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19 <book id=
"index" lang=
"en">
21 <title>Free Culture
</title>
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
25 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
26 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
</subtitle>
28 <pubdate>2004-
03-
25</pubdate>
30 <releaseinfo>Version
2004-
02-
10</releaseinfo>
34 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
35 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
41 <holder>Lawrence Lessig
</holder>
46 This version of Free Culture is licensed under a Creative Commons
47 license. This license permits non-commercial use of this work, so long
48 as attribution is given. For more information about the license,
49 click the icon above, or visit
50 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
55 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
58 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
59 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
60 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
61 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
62 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
63 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
64 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
65 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
66 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
67 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
68 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz
25," and named one of Scientific
69 American's "
50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
70 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
71 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
81 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
83 <itemizedlist mark=
"number" spacing=
"compact">
84 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
85 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B
&N
</ulink></para></listitem>
86 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin
</ulink></para></listitem>
87 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
93 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
96 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
99 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
104 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
107 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
113 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
114 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
115 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
122 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
124 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
128 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
131 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
132 The New York Times, January
16,
2003. Copyright
© 2003 by The New
133 York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
136 Cartoon in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
137 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
140 Diagram in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
141 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
144 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
148 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
149 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
158 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
161 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
164 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
170 343.7309'
9—dc22
173 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
176 Printed in the United States of America
182 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
190 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
191 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
192 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
193 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
194 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
195 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
196 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
197 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
198 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
199 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
200 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
204 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
207 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
212 <figure id=
"CreativeCommons">
213 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</title>
214 <graphic fileref=
"images/cc.png"></graphic>
222 <title>List of figures
</title>
229 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
230 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
231 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
232 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
237 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
241 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
242 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
243 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
244 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
245 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
246 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
250 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
251 2 Architecture and Law: Force
252 2 Market: Concentration
255 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
256 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
257 2 Constraining Creators
258 2 Constraining Innovators
259 2 Corrupting Citizens
261 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
262 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
266 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
267 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
269 2 1. More Formalities
270 3 Registration and Renewal
273 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
274 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
275 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
281 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
283 <preface id=
"preface">
284 <title>PREFACE
</title>
285 <indexterm id=
"idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'
>
286 <primary>Pogue, David
</primary>
289 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
290 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
291 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
295 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
296 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
297 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
298 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
299 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times,
30 January
2000.
304 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
305 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
306 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
307 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
308 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
309 any troubles that exist in
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> space wouldn't
313 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
314 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
315 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
317 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
318 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
319 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
321 <indexterm startref=
"idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'
/>
323 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
324 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
325 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
326 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
329 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
330 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"
—not
331 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
332 free software movement
<footnote>
334 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies
57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
335 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets,"
336 "free trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A
337 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
338 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
339 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
340 follow-on creators and innovators remain
<emphasis>as free as
341 possible
</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
342 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
343 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
344 "permission culture"
—a culture in which creators get to create
345 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
349 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
350 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
351 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
352 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
353 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
354 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
355 culture deem fundamental.
357 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
359 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
360 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
361 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
362 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
363 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
364 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
365 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
366 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
368 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
372 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
373 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
374 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
375 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
376 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
377 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times,
22 May
2003.
378 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
383 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
384 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
385 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
386 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
387 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
388 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
389 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
390 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
391 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
392 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
393 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
394 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
395 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
396 that this work is "merely" derivative.
399 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
400 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
401 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
402 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
403 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
404 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
405 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
406 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
408 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
409 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
410 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
411 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
412 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
413 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
417 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
418 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
419 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
420 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
421 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
422 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
423 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
431 <chapter id=
"c-introduction">
432 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
434 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
435 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
436 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
437 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
438 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
439 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
442 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
443 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
444 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
445 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."
<footnote><para>
446 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries
3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
447 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
450 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
451 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
452 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
455 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
456 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
457 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
458 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
459 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
460 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
461 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
463 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
464 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
466 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
467 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
468 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
469 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
470 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
471 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
472 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
473 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
474 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
476 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
477 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
479 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
480 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
481 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
482 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
483 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
484 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
485 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
486 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
490 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
491 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
492 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
493 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
494 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
495 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
496 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
497 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
499 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
500 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
501 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
502 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
503 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
504 Authorship," Stanford Law Review
48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
505 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
507 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
508 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
513 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
516 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
517 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
518 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
519 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
520 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
521 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
522 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
523 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
524 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
526 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
527 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
529 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
530 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
531 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
532 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
533 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
534 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
535 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
536 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
537 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
538 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
539 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
540 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
541 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
542 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else
—the power of
543 "common sense"
—would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
544 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
547 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
548 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
549 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
550 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
551 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
552 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
553 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
554 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
555 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
556 understanding of radio.
557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
558 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham
</primary></indexterm>
559 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
560 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
563 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
564 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
565 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
566 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
567 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
568 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
569 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
570 much less transmitter power and static.
573 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
574 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
575 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
576 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
577 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
578 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
579 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
580 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
581 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
584 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
588 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
589 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
590 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
591 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
592 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
593 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
594 box."
<footnote><para>
595 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
596 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
601 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
602 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
603 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
604 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
605 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
606 a handful of networks.
607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
610 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
611 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
612 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
613 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
614 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
615 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
619 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
620 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
621 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
622 RCA.
<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
623 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
624 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
626 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
631 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
632 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
633 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
635 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
639 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
640 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
641 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
642 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
643 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
644 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
649 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
650 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
651 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
652 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
653 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
654 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
655 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
656 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
657 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
658 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
659 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
661 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
664 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
665 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
666 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
667 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
672 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
674 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
675 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
676 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
677 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
678 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
679 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
680 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
684 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
685 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
686 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
687 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
688 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
689 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
690 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
691 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
692 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
693 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
696 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
697 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
698 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
699 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
700 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
701 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
702 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
703 course always public spirited; the reality is something
704 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
705 to themselves, would crumble in
706 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
707 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
708 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
709 effect of technological change.
712 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
713 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
714 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
715 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
716 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
717 before.
<footnote><para>
718 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
719 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
720 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
721 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
723 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
727 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
728 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
729 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
730 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
731 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
732 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
733 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
734 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
735 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
738 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
739 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
740 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
741 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
742 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
743 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
747 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
748 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
749 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
750 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
751 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
754 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
755 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
756 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
759 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
760 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
761 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
762 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
763 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
764 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
765 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
766 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
767 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
770 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
771 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
772 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
773 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
774 marketplace.
<footnote>
776 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
777 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
778 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
779 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
780 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
781 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
782 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
784 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
786 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
787 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
788 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
789 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
792 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
793 been erased.
<footnote><para>
794 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
797 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
798 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
799 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
800 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
801 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
802 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
803 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
804 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
805 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
806 culture, more and more a permission culture.
808 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
810 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
811 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
812 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
813 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
814 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
815 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
816 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
817 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
818 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
819 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
823 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
824 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
825 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
826 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
827 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
828 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
829 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
830 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
831 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
832 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
833 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
834 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
835 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
836 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
837 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
838 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
839 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
842 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
843 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
844 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
845 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
846 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
847 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
851 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
853 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
854 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether "piracy" will
855 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
856 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
857 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
858 calls his "own terrorist war"
<footnote><para>
859 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
860 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
861 Times,
17 January
2002.
862 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
863 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
864 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
868 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
869 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
870 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
871 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
872 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
876 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
877 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
878 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
879 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
882 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
883 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
884 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
885 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
886 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
888 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
889 Journal
106 (
1996):
283.
890 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
892 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
893 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
894 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
895 could cultivate and extend our culture.
898 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
899 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
900 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
901 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
902 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
903 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
904 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
905 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
906 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
908 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
910 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
911 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
912 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
913 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
914 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
918 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
919 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
920 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
921 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
922 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
923 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
924 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
926 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
927 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
929 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
930 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
931 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
932 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
933 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
934 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
935 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
936 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
937 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
938 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
939 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
940 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
943 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
944 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
946 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
947 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
948 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
949 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
951 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
952 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
956 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
957 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
958 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
959 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
960 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
961 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
962 <emphasis>uses
</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
963 accepted as it is now.
966 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
967 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
968 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
969 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
972 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
973 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
976 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
977 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
978 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
979 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
980 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
983 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
984 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
985 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
986 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
989 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
990 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
992 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
993 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
994 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
995 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
996 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
997 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
998 this silliness will be much more profound.
999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1002 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1003 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1007 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1008 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1009 obscure French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird
1010 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1011 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1012 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1015 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1016 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1017 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1018 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1019 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1020 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1021 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1022 law
—and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1023 fundamental about who we have always been.
1026 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1027 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1028 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1029 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1030 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1031 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1035 <chapter id=
"c-piracy">
1036 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1039 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'
>
1040 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
1043 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1044 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1045 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1046 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1047 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1051 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1052 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1053 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1055 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1058 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'
/>
1061 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1062 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1063 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1064 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1065 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1066 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1070 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1071 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1072 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1073 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1074 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1078 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1079 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1080 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1081 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1082 never mind body piercing
—our kids are becoming thieves!
1085 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1086 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1087 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1088 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1091 The idea goes something like this:
1095 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1096 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1097 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1098 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1099 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1103 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1105 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1106 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1107 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1109 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1110 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review
65 (
1990):
397.
1112 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1113 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1114 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1115 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1117 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1118 Up," Wall Street Journal,
21 August
1996, available at
1119 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1120 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1121 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe,
24 November
2002.
1122 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
1124 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1125 "right"
—even against the Girl Scouts.
1127 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1129 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1130 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1132 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1133 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1134 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1137 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1138 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1139 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1140 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1141 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1144 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1145 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1146 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1147 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1148 copyright law today regulates both.
1151 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1152 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1153 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1154 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1155 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1156 more expense of doing business.
1158 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1160 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1161 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1162 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1163 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1164 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1165 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1166 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1167 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1168 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1169 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1170 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1171 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1172 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1173 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1174 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1176 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."
<footnote>
1179 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books,
2002),
1180 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1181 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1182 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1183 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1184 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1185 enabled are much more tenuous.
1186 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1188 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1189 this creative class.
1192 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1193 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1194 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1198 <sect1 id=
"creators">
1199 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1201 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1202 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1203 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1204 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1205 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1208 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1209 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1210 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1211 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1212 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1213 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1217 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1218 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1219 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1220 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1221 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1224 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1225 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1226 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1227 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1228 synchronization was pretty close.
1231 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1232 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1233 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1234 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1235 it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1237 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1238 Cartoons (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1243 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1244 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1245 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1246 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1249 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1250 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1251 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1252 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1253 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1254 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1255 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1258 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also
1259 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1260 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1261 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1264 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of
1265 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1266 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1267 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1268 The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular and among the best of its
1272 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1274 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1275 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1277 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1278 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1279 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1280 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1281 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No.
1"
1282 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1283 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1284 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1286 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1287 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1288 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1289 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1290 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1294 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1295 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1296 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1298 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1299 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1300 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1302 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1303 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1304 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1305 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1306 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1307 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1308 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1309 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1313 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1314 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1315 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1316 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1317 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1318 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1319 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1322 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1323 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1324 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1325 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1326 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1327 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1328 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (
1937),
1329 Fantasia (
1940), Pinocchio (
1940), Dumbo (
1941), Bambi (
1942), Song of
1330 the South (
1946), Cinderella (
1950), Alice in Wonderland (
1951), Robin
1331 Hood (
1952), Peter Pan (
1953), Lady and the Tramp
1332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1333 (
1955), Mulan (
1998), Sleeping Beauty (
1959),
101 Dalmatians (
1961),
1334 The Sword in the Stone (
1963), and The Jungle Book (
1967)
—not to
1335 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1336 Treasure Planet (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1337 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1338 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1339 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1342 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1343 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1344 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1345 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1346 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1347 creativity"
—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1348 culture around us and makes it something different.
1350 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1351 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1352 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1353 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1354 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1356 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1357 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1359 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1360 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1361 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1363 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1364 Web site associated with this book, available at
1365 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1367 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1368 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1369 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1370 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1373 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1374 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1375 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1376 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1377 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1378 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1379 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1382 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1383 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1384 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1385 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1387 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1388 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1389 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1390 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1391 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1392 content from before the Great Depression.
1395 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1396 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1397 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1401 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1402 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1403 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1404 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1405 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1406 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1407 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1410 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1411 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1412 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1413 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1414 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1415 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1416 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1417 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1418 interestingly different way.
1421 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1422 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1423 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1426 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1427 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1428 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1429 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1431 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1432 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1433 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1434 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1435 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1436 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1437 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1440 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1441 huge. More than
33,
000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1442 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1443 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1444 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1445 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1446 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1447 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1448 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1451 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1452 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1453 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1454 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1455 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1456 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1457 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1458 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1459 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1460 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1461 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1462 original copyright owner's permission.
1464 <indexterm id=
"idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'
>
1465 <primary>Winick, Judd
</primary>
1468 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1469 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1470 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1471 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1472 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1474 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1475 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1476 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1478 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1479 York: Perennial,
2000).
1483 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1484 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1485 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1486 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1487 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1488 which are fifty years old."
1490 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'
/>
1492 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1493 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1494 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1495 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1496 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1497 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1498 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1500 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1501 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1502 Review
55 (
2002):
155,
182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1503 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1504 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1505 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1506 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1507 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1511 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1512 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1513 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1514 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1515 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1516 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1517 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1518 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1522 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1523 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1524 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1525 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1526 to prosecute cases like this."
1529 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1530 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1531 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1532 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1533 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1534 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1535 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1536 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1537 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1538 their clients or hurt them?
1539 Let's pause for a moment.
1542 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1543 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1544 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1547 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1548 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1549 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1550 "intellectual property."
<footnote><para>
1552 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See
1553 Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
11 (New York: New York
1554 University Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas
1555 (New York: Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately
1556 describes a set of "property" rights
—copyright, patents,
1557 trademark, and trade-secret
—but the nature of those rights is
1559 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
1561 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1562 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1566 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1567 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1568 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1569 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1570 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1571 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1572 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1573 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1574 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1575 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1576 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1577 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1581 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1582 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1583 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1586 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1590 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1591 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1592 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1593 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1594 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1595 form, whether large or small.
1598 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1599 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1600 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1601 particular find it hard to say why.
