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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>Version 2004-02-10</subtitle>
26
27 <authorgroup>
28 <author>
29 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig</surname>
31 </author>
32 </authorgroup>
33
34 <copyright>
35 <year>2004</year>
36 <holder>
37 Lawrence Lessig.
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
45 </holder>
46 </copyright>
47
48 <abstract>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
50 <para>
51 LAWRENCE LESSIG
52 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
66 Appeals.
67 </para>
68 </abstract>
69 </bookinfo>
70
71 <chapter id="c-info">
72 <title>Info</title>
73 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
74
75 <para>
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
77 </para>
78 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
79 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
83 </itemizedlist>
84 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
85
86 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
87 <para>
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
89 <sbr/>The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
90 in a Connected World
91 <sbr/>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
92 </para>
93
94 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
95 <para>
96 THE PENGUIN PRESS
97 <sbr/>NEW YORK
98 </para>
99
100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
101 <para>
102 FREE CULTURE
103 </para>
104
105 <para>
106 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
107 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
108 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
109 </para>
110
111 <para>
112 LAWRENCE LESSIG
113 </para>
114
115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
116 <para>
117 THE PENGUIN PRESS
118 <sbr/>a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
119 York, New York
120 <sbr/>Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
121 <sbr/>All rights reserved
122 <sbr/>Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
123 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
124 Reprinted with permission.
125 <sbr/>Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
126 <sbr/>All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
127 <sbr/>Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
128 <sbr/>Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
129 <sbr/>Lessig, Lawrence.
130 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
131 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
132 <sbr/>p. cm.
133 <sbr/>Includes index.
134 <sbr/>ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
135 <sbr/>1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
136 <sbr/>3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
137 <sbr/>KF2979.L47
138 <sbr/>343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
139 <sbr/>This book is printed on acid-free paper.
140 <sbr/>Printed in the United States of America
141 <sbr/>1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
142 <sbr/>Designed by Marysarah Quinn
143 </para>
144
145 <para>
146 &translationblock;
147 </para>
148
149 <para>
150 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
151 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
152 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
153 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
154 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
155 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
156 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
157 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
158 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
159 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
160 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
161 </para>
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
163
164 <para>
165 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
166 it continues still.
167 </para>
168
169 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
170 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
171 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
172 </figure>
173
174 <toc id="toc"></toc>
175
176 <lot>
177 <title>List of figures</title>
178 </lot>
179
180 <!--
181 c PREFACE xiii
182 c INTRODUCTION
183 c "PIRACY"
184 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
185 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
186 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
187 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
188 2 Film
189 2 Recorded Music
190 2 Radio
191 2 Cable TV
192 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
193 2 Piracy I
194 2 Piracy II
195 c "PROPERTY"
196 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
197 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
198 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
199 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
200 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
201 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
202 2 Beginnings
203 2 Law: Duration
204 2 Law: Scope
205 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
206 2 Architecture and Law: Force
207 2 Market: Concentration
208 2 Together
209 c PUZZLES
210 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
211 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
212 2 Constraining Creators
213 2 Constraining Innovators
214 2 Corrupting Citizens
215 c BALANCES
216 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
217 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
218 c CONCLUSION
219 c AFTERWORD
220 1 Us, Now
221 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
222 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
223 1 Them, Soon
224 2 1. More Formalities
225 3 Registration and Renewal
226 3 Marking
227 2 2. Shorter Terms
228 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
229 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
230 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
231 c NOTES
232 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
233 c INDEX
234 -->
235
236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
237
238 </chapter>
239 <chapter id="c-preface">
240 <title>PREFACE</title>
241 <para>
242 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
243 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
244 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
245 </para>
246 <blockquote>
247 <para>
248 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
249 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
250 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
251 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
252 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
253 </para></footnote>
254 </para>
255 </blockquote>
256 <para>
257 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
258 software,
259 or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review suggested
260 the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we could always
261 "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a switch and be back
262 home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and any troubles
263 that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
264 </para>
265 <para>
266 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
267 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
268 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
270 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
271 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
272 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
273 </para>
274 <para>
275 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
276 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
277 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
278 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
279 </para>
280 <para>
281 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
282 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
283 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
284 freesoftware movement<footnote>
285 <para>
286 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
287 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
288 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
289 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
290 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
291 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
292 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
293 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
294 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
295 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
296 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
297 or of creators from the past.
298 </para>
299 <para>
300 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
301 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
302 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
303 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
304 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
305 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
306 culture deem fundamental.
307 </para>
308 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
309 <para>
310 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
311 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
312 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
313 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
314 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
315 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
316 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
317 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
318 he asked,
319 </para>
320 <blockquote>
321 <para>
322 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
323 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
324 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
325 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
326 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
327 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
328 </para></footnote>
329 </para>
330 </blockquote>
331 <para>
332 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
333 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
334 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
335 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
336 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
337 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
338 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
339 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
340 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
341 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
342 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
343 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
344 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
345 that this work is "merely" derivative.
346 </para>
347 <para>
348 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
349 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this book
350 than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been its own.
351 Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of values. Like
352 Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And like Stallman,
353 I believe those are values of our past that will need to be defended in
354 our future. A free culture has been our past, but it will only be our
355 future
356 if we change the path we are on right now.
357 xv
358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
359 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
360 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
361 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
362 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
363 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
364 what I advance here.
365 </para>
366 <para>
367 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
368 between
369 anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is filled
370 with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract that get
371 enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its
372 property
373 becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism
374 in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear about our
375 culture
376 today. It is against that extremism that this book is written.
377 </para>
378
379 </chapter>
380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
381
382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
383 <chapter id="c-introduction">
384 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
385 <para>
386 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
387 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
388 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
389 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
390 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
391 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
392 </para>
393 <para>
394 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
395 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
396 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
397 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
398 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
399 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
400 </para></footnote>
401 For many
402 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
403 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
404 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
405 </para>
406 <para>
407 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
408 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
409 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
410 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
411 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
412 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
413 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
414 </para>
415 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
416 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
417 <para>
418 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
419 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
420 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
421 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
422 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
423 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
424 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
425 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
426 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
427 </para>
428 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
429 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
430 <para>
431 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
432 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
433 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
434 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
435 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
436 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
437 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
438 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
439 </para>
440 <blockquote>
441 <para>
442 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
443 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
444 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
445 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
446 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
447 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
448 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
449 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
450 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
451 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
452 <para>
453 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
454 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
455 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
456 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
457 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
458 Authorship," Stanford Law Review 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
459 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
460 1112&ndash;13.
461 </para></footnote>
462 </para>
463 </blockquote>
464 <para>
465 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
466 </para>
467 <para>
468 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
469 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
470 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
471 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
472 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
473 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
474 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
475 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
476 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
477 </para>
478 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
479 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
480 <para>
481 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
482 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
483 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
484 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
485 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
486 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
487 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
488 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
489 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
490 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
491 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
492 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
493 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
494 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
495 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
496 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
497 </para>
498 <para>
499 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
500 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
501 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
502 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
503 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
504 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
505 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
506 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
507 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
508 understanding of radio.
509 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
510 </para>
511 <para>
512 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
513 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
514 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
515 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
516 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
517 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
518 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
519 much less transmitter power and static.
520 </para>
521 <para>
522 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting
523 of the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in
524 New York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
525 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
526 seventeen
527 miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and then with a
528 clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an electrical
529 device,
530 it produced the sound of an announcer's voice: "This is amateur
531 station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on frequency
532 modulation
533 at two and a half meters."
534 </para>
535 <para>
536 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
537 </para>
538 <blockquote>
539 <para>
540 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
541 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was
542 crumpled and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling
543 forest fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a
544 piano
545 solo and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was
546 projected with a live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
547 "music box."<footnote><para>
548 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
549 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
550 </para></footnote>
551 </para>
552 </blockquote>
553 <para>
554 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a
555 vastly superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention,
556 Armstrong
557 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the
558 then dominant AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio
559 stations across the United States, but the stations in large cities were all
560 owned by a handful of networks.
561 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
562 </para>
563 <para>
564 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
565 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
566 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
567 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
568 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
569 </para>
570 <blockquote>
571 <para>
572 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
573 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a revolution&mdash;
574 start up a whole damn new industry to compete with RCA.<footnote><para>
575 See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," First
576 Electronic
577 Church of America, at www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
578
579 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
580 </para></footnote>
581 </para>
582 </blockquote>
583 <para>
584 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
585 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
586 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
587 described,
588 </para>
589 <blockquote>
590 <para>
591 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
592 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
593 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
594 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
595 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
596 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
597 </para></footnote>
598 </para>
599 </blockquote>
600 <para>
601 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
602 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
603 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
604 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
605 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
606 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
607 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
608 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
609 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
610 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
611 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
612 </para>
613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
614 <blockquote>
615 <para>
616 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
617 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
618 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
619 deviousness.<footnote><para>
620 Lessing, 256.
621 </para></footnote>
622 </para>
623 </blockquote>
624 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
625 <para>
626 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
627 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
628 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
629 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
630 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
631 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
632 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
633 least temporarily.
634 </para>
635 <para>
636 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
637 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
638 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
639 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
640 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
641 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
642 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
643 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
644 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
645 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
646 </para>
647 <para>
648 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
649 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
650 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
651 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
652 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
653 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
654 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
655 course always public spirited; the reality is something
656 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
657 to themselves, would crumble in
658 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
659 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
660 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
661 effect
662 of technological change.
663 </para>
664 <para>
665 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good
666 date upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the
667 Internet
668 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
669 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had
670 access
671 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years before.<footnote><para>
672 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look
673 at Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
674 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
675 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
676 </para></footnote>
677 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
678 of 2004.
679 </para>
680 <para>
681 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
682 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
683 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
684 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
685 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
686 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
687 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
688 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
689 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
690 </para>
691 <para>
692 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
693 Internet
694 itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that the
695 Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
696 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as old as
697 the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change, would reject
698 it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet has introduced.
699 </para>
700 <para>
701 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
702 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
703 regulation
704 of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our culture
705 that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By "noncommercial
706 culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around parks or on
707 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
708 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
709 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader,"
710 or Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
711 </para>
712 <para>
713 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
714 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
715 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the peace,
716 then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly concerned
717 with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it left this
718 culture
719 "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary individuals shared and
720 transformed their culture&mdash;telling stories, reenacting scenes from plays
721 or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were
722 left alone by the law.
723 </para>
724 <para>
725 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
726 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
727 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
728 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
729 marketplace.<footnote>
730 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
731 <para>
732 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
733 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
734 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
735 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
736 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
737 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
738 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
739 198&ndash;200.
740 </para></footnote>
741 This is also, of
742 course, an important part of creativity and culture, and it has become
743 an increasingly important part in America. But in no sense was it
744 dominant
745 within our tradition. It was instead just one part, a controlled
746 part, balanced with the free.
747 </para>
748 <para>
749 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
750 been erased.<footnote><para>
751 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
752 2001), ch. 13.
753 </para></footnote>
754 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and,
755 pushed by big media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in
756 our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
757 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
758 expanded
759 to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
760 creativity
761 that it never reached before. The technology that preserved the
762 balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were free and
763 uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has been undone.
764 The consequence is that we are less and less a free culture, more and
765 more a permission culture.
766 </para>
767 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
768 <para>
769 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
770 creativity.
771 And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the
772 protectionism that justifies the changes that I will describe below is not
773 the limited and balanced sort that has defined the law in the past. This
774 is not a protectionism to protect artists. It is instead a protectionism
775 to protect certain forms of business. Corporations threatened by the
776 potential of the Internet to change the way both commercial and
777 noncommercial culture are made and shared have united to induce
778 lawmakers to use the law to protect them. It is the story of RCA and
779 Armstrong; it is the dream of the Causbys.
780 </para>
781 <para>
782 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
783 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that
784 reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
785 marketplace
786 for making and cultivating culture generally, and that change
787 in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet is thus to
788 the industries that built and distributed content in the twentieth
789 century
790 what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was to the
791 railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of the end,
792 or at least a substantial transformation. Digital technologies, tied to the
793 Internet, could produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market
794 for building and cultivating culture; that market could include a much
795 wider and more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce
796 and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending
797 upon a few important factors, those creators could earn more on average
798 from this system than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our
799 day don't use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
800 </para>
801 <para>
802 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
803 happening
804 in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the early
805 twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using their
806 power to get the law to protect them against this new, more efficient,
807 more vibrant technology for building culture. They are succeeding in
808 their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet remakes them.
809 </para>
810 <para>
811 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
812 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
813 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
814 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
815 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
816 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
817 Motion
818 Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
819 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
820 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
821 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
822 Times, 17 January 2002.
823 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
824 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
825 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
826 against it.
827 </para>
828 <para>
829 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
830 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
831 especially
832 in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls "creative
833 property."
834 I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the law, properly tuned,
835 should punish "piracy," whether on or off the Internet.
836 </para>
837 <para>
838 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
839 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
840 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
841 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
842 </para>
843 <para>
844 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
845 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
846 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
847 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
848 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
849 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
850 <para>
851 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
852 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
853 </para></footnote>
854 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
855 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
856 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
857 could cultivate and extend our culture.
858 </para>
859 <para>
860 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
861 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
862 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
863 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
864 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
865 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
866 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
867 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
868 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
869 </para>
870 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26 -->
871 <para>
872 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
873 "centrality
874 of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or
875 otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for
876 neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a
877 morality
878 tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
879 </para>
880 <para>
881 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
882 inspired
883 by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its
884 code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace.
885 There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet
886 technologies
887 to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and
888 culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to
889 understand
890 the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
891 </para>
892 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
893 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
894 <para>
895 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
896 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
897 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
898 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
899 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
900 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
901 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
902 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
903 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
904 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
905 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
906 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
907 trespass.
908 </para>
909 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
910 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
911 <para>
912 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
913 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
914 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
915 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
916 war. Unlike
917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
918 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
919 on its side.
920 </para>
921 <para>
922 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
923 increasingly
924 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
925 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
926 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
927 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
928 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
929 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
930 </para>
931 <para>
932 The puzzle is, Why?
933 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
934 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
935 because
936 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
937 absolute
938 claim was wrong?
939 </para>
940 <para>
941 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
942 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
943 </para>
944 <para>
945 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
946 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
947 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
948 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
949 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
950 </para>
951 <para>
952 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
953 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
954 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
955 Armstrong
956 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
957 more powerful view?
958 </para>
959 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
960 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
961 <para>
962 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
963 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
964 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
965 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
966 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
967 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
968 this silliness will be much more profound.
969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
970 </para>
971 <para>
972 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
973 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
974 ideas.
975 </para>
976 <para>
977 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
978 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
979 obscure
980 French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird sort we
981 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
982 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
983 can be more fully understood.
984 </para>
985 <para>
986 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
987 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
988 government,
989 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
990 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
991 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
992 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
993 threatened
994 by the changes to use their power to change the law&mdash;and more
995 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
996 who we have always been.
997 </para>
998 <para>
999 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1000 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1001 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1002 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1003 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1004 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1005 </para>
1006 </chapter>
1007 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1008 <chapter id="c-piracy">
1009 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1010
1011 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1012 <para>
1013 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
1014 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1015 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1016 capture.
1017 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1018 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1019 </para>
1020 <blockquote>
1021 <para>
1022 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1023 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1024 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1025 <!-- f1 -->
1026 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1027 </para></footnote>
1028 </para>
1029 </blockquote>
1030 <para>
1031 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1032 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1033 efficient
1034 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1035 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1036 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1037 content
1038 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1040 </para>
1041 <para>
1042 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1043 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1044 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1045 sharing
1046 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1047 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1048 </para>
1049 <para>
1050 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1051 increasingly
1052 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1053 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1054 believe
1055 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1056 piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1057 </para>
1058 <para>
1059 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1060 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1061 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1062 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1063 </para>
1064 <para>
1065 The idea goes something like this:
1066 </para>
1067 <blockquote>
1068 <para>
1069 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1070 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1071 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1072 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1073 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1074 piracy.
1075 </para>
1076 </blockquote>
1077 <para>
1078 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1079 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1080 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1081 <!-- f2 -->
1082 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1083 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1084 </para></footnote>
1085 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1086 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1087 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1088 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1089 <!-- f3 -->
1090 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1091 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1092 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1093 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1094 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1095 </para></footnote>
1096 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1097 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1098 </para>
1099 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1100 <para>
1101 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1102 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1104 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1105 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1106 property.
1107 It has never taken hold within our law.
1108 </para>
1109 <para>
1110 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1111 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1112 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1113 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1114 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1115 </para>
1116 <para>
1117 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1118 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1119 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1120 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1121 copyright law today regulates both.
1122 </para>
1123 <para>
1124 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1125 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1126 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1127 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1128 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1129 more expense of doing business.
1130 </para>
1131 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1132 <para>
1133 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1134 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1135 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1136 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1137 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1138 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1139 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1140 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1141 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1142 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1143 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1144 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1145 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1146 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1147 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1149 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1150 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1151 <para>
1152 <!-- f4 -->
1153 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1154 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1155 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1156 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1157 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1158 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1159 enabled are much more tenuous.
1160 </para></footnote>
1161 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1162 this creative class.
1163 </para>
1164 <para>
1165 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1166 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1167 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1168 </para>
1169
1170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1171 <sect1 id="creators">
1172 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1173 <para>
1174 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1175 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1176 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1177 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1178 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1179 </para>
1180 <para>
1181 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1182 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1183 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1184 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1185 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1186 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1187 </para>
1188 <blockquote>
1189 <para>
1190 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1191 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1192 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1193 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1194 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1195 </para>
1196 <para>
1197 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1198 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1199 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1200 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1201 synchronization was pretty close.
1202 </para>
1203 <para>
1204 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1205 electric.
1206 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1207 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1208 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1209 wonderful! And it was something new!<footnote><para>
1210 <!-- f1 -->
1211 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1212 Cartoons
1213 (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1214 </para></footnote>
1215 </para>
1216 </blockquote>
1217 <para>
1218 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1219 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1220 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1221 </para>
1222 <para>
1223 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1224 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1225 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1226 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1227 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1228 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1229 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1230 </para>
1231 <para>
1232 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1233 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1234 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1235 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1236 </para>
1237 <para>
1238 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1239 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1240 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1241 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1242 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1243 genre.
1244 </para>
1245 <para>
1246 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1248 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1249 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1250 <!-- f2 -->
1251 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1252 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1253 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1254 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1255 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1256 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1257 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1258 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1259 </para></footnote>
1260 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1261 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1262 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1263 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1264 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1265 Mouse.
1266 </para>
1267 <para>
1268 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1269 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1270 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1271 <!-- f3 -->
1272 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1273 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1274 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1275 </para></footnote>
1276 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1277 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1278 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1279 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1280 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1281 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1282 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1283 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1284 old.
1285 </para>
1286 <para>
1287 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1288 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1289 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1290 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1291 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1292 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1293 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1294 </para>
1295 <para>
1296 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1297 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1298 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1299 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1300 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1301 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1302 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937),
1303 Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of
1304 the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin
1305 Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1307 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1308 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1309 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1310 Treasure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1311 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1312 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1313 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1314 </para>
1315 <para>
1316 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1317 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1318 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1319 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1320 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1321 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1322 culture around us and makes it something different.
1323 </para>
1324 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1325 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1326 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1327 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1328 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1329 <!-- f4 -->
1330 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1331 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1332 determining
1333 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1334 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1335 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1336 average
1337 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1338 Web site associated with this book, available at
1339 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1340 </para></footnote>
1341 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1342 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1343 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1344 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1345 </para>
1346 <para>
1347 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1348 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1349 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1350 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1351 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1352 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1353 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1354 </para>
1355 <para>
1356 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1357 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1358 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1359 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1360
1361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1362 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1363 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1364 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1365 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1366 content from before the Great Depression.
1367 </para>
1368 <para>
1369 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1370 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1371 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1372 universal.
1373 </para>
1374 <para>
1375 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1376 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1377 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1378 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1379 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1380 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1381 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1382 </para>
1383 <para>
1384 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1385 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1386 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1387 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1388 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1389 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1390 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1391 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1392 interestingly different way.
1393 </para>
1394 <para>
1395 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1396 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1397 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1398 </para>
1399 <para>
1400 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1401 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1402 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1403 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1405 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1406 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1407 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1408 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1409 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1410 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1411 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1412 </para>
1413 <para>
1414 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1415 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1416 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1417 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1418 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1419 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1420 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1421 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1422 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1423 </para>
1424 <para>
1425 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1426 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1427 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1428 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1429 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1430 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1431 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1432 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1433 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1434 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1435 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1436 original copyright owner's permission.
1437 </para>
1438 <para>
1439 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1440 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1441 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1442 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1443 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1444
1445 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1446 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1447 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1448 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1449 <!-- f5 -->
1450 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1451 York: Perennial, 2000).
1452 </para></footnote>
1453 </para>
1454 <para>
1455 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1456 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1457 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1458 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1459 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1460 which are fifty years old."
1461 </para>
1462 <para>
1463 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1464 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1465 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1466 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1467 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1468 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1469 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1470 <!-- f6 -->
1471 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1472 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1473 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1474 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1475 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1476 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1477 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1478 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1479 </para></footnote>
1480 </para>
1481 <para>
1482 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1483 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1484 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1485 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1486 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1487 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1488 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1489 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1490 culture?
1491 </para>
1492 <para>
1493 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1494 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1495 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1496 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1497 to prosecute cases like this."
1498 </para>
1499 <para>
1500 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1501 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1502 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1503 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1505 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1506 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1507 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1508 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1509 their clients or hurt them?
1510 Let's pause for a moment.
1511 </para>
1512 <para>
1513 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1514 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1515 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1516 </para>
1517 <para>
1518 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1519 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1520 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1521 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1522 <!-- f7 -->
1523 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1524 Vaidhyanathan,
1525 Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1526 University
1527 Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1528 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately describes a set of
1529 "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the
1530 nature of those rights is very different.
1531 </para></footnote>
1532 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1533 property;
1534 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1535 intellectual property.
1536 </para>
1537 <para>
1538 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1539 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1540 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1541 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1542 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1543 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1544 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1545 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1546 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1547 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1548 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1549 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1550 the public domain.
1551 </para>
1552 <para>
1553 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1554 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1555 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1556
1557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1558 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1559 freedom is good.
1560 </para>
1561 <para>
1562 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1563 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1564 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1565 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1566 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1567 form, whether large or small.
1568 </para>
1569 <para>
1570 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1571 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1572 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1573 particular find it hard to say why.
1574 </para>
1575 <para>
1576 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1577 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1578 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1579 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1580 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1581 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1582 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1583 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1584 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1585 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1586 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster
1587 films in 1997.
1588 </para>
1589 <para>
1590 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1591 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1592 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1593 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1594 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1595 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1596 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1597 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1599 </para>
1600 <para>
1601 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1602 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1603 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1604 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1605 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1606 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1607 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1608 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1609 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1610 </para>
1611 <para>
1612 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1613 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1614 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1615 </para>
1616
1617 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1618 </sect1>
1619 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1620 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1621 <para>
1622 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1623 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1624 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1625 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1626 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1627 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1628 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1629 </para>
1630 <para>
1631 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1632 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1633 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1634 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1635 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1636 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1637 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1638 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1639 amateurs.
1640 </para>
1641 <para>
1642 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1643 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1644 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1645 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1646 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1647 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1648 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1649 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1650 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1651 population of photographers.
1652 </para>
1653 <para>
1654 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1655 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1656 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1657 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1658 <!-- f1 -->
1659 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1660 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1661 </para>
1662 <blockquote>
1663 <para>
1664 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1665 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1666 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1667 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1668 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1669 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1670 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1671 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1672 chemicals.<footnote>
1673 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1674 <para>
1675 <!-- f2 -->
1676 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1677 1977), 53.
1678 </para></footnote>
1679 </para>
1680 </blockquote>
1681 <para>
1682 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1683 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1684 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1685 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1686 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1687 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1688 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1689 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1690 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1691 percent.<footnote><para>
1692 <!-- f3 -->
1693 Jenkins, 177.
1694 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1695 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1696 <!-- f4 -->
1697 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1698 </para></footnote>
1699 </para>
1700 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1701 <para>
1702
1703 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1704 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1705 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1706 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1707 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1708 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1709 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1710 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1711 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1712 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1713 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1714 <!-- f5 -->
1715 Coe, 58.
1716 </para></footnote>
1717 </para>
1718 <para>
1719 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1720 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1721 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1722 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1723 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1724 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1725 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1726 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1727 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1728 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1729 have before.
1730 </para>
1731 <para>
1732 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1733 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1734 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1735 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1736 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1737 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1738 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1739 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1740 <!-- f6 -->
1741 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1742 </para></footnote>
1743 </para>
1744 <para>
1745 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1746 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1747 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1748 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1749 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1750 draw
1751 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1752 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1753 that they thought valuable.
1754 </para>
1755 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1756 <para>
1757 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1758 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1759 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1760 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1761 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1762 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1763 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1764 <para>
1765 <!-- f7 -->
1766 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1767 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1768 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1769 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1770 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1771 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1772 </para>
1773 <para>
1774 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1775 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1776 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1777 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1778 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1779 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1780 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1781 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1782 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1783 <!-- f8 -->
1784 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1785 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1786 Review 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1787 Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1788 (1993).
1789 </para></footnote>)
1790 </para>
1791 <para>
1792 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1793 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1794 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1795 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1796 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1797 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1798 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1799 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1800 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1801 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1802 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1803 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1804 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1805 </para>
1806 <para>
1807
1808 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1809 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1810 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1811 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1812 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1813 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1814 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1815 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1816 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1817 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1818 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1819 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1820 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1821 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1822 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1823 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1824 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1825 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1826 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1827 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1828 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1829 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1830 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1831 learn.
1832 </para>
1833 <para>
1834 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1835 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1836 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1837 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1838 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1839 <!-- f9 -->
1840 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1841 Software
1842 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1843 February 2002, available at
1844 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1845 </para></footnote>
1846 These buses are filled with technology that
1847 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1848 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1849 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1850 teachers call "media literacy."
1851 </para>
1852 <para>
1853 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1854 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1855 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1856 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1857 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1858 the way people access it."
1859 </para>
1860 <para>
1861 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1862 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1863 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1864 about.
