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9961 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9962 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9963 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9964 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9965 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9966 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
9968 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9969 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9970 Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9971 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9972 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9973 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
9974 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today,
15 September
9975 2003,
4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9976 Fan, Either," New York Times,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9977 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star,
18 September
2003, P7.
9982 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9983 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9984 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
9986 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9987 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9988 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
9990 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9991 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9992 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9995 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
9996 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
9997 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
9998 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
9999 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10000 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10001 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10002 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10003 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10004 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10005 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10007 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10008 Boston Globe,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10009 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10010 Colleges," Washington Post,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10011 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
10012 Monitor,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10013 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10014 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10015 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News,
30 January
10016 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10017 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman
10018 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10019 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10020 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10022 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10023 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10026 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10027 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10028 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10029 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10030 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10031 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10035 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10036 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10041 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10042 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10043 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10044 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10045 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10046 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10047 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10048 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10049 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10050 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10051 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10052 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10053 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10054 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10055 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10056 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10061 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10062 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10063 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10064 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10065 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10066 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10073 <chapter id=
"c-balances">
10074 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10076 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10078 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10079 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10080 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10081 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10084 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10085 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10086 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10087 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10088 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10092 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10093 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10094 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10095 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10096 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10097 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10101 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10102 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10103 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10104 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10105 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10106 made that is happening all around.
10109 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10110 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10111 gasoline onto this fire.
10114 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10115 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10116 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10117 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10120 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10121 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10122 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10123 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10124 success will require.
10127 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10128 <sect1 id=
"eldred">
10129 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10131 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10132 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10133 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10134 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10135 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10136 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10140 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10141 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10142 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10143 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10144 them available for free.
10147 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10148 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10149 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10150 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10151 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10153 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10154 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10155 accessible
—today.
10158 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10159 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10160 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10161 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10162 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10163 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10164 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10165 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10166 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10167 commercial publications of public domain works.
10170 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10171 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10172 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10173 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10174 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10175 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10176 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10177 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10178 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10179 generally.
<footnote><para>
10181 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10182 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10183 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10184 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10185 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10186 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10187 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10188 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10189 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10190 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10191 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10192 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10193 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10194 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10195 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10198 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10199 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10200 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10201 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter
10,
10202 in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10203 terms of existing copyrights
—this time by twenty years. Eldred
10204 would not be free to add any works more recent than
1923 to his
10205 collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10206 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10207 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than
1
10208 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10212 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10213 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10214 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10215 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10216 "copyrights should be forever."
<footnote><para>
10218 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10219 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10220 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10221 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10222 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10223 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10224 Congress,"
144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10229 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10230 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10231 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10232 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10233 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10234 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10238 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10240 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10242 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10243 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10245 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10249 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10250 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10251 their . . . Writings. . . .
10255 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10256 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10257 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10258 something
—for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10259 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10260 specific
—to "promote . . . Progress"
—through means that
10261 are also specific
— by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10262 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10265 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10266 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10267 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10268 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10270 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10271 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10272 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms "on the
10273 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10274 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10277 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10278 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10279 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10280 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10281 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10282 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10283 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10284 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10285 this gravy train going.
10288 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10289 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10290 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10291 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10292 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10293 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10294 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10297 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10298 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10299 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10300 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10301 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10302 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10303 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10304 published by anyone for free.
10307 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10308 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10309 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10310 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10314 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10317 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10318 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10322 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10323 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10324 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10325 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10328 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10332 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10333 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10334 they support the bill."
10337 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10338 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10339 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10343 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10344 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10345 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10346 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
10349 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10350 correct conclusion:
10353 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10354 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10356 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10359 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10361 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10362 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
10365 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10366 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10367 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10368 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10369 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10370 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10372 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10373 the copyright term extended.
10376 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10378 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10379 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10382 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10384 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10385 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10386 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10387 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10388 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10389 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10390 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
10391 Chicago Tribune,
17 October
1998,
22.
10393 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10394 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10395 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10396 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10398 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10400 Disney is estimated to have
10401 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10402 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10403 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10405 Quarterly This Week,
8 August
1990, available at
10406 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10411 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10412 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10414 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10415 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10416 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10417 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10418 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10420 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10424 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10425 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10426 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10427 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10428 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10430 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10433 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10437 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10438 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10439 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10441 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10442 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10447 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10448 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10450 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10451 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10453 to impose no limit.
10456 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10457 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10458 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10459 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10460 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10461 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10462 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10463 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10464 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10466 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10469 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10471 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10472 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10474 If anything Congress says is interstate
10475 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10476 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10477 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.
<footnote><para>
10478 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10483 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10484 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10485 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10486 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10488 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10489 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10490 commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10491 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10492 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10493 to regulate copyrights
—the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10495 And if it is applied to the
10496 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10498 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10499 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10501 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10502 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10503 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10505 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10506 existing copyrights.