1604 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1605 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1606 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1607 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1608 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1609 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1610 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1611 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1612 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1613 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1614 movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s; two volcano disaster
1618 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1619 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1620 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1621 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1622 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1623 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1624 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1625 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1626 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1629 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1630 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1631 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1632 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1633 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1634 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1635 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1636 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1637 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1640 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1641 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1642 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1647 <sect1 id=
"mere-copyists">
1648 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
</title>
1649 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1651 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1652 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1653 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1654 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1655 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1656 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1657 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1660 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1661 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1662 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1663 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1664 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1665 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1666 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1667 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1670 <indexterm id=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'
>
1671 <primary>Eastman, George
</primary>
1674 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1675 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1677 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1678 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1679 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1680 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1681 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1682 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1683 population of photographers.
1686 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1687 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1688 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1689 do the rest."
<footnote><para>
1691 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1692 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1696 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1697 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1698 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1699 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1700 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1701 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1702 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1703 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1704 chemicals.
<footnote>
1707 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1709 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1714 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1715 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1716 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1717 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1718 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1719 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1720 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1721 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1722 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1723 percent.
<footnote><para>
1726 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1727 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1729 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1732 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1735 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1736 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1737 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1738 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1739 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1740 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1741 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1742 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1743 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1744 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1745 interpretation or bias."
<footnote><para>
1751 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1752 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1753 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1754 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1755 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1756 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1757 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1758 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1759 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1760 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1764 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1765 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1766 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1767 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1768 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1769 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1770 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1771 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1773 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co.,
50 S.E.
1777 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1778 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1779 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1780 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1781 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1784 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1785 that they thought valuable.
1787 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1789 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1790 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1791 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1792 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1793 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1796 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1797 Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193.
1798 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1799 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1800 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1801 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1802 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1803 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1806 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1807 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1808 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1809 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1810 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1811 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1812 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1813 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1814 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1816 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1817 Problems
19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1818 Review
48 (
1960)
398–407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1819 Inc.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1824 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1825 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1826 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1827 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1828 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1829 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1830 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1831 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1832 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1833 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1834 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1835 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1836 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1841 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1842 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1843 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1844 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1845 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1846 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1847 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1848 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1849 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1850 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1851 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1852 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1853 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1854 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1855 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1856 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1857 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1858 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1859 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1860 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1861 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1862 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1865 <indexterm startref=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'
/>
1867 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1868 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1869 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1870 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1871 professional quality for $
595."
<footnote><para>
1873 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1874 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1875 cadalyst, February
2002, available at
1876 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1878 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1879 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1880 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1881 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1885 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1886 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1887 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1888 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1889 the way people access it."
1890 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave
</primary></indexterm>
1893 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1894 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1895 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1899 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1900 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1901 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
1903 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1904 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1905 Study," Denver Post,
25 May
1997, B6.
1907 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1908 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
1909 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
1910 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
1911 (at least at first) terrible media.
1914 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1915 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
1916 has written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult
1917 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
1918 language to be understandable
—few of us have any real sense of
1919 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
1920 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
1921 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
1924 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1925 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1926 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1927 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1928 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1929 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1931 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
1933 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1934 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1935 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1937 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1938 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1939 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1943 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
1945 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
1946 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
1948 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1949 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1950 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1951 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1952 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1953 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1954 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1955 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
1957 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4
1958 November
2000, available at
1959 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>; "Timeline,"
22 November
2000,
1961 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
1964 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
1966 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1967 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1968 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1969 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1970 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1973 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
1974 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
1975 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1976 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1980 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1981 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1982 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1983 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1988 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1989 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1993 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
1994 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1995 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
1996 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
1998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1999 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2000 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2004 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2005 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2006 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2007 language of the twenty-first century."
<footnote><para>
2012 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2014 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2015 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2016 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2017 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2018 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2019 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2020 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2021 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2022 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2023 students know something about
—gun violence.
2026 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2027 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2028 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2029 away. The "kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,"
2030 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2031 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2034 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2035 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2036 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2037 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2038 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2039 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2040 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2041 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2042 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2043 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2044 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2045 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2046 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2047 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2048 to this form of expression.
2052 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2053 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2054 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2055 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2056 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2057 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2058 part
—and increasingly, not the most powerful part
—of
2059 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2064 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2065 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2066 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2067 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2068 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2069 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2070 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2071 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2072 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2073 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2074 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2075 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2076 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2077 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2078 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2079 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2080 about the topic. . . .
2083 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2084 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2085 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2086 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2087 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2090 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2091 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2092 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2093 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2094 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2095 had a lot of power with this language."
2099 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2100 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2101 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2102 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2103 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2104 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2105 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2106 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2107 world would be watching.
2110 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2111 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2112 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2113 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2114 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2115 entertainment is tragedy.
2117 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2118 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2120 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2121 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2122 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2123 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2124 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2125 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2126 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2127 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2128 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2129 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2130 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2131 was also the Internet.
2134 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2135 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2136 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2137 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2140 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2144 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2145 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2146 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2147 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2148 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2149 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2150 spread practically instantaneously.
2153 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2154 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2155 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2156 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2157 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2158 records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2159 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2162 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2163 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2164 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2165 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2166 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2167 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2168 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2169 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2170 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2171 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2172 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2173 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2176 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2177 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2178 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2179 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2180 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2183 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2184 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2187 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2188 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2189 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2190 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2191 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2192 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2193 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2194 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2195 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2196 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2197 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2198 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2199 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2200 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2202 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk.
1, trans.
2203 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2207 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2208 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2209 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2211 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2212 Political Philosophy
10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2214 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2215 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2216 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2219 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2220 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2221 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2222 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2223 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2224 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2226 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2227 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2228 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2229 little beyond what our friends say.
2232 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2233 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2234 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2235 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2236 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2238 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2239 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2243 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2244 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2245 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2246 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2247 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2248 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2251 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2252 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential race
2253 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2254 is having an effect.
2255 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard
</primary></indexterm>
2258 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2259 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2260 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2261 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2262 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2263 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2264 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2265 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2266 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2267 resign as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2269 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2270 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2272 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent
</primary></indexterm>
2275 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2276 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2277 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2278 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2282 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2283 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2284 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2285 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2286 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2287 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2288 peer-generated rankings.
2290 <indexterm id=
"idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'
>
2291 <primary>Winer, Dave
</primary>
2294 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2295 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2296 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2297 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2298 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2299 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2300 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2301 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2302 get it out of the way."
2304 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2306 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2307 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2308 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2309 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2310 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2312 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2314 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2315 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2316 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2317 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2318 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2319 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2320 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2322 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2323 debate
—"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2324 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2325 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2326 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2327 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2328 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2330 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2331 Information Online," New York Times,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2332 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2333 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2334 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2336 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2337 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2338 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2339 out of it"
—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2342 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2343 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2344 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2345 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this
—some journalists
2346 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2349 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2350 York Times,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2351 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2352 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2353 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2354 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2355 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2356 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2357 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2359 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2362 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2363 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2364 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2365 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2366 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2369 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2370 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2371 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2372 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2373 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2374 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2375 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2376 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2377 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2378 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2379 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2380 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2381 extraordinary to report.
2383 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'
/>
2384 <indexterm id=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'
>
2385 <primary>Brown, John Seely
</primary>
2388 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2389 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2390 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2393 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2394 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2395 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2396 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2400 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2401 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2402 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2403 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2404 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2405 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2406 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2407 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2408 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2409 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2410 the tinkering of many others.
2413 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2414 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2415 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2416 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2417 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2420 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2421 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2422 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2423 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2424 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2425 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2428 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2429 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2430 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2431 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2432 platform. . . . You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2433 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2437 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2438 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2439 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2440 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2441 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2442 text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2443 you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a
2444 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2445 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2447 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2449 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2450 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2452 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2453 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2454 kind of recognition.
2457 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2458 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2459 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2460 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2461 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2462 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2463 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2466 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2467 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2468 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2469 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2470 general.
<footnote><para>
2472 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2473 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2474 of the Association for Computer Machinery
43 (
2000):
9.
2476 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2477 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2480 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2481 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2485 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2486 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2487 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2488 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2489 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2491 <indexterm startref=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'
/>
2493 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2494 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2495 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2496 the law to close down that technology.
2499 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2500 chapter
9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2502 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2504 <sect1 id=
"catalogs">
2505 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2507 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2508 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2509 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2510 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2511 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2514 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2515 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2516 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2517 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2518 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2519 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2522 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2523 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2524 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2525 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2526 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2529 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2531 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2532 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2533 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2534 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2535 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2536 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2537 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2538 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2541 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2542 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2543 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2544 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2545 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2546 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2547 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2550 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2551 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2552 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2553 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2554 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2555 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2556 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2557 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2558 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2562 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2563 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2564 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2565 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2566 be on users' computers.
2569 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2570 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2571 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2572 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2574 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2578 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2579 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2580 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2581 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2582 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2583 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2584 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2585 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2586 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2587 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2588 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2589 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2593 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2594 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2595 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2596 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2597 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2598 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2599 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2602 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2603 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2604 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2605 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2606 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2607 easier to use"
—again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2608 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2609 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2610 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2611 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2614 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2615 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2616 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2617 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2618 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2619 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2620 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2621 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2622 Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2625 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2626 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2627 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2628 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2629 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2630 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2631 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100 billion
—six
2632 times the total profit of the film industry in
2001.
<footnote><para>
2634 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2635 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC
6
2636 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2640 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2641 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2642 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2643 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2644 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2647 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2648 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2649 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2650 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2651 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2652 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2653 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2654 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2655 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2658 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2659 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2660 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2661 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2662 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2664 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2665 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2668 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2669 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2672 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2673 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2674 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2675 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2676 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2677 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2678 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2680 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2681 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2682 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (
2000).
2684 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2685 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2686 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2688 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2689 Wall Street Journal,
10 September
2003, A24.
2693 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2694 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2695 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2700 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2701 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2702 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2703 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2707 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2708 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2709 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2710 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2711 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2713 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2715 <sect1 id=
"pirates">
2716 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
</title>
2718 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2719 their permission
—if "if value, then right" is true
—then the history of
2720 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2721 "big media" today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2722 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2723 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2728 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2730 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2731 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
87–93,
2732 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2733 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
2735 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2736 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2737 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2738 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2739 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2740 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2741 this creative property
2742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2743 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2746 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2750 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2751 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2752 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2753 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2754 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2755 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2756 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2759 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2760 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2761 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2762 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2763 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2764 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2765 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2766 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2767 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2768 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2770 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2771 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2772 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2773 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2774 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2775 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2776 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2777 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2778 the Propertization of Copyright" (September
2002), University of
2779 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2780 Working Paper No.
159.
</para></footnote>
2781 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
2782 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
2786 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2787 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2788 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2789 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2790 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."
<footnote><para>
2792 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2793 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2795 That led the independents to flee the East
2796 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2797 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2798 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2802 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2803 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2804 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2807 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2808 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2809 Edison's creative property.
2812 <sect2 id=
"recordedmusic">
2813 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2815 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2816 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2819 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2820 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2821 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2822 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2823 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2824 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2825 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2826 right to perform it publicly.
2828 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2830 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2831 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2832 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2833 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2834 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2835 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2836 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2837 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2838 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2839 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2840 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2841 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2842 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2843 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2844 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2845 its composer anything.
2848 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2849 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2850 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2855 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2856 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2857 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2858 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2859 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2860 rights.
<footnote><para>
2862 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2863 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2864 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2865 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2866 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2867 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2872 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2873 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2874 genius of American composers,"
<footnote><para>
2876 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2877 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2879 and the "music publishing industry"
2880 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."
<footnote><para>
2882 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2883 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2886 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2887 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."
<footnote><para>
2889 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
2890 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2894 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2895 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2896 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2897 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2898 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2899 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
2902 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
2903 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2904 Perforating Company of New York).
2905 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
2906 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
2907 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2908 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
2909 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
2910 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
2911 statute."
<footnote><para>
2913 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
2914 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2915 Graphophone Company Association).
2919 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and the
2920 recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that composers
2921 would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their music. But
2922 rather than simply granting the composer complete control over the
2923 right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave recording
2924 artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress, once
2925 the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2927 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2928 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2929 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2930 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2933 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2934 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
2935 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
2936 Copyright Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
2937 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
2938 the fee set by the statute.
2941 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2942 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2943 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2944 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2945 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2946 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2948 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
2951 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2952 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a
2953 kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a weaker right than
2954 it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control
2955 over their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of
2956 this less control are the recording industry and the public. The
2957 recording industry gets something of value for less than it otherwise
2958 would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range of musical
2959 creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its reasons for
2960 granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of rights
2961 holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2962 creativity.
<footnote><para>
2964 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
2965 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
2966 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2967 in Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2968 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2970 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2973 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2974 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2975 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2980 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2982 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2983 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2984 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
2985 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
2986 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
2987 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
2988 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before
1909 and
2989 the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
2990 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
2991 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
2992 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
2993 choice.
<footnote><para>
2995 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
2996 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
2997 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
2998 this report.
</para></footnote>
3002 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3003 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3007 <title>Radio
</title>
3009 Radio was also born of piracy.
3012 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3013 "public performance" of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3015 See
17 United States Code, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3016 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3017 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3018 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3019 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3020 station. See RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3021 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3022 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3023 Copyright," University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
281.
3024 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3025 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3027 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3028 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3029 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3032 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3033 copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3034 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3035 Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite
3036 another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The
3037 recording artist is adding to the value of the composition performed
3038 on the radio station. And if the law were perfectly consistent, the
3039 radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work,
3040 just as it pays the composer of the music for his work.
3041 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
3043 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3046 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3047 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3048 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3049 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3050 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3051 of playing the song.
3053 <indexterm id=
"idxmadonna" class='startofrange'
>
3054 <primary>Madonna
</primary>
3057 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3058 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3059 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3060 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3063 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3064 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3065 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3066 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3067 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3068 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3069 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3071 <indexterm startref=
"idxmadonna" class='endofrange'
/>
3073 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3074 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3075 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3076 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3077 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3078 to take something for nothing.
3081 <sect2 id=
"cabletv">
3082 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3085 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3088 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3089 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3090 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3091 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3093 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3094 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3095 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3098 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3099 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3101 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3102 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3103 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."
<footnote><para>
3105 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3106 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3107 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3108 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3111 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3112 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3113 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3114 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<footnote><para>
3116 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3117 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3119 As another broadcaster put it,
3123 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3124 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3125 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3127 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3128 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3133 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3137 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3138 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3139 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3140 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3142 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3143 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3144 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3149 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3150 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3151 compensation."