1865 </para>
1866 <para>
1867 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1868 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1869 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1870 <!-- f10 -->
1871 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1872 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1873 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1874 </para></footnote>
1875 it is increasingly important to understand the
1876 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1877 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1878 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1879 constructing
1880 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1881 </para>
1882 <para>
1883 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1884 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1885 written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult it is to
1886 sequence
1887 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1888 understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1889 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1890 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1891 emotion or builds suspense.
1892 </para>
1893 <para>
1894 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1895 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1896 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1897 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1898 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1899 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1900 </para>
1901 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
1902 <para>
1903 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1904 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1905 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1906
1907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1908 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1909 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1910 texture."<footnote>
1911 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1912 <para>
1913 <!-- f11 -->
1914 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1915 2002.
1916 </para></footnote>
1917 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1918 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1919 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1920 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1921 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1922 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1923 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1924 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1925 <!-- f12 -->
1926 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1927 November 2000, available at
1928 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1929 available at
1930 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1931 </para></footnote>
1932 </para>
1933 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1934 <para>
1935 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1936 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1937 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1938 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1939 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1940 </para>
1941 <para>
1942 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1943 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1944 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1945 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1946 </para>
1947 <blockquote>
1948 <para>
1949 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1950 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1951 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1952 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1953 being read-only.
1954 </para>
1955 </blockquote>
1956 <para>
1957 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1958 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1959 twentieth century.
1960 </para>
1961 <para>
1962 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1963 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1964 understanding
1965 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1966 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1968 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1969 appropriate
1970 language for what they need to create or express."<footnote>
1971 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1972 <para>
1973 <!-- f13 -->
1974 Interview with Daley and Barish.
1975 </para></footnote> It is to enable
1976 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
1977 <!-- f14 -->
1978 Ibid.
1979 </para></footnote>
1980 </para>
1981 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1982 <para>
1983 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
1984 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
1985 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
1986 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
1987 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
1988 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
1989 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
1990 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
1991 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
1992 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
1993 </para>
1994 <para>
1995 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
1996 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
1997 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
1998 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
1999 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2000 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2001 </para>
2002 <para>
2003 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2004 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2005 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2006 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2007 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2008 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2009 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2010 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2011 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2012 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2013 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2014 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2015 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2016 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2017 to this form of expression.
2018 </para>
2019 <para>
2020
2021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2022 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2023 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2024 Daley
2025 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2026 meaning."
2027 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2028 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&mdash;and
2029 increasingly,
2030 not the most powerful part&mdash;of constructing meaning. As Daley
2031 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2032 </para>
2033 <blockquote>
2034 <para>
2035 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2036 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2037 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2038 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2039 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2040 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2041 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2042 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2043 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2044 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2045 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2046 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2047 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2048 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2049 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2050 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2051 about the topic. . . .
2052 </para>
2053 <para>
2054 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2055 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2056 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2057 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2058 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2059 </para>
2060 <para>
2061 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2062 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2063 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2064 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2065 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2066 had a lot of power with this language."
2067 </para>
2068 </blockquote>
2069 <para>
2070 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2071 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2072 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2073 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2074 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2075 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2076 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2077 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2078 world would be watching.
2079 </para>
2080 <para>
2081 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2082 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2083 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2084 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2085 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2086 entertainment is tragedy.
2087 </para>
2088 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2089 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2090 <para>
2091 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2092 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2093 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2094 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2095 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2096 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2097 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2098 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2099 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2100 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2101 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2102 was also the Internet.
2103 </para>
2104 <para>
2105 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2106 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2107 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2108 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2109 movie
2110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2111 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2112 with sound or text.
2113 </para>
2114 <para>
2115 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2116 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2117 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2118 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2119 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2120 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2121 spread practically instantaneously.
2122 </para>
2123 <para>
2124 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2125 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2126 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2127 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2128 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2129 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2130 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2131 </para>
2132 <para>
2133 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2134 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2135 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2136 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2137 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2138 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2139 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2140 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2141 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2142 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2143 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2144 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2145 </para>
2146 <para>
2147 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2148 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2149 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2150 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2151 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2152 people vote
2153 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2154 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2155 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2156 </para>
2157 <para>
2158 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2159 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2160 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2161 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2162 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2163 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2164 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2165 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2166 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2167 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2168 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2169 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2170 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2171 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2172 <!-- f15 -->
2173 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2174 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2175 </para></footnote>
2176 </para>
2177 <para>
2178 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2179 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2180 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2181 <!-- f16 -->
2182 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2183 Political
2184 Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2185 </para></footnote>
2186 And in some towns in
2187 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2188 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2189 deliberation"
2190 to occur.
2191 </para>
2192 <para>
2193 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2194 occur.
2195 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2196 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2197 politics
2198 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2199 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2200 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2201 <!-- f17 -->
2202 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2203 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2204 </para></footnote> We say what our
2205 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2206 </para>
2207 <para>
2208 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2209 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2210 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2211 Technologies
2212 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2213 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2214
2215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2216 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2217 place.
2218 </para>
2219 <para>
2220 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2221 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2222 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2223 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2224 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2225 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2226 </para>
2227 <para>
2228 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2229 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential
2230 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2231 reading
2232 is having an effect.
2233 </para>
2234 <para>
2235 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2236 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2237 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2238 praising
2239 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2240 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2241 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2242 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2243 instances
2244 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2245 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2246 as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2247 <!-- f18 -->
2248 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2249 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2250 </para></footnote>
2251 </para>
2252 <para>
2253 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2254 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2255 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2256 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2257 on.
2258 </para>
2259 <para>
2260 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2261 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2262 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2263 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2264 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2265 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2266 peer-generated rankings.
2267 </para>
2268 <para>
2269 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2271 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2272 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2273 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2274 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2275 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2276 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2277 get it out of the way."
2278 </para>
2279 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2280 <para>
2281 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2282 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2283 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2284 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2285 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2286 <!-- f19 -->
2287 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2288 </para></footnote>
2289 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2290 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2291 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2292 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2293 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2294 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2295 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2296 </para>
2297 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2298 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2299 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2300 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2301 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2302 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2303 had seen.<footnote><para>
2304 <!-- f20 -->
2305 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2306 Information Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2307 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2308 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2309 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2310 </para></footnote>
2311 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2312 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2313 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2314 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2315 </para>
2316 <para>
2317 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2318 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2319 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2320 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2321 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2322 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2323 <para>
2324 <!-- f21 -->
2325 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2326 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2327 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2328 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2329 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2330 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2331 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2332 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2333 </para></footnote>
2334 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2335
2336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2337 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2338 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2339 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2340 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2341 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2342 </para>
2343 <para>
2344 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2345 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2346 gatekeeper."
2347 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2348 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2349 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2350 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2351 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2352 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2353 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2354 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2355 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2356 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2357 extraordinary
2358 to report.
2359 </para>
2360 <para>
2361 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2362 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2363 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2364 </para>
2365 <para>
2366 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2367 differently
2368 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2369 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2370 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2371 </para>
2372 <para>
2373 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2374 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2375 lawnmower
2376 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2377 technologies
2378 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2379 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2380 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2382 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2383 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2384 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2385 tinkering of many others.
2386 </para>
2387 <para>
2388 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2389 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2390 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2391 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2392 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2393 </para>
2394 <para>
2395 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2396 platform,"
2397 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2398 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2399 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2400 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2401 becomes
2402 a major apprenticeship platform."
2403 </para>
2404 <para>
2405 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2406 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2407 abstract,
2408 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2409 doing
2410 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2411 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2412 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2413 </para>
2414 <para>
2415 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2416 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2417 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2418 multiple
2419 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2420 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2421 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2422 artistic,
2423 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2424 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2425 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2426 </para>
2427 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2428 <para>
2429 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2430 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2431
2432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2433 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2434 of recognition.
2435 </para>
2436 <para>
2437 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2438 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2439 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2440 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2441 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2442 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2443 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2444 </para>
2445 <para>
2446 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2447 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2448 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2449 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2450 general.<footnote><para>
2451 <!-- f22 -->
2452 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2453 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2454 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2455 </para></footnote>
2456 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2457 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2458 </para>
2459 <para>
2460 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2461 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2462 and want to learn."
2463 </para>
2464 <para>
2465 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2466 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2467 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2468 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2469 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2470 </para>
2471 <para>
2472 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2473 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2474 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2475 the law to close down that technology.
2476 </para>
2477 <para>
2478 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2479 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2480 </para>
2481 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2482 </sect1>
2483 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2484 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2485 <para>
2486 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2487 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2488 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2489 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2490 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2491 </para>
2492 <para>
2493 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2494 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2495 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2496 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2497 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2498 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2499 </para>
2500 <para>
2501 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2502 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2503 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2504 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2505 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2506 </para>
2507 <para>
2508 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2509 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2510 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2511 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2512 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2513 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2514 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2515 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2516 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2517 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2518 </para>
2519 <para>
2520 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2521 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2522 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2523 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2524 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2525 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2526 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2527 </para>
2528 <para>
2529 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2530 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2531 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2532 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2533 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2534 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2535 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2536 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2537 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2538 on-line.
2539 </para>
2540 <para>
2541 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2542 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2543 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2544 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2545 be on users' computers.
2546 </para>
2547 <para>
2548 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2549 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2550 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2551 students
2552 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2554 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2555 computer.
2556 </para>
2557 <para>
2558 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2559 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2560 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2561 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2562 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2563 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2564 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2565 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2566 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2567 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2568 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2569 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2570 supposed to do.
2571 </para>
2572 <para>
2573 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2574 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2575 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2576 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2577 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2578 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2579 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2580 </para>
2581 <para>
2582 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2583 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2584 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2585 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2586 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2587 easier to use"&mdash;again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2588 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2589 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2590 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2591 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2592 </para>
2593 <para>
2594 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2595 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2596 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2597 demanded
2598 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2599 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2600 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2601 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2602 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2603 that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2604 </para>
2605 <para>
2606 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2607 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2608 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2609 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2610 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2611 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2612 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2613 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2614 <!-- f1 -->
2615 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2616 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2617 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2618 </para></footnote>
2619 </para>
2620 <para>
2621 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2622 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2623 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2624 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2625 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2626 </para>
2627 <para>
2628 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2629 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2630 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2631 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2632 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2633 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2634 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2635 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2636 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2637 </para>
2638 <para>
2639 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2640 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2641 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2642 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2643 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2644 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2645 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2646 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2647 </para>
2648 <para>
2649 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2650 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2651 </para>
2652 <para>
2653 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2654 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2655 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2656 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2657 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2658 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2659 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2660 <!-- f2 -->
2661 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2662 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2663 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2664 </para></footnote>
2665 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2666 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2667 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2668 <!-- f3 -->
2669 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2670 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2671 </para></footnote>
2672 </para>
2673 <para>
2674 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2675 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2676 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2677 activist:
2678 </para>
2679 <blockquote>
2680 <para>
2681 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2682 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2683 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2684 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2685 </para>
2686 </blockquote>
2687 <para>
2688 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2689 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2690 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2691 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2692 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2693 </para>
2694 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2695 </sect1>
2696 <sect1 id="pirates">
2697 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2698 <para>
2699 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2700 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2701 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2702 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2703 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2704 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2705 </para>
2706 <sect2 id="film">
2707 <title>Film</title>
2708 <para>
2709 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2710 <!-- f1 -->
2711 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2712 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2713 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2714 </para></footnote>
2715 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2716 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2717 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2718 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2719 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2720 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2721 this creative property
2722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2723 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2724 </para>
2725 <para>
2726 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2727 </para>
2728 <blockquote>
2729 <para>
2730 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2731 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2732 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2733 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2734 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2735 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2736 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2737 </para>
2738 <para>
2739 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2740 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2741 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2742 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2743 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2744 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2745 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2746 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2747 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2748 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2749 <!-- f2 -->
2750 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2751 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2752 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2753 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2754 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2755 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2756 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2757 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2758 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2759 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2760 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2761 </para>
2762 </blockquote>
2763 <para>
2764 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2765 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2766 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2767 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2768 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2769 <!-- f3 -->
2770 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2771 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2772 </para></footnote>
2773 That led the independents to flee the East
2774 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2775 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2776 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2777 did just that.
2778 </para>
2779 <para>
2780 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2781 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2782 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2783
2784 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2785 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2786 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2787 Edison's creative property.
2788 </para>
2789 </sect2>
2790 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2791 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2792 <para>
2793 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2794 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2795 </para>
2796 <para>
2797 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2798 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2799 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2800 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2801 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2802 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2803 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2804 right to perform it publicly.
2805 </para>
2806 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2807 <para>
2808 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2809 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2810 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2811 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2812 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2813 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2814 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2815 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2816 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2817 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2818 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2819 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2820 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2821 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2822 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2823 its composer anything.
2824 </para>
2825 <para>
2826 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2827 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2828 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2829 put it,
2830 </para>
2831 <blockquote>
2832 <para>
2833 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2834 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2835 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2836 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2837 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2838 rights.<footnote><para>
2839 <!-- f4 -->
2840 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2841 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2842 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2843 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2844 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2845 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2846 </para></footnote>
2847 </para>
2848 </blockquote>
2849 <para>
2850 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2851 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2852 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2853 <!-- f5 -->
2854 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2855 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2856 </para></footnote>
2857 and the "music publishing industry"
2858 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2859 <!-- f6 -->
2860 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2861 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2862 </para></footnote>
2863 As John Philip
2864 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2865 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2866 <!-- f7 -->
2867 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2868 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2869 </para></footnote>
2870 </para>
2871 <para>
2872 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2873 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2874 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2875 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2876 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2877 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2878 <!-- f8 -->
2879 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2880 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2881 Perforating
2882 Company of New York).
2883 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2884 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2885 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2886 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2887 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2888 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."<footnote><para>
2889 <!-- f9 -->
2890 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376
2891 (prepared
2892 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2893 American
2894 Graphophone Company Association).
2895 </para></footnote>
2896 </para>
2897 <para>
2898 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2899 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2900 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2901 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2902 control
2903 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2904 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2905 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2906
2907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2908 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2909 authorizes
2910 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2911 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2912 </para>
2913 <para>
2914 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2915 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2916 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2917 Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2918 recordings
2919 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2920 by the statute.
2921 </para>
2922 <para>
2923 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2924 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
2925 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
2926 whatever
2927 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
2928 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
2929 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
2930 </para>
2931 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2932 <para>
2933 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2934 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
2935 of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
2936 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
2937 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
2938 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
2939 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
2940 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2941 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2942 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
2943 stifle
2944 follow-on creativity.<footnote><para>
2945 <!-- f10 -->
2946 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2947 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2948 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2949 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2950 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2951 </para></footnote>
2952 </para>
2953 <para>
2954 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2955 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2956 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2957 relates,
2958 </para>
2959 <blockquote>
2960 <para>
2961 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2962 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2963 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2964 industry
2965 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2966 importance
2967 in the United States and throughout the world; records
2968 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
2969 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
2970 access
2971 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
2972 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
2973 before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
2974 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
2975 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
2976 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
2977 improved
2978 quality, and a greater choice.<footnote><para>
2979 <!-- f11 -->
2980 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
2981 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
2982 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
2983 this report.</para></footnote>
2984 </para>
2985 </blockquote>
2986 <para>
2987 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
2988 creative
2989 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2990 </para>
2991 </sect2>
2992 <sect2 id="radio">
2993 <title>Radio</title>
2994 <para>
2995 Radio was also born of piracy.
2996 </para>
2997 <para>
2998 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
2999 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3000 <!-- f12 -->
3001 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning, record
3002 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3003 messages
3004 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
3005 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
3006 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
3007 Manufacturing
3008 Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.
3009 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
3010 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
3011 Review 70 (2003): 281.
3012 </para></footnote>
3013 As I described above,
3014 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3015 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3016 composer
3017 money for that performance.
3018 </para>
3019 <para>
3020 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3021 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3022 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3023 Birthday"
3024 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3025 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3026 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3027 station.
3028 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3029 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3030 composer
3031 of the music for his work.
3032
3033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3034 </para>
3035 <para>
3036 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3037 radio
3038 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3039 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3040 something
3041 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3042 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3043 playing the song.
3044 </para>
3045 <para>
3046 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3047 music.
3048 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3049 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3050 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3051 </para>
3052 <para>
3053 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3054 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3055 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3056 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3057 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3058 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3059 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3060 </para>
3061 <para>
3062 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3063 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3064 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3065 ordinarily
3066 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3067 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3068 something for nothing.
3069 </para>
3070 </sect2>
3071 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3072 <title>Cable TV</title>
3073 <para>
3074
3075 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3076 </para>
3077 <para>
3078 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3079 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3080 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3081 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3083 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3084 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3085 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3086 give away.
3087 </para>
3088 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3089 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3090 <para>
3091 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3092 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3093 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3094 <!-- f13 -->
3095 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3096 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3097 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3098 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3099 Commission).
3100 </para></footnote>
3101 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3102 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3103 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3104 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3105 <!-- f14 -->
3106 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3107 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3108 </para></footnote>
3109 As another broadcaster put it,
3110 </para>
3111 <blockquote>
3112 <para>
3113 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3114 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3115 paid for.<footnote><para>
3116 <!-- f15 -->
3117 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3118 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3119 </para></footnote>
3120 </para>
3121 </blockquote>
3122 <para>
3123 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3124 </para>
3125 <blockquote>
3126 <para>
3127 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3128 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3129 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3130 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3131 <!-- f16 -->
3132 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3133 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3134 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3135 </para></footnote>
3136 </para>
3137 </blockquote>
3138 <para>
3139 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3140 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3141 compensation."<footnote><para>
3142 <!-- f17 -->
3143 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3144 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3145 </para></footnote>
3146 </para>
3147 <para>
3148 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3149 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3150 </para>
3151 <blockquote>
3152 <para>
3153 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3154 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3155 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3156 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3157
3158 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3159 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3160 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3161 <!-- f18 -->
3162 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3163 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3164 </para></footnote>
3165 </para>
3166 </blockquote>
3167 <para>
3168 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3169 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3170 </para>
3171 <para>
3172 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3173 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3174 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3175 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3176 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3177 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3178 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3179 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3180 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3181 created by broadcasters' content.
3182 </para>
3183 <para>
3184 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3185 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3186 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3187 today<footnote><para>
3188 <!-- f19 -->
3189 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3190 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3191 Information, available at
3192 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3193 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3194 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3195 </para></footnote>
3196 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3197 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3198 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3199 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3200 generation&mdash;until now.
3201 </para>
3202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3203 </sect2>
3204 </sect1>
3205 <sect1 id="piracy">
3206 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3207 <para>
3208 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3209 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3210 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3211 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3212 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3213 should stop it.
3214 </para>
3215 <para>
3216 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3217 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3218 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3219 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3220 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3221 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3222 has so often done in the past.
3223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3224 </para>
3225 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3226 <title>Piracy I</title>
3227 <para>
3228 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3229 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3230 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3231 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3232 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3233 <!-- f1 -->
3234 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3235 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3236
3237 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3238 Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3239 </para></footnote>
3240 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3241 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually
3242 worldwide to piracy.
3243 </para>
3244 <para>
3245 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3246 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3247 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3248 This piracy is wrong.
3249 </para>
3250 <para>
3251 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3252 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3253 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3254 foreign
3255 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3256 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3257 developing
3258 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3259 existence, treated as right.
3260 </para>
3261 <para>
3262 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3263 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3264 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3265 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3266 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3267 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3268 violate
3269 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3270 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3271 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3272 </para>
3273 <para>
3274 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3275 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3277 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3278 pirate
3279 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3280 childhood.
3281 </para>
3282 <para>
3283 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3284 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3285 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3286 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3287 <!-- f2 -->
3288 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3289 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3290 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3291 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3292 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3293 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3294 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3295 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3296 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3297 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3298 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3299 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3300 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3301 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3302 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3303 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3304 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3305 is wrong.
3306 </para>
3307 <para>
3308 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3309 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3310 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3311 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3312 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3313 <!-- f3 -->
3314 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3315 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3316 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3317 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3318 instance
3319 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3320 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3321 </para></footnote>
3322 </para>
3323 <para>
3324 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3325 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3326 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3327 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3328 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3329 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3330 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3331 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3332 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3333 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3334 piracy of the tangible.
3335 </para>
3336 <para>
3337 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3338 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3339 property
3340 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3341 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3342 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3343 licenses
3344 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3345 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3346 copyrighted
3347 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3348
3349 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3350 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3351 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3352 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3353 technology
3354 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3355 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3356 </para>
3357 <para>
3358 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3359 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3360 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3361 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3362 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3363 nation
3364 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3365 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3366 benefit
3367 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3368 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3369 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3370 Microsoft.
3371 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3372 </para>
3373 <para>
3374 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3375 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3376 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3377 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3378 become
3379 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3380 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3381 </para>
3382 <para>
3383 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3384 alcoholic
3385 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3386 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3387 ordinarily
3388 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3389 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3390 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3391 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3392 giving
3393 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what&mdash;at
3394 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3395 copyright
3396 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3397 wrong.
3398 </para>
3399 <para>
3400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3401 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3402 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3403 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3404 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3405 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3406 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3407 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3408 is flat out wrong.
3409 </para>
3410 <para>
3411 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3412 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3413 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3414 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3415 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3416 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3417 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3418 </para>
3419 <para>
3420 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3421 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3422 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3423 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3424 </para>
3425 <para>
3426 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3427 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3428 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3429 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3430 </para>
3431 <para>
3432 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3433 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3434 sharing
3435 to survive.
3436 </para>
3437 </sect2>
3438 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3439 <title>Piracy II</title>
3440 <para>
3441 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3442 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3443 <!-- f4 -->
3444 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3445 </para></footnote>
3446 This means we must determine whether
3447 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3448 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3449 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3450 author of his profit.
3451 </para>
3452 <para>
3453 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors
3454 of the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3455 innovations.
3456 Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and,
3457 arguably,
3458 off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3459 <!-- f5 -->
3460 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3461 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3462 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3463 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
3464 up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.
3465 This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing
3466 technology
3467 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see
3468 Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3469 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3470 put together components that had been developed independently.
3471 </para>
3472 <para>
3473 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3474 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3475 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3476 system.<footnote><para>
3477 <!-- f6 -->
3478 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3479 San Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3480 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3481 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3482 "Napster's
3483 Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3484 "Hollywood
3485 at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3486 </para></footnote>
3487 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3488 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3489 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3490 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3491 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3492 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3493 or your 20,000 best friends.
3494 </para>
3495 <para>
3496 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3497 Americans
3498 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3499 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3500 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3501 <!-- f7 -->
3502 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3503 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3504 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3505 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3506 </para></footnote>
3507 A survey by the NPD
3508 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens
3509 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3510 <!-- f8 -->
3511 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3512 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3513 </para></footnote>
3514 The vast
3515 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3516 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3517 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3518 enjoy
3519 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3520 </para>
3521 <para>
3522 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3523 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3524 infringement,
3525 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3526 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more carefully
3527 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do&mdash;the kinds of
3528 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3529 </para>
3530 <para>
3531 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3532 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3533 different kinds into four types.
3534 </para>
3535 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3536 <listitem><para>
3537 <!-- A. -->
3538 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3539 purchasing
3540 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3541 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3542 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3543 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3544 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3545 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3546 instead
3547 of purchasing.
3548 </para></listitem>
3549 <listitem><para>
3550 <!-- B. -->
3551 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3552 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3553 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3554 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3555 succeed.
3556 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3557 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3558 recommendations
3559 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3560 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3561 </para></listitem>
3562 <listitem><para>
3563 <!-- C. -->
3564 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3565 copyrighted
3566 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3567 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3568 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3569 rewarding
3570 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3571 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3572 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3573 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3574 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3575 available.)
3576 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3577 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3578 content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same harm
3579 that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3580 a local collector.
3581 </para></listitem>
3582 <listitem><para>
3583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3584 <!-- D. -->
3585 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3586 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3587 wants to give away.
3588 </para></listitem>
3589 </orderedlist>
3590 <para>
3591 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3592 </para>
3593 <para>
3594 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3595 perspective
3596 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3597 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<footnote><para>
3598 <!-- f9 -->
3599 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3600 </para></footnote>
3601 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3602 illegal,
3603 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3604 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3605 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer&mdash;and
3606 certainly
3607 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3608 suggests.
3609 </para>
3610 <para>
3611 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3612 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3613 Hollywood,
3614 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3615 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3616 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3617 that is "devastating" the industry.
3618 </para>
3619 <para>
3620 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3621 harmful
3622 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3623 practice
3624 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3625 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp;
3626 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3627 labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3628 <!-- f10 -->
3629 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3630 Industry's
3631 Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music
3632 industry's
3633 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3634 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3635 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3636 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3637 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent
3638 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3639 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3640 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3641 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&ndash;56.
3642 </para></footnote>
3643 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3644 album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the
3645 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3646 problem,
3647 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3648 </para>
3649 <para>
3650 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3651 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3652 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3653 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3655 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3656 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3657 <!-- f11 -->
3658 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3659 </para></footnote>
3660 </para>
3661 <para>
3662 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3663 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3664 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3665 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3666 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3667 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3668 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3669 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3670 </para>
3671 <para>
3672 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3673 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3674 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3675 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3676 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3677 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3678 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3679 </para>
3680 <para>
3681 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3682 because
3683 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3684 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3685 </para>
3686 <para>
3687 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3688 percent,
3689 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3690 <!-- f12 -->
3691 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3692 available at
3693 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3694 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3695 25 June 2003, available at
3696 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3697 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3698 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3699 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3700 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3701 music
3702 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3703 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3704 </para></footnote>
3705 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3706 Internet
3707 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3708 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3709 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3710 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3711 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3712 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3713 <!-- f13 -->
3714 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3715 <para>
3716 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3717 February 2003, available at
3718 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3719 </para>
3720 </footnote>
3721 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3722 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3723 High Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie
3724 [on DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3725 <!-- f14 -->
3726 Ibid.
3727 </para></footnote>
3728 </para>
3729 <para>
3730
3731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3732 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3733 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3734 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3735 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3736 although
3737 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3738 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3739 </para>
3740 <para>
3741 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3742 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3743 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3744 between
3745 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3746 numbers
3747 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3748 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3749 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3750 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3751 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3752 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3753 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3754 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3755 between
3756 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3757 </para>
3758 <para>
3759 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3760 assume,
3761 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3762 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3763 costs?