10509 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10510 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics
—a conservative
10511 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10512 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10514 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10515 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10516 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10517 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10519 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10520 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10523 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10524 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10526 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10527 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy
—piracy of
10528 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10529 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10530 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10532 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10533 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10534 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10535 work. But now these entities were using their power
—expressed
10536 through the power of lobbyists' money
—to get another twenty-year
10537 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10538 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10541 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10544 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10545 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<footnote><para>
10546 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
10547 186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available at
10548 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10551 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10552 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10553 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10556 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10558 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10560 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10561 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10562 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10563 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10564 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10565 bought to extend them again.
10568 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10570 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10571 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10573 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10575 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10576 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10577 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10578 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10580 and no longer available as a result.
10583 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10584 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10585 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10586 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10587 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10588 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10589 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10591 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10592 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
7, available at
10593 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10598 Think practically about the consequence of this
10599 extension
—practically,
10600 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10602 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10603 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10604 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10605 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10607 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10610 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10611 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10612 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10613 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10614 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10615 list of books still under copyright.
10618 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10619 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10622 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10624 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10625 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10626 being at least a list?
10629 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10630 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10632 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10634 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10635 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10638 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10640 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10644 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10645 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10646 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10648 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10649 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10650 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10653 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10654 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10655 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10658 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10659 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10661 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10662 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10663 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10664 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10665 know quite well who owns what property.
10668 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10669 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10671 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10672 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10673 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10674 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10675 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10676 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10677 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10680 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10681 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10683 for other creative works is much more dire.
10685 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
10687 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10688 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10689 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10690 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10691 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10692 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10693 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10694 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
10695 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10696 films."
<footnote><para>
10698 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10699 Los Angeles Times,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10700 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10701 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
9 October
2002.
10706 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10707 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10708 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10709 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10712 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10714 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10715 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10716 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10717 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10718 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10719 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10720 work available for distribution.
10723 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10724 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10725 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10726 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10727 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10728 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10729 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10731 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
10732 618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10733 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10734 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10739 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10741 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10742 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10743 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10744 locate the copyright owner.
10747 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10748 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10749 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10750 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10751 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10756 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10757 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10758 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10759 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10760 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10761 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10762 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10763 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10764 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10767 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10769 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10770 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10772 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10773 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10774 the copyright expires.
10777 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10778 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10779 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10781 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10785 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10786 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10787 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10788 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10790 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10794 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10795 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10797 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10798 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10799 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10801 the commercial life ends.
10804 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10805 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
10806 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10808 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10810 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10811 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
10812 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10813 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10814 have, we need to have access to this history.
10817 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10819 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10820 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10821 this context do no good.
10824 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10825 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10826 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10827 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10828 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10829 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10830 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10831 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10834 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10835 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
10836 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10837 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10838 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10839 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10840 market didn't have more to offer.
10843 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10844 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10845 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10846 would not have interfered with anything.
10849 But this situation has now changed.
10852 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10853 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10854 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10855 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10856 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10857 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10858 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10859 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10860 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10861 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10864 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10865 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10866 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10867 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10868 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10869 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10870 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10871 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10872 written for a radically different context.
10875 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10876 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10877 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10878 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10879 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10880 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10881 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10882 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10883 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10886 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10887 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10888 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10892 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10893 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
10894 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10895 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10896 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10897 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
10898 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10899 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
10900 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10903 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10904 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10905 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10906 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10908 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10909 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10910 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10911 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10912 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
10913 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
10915 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20
10916 December
2002, available at
10917 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
10922 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10923 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10924 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10925 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
10926 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that
10927 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10930 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10931 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10932 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10933 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10934 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10937 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10938 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10939 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10940 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10941 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10942 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10943 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10944 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10945 power to extend existing terms.
10948 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10949 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10950 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10951 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10954 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10955 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10958 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10959 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10960 overstepped its bounds.
10963 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10964 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10965 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10966 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10967 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10970 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10971 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10972 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
10973 briefs and preparing for argument.
10976 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10977 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10978 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10979 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10980 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10981 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10982 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10983 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10986 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10987 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10988 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10991 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
10993 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
10994 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
10995 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
10996 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
10998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
10999 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11000 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11001 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11003 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11004 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11005 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11007 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11008 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11009 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11010 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11011 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11012 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11013 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11014 most powerful media companies in the world."
11017 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11018 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11019 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11020 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11021 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11022 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11023 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11024 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11026 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11027 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11029 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11030 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11031 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11033 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11034 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11035 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11038 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11039 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11040 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11041 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11042 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11043 why it was unconstitutional.