<footnote><para>
3153 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3154 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3158 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3159 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3163 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3164 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3165 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3166 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3169 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3170 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3172 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3173 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3174 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3176 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3180 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3181 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3184 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3185 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3186 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3187 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3188 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3189 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3190 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3191 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3192 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3193 created by broadcasters' content.
3196 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3197 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3198 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3199 today
<footnote><para>
3201 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3202 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3203 Information, available at
3204 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>. "The
3205 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3206 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
3208 — then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3209 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3210 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3211 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3212 generation
—until now.
3214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3218 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
</title>
3220 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3221 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3222 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3223 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3224 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3228 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3229 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3230 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3231 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3232 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3233 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3234 has so often done in the past.
3235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3237 <sect2 id=
"piracy-i">
3238 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3240 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3241 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3242 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3243 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3244 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3246 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3247 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003, July
2003, available
3248 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See
3249 also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk," Financial
3250 Times,
14 February
2003,
11.
3252 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3253 estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3256 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3257 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3258 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3259 This piracy is wrong.
3262 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3263 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3264 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3265 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3266 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3267 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3268 of our existence, treated as right.
3271 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3272 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3273 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3274 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3275 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3276 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3277 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3278 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3279 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3282 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3283 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3285 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3286 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3290 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3291 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3292 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3293 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3295 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3296 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10–13,
3297 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3298 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3299 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3300 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3301 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3302 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3303 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3304 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3305 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3306 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3307 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3308 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3309 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3310 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3311 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3312 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3316 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3317 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3318 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3319 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3320 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3322 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3323 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3324 144–90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the
3325 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3326 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3327 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3328 pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
3329 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3333 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3334 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3335 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3336 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3337 "You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3338 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3339 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3340 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3341 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3342 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3343 piracy of the tangible.
3346 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3347 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like
3348 all property rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide
3349 the terms under which content is shared. If the copyright owner
3350 doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions:
3351 important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted content
3352 regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses give
3353 people the right to "take" copyrighted content whether or not the
3354 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3357 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3358 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3359 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3360 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3361 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3364 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3365 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal"
3366 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3367 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3368 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3369 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3370 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3371 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3372 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3373 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3374 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3375 <indexterm><primary>Windows
</primary></indexterm>
3378 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3379 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3380 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3381 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3382 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3383 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3386 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3387 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3388 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3389 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3390 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3391 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3392 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3393 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3394 what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3395 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3396 violating the law is still wrong.
3399 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3400 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3401 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3402 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3403 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3404 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3405 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3406 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3410 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3411 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3412 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3413 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3414 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3415 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3416 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3419 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3420 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3421 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3422 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3425 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3426 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3427 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3428 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3431 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3432 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3436 <sect2 id=
"piracy-ii">
3437 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3439 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3440 the author of [his] profit."
<footnote><para>
3442 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3444 This means we must determine whether
3445 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3446 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3447 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3448 author of his profit.
3451 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3452 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3453 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3454 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3456 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3457 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3458 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3459 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3460 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3461 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3462 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3463 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, Future,
89–92,
139.
3464 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3465 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3466 put together components that had been developed independently.
3467 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3470 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3471 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3472 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3473 system.
<footnote><para>
3475 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," San
3476 Francisco Chronicle,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3477 New Scientist,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3478 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle,
23 May
2003, C1;
3479 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," Economist,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3480 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) Times,
26 July
2002,
18.
3482 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3483 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3484 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3485 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3486 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3487 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3488 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3491 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3492 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3493 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3494 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3497 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3498 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3499 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3500 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3502 A survey by the NPD group quoted in The New York Times estimated that
3503 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to exchange content in
3504 May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3506 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3507 York Times,
6 June
2003, A1.
3509 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3510 massive quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The
3511 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3512 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3515 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3516 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3517 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3518 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more
3519 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3520 do
—the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3525 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3526 different kinds into four types.
3528 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3531 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3532 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3533 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3534 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3535 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3536 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3537 users who download instead of purchasing.
3538 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
3542 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3543 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3544 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3545 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3546 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3547 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3548 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3553 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3554 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3555 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3556 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3557 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3558 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3559 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old
3560 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3561 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3562 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3563 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
3564 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3568 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3570 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3571 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3576 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3579 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3580 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3581 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3582 harmful.
<footnote><para>
3584 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,
148–49.
3585 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3587 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3588 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3589 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3590 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3591 answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
3592 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3595 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3596 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3597 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3598 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3599 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is
3600 "devastating" the industry.
3603 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3604 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3605 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3606 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3607 & Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3608 technology, the labels fought it."
<footnote><para>
3610 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young, Technology Evolution and the
3611 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis (
2003),
3. This report
3612 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3613 practice of cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising
3614 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping
3615 is killing music." At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3616 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3617 behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3618 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3619 Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law,
3620 OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3621 October
1989),
145–56.
</para></footnote>
3622 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3623 when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the industry claimed
3624 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3625 regulating technology was the answer.
3628 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3629 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3630 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3631 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3633 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3634 innovation at the major labels."
<footnote><para>
3636 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying,
4.
3640 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3641 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3642 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3643 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3644 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3645 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3646 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3647 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3650 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3651 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3652 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3653 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3654 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3655 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3656 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3659 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3661 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3662 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3665 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9
3667 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7 percent.
<footnote><para>
3669 See Recording Industry Association of America,
2002 Yearend Statistics,
3671 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3672 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3673 25 June
2003, available at
3674 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3675 of recorded music have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in
3676 to
860 million units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3677 In terms of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in
3678 to $
12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3680 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3681 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3683 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3685 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3686 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3687 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That
3688 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3689 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average
3690 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<footnote>
3693 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13
3694 February
2003, available at
3695 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3696 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3699 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3700 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3701 High Fidelity has a list price of $
18.98. You could get the whole movie
3702 [on DVD] for $
19.99."
<footnote><para>
3709 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3710 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3711 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3712 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3713 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3715 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3716 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3719 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3720 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3721 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3723 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"
—but their own
3725 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3726 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3727 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3728 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of Kazaa
3729 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"
—then the industry would have
3730 suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7 percent drop. If
2.6
3731 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3732 revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3734 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3737 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3739 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3740 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3744 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that is
3745 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3747 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3748 tracks that are no longer commercially available.
<footnote><para>
3750 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3751 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law
—Coming
3752 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3754 on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
2001) (prepared
3756 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3757 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3761 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3762 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3763 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3765 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3769 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3770 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3771 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3773 of used book and used record stores in America today.
<footnote><para>
3775 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3776 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3777 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3778 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (
2002), available at
3779 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3781 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3784 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3787 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3788 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3789 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3790 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3791 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3793 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3794 owner for the content they sell.
3796 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3798 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3799 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3800 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3801 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3802 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3803 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3804 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3805 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3806 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3807 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3808 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3811 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3812 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3813 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3814 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3815 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3819 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3820 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3821 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3822 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3823 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3824 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3827 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3828 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3829 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3830 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3831 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3832 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3836 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3837 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3838 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3839 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3842 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3843 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3844 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3845 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3849 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3850 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3851 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4, much of
3852 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3853 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3854 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3855 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3856 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3857 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3858 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3859 found only with time.
3862 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3863 just what you call type A sharing?"
3866 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3868 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3869 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3871 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3873 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
3874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3875 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
3876 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3877 "down to zero."
<footnote><para>
3879 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
3880 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
3882 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3883 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3885 Napster (New York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
3889 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3890 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3891 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
3892 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
3893 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
3894 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3895 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3896 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3897 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3900 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3901 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3902 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3904 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3906 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3907 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3908 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3911 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3912 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3913 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3915 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3916 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3917 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3918 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3919 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3921 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3924 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3925 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3926 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3927 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3929 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3934 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3935 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals of
3936 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3937 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3939 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3941 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3942 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3943 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3944 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3946 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3947 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3948 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3950 over the future (cable).
3952 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
3954 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3955 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3956 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3957 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3958 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3959 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3960 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3961 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3962 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3963 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3964 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3967 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3968 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3969 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3970 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3971 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
3972 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
3973 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
3974 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
3975 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
3976 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
3977 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
3978 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
3979 for the architecture it chose.
3982 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
3983 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
3984 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
3985 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
3986 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
3987 copyright."
<footnote><para>
3989 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
3990 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
3991 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
3992 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
3994 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
3995 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
3996 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
3997 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
3998 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
3999 and plain common sense."
<footnote><para>
4001 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4003 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4004 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4006 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4009 — a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4010 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4011 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4012 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4013 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4014 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4015 profit from its reproduction."
<footnote><para>
4017 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4022 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4023 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4024 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4025 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"
—held
4026 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4027 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4028 technology
—which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4029 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4030 of the American film industry)
—was an illegal
4031 technology.
<footnote><para>
4033 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4038 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4040 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4041 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4042 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4047 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4048 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4050 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4052 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4053 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4055 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4057 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4062 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4063 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4065 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4066 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4067 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4071 <title>Table
</title>
4072 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4076 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</entry>
4077 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4078 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4083 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4084 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4085 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4086 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4089 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4090 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4092 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4095 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4096 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4097 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4098 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4102 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4103 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4104 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4111 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4112 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4114 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4115 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4116 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4117 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4118 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4119 1992 (Title
17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4120 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4121 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4122 Lessig, Future,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4123 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
293–96.
4124 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4126 In each case, throughout our history,
4127 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4131 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4132 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4133 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4134 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4135 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4137 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4138 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4139 the interests at stake.
4140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4143 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4144 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4145 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4146 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4147 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4149 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4150 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4151 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4152 permission to record a song?
4155 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4156 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4157 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4158 over all possible uses of his work."
<footnote><para>
4160 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
4163 Instead, the particular uses that the
4164 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4165 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4166 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4168 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4169 the distribution of content.
4172 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4173 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4174 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4175 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4176 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4177 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4178 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4179 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4180 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4181 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4183 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4189 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4191 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4192 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4194 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4196 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4197 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."
<footnote><para>
4199 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4200 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times,
22 September
2003, C3.
4202 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4204 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4205 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4206 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4207 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4208 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4209 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4210 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4213 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4214 just as any other property is protected."
4216 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4220 <chapter id=
"c-property">
4221 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4225 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4226 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4227 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4228 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4229 the price she can get.
4232 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4233 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4234 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4235 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4236 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4237 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4238 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard
—by, for example,
4240 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4241 thing I am taking then?
4244 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4245 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4246 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4247 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4249 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4250 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4251 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4252 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4253 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4254 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4255 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<footnote><para>
4257 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4258 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4259 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4263 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4264 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4265 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4267 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4271 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details, in
4272 other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4274 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4276 in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4278 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4280 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4281 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4283 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4284 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4286 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review
45 (
2003):
4291 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4293 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4295 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4296 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4297 significance of this true statement
—"copyright material is property"
—
4298 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4299 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4304 <sect1 id=
"founders">
4305 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4307 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in
1595. The play
4308 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4310 had written. He would continue to write plays through
1613,
4311 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4312 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4313 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4314 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4316 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4319 In
1774, almost
180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4320 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4321 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4323 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4324 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4325 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4326 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4327 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4328 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4329 Bookseller," American Scholar
61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4331 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4332 the Conger
<footnote><para>
4334 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4335 Vanderbilt University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4337 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4338 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of
4339 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4342 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4343 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4344 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4347 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4348 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4349 history of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament
4350 adopted the first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4351 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4352 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4353 works already published by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4354 additional years.
<footnote><para>
4356 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4357 "copyright law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
40.
4358 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4359 </para></footnote> Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been
4360 free in
1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4361 Tonson's control in
1774?
4364 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a "copyright"
4365 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4366 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4367 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4368 expired in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4369 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4370 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4371 that the publishers, or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print
4375 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4376 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4377 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4379 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4381 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4382 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4384 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4385 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4387 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4389 of any positive law.
4392 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4393 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4394 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4395 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4397 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4398 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4399 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4401 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4404 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4405 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4407 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4408 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4410 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4411 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4414 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4415 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4416 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4419 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4420 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4421 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4422 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4423 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4424 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4425 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4426 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4428 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4431 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4433 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4434 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4438 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4439 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4440 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4441 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4443 from reprinting a book. In
1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4444 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4446 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4447 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4448 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4450 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4451 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4455 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4456 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4457 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4459 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4461 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4462 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4463 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4464 to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4467 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4468 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4470 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4471 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4472 monopolies
—especially
4473 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4474 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4475 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4476 against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the Statute of
4478 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4479 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4483 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4485 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4486 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4487 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4488 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4489 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4491 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4494 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4495 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4496 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4497 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4498 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4499 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind
—tools of the
4500 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4502 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4503 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4504 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4505 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."
<footnote><para>
4507 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4508 York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4512 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4513 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4515 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4516 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4517 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4521 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4522 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4523 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4524 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4525 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4526 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4528 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4529 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4530 construction and spread of culture.
4533 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4534 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4535 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4536 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4537 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4538 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4539 they said; they needed more time.
4542 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4543 words that echo today,
4547 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4548 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4549 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4550 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4551 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4552 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4553 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4554 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4555 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4557 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4558 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4559 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4560 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4561 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4562 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4563 al.,
8, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4568 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4569 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4570 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4571 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4572 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4573 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4574 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4575 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4576 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4577 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4578 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4579 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4580 way to protect authors.
4583 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4584 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4585 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4586 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4587 rancher has for cattle."
<footnote><para>
4589 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4590 Law Review
40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4591 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4592 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4594 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4595 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4598 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4599 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4600 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4602 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4603 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4607 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4608 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4609 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4610 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4612 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4615 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4616 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4617 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4618 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4619 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4620 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."
<footnote><para>
4624 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4627 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4628 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4629 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4630 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4631 Property."
<footnote><para>
4633 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective,
167 (quoting
4636 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4637 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4638 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4641 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4642 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4643 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4646 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4647 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4648 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4649 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4650 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4651 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4653 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4654 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review
29
4658 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'
>
4659 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
4662 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4663 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4664 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4665 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4666 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4667 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4668 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4669 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4670 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4673 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4674 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4675 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4676 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4677 with in
1710: How best to limit
4678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4679 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4680 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4681 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4682 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4683 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4684 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4686 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'
/>
4688 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4689 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4691 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4693 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4694 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4695 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4699 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4700 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4701 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4702 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4703 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4704 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4707 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4708 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4709 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4710 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4711 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4712 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4713 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4714 statute were no longer protected.