3764 </para>
3765 <para>
3766 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3767 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3768 available.
3769 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3770 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3771 <!-- f15 -->
3772 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3773 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3774 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3775 Committee
3776 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3777 statement
3778 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3779 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3780 </para></footnote>
3781 And while it's
3782 conceivable
3783 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3784 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3785 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3786 distributor
3787 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3788 make it available.
3789 </para>
3790 <para>
3791 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3793 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3794 thousands
3795 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3796 <!-- f16 -->
3797 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3798 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3799 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3800 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3801 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3802 National
3803 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3804 Results,"
3805 available at
3806 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3807 </para></footnote>
3808 These
3809 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3810 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3811 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3812 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3813 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3814 companies
3815 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3816 owner for the content they sell.
3817 </para>
3818 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3819 <para>
3820 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3821 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3822 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3823 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3824 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3825 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3826 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3827 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3828 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3829 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3830 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3831 </para>
3832 <para>
3833 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3834 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3835 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3836 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3837 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3838 shut as well?
3839 </para>
3840 <para>
3841 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3842 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3843 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3844 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3845 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3846 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3847
3848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3849 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3850 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3851 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3852 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3853 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3854 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3855 great book!)
3856 </para>
3857 <para>
3858 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3859 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3860 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3861 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3862 </para>
3863 <para>
3864 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3865 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3866 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3867 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3868 unavailable?"
3869 </para>
3870 <para>
3871 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3872 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3873 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
3874 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3875 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3876 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3877 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3878 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3879 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3880 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3881 found only with time.
3882 </para>
3883 <para>
3884 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3885 just what you call type A sharing?"
3886 </para>
3887 <para>
3888 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3889 effect
3890 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3891 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3892 Napster
3893 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3894 developed
3895 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3896 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3897 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3898 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3899 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3900 <!-- f17 -->
3901 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3902 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3903 MHP, available at
3904 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3905 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3906 Fanning's
3907 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3908 </para></footnote>
3909 </para>
3910 <para>
3911 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3912 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3913 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3914 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3915 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3916 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3917 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3918 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3919 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3920 </para>
3921 <para>
3922 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3923 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3924 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3925 content
3926 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3927 technology.
3928 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3929 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3930 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3931 </para>
3932 <para>
3933 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3934 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3935 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3936 composers,
3937 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3938 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3939 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3940 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3941 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3942 broadcast),
3943 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3944 </para>
3945 <para>
3946 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3947 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3948 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3949 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3950 companies
3951 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3952 </para>
3953 <para>
3954
3955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3956 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3957 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
3958 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3959 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3960 Second,
3961 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3962 content
3963 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3964 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3965 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3966 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3967 Congress
3968 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3969 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3970 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3971 control
3972 over the future (cable).
3973 </para>
3974 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
3975 <para>
3976 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3977 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3978 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3979 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3980 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3981 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3982 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3983 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3984 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3985 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3986 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3987 </para>
3988 <para>
3989 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3990 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3991 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3992 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3993 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
3994 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
3995 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
3996 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
3997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
3998 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
3999 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4000 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4001 for the architecture it chose.
4002 </para>
4003 <para>
4004 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4005 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4006 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4007 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4008 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4009 copyright."<footnote><para>
4010 <!-- f18 -->
4011 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4012 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4013 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4014 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4015 </para></footnote>
4016 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4017 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4018 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4019 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4020 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4021 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4022 <!-- f19 -->
4023 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4024 </para></footnote>
4025 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4026 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4027 <!-- f20 -->
4028 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4029 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4030 </para></footnote>
4031 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4032 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4033 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4034 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4035 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4036 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4037 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4038 <!-- f21 -->
4039 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4040 of Jack Valenti).
4041 </para></footnote>
4042 </para>
4043 <para>
4044 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4045 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4046 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4047 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4048 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4049 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4050 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4051 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4052 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4053 technology.<footnote><para>
4054 <!-- f22 -->
4055 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4056 1981).
4057 </para></footnote>
4058 </para>
4059 <para>
4060 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4061
4062 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4063 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4064 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4065 Court wrote,
4066 </para>
4067 <blockquote>
4068 <para>
4069 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4070 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4071 market
4072 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4073 authority
4074 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4075 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4076 implicated
4077 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4078 <!-- f23 -->
4079 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4080 </para></footnote>
4081 </para>
4082 </blockquote>
4083 <para>
4084 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4085 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4086 Congress
4087 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4088 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4089 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4090 </para>
4091
4092 <table id="t1">
4093 <title>Table</title>
4094 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4095 <thead>
4096 <row>
4097 <entry>CASE</entry>
4098 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4099 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4100 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4101 </row>
4102 </thead>
4103 <tbody>
4104 <row>
4105 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4106 <entry>Composers</entry>
4107 <entry>No protection</entry>
4108 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4109 </row>
4110 <row>
4111 <entry>Radio</entry>
4112 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4113 <entry>N/A</entry>
4114 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4115 </row>
4116 <row>
4117 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4118 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4119 <entry>No protection</entry>
4120 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4121 </row>
4122 <row>
4123 <entry>VCR</entry>
4124 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4125 <entry>No protection</entry>
4126 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4127 </row>
4128 </tbody>
4129 </tgroup>
4130 </table>
4131
4132 <para>
4133 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4134 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4135 <!-- f24 -->
4136 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4137 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4138 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4139 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4140 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4141 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4142 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4143 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4144 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4145 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4146 </para></footnote>
4147 In each case, throughout our history,
4148 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4149 work.
4150 </para>
4151 <para>
4152 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4153 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4154 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4155 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4156 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4157 legitimacy
4158 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4159 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4160 the interests at stake.
4161 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4162 </para>
4163 <para>
4164 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4165 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4166 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4167 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4168 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4169 regulated?
4170 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4171 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4172 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4173 permission to record a song?
4174 </para>
4175 <para>
4176 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4177 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4178 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4179 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4180 <!-- f25 -->
4181 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4182 (1984).
4183 </para></footnote>
4184 Instead, the particular uses that the
4185 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4186 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4187 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4188 technology
4189 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4190 the distribution of content.
4191 </para>
4192 <para>
4193 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4194 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4195 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4196 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4197 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4198 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4199 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4200 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4201 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4202 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4203 protection
4204 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4205 continue.
4206 </para>
4207 <para>
4208
4209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4210 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4211 superior
4212 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4213 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4214 network.
4215 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4216 efficient.
4217 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4218 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4219 <!-- f26 -->
4220 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4221 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4222 </para></footnote>
4223 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4224 warriors
4225 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4226 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4227 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4228 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4229 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4230 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4231 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4232 </para>
4233 <para>
4234 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4235 just as any other property is protected."
4236 </para>
4237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4238 </sect2>
4239 </sect1>
4240 </chapter>
4241 <chapter id="c-property">
4242 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4243 <para>
4244
4245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4246 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4247 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4248 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4249 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4250 the price she can get.
4251 </para>
4252 <para>
4253 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4254 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4255 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4256 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4257 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4258 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4259 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4260 going
4261 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4262 thing I am taking then?
4263 </para>
4264 <para>
4265 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4266 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4267 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4268 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4269 narrow
4270 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4271 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4272 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4273 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4274 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4275 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4276 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4277 <!-- f1 -->
4278 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4279 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4280 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4281 </para></footnote>
4282 </para>
4283 <para>
4284 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4285 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4286 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4287 expression
4288 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4289 property.
4290 </para>
4291 <para>
4292 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4293 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4294 turning
4295 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4296 "property"
4297 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4298 <!-- f2 -->
4299 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4300 intangible.
4301 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4302 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4303 physical
4304 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4305 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4306 Property?
4307 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4308 373, 429 n. 241.
4309 </para></footnote>
4310 </para>
4311 <para>
4312 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4313 preceding
4314 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4315 material
4316 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4317 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4318 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4319 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4320 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4321 us draw.
4322 </para>
4323
4324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4325 <sect1 id="founders">
4326 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4327 <para>
4328 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4329 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4330 Shakespeare
4331 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4332 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4333 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4334 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4335 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4336 adaptation
4337 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4338 </para>
4339 <para>
4340 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4341 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4342 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4343 <!-- f1 -->
4344 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4345 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4346 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4347 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4348 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4349 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4350 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4351 </para></footnote>
4352 Tonson was the
4353 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4354 <!-- f2 -->
4355 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4356 Vanderbilt
4357 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4358 </para></footnote>
4359 who
4360 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4361 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4362 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4363 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4364 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4365 copyright.
4366 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4367 produce
4368 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4369 </para>
4370 <para>
4371 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4372 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4373 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4374 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4375 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4376 renewable
4377 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4378 published
4379 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4380 <!-- f3 -->
4381 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4382 "copyright
4383 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4384 </para></footnote>
4385 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4386 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4387 </para>
4388 <para>
4389 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4390 "copyright"
4391 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4392 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4393 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4394 expired
4395 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4396 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4397 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4398 publishers,
4399 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4400 </para>
4401 <para>
4402 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4403 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4404 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4405 govern
4406 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4407 "positive
4408 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4409 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4410 legislature,
4411 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4412 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4413 expired
4414 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4415 independent
4416 of any positive law.
4417 </para>
4418 <para>
4419 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4420 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4421 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4422 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4423
4424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4425 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4426 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4427 ultimately
4428 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4429 </para>
4430 <para>
4431 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4432 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4433 however,
4434 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4435 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4436 "expired,"
4437 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4438 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4439 </para>
4440 <para>
4441 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4442 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4443 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4444 </para>
4445 <para>
4446 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4447 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4448 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4449 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4450 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4451 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4452 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4453 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4454 reason
4455 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4456 </para>
4457 <para>
4458 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4459 special
4460 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4461 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4462 "booksellers."
4463 </para>
4464 <para>
4465 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4466 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4467 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4468 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4469 others
4470 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4471 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4472 beyond
4473 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4475 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4476 restrictions
4477 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4478 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4479 perform, and so on.
4480 </para>
4481 <para>
4482 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4483 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4484 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4485 permission
4486 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4487 anything,
4488 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4489 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4490 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4491 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4492 </para>
4493 <para>
4494 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4495 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4496 especially
4497 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4498 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4499 monopolies&mdash;especially
4500 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4501 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4502 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4503 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4504 Monopolies,
4505 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4506 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4507 publishing.
4508 </para>
4509 <para>
4510 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4511 naturally
4512 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4513 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4514 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4515 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4516 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4517 specialinterest
4518 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4519 </para>
4520 <para>
4521 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4522 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4523 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4524 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4526 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4527 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4528 themselves
4529 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4530 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4531 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4532 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4533 <!-- f4 -->
4534 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4535 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4536 </para></footnote>
4537 </para>
4538 <para>
4539 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4540 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4541 Enlightenment
4542 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4543 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4544 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4545 that idea.
4546 </para>
4547 <para>
4548 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4549 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4550 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4551 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4552 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4553 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4554 compromise
4555 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4556 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4557 construction and spread of culture.
4558 </para>
4559 <para>
4560 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4561 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4562 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4563 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4564 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4565 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4566 they said; they needed more time.
4567 </para>
4568 <para>
4569 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4570 words that echo today,
4571 </para>
4572 <blockquote>
4573 <para>
4574 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4575 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4576 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4577 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4578 establishing
4579 a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in
4580 the Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a
4581 Discouragement
4582 to Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general
4583 Tax on the Publick; and all this only to increase the private Gain
4584 of the Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4585 <!-- f5 -->
4586 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4587 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4588 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4589 Encouragement
4590 of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
4591 Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4592 mentioned
4593 (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al., 8,
4594 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4595 </para></footnote>
4596 </para>
4597 </blockquote>
4598 <para>
4599 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in
4600 a series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4601 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4602 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4603 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4604 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4605 creative
4606 "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of Anne,
4607 the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just because the
4608 protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't mean the
4609 protections
4610 of the common law expired: Under the common law they had
4611 the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its Statute of Anne
4612 copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only way to protect
4613 authors.
4614 </para>
4615 <para>
4616 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some
4617 of the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4618 chutzpah.
4619 Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it, "The
4620 publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle rancher has
4621 for cattle."<footnote><para>
4622 <!-- f6 -->
4623 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4624 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4625 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4626 </para></footnote>
4627 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the
4628 author.
4629 His concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4630 </para>
4631 <para>
4632 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4633 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4634 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4635 <!-- f7 -->
4636 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4637 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4638 </para></footnote>
4639 </para>
4640 <para>
4641 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4642 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4643 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4644 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4645 <!-- f8 -->
4646 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4647 1993), 92.
4648 </para></footnote>
4649 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4650 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4651 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4652 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4653 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4654 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4655 <!-- f9 -->
4656 Ibid., 93.
4657 </para></footnote>
4658 </para>
4659 <para>
4660 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's
4661 shop in Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where
4662 he sold inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in
4663 defiance
4664 of the supposed common law right of Literary Property."<footnote><para>
4665 <!-- f10 -->
4666 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4667 Borwell).
4668 </para></footnote>
4669 His
4670 books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he rested
4671 his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of Anne,
4672 the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4673 </para>
4674 <para>
4675 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4676 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4677 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4678 </para>
4679 <para>
4680 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to
4681 James Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the
4682 requirements
4683 of the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full
4684 protection
4685 of the statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor
4686 began printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual
4687 common law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4688 <!-- f11 -->
4689 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright
4690 Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law
4691 Review
4692 29 (1983): 1152.
4693 </para></footnote>
4694 </para>
4695 <para>
4696 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in
4697 English
4698 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4699 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4700 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the
4701 common law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4702 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4703 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That
4704 common
4705 law rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4706 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4707 </para>
4708 <para>
4709 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if justice
4710 were just a matter of logical deduction from first principles&mdash;Mansfield's
4711 conclusion might make some sense. But what it ignored was the larger
4712 issue that Parliament had struggled with in 1710: How best to limit
4713 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4714 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4715 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4716 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4717 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4718 believed,
4719 Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4720 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4721 </para>
4722 <para>
4723 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4724 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4725 </para>
4726 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4727 <para>
4728 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4729 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4730 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4731 <!-- f12 -->
4732 Ibid., 1156.
4733 </para></footnote>
4734 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4735 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4736 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4737 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4738 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4739 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4740 </para>
4741 <para>
4742 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4743 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4744 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4745 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4746 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4747 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4748 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4749 statute were no longer protected.
4750 </para>
4751 <para>
4752 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4753 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4754 members
4755 of special legal distinction who functioned much like the Justices
4756 in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the House of
4757 Lords generally voted.
4758 </para>
4759 <para>
4760 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4761 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4762 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4763 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4764 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4765 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4766 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4767 passed into the public domain.
4768 </para>
4769 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4770 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4771 <para>
4772 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4773 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4774 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4775 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4776 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4777 and the greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of
4778 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of
4779 legal restraint.
4780 </para>
4781 <para>
4782 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4783 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4784 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people celebrated
4785 the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser reported, "No
4786 private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the public, and
4787 none has been tried before the House of Lords in the decision of
4788 which so many individuals were interested." "Great rejoicing in
4789 Edinburgh
4790 upon victory over literary property: bonfires and
4791 illuminations."<footnote><para>
4792 <!-- f13 -->
4793 Rose, 97.
4794 </para></footnote>
4795 </para>
4796 <para>
4797 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4798 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4799 reported:
4800 </para>
4801 <blockquote>
4802 <para>
4803 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what
4804 was honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday
4805 thought property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of
4806 London and Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses
4807 to purchase Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who
4808 after many years industry thought they had acquired a
4809 competency
4810 to provide for their families now find themselves without a
4811 shilling to devise to their successors.<footnote><para>
4812 <!-- f14 -->
4813 Ibid.
4814 </para></footnote>
4815 </para>
4816 </blockquote>
4817 <para>
4818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4819 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4820 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4821 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4822 England
4823 would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter free.
4824 Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of course,
4825 for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller had an
4826 exclusive
4827 right to control the publication of that book. And not in the
4828 sense that books could be stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you
4829 still had to buy the book from someone. But free in the sense that the
4830 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4831 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free culture
4832 would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English culture
4833 would develop as the many English readers chose to let it develop&mdash;
4834 chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the memes they
4835 repeated and endorsed. Chose in a competitive context, not a context
4836 in which the choices about what culture is available to people and
4837 how they get access to it are made by the few despite the wishes of
4838 the many.
4839 </para>
4840 <para>
4841 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4842 antimonopoly,
4843 resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a world
4844 where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4845 protected.
4846 </para>
4847 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4848 </sect1>
4849 <sect1 id="recorders">
4850 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4851 <para>
4852 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4853 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4854 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4855 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4856 He was their god.)
4857 </para>
4858 <para>
4859 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4860 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4861 today.
4862 </para>
4863 <para>
4864 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4865 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4866 Stagehands
4867 are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4868 During
4869 a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and in
4870 the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the stage.
4871 </para>
4872 <para>
4873 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some
4874 stagehands
4875 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4876 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers and
4877 the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4879 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4880 about the scene.
4881 </para>
4882 <para>
4883 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4884 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4885 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4886 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4887 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4888 </para>
4889 <para>
4890 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get
4891 permission.
4892 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a
4893 four-and-a-halfsecond
4894 image on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How
4895 could it hurt? Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told
4896 Else to contact Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4897 </para>
4898 <para>
4899 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4900 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4901 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4902 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4903 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4904 </para>
4905 <para>
4906 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we
4907 discovered
4908 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at least
4909 that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation." And
4910 second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us to use
4911 this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited Simpsons which
4912 was in the corner of the shot."
4913 </para>
4914 <para>
4915 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to
4916 someone he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca
4917 Herrera.
4918 He explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . .
4919 We're asking for your educational rate on this." That was the
4920 educational
4921 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4922 confirm what he had been told.
4923 </para>
4924 <para>
4925 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes,
4926 you have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4927 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film about
4928
4929 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4930 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4931 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant to
4932 Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want the
4933 money."
4934 </para>
4935 <para>
4936 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was
4937 playing
4938 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4939 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the very
4940 last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally replaced the
4941 shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on, The Day After
4942 Trinity, from ten years before.
4943 </para>
4944 <para>
4945 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox,
4946 owns the copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property.
4947 To use that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the
4948 permission
4949 of the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4950 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4951 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4952 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner of
4953 the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law says the
4954 owner gets to control.
4955 </para>
4956 <para>
4957 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that
4958 the copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4959 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4960 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the
4961 copyright
4962 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4963 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set by
4964 the law.
4965 </para>
4966 <para>
4967 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4968 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4969 <!-- f1 -->
4970 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that lawyers don't
4971 permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard A. Posner with William
4972 F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred " (draft on
4973 file with author), University of Chicago Law School, 5 August 2003.
4974 </para></footnote>
4975 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot
4976 of a Simpsons episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use
4977 does not require the permission of anyone.
4978 </para>
4979 <para>
4980 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4981 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4982 </para>
4983 <blockquote>
4984 <para>
4985 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf
4986 between
4987 what lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and
4988 what is crushingly relevant in practice to those of us actually
4989 trying to make and broadcast documentaries. I never had any
4990 doubt that it was "clearly fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But
4991 I couldn't rely on the concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4992 </para>
4993 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
4994 <listitem><para>
4995 <!-- 1. -->
4996 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires
4997 that we buy Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers
4998 require
4999 a detailed "visual cue sheet" listing the source and
5000 licensing
5001 status of each shot in the film. They take a dim view of
5002 "fair use," and a claim of "fair use" can grind the application
5003 process to a halt.
5004 </para></listitem>
5005 <listitem><para>
5006 <!-- 2. -->
5007 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the
5008 first place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a
5009 history of tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons
5010 usage, just as George Lucas had a very high profile litigating
5011 Star Wars usage. So I decided to play by the book, thinking
5012 that we would be granted free or cheap license to four seconds
5013 of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working to
5014 exhaustion
5015 on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk legal
5016 trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5017 principle.
5018 </para></listitem>
5019 <listitem><para>
5020 <!-- 3. -->
5021 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford
5022 Law School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also
5023 confirmed that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within
5024 an inch of your life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He
5025 made clear that it would boil down to who had the bigger
5026 legal
5027 department and the deeper pockets, me or them.
5028 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5029 </para></listitem>
5030 <listitem><para>
5031 <!-- 4. -->
5032 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5033 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5034 money.
5035 </para></listitem>
5036 </orderedlist>
5037 </blockquote>
5038 <para>
5039 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory
5040 therefore
5041 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture.
5042 But in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5043 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means
5044 that the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law
5045 has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5046 </para>
5047 <para>
5048 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5049 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5050 publishers'
5051 profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has matured
5052 into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or not.
5053 </para>
5054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5055 </sect1>
5056 <sect1 id="transformers">
5057 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5058 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5059 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5060 <para>
5061 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5062 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5063 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5064 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5065 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5066 </para>
5067 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5068 <para>
5069 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5070 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5071 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5072 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5073 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5074 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5075 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5076 important to his career.
5077 </para>
5078 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5079 <para>
5080 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5081 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5082 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5083 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5084 </para>
5085 <para>
5086 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5087 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5088 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5089 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5090 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5091 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5092 </para>
5093 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5094 <para>
5095 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5096 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5097 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5098 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5099 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5100 actor's career."
5101 </para>
5102 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5103 <para>
5104 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5105 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5106 </para>
5107 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5108 <para>
5109 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5110 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5111 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5112 for it."<footnote>
5113 <indexterm>
5114 <primary>artists</primary>
5115 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5116 </indexterm>
5117 <para>
5118 <!-- f1 -->
5119 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5120 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5121 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5122 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5123 </para></footnote>
5124 </para>
5125 <para>
5126 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5127 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5128 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5129 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5130 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5131 </para>
5132 <para>
5133 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5134 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5135 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5136 </para>
5137 <blockquote>
5138 <para>
5139 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5140 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5141 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5142 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5143 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5144 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5145 </para>
5146 <para>
5147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5148 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the
5149 dayplayer
5150 rate for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking
5151 about a clip of less than a minute, but to reuse that performance
5152 in the CD-ROM the rate at the time was about $600.
5153 So we had to identify the people&mdash;some of them were hard to
5154 identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
5155 crashing through the glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman?
5156 And then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some
5157 others, and we just started calling people.
5158 </para>
5159 </blockquote>
5160 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5161 <para>
5162 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5163 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5164 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5165 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5166 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5167 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5168 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5169 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5170 career.
5171 </para>
5172 <para>
5173 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5174 were totally in the clear."
5175 </para>
5176 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5177 <para>
5178 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5179 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5180 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5181 </para>
5182 <blockquote>
5183 <para>
5184 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5185 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5186 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5187 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5188 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5189 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5190 systematically and cleared the rights.
5191 </para>
5192 </blockquote>
5193 <para>
5194
5195 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5196 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5197 loved it, and it sold very well.
5198 </para>
5199 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5200 <para>
5201 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5202 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5203 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5204 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5205 at all."<footnote><para>
5206 <!-- f2 -->
5207 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5208 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5209 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5210 </para></footnote>
5211 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5212 has to be made?
5213 </para>
5214 <para>
5215 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5216 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5217 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5218 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5219 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5220 </para>
5221 <blockquote>
5222 <para>
5223 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5224 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5225 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5226 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5227 compensated for that.
5228 </para>
5229 </blockquote>
5230 <para>
5231 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5232 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license that
5233 someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips like this?
5234 Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would have to track
5235 down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit permission
5236 from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of the
5237 creative
5238 process could be made to be more clean?
5239 </para>
5240 <blockquote>
5241 <para>
5242 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5243 mechanism&mdash;where
5244 you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5245 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5246 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5248 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it
5249 with lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost
5250 as the producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of
5251 paying
5252 X dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a
5253 known cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes
5254 this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have
5255 a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me
5256 X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get
5257 investments
5258 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you
5259 say, "Oh, I want a hundred minutes of something and I have no
5260 idea what it's going to cost me, and a certain number of people are
5261 going to hold me up for money," then it becomes difficult to put
5262 one of these things together.
5263 </para>
5264 </blockquote>
5265 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5266 <para>
5267 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5268 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5269 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5270 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5271 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5272 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5273 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5274 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5275 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5276 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5277 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5278 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5279 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5280 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5281 "Does this still make sense?"
5282 </para>
5283 <para>
5284 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5285 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5286 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5287 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5288
5289 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5290 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5291 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5292 </para>
5293 <para>
5294 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5295 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5296 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5297 judges loved every minute of it.
5298 </para>
5299 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5300 <para>
5301 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5302 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5303 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5304 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5305 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5306 were just violated in this room?"
5307 </para>
5308 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5309 <para>
5310 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5311 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5312 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5313 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5314 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5315 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5316 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5317 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5318 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5319 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5320 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5321 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5322 couldn't easily do them legally.
5323 </para>
5324 <para>
5325 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5326 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5327 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5328 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5329 planted in your presentation.
5330 </para>
5331 <para>
5332 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5334 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5335 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5336 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5337 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5338 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5339 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5340 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5341 </para>
5342 <para>
5343 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5344 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5345 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5346 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5347 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5348 </para>
5349 <para>
5350 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5351 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5352 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5353 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5354 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5355 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5356 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5357 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5358 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5359 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5360 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5361 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5362 registers the work.
5363 </para>
5364 <para>
5365 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5366 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5367 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5368 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5369 </para>
5370 <para>
5371 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5372 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5373 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5374 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5375 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5376 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5377 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5378 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5379 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5380 entertainment."
5381 </para>
5382 <para>
5383 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5384 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5385 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5386 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5387 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5388 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5389 new audiences, it is Mike."
5390 </para>
5391 <para>
5392 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5393 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5394 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5395 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5396 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5397 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5398 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5399 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5400 </para>
5401 <para>
5402 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5403 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5404 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5405 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5406 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5407 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5408 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5409 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5410 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5411 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5412 curse, reserved for the few.
5413 </para>
5414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5415 </sect1>
5416 <sect1 id="collectors">
5417 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5418 <para>
5419 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5420 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5421 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5422 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5423 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5424 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5425 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5426 </para>
5427 <para>
5428 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5429 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive
5430 that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the
5431 world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5432 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as well
5433 as when those pages changed.
5434 </para>
5435 <para>
5436 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5437 appreciated.