11046 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11048 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11049 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11050 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11051 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11052 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11053 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11055 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11056 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11057 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11058 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11059 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11060 gather the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11061 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11062 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11065 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11066 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11068 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11069 November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11071 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11072 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11073 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11074 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11075 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11076 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11077 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11078 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11081 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11083 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11084 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11085 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11086 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11087 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11090 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11091 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11093 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11094 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11095 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11096 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11097 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11098 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11099 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11100 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11103 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11104 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11105 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11106 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11109 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11110 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11111 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11112 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11115 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11116 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11117 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11118 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11119 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11121 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11122 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11123 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11124 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11125 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11126 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11127 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11128 nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the fancy term economists use
11129 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11132 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11133 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11134 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11135 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11136 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11137 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11138 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11139 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11142 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11143 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11146 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11147 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11148 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11149 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11150 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11151 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11152 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11153 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11154 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11155 confidence in our argument.
11158 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11159 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11160 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11161 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11165 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11166 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11167 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11168 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11169 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11170 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11174 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11175 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11176 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11177 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11178 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11179 pornography."
<footnote><para>
11181 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537
11182 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11184 That was also the motive of
11185 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11186 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11187 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11189 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11190 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times,
28 March
1998, B7.
11194 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11195 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11196 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11199 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11200 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11201 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11202 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11203 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11204 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11205 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11206 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11207 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11208 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11211 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11212 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11213 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11214 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11215 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11216 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11217 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11220 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11221 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11222 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11223 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11224 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11225 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11226 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11229 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11231 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11232 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11233 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11236 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11237 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11238 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11239 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11240 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11243 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11244 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11245 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11246 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11247 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11248 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11249 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11250 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11253 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11255 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11256 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11257 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11258 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11259 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11260 these retrospective extensions.
11263 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11264 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11265 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11266 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11267 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11268 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11271 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11272 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11273 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11275 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11276 most important jurisprudential innovation
—the argument that Judge
11277 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11278 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11281 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11282 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11285 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11286 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11287 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11288 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11289 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11290 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11291 copyright be limited.
11294 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11296 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11298 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11299 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11300 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11303 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11304 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11305 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11307 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11310 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11312 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11313 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11314 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11316 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11318 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11319 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11321 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11322 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11323 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11325 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11326 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11328 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11329 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11330 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11333 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11334 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11335 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11336 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11338 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11339 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11342 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11344 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11345 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11346 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11347 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11350 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11351 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11352 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11353 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11354 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11356 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11358 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11359 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11360 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11361 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11362 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11363 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11364 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11365 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11366 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11367 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11368 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11370 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11371 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11372 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11375 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11376 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11377 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11378 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11380 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11381 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11382 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11383 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11384 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11385 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11386 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11387 family of the Justices.
11390 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11391 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11392 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11393 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11396 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11397 The history was bothering her.
11401 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11402 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11403 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11404 practice that began with the very first act.
11408 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11409 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11410 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11414 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11415 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11416 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11417 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11422 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11423 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11424 Kennedy, who observed,
11428 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11429 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11430 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11431 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11432 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11436 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11442 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11443 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11444 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11445 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11447 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11450 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11452 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11453 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11454 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11455 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11456 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11459 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11460 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11461 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11464 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11466 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11472 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11473 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11476 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11477 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11479 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11480 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11481 into the Copyright Clause.
11485 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11486 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11487 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11491 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11493 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11494 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11495 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11500 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11501 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11502 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11503 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11504 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11505 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11506 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause
—
11507 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11509 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11510 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11513 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11514 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11516 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11517 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11521 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11522 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11523 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11524 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11526 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11528 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11529 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11530 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11531 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11533 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11535 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in
11536 particular, the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule
11537 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11540 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11541 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11542 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11543 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11544 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11547 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11548 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11549 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11552 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11553 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11554 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11557 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11559 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11561 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11562 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11563 in the Court's opinion.
11567 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11568 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11569 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11571 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11574 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11575 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11576 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11577 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11580 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11581 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11582 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11583 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11584 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11585 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11586 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11587 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11591 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11592 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11593 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11594 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11595 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11596 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11597 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11598 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11599 the system we have.
11601 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11603 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11604 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11605 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11606 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11607 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11608 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11609 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11610 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11611 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11613 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11615 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11616 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11617 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11618 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11619 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11620 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11621 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11622 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11623 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11624 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11627 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11628 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11629 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11630 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11631 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11634 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11635 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11636 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11639 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11640 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11641 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11642 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11643 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11644 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11645 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to
11646 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11647 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11648 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11652 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11653 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11654 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11655 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11658 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11659 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11660 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11661 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11662 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11663 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11667 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11669 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11672 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11674 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11675 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11676 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11677 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11678 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11679 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11680 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11681 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11682 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11685 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11686 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11687 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11688 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11689 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11690 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11691 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11692 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11693 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11694 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11695 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11696 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11697 effort to persuade; but I
11698 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11699 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11700 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11701 should decide the issue.
11703 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11705 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11706 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11710 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11711 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11712 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11713 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11716 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11717 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11718 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11719 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11723 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11724 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11725 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11726 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11727 issue should not be raised until it is.