4717 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4718 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4719 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4720 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4721 House of Lords generally voted.
4724 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4725 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4727 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4728 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4729 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4730 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4731 passed into the public domain.
4734 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4735 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before
1774, there
4736 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4737 After
1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4738 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4739 and the greatest works in English history
—including those of
4740 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan
—were free of
4742 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4743 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4744 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4745 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4746 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4749 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4750 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4751 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4752 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4753 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4754 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4755 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4756 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4757 and illuminations."
<footnote><para>
4763 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4764 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4769 By the above decision . . . near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4770 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4771 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4772 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4773 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4774 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4775 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4776 successors.
<footnote><para>
4783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4784 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4785 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4786 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4787 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4788 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4789 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4790 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4791 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4792 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4793 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4794 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4795 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4796 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4797 readers chose to let it develop
— chose in the books they bought
4798 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4799 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4800 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4801 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4804 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4805 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4806 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4809 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4811 <sect1 id=
"recorders">
4812 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4814 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4815 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4816 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4817 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4821 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4822 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4826 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4827 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4828 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4829 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4830 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4832 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4835 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4836 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4837 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4838 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4840 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4844 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4845 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4846 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4847 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4848 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4851 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4852 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4853 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4854 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4855 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4856 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4859 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4860 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4861 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4862 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4863 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4864 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4867 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4868 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
4869 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4870 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4871 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4872 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4875 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4876 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4877 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4878 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4879 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4880 confirm what he had been told.
4883 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4884 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
4885 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4888 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4889 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4890 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4891 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4895 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4896 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4897 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4898 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4899 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4900 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4901 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4902 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The
</primary></indexterm>
4905 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4906 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4907 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4908 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4909 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4910 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4911 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4912 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4913 says the owner gets to control.
4916 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4917 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4918 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4919 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4920 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4921 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
4925 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4926 thought is "fair use."
<footnote><para>
4928 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4929 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4930 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4931 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4932 Law School,
5 August
2003.
4934 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4935 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons
—and fair use does
4936 not require the permission of anyone.
4939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4940 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4944 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4945 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4946 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4947 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4948 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4949 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4951 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
4954 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4955 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
4956 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
4957 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
4958 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
4962 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
4963 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
4964 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
4965 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
4966 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
4967 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
4968 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
4969 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
4971 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George
</primary></indexterm>
4975 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
4976 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
4977 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
4978 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
4979 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
4980 pockets, me or them.
4981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
4985 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
4986 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
4992 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
4993 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
4994 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
4995 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
4996 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
4997 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5000 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5001 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5002 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5003 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5006 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5008 <sect1 id=
"transformers">
5009 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5010 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5011 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5013 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5014 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5015 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5016 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5017 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5019 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5021 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5022 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5023 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5024 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5025 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5026 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5027 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5028 important to his career.
5030 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5032 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5033 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5034 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5035 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5039 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5040 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5041 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5042 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5043 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5045 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5047 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5048 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5049 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5050 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5051 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5054 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5056 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5057 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5059 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5061 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5062 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5063 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5067 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5068 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5069 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5070 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5072 <primary>artists
</primary>
5073 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5078 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5079 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5080 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5081 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5082 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5085 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5086 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5087 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5091 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5092 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5093 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5094 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5095 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5096 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5100 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5101 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5102 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5103 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5104 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5105 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5106 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5107 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5108 started calling people.
5111 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5113 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5114 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5115 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5116 "Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5117 know, $
1,
200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5118 to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5119 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5120 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5124 It was one year later
—"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5125 were totally in the clear."
5127 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5129 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5130 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5131 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5135 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5136 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5137 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5138 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5139 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5140 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5141 systematically and cleared the rights.
5146 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5147 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5148 loved it, and it sold very well.
5150 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5151 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5153 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5154 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5155 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5156 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5157 at all."
<footnote><para>
5159 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5160 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5161 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5163 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5167 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5168 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5169 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5170 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5171 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5175 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5176 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when
30 seconds of
5177 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5178 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5179 compensated for that.
5183 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5184 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license
5185 that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips
5186 like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
5187 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get
5188 explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the
5189 legal part of the creative process could be made to be more clean?
5193 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5194 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5195 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5196 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5198 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5199 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5200 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5201 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5202 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5203 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5204 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5205 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5206 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5207 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5208 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5209 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5212 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5214 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5215 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5216 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5217 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5218 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5219 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5220 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5221 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5222 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5223 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5224 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5225 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5226 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5227 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5228 "Does this still make sense?"
5231 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5232 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5233 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5234 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5237 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5238 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5241 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5242 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
60 Minutes episode.
5243 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5244 judges loved every minute of it.
5246 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5248 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5249 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5250 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5251 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5252 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5253 were just violated in this room?"
5255 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5257 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5258 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5259 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5260 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5261 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5262 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5263 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5264 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5265 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5266 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5267 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5268 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5269 couldn't easily do them legally.
5272 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5273 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5274 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5275 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5276 planted in your presentation.
5279 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5280 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5281 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5282 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5283 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5284 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5285 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5286 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5287 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5288 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5291 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5292 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5293 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5294 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5295 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5298 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5299 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5300 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5301 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5302 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5303 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5304 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5305 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5306 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5307 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5308 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5309 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5313 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5314 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5315 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5316 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5319 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5320 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5322 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5323 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5324 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5325 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5326 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5327 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5331 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5332 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5333 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5334 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5335 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5336 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5337 new audiences, it is Mike."
5340 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5341 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5342 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5343 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5344 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5345 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5346 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5347 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5350 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5351 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5352 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5353 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5354 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5355 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5356 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5357 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5358 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5359 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5360 curse, reserved for the few.
5362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5364 <sect1 id=
"collectors">
5365 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5367 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to
5368 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5369 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5370 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5371 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5372 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5373 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5376 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5377 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5378 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5379 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5380 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5381 well as when those pages changed.
5384 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5385 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
1984, old newspapers were
5386 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5387 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5392 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5393 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5394 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5397 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5398 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5399 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5400 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5401 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5404 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5405 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5406 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5407 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5408 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5410 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5411 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5412 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5413 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5414 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5418 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5419 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5420 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to
5421 Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5422 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5423 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5424 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what
5425 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5429 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5430 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is
5431 whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More
5432 directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
5433 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it,
5434 for schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society
5435 presumes this knowedge.
5438 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5439 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5440 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5441 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5442 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5443 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5444 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5445 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5446 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5449 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5450 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5451 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5452 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5453 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5454 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5455 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5456 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5459 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5460 human history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5461 terabytes of material"
—and was "ten times larger than the
5462 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5463 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5464 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5465 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5466 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5467 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5468 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5469 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5470 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5471 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5472 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5473 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5477 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5478 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5479 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5480 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5481 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5483 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5484 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5485 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5489 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5490 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5491 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5492 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5493 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5494 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5497 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5498 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5499 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5500 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5501 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5505 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5506 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5507 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5508 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5509 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed
5510 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5511 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5512 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5514 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5515 the Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly
13 nos.
2–3
5516 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5517 Preservation in the United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5522 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5523 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5524 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5525 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5526 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5527 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5528 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5529 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5530 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5533 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5535 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5536 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5537 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5538 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5539 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5540 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5544 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5545 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5546 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5547 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5548 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5549 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5550 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5551 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5552 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5553 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5554 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5555 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5556 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5557 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5558 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5559 few minutes
—for free.
5560 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5563 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5564 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5565 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5566 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5567 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5571 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5572 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5573 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5574 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5575 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5576 has
—a noncommercial life.
5579 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5580 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5584 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5585 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5586 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5587 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5588 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5591 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5592 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5593 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5594 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5595 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5596 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5600 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5601 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5603 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5604 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5605 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5606 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5607 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston
5608 College Law Review
44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5609 </para></footnote>). After
5610 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5611 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5612 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5613 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5614 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5617 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5618 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5619 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5620 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5621 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5622 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5623 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5624 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5628 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5629 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5630 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5631 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5632 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5634 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5635 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5636 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5637 little practical effect.
5640 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5641 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5642 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5643 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5644 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5645 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5648 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5649 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5650 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5655 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5656 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5657 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5658 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5659 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5660 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5661 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5662 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5663 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5664 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5665 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5669 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5670 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5671 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5672 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5673 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5674 remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
5676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5677 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5678 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5679 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5680 future for our past. The technology of digital arts could make the
5681 dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5684 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5685 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5686 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5687 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5688 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5689 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5691 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5693 <sect1 id=
"property-i">
5694 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
</title>
5696 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5697 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5698 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5699 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5700 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5701 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5702 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5703 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5706 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5707 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5708 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5709 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5710 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5711 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5712 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5713 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5714 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5716 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
5717 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment
</primary></indexterm>
5718 <indexterm><primary>MGM
</primary></indexterm>
5719 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5720 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox
</primary></indexterm>
5721 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5722 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
5725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5726 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5727 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5728 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5729 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5730 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5731 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5732 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5733 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5734 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5738 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5739 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5740 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5741 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5742 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5743 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5744 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5747 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5752 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5753 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5754 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5755 theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must
5756 be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other
5757 property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the
5758 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
5759 debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5761 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5762 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5763 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5764 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5765 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5771 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5772 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5773 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5776 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5777 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5778 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5779 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5782 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5783 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5784 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5785 extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this
5786 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant,
5787 is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature
5788 and scope of "creative property." His views have no reasonable
5789 connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of
5790 his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
5794 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5795 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5797 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5798 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5799 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5800 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5801 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5802 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the
5803 Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5804 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5805 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5806 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5807 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5808 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5812 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5813 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5814 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5815 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5816 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5817 culture would develop.
5820 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5821 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5822 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5823 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5824 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5825 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5826 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5827 the same would be to
5829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5830 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5831 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5835 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5836 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5837 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5838 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5839 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5840 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5841 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5842 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5843 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5844 Constitution itself.
5847 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5848 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5849 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
5850 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5851 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5852 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5853 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5854 sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the
5855 government pays for the privilege.
5858 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5859 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5860 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that
5861 after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
5862 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet
5863 when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term
5864 "takes" your copyright and turns it over to the public domain,
5865 Congress does not have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for
5866 this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that requires
5867 compensation for your land
5868 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5869 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5870 compensation at all.
5873 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5874 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5875 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5876 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5877 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5878 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5882 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5883 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5884 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5885 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5886 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5887 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
5888 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5889 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5890 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5891 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5894 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5895 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5896 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given
5897 the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5898 creative property there must be a public domain?
5901 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5902 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5903 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5904 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5905 should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property
5906 should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights
5907 the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix
5908 of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether
5909 institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
5910 control how culture develops.
5914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5915 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5916 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5917 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5918 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5919 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5920 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5921 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5923 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
5924 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
5925 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
5928 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5929 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5930 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5931 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5932 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5933 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5934 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5935 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5936 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5937 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5938 Web, you can be punished
5939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5940 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5941 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5942 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
5945 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5946 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5947 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5948 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5949 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5950 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5951 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5952 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5953 the source of the enforcement.
5956 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5957 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5958 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5959 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5960 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5961 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5962 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5963 individual or group might behave.
5966 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
5967 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
5968 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
5969 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
5970 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
5971 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
5972 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
5973 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
5974 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
5975 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
500-pound boulder
5976 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
5977 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
5978 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
5982 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
5983 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
5984 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
5985 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
5986 undermined by another.
5989 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
5990 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
5991 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
5992 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
5993 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
5994 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
5995 must consider how these four in particular interact.
5997 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
5998 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6001 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6002 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6003 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6004 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6005 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6006 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6007 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6008 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6009 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6010 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6011 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6012 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6015 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6016 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6017 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6019 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6020 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6021 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6022 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6023 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And
6024 Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6025 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies,
6028 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6029 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6030 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6031 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6032 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6033 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6034 used to require that other laws be more
6035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6036 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6037 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6040 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6042 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6043 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6044 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6047 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6048 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6049 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6050 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6051 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6055 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6056 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6057 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6058 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6059 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6060 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6061 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6062 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6063 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6064 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6065 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6066 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6067 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6068 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6069 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6070 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6071 Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended
6072 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6073 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6074 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6075 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6076 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6077 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6078 places easier;
42 United States Code, section
12101 (
2000). Each of
6079 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6080 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6081 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6082 of these groups might face.
6083 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6086 <sect2 id=
"hollywood">
6087 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6089 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6090 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6091 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6092 rallying makes sense.
6095 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6098 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6099 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6100 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6104 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6105 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6106 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6107 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6108 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6109 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6110 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6111 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6112 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6113 this form of infringement.
6116 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6117 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6118 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6119 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6120 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6121 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6124 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6125 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6126 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6127 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6129 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6130 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6131 looting that results.
6133 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6134 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6135 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6138 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6139 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6140 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6141 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6142 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6143 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6144 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6145 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6146 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6147 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6150 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6151 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6152 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6153 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6154 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6155 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6156 life. Homeowners living in a
6158 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6159 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6160 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6161 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6162 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6163 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6164 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6167 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6168 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6169 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6170 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6171 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6172 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6175 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6176 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6177 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6178 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6179 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6180 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6181 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6183 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6184 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6185 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6186 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6187 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6
6188 October
2003, available at
6189 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6192 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6193 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6194 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6195 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6196 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6197 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6198 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6199 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6200 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6201 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6202 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6205 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6206 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6207 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6209 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6210 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6211 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6212 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6213 have an interest in excluding future competitors."
<footnote><para>
6215 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6218 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6219 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6220 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6221 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6222 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6224 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6227 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6228 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6229 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6230 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6231 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6232 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6233 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6234 opportunities for innovation and change.
6237 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6238 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6239 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6240 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6241 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6242 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6243 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6244 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6245 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6246 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6247 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6248 regulation is justified.
6251 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6253 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6254 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6255 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6256 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6257 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6260 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6262 <indexterm id=
"idxddt" class='startofrange'
>
6263 <primary>DDT
</primary>
6266 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6267 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6268 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6269 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6270 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6271 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann
</primary></indexterm>
6274 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6275 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6276 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6278 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6280 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6281 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6282 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6283 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6284 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6285 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6288 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6289 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6290 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6291 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6292 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6293 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6294 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6297 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6298 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6299 culture.