5438 In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5439 constantly
5440 updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved
5441 of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
5442 </para>
5443 <para>
5444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5445 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5446 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5447 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5448 </para>
5449 <para>
5450 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5451 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5452 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5453 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5454 library&mdash;constantly
5455 updated, without any reliable memory.
5456 </para>
5457 <para>
5458 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back
5459 Machine,
5460 and the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the
5461 Internet was. You have the power to see what you remember. More
5462 importantly, perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't
5463 remember and what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5464 <!-- f1 -->
5465 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5466 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003, press
5467 release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later
5468 changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended."
5469 E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5470 </para></footnote>
5471 </para>
5472 <para>
5473 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we
5474 remember
5475 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the
5476 reaction
5477 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965,
5478 or to Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5479 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5480 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5481 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what it is
5482 convenient to remember, but remember something close to the truth.
5483 </para>
5484 <para>
5485 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5486 repeat
5487 it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is whether
5488 we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More directly, the
5489 key is whether an objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do
5490 that, by collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5491 researchers,
5492 for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5493 </para>
5494 <para>
5495 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the
5496 Internet
5497 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5498 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5499 important
5500 in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5502 important
5503 to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to think that
5504 we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns around the
5505 world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the one kept by the
5506 Internet
5507 Archive.
5508 </para>
5509 <para>
5510 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5511 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5512 researcher.
5513 In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5514 success.
5515 It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
5516 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5517 Internet
5518 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie
5519 of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10 billion
5520 pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5521 </para>
5522 <para>
5523 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge
5524 in human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5525 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the Library of
5526 Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set
5527 out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been
5528 constructing
5529 the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more
5530 ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture
5531 was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of that
5532 culture
5533 is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news are
5534 recorded
5535 each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a specific
5536 exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and is available
5537 to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that, [television] is almost
5538 unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were Barbara Walters you could get
5539 access to [the archives], but if you are just a graduate student?" As Kahle
5540 put it,
5541 </para>
5542 <blockquote>
5543 <para>
5544 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with
5545 Murphy
5546 Brown? Remember that back and forth surreal experience of
5547 a politician interacting with a fictional television character? If you
5548 were a graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to
5549 get those original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5550
5551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5552 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5553 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5554 </para>
5555 </blockquote>
5556 <para>
5557 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5558 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5559 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5560 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5561 nineteenthcentury
5562 America will have an easier time than researchers trying to
5563 understand
5564 the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5565 </para>
5566 <para>
5567 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5568 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5569 libraries.
5570 These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
5571 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once
5572 the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
5573 </para>
5574 <para>
5575 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library of
5576 Congress
5577 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long
5578 as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5579 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In 1915
5580 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed back."
5581 Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any
5582 library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at all&mdash;in the library archive of the
5583 film company.<footnote><para>
5584 <!-- f2 -->
5585 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
5586 Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3 (1980): 5;
5587 Anthony
5588 Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the United
5589 States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp; Co., 1992), 36.
5590 </para></footnote>
5591 </para>
5592 <para>
5593 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5594 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5595 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5596 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5597 required
5598 they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5599 "copyrighted."
5600 But those copies were simply kept by the broadcasters. No
5601 library had any right to them; the government didn't demand them.
5602 The content of this part of American culture is practically invisible to
5603 anyone who would look.
5604 </para>
5605 <para>
5606 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5608 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5609 stations
5610 from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5611 September
5612 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations
5613 from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made their
5614 coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5615 Anyone
5616 could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5617 events of that day.
5618 </para>
5619 <para>
5620 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger,
5621 whose archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films"
5622 (meaning films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never
5623 copyrighted), Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle
5624 digitize 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet
5625 to be downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5626 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5627 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock footage
5628 sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the material they
5629 wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made films on
5630 their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to be made.
5631 Either way, the archive enabled access to this important part of our
5632 culture.
5633 Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film that instructed
5634 children how to save themselves in the middle of nuclear attack? Go to
5635 archive.org, and you can download the film in a few minutes&mdash;for free.
5636 </para>
5637 <para>
5638 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that
5639 we otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
5640 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law
5641 doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in
5642 an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
5643 </para>
5644 <para>
5645 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to
5646 this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His
5647 aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part of our
5648 culture.
5649 Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but
5650 during
5651 a second life that all creative property has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5652 </para>
5653 <para>
5654 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5655 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
5656
5657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5658 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5659 market
5660 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
5661 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
5662 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial
5663 market,
5664 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5665 </para>
5666 <para>
5667 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5668 tradition
5669 has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers
5670 the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is
5671 used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive
5672 of knowledge about our history. In this second life, the content can
5673 continue to inform even if that information is no longer sold.
5674 </para>
5675 <para>
5676 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of
5677 print very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5678 <!-- f3 -->
5679 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5680 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5681 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5682 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese, "The
5683 First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston College Law
5684 Review
5685 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5686 </para></footnote>). After it is
5687 out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the copyright
5688 owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many get to read
5689 the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are thus the
5690 second
5691 life of a book. That second life is extremely important to the
5692 spread and stability of culture.
5693 </para>
5694 <para>
5695 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5696 creative
5697 property does not hold true with the most important components
5698 of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
5699 these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the Internet&mdash;there is no
5700 guarantee
5701 of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've replaced
5702 libraries with Barnes &amp; Noble superstores. With this culture, what's
5703 accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
5704 Beyond
5705 that, culture disappears.
5706 </para>
5707 <para>
5708 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5709 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5710 accessible
5711 all television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is
5712 extraordinarily
5713 high. So even though the law in principle would have
5714 restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5716 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly difficult
5717 to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had little
5718 practical
5719 effect.
5720 </para>
5721 <para>
5722 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution
5723 is that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
5724 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or
5725 distributed
5726 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
5727 books published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an
5728 archive of all moving images and sound.
5729 </para>
5730 <para>
5731 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never
5732 imagined
5733 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it;
5734 but we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5735 Kahle describes,
5736 </para>
5737 <blockquote>
5738 <para>
5739 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of
5740 music.
5741 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases
5742 of movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed]
5743 during the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million
5744 different titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that
5745 would fit in this room and be able to be afforded by a small
5746 company.
5747 So we're at a turning point in our history. Universal access is
5748 the goal. And the opportunity of leading a different life, based on
5749 this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind
5750 would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria,
5751 putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
5752 press.
5753 </para>
5754 </blockquote>
5755 <para>
5756 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5757 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5758 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5759 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5760 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5761 remains
5762 perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand it;
5763 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5764 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
5765 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
5766 become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a future for our past. The
5767 technology of digital arts could make the dream of the Library of
5768 Alexandria real again.
5769 </para>
5770 <para>
5771 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building
5772 such an archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might
5773 like to call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might
5774 seem, the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5775 someone's
5776 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that
5777 Kahle and others would exercise.
5778 </para>
5779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5780 </sect1>
5781 <sect1 id="property-i">
5782 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5783 <para>
5784 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture
5785 Association
5786 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C.,
5787 with Lyndon Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture
5788 of Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5789 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5790 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5791 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5792 </para>
5793 <para>
5794 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion
5795 Picture Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose
5796 goal was to defend American movies against increasing domestic
5797 criticism.
5798 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but
5799 producers
5800 and distributors of entertainment for television, video, and
5801 cable. Its board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven
5802 major producers and distributors of motion picture and television
5803 programs
5804 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures
5805 Entertainment,
5806 MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal
5807 Studios, and Warner Brothers.
5808 </para>
5809 <para>
5810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5811 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president
5812 before him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5813 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most
5814 important
5815 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5816 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays
5817 the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5818 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5819 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5820 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5821 Washingtonian way.
5822 </para>
5823 <para>
5824 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5825 culture
5826 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5827 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5828 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5829 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5830 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine
5831 the meaning of "creative property."
5832 </para>
5833 <para>
5834 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5835 perfectly:
5836 </para>
5837 <blockquote>
5838 <para>
5839 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges
5840 and the counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting,
5841 reasonable men and women will keep returning to the
5842 fundamental
5843 issue, the central theme which animates this entire debate:
5844 Creative
5845 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protection
5846 resident in all other property owners in the nation. That is the issue.
5847 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5848 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5849 <!-- f1 -->
5850 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5851 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5852 Subcommittee
5853 on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
5854 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th
5855 Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
5856 </para></footnote>
5857 </para>
5858 </blockquote>
5859 <para>
5860 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5861 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5862 "central
5863 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this:
5864 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5865 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5866 protections
5867 resident in all other property owners in the nation." There are
5868 no second-class citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should
5869 be no second-class property owners.
5870 </para>
5871 <para>
5872 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5873 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5874 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a
5875 claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this claim of
5876 Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is perhaps
5877 the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and scope
5878 of "creative property." His views have no reasonable connection to our
5879 actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has
5880 slowly redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5881 </para>
5882 <para>
5883 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5884 precise
5885 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5886 <!-- f2 -->
5887 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
5888 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
5889 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
5890 right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
5891 ordinary
5892 meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private
5893 Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977),
5894 26&ndash;27.
5895 </para></footnote> it has never been the
5896 case, nor should it be, that "creative property owners" have been
5897 "accorded
5898 the same rights and protection resident in all other property
5899 owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were given the same rights
5900 as all other property owners, that would effect a radical, and radically
5901 undesirable, change in our tradition.
5902 </para>
5903 <para>
5904 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat
5905 for our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5906 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5907 overturned
5908 in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a
5909 powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5910 culture would develop.
5911 </para>
5912 <para>
5913 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5914 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to
5915 convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5916 history.
5917 We have always treated rights in creative property differently
5918 from the rights resident in all other property owners. They have never
5919 been the same. And they should never be the same, because, however
5920 counterintuitive this may seem, to make them the same would be to
5921
5922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5923 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5924 Creativity
5925 depends upon the owners of creativity having less than perfect
5926 control.
5927 </para>
5928 <para>
5929 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most
5930 powerful of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5931 notwithstanding,
5932 in assuring that the new can displace them. No organization
5933 does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what's
5934 good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A society that
5935 defends the ideals of free culture must preserve precisely the
5936 opportunity
5937 for new creativity to threaten the old.
5938 To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5939 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5940 Constitution itself.
5941 </para>
5942 <para>
5943 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so
5944 strongly did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5945 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if it
5946 condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm&mdash;it is
5947 required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you
5948 "just compensation" for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees
5949 that property is, in a certain sense, sacred. It cannot ever be taken from
5950 the property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5951 </para>
5952 <para>
5953 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5954 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5955 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that after
5956 a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has granted and
5957 set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
5958 Congress
5959 does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
5960 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not
5961 have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking."
5962 Instead,
5963 the same Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5964 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5965 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5966 compensation
5967 at all.
5968 </para>
5969 <para>
5970 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5971 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be
5972 treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in
5973 our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be
5974 accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is
5975 effectively
5976 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
5977 </para>
5978 <para>
5979 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5980 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5981 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5982 appointed
5983 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college
5984 to produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it
5985 did in 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be
5986 the first to admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected
5987 some of those mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should
5988 reject as well. So my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did
5989 it, we should, too.
5990 </para>
5991 <para>
5992 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5993 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5994 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given the
5995 same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5996 creative
5997 property there must be a public domain?
5998 </para>
5999 <para>
6000 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6001 history
6002 of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
6003 enabled.
6004 Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6005 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that should
6006 be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property should be
6007 protected,
6008 but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights the law gives to
6009 creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights ought to
6010 be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether institutions designed
6011 to assure that artists get paid need also control how culture develops.
6012 </para>
6013 <para>
6014
6015 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6016 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6017 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6018 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
6019 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6020 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6021 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6022 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6023 </para>
6024 <figure id="fig-1331">
6025 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
6026 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6027 </figure>
6028 <para>
6029 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6030 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each
6031 case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.
6032 For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals
6033 represent
6034 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated&mdash;
6035 either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious
6036 constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening
6037 punishments
6038 after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for
6039 example,
6040 you willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song
6041 from her latest CD and posting it on the Web, you can be punished
6042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6043 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6044 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6045 </para>
6046 <para>
6047 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6048 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6049 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6050 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6051 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6052 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6053 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6054 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6055 the source of the enforcement.
6056 </para>
6057 <para>
6058 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6059 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6060 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6061 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it is to
6062 be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But
6063 given a set of norms, and a background of property and contract law,
6064 the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or
6065 group might behave.
6066 </para>
6067 <para>
6068 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6069 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a constraint on
6070 behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across
6071 a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community to
6072 integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
6073 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as
6074 with the market, architecture effects its constraint through
6075 simultaneous conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts
6076 enforcing contracts, or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by
6077 "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law
6078 of gravity that enforces this constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket
6079 stands between you and a flight to New York, it is the market that
6080 enforces this constraint.
6081 </para>
6082 <para>
6083
6084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6085 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6086 obvious:
6087 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced
6088 by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by
6089 another.
6090 </para>
6091 <para>
6092 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6093 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6094 particular
6095 thing, we have to consider how these four modalities interact.
6096 Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well be; my
6097 claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most
6098 significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must
6099 consider how these four in particular interact.
6100 </para>
6101 <para>
6102 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6103 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say
6104 how fast you can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in
6105 part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most
6106 rational
6107 drivers; governors in buses, as another example, set the
6108 maximum
6109 rate at which the driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted
6110 by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of
6111 gasoline indirectly constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a
6112 community
6113 may or may not constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at 50
6114 mph by a school in your own neighborhood and you're likely to be
6115 punished by the neighbors. The same norm wouldn't be as effective in
6116 a different town, or at night.
6117 </para>
6118 <para>
6119 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6120 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6121 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6122 <!-- f3 -->
6123 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6124 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6125 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right self-consciously to
6126 change the other three. The right of the other three is more timidly
6127 expressed.
6128 See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New
6129 York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95; Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago
6130 School," Journal of Legal Studies, June 1998.
6131 </para></footnote>
6132 The law, in other words, sometimes
6133 operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality.
6134 Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to
6135 increase
6136 the incentives to drive more slowly. The law might be used to
6137 mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty of driving
6138 rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless
6139 driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be more
6140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6141 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed limit, for
6142 example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast driving.
6143 </para>
6144 <figure id="fig-1361">
6145 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6146 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6147 </figure>
6148 <para>
6149 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6150 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6151 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6152 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6153 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6154 another.<footnote>
6155 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6156 <para>
6157 <!-- f4 -->
6158 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6159 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6160 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6161 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6162 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6163 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6164 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6165 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6166 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6167 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6168 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6169 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6170 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6171 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6172 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6173 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6174 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6175 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6176 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6177 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6178 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6179 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6180 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6181 places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6182 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6183 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6184 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6185 of these groups might face. </para></footnote>
6186 </para>
6187 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6188 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6189 <para>
6190 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6191 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6192 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6193 rallying makes sense.
6194 </para>
6195 <para>
6196 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6197 Internet:
6198 </para>
6199 <figure id="fig-1371">
6200 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6201 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6202 </figure>
6203 <para>
6204 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6205 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6206 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6207 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6208 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6209 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6210 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6211 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6212 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6213 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6214 this form of infringement.
6215 </para>
6216 <para>
6217 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6218 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6219 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6220 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6221 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6222 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6223 </para>
6224 <para>
6225 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6226 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6227 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6228 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6229 Iraq
6230 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6231 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6232 looting that results.
6233 </para>
6234 <figure id="fig-1381">
6235 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6236 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6237 </figure>
6238 <para>
6239 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6240 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6241 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6242 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6243 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6244 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6245 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6246 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6247 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6248 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6249 </para>
6250 <para>
6251 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6252 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6253 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6254 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6255 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6256 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6257 life. Homeowners living in a
6258
6259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6260 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6261 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6262 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6263 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6264 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6265 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6266 </para>
6267 <para>
6268 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6269 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6270 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6271 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6272 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6273 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6274 </para>
6275 <para>
6276 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6277 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6278 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6279 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6280 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6281 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6282 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6283 <!-- f5 -->
6284 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6285 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6286 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6287 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6288 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6289 October 2003, available at
6290 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6291 </para></footnote>
6292
6293 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6294 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6295 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6296 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6297 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6298 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6299 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6300 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6301 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6302 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6303 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6304 </para>
6305 <para>
6306 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6307 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6308 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6310 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6311 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6312 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6313 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6314 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6315 <!-- f6 -->
6316 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6317 </para></footnote>
6318 And relative to a
6319 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6320 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6321 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6322 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6323 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6324 Brezhnev.
6325 </para>
6326 <para>
6327 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6328 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6329 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6330 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6331 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6332 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6333 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6334 opportunities for innovation and change.
6335 </para>
6336 <para>
6337 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6338 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6339 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6340 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6341 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6342 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6343 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6344 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6345 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6346 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6347 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6348 regulation is justified.
6349 </para>
6350 <para>
6351 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6352 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6353 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6354 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6355 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6356 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6357 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6358 </para>
6359 <para>
6360 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6361 </para>
6362 <para>
6363 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6364 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6365 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6366 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6367 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6368 </para>
6369 <para>
6370 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6371 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6372 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6373 </para>
6374 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6375 <para>
6376 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6377 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6378 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6379 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6380 </para>
6381 <para>
6382 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6383 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6384 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6385 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6386 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6387 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6388 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6389 </para>
6390 <para>
6391 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6392 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6393 culture.<footnote><para>
6394 <!-- f7 -->
6395 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6396 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6397 </para></footnote>
6398 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6399 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6400 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6401 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6402 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6403 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6405 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6406 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6407 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6408 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6409 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6410 </para>
6411 <para>
6412 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6413 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6414 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6415 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6416 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6417 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6418 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6419 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6420 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6421 </para>
6422 <para>
6423 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6424 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6425 be lost.
6426 </para>
6427 </sect2>
6428 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6429 <title>Beginnings</title>
6430 <para>
6431 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6432 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6433 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6434 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6435 </para>
6436 <para>
6437 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6438 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6439 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6440 </para>
6441 <para>
6442 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6443 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6444 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6445
6446 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6447 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6448 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6449 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6450 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6451 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6452 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6453 </para>
6454 <para>
6455 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6456 in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6457 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6458 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6459 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6460 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6461 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6462 </para>
6463 <para>
6464 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6465 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6466 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6467 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6468 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6469 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6470 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6471 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6472 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6473 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6474 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6475 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6476 power.
6477 </para>
6478 <para>
6479 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6480 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6481 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6482 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6483 years since they first struck its design.
6484 </para>
6485 <para>
6486 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6487 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6488 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6489 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6490 started here:
6491 </para>
6492 <figure id="fig-1441">
6493 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6494 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6495 </figure>
6496 <para>
6497 We will end here:
6498 </para>
6499 <figure id="fig-1442">
6500 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6501 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6502 </figure>
6503 <para>
6504 Let me explain how.
6505 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6506 </para>
6507 </sect2>
6508 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6509 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6510 <para>
6511 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6512 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6513 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6514 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6515 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6516 authorship.<footnote>
6517 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6518 <para>
6519 <!-- f8 -->
6520 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6521 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6522 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6523 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6524 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6525 </para></footnote>
6526 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6527 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6528 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6529 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6530 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6531 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6532 </para>
6533 <para>
6534 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6535 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6536 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6537 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6538 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6539 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6540 </para>
6541 <para>
6542 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6543 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6544 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6545 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6546 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6547 </para>
6548 <para>
6549 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6550 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6551 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6552 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6553 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6554 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6555 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6556 <!-- f9 -->
6557 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6558 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6559 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6560 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6561 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6562 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6563 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6564 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6565 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6566 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6567 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6568 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6569 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6570 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6571 </para>
6572 <para>
6573 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6574 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6575 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6576 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6577 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6578 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6579 copyright, either.
6580 </para>
6581 <para>
6582 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6583 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6584 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6585 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6586 domain.<footnote><para>
6587 <!-- f10 -->
6588 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6589 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6590 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6591 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6592 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6593 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6594 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6595 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6596 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6597 </para>
6598 <para>
6599 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6600 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6601 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6602 <!-- f11 -->
6603 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6604 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6605 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6606 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6607 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6608 effectively free.
6609 </para>
6610 <para>
6611 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6612 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6613 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6614 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6615 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6616 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6617 </para>
6618 <para>
6619 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6620 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6621 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6622 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6623 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6624 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6625 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6626 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6627 </para>
6628 <para>
6629 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6630 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6631 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6632 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6633
6634 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6635 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6636 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6637 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6638 </para>
6639 <para>
6640 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6641 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6642 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6643 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6644 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6645 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6646 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6647 value.
6648 </para>
6649 <para>
6650 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6651 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6652 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6653 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6654 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6655 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6656 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6657 was ninety-five years.
6658 </para>
6659 <para>
6660 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6661 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6662 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6663 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6664 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6665 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6666 them.
6667 </para>
6668 <para>
6669 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6670 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6671 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6672 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6673 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6674 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6675 years.<footnote><para>
6676 <!-- f12 -->
6677 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6678 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6679 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6680 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6681 </para></footnote>
6682 </para>
6683 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6684 </sect2>
6685 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6686 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6687 <para>
6688 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6689 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6690 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6691 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6692 </para>
6693 <para>
6694 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6695 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6696 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6697 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6698 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6699 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6700 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6701 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6702 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6703 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6704 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6705 </para>
6706 <para>
6707 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6708 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6709 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6710 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6711 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6712 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6713 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6714 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6715 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6716 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6717 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6718 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6719 on the initial creative work.
6720 </para>
6721 <para>
6722 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6723 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6724 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6726 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6727 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6728 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6729 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6730 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6731 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6732 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6733 </para>
6734 <para>
6735 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6736 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6737 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6738 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6739 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6740 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6741 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6742 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6743 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6744 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6745 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6746 original author.
6747 </para>
6748 <para>
6749 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6750 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6751 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6752 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6753 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6754 copy available for others to copy.
6755 </para>
6756 <para>
6757 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6758 differences.
6759 </para>
6760 <para>
6761 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6762 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6763 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6764 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6765 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6766 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6767 <!-- f13 -->
6768 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6769 Creation
6770 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6771 International
6772 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6773 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6774 </para></footnote>
6775 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6776 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6777 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6778 </para>
6779 <para>
6780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6781 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6782 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6783 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6784 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6785 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6786 creative
6787 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6788 restrained.
6789 </para>
6790 <para>
6791 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6792 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6793 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6794 reduced
6795 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6796 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6797 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6798 </para>
6799 <para>
6800 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6801 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6802 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6803 </para>
6804 <para>
6805 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6806 control
6807 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6808 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6809 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6810 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6811 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6812 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6813 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6814 exclusive
6815 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6816 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6817 </para>
6818 <para>
6819 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6820 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6821 expansion
6822 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6823 copyright.
6824 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6825 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6826 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6827 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6828 </para>
6829 <para>
6830
6831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6832 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6833 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6834 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6835 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6836 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6837 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6838 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6839 protect
6840 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6841 <!-- f14 -->
6842 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6843 2003, available at
6844 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6845 </para></footnote>
6846 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6847 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6848 the wrong of direct piracy.
6849 </para>
6850 <para>
6851 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6852 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6853 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6854 transformative
6855 use of my book.<footnote><para>
6856 <!-- f15 -->
6857 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6858 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6859 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6860 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6861 Constitutionality,"
6862 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6863 </para></footnote>
6864 These two different uses of my creative work are
6865 treated the same.
6866 </para>
6867 <para>
6868 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6869 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6870 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6871 creates
6872 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6873 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6874 originally created?
6875 </para>
6876 <para>
6877 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6878 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6879 simply
6880 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6881 rights originally granted.
6882 </para>
6883 </sect2>
6884 <sect2 id="lawreach">
6885 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6886 <para>
6887 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6888 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6889 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6890 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6891 <!-- f16 -->
6892 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6893 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
6894 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6895 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
6896 sometimes
6897 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
6898 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
6899 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6900 </para></footnote>
6901 </para>
6902 <para>
6903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6904 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6905 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6906 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6907 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6908 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6909 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6910 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6911 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6912 trigger for copyright law.
6913 </para>
6914 <para>
6915 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6916 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6917 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6918 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6919 <!-- f17 -->
6920 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6921 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6922 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6923 basis
6924 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6925 </para></footnote>
6926 because it is clear that the
6927 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6928 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6929 </para>
6930 <para>
6931 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6932 empty circle.
6933 </para>
6934 <figure id="fig-1521">
6935 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6936 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6937 </figure>
6938 <para>
6939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6940 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6941 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6942 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6943 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6944 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6945 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6946 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6947 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6948 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6949 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6950 not make a copy.
6951 </para>
6952 <figure id="fig-1531">
6953 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6954 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6955 </figure>
6956 <para>
6957 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6958 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6959 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6960 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6961 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6962 diagram on next page).
6963 </para>
6964 <para>
6965 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6966 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6967 </para>
6968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6969 <figure id="fig-1541">
6970 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6971 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6972 </figure>
6973 <para>
6974 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6975 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6976 unregulated.
6977 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6978 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6979 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6980 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6981 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6982 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6983 </para>
6984 <figure id="fig-1542">
6985 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6986 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6987 </figure>
6988 <para> </para>
6989 <figure id="fig-1551">
6990 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6991 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
6992 </figure>
6993 <para>
6994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6995 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6996 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
6997 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6998 </para>
6999 <para>
7000 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
7001 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
7002 <!-- f18 -->
7003 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
7004 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
7005 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
7006 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
7007 </para></footnote>
7008 And because of this single,
7009 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
7010 category
7011 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
7012 unregulated
7013 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
7014 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
7015 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
7016 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
7017 category
7018 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
7019 copyrighted
7020 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
7021 burden of this shift.
7022 </para>
7023 <para>
7024 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7025 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
7026 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
7027 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
7028 nothing
7029 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
7030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7031 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
7032 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
7033 produced
7034 a copy.
7035 </para>
7036 <para>
7037 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
7038 different
7039 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7040 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
7041 copyright
7042 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
7043 accidental
7044 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
7045 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
7046 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
7047 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
7048 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
7049 </para>
7050 <para>
7051 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7052 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7053 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7054 points also become clear:
7055 </para>
7056 <para>
7057 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7058 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7059 presumptively
7060 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7061 evidence
7062 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7063 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7064 free culture before the Internet.