11728 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
11731 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11732 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11733 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11734 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11735 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11736 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11737 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
11738 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11739 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11740 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11741 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11743 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11744 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11745 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11746 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11747 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11748 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11752 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11753 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11754 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11755 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11756 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11757 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11761 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11762 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11763 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11764 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11765 in the face felt exactly like that.
11768 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11769 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11770 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11771 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11772 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11773 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11774 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11776 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11778 <sect1 id=
"eldred-ii">
11779 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
11781 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11782 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11783 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
11784 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11785 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11786 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11787 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11789 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11791 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11792 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11793 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11794 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11795 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11796 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11797 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11798 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11801 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11802 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11803 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11804 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11805 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11806 the work passed into the public domain.
11809 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11810 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11811 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11814 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11815 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11816 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11817 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11818 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11819 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
11820 everything else, let the content go.
11822 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11824 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11825 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11826 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11827 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11828 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11829 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11830 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11831 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11832 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11833 the stupid harm of the present system.
11836 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11837 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11838 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11839 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11840 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11841 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11842 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11843 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11844 where copyright owners could be identified.
11846 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11847 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11849 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11850 As I described in chapter
10, formalities in copyright law were
11851 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11852 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
11854 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11855 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11856 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11857 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
11858 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11859 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11860 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11861 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11862 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11863 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11864 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11865 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11866 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11867 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11868 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11869 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11870 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11871 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
11872 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11873 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11874 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11875 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11876 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11877 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11880 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11881 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11882 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11883 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11884 know what's protected and what's not.
11886 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11888 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11889 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11890 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11891 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11892 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11893 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11894 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11895 in the loss of widows' only income.
11898 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11899 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11900 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11901 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11902 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11903 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11906 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11907 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11908 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11909 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11911 imposed upon creators.
11914 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
11915 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11918 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11919 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11920 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11921 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11922 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11926 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11927 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11928 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11929 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11930 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11931 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11935 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11936 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11937 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11938 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11939 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11940 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
11941 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11942 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11943 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11944 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11945 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11946 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11947 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11948 system of protection for property generally.
11951 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11952 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11953 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11954 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11955 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11956 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11957 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11958 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11961 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
11965 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11966 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11967 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11968 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11969 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11970 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11971 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11972 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11975 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11976 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11977 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11978 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11979 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11980 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11981 seen before because there are no formalities.
11984 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11985 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11986 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11987 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11988 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11991 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11992 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
11993 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
11994 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
11995 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
11998 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
11999 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12000 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12004 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12005 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12006 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12009 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12010 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12011 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12012 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12013 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12014 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12015 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12016 historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of commercial
12017 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12018 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12020 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12022 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12023 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12024 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12025 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12028 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12029 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12030 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12031 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12032 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12033 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12034 something good might happen here.
12037 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12038 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12039 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12040 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12041 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12042 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12045 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12046 concept in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That
12047 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12048 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12049 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12050 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12051 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12052 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12053 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12054 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12055 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12056 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12057 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12058 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12059 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12060 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12061 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12062 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12063 film is a valid derivative use.
12066 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12067 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12068 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12069 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12070 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12071 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12074 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12075 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12076 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12077 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12078 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12079 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12080 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12084 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12085 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12086 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12087 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12093 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12094 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12095 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12096 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12097 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12098 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12099 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12100 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12101 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12104 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12105 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12106 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12107 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12108 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12109 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12110 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12111 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12114 What does this industry really want?
12117 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12118 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12119 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12120 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12121 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12122 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12123 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12127 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12128 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12129 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12130 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12131 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12134 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12135 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12138 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12139 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12140 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12141 and to share its own creation.
12143 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12144 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12146 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12147 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12148 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12149 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12150 block the progress of others.
12153 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12154 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12155 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12156 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12157 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12158 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12159 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12161 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12164 <chapter id=
"c-conclusion">
12165 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12167 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12168 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12169 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12170 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12171 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12174 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12175 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12176 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12177 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12178 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12179 the disease almost invisible.
12182 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12183 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12184 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12185 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12187 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12188 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12189 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12190 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
12192 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12194 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12195 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12200 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12201 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12202 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12203 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12204 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12205 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12208 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12209 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12210 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12211 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12212 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12213 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12214 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12215 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12219 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12220 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12221 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12222 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12223 costs significantly below the market price.
12226 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12227 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12228 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12229 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12230 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12231 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12232 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12235 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12236 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12237 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12238 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12242 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12243 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12245 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12246 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."
<footnote><para>
12247 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12248 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12250 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12251 2000),
14, available at
12252 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12253 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12254 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12255 Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess., Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57
12256 (statement of James Love).