<footnote><para>
6301 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6302 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal
47 (
1997):
87.
6304 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6305 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6306 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6307 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6308 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6309 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6310 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6311 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6312 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6313 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6314 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6315 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6318 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6319 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6320 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6321 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6322 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6323 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6324 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6325 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6326 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6329 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6330 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6333 <indexterm startref=
"idxddt" class='endofrange'
/>
6335 <sect2 id=
"beginnings">
6336 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6338 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6339 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6340 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6341 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6344 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6345 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6346 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6349 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6350 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6351 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6354 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6355 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6356 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6357 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6358 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6359 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6362 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6363 in chapter
6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6364 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6365 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6366 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6367 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6368 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6371 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6372 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6373 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6374 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6375 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6376 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6377 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6378 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6379 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6380 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6381 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6382 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6386 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6387 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6388 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6389 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6390 years since they first struck its design.
6393 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6394 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6395 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6396 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6399 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6400 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6401 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6406 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6407 <title>"Copyright
" today.
</title>
6408 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6415 <sect2 id=
"lawduration">
6416 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6418 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6419 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6420 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6421 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6422 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6423 authorship.
<footnote>
6426 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6427 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6428 485–86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6429 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6430 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6431 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.
</primary></indexterm>
6433 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6434 States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6435 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6436 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6437 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6438 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6441 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6442 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6443 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6444 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6445 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6446 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6449 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6450 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6451 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6452 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6453 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6456 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6457 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6458 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6459 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6460 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6461 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6462 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6464 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6465 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6466 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol.
1, The Creation
6467 of an Industry,
1630–1865 (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6468 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6469 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6470 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context,
7–10 (
2002),
6471 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6472 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6473 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6474 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6475 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6476 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6477 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6480 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6481 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6483 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6484 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6485 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6489 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6490 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6491 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6492 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6493 domain.
<footnote><para>
6495 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6496 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6497 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6498 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6499 Studies on Copyright, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6500 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6501 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6502 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6503 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6506 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6507 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6508 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6510 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6511 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6512 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6513 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6514 books; that use
—because it does not involve publication
—is
6518 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6519 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6520 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6521 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6522 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6523 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6526 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6527 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6528 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6529 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6530 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6531 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6532 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6533 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6536 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6537 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6538 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6539 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6541 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6542 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6543 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6544 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6547 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6548 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6549 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6550 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6551 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6552 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6553 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6557 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6558 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6559 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6560 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6561 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6562 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6563 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6564 was ninety-five years.
6567 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6568 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6569 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6570 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6571 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6572 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6576 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6577 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6578 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6579 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6580 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6581 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6582 years.
<footnote><para>
6584 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6585 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6586 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6587 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6592 <sect2 id=
"lawscope">
6593 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6595 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6596 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6597 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6598 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6601 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6602 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6603 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6604 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6605 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6606 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6607 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6608 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6609 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6610 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6611 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6614 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6615 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6616 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6617 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6618 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6619 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6620 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6621 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6622 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6623 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6624 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6625 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6626 on the initial creative work.
6629 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6630 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6631 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6633 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6634 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6635 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6636 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6637 famous
© or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6638 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6639 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6642 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6643 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6644 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6645 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6646 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6647 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6648 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6649 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6650 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6651 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6652 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6656 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6657 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6658 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6659 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6660 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6661 copy available for others to copy.
6664 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6668 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6669 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6670 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6671 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6672 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6673 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6675 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6677 of American Literature,"
29 New York University Journal of
6679 Law and Politics
255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6680 Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6682 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6683 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6684 the United States
—publishers.
6687 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6688 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6689 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6690 act was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and
6691 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6692 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6694 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6698 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6699 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6700 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6702 to a tangible form
—all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6703 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6704 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6707 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6708 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6709 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6712 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6714 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6715 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6716 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6717 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6718 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6719 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6720 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6722 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6723 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6726 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6727 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6729 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6731 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6732 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6733 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6734 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6739 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6740 a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6741 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6742 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6743 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6744 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6745 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6747 derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6749 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6751 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6752 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
6754 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6755 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6756 the wrong of direct piracy.
6759 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6760 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6761 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6763 use of my book.
<footnote><para>
6765 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6766 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6767 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6768 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6770 Yale Law Journal
112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially pp.
53–59).
6772 These two different uses of my creative work are
6776 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6777 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6778 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6780 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6781 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6785 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6786 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6788 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6789 rights originally granted.
6792 <sect2 id=
"lawreach">
6793 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6795 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6796 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6797 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6798 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6800 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6801 regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a copyrighted
6802 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6803 make a copy;
17 United States Code, section
106(
4). And it certainly
6805 doesn't regulate a "copy";
17 United States Code, section
112(a). But
6806 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;"
17
6807 United States Code, section
102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6812 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6813 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6814 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6815 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6816 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6817 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6818 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6819 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6820 trigger for copyright law.
6823 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6824 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6825 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6826 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
6828 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6829 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6830 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6832 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6834 because it is clear that the
6835 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6836 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6839 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6842 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
6843 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
6844 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
6847 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6848 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6849 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6850 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6851 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6852 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6853 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6854 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6855 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6856 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6857 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6860 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
6861 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
6862 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
6865 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6866 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6867 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6868 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6869 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6870 diagram on next page).
6873 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6874 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6876 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6877 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
6878 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
6879 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
6882 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6883 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6885 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6886 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6887 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6888 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6889 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6890 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6892 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
6893 <title>Unregulated copying considered
"fair uses.
"</title>
6894 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
6897 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
6898 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
6899 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
6902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6903 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6904 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
6905 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6908 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
6909 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
6911 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6912 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6913 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6914 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6916 And because of this single,
6917 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6919 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6921 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6922 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6923 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6924 because each use also makes a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into
6926 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6928 work must look exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the
6929 burden of this shift.
6932 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6933 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
6934 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
6935 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
6937 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
6938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6939 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use
—reading
—
6940 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6945 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
6947 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6948 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
6950 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
6952 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
6953 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
6954 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
6955 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
6956 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
6959 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6960 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6961 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6962 points also become clear:
6965 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6966 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6968 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6970 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
6971 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
6972 free culture before the Internet.
6975 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
6977 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
6978 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
6980 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
6981 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
6983 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
6985 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
6986 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
6988 uses of creative work.
6991 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
6993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
6994 burden on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
6995 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
6996 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
6997 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
6998 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7000 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7001 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7003 before because reading was not regulated.
7006 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7007 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7009 upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question about
7010 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7011 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7012 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7014 of fair use are not enough.
7017 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7018 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7019 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7020 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7021 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7024 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it
7026 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7028 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7029 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7030 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7031 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7036 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7038 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7039 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7040 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7042 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7044 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7045 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7046 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7048 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7049 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7050 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7053 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7054 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7056 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7058 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7059 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7060 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7061 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7062 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7065 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7066 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7067 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7068 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7069 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7070 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7071 Disney's permission.
7074 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7075 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7076 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7077 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7078 was in the marketplace, the "first-sale doctrine" would free the
7079 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7080 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7081 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7082 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7083 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7084 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7085 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7088 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7089 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7090 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the
7091 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7092 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7093 abuse. If Barnes
& Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7094 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7095 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7096 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7097 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7098 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7099 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7100 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7101 happening are quite slight.
7104 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7105 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7106 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7107 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7108 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7109 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7112 <sect2 id=
"lawforce">
7113 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7115 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7116 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7117 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7118 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7121 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7122 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7123 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7124 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7125 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7128 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7130 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7131 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7133 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7134 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7135 if they went forward with their plan.
<footnote><para>
7137 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7138 Contemporary Problems
44 (
1981):
172–73.
7142 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7143 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7144 you were."
<footnote><para>
7146 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
1–3.
7147 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
7149 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7150 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7151 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7154 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7155 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7156 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7157 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7160 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7161 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7162 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7163 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7165 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7166 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7167 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7168 that is not at all funny.
7171 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7174 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7175 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7176 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7178 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7181 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7185 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7186 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7187 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7188 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7189 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7190 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7191 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7192 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7195 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7196 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7197 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7200 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7201 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7203 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7204 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7205 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7209 According to my eBook
7210 Reader, I have the permission
7211 to copy to the clipboard of the
7212 computer ten text selections
7213 every ten days. (So far, I've
7214 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7215 I also have the permission to
7216 print ten pages from the book
7217 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7218 the permission to use the Read
7219 Aloud button to hear
7221 read aloud through the
7225 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7226 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7228 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7229 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
"Politics
"</title>
7230 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7233 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7234 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7237 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7238 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
"Politics
".
</title>
7239 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7242 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7243 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7246 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7247 <title>List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas
".
</title>
7248 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7251 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7254 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"
—
7255 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7256 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7257 the power
—up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7259 copyright, there is no such copyright power.
<footnote><para>
7261 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7262 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7263 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7265 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7266 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7267 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7270 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7271 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7272 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7273 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7276 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7277 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7278 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7279 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7280 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till
2 A.M., but
7281 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7282 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7283 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7284 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7286 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7287 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7288 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud
—it's not that the company
7289 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7290 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7293 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7294 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7295 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7296 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7299 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7300 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7301 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7302 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7303 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7304 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7307 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7308 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7310 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7311 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7312 protections as well?
7315 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7319 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7321 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7322 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7323 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7324 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7326 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7327 <title>List of the permissions for
"Alice's Adventures in
7328 Wonderland
".
</title>
7329 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7333 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7335 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7337 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7340 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7341 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7342 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7343 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7344 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7345 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7348 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7349 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7350 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7351 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7352 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7353 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7354 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7355 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7356 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7357 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7358 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7361 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7362 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7363 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7364 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7365 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7369 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7370 story of mine that makes the same point.
7372 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo" class='startofrange'
>
7373 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7376 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7377 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7378 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7381 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7382 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7383 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7385 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7386 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7387 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7390 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7391 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7392 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7393 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7394 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7395 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7398 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7399 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7400 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7401 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7402 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7403 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7404 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7405 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7406 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7407 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7410 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7411 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7412 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7413 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7417 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7418 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7419 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7420 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7421 than Sony had built.
7423 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo" class='endofrange'
/>
7425 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7426 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7427 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7428 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7432 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7433 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7434 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7435 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7436 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7437 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7441 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7442 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7443 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7444 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7445 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7446 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7447 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7448 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7449 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7452 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7454 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7455 Science
293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7456 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7457 January
2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7458 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter,
11 December
2001; Bill
7459 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7460 May
2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7461 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7462 Questions about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7463 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7464 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7466 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7467 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7468 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7469 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7472 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7473 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7474 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7475 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7476 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7477 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7478 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7482 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7483 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7484 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7485 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7488 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7489 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7490 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7491 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7492 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7495 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7496 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7497 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7498 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7499 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7500 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7503 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7504 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7505 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7506 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7507 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7508 constituted, succeed.
7511 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7512 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7513 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7518 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7519 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7520 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7524 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7525 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7526 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7530 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7531 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7532 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7533 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7534 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7538 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7539 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7540 spreading such information an offense.
7543 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7544 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7545 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7546 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies
—
7547 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7548 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7549 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7552 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7553 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7554 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7555 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7558 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7559 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7560 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7561 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7562 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7563 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7564 have been a copyright violation.
7567 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7568 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7569 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7570 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7571 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7572 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7573 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7574 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7575 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7576 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7579 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7580 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7581 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7582 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7583 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7584 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7587 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7588 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7589 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7590 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7591 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7592 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7593 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7594 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7598 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7599 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7600 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7601 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7602 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7603 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7604 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7605 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7606 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7607 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7608 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7609 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7610 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7611 important.
<footnote><para>
7613 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
7614 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7615 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7616 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7621 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7622 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7623 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7624 the VCR responsible.
7627 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7631 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7634 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7635 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7636 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7637 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7638 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7639 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7642 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7643 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7644 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7645 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7646 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7649 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7650 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7651 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7654 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7655 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7656 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7657 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7658 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7659 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7662 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7663 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7664 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7665 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7666 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7667 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7670 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7671 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7672 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law
—increasing its
7673 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7674 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7675 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7676 owners effect
—at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7677 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7680 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7681 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7682 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7683 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7684 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7685 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7686 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7687 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7688 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7692 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7693 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7694 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7695 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7696 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7697 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7699 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7700 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7701 Entertainment Law Journal
17 (
1997):
651.
7705 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7706 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7707 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7708 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7709 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7712 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7713 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7714 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7715 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7716 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7717 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7718 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7719 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7722 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7723 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7724 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7725 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7726 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7727 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7730 <sect2 id=
"marketconcentration">
7731 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7733 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7734 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7735 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7736 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7737 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7740 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7741 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7742 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7743 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7744 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7745 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7746 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7747 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7751 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7752 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7753 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7754 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7755 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7758 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7759 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7760 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7761 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7762 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7763 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7764 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7765 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7769 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7772 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
7774 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7775 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7776 ownership, "five companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<footnote><para>
7778 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7779 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
7780 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
7781 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7782 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
7783 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
7785 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7786 Slide," New York Times,
23 December
2002.
7788 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7789 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."
<footnote><para>
7791 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7794 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John
</primary></indexterm>
7797 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7798 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7800 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than
1,
200
7801 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7802 radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7803 largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that market's
7804 revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of the
7805 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7808 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7809 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7810 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7811 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7812 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
7813 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
7814 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7815 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7816 protected
— by the market.
7819 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7820 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7821 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7822 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7826 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7827 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
7828 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7829 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7830 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7831 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7832 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7833 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7834 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7835 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7837 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7839 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7844 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7845 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7846 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7847 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7849 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
7850 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
7851 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
7854 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7855 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7856 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7860 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7861 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7862 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7863 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7866 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7867 integration may matter.
7869 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
7870 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
7871 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7873 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7874 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7875 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7876 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7877 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7880 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7881 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7882 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7883 control.
<footnote><para>
7885 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7886 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7888 3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7889 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
7890 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7891 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
7896 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7897 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7898 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7899 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7900 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
7901 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7902 television
—75 percent of it
—was "independent" of the
7906 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7907 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
7908 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7909 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
1992,
7910 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7911 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7912 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
16
7913 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7914 year there was one."
<footnote><para>
7916 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7917 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
7918 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7919 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7920 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7921 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7922 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
7925 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7926 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
7927 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7928 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7929 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7930 63%."