7065 </para>
7066 <para>
7067 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7068 transformative
7069 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7070 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7071 transformation
7072 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7073 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7074 releasing
7075 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7076 justification.
7077 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7078 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7079 transformative
7080 uses of creative work.
7081 </para>
7082 <para>
7083 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7084
7085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7086 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7087 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7088 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7089 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7090 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7091 Internet,
7092 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7093 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7094 protected
7095 before because reading was not regulated.
7096 </para>
7097 <para>
7098 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7099 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7100 depend
7101 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
7102 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7103 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7104 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7105 protections
7106 of fair use are not enough.
7107 </para>
7108 <para>
7109 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7110 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7111 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7112 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7113 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7114 </para>
7115 <para>
7116 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7117 began
7118 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7119 previews.
7120 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7121 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7122 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7123 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7124 before
7125 you bought it.
7126 </para>
7127 <para>
7128 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7129 distributors
7130 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7131 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7132 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7134 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7135 business
7136 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7137 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7138 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7139 immediately.
7140 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7141 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7142 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7143 </para>
7144 <para>
7145 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7146 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7147 infringed"
7148 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7149 willful
7150 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7151 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7152 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7153 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7154 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7155 </para>
7156 <para>
7157 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7158 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7159 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7160 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7161 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7162 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7163 Disney's permission.
7164 </para>
7165 <para>
7166 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7167 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7168 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7169 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7170 marketplace,
7171 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7172 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7173 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7174 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7175 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7176 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7177 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7178 </para>
7179 <para>
7180 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7181 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7182 control
7183 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7184 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7185 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7186 Noble
7187 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7188 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7189 argument
7190 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7191 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7192 exercising
7193 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7194 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7195 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7196 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7197 </para>
7198 <para>
7199 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7200 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7201 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7202 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7203 owners
7204 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7205 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7206 </para>
7207 </sect2>
7208 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7209 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7210 <para>
7211 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7212 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7213 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7214 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7215 </para>
7216 <para>
7217 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7218 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7219 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7220 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7221 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7222 your freedom.
7223 </para>
7224 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7225 <para>
7226 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7227 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7229 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7230 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7231 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7232 <!-- f19 -->
7233 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7234 Contemporary
7235 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7236 </para></footnote>
7237 </para>
7238 <para>
7239 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7240 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7241 you were."<footnote><para>
7242 <!-- f20 -->
7243 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7244 </para></footnote>
7245 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7246 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7247 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7248 </para>
7249 <para>
7250 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7251 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7252 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7253 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7254 </para>
7255 <para>
7256 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7257 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7258 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7259 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7260 copyrighted
7261 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7262 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7263 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7264 that is not at all funny.
7265 </para>
7266 <para>
7267 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7268 </para>
7269 <para>
7270 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7271 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7272 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7273 technology,
7274 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7275 </para>
7276 <para>
7277 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7278 Reader.
7279 </para>
7280 <para>
7281 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7282 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7283 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7284 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7285 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7286 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7288 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7289 called Permissions.
7290 </para>
7291 <figure id="fig-1611">
7292 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7293 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7294 </figure>
7295 <para>
7296 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7297 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7298 </para>
7299 <figure id="fig-1612">
7300 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7301 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7302 </figure>
7303 <para>
7304 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7305 According to my eBook
7306 Reader, I have the permission
7307 to copy to the clipboard of the
7308 computer ten text selections
7309 every ten days. (So far, I've
7310 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7311 I also have the permission to
7312 print ten pages from the book
7313 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7314 the permission to use the Read
7315 Aloud button to hear
7316 Middlemarch
7317 read aloud through the
7318 computer.
7319 </para>
7320 <para>
7321 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7322 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7323 </para>
7324 <figure id="fig-1621">
7325 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7326 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7327 </figure>
7328 <para>
7329 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7330 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7331 the book.
7332 </para>
7333 <figure id="fig-1622">
7334 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7335 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7336 </figure>
7337 <para>
7338 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7339 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7340 </para>
7341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7342 <figure id="fig-1631">
7343 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7344 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7345 </figure>
7346 <para>
7347 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7348 </para>
7349 <para>
7350 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7351 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7352 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7353 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7354 under
7355 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7356 <!-- f21 -->
7357 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7358 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7359 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7360 obligation
7361 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7362 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7363 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7364 </para></footnote>
7365 When my e-book of
7366 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7367 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7368 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7369 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7370 </para>
7371 <para>
7372 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7373 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7374 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7375 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7376 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7377 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7378 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7379 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7380 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7381 restrictions:
7382 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7383 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7384 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7385 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7386 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7387 </para>
7388 <para>
7389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7390 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7391 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7392 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7393 </para>
7394 <para>
7395 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7396 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7397 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7398 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7399 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7400 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7401 </para>
7402 <para>
7403 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7404 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7405 technologies
7406 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7407 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7408 protections as well?
7409 </para>
7410 <para>
7411 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7412 eBook Reader.
7413 </para>
7414 <para>
7415 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7416 public
7417 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7418 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7419 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7420 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7421 </para>
7422 <figure id="fig-1641">
7423 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7424 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7425 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7426 </figure>
7427 <para>
7428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7429 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7430 allowed
7431 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7432 "permissions"
7433 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7434 </para>
7435 <para>
7436 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7437 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7438 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7439 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7440 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7441 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7442 </para>
7443 <para>
7444 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7445 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7446 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7447 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7448 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7449 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7450 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7451 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7452 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7453 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7454 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7455 </para>
7456 <para>
7457 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7458 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7459 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7460 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7461 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7462 often crazy.
7463 </para>
7464 <para>
7465 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7466 story of mine that makes the same point.
7467 </para>
7468 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7469 <para>
7470 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7471 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7472 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7473 </para>
7474 <para>
7475 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7476 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7477 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7479 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7480 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7481 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7482 </para>
7483 <para>
7484 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7485 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7486 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7487 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7488 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7489 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7490 </para>
7491 <para>
7492 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7493 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7494 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7495 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7496 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7497 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7498 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7499 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7500 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7501 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7502 </para>
7503 <para>
7504 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7505 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7506 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7507 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7508 ethically.
7509 </para>
7510 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7511 <para>
7512 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7513 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7514 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7515 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7516 than Sony had built.
7517 </para>
7518 <para>
7519 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7520 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7521 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7522 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7523 the
7524
7525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7526 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7527 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7528 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7529 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7530 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7531 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7532 dog to dance?
7533 </para>
7534 <para>
7535 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7536 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7537 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7538 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7539 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7540 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7541 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7542 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7543 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7544 </para>
7545 <para>
7546 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7547 <!-- f22 -->
7548 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7549 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7550 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7551 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7552 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7553 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7554 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7555 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7556 Questions
7557 about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7558 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7559 </para></footnote>
7560 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7561 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7562 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7563 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7564 </para>
7565 <para>
7566 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7567 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7568 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7569 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7570 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7571 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7572 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7573 Internet much more.
7574 </para>
7575 <para>
7576 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7577 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7578 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7579 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7580 </para>
7581 <para>
7582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7583 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7584 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7585 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7586 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7587 </para>
7588 <para>
7589 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7590 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7591 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7592 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7593 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7594 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7595 </para>
7596 <para>
7597 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7598 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7599 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7600 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7601 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7602 constituted, succeed.
7603 </para>
7604 <para>
7605 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7606 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7607 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7608 wrote:
7609 </para>
7610 <blockquote>
7611 <para>
7612 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7613 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7614 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7615 </para>
7616 </blockquote>
7617 <para>
7618 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7619 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7620 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7621 </para>
7622 <blockquote>
7623 <para>
7624 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7626 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7627 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7628 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7629 </para>
7630 </blockquote>
7631 <para>
7632 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7633 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7634 spreading such information an offense.
7635 </para>
7636 <para>
7637 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7638 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7639 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7640 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7641 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7642 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7643 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7644 </para>
7645 <para>
7646 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7647 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7648 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7649 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7650 </para>
7651 <para>
7652 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7653 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7654 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7655 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7656 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7657 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7658 have been a copyright violation.
7659 </para>
7660 <para>
7661 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7662 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7663 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7664 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7665 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7666 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7667 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7668 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7669 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7670 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7671 </para>
7672 <para>
7673 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7674 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7675 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7676 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7677 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7678 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7679 </para>
7680 <para>
7681 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7682 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7683 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7684 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7685 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7686 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7687 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7688 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7689 </para>
7690 <blockquote>
7691 <para>
7692 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7693 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7694 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7695 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7696 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7697 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7698 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7699 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7700 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7701 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7702 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7703 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7704 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7705 important.<footnote><para>
7706 <!-- f23 -->
7707 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7708 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7709 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7710 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7711 </para></footnote>
7712 </para>
7713 </blockquote>
7714 <para>
7715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7716 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7717 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7718 the VCR responsible.
7719 </para>
7720 <para>
7721 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7722 the DMCA.
7723 </para>
7724 <para>
7725 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7726 </para>
7727 <para>
7728 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7729 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7730 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7731 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7732 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7733 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7734 </para>
7735 <para>
7736 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7737 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7738 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7739 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7740 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7741 and bad uses.
7742 </para>
7743 <figure id="fig-1711">
7744 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7745 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7746 </figure>
7747 <para>
7748 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7749 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7750 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7751 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7752 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7753 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7754 </para>
7755 <para>
7756 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7757 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7758 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7759 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7760 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7761 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7762 </para>
7763 <para>
7764 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7765 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7766 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7767 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7768 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7769 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7770 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7771 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7772 </para>
7773 <para>
7774 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7775 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7776 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7777 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7778 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7779 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7780 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7781 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7782 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7783 </para>
7784 <para>
7785
7786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7787 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7788 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7789 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7790 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7791 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7792 <!-- f24 -->
7793 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7794 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7795 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7796 </para></footnote>
7797 </para>
7798 <para>
7799 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7800 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7801 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7802 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7803 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7804 </para>
7805 <para>
7806 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7807 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7808 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7809 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7810 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7811 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7812 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7813 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7814 </para>
7815 <para>
7816 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7817 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7818 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7819 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7820 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7821 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7822 </para>
7823 </sect2>
7824 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
7825 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7826 <para>
7827 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7828 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7829 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7830 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7831 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7832 find better ways
7833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7834 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7835 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7836 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7837 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7838 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7839 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7840 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7841 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7842 control.
7843 </para>
7844 <para>
7845 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7846 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7847 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7848 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7849 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7850 </para>
7851 <para>
7852 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7853 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7854 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7855 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7856 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7857 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7858 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7859 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7860 of the media.
7861 </para>
7862 <para>
7863 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7864 nature.
7865 </para>
7866 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7867 <para>
7868 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7869 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7870 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7871 <!-- f25 -->
7872 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7873 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7874 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7875 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7876 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7877 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7878 <!-- f26 -->
7879 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7880 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
7881 </para></footnote>
7882 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7883 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7884 <!-- f27 -->
7885 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7886 31 May 2003.
7887 </para></footnote>
7888 </para>
7889 <para>
7890 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7891 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7893 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
7894 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7895 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7896 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
7897 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
7898 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7899 </para>
7900 <para>
7901 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7902 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7903 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7904 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7905 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7906 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7907 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7908 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7909 protected&mdash; by the market.
7910 </para>
7911 <para>
7912 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7913 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7914 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7915 </para>
7916 <blockquote>
7917 <para>
7918 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7919 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7920 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7921 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7922 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7923 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7924 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7925 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7926 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7927 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7928 <!-- f28 -->
7929 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7930 2003): 89.
7931 </para></footnote>
7932 </para>
7933 </blockquote>
7934 <para>
7935 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7936 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7937 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7938 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7939 </para>
7940 <figure id="fig-1761">
7941 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7942 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7943 </figure>
7944 <para>
7945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7946 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7947 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7948 distribute content?
7949 </para>
7950 <para>
7951 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7952 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7953 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7954 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7955 </para>
7956 <para>
7957 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7958 integration may matter.
7959 </para>
7960 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7961 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7962 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7963 <para>
7964 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7965 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7966 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7967 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7968 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7969 </para>
7970 <para>
7971 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7972 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7973 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7974 control.<footnote><para>
7975 <!-- f29 -->
7976 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7977 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7978 Missouri,
7979 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7980 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7981 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7982 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7983 </para></footnote>
7984 </para>
7985 <para>
7986
7987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7988 The network did not control those copyrights because the law
7989 forbade
7990 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The
7991 law required a separation between the networks and the content
7992 producers;
7993 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
7994 1992, because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7995 television&mdash;75
7996 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the networks.
7997 </para>
7998 <para>
7999 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this
8000 independence.
8001 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.
8002 In 1985, there were twenty-five independent television production
8003 studios;
8004 in 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
8005 1992, only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a
8006 company it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8007 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992,
8008 16 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control,
8009 last year there was one."<footnote><para>
8010 <!-- f30 -->
8011 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on
8012 Media Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th
8013 Cong., 1st sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of
8014 Consumers
8015 Union and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8016 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of
8017 America, West, in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond,
8018 Virginia, 27 February 2003.
8019 </para></footnote>
8020 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television
8021 was owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
8022 1992 and 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week
8023 produced by network studios increased over 200%, whereas the
8024 number
8025 of prime time television hours per week produced by independent
8026 studios decreased 63%."<footnote><para>
8027 <!-- f31 -->
8028 Ibid.
8029 </para></footnote>
8030 </para>
8031 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8032 <para>
8033 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
8034 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8035 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8036 owned by the network.
8037 </para>
8038 <para>
8039 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the
8040 ownership
8041 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller
8042 few. As Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8043 </para>
8044 <blockquote>
8045 <para>
8046 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8047 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8048 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8049 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8050 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8051 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent
8052 production
8053 companies producing television programs. Now you have less
8054 than a handful.<footnote><para>
8055 <!-- f32 -->
8056 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
8057 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8058 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8059 </para></footnote>
8060 </para>
8061 </blockquote>
8062 <para>
8063 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of
8064 such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8065 Increasingly
8066 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from
8067 networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the network
8068 wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from the
8069 inside,
8070 it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question
8071 without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment to Siberia,
8072 but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are
8073 quashed. This is not the environment for a democracy.
8074 </para>
8075 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8076 <para>
8077 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8078 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8079 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8080 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8081 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8082 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8083 <!-- f33 -->
8084 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
8085 National
8086 Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard
8087 Business School Press, 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was
8088 first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of
8089 Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
8090 Research Policy 14 (1985): 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard
8091 Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are
8092 Built to Last Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform
8093 Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001).
8094 </para></footnote>
8095
8096 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8097 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8098 sprinting.
8099 </para>
8100 <para>
8101 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8102 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8103 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8104 measure.
8105 </para>
8106 <para>
8107 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8108 suggest the concern.
8109 </para>
8110 <para>
8111 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8112 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8113 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8114 </para>
8115 <para>
8116 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8117 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8118 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8119
8120 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8121 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8122 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8123 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8124 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8125 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8126 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8127 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8128 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8129 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8130 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8131 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8132 outweigh these costs.
8133 </para>
8134 <para>
8135 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8136 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8137 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8138 these issues.
8139 </para>
8140 <para>
8141 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8142 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8143 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8144 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8145 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8146 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8147 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8148 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8149 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8150 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8151 </para>
8152 <para>
8153 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8154 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8155 </para>
8156 <para>
8157 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8158 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8159 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8160 war. Can you do it?
8161 </para>
8162 <para>
8163 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8165 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8166 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8167 message will be heard then?
8168 </para>
8169 <para>
8170 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8171 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8172 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8173 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8174 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8175 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8176 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8177 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8178 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8179 <!-- f34 -->
8180 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8181 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8182 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8183 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8184 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8185 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8186 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8187 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8188 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8189 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8190 York Times, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8191 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8192 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8193 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8194 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8195 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8196 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d 872
8197 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8198 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8199 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8200 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8201 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8202 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8203 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8204 </para></footnote>
8205 </para>
8206 <para>
8207 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8208 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8209 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8210 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8211 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8212 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8213 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8214 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8215 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8216 </para>
8217 </sect2>
8218 <sect2 id="together">
8219 <title>Together</title>
8220 <para>
8221 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8222 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8223 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8224 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8225 </para>
8226 <para>
8227 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8228 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8229 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8230 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8231 to seem
8232
8233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8234 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8235 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8236 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8237 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8238 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8239 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8240 be redefined.
8241 </para>
8242 <para>
8243 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8244 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8245 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8246 our culture today.
8247 </para>
8248 <para>
8249 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8250 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8251 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8252 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8253 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8254 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8255 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8256 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8257 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8258 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8259 </para>
8260 <para>
8261 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8262 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8263 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8264 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8265 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8266 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8267 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8268 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8269 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8270 technology and the market enable.
8271 </para>
8272 <para>
8273 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8274 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8276 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8277 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8278 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8279 the development of our culture than now.
8280 </para>
8281 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8282 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8283 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8284 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8285 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8286 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8287 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8288 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny
8289 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8290 founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8291 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8292 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8293 culture that our free society has known.<footnote><para>
8294 <!-- f35 -->
8295 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8296 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8297 </para></footnote>
8298 </para>
8299 <para>
8300 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8301 </para>
8302 <para>
8303 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8304 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8305 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8306 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8307 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8308 </para>
8309
8310 <table id="t2">
8311 <title></title>
8312 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8313 <thead>
8314 <row>
8315 <entry></entry>
8316 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8317 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8318 </row>
8319 </thead>
8320 <tbody>
8321 <row>
8322 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8323 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8324 <entry>Free</entry>
8325 </row>
8326 <row>
8327 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8328 <entry>Free</entry>
8329 <entry>Free</entry>
8330 </row>
8331 </tbody>
8332 </tgroup>
8333 </table>
8334
8335 <para>
8336 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8337 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8338 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8339
8340 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8341 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8342 noncommercial work was also free.
8343 </para>
8344 <para>
8345 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8346 </para>
8347
8348 <table id="t3">
8349 <title></title>
8350 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8351 <thead>
8352 <row>
8353 <entry></entry>
8354 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8355 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8356 </row>
8357 </thead>
8358 <tbody>
8359 <row>
8360 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8361 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8362 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8363 </row>
8364 <row>
8365 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8366 <entry>Free</entry>
8367 <entry>Free</entry>
8368 </row>
8369 </tbody>
8370 </tgroup>
8371 </table>
8372
8373 <para>
8374 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8375 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8376 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8377 transformation were still essentially free.
8378 </para>
8379 <para>
8380 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8381 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8382 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8383 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8384 we could say the law began to look like this:
8385 </para>
8386
8387 <table id="t4">
8388 <title></title>
8389 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8390 <thead>
8391 <row>
8392 <entry></entry>
8393 <entry>COPY</entry>
8394 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8395 </row>
8396 </thead>
8397 <tbody>
8398 <row>
8399 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8400 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8401 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8402 </row>
8403 <row>
8404 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8405 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8406 <entry>Free</entry>
8407 </row>
8408 </tbody>
8409 </tgroup>
8410 </table>
8411
8412 <para>
8413 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through,
8414 say, copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the
8415 commercial
8416 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of
8417 digital technologies, especially in the context of a digital network,
8418 means that the law now looks like this:
8419 </para>
8420
8421 <table id="t5">
8422 <title></title>
8423 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8424 <thead>
8425 <row>
8426 <entry></entry>
8427 <entry>COPY</entry>
8428 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8429 </row>
8430 </thead>
8431 <tbody>
8432 <row>
8433 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8434 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8435 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8436 </row>
8437 <row>
8438 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8439 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8440 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8441 </row>
8442 </tbody>
8443 </tgroup>
8444 </table>
8445
8446 <para>
8447 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8448 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8449 creativity&mdash;
8450 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8451 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8452 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8453 </para>
8454 <para>
8455 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8456 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8457 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8458 these domains actually does any good.
8459 </para>
8460 <para>
8461 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8462 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8463 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8464 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8465 reasons sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8466 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8467 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8468 rights were more sharply restricted.
8469 </para>
8470 <para>
8471 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8472 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8473 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8474 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8475 property rights<footnote><para>
8476 <!-- f36 -->
8477 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8478 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8479 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8480 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8481 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8482 Press, 1980).
8483 </para></footnote>)
8484 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8485 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8486 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8487 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8488 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8489 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8490 almost 180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8491 free culture.
8492 </para>
8493 <para>
8494 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8495 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8496 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8497 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8498 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8499 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8500 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8501 chapter 7). Adding
8502 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8503 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8504 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8505 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8506 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8507 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8508 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8509 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8510 dominates the debate today.
8511 </para>
8512 <para>
8513 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8514 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8515 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8516 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8517 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8518 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8519 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8520 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8521 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8522 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8523 lawyer.
8524 </para>
8525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8526 </sect2>
8527 </sect1>
8528 </chapter>
8529 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8530 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8531 <para></para>
8532 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8533 <sect1 id="chimera">
8534 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8535 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8536 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8537 </indexterm>
8538 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8539 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8540 </indexterm>
8541 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8542 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8543 </indexterm>
8544
8545 <para>
8546 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8547 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8548 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8549 <!-- f1. -->
8550 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8551 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8552 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8553 </para></footnote>
8554 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8555 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8556 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8557 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8558 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8559 villagers to explore life as a king.
8560 </para>
8561 <para>
8562 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8563 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8564 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8565 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8566 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8567 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8568 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8569 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8570 alone!'"
8571 </para>
8572 <para>
8573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8574 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8575 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8576 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8577 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8578 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8579 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8580 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8581 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8582 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8583 </para>
8584 <para>
8585 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8586 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8587 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8588 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8589 </para>
8590 <para>
8591 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8592 is affected," he reports.
8593 </para>
8594 <para>
8595 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8596 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8597 his brain."
8598 </para>
8599 <para>
8600 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8601 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8602 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8603 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8604 </para>
8605 <para>
8606 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8607 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8608 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8609 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8610 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8611 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8612 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8613 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8614
8615 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8616 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8617 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8618 scene. . . ."
8619 </para>
8620 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8621 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8622 <para>
8623 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8624 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8625 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8626 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8627 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8628 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8629 </para>
8630 <para>
8631 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8632 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8633 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8634 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8635 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8636 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8637 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8638 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8639 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8640 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8641 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8642 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8643 </para>
8644 <para>
8645 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8646 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8647 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8648 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8649 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8650 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8651 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8652 </para>
8653 <para>
8654 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8655 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8656 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8657 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8658 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8659 from Tower.
8660 </para>
8661 <para>
8662
8663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8664 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8665 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8666 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8667 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8668 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8669 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8670 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8671 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8672 </para>
8673 <para>
8674 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8675 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8676 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8677 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8678 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8679 </para>
8680 <para>
8681 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8682 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8683 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8684 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8685 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8686 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8687 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8688 implemented.<footnote><para>
8689 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8690 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8691 "Copyright
8692 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available
8693 at
8694 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8695 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8696 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8697 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8698 Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8699 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8700 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8701 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8702 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer,
8703 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.
8704 Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8705 high as $90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8706 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8707 from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8708 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8709 billion
8710 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8711 Elizabeth
8712 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8713 August 2003, available at
8714 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8715 targeting
8716 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8717 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8718 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003,
8719 D3, available at
8720 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8721 </para></footnote>
8722
8723 </para>
8724 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8725 <para>
8726 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8727 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8728 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8729 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8730 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8731 </para>
8732 <para>
8733 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8734 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8735 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8736 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter
8737 is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance
8738 extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a reasonable
8739 alternative.
8740 But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
8741 of the two extremes.
8742 </para>
8743 <para>
8744
8745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8746 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8747 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land
8748 grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give
8749 content
8750 holders a kind of control over our culture that they have never had
8751 before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8752 innovation
8753 and new creativity will be lost.
8754 </para>
8755 <para>
8756 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8757 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8758 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8759 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8760 innovation
8761 that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the
8762 passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to distribute
8763 content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the vice president
8764 for global public policy at one of these new innovators, eMusic.com,
8765 put it when criticizing the DMCA's added protection for copyrighted
8766 material,
8767 </para>
8768 <blockquote>
8769 <para>
8770 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8771 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8772 </para>
8773 <para>
8774 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8775 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8776 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8777 answer
8778 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8779 well produce a totally different industry model.
8780 </para>
8781 <para>
8782 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8783 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8784 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8785 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8786 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8787 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8788 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8789 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8790 interests.<footnote><para>
8791 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8792 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8793 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8794 Protection,
8795 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
8796 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8797 EMusic.com),
8798 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8799 Congressional
8800 Testimony File.
8801 </para></footnote>
8802 </para>
8803 </blockquote>
8804 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8805 <para>
8806 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8807 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8808 changed.
8809 </para>
8810 <para>
8811 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8812 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8813 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8814 </para>
8815
8816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8817 </sect1>
8818 <sect1 id="harms">
8819 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8820 <para>
8821
8822 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8823 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8824 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8825 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8826 prohibition,
8827 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8828 </para>
8829 <para>
8830 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8831 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8832 extend
8833 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8834 justified?
8835 </para>
8836 <para>
8837 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8838 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8839 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8840 our history.
8841 </para>
8842 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8843 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8844 <para>
8845 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8846 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8847 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8848 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8849 </para>
8850 <para>
8851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8852 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8853 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8854 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8855 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8856 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8857 </para>
8858 <sect2 id="constrain">
8859 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8860 <para>
8861 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8862 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8863 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8864 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8865 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8866 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8867 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8868 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8869 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8870 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8871 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8872 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8873 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8874 </para>
8875 <para>
8876 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8877 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8878 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8879 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8880 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8881 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8882 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8883 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8884 the culture all around.
8885 </para>
8886 <para>
8887 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8888 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8889
8890 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8891
8892 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8893 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8894 storytelling extended across the globe.
8895 </para>
8896 <para>
8897 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8898 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8899 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8900 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8901 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8902 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8903 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8904 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8905 work is presumptively illegal.
8906 </para>
8907 <para>
8908 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8909 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8910 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8911 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8912 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8913 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8914 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8915 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8916 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8917 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8918 million.<footnote><para>
8919 <!-- f1. -->
8920 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8921 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8922 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8923 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8924 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8925 </para></footnote>
8926 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8927 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8928 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8929 suffering.<footnote>
8930 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8931 <para>
8932 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8933 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8934 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8935 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8936 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8937 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8938 available at
8939 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8940 recent months.