12259 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12260 asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add pressure to that
12262 in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12264 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12266 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12268 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12269 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12271 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12273 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent
—
12274 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12275 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12276 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12277 of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12279 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent
12280 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12281 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12282 Organization (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12285 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12286 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12287 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12288 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12289 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12290 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12291 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12292 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12295 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12296 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12297 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12298 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12299 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12300 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12303 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12304 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12305 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12306 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12307 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12308 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12312 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12313 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12316 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12318 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12319 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle,
24
12320 May
1999, A1, available at
12321 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12322 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12323 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12324 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12325 Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus
4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12326 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12327 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12328 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12329 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," Widener Law
12330 Symposium Journal (Spring
2001):
175.
12331 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12333 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12334 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12335 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12336 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12339 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12340 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12341 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12342 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12343 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12344 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12345 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12346 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12349 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12350 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12351 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12352 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12353 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12354 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12357 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12358 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12359 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12360 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12361 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12362 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12365 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12366 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12367 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12368 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12369 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?" Because there is no "sound
12370 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12371 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12372 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12373 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12374 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12375 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12376 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12377 idea called "intellectual property."
12380 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12381 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12382 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12383 What is the argument?
12386 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12387 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12388 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12389 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12390 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12391 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12392 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12393 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12394 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12395 were balanced in just this sense.
12398 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12399 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12400 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12401 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12402 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12403 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12404 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12405 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12406 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12407 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12408 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12409 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12412 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12413 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12414 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12415 this common sense open its eyes.
12418 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12419 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12420 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12421 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12422 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12423 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12424 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12425 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12426 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12427 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12428 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12429 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12432 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12433 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12434 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12435 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12436 August
2003, E1, available at
12437 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12438 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12439 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12440 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12441 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12442 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12443 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12445 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12446 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12447 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12448 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12449 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12450 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12451 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12452 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12453 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12454 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12455 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12456 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12457 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12459 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12460 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12461 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12462 in the early
1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12465 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12466 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12467 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12468 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12469 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12472 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12473 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12476 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12477 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12478 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12479 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12483 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12484 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12485 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12486 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12487 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12488 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12489 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12490 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12491 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12492 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12493 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12494 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12495 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12496 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12497 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12498 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12499 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12502 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12503 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12504 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12507 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12508 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12509 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12510 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12513 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12514 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12515 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12516 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12517 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12518 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12519 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12520 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12521 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12524 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12525 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12527 software. There are many important companies that depend
12529 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12530 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12531 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"
—and IBM is
12532 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12533 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12534 support a mode of software development that is different from
12535 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12536 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12538 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12539 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12541 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12543 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12544 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12546 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12547 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12548 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
2002),
69,
12550 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12552 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12553 Stern School of Business (
3 May
2001), available at
12554 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12558 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12559 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12560 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12561 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12562 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12564 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12565 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12566 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12567 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12568 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12569 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12570 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12571 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12572 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12573 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12576 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12577 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12578 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12579 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12580 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12581 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12582 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12584 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at
<ulink
12585 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12587 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12590 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12591 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12592 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12593 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12594 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12595 its lobbying efforts.
12598 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12599 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12600 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12601 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12602 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12603 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12604 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12608 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12610 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12612 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12613 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12614 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12615 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12616 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12617 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12618 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12619 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12622 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12623 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12624 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12625 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12626 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12627 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12628 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12629 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12630 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12631 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12632 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12635 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12636 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12637 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12638 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12639 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12640 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12641 $
20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12642 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12643 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12644 right to decide what to do with their property.
12647 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12648 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12649 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12650 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12651 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12652 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12653 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12654 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12655 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12659 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12660 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12661 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12662 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12663 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12664 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12665 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12666 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12667 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12670 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12671 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12673 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12674 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12676 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism,
210–20.
12677 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12679 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12680 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12681 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12684 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12685 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12686 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12687 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12691 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12692 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12693 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12694 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12695 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12696 say anything wrong. But in the world
12697 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12698 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12699 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12703 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12704 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12705 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12706 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12707 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12708 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12709 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12710 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12713 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12714 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12715 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12716 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12717 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12718 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12721 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12722 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12723 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12724 our own country's history).
12727 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12728 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12729 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12730 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12731 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12732 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12733 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12734 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
12735 democracy in the world, become?
12738 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12739 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12740 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12741 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12742 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12743 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
12745 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
12747 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12748 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12749 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12750 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12751 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12752 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12753 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12754 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12755 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12756 hearings and a different result.
12759 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12760 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12761 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12762 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12763 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12764 concentration in the media.
12767 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12768 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12769 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12770 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12771 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12774 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12775 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12776 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12777 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12778 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12779 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
12780 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
12782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12784 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12785 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12786 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12787 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12788 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12791 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12792 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12793 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12794 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12795 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12796 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12799 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12802 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
12804 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12805 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
12807 John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12809 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
12810 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8 September
12812 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
12813 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12814 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News,
9
12815 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12816 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12817 Defendants," Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12818 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News,
10 September
2003,
12820 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
12822 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12823 music.