<footnote><para>
7935 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7937 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
7938 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7939 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7940 owned by the network.
7943 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7944 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7945 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7946 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry
</primary></indexterm>
7947 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
7951 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7952 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7953 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7954 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7956 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7957 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7958 handful.
<footnote><para>
7960 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
7961 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
7962 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
7967 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
7968 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
7969 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
7970 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
7971 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
7972 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
7973 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
7974 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
7975 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
7978 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
7980 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
7981 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
7982 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
7983 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
7984 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
7985 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
7987 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The
7988 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
7989 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
7990 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
7991 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
7992 Concepts in Technological Evolution," Research Policy
14 (
1985):
7993 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
7994 Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
7995 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
7996 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
7998 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
7999 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8001 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8004 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8005 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8006 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8010 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8011 suggest the concern.
8014 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8015 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8016 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8019 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8020 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8021 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8024 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8025 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8026 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8027 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8028 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8029 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8030 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8031 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8032 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8033 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8034 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8035 outweigh these costs.
8038 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8039 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8040 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8044 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8045 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8046 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8047 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8048 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8049 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8050 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8051 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8052 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8053 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8056 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8057 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8060 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8061 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8062 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8066 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8068 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8069 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8070 message will be heard then?
8073 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8074 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8075 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8076 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8077 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8078 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8079 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8080 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8081 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8083 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8084 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8085 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8086 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8087 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8088 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8089 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8090 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8091 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8092 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8093 York Times,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8094 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8095 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8096 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8097 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review
6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8098 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8099 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC,
184 F.
3d
872
8100 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8101 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8102 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8103 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8104 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8105 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8106 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8107 <indexterm><primary>Comcast
</primary></indexterm>
8108 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project
</primary></indexterm>
8109 <indexterm><primary>WJOA
</primary></indexterm>
8113 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8114 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8115 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8116 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8117 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8118 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8119 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8120 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8121 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8124 <sect2 id=
"together">
8125 <title>Together
</title>
8127 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8128 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8129 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8130 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8133 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
—
8134 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8135 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8136 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8140 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8141 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8142 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8143 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8144 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8145 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8149 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8150 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8151 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8155 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8156 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8157 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8158 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8159 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8160 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8161 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8162 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8163 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8164 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8167 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8168 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8169 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8170 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8171 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8172 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8173 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8174 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8175 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8176 technology and the market enable.
8179 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8180 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8182 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8183 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8184 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8185 the development of our culture than now.
8188 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8189 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8190 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8191 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8192 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8193 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8194 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8195 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation
—a tiny
8196 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8197 founding
—is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8198 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8199 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8200 culture that our free society has known.
<footnote><para>
8202 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8203 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8204 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
8208 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8211 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8212 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8213 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8214 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8215 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8220 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8224 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8225 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8230 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8231 <entry>©</entry>
8235 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8244 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8245 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8246 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8248 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8249 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8250 noncommercial work was also free.
8253 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8258 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8262 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8263 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8268 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8269 <entry>©</entry>
8270 <entry>©</entry>
8273 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8282 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8283 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8284 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8285 transformation were still essentially free.
8288 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8289 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8290 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8291 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8292 we could say the law began to look like this:
8297 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8302 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8307 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8308 <entry>©</entry>
8309 <entry>©</entry>
8312 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8313 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8321 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8322 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8323 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8324 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8325 that the law now looks like this:
8330 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8335 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8340 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8341 <entry>©</entry>
8342 <entry>©</entry>
8345 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8346 <entry>©</entry>
8347 <entry>©</entry>
8354 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8355 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8358 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8359 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8362 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8363 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8364 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8365 these domains actually does any good.
8368 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8369 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8370 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8371 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8372 reasons sketched especially in chapters
7 and
8, one might well wonder
8373 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8374 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8375 rights were more sharply restricted.
8378 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8379 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8380 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8381 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8382 property rights
<footnote><para>
8384 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8385 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8386 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8387 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8388 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8391 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8392 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8393 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8394 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8395 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8396 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8397 almost
180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8401 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8402 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8403 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8404 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8405 story of chapter
6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8406 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8407 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8410 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8411 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8412 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8413 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8414 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8415 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8416 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8417 dominates the debate today.
8420 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8421 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8422 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8423 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8424 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8425 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8426 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8427 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8428 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8429 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8436 <chapter id=
"c-puzzles">
8437 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8439 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8440 <sect1 id=
"chimera">
8441 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8442 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8443 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8445 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8446 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8448 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8449 <primary>"Country of the Blind, The
" (Wells)
</primary>
8453 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8454 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8455 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8457 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8458 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8459 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8461 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8462 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8463 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8464 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8465 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8466 villagers to explore life as a king.
8469 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8470 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8471 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8472 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8473 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8474 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8475 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8476 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8480 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8481 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8482 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8483 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8484 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8485 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8486 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8487 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8488 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8489 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8492 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8493 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8494 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8495 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8498 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8499 is affected," he reports.
8502 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8503 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8507 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8508 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8509 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8510 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8513 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8514 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8515 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8516 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8517 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8518 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8519 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8520 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8523 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8524 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8527 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8528 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8530 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8531 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8532 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8533 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8534 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8535 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8538 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8539 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8540 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8541 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8542 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8543 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8544 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8545 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8546 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8547 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8548 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8549 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8552 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8553 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8554 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8555 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8556 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8557 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8558 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8561 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8562 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8563 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8564 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8565 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8567 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
8571 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8572 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8573 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8574 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8575 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8576 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8577 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8578 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8579 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8582 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8583 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8584 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8585 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8586 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8589 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8590 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8591 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8592 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8593 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8594 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8595 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8596 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8598 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8599 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8600 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003,
8602 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8603 #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8604 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8605 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8606 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up
8607 Stakes on Piracy," Los Angeles Times,
17 July
2003, available at
8608 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil
8609 penalties are currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent
8610 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8611 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than
600 songs
8612 through a family computer, see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In
8613 re. Verizon Internet Services),
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
8614 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
8615 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8616 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8617 $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8618 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8619 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8620 Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8621 August
2003, available at
8622 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an
8623 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8624 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8625 identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8626 Name Students," Boston Globe,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
8627 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8628 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
8632 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8634 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8635 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8636 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8637 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8638 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8641 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8642 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8643 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8644 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8645 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8646 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a
8647 reasonable alternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution
8648 would be the worse of the two extremes.
8652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8653 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8654 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8655 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8656 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8657 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8658 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8661 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8662 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8663 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8664 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8665 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8666 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8667 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8668 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8669 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8670 protection for copyrighted material,
8674 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8675 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8678 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8679 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8680 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8682 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8683 well produce a totally different industry model.
8686 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8687 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8688 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8689 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8690 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8691 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8692 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8693 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8694 interests.
<footnote><para>
8696 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8697 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8698 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8699 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement of Peter
8700 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8701 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8702 Congressional Testimony File.
</para></footnote>
8705 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8707 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8708 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8710 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary></indexterm>
8713 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8714 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8715 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8718 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8721 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8724 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8725 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8726 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8727 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8729 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8732 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8733 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8735 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8739 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8740 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8741 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8744 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
8745 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
8747 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8748 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8749 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8750 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8754 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8755 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8756 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8757 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8758 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8760 <sect2 id=
"constrain">
8761 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
8763 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8764 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8765 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8766 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8767 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8768 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8769 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8770 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8771 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8772 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8773 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8774 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
8775 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8778 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8779 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8780 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8781 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8782 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8783 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8784 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8785 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8786 the culture all around.
8789 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8790 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8794 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8795 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8796 storytelling extended across the globe.
8799 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8800 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8801 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8802 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8803 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8804 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8805 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8806 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8807 work is presumptively illegal.
8810 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8811 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8812 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8813 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8814 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8815 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
8816 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8817 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
8818 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8819 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
8820 million.
<footnote><para>
8822 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8823 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
8824 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8825 Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
8826 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
8827 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
8829 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8830 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8831 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
8832 suffering.
<footnote>
8834 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8835 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
8836 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8837 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
8838 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
8839 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
8841 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8843 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
8845 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8846 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8847 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8848 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
8851 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8852 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8853 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8855 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8856 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8857 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8859 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8860 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8862 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8863 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8865 to see a world of underground art
—not because the message is
8867 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8868 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8870 art" tour the United States.
<footnote><para>
8871 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired,
7 July
2003,
8874 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8875 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
8877 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8878 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8879 critical or reflective.
8882 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8883 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
10. But an
8884 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8885 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8886 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8887 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8888 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8889 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8890 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8893 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8894 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8895 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8896 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8897 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8898 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8899 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8900 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8901 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8904 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8905 described in chapter
7, in response to the story about documentary
8906 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8907 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8908 law regulates such a use.
8912 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8913 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8914 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8915 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
8916 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8917 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8918 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8919 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8920 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8923 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8924 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8925 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8926 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8927 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8928 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8929 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8930 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8934 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
8935 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8936 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8937 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8938 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
8939 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8940 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8941 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8942 culture that is free.
8945 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8949 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8950 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8951 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8952 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8953 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8955 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8956 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8957 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8961 <sect2 id=
"innovators">
8962 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
8964 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8965 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8966 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8967 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8968 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8969 think there's little in this story to worry you.
8972 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
8973 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
8974 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
8975 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
8976 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
8977 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
8978 affecting culture are more fundamental.
8981 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
8982 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
8983 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
8984 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
8985 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
8986 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
8987 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
8988 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
8989 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
8990 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
8991 against the competitors of tomorrow.
8993 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
8995 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
8996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
8997 strategy that I described in chapter
10. The consequence of this
8998 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
8999 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9000 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9001 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9002 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9003 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9004 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9007 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9008 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9009 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9012 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9013 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9014 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9015 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9016 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9017 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9020 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9021 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9022 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9023 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9025 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
9028 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9029 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9030 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9031 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9032 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9033 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9034 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9035 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9036 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9037 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9040 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9041 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9043 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9044 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9045 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9046 the kind of content the users liked.
9049 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9050 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9051 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9052 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9053 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9054 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9055 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9056 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9057 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9058 they had already bought.
9060 <indexterm id=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'
>
9061 <primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary>
9064 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9065 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9066 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9067 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9068 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9069 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9070 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9071 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9074 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9077 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9078 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9079 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9080 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9081 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9082 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9083 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9087 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9088 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9089 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9092 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9093 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9094 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9095 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9097 <indexterm startref=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'
/>
9098 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9099 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9101 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9102 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9103 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9104 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9105 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9107 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9108 Times,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9109 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9110 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available
9111 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9112 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9115 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9116 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9117 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9118 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9119 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9120 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9121 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9122 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9123 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9124 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9125 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9128 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9130 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9131 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9132 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9133 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9134 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9135 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9136 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . .
<footnote>
9139 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business
2.0,
16 June
9141 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9142 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9143 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9148 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with "your money or your
9149 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9150 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9151 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9152 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9153 constantly threatened by litigation.
9157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9158 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9159 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9160 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9161 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9162 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9164 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9166 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9167 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9168 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9169 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9170 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9173 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9174 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9175 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9176 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9177 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9178 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9179 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9180 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9181 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9182 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9185 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9186 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9187 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9188 culture
—a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9189 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9190 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9191 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9192 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9193 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9194 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9195 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9196 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9198 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9199 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9200 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9201 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9202 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9203 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9204 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9207 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9208 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9209 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9210 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9211 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9212 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9213 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9214 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9217 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9218 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9219 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9220 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9221 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9222 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9223 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9224 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9228 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9230 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9231 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9232 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9233 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9234 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9236 and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9237 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2,
26–27.
9242 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9243 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9245 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9246 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9248 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9249 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9253 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9254 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9255 impose.
<footnote><para>
9256 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9257 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9259 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9260 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9264 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9265 innovation
—again,
9266 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9270 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9271 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9272 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9273 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9276 As I described in chapter
10, despite this feature of copyright as
9277 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9278 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,
<footnote><para>
9279 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9282 overall this history of copyright
9283 is not bad. As chapter
10 details, when new technologies have come
9284 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9285 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9286 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9289 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9290 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9291 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9292 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9293 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9296 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9297 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9298 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
180 F.
3d
1072 (
9th
9299 Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9300 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9302 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9304 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9305 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9306 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9308 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
1029 (C.D.
9309 Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9310 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9311 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9314 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9315 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.
<footnote><para>
9317 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9318 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9319 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9320 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9321 August
2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9322 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9323 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that
9324 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9325 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9326 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9327 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and
9328 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34,
9330 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9331 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9333 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9334 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9339 As I described in chapter
4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9340 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless
9341 he or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9342 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous
9343 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9344 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9345 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9346 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9349 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9350 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9351 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9352 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9353 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9354 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9355 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9356 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9360 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9361 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9362 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9363 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9364 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9365 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9369 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9370 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9371 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9372 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9373 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9374 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9375 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9376 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9377 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9378 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9379 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9383 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9384 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9385 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9386 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9387 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9388 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9389 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9394 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9395 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9396 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9397 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9398 than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong likened the situation
9399 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9400 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9401 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9402 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9403 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9404 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9405 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9406 shackles.
<footnote><para>
9413 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not
9414 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9415 underestimated the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and
9416 legislation"
<footnote><para>
9420 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9423 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9424 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9425 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9426 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9427 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9431 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9432 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9435 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9437 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9438 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9439 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9441 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9442 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9443 neutral toward Internet radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio
9444 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9447 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9448 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9449 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9450 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9451 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9454 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9455 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9456 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9457 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9458 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9459 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9460 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9461 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9462 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9463 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9464 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9465 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was
9466 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9467 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9468 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9469 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9470 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9471 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9472 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9474 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9478 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9479 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9480 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9483 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9485 name of the service;
9488 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9491 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9494 date of transmission;
9497 time of transmission;
9500 time zone of origination of transmission;
9503 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9506 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9509 sound recording title;
9512 ISRC code of the recording;
9515 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9518 featured recording artist;
9527 UPC code of the retail album;
9533 copyright owner information;
9536 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9539 name of the service or entity;
9545 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9548 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9551 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9554 Unique User identifier;
9557 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9562 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9563 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9564 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9565 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9566 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9570 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9571 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9572 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9574 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
9576 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9577 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9578 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9582 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9583 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9584 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9585 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9586 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9587 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9589 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9590 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9592 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9593 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9594 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9598 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9599 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9600 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9601 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9605 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9606 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9607 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9608 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9609 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9610 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9611 effective to prevent it.