8941 </para></footnote>
8942 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8943 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8944 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8945 </para>
8946 <para>
8947 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8948 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8949 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8950 creative
8951 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8952 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8953 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8954
8955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8956 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8957 create,
8958 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8959 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8960 begin
8961 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
8962 necessarily
8963 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8964 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8965 "illegal
8966 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
8967 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
8968 available
8969 at
8970 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8971 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
8972 </para></footnote>
8973 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8974 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8975 critical or reflective.
8976 </para>
8977 <para>
8978 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8979 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
8980 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8981 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8982 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8983 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8984 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8985 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8986 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8987 </para>
8988 <para>
8989 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8990 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8991 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8992 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8993 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8994 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8995 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8996 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8997 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8998 </para>
8999 <para>
9000 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9001 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
9002 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
9003 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
9004 law regulates such a use.
9005 </para>
9006 <para>
9007
9008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9009 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9010 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9011 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
9012 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9013 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9014 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9015 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9016 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9017 </para>
9018 <para>
9019 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9020 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
9021 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9022 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9023 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9024 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9025 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9026 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9027 comfort themselves.
9028 </para>
9029 <para>
9030 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
9031 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9032 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9033 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9034 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
9035 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9036 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9037 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9038 culture that is free.
9039 </para>
9040 <para>
9041 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9042 </para>
9043 <blockquote>
9044 <para>
9045 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9046 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9047 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9048 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
9049 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9050 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9051 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9052 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9053 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9054 </para>
9055 </blockquote>
9056 </sect2>
9057 <sect2 id="innovators">
9058 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9059 <para>
9060 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9061 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9062 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9063 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9064 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9065 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9066 </para>
9067 <para>
9068 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9069 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9070 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9071 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9072 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9073 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9074 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9075 </para>
9076 <para>
9077 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9078 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9079 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9080 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9081 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9082 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9083 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9084 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9085 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9086 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9087 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9088 </para>
9089 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9090 <para>
9091 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9093 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
9094 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9095 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9096 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9097 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9098 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9099 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9100 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9101 </para>
9102 <para>
9103 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9104 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9105 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9106 </para>
9107 <para>
9108 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9109 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9110 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9111 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9112 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9113 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9114 </para>
9115 <para>
9116 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9117 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9118 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9119 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9120 Raitt. And so on.
9121 </para>
9122 <para>
9123 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9124 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9125 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9126 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9127 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9128 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9129 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9130 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9131 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9132 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9133 </para>
9134 <para>
9135 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9136 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9137
9138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9139 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9140 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9141 the kind of content the users liked.
9142 </para>
9143 <para>
9144 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9145 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9146 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9147 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9148 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9149 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9150 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9151 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9152 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9153 they had already bought.
9154 </para>
9155 <para>
9156 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9157 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9158 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9159 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9160 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9161 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9162 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9163 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9164 </para>
9165 <para>
9166 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9167 </para>
9168 <para>
9169 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9170 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9171 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9172 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9173 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9174 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9175 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9176 demanded.
9177 </para>
9178 <para>
9179 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9180 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9181 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9182 clients in this
9183 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9184 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9185 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9186 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9187 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9188 </para>
9189 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9190 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9191 <para>
9192 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9193 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9194 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9195 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9196 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9197 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9198 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9199 innovation
9200 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9201 Revolution
9202 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9203 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9204 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9205 Times, 28 May 2001.
9206 </para></footnote>
9207 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9208 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9209 industry
9210 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9211 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9212 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9213 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9214 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9215 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9216 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9217 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9218 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9219 </para>
9220 <blockquote>
9221 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9222 <para>
9223 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9224 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9225 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9226 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9227 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9228 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9229 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote>
9230 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9231 <para>
9232 <!-- f5. -->
9233 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9234 2003, available at
9235 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9236 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9237 </para></footnote>
9238 </para>
9239 </blockquote>
9240 <para>
9241 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9242 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9243 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9244 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9245 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9246 constantly threatened by litigation.
9247 </para>
9248 <para>
9249
9250 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9251 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9252 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9253 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9254 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9255 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9256 imposes,
9257 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9258 conservative
9259 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9260 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9261 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9262 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9263 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9264 </para>
9265 <para>
9266 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9267 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9268 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9269 systematically
9270 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9271 industries
9272 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9273 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9274 competition.
9275 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9276 competition.
9277 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9278 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9279 overregulatedregulated
9280 market.
9281 </para>
9282 <para>
9283 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9284 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9285 burden
9286 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&mdash;a
9287 culture
9288 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9289 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9290 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9291 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9292 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9293 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9294 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9295 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9296 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9297 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9298 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9299 creativity.
9300 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9301 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9302 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9303 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9304 technology
9305 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9306 </para>
9307 <para>
9308 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9309 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9310 Internet's
9311 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9312 feature
9313 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9314 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9315 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9316 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9317 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9318 </para>
9319 <para>
9320 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9321 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9322 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9323 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9324 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9325 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9326 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9327 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9328 </para></footnote>
9329
9330 Congress
9331 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9332 "broadcast
9333 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9334 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9335 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9336 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9337 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9338 violators
9339 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9340 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9341 </para></footnote>
9342
9343 </para>
9344 <para>
9345 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9346 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9347 regulation
9348 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9349 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9350
9351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9352 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9353 those requirements.
9354 </para>
9355 <para>
9356 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9357 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9358 impose.<footnote><para>
9359 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9360 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9361 </para></footnote>
9362 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9363 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9364 harm than good.
9365 </para>
9366 <para>
9367 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9368 innovation&mdash;again,
9369 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9370 crowd.
9371 </para>
9372 <para>
9373 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9374 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9375 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9376 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9377 </para>
9378 <para>
9379 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9380 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9381 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9382 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9383 2001).
9384 </para></footnote>
9385 overall this history of copyright
9386 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9387 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9388 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9389 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9390 </para>
9391 <para>
9392 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9393 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9394 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9395 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9396 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9397 </para>
9398 <para>
9399 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9400 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9401 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9402 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9403 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9404 copyright
9405 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9406 music
9407 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9408 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9409 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9410 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9411 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9412 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9413 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9414 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9415 </para></footnote>
9416 It has been
9417 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9418 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9419 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9420 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9421 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9422 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9423 August
9424 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9425 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9426 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9427 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9428 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9429 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9430 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9431 World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34, available at
9432 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9433 </para></footnote>
9434 But there is one
9435 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9436 demise
9437 of Internet radio.
9438 </para>
9439 <para>
9440
9441 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9442 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9443 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9444 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9445 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9446 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9447 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9448 copyright
9449 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9450 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9451 </para>
9452 <para>
9453 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9454 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9455 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9456 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9457 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9458 Probably
9459 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9460 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9461 efforts
9462 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9463 </para>
9464 <para>
9465 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9466 technology
9467 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9468 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9469 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9470 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9471 regular
9472 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9473 </para>
9474 <para>
9475 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9476 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9477 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9478 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9479 broadcasters
9480 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9481 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9482 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9483 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9484 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9485 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9486 in to this new form of radio.
9487 </para>
9488 <para>
9489
9490 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9491 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9492 improvement
9493 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9494 improvement
9495 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9496 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9497 establish
9498 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9499 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9500 </para>
9501 <blockquote>
9502 <para>
9503 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9504 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9505 radio
9506 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9507 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9508 competition
9509 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9510 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9511 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9512 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9513 communications
9514 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9515 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9516 acquire
9517 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9518 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9519 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.<footnote><para>
9520 <!-- f12. --> Lessing, 239.
9521 </para></footnote>
9522 </para>
9523 </blockquote>
9524 <para>
9525 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not because
9526 Armstrong
9527 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9528 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<footnote><para>
9529 <!-- f13. --> Ibid., 229.
9530 </para></footnote>
9531 to
9532 retard
9533 the growth of this competing technology.
9534 </para>
9535 <para>
9536 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9537 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9538 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9539 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9540 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9541 radio?
9542 </para>
9543 <para>
9544 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9545 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9546
9547 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9548 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9549 phenomenon
9550 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9551 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9552 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9553 hypothetical
9554 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9555 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9556 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9557 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9558 </para>
9559 <para>
9560 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9561 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9562 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9563 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9564 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9565 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9566 <para>
9567 <!-- f14. -->
9568 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9569 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9570 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9571 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9572 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9573 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9574 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9575 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9576 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9577 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9578 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9579 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9580 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9581 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9582 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9583 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9584 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9585 </para></footnote>
9586 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9587 equivalent fee.
9588 </para>
9589 <para>
9590 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9591 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9592 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9593 </para>
9594 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9595 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9596 <listitem><para>
9597 name of the service;
9598 </para></listitem>
9599 <listitem><para>
9600 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9601 </para></listitem>
9602 <listitem><para>
9603 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9604 </para></listitem>
9605 <listitem><para>
9606 date of transmission;
9607 </para></listitem>
9608 <listitem><para>
9609 time of transmission;
9610 </para></listitem>
9611 <listitem><para>
9612 time zone of origination of transmission;
9613 </para></listitem>
9614 <listitem><para>
9615 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9616 </para></listitem>
9617 <listitem><para>
9618 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9619 </para></listitem>
9620 <listitem><para>
9621 sound recording title;
9622 </para></listitem>
9623 <listitem><para>
9624 ISRC code of the recording;
9625 </para></listitem>
9626 <listitem><para>
9627 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9628 </para></listitem>
9629 <listitem><para>
9630 featured recording artist;
9631 </para></listitem>
9632 <listitem><para>
9633 retail album title;
9634 </para></listitem>
9635 <listitem><para>
9636 recording label;
9637 </para></listitem>
9638 <listitem><para>
9639 UPC code of the retail album;
9640 </para></listitem>
9641 <listitem><para>
9642 catalog number;
9643 </para></listitem>
9644 <listitem><para>
9645 copyright owner information;
9646 </para></listitem>
9647 <listitem><para>
9648 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9649 </para></listitem>
9650 <listitem><para>
9651 name of the service or entity;
9652 </para></listitem>
9653 <listitem><para>
9654 channel or program;
9655 </para></listitem>
9656 <listitem><para>
9657 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9658 </para></listitem>
9659 <listitem><para>
9660 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9661 </para></listitem>
9662 <listitem><para>
9663 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9664 </para></listitem>
9665 <listitem><para>
9666 Unique User identifier;
9667 </para></listitem>
9668 <listitem><para>
9669 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9670 </para></listitem>
9671 </orderedlist>
9672
9673 <para>
9674 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9675 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9676 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9677 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9678 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9679 does not.
9680 </para>
9681 <para>
9682 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9683 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9684 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9685 </para>
9686 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9687 <para>
9688 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9689 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9690 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9691 </para>
9692 <blockquote>
9693 <para>
9694 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9695 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9696 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9697 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9698 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9699 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9700
9701 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9702 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9703 Because
9704 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9705 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9706 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9707 of business. . . ."
9708 </para>
9709 <para>
9710 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9711 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9712 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9713 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9714 </para>
9715 </blockquote>
9716 <para>
9717 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9718 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9719 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9720 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9721 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9722 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9723 effective to prevent it.
9724 </para>
9725 </sect2>
9726 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9727 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9728 <para>
9729 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9730 dinosaurs
9731 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9732 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9733 </para>
9734 <para>
9735 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9736 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9737 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9738 </para>
9739 <para>
9740 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9741 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9742 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9743 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9744 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9745 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9746 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9747 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9748 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9749 </para></footnote>
9750 According to the RIAA,
9751 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9752 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9753
9754 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9755 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9756 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9757 increasingly
9758 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9759 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9760 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9761 extreme
9762 response by the other.
9763 </para>
9764 <para>
9765 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9766 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9767 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9768 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9769 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9770 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9771 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9772 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9773 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9774 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9775 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9776 was.<footnote><para>
9777 <!-- f16. -->
9778 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9779 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9780 </para></footnote>
9781 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9782 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9783 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9784 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9785 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9786 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9787 they oppose.
9788 </para>
9789 <para>
9790 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9791 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9792 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9793 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9794 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9795 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9796 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9797 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9798 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9799 <!-- f17. -->
9800 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9801 Prohibition," American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9802 </para></footnote>
9803 We have
9804 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9805 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9806 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9807 <!-- f18. -->
9808 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9809 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9810 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9811 </para></footnote>
9812 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9813 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9814 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9815 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9816 cheat.<footnote><para>
9817 <!-- f19. -->
9818 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9819 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9820 compliance literature).
9821 </para></footnote>
9822 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9823 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9824 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9825 </para>
9826 <para>
9827 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9828 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9829 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9830 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9831 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9832 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9833 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9834 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9835 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9836 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9837 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9838 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9839 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9840 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9841 degree of illegality.
9842 </para>
9843 <para>
9844 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9845 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9846 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9847 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9848 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9849 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9850 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9851 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9852 to consider the alternative.
9853 </para>
9854 <para>
9855
9856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9857 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9858 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9859 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9860 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9861 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9862 </para>
9863 <para>
9864 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9865 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9866 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9867 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9868 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9869 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9870 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9871 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9872 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9873 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9874 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9875 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9876 </para>
9877 <para>
9878 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9879 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9880 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9881 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9882 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9883 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9884 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9885 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9886 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9887 a nation of felons?
9888 </para>
9889 <para>
9890 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9891 </para>
9892 <para>
9893 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9894 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9895 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9896 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9897 used
9898
9899 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9900 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9901 recordings is free.
9902 </para>
9903 <para>
9904 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9905 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9906 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9907 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9908 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9909 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9910 capacities of digital technologies.
9911 </para>
9912 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9913 <para>
9914 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9915 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9916 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9917 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9918 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9919 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9920 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9921 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9922 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9923 </para>
9924 <para>
9925 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9926 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9927 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9928 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9929 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9930 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9931 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9932 on people's machines.
9933 </para>
9934 <para>
9935 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9936 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9937 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9938 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9939 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9940 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9941
9942 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9943 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9944 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9945 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9946 management" system.
9947 </para>
9948 <para>
9949 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9950 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9951 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9952 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9953 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9954 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9955 freedom to move content easily?
9956 </para>
9957 <para>
9958 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9959 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9960 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9961 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9962 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9963 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9964 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9965 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9966 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9967 </para>
9968 <para>
9969 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9970 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9971 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9972 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9973 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9974 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9975 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9976 </para>
9977 <para>
9978 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9979 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9980 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9981 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9982 </para>
9983 <para>
9984 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9985 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9986
9987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9988
9989 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9990 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9991 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9992 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9993 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9994 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9995 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9996 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9997 generally.
9998 </para>
9999 <para>
10000 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
10001 explains,
10002 </para>
10003 <blockquote>
10004 <para>
10005 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10006 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
10007 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10008 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10009 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10010 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
10011 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
10012 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10013 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
10014 </para>
10015 </blockquote>
10016 <para>
10017 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10018 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10019 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10020 </para>
10021 <para>
10022 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
10023 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10024 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10025 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10026 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10027 an Internet user is revealed.
10028 </para>
10029 <para>
10030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10031 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10032 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10033 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10034 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10035 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10036 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10037 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10038 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
10039 <!-- f20. -->
10040 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10041 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10042 Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
10043 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10044 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10045 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
10046 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September
10047 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10048 Fan, Either," New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
10049 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
10050 </para></footnote>
10051
10052 </para>
10053 <para>
10054 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10055 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10056 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10057 <!-- f21. -->
10058 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10059 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10060 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10061 </para></footnote>
10062 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10063 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10064 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10065 </para>
10066 <para>
10067 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10068 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10069 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10070 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10071 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10072 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10073 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10074 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10075 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10076 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10077 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10078 <!-- f22. -->
10079 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10080 Boston Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10081 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10082 Colleges," Washington Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10083 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
10084 Monitor, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10085 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10086 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10087 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News, 30 January
10088 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10089 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
10090 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10091 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10092 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10093 </para></footnote>
10094 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10095 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10096 </para>
10097 <para>
10098 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10099 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10100 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10101 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10102 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10103 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10104 college students
10105
10106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10107 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10108 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10109 Says von Lohmann,
10110 </para>
10111 <blockquote>
10112 <para>
10113 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10114 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10115 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10116 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10117 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10118 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10119 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10120 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10121 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10122 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10123 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10124 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10125 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10126 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10127 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10128 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10129 million of them.
10130 </para>
10131 </blockquote>
10132 <para>
10133 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10134 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10135 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10136 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10137 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10138 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10139 </para>
10140
10141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10142 </sect2>
10143 </sect1>
10144 </chapter>
10145 <chapter id="c-balances">
10146 <title>BALANCES</title>
10147
10148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10149 <para>
10150 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10151 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10152 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10153 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10154 </para>
10155 <para>
10156 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10157 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10158 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10159 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10160 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10161 everything around.
10162 </para>
10163 <para>
10164 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10165 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10166 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10167 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10168 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10169 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10170 </para>
10171 <para>
10172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10173 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10174 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10175 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10176 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10177 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10178 made that is happening all around.
10179 </para>
10180 <para>
10181 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10182 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10183 gasoline onto this fire.
10184 </para>
10185 <para>
10186 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10187 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10188 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10189 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10190 </para>
10191 <para>
10192 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10193 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10194 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10195 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10196 success will require.
10197 </para>
10198
10199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10200 <sect1 id="eldred">
10201 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10202 <para>
10203 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10204 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10205 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10206 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10207 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10208 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10209 come alive.
10210 </para>
10211 <para>
10212 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10213 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10214 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10215 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10216 them available for free.
10217 </para>
10218 <para>
10219 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10220 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10221 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10222 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10223 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10225 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10226 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10227 accessible&mdash;today.
10228 </para>
10229 <para>
10230 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10231 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10232 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10233 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10234 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10235 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10236 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10237 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10238 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10239 commercial publications of public domain works.
10240 </para>
10241 <para>
10242 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10243 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10244 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10245 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10246 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10247 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10248 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10249 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10250 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10251 generally.<footnote><para>
10252 <!-- f1. -->
10253 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10254 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10255 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10256 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10257 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10258 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10259 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10260 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10261 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10262 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10263 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10264 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10265 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10266 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10267 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10268 </para>
10269 <para>
10270 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10271 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10272 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10273 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
10274 in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10275 terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
10276 would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
10277 collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10278 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10279 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
10280 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10281 </para>
10282 <para>
10283
10284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10285 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10286 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10287 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10288 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10289 <!-- f2. -->
10290 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10291 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10292 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10293 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10294 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10295 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10296 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10297 </para></footnote>
10298
10299 </para>
10300 <para>
10301 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10302 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10303 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10304 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10305 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10306 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10307 to undertake.
10308 </para>
10309 <para>
10310 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10311 constitutional
10312 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10313 interpretation.
10314 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10315 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10316 importantly
10317 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10318 </para>
10319 <blockquote>
10320 <para>
10321 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10322 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10323 their . . . Writings. . . .
10324 </para>
10325 </blockquote>
10326 <para>
10327 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10328 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10329 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10330 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10331 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10332 specific&mdash;to
10333 "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that are also specific&mdash;
10334 by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
10335 </para>
10336 <para>
10337 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10338 extending
10339 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10340 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10341 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10343 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10344 Congress
10345 has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what
10346 the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the installment
10347 plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10348 </para>
10349 <para>
10350 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10351 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10352 consideration
10353 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10354 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10355 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the
10356 practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10357 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10358 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to
10359 keep this gravy train going.
10360 </para>
10361 <para>
10362 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10363 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
10364 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10365 beneficiaries
10366 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce
10367 it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can
10368 do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must do&mdash;and those
10369 things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10370 </para>
10371 <para>
10372 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10373 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10374 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10375 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10376 continues
10377 to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10378 benefits
10379 greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher would
10380 pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be published
10381 by anyone for free.
10382 </para>
10383 <para>
10384 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10385 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10386 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10387 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10388 report:
10389 </para>
10390 <para>
10391 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10392
10393 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10394 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10395 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10396 those works.
10397 </para>
10398 <para>
10399 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10400 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10401 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10402 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10403 </para>
10404 <para>
10405 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10406 about it?"
10407 </para>
10408 <para>
10409 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10410 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10411 they support the bill."
10412 </para>
10413 <para>
10414 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10415 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10416 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10417 much is it worth?"
10418 </para>
10419 <para>
10420 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10421 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10422 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10423 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10424 </para>
10425 <para>
10426 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10427 correct conclusion:
10428 </para>
10429 <para>
10430 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10431 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10432 contributions
10433 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10434 </para>
10435 <para>
10436 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10437 contribute
10438 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10439 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10440 </para>
10441 <para>
10442 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10443 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10444 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10445 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10446 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10447 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10448 copyrights
10449 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10450 the copyright term extended.
10451 </para>
10452 <para>
10453 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10454 legislation
10455 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10456 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10457 </para>
10458 <para>
10459 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10460 Copyright
10461 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10462 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10463 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10464 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10465 contributions.<footnote><para>
10466 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10467 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10468 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10469 </para></footnote>
10470 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10471 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10472 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10473 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10474 Age," available at
10475 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10476 </para></footnote>
10477 Disney is estimated to have
10478 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10479 cycle.<footnote><para>
10480 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10481 Congressional
10482 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10483 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10484 </para></footnote>
10485
10486 </para>
10487 <para>
10488 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10489 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10490 reality
10491 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10492 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10493 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10494 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10495 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10496 "limited."
10497 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10498 and again.
10499 </para>
10500 <para>
10501 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10502 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10503 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10504 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10505 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10506 scholars,
10507 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10508
10509 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10510 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10511 guns near schools.
10512 </para>
10513 <para>
10514 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10515 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10516 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10517 "interstate
10518 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10519 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10520 interstate
10521 commerce.
10522 </para>
10523 <para>
10524 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10525 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10526 activity,
10527 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10528 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10529 interpreted
10530 to impose no limit.
10531 </para>
10532 <para>
10533 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10534 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10535 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10536 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10537 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10538 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10539 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10540 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10541 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10542 government
10543 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10544 </para>
10545 <para>
10546 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10547 arguments,"
10548 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10549 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10550 </para></footnote>
10551 If anything Congress says is interstate
10552 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10553 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10554 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10555 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10556 </para></footnote>
10557
10558 </para>
10559 <para>
10560 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10561 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10562 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10563 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10564 context
10565 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10566 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10567 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10568 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10569 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10570 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10571 </para></footnote>
10572 And if it is applied to the
10573 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10574 Congress
10575 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10576 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10577 existing
10578 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10579 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10580 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10581 copyrights
10582 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10583 existing copyrights.
10584 </para>
10585 <para>
10586 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10587 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10588 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10589 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10590 rejected
10591 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10592 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10593 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10594 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10595 boring.
10596 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10597 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10598 </para>
10599 <para>
10600 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10601 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10602 Constitution's
10603 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10604 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10605 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10606 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10607 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10608 already
10609 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10610 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10611 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10612 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10613 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10614 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10615 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10616 </para>
10617 <para>
10618 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10619
10620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10621 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10622 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10623 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10624 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10625 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10626 </para></footnote>
10627 But
10628 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10629 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10630 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10631 </para>
10632 <para>
10633 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10634 copyright
10635 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10636 influence
10637 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10638 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10639 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10640 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10641 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10642 bought to extend them again.
10643 </para>
10644 <para>
10645 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10646 extended.
10647 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10648 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10649 society
10650 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10651 Disney's.
10652 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10653 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10654 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10655 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10656 exploited,
10657 and no longer available as a result.
10658 </para>
10659 <para>
10660 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10661 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10662 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10663 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10664 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10665 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10666 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10667 Congressional
10668 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10669 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10670 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10671 </para></footnote>
10672
10673 </para>
10674 <para>
10675 Think practically about the consequence of this
10676 extension&mdash;practically,
10677 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10678
10679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10680 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10681 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10682 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10683 remaining
10684 9,873. What would you have to do?
10685 </para>
10686 <para>
10687 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10688 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10689 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10690 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10691 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10692 list of books still under copyright.
10693 </para>
10694 <para>
10695 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10696 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10697 </para>
10698 <para>
10699 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10700 owners
10701 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10702 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10703 being at least a list?
10704 </para>
10705 <para>
10706 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10707 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10708 practically
10709 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10710 thousands
10711 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10712 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10713 </para>
10714 <para>
10715 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10716 apologists
10717 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10718 owners?"
10719 </para>
10720 <para>
10721 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10722 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10723 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10724 suggesting
10725 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10726 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10727 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10728 </para>
10729 <para>
10730 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10731 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10732 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10733
10734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10735 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10736 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10737 happen
10738 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10739 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10740 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10741 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10742 know quite well who owns what property.
10743 </para>
10744 <para>
10745 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10746 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10747 already
10748 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10749 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10750 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10751 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10752 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10753 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10754 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10755 </para>
10756 <para>
10757 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10758 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10759 consequence
10760 for other creative works is much more dire.
10761 </para>
10762 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10763 <para>
10764 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10765 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10766 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10767 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10768 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10769 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10770 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10771 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10772 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10773 films."<footnote><para>
10774 <!-- f11. -->
10775 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10776 Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10777 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10778 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
10779 </para></footnote>
10780
10781 </para>
10782 <para>
10783 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10784 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10785 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10786 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10787 </para>
10788 <para>
10789 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10790
10791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10792 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10793 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10794 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10795 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10796 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10797 work available for distribution.
10798 </para>
10799 <para>
10800 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10801 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10802 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10803 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10804 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10805 mm film.<footnote><para>
10806 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10807 Supporting
10808 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
10809 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10810 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10811 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10812 </para></footnote>
10813
10814 </para>
10815 <para>
10816 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10817 important.
10818 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10819 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10820 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10821 locate the copyright owner.
10822 </para>
10823 <para>
10824 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10825 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10826 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10827 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10828 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10829 exceptionally
10830 high.
10831 </para>
10832 <para>
10833 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10834 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10835 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10836 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10837 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10838 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10839 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10840 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10841 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10842 </para>
10843 <para>
10844 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10845
10846 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10847 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10848 benefit
10849 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10850 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10851 the copyright expires.
10852 </para>
10853 <para>
10854 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10855 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10856 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10857 canisters
10858 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10859 than dust.
10860 </para>
10861 <para>
10862 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10863 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10864 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10865 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10866 creative
10867 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10868 free expression."
10869 </para>
10870 <para>
10871 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10872 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10873 indicated,
10874 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10875 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10876 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10877 distributors,
10878 the commercial life ends.