<footnote><para>
12825 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12826 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
12827 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
12829 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12830 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
12832 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12833 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
12834 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
12835 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12837 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
12838 anonymous
—reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12839 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12840 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12841 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12842 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12843 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12844 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12845 kids who use a computer to share content.
12847 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12848 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12849 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
12850 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
12852 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12853 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12854 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
12855 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12856 24 August
2003, available at
12857 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
12859 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12860 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12861 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12862 country.
<footnote><para>
12864 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
12866 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
12868 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12869 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12870 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12871 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12872 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12873 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12874 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12875 day into the Causbys.
12878 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12879 potential is ever to be realized.
12881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12885 <chapter id=
"c-afterword">
12886 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
12889 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12890 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12891 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12892 maps what might be done.
12895 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12896 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12897 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12898 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12901 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12902 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12903 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
12904 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12908 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12909 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12910 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12911 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12912 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12917 <title>US, NOW
</title>
12919 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12920 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
12921 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12922 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12925 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12926 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12927 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights
12928 Reserved"
— and those who reject copyright
—"No Rights
12929 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12930 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12931 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12932 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12935 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12936 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12937 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12938 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12942 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12943 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12947 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12948 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12949 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12950 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12951 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12952 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12953 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12954 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12955 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12956 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12957 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12958 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12961 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
12962 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12963 reserved"
— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12964 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12965 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12969 <sect2 id=
"examples">
12970 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
12972 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12973 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12974 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12975 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12976 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12977 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12978 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12982 What made it assured?
12984 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12986 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12987 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
12988 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12989 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
12990 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
12991 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
12992 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
12993 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
12994 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
12995 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
12996 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
12997 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
12998 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13000 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13002 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13003 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13004 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13005 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13006 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13007 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13008 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13009 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13012 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13013 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13014 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13015 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13016 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13017 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13018 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13022 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13023 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13024 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13025 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13028 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13029 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
13030 Law Review
1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13032 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13033 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13034 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13035 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13036 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13037 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13038 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13040 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13041 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13042 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13043 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13046 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13047 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13048 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13049 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13050 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13051 care much about controlling their software.
13053 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13055 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13056 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13057 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13058 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13059 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13063 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13064 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13065 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13066 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13067 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13068 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13069 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13070 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13071 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13075 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13076 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13077 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13078 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13079 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13080 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13081 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13084 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13085 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13086 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13087 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13088 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13089 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13090 fundamentally weakened.
13093 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13094 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13095 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13096 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13099 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13100 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13101 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13102 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13103 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13104 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13105 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13106 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13110 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13111 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13112 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13113 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13114 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13115 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13118 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13119 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13120 scientific journals are produced.
13123 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13124 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13125 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13126 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13127 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13128 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13129 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13130 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13131 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13132 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13133 and Westlaw are also free
13134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13135 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13136 Court opinion through their respective services.
13139 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13140 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13141 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13142 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13143 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13144 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13145 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13148 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13149 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13150 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13153 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13154 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13155 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13156 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13157 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13158 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13159 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13160 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13161 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13162 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13165 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13166 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13167 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13168 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13169 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13173 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13174 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13175 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13176 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13178 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13179 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13180 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13181 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13182 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13183 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13186 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13187 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13188 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13189 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13190 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13191 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13196 <sect2 id=
"oneidea">
13197 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13198 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13199 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13202 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13203 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13206 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13207 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13208 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13209 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13210 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13211 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13212 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13213 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13216 Simple
—which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13217 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13218 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13219 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13220 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13221 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13222 three expressions together
—a legal license, a human-readable
13224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13225 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13226 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13227 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13228 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13229 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13230 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13231 certain freedoms are given.
13234 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13235 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13236 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13237 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13238 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13239 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13240 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13241 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13242 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13245 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13246 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13247 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13248 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13249 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13250 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13251 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13252 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13256 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13257 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13258 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13259 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13260 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13261 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13262 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13263 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13264 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13265 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13268 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13269 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13270 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13271 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13272 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13273 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13274 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13275 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13276 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13277 to begin to build those rules.
13280 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13281 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13282 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13283 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13284 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13287 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13288 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13289 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13290 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13291 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13292 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13293 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13294 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13295 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13296 sales of Cory's book.
13299 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13300 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13301 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13302 was a total success.
13305 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13306 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13307 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13308 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13309 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13310 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13311 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13312 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13316 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13317 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13318 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13319 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13320 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13321 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13322 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13323 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13324 with their own art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13325 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13326 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13327 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13328 because the legal costs are so high
<footnote><para>
13331 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13332 Culture Wars (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13333 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13334 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13335 </para></footnote>),
13336 these artists release into the creative environment content
13337 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13340 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13341 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13342 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13343 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13344 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13345 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13346 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13347 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13348 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13352 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13353 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13354 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13355 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13358 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13359 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13362 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13363 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13364 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13365 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13366 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13367 steps are possible.