9614 <sect2 id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9615 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9617 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9619 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9620 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9623 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9624 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9625 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9628 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9629 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9630 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times,
43 million
9631 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9632 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9633 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9634 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9635 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9636 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9638 According to the RIAA,
9639 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9640 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9642 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9643 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9644 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9646 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9647 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9648 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9650 response by the other.
9653 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9654 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9655 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9656 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9657 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9658 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9659 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9660 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9661 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9662 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9663 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9664 was.
<footnote><para>
9666 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9667 Angeles Times,
10 September
2003, Business.
9669 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9670 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9671 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9672 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9673 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9674 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9678 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9679 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9680 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9681 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9682 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9683 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9684 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9685 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9686 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9688 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9689 Prohibition," American Economic Review
81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9692 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9693 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9694 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9696 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9697 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9698 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9700 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9701 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9702 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9703 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9704 cheat.
<footnote><para>
9706 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9707 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature
36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
9708 compliance literature).
9710 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9711 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9712 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9715 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9716 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9717 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9718 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9719 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9720 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9721 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9722 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9723 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
9724 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9725 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9726 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
9727 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
9728 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9729 degree of illegality.
9732 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9733 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9734 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9735 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9736 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9737 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9738 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9739 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9740 to consider the alternative.
9744 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9745 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9746 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9747 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9748 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9749 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9752 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9753 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9754 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9755 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9756 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9757 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9758 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9759 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9760 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9761 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9762 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9763 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9766 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9767 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9768 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9769 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9770 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9771 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9772 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9773 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9774 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9778 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9781 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9782 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9783 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9784 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9787 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9788 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9792 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9793 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9794 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9795 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9796 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9797 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9798 capacities of digital technologies.
9800 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
9802 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9803 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9804 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9805 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9806 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9807 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9808 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9809 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9810 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9813 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
9814 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9815 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9816 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9817 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9818 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9819 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9820 on people's machines.
9823 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9824 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9825 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9826 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9827 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9828 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9830 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9831 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9832 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9833 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9837 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9838 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9839 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9840 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9841 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9842 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9843 freedom to move content easily?
9846 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9847 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9848 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9849 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9850 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9851 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9852 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9853 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9854 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9857 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9858 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9859 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9860 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9861 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9862 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9863 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9866 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9867 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9868 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9869 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9872 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9873 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9877 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9878 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9879 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9880 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9881 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9882 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9883 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9884 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9886 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
9889 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9891 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
9895 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9896 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9897 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9898 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9899 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9900 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9901 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9902 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9903 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9907 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9908 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9909 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9912 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
9913 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9914 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9915 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9916 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9917 an Internet user is revealed.
9920 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9921 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9922 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9923 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9924 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9925 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9926 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9927 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9928 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
9930 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9931 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9932 Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9933 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9934 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9935 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
9936 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today,
15 September
9937 2003,
4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9938 Fan, Either," New York Times,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9939 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star,
18 September
2003, P7.
9944 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9945 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9946 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
9948 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9949 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9950 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
9952 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9953 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9954 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9957 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
9958 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
9959 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
9960 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
9961 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
9962 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
9963 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
9964 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
9965 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
9966 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
9967 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
9969 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
9970 Boston Globe,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
9971 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
9972 Colleges," Washington Post,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
9973 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
9974 Monitor,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
9975 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
9976 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
9977 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News,
30 January
9978 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
9979 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman
9980 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
9981 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
9982 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today,
26 September
2000,
3D.
9984 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
9985 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
9988 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
9989 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
9990 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
9991 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
9992 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
9993 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
9996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
9997 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
9998 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10000 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10004 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10005 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10006 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10007 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10008 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10009 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10010 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10011 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10012 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10013 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10014 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10015 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10016 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10017 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10018 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10019 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10024 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10025 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10026 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10027 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10028 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10029 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10032 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10036 <chapter id=
"c-balances">
10037 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10041 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10042 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10043 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10044 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10047 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10048 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10049 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10050 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10051 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10055 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10056 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10057 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10058 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10059 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10060 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10064 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10065 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10066 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10067 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10068 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10069 made that is happening all around.
10072 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10073 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10074 gasoline onto this fire.
10077 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10078 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10079 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10080 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10083 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10084 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10085 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10086 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10087 success will require.
10090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10091 <sect1 id=
"eldred">
10092 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10094 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10095 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10096 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10097 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10098 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10099 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10103 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10104 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10105 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10106 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10107 them available for free.
10110 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10111 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10112 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10113 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10114 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10116 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10117 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10118 accessible
—today.
10121 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10122 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10123 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10124 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10125 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10126 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10127 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10128 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10129 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10130 commercial publications of public domain works.
10133 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10134 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10135 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10136 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10137 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10138 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10139 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10140 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10141 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10142 generally.
<footnote><para>
10144 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10145 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10146 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10147 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10148 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10149 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10150 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10151 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10152 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10153 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10154 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10155 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10156 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10157 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10158 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10161 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10162 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10163 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10164 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter
10,
10165 in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10166 terms of existing copyrights
—this time by twenty years. Eldred
10167 would not be free to add any works more recent than
1923 to his
10168 collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10169 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10170 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than
1
10171 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10176 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10177 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10178 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10179 "copyrights should be forever."
<footnote><para>
10181 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10182 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10183 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10184 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10185 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10186 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10187 Congress,"
144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10192 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10193 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10194 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10195 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10196 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10197 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10201 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10203 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10205 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10206 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10208 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10212 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10213 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10214 their . . . Writings. . . .
10218 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10219 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10220 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10221 something
—for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10222 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10223 specific
—to "promote . . . Progress"
—through means that
10224 are also specific
— by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10225 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10228 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10229 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10230 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10231 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10232 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10233 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10234 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10235 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms "on the
10236 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10237 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10240 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10241 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10242 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10243 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10244 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10245 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10246 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10247 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10248 this gravy train going.
10251 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10252 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10253 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10254 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10255 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10256 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10257 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10260 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10261 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10262 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10263 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10264 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10265 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10266 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10267 published by anyone for free.
10270 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10271 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10272 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10273 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10277 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10279 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10280 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10281 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10285 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10286 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10287 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10288 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10291 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10295 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10296 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10297 they support the bill."
10300 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10301 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10302 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10306 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10307 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10308 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10309 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
10312 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10313 correct conclusion:
10316 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10317 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10319 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10322 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10324 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10325 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
10328 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10329 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10330 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10331 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10333 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10335 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10336 the copyright term extended.
10339 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10341 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10342 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10345 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10347 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10348 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10349 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10350 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10351 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10352 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10353 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
10354 Chicago Tribune,
17 October
1998,
22.
10356 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10357 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10358 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10359 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10361 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10363 Disney is estimated to have
10364 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10365 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10366 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10368 Quarterly This Week,
8 August
1990, available at
10369 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10374 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10375 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10377 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10378 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10379 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10380 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10381 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10383 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10387 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10388 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10389 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10390 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10391 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10393 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10395 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10396 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10400 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10401 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10402 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10404 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10405 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10410 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10411 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10413 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10414 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10416 to impose no limit.
10419 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10420 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10421 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10422 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10423 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10424 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10425 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10426 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10427 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10429 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10432 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10434 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10435 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10437 If anything Congress says is interstate
10438 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10439 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10440 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.
<footnote><para>
10441 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10446 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10447 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10448 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10449 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10451 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10452 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10453 commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10454 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10455 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10456 to regulate copyrights
—the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10458 And if it is applied to the
10459 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10461 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10462 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10464 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10465 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10466 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10468 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10469 existing copyrights.
10472 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10473 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics
—a conservative
10474 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10475 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10477 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10478 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10479 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10480 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10482 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10483 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10486 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10487 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10489 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10490 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy
—piracy of
10491 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10492 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10493 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10495 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10496 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10497 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10498 work. But now these entities were using their power
—expressed
10499 through the power of lobbyists' money
—to get another twenty-year
10500 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10501 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10504 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10507 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10508 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<footnote><para>
10509 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
10510 186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available at
10511 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10514 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10515 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10516 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10519 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10521 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10523 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10524 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10525 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10526 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10527 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10528 bought to extend them again.
10531 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10533 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10534 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10536 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10538 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10539 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10540 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10541 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10543 and no longer available as a result.
10546 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10547 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10548 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10549 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10550 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10551 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10552 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10554 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10555 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
7, available at
10556 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10561 Think practically about the consequence of this
10562 extension
—practically,
10563 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10566 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10567 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10568 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10570 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10573 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10574 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10575 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10576 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10577 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10578 list of books still under copyright.
10581 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10582 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10585 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10587 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10588 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10589 being at least a list?
10592 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10593 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10595 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10597 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10598 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10601 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10603 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10607 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10608 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10609 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10611 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10612 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10613 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10616 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10617 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10618 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10621 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10622 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10624 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10625 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10626 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10627 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10628 know quite well who owns what property.
10631 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10632 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10634 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10635 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10636 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10637 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10638 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10639 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10640 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10643 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10644 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10646 for other creative works is much more dire.
10648 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
10650 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10651 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10652 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10653 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10654 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10655 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10656 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10657 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
10658 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10659 films."
<footnote><para>
10661 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10662 Los Angeles Times,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10663 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10664 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
9 October
2002.
10667 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The
</primary></indexterm>
10670 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10671 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10672 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10673 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10676 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10679 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10680 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10681 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10682 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10683 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10684 work available for distribution.
10687 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10688 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10689 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10690 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10691 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10692 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10693 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10695 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
10696 618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10697 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10698 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10703 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10705 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10706 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10707 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10708 locate the copyright owner.
10711 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10712 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10713 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10714 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10715 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10720 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10721 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10722 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10723 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10724 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10725 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10726 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10727 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10728 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10731 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10734 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10736 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10737 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10738 the copyright expires.
10741 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10742 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10743 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10745 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10749 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10750 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10751 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10752 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10754 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10758 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10759 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10761 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10762 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10763 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10765 the commercial life ends.
10768 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10769 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
10770 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10772 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10774 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10775 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
10776 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10777 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10778 have, we need to have access to this history.
10781 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10784 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10785 this context do no good.
10788 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10789 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10790 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10791 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10792 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10793 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10794 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10795 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10798 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10799 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
10800 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10801 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10802 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10803 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10804 market didn't have more to offer.
10807 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10808 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10809 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10810 would not have interfered with anything.
10813 But this situation has now changed.
10816 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10817 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10818 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10819 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10820 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10821 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10822 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10823 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10824 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10825 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10828 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10829 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10830 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10831 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10832 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10833 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10834 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10835 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10836 written for a radically different context.
10839 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10840 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10841 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10842 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10843 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10844 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10845 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10846 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10847 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10850 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10851 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10852 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10856 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10857 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
10858 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10859 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10860 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10861 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
10862 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10863 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
10864 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10867 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10868 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10869 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10870 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10873 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10874 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10875 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10876 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
10877 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
10879 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20
10880 December
2002, available at
10881 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
10886 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10887 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10888 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10889 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
10890 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that
10891 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10894 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10895 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10896 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10897 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10898 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10901 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10902 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10903 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10904 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10905 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10906 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10907 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10908 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10909 power to extend existing terms.
10912 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10913 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10914 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10915 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10918 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10919 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10922 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10923 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10924 overstepped its bounds.
10927 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10928 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10929 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10930 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10931 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10934 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10935 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10936 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
10937 briefs and preparing for argument.
10940 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10941 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10942 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10943 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10944 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10945 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10946 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10947 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10950 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10951 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10952 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10955 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
10957 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
10958 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
10959 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
10960 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
10962 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
10963 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
10964 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
10965 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
10967 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
10968 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
10969 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
10971 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
10972 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
10973 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
10974 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
10975 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
10976 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
10977 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
10978 most powerful media companies in the world."
10981 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
10982 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
10983 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
10984 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
10985 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
10986 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
10987 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
10988 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
10990 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
10991 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
10993 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
10994 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
10995 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
10997 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
10998 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
10999 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11002 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11003 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11004 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11005 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11006 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11007 why it was unconstitutional.
11010 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11012 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11013 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11014 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11015 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11016 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11017 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11019 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11020 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11021 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11022 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11023 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11024 gather the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11025 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11026 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11029 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11030 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11031 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11032 Congress. In November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11033 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11034 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11035 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11036 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11037 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11038 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11039 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11040 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11041 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11042 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis
</primary></indexterm>
11045 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11046 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11047 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11048 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11049 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11050 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11053 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11054 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11057 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11058 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11059 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11060 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11061 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11062 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11063 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11064 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11067 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11068 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11069 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11070 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11073 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11074 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11075 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11076 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11079 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11080 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11081 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11082 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11083 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11085 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11086 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11087 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11088 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11089 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11090 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11091 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11092 nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the fancy term economists use
11093 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11096 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11097 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11098 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11099 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11100 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11101 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11102 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11103 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11105 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11106 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11107 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11108 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11111 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11112 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11113 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11114 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11115 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11116 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11117 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11118 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11119 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11120 confidence in our argument.
11121 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11124 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11125 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11126 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11127 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11131 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11132 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11133 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11134 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11135 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11136 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11140 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11141 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11142 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11143 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11144 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11145 pornography."
<footnote><para>
11147 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537
11148 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11150 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11151 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11152 to license Porgy and Bess to anyone who refuses to use African
11153 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11155 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11156 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times,
28 March
1998, B7.
11159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11160 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11161 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11162 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11165 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11166 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11167 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11168 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11169 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11170 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11171 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11172 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11173 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11174 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11177 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11178 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11179 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11180 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11181 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11182 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11183 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11186 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11187 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11188 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11189 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11190 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11191 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11192 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11195 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11197 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11198 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11199 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11202 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11203 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11204 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11205 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11206 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11209 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11210 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11211 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11212 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11213 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11214 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11215 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11216 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11219 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11221 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11222 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11223 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11224 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11225 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11226 these retrospective extensions.
11229 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11230 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11231 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11232 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11233 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11234 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11237 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11238 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11239 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11241 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11242 most important jurisprudential innovation
—the argument that Judge
11243 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11244 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11247 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11248 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11250 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11251 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11252 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11253 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11254 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11255 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11256 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11257 copyright be limited.