10879 </para>
10880 <para>
10881 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10882 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10883 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10884 between
10885 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10886 Friday
10887 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10888 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10889 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10890 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10891 have, we need to have access to this history.
10892 </para>
10893 <para>
10894 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10895
10896 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10897 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10898 this context do no good.
10899 </para>
10900 <para>
10901 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10902 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10903 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10904 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10905 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10906 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10907 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10908 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10909 </para>
10910 <para>
10911 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10912 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10913 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10914 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10915 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10916 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10917 market didn't have more to offer.
10918 </para>
10919 <para>
10920 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10921 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10922 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10923 would not have interfered with anything.
10924 </para>
10925 <para>
10926 But this situation has now changed.
10927 </para>
10928 <para>
10929 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10930 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10931 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10932 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10933 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10934 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10935 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10936 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10937 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10938 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10939 </para>
10940 <para>
10941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10942 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10943 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10944 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10945 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10946 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10947 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10948 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10949 written for a radically different context.
10950 </para>
10951 <para>
10952 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10953 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10954 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10955 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10956 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10957 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10958 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10959 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10960 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10961 </para>
10962 <para>
10963 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10964 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10965 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10966 culture widely?"
10967 </para>
10968 <para>
10969 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10970 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
10971 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10972 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10973 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10974 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
10975 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10976 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
10977 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10978 </para>
10979 <para>
10980 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10981 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10982 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10983 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10984
10985 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10986 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10987 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10988 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10989 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
10990 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
10991 <!-- f13. -->
10992 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
10993 December 2002, available at
10994 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
10995 </para></footnote>
10996
10997 </para>
10998 <para>
10999 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11000 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11001 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11002 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
11003 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
11004 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11005 </para>
11006 <para>
11007 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11008 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11009 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11010 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11011 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11012 </para>
11013 <para>
11014 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11015 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
11016 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11017 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11018 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11019 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11020 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11021 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11022 power to extend existing terms.
11023 </para>
11024 <para>
11025 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11026 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11027 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11028 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11029 </para>
11030 <para>
11031 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11032 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11033
11034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11035 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11036 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11037 overstepped its bounds.
11038 </para>
11039 <para>
11040 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11041 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11042 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11043 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11044 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11045 </para>
11046 <para>
11047 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11048 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11049 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
11050 briefs and preparing for argument.
11051 </para>
11052 <para>
11053 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11054 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11055 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11056 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11057 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11058 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11059 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11060 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11061 </para>
11062 <para>
11063 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11064 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11065 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11066 mistake lost it.
11067 </para>
11068 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11069 <para>
11070 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11071 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11072 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11073 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11074 heat
11075 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11076 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11077 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11078 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11079 </para>
11080 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11081 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11082 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11083 <para>
11084 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11085 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11086 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11087 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11088 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11089 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11090 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11091 most powerful media companies in the world."
11092 </para>
11093 <para>
11094 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11095 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11096 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11097 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11098 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11099 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11100 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11101 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11102 interpretation
11103 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11104 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11105 unconstitutional,
11106 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11107 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11108 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11109 Constitution,
11110 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11111 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11112 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11113 </para>
11114 <para>
11115 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11116 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11117 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11118 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11119 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11120 why it was unconstitutional.
11121 </para>
11122 <para>
11123 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11124
11125 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11126 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11127 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11128 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11129 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11130 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11131 minority.
11132 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11133 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11134 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11135 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11136 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11137 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11138 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11139 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11140 </para>
11141 <para>
11142 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11143 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11144 beginning.
11145 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11146 November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11147 Republican
11148 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11149 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11150 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11151 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11152 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11153 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11154 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11155 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11156 </para>
11157 <para>
11158 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11159 supporting
11160 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11161 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11162 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11163 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11164 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11165 </para>
11166 <para>
11167 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11168 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11169
11170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11171 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11172 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11173 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11174 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11175 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11176 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11177 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11178 </para>
11179 <para>
11180 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11181 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11182 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11183 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11184 </para>
11185 <para>
11186 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11187 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11188 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11189 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11190 clear.
11191 </para>
11192 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11193 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11194 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11195 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11196 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11197 <para>
11198 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11199 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11200 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11201 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11202 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11203 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11204 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11205 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11206 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11207 </para>
11208 <para>
11209 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11210 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11211 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11212 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11213 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11214 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11215 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11216 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11217
11218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11219 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11220 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11221 </para>
11222 <para>
11223 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11224 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11225 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11226 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11227 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11228 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11229 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11230 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11231 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11232 confidence in our argument.
11233 </para>
11234 <para>
11235 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11236 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11237 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11238 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11239 copyright holders.
11240 </para>
11241 <para>
11242 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11243 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11244 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11245 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11246 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11247 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11248 wanted to control.
11249 </para>
11250 <para>
11251 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11252 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11253 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11254 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11255 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11256 pornography."<footnote><para>
11257 <!-- f14. -->
11258 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11259 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11260 </para></footnote>
11261 That was also the motive of
11262 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11263 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11264 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11265 <!-- f15. -->
11266 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11267 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11268 </para></footnote>
11269 That's
11270
11271 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11272 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11273 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11274 </para>
11275 <para>
11276 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11277 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11278 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11279 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11280 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11281 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11282 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11283 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11284 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11285 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11286 </para>
11287 <para>
11288 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11289 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11290 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11291 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11292 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11293 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11294 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11295 </para>
11296 <para>
11297 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11298 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11299 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11300 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11301 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11302 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11303 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11304 powers had limits.
11305 </para>
11306 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11307 <para>
11308 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11309 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11310 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11311 the Constitution
11312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11313 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11314 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11315 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11316 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11317 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11318 </para>
11319 <para>
11320 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11321 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11322 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11323 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11324 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11325 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11326 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11327 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11328 sense.
11329 </para>
11330 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11331 <para>
11332 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11333 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11334 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11335 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11336 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11337 these retrospective extensions.
11338 </para>
11339 <para>
11340 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11341 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11342 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11343 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11344 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11345 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11346 </para>
11347 <para>
11348 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11349 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11350 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11351 overriding
11352 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11353 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11354 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11355 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11356 </para>
11357 <para>
11358 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11359 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11360
11361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11362 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11363 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11364 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11365 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11366 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11367 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11368 copyright be limited.
11369 </para>
11370 <para>
11371 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11372 Congress
11373 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11374 government
11375 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11376 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11377 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11378 </para>
11379 <para>
11380 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11381 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11382 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11383 existing
11384 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11385 </para>
11386 <para>
11387 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11388 extended
11389 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11390 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11391 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11392 existing
11393 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11394 restraint
11395 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11396 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11397 hesitated
11398 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11399 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11400 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11401 arrived
11402 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11403 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11404
11405 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11406 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11407 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11408 </para>
11409 <para>
11410 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11411 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11412 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11413 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11414 Congress
11415 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11416 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11417 this central idea.
11418 </para>
11419 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11420 <para>
11421 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11422 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11423 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11424 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11425 </para>
11426 <para>
11427 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11428 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11429 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11430 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11431 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11432 </para>
11433 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11434 <para>
11435 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11436 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11437 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11438 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11439 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11440 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11441 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11442 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11443 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11444 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11445 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11446
11447 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11448 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11449 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11450 </para>
11451 <para>
11452 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11453 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11454 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11455 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11456 congressmen
11457 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11458 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11459 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11460 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11461 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11462 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11463 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11464 family of the Justices.
11465 </para>
11466 <para>
11467 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11468 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11469 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11470 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11471 </para>
11472 <para>
11473 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11474 The history was bothering her.
11475 </para>
11476 <blockquote>
11477 <para>
11478 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11479 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11480 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11481 practice that began with the very first act.
11482 </para>
11483 </blockquote>
11484 <para>
11485 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11486 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11487 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11488 </para>
11489 <blockquote>
11490 <para>
11491 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11492 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11493 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11494 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11495 is yes.
11496 </para>
11497 </blockquote>
11498 <para>
11499 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11500 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11501 Kennedy, who observed,
11502 </para>
11503 <blockquote>
11504 <para>
11505 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11506 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11507 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11508 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11509 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11510 </para>
11511 </blockquote>
11512 <para>
11513 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11514 student,
11515 I answered,
11516 </para>
11517 <blockquote>
11518 <para>
11519 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11520 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11521 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11522 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11523 effectively
11524 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11525 </para>
11526 </blockquote>
11527 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11528 <para>
11529 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11530 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11531 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11532 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11533 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11534 </para>
11535 <para>
11536 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11537 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11538 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11539 </para>
11540 <para>
11541 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11542 sympathetic.
11543 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11544
11545 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11546 </para>
11547 <blockquote>
11548 <para>
11549 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11550 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11551 </para>
11552 <para>
11553 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11554 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11555 domain
11556 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11557 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11558 into the Copyright Clause.
11559 </para>
11560 </blockquote>
11561 <para>
11562 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11563 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11564 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11565 </para>
11566 <blockquote>
11567 <para>
11568 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11569 unlimited
11570 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11571 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11572 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11573 an unlimited time.
11574 </para>
11575 </blockquote>
11576 <para>
11577 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11578 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11579 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11580 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11581 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11582 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11583 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause&mdash;
11584 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11585 specific
11586 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11587 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11588 </para>
11589 <para>
11590 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11591 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11592
11593 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11594 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11595 optimistic.
11596 </para>
11597 <para>
11598 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11599 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11600 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11601 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11602 believed
11603 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11604 Copyright
11605 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11606 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11607 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11608 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11609 Copyright
11610 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11611 believe
11612 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in
11613 particular, the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule
11614 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11615 </para>
11616 <para>
11617 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11618 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11619 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11620 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11621 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11622 </para>
11623 <para>
11624 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11625 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11626 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11627 </para>
11628 <para>
11629 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11630 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11631 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11632 </para>
11633 <para>
11634 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11635 distinguish
11636 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11637 argument
11638 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11639 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11640 in the Court's opinion.
11641 </para>
11642 <para>
11643
11644 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11645 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11646 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11647 generally,
11648 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11649 </para>
11650 <para>
11651 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11652 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11653 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11654 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11655 </para>
11656 <para>
11657 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11658 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11659 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11660 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11661 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11662 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11663 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11664 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11665 would not.
11666 </para>
11667 <para>
11668 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11669 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11670 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11671 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11672 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11673 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11674 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11675 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11676 the system we have.
11677 </para>
11678 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11679 <para>
11680 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11681 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11682 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11683 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11684 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11685 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11686 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11687 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11688 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11689 </para>
11690 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11691 <para>
11692 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11693 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11694 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11695 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11696 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11697 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11698 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11699 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11700 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11701 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11702 </para>
11703 <para>
11704 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11705 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11706 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11707 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11708 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11709 </para>
11710 <para>
11711 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11712 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11713 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11714 </para>
11715 <para>
11716 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11717 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11718 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11719 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11720 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11721 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11722 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11723 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11724 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11725 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11726 "originalism" now?
11727 </para>
11728 <para>
11729 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11730 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11731 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11732 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11733
11734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11735 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11736 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11737 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11738 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11739 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11740 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11741 own principles.
11742 </para>
11743 <para>
11744 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11745 myself.
11746 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11747 the law as it is.
11748 </para>
11749 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11750 <para>
11751 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11752 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11753 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11754 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11755 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11756 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11757 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11758 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11759 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11760 </para>
11761 <para>
11762 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11763 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11764 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11765 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11766 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11767 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11768 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11769 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11770 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11771 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11772 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11773 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11774 effort to persuade; but I
11775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11776 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11777 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11778 should decide the issue.
11779 </para>
11780 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11781 <para>
11782 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11783 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11784 Kathleen Sullivan?
11785 </para>
11786 <para>
11787 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11788 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11789 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11790 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11791 </para>
11792 <para>
11793 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11794 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11795 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11796 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11797 have persuaded.
11798 </para>
11799 <para>
11800 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11801 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11802 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11803 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11804 issue should not be raised until it is.
11805 </para>
11806 <para>
11807 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11808 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11809 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11810 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11811 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11812 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11813 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11814 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11815 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11816 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11817 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11818
11819 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11820 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11821 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11822 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11823 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11824 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11825 </para>
11826 <blockquote>
11827 <para>
11828 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11829 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11830 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11831 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11832 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11833 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11834 </para>
11835 </blockquote>
11836 <para>
11837 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11838 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11839 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11840 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11841 in the face felt exactly like that.
11842 </para>
11843 <para>
11844 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11845 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11846 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11847 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11848 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11849 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11850 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11851 </para>
11852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11853 </sect1>
11854 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
11855 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11856 <para>
11857 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11858 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11859 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11860 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11861 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11862 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11863 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11864 </para>
11865 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11866 <para>
11867 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11868 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11869 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11870 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11871 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11872 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11873 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11874 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11875 </para>
11876 <para>
11877 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11878 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11880 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11881 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11882 the work passed into the public domain.
11883 </para>
11884 <para>
11885 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11886 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11887 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11888 </para>
11889 <para>
11890 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11891 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11892 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11893 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11894 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11895 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11896 everything else, let the content go.
11897 </para>
11898 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11899 <para>
11900 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11901 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11902 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11903 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11904 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11905 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11906 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11907 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11908 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11909 the stupid harm of the present system.
11910 </para>
11911 <para>
11912 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11913 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11914 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11915 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11916 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11917 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11918 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11919 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11920 where copyright owners could be identified.
11921 </para>
11922 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11923 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11924 <para>
11925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11926 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
11927 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11928 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11929 <!-- f1. -->
11930 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11931 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11932 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11933 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11934 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11935 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11936 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11937 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11938 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11939 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11940 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11941 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11942 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11943 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11944 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11945 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11946 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11947 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11948 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11949 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11950 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11951 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11952 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11953 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11954 </para>
11955 <para>
11956 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11957 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11958 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11959 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11960 know what's protected and what's not.
11961 </para>
11962 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11963 <para>
11964 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11965 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11966 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11967 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11968 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11969 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11970 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11971 in the loss of widows' only income.
11972 </para>
11973 <para>
11974 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11975 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11976 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11977 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11978 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11979 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11980 </para>
11981 <para>
11982 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11983 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11984 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11985 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11986 burden
11987 imposed upon creators.
11988 </para>
11989 <para>
11990 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
11991 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11992
11993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11994 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11995 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11996 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11997 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11998 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11999 table.
12000 </para>
12001 <para>
12002 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12003 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12004 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12005 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12006 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12007 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12008 spread.
12009 </para>
12010 <para>
12011 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12012 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12013 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12014 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12015 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12016 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
12017 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12018 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12019 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12020 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12021 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12022 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12023 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12024 system of protection for property generally.
12025 </para>
12026 <para>
12027 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12028 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12029 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12030 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12031 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12032 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12033 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12034 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12035
12036 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12037 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
12038 take their place.
12039 </para>
12040 <para>
12041 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12042 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12043 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12044 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12045 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12046 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12047 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12048 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12049 </para>
12050 <para>
12051 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12052 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12053 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12054 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12055 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12056 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12057 seen before because there are no formalities.
12058 </para>
12059 <para>
12060 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12061 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12062 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12063 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12064 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12065 </para>
12066 <para>
12067 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12068 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12069 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12070 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12071 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12072 </para>
12073 <para>
12074 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12075 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12076 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12077 registration?
12078 </para>
12079 <para>
12080 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12081 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12082 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12083
12084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12085 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12086 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12087 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12088 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12089 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12090 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12091 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12092 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
12093 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12094 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12095 </para>
12096 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12097 <para>
12098 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12099 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12100 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12101 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12102 </para>
12103 <para>
12104 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12105 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12106 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12107 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12108 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12109 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12110 something good might happen here.
12111 </para>
12112 <para>
12113 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12114 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12115 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12116 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12117 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12118 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12119 </para>
12120 <para>
12121 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12122 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12123 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12124 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12125 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12126 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12127 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12128 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12129 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12130 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12131 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12132 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12133 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12134 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12135 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12136 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12137 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12138 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12139 film is a valid derivative use.
12140 </para>
12141 <para>
12142 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12143 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12144 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12145 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12146 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12147 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12148 </para>
12149 <para>
12150 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12151 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12152 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12153 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12154 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12155 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12156 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12157 threat.
12158 </para>
12159 <para>
12160 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12161 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12162 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12163 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12164 sense?
12165 </para>
12166 <para>
12167
12168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12169 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12170 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12171 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12172 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12173 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12174 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12175 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12176 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12177 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12178 </para>
12179 <para>
12180 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12181 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12182 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12183 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12184 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12185 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12186 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12187 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12188 </para>
12189 <para>
12190 What does this industry really want?
12191 </para>
12192 <para>
12193 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12194 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12195 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12196 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12197 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12198 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12199 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12200 permission first.
12201 </para>
12202 <para>
12203 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12204 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12205 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12206 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12207 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12208 </para>
12209 <para>
12210 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12211 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12212
12213 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12214 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12215 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12216 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12217 and to share its own creation.
12218 </para>
12219 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12220 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12221 <para>
12222 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12223 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12224 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12225 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12226 block the progress of others.
12227 </para>
12228 <para>
12229 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12230 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12231 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12232 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12233 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12234 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12235 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12236 </para>
12237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12238 </sect1>
12239 </chapter>
12240 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12241 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12242 <para>
12243 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12244 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12245 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12246 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12247 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12248 </para>
12249 <para>
12250 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12251 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12252 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12253 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12254 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12255 the disease almost invisible.
12256 </para>
12257 <para>
12258 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12259 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12260 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12261 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12262 population:
12263 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12264 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12265 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12266 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12267 available at
12268 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12269 release
12270 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12271 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12272 </para></footnote>
12273 </para>
12274 <para>
12275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12276 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12277 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12278 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12279 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12280 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12281 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12282 </para>
12283 <para>
12284 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12285 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12286 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12287 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12288 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12289 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12290 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12291 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12292 changes.
12293 </para>
12294 <para>
12295 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12296 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12297 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12298 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12299 costs significantly below the market price.
12300 </para>
12301 <para>
12302 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12303 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12304 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12305 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12306 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12307 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12308 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12309 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12310 <para>
12311 <!-- f2. -->
12312 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12313 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12314 </para></footnote>
12315 </para>
12316 <para>
12317 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12318 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12319 Association
12320 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12321 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12322 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12323 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12324 Prepared
12325 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12326 2000), 14, available at
12327 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12328 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12329 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12330 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12331 (statement of James Love).
12332 </para></footnote>
12333 Through the
12334 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12335 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12336 request,
12337 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12339 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12340 began
12341 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12342 government's
12343 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12344 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12345 companies,
12346 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12347 international
12348 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12349 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12350 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12351 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12352 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12353 <!-- f4. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12354 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12355 Prepared
12356 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12357 2000), 15.
12358 </para></footnote>
12359 </para>
12360 <para>
12361 We should place the intervention by the United States in context.
12362 No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans
12363 don't have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12364 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12365 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their
12366 demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12367 marginal,
12368 there was an effect from our government's intervention to stop
12369 the flow of medications into Africa.
12370 </para>
12371 <para>
12372 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12373 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12374 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12375 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12376 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12377 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12378 </para>
12379 <para>
12380 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12381 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12382 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12383 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12384 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12385 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12386 by U.S. companies.
12387 </para>
12388 <para>
12389 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12390 information,
12391 which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument
12392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12393 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12394 <!-- f5. --> See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12395 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12396 May 1999, A1, available at
12397 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink> ("compulsory licenses and gray
12398 markets
12399 pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property protection");
12400 Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
12401 Access
12402 to Essential Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999),
12403 available at
12404 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink> (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS,
12405 Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
12406 Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a
12407 Synopsis,"
12408 Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12410 </para></footnote>
12411 It was because "intellectual property"
12412 would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was
12413 a principle about the importance of "intellectual property" that led
12414 these government actors to intervene against the South African
12415 response
12416 to AIDS.
12417 </para>
12418 <para>
12419 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12420 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12421 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12422 direct
12423 cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans, and
12424 whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an idea?
12425 What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results
12426 in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so
12427 many to die for such an abstraction?
12428 </para>
12429 <para>
12430 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12431 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12432 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12433 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12434 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12435 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12436 </para>
12437 <para>
12438 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12439 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to sell their
12440 drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere.
12441 There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn't get
12442 back into the United States, but those are mere problems of
12443 technology.
12444 They could be overcome.
12445 </para>
12446 <para>
12447 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12448 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12449 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12450 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12451 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12452 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12453 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12454 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12455 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12456 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12457 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12458 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12459 idea called "intellectual property."
12460 </para>
12461 <para>
12462 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12463 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12464 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12465 What is the argument?
12466 </para>
12467 <para>
12468 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the
12469 patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly
12470 the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and
12471 strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the
12472 spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could
12473 endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block
12474 the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market
12475 prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12476 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were
12477 balanced in just this sense.
12478 </para>
12479 <para>
12480 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12481 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12482 extremism.
12483 A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our
12484 tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with consequences
12485 more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other
12486 single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12487 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much
12488 happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically
12489 do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice
12490 how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12491 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that
12492 we don't even question when the control of that property removes our
12493 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12494 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12495 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12496 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12497 this common sense open its eyes.
12498 </para>
12499 <para>
12500 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12501 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12502 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12503 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12504 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12505 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12506 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12507 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12508 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12509 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12510 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12511 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12512 </para>
12513 <para>
12514 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12515 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12516 meeting.<footnote><para>
12517 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12518 August 2003, E1, available at
12519 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12520 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12521 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12522 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12523 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12524 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12525 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12526 </para></footnote>
12527 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had
12528 decided
12529 to hold a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to
12530 create public goods." These are projects that have been successful in
12531 producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary
12532 use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the
12533 World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of
12534 protocols
12535 in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support
12536 open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science
12537 project
12538 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12539 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12540 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12541 comprised
12542 a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12543 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12544 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12545 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12546 Glaxo-SmithKline,
12547 IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included
12548 the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the
12549 early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12550 </para>
12551 <para>
12552 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12553 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12554 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12555 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12556 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12557 </para>
12558 <para>
12559 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12560 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12561 meeting.
12562 </para></footnote>
12563 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12564 noncommercial
12565 work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12566 perspectives.
12567 And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12568 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12569 property issues.
12570 </para>
12571 <para>
12572 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12573 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12574 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information
12575 Society
12576 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked
12577 what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12578 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12579 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12580 interrupted
12581 to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12582 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12583 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12584 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12585 relatively
12586 minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual
12587 property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an
12588 "Information Society" unless one also talked about the range of
12589 information
12590 and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my
12591 immoderate
12592 moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the
12593 scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of
12594 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12595 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12596 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12597 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12598 </para>
12599 <para>
12600 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual
12601 property,
12602 I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and
12603 should. And thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to
12604 create public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO
12605 agenda.
12606 </para>
12607 <para>
12608 But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial,
12609 at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source and free
12610 software."
12611 Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From
12612 its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software
12613 would be like a conference to discuss Apple's operating system. Both
12614 open source and free software compete with Microsoft's software. And
12615 internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements
12616 that they use open source or free software, rather than "proprietary
12617 software," for their own internal uses.
12618 </para>
12619 <para>
12620 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12621 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12622 noncommercial
12623 software. There are many important companies that depend
12624 fundamentally
12625 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12626 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12627 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM is
12628 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12629 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12630 support a mode of software development that is different from
12631 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12632 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12633 sophisticated.
12634 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12635 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12636 opposition
12637 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12638 license
12639 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12640 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12641 Marketplace
12642 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12643 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12644 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2002), 69,
12645 available at
12646 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12647 president,
12648 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12649 Stern School of Business (3 May 2001), available at
12650 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12651 </para></footnote>
12652 </para>
12653 <para>
12654 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12655 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12656 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12657 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12658 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12659 by
12660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12661 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12662 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12663 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12664 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12665 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12666 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12667 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12668 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12669 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12670 </para>
12671 <para>
12672 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12673 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12674 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12675 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12676 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12677 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12678 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12679 <!-- f9. -->
12680 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12681 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12682 </para></footnote>
12683 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12684 </para>
12685 <para>
12686 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12687 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12688 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12689 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12690 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12691 its lobbying efforts.
12692 </para>
12693 <para>
12694 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12695 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12696 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12697 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12698 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12699 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12700 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12701 goals of WIPO."
12702 </para>
12703 <para>
12704 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12705 </para>
12706 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12707 <para>
12708 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12709 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12710 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12711 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12712 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12713 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12714 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12715 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12716 </para>
12717 <para>
12718 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12719 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12720 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12721 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12722 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12723 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12724 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12725 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12726 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12727 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12728 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12729 </para>
12730 <para>
12731 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12732 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12733 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12734 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12735 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12736 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12737 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12738 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12739 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12740 right to decide what to do with their property.
12741 </para>
12742 <para>
12743 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12744 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12745 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12746 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12747 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12748 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12749 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12750 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12751 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12752 way possible.
12753 </para>
12754 <para>
12755 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12756 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12757 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12758 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12759 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12760 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12761 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12762 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12763 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12764 that control.
12765 </para>
12766 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12767 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12768 <para>
12769 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12770 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12771 <!-- f10. -->
12772 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
12773 </para></footnote>
12774 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12775 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12776 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12777 </para>
12778 <para>
12779 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12780 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12781 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12782 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12783 </para>
12784 <blockquote>
12785 <para>
12786 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12787 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12788 should be to promote the right balance of intellectualproperty rights,
12789 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12790 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12791 say anything wrong. But in the world
12792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12793 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12794 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12795 </para>
12796 </blockquote>
12797 <para>
12798 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12799 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12800 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12801 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12802 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12803 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12804 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12805 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12806 </para>
12807 <para>
12808 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12809 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12810 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12811 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12812 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12813 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12814 </para>
12815 <para>
12816 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12817 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12818 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12819 our own country's history).
12820 </para>
12821 <para>
12822 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12823 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12824 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12825 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12826 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12827 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12828 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12829 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12830 democracy in the world, become?
12831 </para>
12832 <para>
12833 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12834 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12835 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12836 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12837 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12838 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12839 </para>
12840 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12841 <para>
12842 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12843 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12844 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12845 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12846 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12847 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12848 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12849 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12850 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12851 hearings and a different result.
12852 </para>
12853 <para>
12854 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12855 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12856 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12857 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12858 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12859 concentration in the media.