13370 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13371 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13372 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13373 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13374 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13375 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13376 creativity to spread more easily.
13378 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13383 <sect1 id=
"themsoon">
13384 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13386 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13387 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13388 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13389 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13390 changes that we need.
13393 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13394 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13395 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13399 <sect2 id=
"formalities">
13400 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13402 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13403 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13404 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13405 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13408 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13409 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13410 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13414 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13415 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13416 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13417 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13423 As I suggested in chapter
10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13424 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13425 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13426 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13427 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13428 formalities were getting in the way.
13431 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13432 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13433 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13434 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13435 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13436 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13437 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13438 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13439 past. And thus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where
13440 they otherwise could speak.
13443 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13445 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13446 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13447 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13448 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13449 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13450 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13453 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13454 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13455 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13456 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13457 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13458 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13459 developed by others.
13462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13464 <sect3 id=
"registration">
13465 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13467 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13468 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13469 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13470 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13471 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13472 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13473 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13474 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13475 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13476 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13477 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13480 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13481 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13482 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13483 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13484 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13485 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13486 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13489 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13490 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13491 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13492 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13493 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13494 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13495 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13496 with which registration occurs up.
13499 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13500 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13501 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13502 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13503 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13504 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13505 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13506 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13507 formality
—while producing a database
13508 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13509 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13513 <sect3 id=
"marking">
13514 <title>MARKING
</title>
13516 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13517 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13518 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13519 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13520 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13521 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13522 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13523 uniformly across all media.
13526 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13527 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13528 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13532 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13533 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13534 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13535 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13536 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13537 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13538 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13539 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13542 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13543 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13544 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13545 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13546 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13547 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13549 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13550 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13551 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13553 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13554 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13555 stop using the work in any new
13556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13557 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13558 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13562 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13563 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13564 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13565 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13566 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13569 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13570 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13571 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13572 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13573 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13574 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13575 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13576 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13577 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13580 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13581 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13582 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13583 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13584 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13585 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13588 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13589 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13590 make things unclear.
13593 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13594 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13595 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13596 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13597 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13598 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13601 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13604 <sect2 id=
"shortterms">
13605 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13607 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13608 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13612 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13613 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13614 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13615 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13616 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13617 term.
<footnote><para>
13619 "A Radical Rethink," Economist,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13621 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13623 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13626 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13627 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13628 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13631 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13634 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13635 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13636 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13637 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13638 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13639 regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
</para></listitem>
13642 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13643 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13644 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13645 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13646 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13647 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13648 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13649 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13655 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13656 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13657 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13658 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13659 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13660 veteran to apply for a pension.
<footnote><para>
13662 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13663 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
13665 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
13667 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13668 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13673 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13674 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13675 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in
1923 for the law to
13676 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13677 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13678 fewer authors to create in
1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13679 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13680 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13681 in
1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13682 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13683 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13684 not increase their creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done,
13685 and there's nothing we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
13688 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13689 that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976, the average
13690 term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13693 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13694 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13695 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13696 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13699 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13702 <sect2 id=
"freefairuse">
13703 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
13705 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13706 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13707 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13708 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13709 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13710 the emergence of that new technology.
13713 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13714 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13715 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13716 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13717 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13718 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13719 though that movie is not "my writing."
13722 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
13723 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13724 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
13726 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13727 University Press,
1967),
32.
13729 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13730 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13731 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13735 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13736 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13737 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13738 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
13739 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
13744 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13745 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13746 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13747 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13748 Consider each limitation in turn.
13751 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13752 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13754 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13755 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13756 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13757 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13758 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13759 after the creative work is done.
13762 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13763 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13764 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13765 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13766 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13767 perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no
13768 longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all
13769 the creative possibilities that digital technologies enable; now
13770 imagine pouring molasses into the machines. That's what this general
13771 requirement of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13774 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13775 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13776 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
13777 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
13778 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13782 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13783 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13784 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13785 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
13788 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13789 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
13790 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
13792 His view is that the law should be written so that
13793 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13796 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13797 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13798 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13799 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13800 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13803 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13804 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13805 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13806 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13807 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13808 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13812 <sect2 id=
"liberatemusic">
13813 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
13815 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13816 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13817 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
13818 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13819 battles around the sharing of music.
13822 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13823 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13824 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13825 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13826 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13827 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13828 innovation on the network.
13831 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13832 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13833 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13834 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13835 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13838 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13839 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13840 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13841 chapter
5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13843 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
13846 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13847 for purchasing CDs.
13851 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13852 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13855 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13857 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13858 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13859 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13863 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13864 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13865 owner plainly endorses.
13869 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13870 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13871 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13872 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13873 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13874 significantly weakened.