12860 </para>
12861 <para>
12862 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12863 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12864 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12865 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12866 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12867 </para>
12868 <para>
12869 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12870 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12871 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12872 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12873 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12874 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12875 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12876 </para>
12877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12878 <para>
12879 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12880 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12881 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12882 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12883 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12884 </para>
12885 <para>
12886 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12887 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12888 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12889 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12890 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12891 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12892 </para>
12893 <para>
12894 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12895 of our tragedy.
12896 </para>
12897 <para>
12898 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12899 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12900 <!-- f11. -->
12901 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12902 2003, available at
12903 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12904 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12905 2003, available at
12906 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12907 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12908 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News, 9
12909 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12910 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12911 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12912 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
12913 available at
12914 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12915 </para></footnote>
12916 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12917 music.<footnote><para>
12918 <!-- f12. -->
12919 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12920 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12921 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12922 </para></footnote>
12923 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12924 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12925 <!-- f13. -->
12926 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12927 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12928 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12929 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12930 </para></footnote>
12931 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12932 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12933 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12934 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12935 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12936 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12937 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12938 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12939 kids who use a computer to share content.
12940 </para>
12941 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12942 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12943 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commonts</primary></indexterm>
12944 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12945 <para>
12946 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12947 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12948 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12949 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12950 24 August 2003, available at
12951 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12952 </para></footnote>
12953 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12954 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12955 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12956 country.<footnote><para>
12957 <!-- f15. -->
12958 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
12959 available at
12960 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12961 </para></footnote>
12962 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12963 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12964 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12965 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12966 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12967 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12968 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12969 day into the Causbys.
12970 </para>
12971 <para>
12972 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12973 potential is ever to be realized.
12974
12975 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12976
12977 </para>
12978 </chapter>
12979 <chapter id="c-afterword">
12980 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
12981 <para>
12982
12983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12984 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12985 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12986 maps what might be done.
12987 </para>
12988 <para>
12989 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12990 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12991 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12992 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12993 </para>
12994 <para>
12995 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12996 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12997 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
12998 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12999 is so important.
13000 </para>
13001 <para>
13002 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13003 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13004 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13005 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13006 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13007 </para>
13008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13009
13010 <sect1 id="usnow">
13011 <title>US, NOW</title>
13012 <para>
13013 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
13014 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
13015 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13016 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13017 </para>
13018 <para>
13019 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13020 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13021 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
13022 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
13023 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
13024 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
13025 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13026 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13027 </para>
13028 <para>
13029 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13030 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13031 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13032 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13033 the
13034
13035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13036 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13037 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13038 unprotected.
13039 </para>
13040 <para>
13041 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13042 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13043 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13044 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13045 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13046 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
13047 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
13048 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13049 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13050 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
13051 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
13052 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13053 </para>
13054 <para>
13055 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither "all
13056 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"&mdash;
13057 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content
13058 as they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of
13059 freedoms
13060 that we could just take for granted before.
13061 </para>
13062
13063 <sect2 id="examples">
13064 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
13065 <para>
13066 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13067 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13068 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13069 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13070 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13071 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13072 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
13073 assured.
13074 </para>
13075 <para>
13076 What made it assured?
13077 </para>
13078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13079 <para>
13080 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13081 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
13082 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13083 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13084 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13085 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13086 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13087 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13088 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13089 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13090 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13091 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13092 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13093 </para>
13094 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13095 <para>
13096 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13097 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13098 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13099 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13100 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13101 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13102 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13103 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13104 </para>
13105 <para>
13106 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13107 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13108 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13109 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13110 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13111 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13112 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13113 disappears.
13114 </para>
13115 <para>
13116 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13117 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13118 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13119 friction did.<footnote><para>
13120 <!-- f1. -->
13121
13122 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13123 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
13124 Law Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13125
13126 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13127 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13128 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13129 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13130 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13131 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13132 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13133
13134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13135 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13136 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13137 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13138 </para>
13139 <para>
13140 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13141 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13142 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13143 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13144 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13145 care much about controlling their software.
13146 </para>
13147 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13148 <para>
13149 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13150 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13151 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13152 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13153 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13154 people's work.
13155 </para>
13156 <para>
13157 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13158 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13159 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13160 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13161 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13162 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13163 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13164 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13165 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13166 anything else?
13167 </para>
13168 <para>
13169 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13170 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13171 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13172 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13173 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13174 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13175 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13176 </para>
13177 <para>
13178 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13179 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13180 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13181 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13182 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13183 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13184 fundamentally weakened.
13185 </para>
13186 <para>
13187 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13188 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13189 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13190 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13191 </para>
13192 <para>
13193 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13194 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13195 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13196 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13197 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13198 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13199 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13200 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13201 byproduct.
13202 </para>
13203 <para>
13204 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13205 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13206 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13207 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13208 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13209 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13210 </para>
13211 <para>
13212 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13213 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13214 scientific journals are produced.
13215 </para>
13216 <para>
13217 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many
13218 that printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending
13219 them to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13220 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13221 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
13222 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
13223 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
13224 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
13225 service.
13226 Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and
13227 anyone
13228 is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free
13229 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13230 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13231 Court opinion through their respective services.
13232 </para>
13233 <para>
13234 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability
13235 to charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13236 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13237 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been
13238 allowed
13239 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13240 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13241 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13242 </para>
13243 <para>
13244 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13245 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13246 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13247 </para>
13248 <para>
13249 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13250 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
13251 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to
13252 the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts
13253 because
13254 the library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand
13255 the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks by reading all
13256 available articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a
13257 function of the institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of
13258 paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it was very hard to control
13259 access to a paper journal.
13260 </para>
13261 <para>
13262 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13263 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13264 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13265 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13266 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13267 granted before.
13268 </para>
13269 <para>
13270 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13271 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13272 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13273 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13274 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13275 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13276 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13277 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13278 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13279 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13280 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13281 </para>
13282 <para>
13283 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13284 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13285 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13286 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13287 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13288 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13289 and science.
13290 </para>
13291
13292 </sect2>
13293 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13294 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13295 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13296 <primary>Creative Commonts</primary>
13297 </indexterm>
13298 <para>
13299 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13300 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13301 </para>
13302 <para>
13303 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13304 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13305 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13306 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13307 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13308 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13309 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13310 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13311 </para>
13312 <para>
13313 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13314 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13315 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13316 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13317 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13318 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13319 three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable
13320 description, and
13321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13322 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13323 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13324 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13325 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13326 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13327 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13328 certain freedoms are given.
13329 </para>
13330 <para>
13331 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13332 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13333 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13334 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13335 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13336 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13337 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13338 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13339 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13340 </para>
13341 <para>
13342 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13343 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13344 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13345 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13346 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13347 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13348 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13349 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13350 a public domain.
13351 </para>
13352 <para>
13353 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13354 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13355 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13356 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13357 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13358 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13359 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13360 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13361 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13362 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13363 </para>
13364 <para>
13365 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13366 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13367 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13368 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13369 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13370 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13371 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13372 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13373 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13374 to begin to build those rules.
13375 </para>
13376 <para>
13377 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13378 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13379 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13380 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13381 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13382 </para>
13383 <para>
13384 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13385 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13386 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13387 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13388 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13389 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13390 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13391 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13392 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13393 sales of Cory's book.
13394 </para>
13395 <para>
13396 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13397 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13398 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13399 was a total success.
13400 </para>
13401 <para>
13402 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13403 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13405 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13406 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13407 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13408 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13409 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13410 well.
13411 </para>
13412 <para>
13413 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13414 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13415 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13416 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13417 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13418 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13419 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13420 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13421 with their own art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13422 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13423 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13424 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13425 because the legal costs are so high<footnote><para>
13426 <!-- f2. -->
13427
13428 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13429 Culture Wars (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13430 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13431 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13432 </para></footnote>),
13433 these artists release into the creative environment content
13434 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13435 </para>
13436 <para>
13437 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13438 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13439 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13440 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13441 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13442 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13443 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13444 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13445 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13446 say it to others.
13447 </para>
13448 <para>
13449 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13450 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13451 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13452 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13453
13454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13455 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13456 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13457 </para>
13458 <para>
13459 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13460 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13461 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13462 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13463 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13464 steps are possible.
13465 </para>
13466 <para>
13467 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13468 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13469 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13470 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13471 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13472 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13473 creativity to spread more easily.
13474 </para>
13475 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13476
13477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13478 </sect2>
13479 </sect1>
13480 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13481 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13482 <para>
13483 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13484 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13485 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13486 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13487 changes that we need.
13488 </para>
13489 <para>
13490 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13491 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13492 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13493 to our end.
13494 </para>
13495
13496 <sect2 id="formalities">
13497 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13498 <para>
13499 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13500 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13501 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13502 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13503 </para>
13504 <para>
13505 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13506 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13507 requirements
13508 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
13509 </para>
13510 <para>
13511 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13512 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13513 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13514 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13515 </para>
13516 <para>
13517 Why?
13518 </para>
13519 <para>
13520 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13521 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13522 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13523 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13524 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13525 formalities
13526 were getting in the way.
13527 </para>
13528 <para>
13529 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13530 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13531 burdens
13532 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what,
13533 or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13534 creative
13535 work of others. There are no records, there is no system to trace&mdash;
13536 there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the
13537 massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is
13538 a necessary step for any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
13539 lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could
13540 speak.
13541 </para>
13542 <para>
13543 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13544 <!-- f1. --> The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13545 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
13546 by other countries as well.
13547 </para></footnote>&mdash;but it should
13548 not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We should
13549 require
13550 formalities, but we should establish a system that will create the
13551 incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13552 </para>
13553 <para>
13554 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13555 registering
13556 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally,
13557 the first of these three was something the copyright owner did; the
13558 second
13559 two were something the government did. But a revised system of
13560 formalities would banish the government from the process, except for
13561 the sole purpose of approving standards developed by others.
13562 </para>
13563
13564 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13565
13566 <sect3 id="registration">
13567 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13568 <para>
13569 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with
13570 the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
13571 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
13572 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the
13573 burden of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.
13574 And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of government
13575 policymaking,
13576 the office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus,
13577 when people who know something about the process hear this idea
13578 about formalities, their first reaction is panic&mdash;nothing could be worse
13579 than forcing people to deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13580 </para>
13581 <para>
13582 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a
13583 tradition
13584 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13585 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13586 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't
13587 follow that the government must actually administer the role. Instead,
13588 we should be creating incentives for private parties to serve the public,
13589 subject to standards that the government sets.
13590 </para>
13591 <para>
13592 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13593 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13594 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13595 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13596 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13597 performed
13598 by many competing registrars. That competition drives the cost
13599 of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease with which
13600 registration occurs up.
13601 </para>
13602 <para>
13603 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13604 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry,
13605 but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should
13606 establish
13607 a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
13608 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete
13609 with one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for
13610 registering
13611 and renewing copyrights. That competition would
13612 substantially
13613 lower the burden of this formality&mdash;while producing a database
13614 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13615 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13616 </para>
13617
13618 </sect3>
13619 <sect3 id="marking">
13620 <title>MARKING</title>
13621 <para>
13622 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
13623 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13624 punishment
13625 for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to imposing
13626 the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.
13627 Here again, there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be
13628 enforced in this way. And more importantly, there is no reason a
13629 marking
13630 requirement needs to be enforced uniformly across all media.
13631 </para>
13632 <para>
13633 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13634 copyrighted
13635 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also
13636 makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use
13637 the work.
13638 </para>
13639 <para>
13640 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13641 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13642 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13643 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13644 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13645 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13646 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13647 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13648 </para>
13649 <para>
13650 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13651 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13652 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13653 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13654 copyright
13655 owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13656 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13657 <!-- f2. --> There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13658 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13659 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13660 </para></footnote>
13661 The meaning of an unmarked work would
13662 therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
13663 complain,
13664 then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
13665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13666 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13667 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13668 their work.
13669 </para>
13670 <para>
13671 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13672 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13673 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13674 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13675 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13676 </para>
13677 <para>
13678 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13679 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13680 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13681 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13682 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13683 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13684 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13685 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13686 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13687 </para>
13688 <para>
13689 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13690 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13691 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13692 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13693 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13694 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13695 </para>
13696 <para>
13697 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13698 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13699 make things unclear.
13700 </para>
13701 <para>
13702 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13703 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13704 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13705 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13706 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13707 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13708 </para>
13709
13710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13711 </sect3>
13712 </sect2>
13713 <sect2 id="shortterms">
13714 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13715 <para>
13716 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13717 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13718 natural authors.
13719 </para>
13720 <para>
13721 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13722 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five years.
13723 That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost Eldred v.
13724 Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The Economist
13725 endorsed
13726 a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright term.<footnote><para>
13727 <!-- f3. --> "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15, available
13728 at
13729 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13730 </para></footnote>
13731 Others have
13732 proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13733 </para>
13734 <para>
13735 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13736 copyright's
13737 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four
13738 principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
13739 </para>
13740 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13741 <listitem><para>
13742 <!-- (1) -->
13743 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to
13744 give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very
13745 strong protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim
13746 rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13747 derivative
13748 works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13749 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an
13750 author.
13751 </para></listitem>
13752 <listitem><para>
13753 <!-- (2) -->
13754 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and
13755 protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13756 fuzziness
13757 of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13758 "expression."
13759 That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13760 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus
13761 unprotected.
13762 The value of short terms is that there is little need to
13763 build exceptions into copyright when the term itself is kept
13764 short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13765 complexities
13766 of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13767 navigate.
13768 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13769 </para></listitem>
13770 <listitem><para>
13771 <!-- (3) -->
13772 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed.
13773 Especially
13774 if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13775 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the
13776 protection continued. This need not be an onerous burden,
13777 but there is no reason this monopoly protection has to be
13778 granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13779 veteran
13780 to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
13781 <!-- f4. --> Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13782 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13783 available at
13784 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13785 </para></footnote>
13786 If we make veterans suffer that
13787 burden, I don't see why we couldn't require authors to spend
13788 ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
13789 </para></listitem>
13790 <listitem><para>
13791 <!-- (4) -->
13792 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should
13793 be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term
13794 once given should not be extended. It might have been a
13795 mistake
13796 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year
13797 term. I don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then
13798 the consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
13799 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct that
13800 mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do
13801 today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13802 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who
13803 write now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden
13804 that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
13805 increasing
13806 their reward will not increase their creativity in 1923.
13807 What's not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do
13808 about that now.
13809 </para></listitem>
13810 </orderedlist>
13811 <para>
13812 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13813 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
13814 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13815 </para>
13816 <para>
13817 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13818 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13819 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13820 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13821 </para>
13822
13823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13824
13825 </sect2>
13826 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
13827 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13828 <para>
13829 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13830 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13831 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13832 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13833 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13834 the emergence of that new technology.
13835 </para>
13836 <para>
13837 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
13838 "exclusive
13839 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13840 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that
13841 are sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
13842 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the
13843 right to release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
13844 </para>
13845 <para>
13846 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13847 expanded
13848 the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control
13849 translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13850 <!-- f5. --> Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13851 University Press, 1967), 32.
13852 </para></footnote>
13853 The courts have expanded
13854 it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This expansion has
13855 been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
13856 Benjamin
13857 Kaplan.
13858 </para>
13859 <blockquote>
13860 <para>
13861 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13862 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13863 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13864 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13865 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13866 </para></footnote>
13867 </para>
13868 </blockquote>
13869 <para>
13870 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13871 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13872 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13873 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13874 Consider each limitation in turn.
13875 </para>
13876 <para>
13877 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13878 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13879
13880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13881 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13882 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13883 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13884 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13885 after the creative work is done.
13886 </para>
13887 <para>
13888 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13889 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13890 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13891 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13892 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13893 perhaps
13894 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer
13895 makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the
13896 creative
13897 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine
13898 pouring
13899 molasses into the machines. That's what this general requirement
13900 of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13901 </para>
13902 <para>
13903 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13904 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13905 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13906 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13907 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13908 much more sense.
13909 </para>
13910 <para>
13911 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13912 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13913 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13914 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13915 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13916 <para>
13917 <!-- f7. -->
13918 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13919 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13920 </para></footnote>
13921 His view is that the law should be written so that
13922 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13923 </para>
13924 <para>
13925 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13926 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13927 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13928 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13929 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13930 </para>
13931 <para>
13932 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13934 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13935 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13936 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13937 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13938 </para>
13939 </sect2>
13940
13941 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
13942 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13943 <para>
13944 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13945 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13946 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13947 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13948 battles around the sharing of music.
13949 </para>
13950 <para>
13951 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13952 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13953 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13954 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13955 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13956 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13957 innovation on the network.
13958 </para>
13959 <para>
13960 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13961 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13962 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13963 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13964 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13965 </para>
13966 <para>
13967 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13968 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13969 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13970 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13971 </para>
13972 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
13973 <listitem><para>
13974 <!-- A. -->
13975 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13976 for purchasing CDs.
13977 </para></listitem>
13978 <listitem><para>
13979 <!-- B. -->
13980 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13981 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13982 </para></listitem>
13983 <listitem><para>
13984 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13985 <!-- C. -->
13986 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13987 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13988 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13989 </para></listitem>
13990 <listitem><para>
13991 <!-- D. -->
13992 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13993 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13994 owner plainly endorses.
13995 </para></listitem>
13996 </orderedlist>
13997 <para>
13998 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13999 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14000 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14001 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14002 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14003 significantly weakened.
14004 </para>
14005 <para>
14006 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14007 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14008 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14009 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14010 networks.
14011 </para>
14012 <para>
14013 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14014 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14015 should respond.
14016 </para>
14017 <para>
14018 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14019 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14020 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14021 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14022 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
14023 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14024 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14025 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14026 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14027 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14028 </para>
14029 <para>
14030 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14031 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14032 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14034 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14035 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14036 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14037 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14038 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14039 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
14040 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
14041 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14042 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14043 </para>
14044 <para>
14045 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
14046 that give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet
14047 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
14048 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
14049 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
14050 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
14051 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
14052 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
14053 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14054 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14055 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14056 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14057 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14058 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14059 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
14060 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
14061 <!-- f8. -->
14062 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
14063 April 2002, available at
14064 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
14065 </para></footnote>
14066
14067 </para>
14068 <para>
14069 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14070 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14071 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
14072 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14073 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14074 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14075 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14076 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14077 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14078 artists get paid, during
14079
14080 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14081 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14082 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14083 </para>
14084 <para>
14085 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14086 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14087 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14088 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14089 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14090 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14091 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14092 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14093 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14094 </para>
14095 <para>
14096 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14097 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14098 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14099 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14100 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14101 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14102 way that returns something to the artist.
14103 </para>
14104 <para>
14105 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14106 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14107 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14108 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14109 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14110 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14111 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14112 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14113 </para>
14114 <para>
14115 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14116 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14117 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14118 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14119 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14120 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14121 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14122 </para>
14123 <para>
14124
14125 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14126 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14127 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14128 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14129 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14130 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14131 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14132 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14133 trade.
14134 </para>
14135 <para>
14136 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14137 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14138 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14139 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14140 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14141 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14142 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14143 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14144 </para>
14145 <para>
14146 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14147 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14148 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14149 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14150 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14151 delivering and accessing content.
14152 </para>
14153 <para>
14154 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14155 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14156 </para>
14157 <para>
14158 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14159 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14160 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14161 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14162 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14163 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14164 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14165 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14166 </para>
14167 <para>
14168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14169 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14170 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14171 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14172 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14173 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14174 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14175 </para>
14176 <para>
14177 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14178 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14179 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14180 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14181 <para>
14182 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14183 10 October 2000), available at
14184 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14185 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14186 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
14187 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14188 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14189 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14190 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14191 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14192 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14193 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14194 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14195 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14196 available at
14197 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14198 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14199 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14200 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14201 2002, available at
14202 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14203 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14204 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14205 McCullagh,
14206 "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14207 2002, available at
14208 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14209 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14210 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14211 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14212 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14213 debate
14214 by about a decade. See
14215 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14216 </para></footnote>
14217 Fisher suggests a
14218 very clever way around the current impasse of the Internet. Under his
14219 plan, all content capable of digital transmission would (1) be marked
14220 with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to evade
14221 these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once the
14222 content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to
14223 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the
14224 basis
14225 of those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The
14226 compensation
14227 would be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
14228 </para>
14229 <para>
14230 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14231 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14232 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14233 simple:
14234 Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14235 system.
14236 I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of the
14237 proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
14238 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14239 facilitating
14240 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal
14241 after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free
14242 exchange
14243 of content, supported through a taxation system, then it can be
14244 continued. If this form of protection is no longer necessary, then the
14245 system could lapse into the old system of controlling access.
14246 </para>
14247 <para>
14248 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His
14249 aim is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the
14250 system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But
14251 the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes
14252 I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the limits on derivative
14253
14254 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14255 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14256 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14257 allowed
14258 to do with the content itself.
14259 </para>
14260 <para>
14261 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14262 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14263 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14264 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14265 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14266 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14267 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14268 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14269 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14270 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14271 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14272 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14273 on-line.
14274 </para>
14275 <para>
14276 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14277 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14278 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14279 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14280 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14281 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14282 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14283 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14284 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14285 finding ways to compete with "free."
14286 </para>
14287 <para>
14288 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14289 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14290 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14291 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14292 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14293 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14294 the law.
14295 </para>
14296 <para>
14297 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14298 </para>
14299 <para>
14300
14301 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14302 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14303 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14304 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14305 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14306 create.
14307 </para>
14308 <para>
14309 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14310 by
14311 </para>
14312 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14313 <listitem><para>
14314 <!-- 1. -->
14315 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14316 </para></listitem>
14317 <listitem><para>
14318 <!-- 2. -->
14319 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14320 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14321 statute;
14322 </para></listitem>
14323 <listitem><para>
14324 <!-- 3. -->
14325 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14326 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14327 </para></listitem>
14328 </orderedlist>
14329 <para>
14330 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a
14331 competitive
14332 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14333 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14334 something then?
14335 </para>
14336 <para>
14337 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14338 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But
14339 the real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract.
14340 The real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14341 technology
14342 that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x, or
14343 (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14344 market
14345 of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14346 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14347 authorized
14348 sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14349 compensation
14350 without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then it
14351 may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty pirates.
14352 </para>
14353 <para>
14354 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14355 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not be
14356 on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14357
14358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14359 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting the
14360 space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14361 </para>
14362 </sect2>
14363
14364 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14365 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14366 <para>
14367 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14368 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14369 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14370 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14371 </para>
14372 <para>
14373 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14374 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it is
14375 my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client. And
14376 in a world where the rich clients have one strong view, the
14377 unwillingness
14378 of the profession to question or counter that one strong view queers
14379 the law.
14380 </para>
14381 <para>
14382 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14383 "radical"
14384 by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14385 advocating
14386 are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate and
14387 significant figures in the history of this branch of the law. Many, for
14388 example,
14389 thought crazy the challenge that we brought to the Copyright
14390 Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the dominant scholar
14391 and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville Nimmer, thought it
14392 obvious.<footnote><para>
14393 <!-- f10. --> Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14394 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14395 </para></footnote>
14396
14397 </para>
14398 <para>
14399 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14400 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14401 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14402 </para>
14403 <para>
14404 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and
14405 benefits.
14406 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the
14407 legal system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction
14408 costs of the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14409 <!-- f11. --> A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is to
14410 be commended for his careful review of data about infringement, leading
14411 him to question his own publicly stated position&mdash;twice. He initially
14412 predicted
14413 that downloading would substantially harm the industry. He then
14414 revised his view in light of the data, and he has since revised his view again.
14415 Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True
14416 Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002),
14417 (reviewing his original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J.
14418 Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper,
14419 June 2003, available at
14420 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14421 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14422 effect
14423 of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he underestimates the
14424 costs of the legal system. See, for example, Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14425 </para></footnote>
14426 They see a system that has been
14427 around for hundreds of years, and they assume it works the way their
14428 elementary school civics class taught them it works.
14429 </para>
14430 <para>
14431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14432 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't
14433 work for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14434 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal level, at
14435 least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of our legal
14436 system
14437 are so astonishingly high that justice can practically never be done.
14438 </para>
14439 <para>
14440 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14441 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14442 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14443 obscure
14444 strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality: very
14445 little.
14446 The law depended upon the careful articulation and development
14447 of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development of legal
14448 doctrine
14449 depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work costs too much,
14450 except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14451 </para>
14452 <para>
14453 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14454 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14455 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14456 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14457 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14458 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14459 </para>
14460 <para>
14461 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the
14462 law away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is
14463 precisely
14464 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left
14465 to its review.
14466 </para>
14467 <para>
14468 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with
14469 digital technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or
14470 think about the amazing things your community could facilitate with
14471 digital technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change
14472 something.
14473 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold
14474 molasses poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that
14475 requires
14476 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's
14477 Russia.
14478 </para>
14479 <para>
14480 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14481 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14482
14483 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14484 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14485 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14486 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14487 </para>
14488 <para>
14489 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14490 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14491 keep your lawyers away.
14492 </para>
14493 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14494 </sect2>
14495 </sect1>
14496 </chapter>
14497 <chapter id="c-notes">
14498 <title>NOTES</title>
14499 <para>
14500 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14501 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14502 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14503 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14504 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14505 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14506 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14507 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14508 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14509 the material.
14510 </para>
14511 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14512
14513 </chapter>
14514 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14515 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14516 <para>
14517 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14518 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14519 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14520 to him that this book is dedicated.
14521 </para>
14522 <para>
14523 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14524 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14525 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14526 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14527 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14528 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14529 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14530 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14531 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14532 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14533 critical eye on much of this.
14534 </para>
14535 <para>
14536 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14537 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14538 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14539 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14540 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14541 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14542 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14543 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14544 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14545 </para>
14546 <para>
14547 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14548 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14549 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14550 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14551 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14552 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14553 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14554 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14555 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14556 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14557 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14558 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14559 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14560 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14561 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14562 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14563 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14564 a bunch of great replies.)
14565 </para>
14566 <para>
14567 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14568 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14569 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14570 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14571 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14572 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14573 throughout this book.
14574 </para>
14575 <para>
14576 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14577 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14578 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14579 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14580 </para>
14581 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14582
14583 </chapter>
14584 </book>