13877 As I said in chapter
5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13878 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13879 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13880 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13884 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13885 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13889 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13890 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13891 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13892 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13893 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
13894 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13895 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13896 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13897 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13898 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13901 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13902 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13903 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13904 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13905 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13906 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13907 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13908 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13909 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13910 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
13911 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
13912 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13913 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13916 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13917 that give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet
13918 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13919 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
13920 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
13921 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
13922 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
13923 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
13924 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13925 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13926 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13927 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13928 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13929 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13930 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13931 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
13933 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
13934 April
2002, available at
13935 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
13940 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13941 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13942 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
13943 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13944 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13945 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13946 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13947 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13948 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13949 artists get paid, during
13951 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13952 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13953 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13956 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13957 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
13958 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13959 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13960 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13961 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13962 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13963 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13964 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13967 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13968 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13969 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13970 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13971 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13972 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13973 way that returns something to the artist.
13976 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13977 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13978 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13979 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13980 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13981 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13982 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
13983 his being compensated is less than ideal.
13986 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
13987 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
13988 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
13989 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
13990 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
13991 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
13992 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
13996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
13997 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
13998 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
13999 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14000 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14001 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14002 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14003 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14007 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14008 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14009 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14010 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14011 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14012 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14013 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14014 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14017 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14018 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14019 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14020 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14021 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14022 delivering and accessing content.
14025 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14026 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14029 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14030 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14031 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14032 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14033 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14034 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14035 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14036 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14040 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14041 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14042 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14043 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14044 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14045 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14048 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14049 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14051 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14052 10 October
2000), available at
14053 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14054 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14055 Stanford University Press,
2004), ch.
6, available at
14056 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14057 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14058 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14059 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14060 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14061 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14062 Broadband?" Washington Post,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14063 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14064 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14066 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14067 Use Fee (IPUF),
3 March
2002, available at
14068 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14069 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today,
13 May
14071 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14072 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14073 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14074 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
14076 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14077 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14078 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14079 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14080 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14081 debate by about a decade. See
14082 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14083 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14084 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14086 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14087 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14088 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14089 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14090 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14091 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14092 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14093 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14097 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14098 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14099 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14100 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14101 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14102 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14103 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14104 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14105 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14106 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14107 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14108 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14109 controlling access.
14112 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14113 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14114 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14115 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14116 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14117 limits on derivative
14119 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14120 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14121 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14122 allowed to do with the content itself.
14125 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14126 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14127 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14128 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14129 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14130 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14131 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14132 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14133 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14134 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14135 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14136 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14140 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14141 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14142 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14143 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14144 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14145 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14146 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14147 theaters are often luxurious
—with "first class" seats, and meals
14148 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14149 finding ways to compete with "free."
14152 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14153 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14154 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14155 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14156 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14157 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14161 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14166 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14167 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14168 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14169 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14173 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14176 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14179 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14183 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14184 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14189 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14190 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14194 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14195 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14196 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14200 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14201 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14202 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14203 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14204 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size x,
14205 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14206 market of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14207 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14208 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14209 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14210 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14214 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14215 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14216 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14219 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14220 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14224 <sect2 id=
"firelawyers">
14225 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14227 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14228 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14229 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14230 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14233 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14234 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14235 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14236 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14237 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14238 strong view queers the law.
14241 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14242 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14243 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14244 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14245 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14246 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14247 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14248 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14250 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14251 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review
48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14256 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14257 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14258 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14261 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14262 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14263 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14264 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14266 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14267 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14268 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14269 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14270 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14271 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14272 J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14273 Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14274 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14275 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June
2003,
14277 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14278 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14279 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14280 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14281 Rethinking,
174–76.
14283 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14284 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14288 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14289 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14290 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14291 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14292 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14293 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14294 practically never be done.
14297 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14298 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14299 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14300 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14301 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14302 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14303 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14304 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14307 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14308 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14309 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14310 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14311 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14312 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14315 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14316 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14317 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14321 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14322 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14323 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14324 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14325 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14326 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14327 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14330 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14331 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14334 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14335 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14336 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14339 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14340 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14341 keep your lawyers away.
14343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14347 <chapter id=
"c-notes">
14348 <title>NOTES
</title>
14350 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14351 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14352 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14353 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14354 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14355 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14356 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14357 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14358 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14364 <chapter id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14365 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14367 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14368 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14369 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14370 to him that this book is dedicated.
14373 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14374 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14375 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14376 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14377 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14378 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14379 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14380 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14381 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14382 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14383 critical eye on much of this.
14386 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14387 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14388 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14389 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14391 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14392 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14393 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14394 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14397 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14398 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14399 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14400 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14401 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14402 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14403 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14404 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14405 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14406 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14407 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14408 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14409 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14410 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14411 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14412 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14413 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14414 a bunch of great replies.)
14417 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14418 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14419 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14420 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14421 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14422 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14423 throughout this book.
14426 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14427 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14428 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14429 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
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