11260 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11262 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11264 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11265 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11266 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11269 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11270 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11271 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11273 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11276 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11278 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11279 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11280 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11282 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11284 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11285 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11287 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11288 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11289 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11291 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11292 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11295 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11296 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11299 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11300 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11301 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11302 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11304 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11305 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11308 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11310 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11311 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11312 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11313 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11314 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11317 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11318 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11319 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11320 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11321 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11323 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11325 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11326 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11327 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11328 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11329 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11330 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11331 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11332 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11333 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11334 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11335 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11338 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11339 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11342 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11343 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11344 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11345 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11347 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11348 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11349 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11350 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11351 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11352 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11353 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11354 family of the Justices.
11357 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11358 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11359 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11360 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11363 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11364 The history was bothering her.
11368 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11369 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11370 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11371 practice that began with the very first act.
11375 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11376 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11377 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11381 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11382 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11383 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11384 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11389 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11390 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11391 Kennedy, who observed,
11395 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11396 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11397 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11398 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11399 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11403 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11409 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11410 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11411 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11412 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11414 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11417 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11419 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11420 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11421 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11422 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11423 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11426 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11427 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11428 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11431 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11433 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11439 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11440 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11443 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11444 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11446 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11447 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11448 into the Copyright Clause.
11452 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11453 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11454 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11458 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11459 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11460 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11461 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11466 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11467 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11468 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11469 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11470 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11471 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11472 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11473 Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11474 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11475 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11479 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11480 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11483 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11487 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11488 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11489 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11490 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11491 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11492 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11493 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11494 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11495 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11496 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11497 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in particular,
11498 the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11499 law that it had established elsewhere.
11502 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11503 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11504 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11505 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11506 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11509 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11510 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11511 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11514 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the world
11515 against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor, scouring
11516 the pages, looking for reasoning.
11519 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11520 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11521 Lopez. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11522 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11523 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11528 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11529 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11530 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11533 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11534 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11535 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11536 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11539 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11540 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11541 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11542 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11543 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11544 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11545 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11546 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context
11550 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11551 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11552 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11553 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11554 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11555 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11556 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11557 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11558 the system we have.
11560 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11562 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11563 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11564 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11565 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11566 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11567 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11568 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11569 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11570 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11572 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11574 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11575 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11576 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11577 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11578 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11579 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11580 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11581 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11582 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11583 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11586 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11587 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11588 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11589 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11590 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11593 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11594 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11595 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11598 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11599 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11600 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11601 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11602 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11603 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11604 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to
11605 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11606 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11607 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11611 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11612 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11613 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11614 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11616 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11617 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11618 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11619 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11620 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11621 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11622 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11626 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11628 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11631 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11633 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11634 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11635 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11636 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11637 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11638 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11639 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11640 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11641 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11644 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11645 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11646 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11647 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11648 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11649 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11650 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11651 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11652 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11653 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11654 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11655 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11656 effort to persuade; but I
11657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11658 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11659 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11660 should decide the issue.
11662 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11664 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11665 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11667 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11670 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11671 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11672 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11673 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11676 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11677 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11678 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11679 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11683 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11684 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11685 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11686 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11687 issue should not be raised until it is.
11688 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
11691 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11692 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11693 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11694 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11695 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11696 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11697 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
11698 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11699 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11700 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11701 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11703 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11704 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11705 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11706 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11707 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11708 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11712 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11713 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11714 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11715 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11716 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11717 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11721 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11722 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11723 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11724 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11725 in the face felt exactly like that.
11726 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
11729 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11730 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11731 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11732 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11733 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11734 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11735 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11737 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11739 <sect1 id=
"eldred-ii">
11740 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
11742 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11743 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11744 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
11745 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11746 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11747 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11748 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11750 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11752 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11753 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11754 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11755 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11756 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11757 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11758 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11759 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11762 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11763 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11765 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11766 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11767 the work passed into the public domain.
11770 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11771 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11772 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11775 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11776 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11777 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11778 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11779 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11780 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
11781 everything else, let the content go.
11783 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11785 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11786 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11787 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11788 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11789 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11790 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11791 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11792 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11793 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11794 the stupid harm of the present system.
11797 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11798 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11799 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11800 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11801 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11802 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11803 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11804 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11805 where copyright owners could be identified.
11807 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11808 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11811 As I described in chapter
10, formalities in copyright law were
11812 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11813 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
11815 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11816 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11817 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11818 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
11819 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11820 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11821 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11822 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11823 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11824 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11825 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11826 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11827 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11828 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11829 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11830 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11831 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11832 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
11833 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11834 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11835 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11836 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11837 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11838 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11841 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11842 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11843 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11844 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11845 know what's protected and what's not.
11847 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11849 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11850 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11851 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11852 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11853 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11854 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11855 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11856 in the loss of widows' only income.
11859 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11860 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11861 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11862 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11863 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11864 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11867 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11868 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11869 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11870 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11872 imposed upon creators.
11875 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
11876 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11879 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11880 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11881 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11882 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11883 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11887 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11888 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11889 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11890 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11891 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11892 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11896 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11897 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11898 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11899 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11900 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11901 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
11902 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11903 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11904 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11905 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11906 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11907 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11908 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11909 system of protection for property generally.
11912 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11913 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11914 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11915 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11916 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11917 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11918 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11919 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11922 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
11924 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
11927 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11928 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11929 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11930 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11931 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11932 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11933 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11934 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11937 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11938 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11939 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11940 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11941 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11942 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11943 seen before because there are no formalities.
11946 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11947 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11948 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11949 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11950 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11953 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11954 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
11955 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
11956 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
11957 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
11960 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
11961 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
11962 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
11966 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
11967 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
11968 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
11970 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
11971 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
11972 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
11973 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
11974 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
11975 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
11976 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
11977 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
11978 historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of commercial
11979 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
11980 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
11982 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11984 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
11985 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
11986 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
11987 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
11990 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
11991 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
11992 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
11993 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
11994 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
11995 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
11996 something good might happen here.
11997 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe
</primary></indexterm>
12000 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12001 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12002 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12003 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12004 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12005 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12008 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12009 concept in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That
12010 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12011 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12012 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12013 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12014 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12015 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12016 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12017 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12018 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12019 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12020 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12021 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12022 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12023 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12024 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12025 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12026 film is a valid derivative use.
12029 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12030 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12031 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12032 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12033 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12034 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12037 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12038 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12039 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12040 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12041 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12042 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12043 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12047 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12048 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12049 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12050 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12055 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12056 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12057 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12058 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12059 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12060 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12061 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12062 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12063 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12064 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12067 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12068 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12069 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12070 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12071 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12072 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12073 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12074 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12077 What does this industry really want?
12080 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12081 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12082 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12083 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12084 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12085 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12086 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12090 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12091 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12092 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12093 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12094 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12097 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12098 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12101 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12102 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12103 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12104 and to share its own creation.
12106 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12107 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12109 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12110 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12111 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12112 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12113 block the progress of others.
12116 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12117 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12118 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12119 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12120 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12121 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12122 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12124 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12127 <chapter id=
"c-conclusion">
12128 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12130 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12131 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12132 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12133 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12134 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12137 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12138 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12139 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12140 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12141 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12142 the disease almost invisible.
12145 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12146 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12147 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12148 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12150 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12151 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12152 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12153 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
12155 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12157 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12158 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12163 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12164 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12165 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12166 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12167 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12168 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12171 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12172 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12173 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12174 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12175 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12176 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12177 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12178 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12182 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12183 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12184 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12185 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12186 costs significantly below the market price.
12189 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12190 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12191 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12192 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12193 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12194 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12195 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12198 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12199 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12200 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12201 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12205 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12206 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12208 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12209 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."
<footnote><para>
12210 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12211 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12213 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12214 2000),
14, available at
12215 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12216 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12217 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12218 Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess., Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57
12219 (statement of James Love).
12222 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12223 asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add pressure to that
12225 in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12226 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12227 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12229 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12231 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12232 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12234 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12236 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent
—
12237 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12238 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12239 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12240 of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12242 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent
12243 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12244 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12245 Organization (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12248 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12249 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12250 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12251 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12252 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12253 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12254 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12255 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12258 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12259 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12260 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12261 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12262 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12263 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12266 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12267 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12268 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12269 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12270 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12271 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12275 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12276 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12279 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12281 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12282 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle,
24
12283 May
1999, A1, available at
12284 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12285 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12286 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12287 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12288 Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus
4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12289 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12290 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12291 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12292 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," Widener Law
12293 Symposium Journal (Spring
2001):
175.
12294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12296 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12297 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12298 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12299 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12302 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12303 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12304 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12305 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12306 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12307 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12308 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12309 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12312 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12313 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12314 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12315 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12316 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12317 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12320 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12321 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12322 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12323 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12324 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12325 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12328 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12329 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12330 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12331 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12332 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?" Because there is no "sound
12333 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12334 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12335 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12337 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12338 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12339 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12340 idea called "intellectual property."
12343 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12344 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12345 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12346 What is the argument?
12349 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12350 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12351 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12352 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12353 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12354 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12355 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12356 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12357 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12358 were balanced in just this sense.
12361 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12362 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12363 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12364 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12365 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12366 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12367 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12368 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12369 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12370 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12371 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12372 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12375 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12376 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12377 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12378 this common sense open its eyes.
12381 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12382 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12383 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12384 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12385 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12386 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12387 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12388 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12389 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12390 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12391 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12392 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12395 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12396 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12397 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12398 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12399 August
2003, E1, available at
12400 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12401 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12402 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12403 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12404 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12405 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12406 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12408 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12409 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12410 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12411 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12412 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12413 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12414 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12415 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12416 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12417 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12418 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12419 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12420 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12421 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12422 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12423 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12424 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12425 in the early
1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12426 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
12429 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12430 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12431 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12432 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12433 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12436 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12437 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12440 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12441 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12442 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12443 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12447 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12448 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12449 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12450 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12451 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12452 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12453 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12454 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12455 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12456 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12457 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12458 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12459 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12460 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12461 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12462 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12463 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12466 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12467 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12468 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12471 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12472 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12473 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12474 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12477 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12478 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12479 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12480 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12481 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12482 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12483 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12484 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12485 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12488 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12489 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12490 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12491 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12492 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12493 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"
—and IBM
12494 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12495 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12496 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12497 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12499 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12500 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12501 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12502 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12503 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12504 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12505 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide," Government Policy
12506 Toward Open Source Software (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12507 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12508 Public Policy Research,
2002),
69, available at
12509 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also
12510 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, The Commercial Software
12511 Model, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (
3
12512 May
2001), available at
12513 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12517 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12518 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12519 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12520 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12521 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12523 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12524 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12525 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12526 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12527 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12528 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12529 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12530 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12531 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12532 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12535 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12536 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12537 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12538 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12539 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12540 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12541 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12543 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at
<ulink
12544 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12546 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12549 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12550 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12551 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12552 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12553 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12554 its lobbying efforts.
12557 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12558 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12559 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12560 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12561 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12562 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12563 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12567 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12571 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12572 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12573 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12574 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12575 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12576 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12577 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12578 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12581 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12582 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12583 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12584 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12585 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12586 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12587 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12588 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12589 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12590 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12591 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12594 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12595 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12596 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12597 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12598 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12599 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12600 $
20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12601 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12602 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12603 right to decide what to do with their property.
12604 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
12607 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12608 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12609 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12610 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12611 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12612 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12613 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12614 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12615 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12619 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12620 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12621 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12622 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12623 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12624 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12625 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12626 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12627 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12630 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12631 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12633 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12634 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12636 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism,
210–20.
12637 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12639 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12640 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12641 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12644 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12645 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12646 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12647 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12651 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12652 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12653 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12654 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12655 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12656 say anything wrong. But in the world
12657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12658 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12659 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12663 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12664 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12665 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12666 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12667 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12668 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12669 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12670 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12673 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12674 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12675 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12676 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12677 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12678 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12681 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12682 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12683 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12684 our own country's history).
12687 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12688 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12689 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12690 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12691 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12692 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12693 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12694 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
12695 democracy in the world, become?
12698 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12699 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12700 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12701 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12702 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12703 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
12705 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
12707 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12708 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12709 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12710 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12711 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12712 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12713 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12714 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12715 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12716 hearings and a different result.
12717 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
12718 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
12721 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12722 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12723 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12724 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12725 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12726 concentration in the media.
12729 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12730 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12731 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12732 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12733 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12736 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12737 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12738 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12739 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12740 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12741 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
12742 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
12744 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12746 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12747 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12748 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12749 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12750 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12753 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12754 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12755 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12756 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12757 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12758 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12761 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12764 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
12766 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12767 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
12769 John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12771 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
12772 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8 September
12774 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
12775 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12776 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News,
9
12777 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12778 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12779 Defendants," Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12780 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News,
10 September
2003,
12782 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
12784 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12785 music.
<footnote><para>
12787 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12788 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
12789 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
12791 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12792 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
12794 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12795 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
12796 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
12797 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12799 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
12800 anonymous
—reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12801 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12802 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12803 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12804 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12805 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12806 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12807 kids who use a computer to share content.
12809 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12810 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12811 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
12812 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
12814 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12815 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12816 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
12817 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12818 24 August
2003, available at
12819 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
12821 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12822 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12823 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12824 country.
<footnote><para>
12826 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
12828 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
12830 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12831 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12832 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12833 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12834 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12835 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12836 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12837 day into the Causbys.
12840 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12841 potential is ever to be realized.
12843 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12847 <chapter id=
"c-afterword">
12848 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
12851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12852 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12853 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12854 maps what might be done.
12857 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12858 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12859 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12860 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12863 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12864 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12865 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
12866 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12870 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12871 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12872 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12873 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12874 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12876 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12879 <title>US, NOW
</title>
12881 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12882 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
12883 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12884 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12887 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12888 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12889 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights
12890 Reserved"
— and those who reject copyright
—"No Rights
12891 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12892 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12893 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12894 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12897 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12898 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12899 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12900 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12904 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12905 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12909 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12910 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12911 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12912 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12913 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12914 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12915 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12916 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12917 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12918 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12919 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12920 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12923 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
12924 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12925 reserved"
— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12926 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12927 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12931 <sect2 id=
"examples">
12932 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
12934 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12935 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12936 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12937 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12938 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12939 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12940 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12944 What made it assured?
12946 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12948 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12949 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
12950 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12951 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
12952 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
12953 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
12954 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
12955 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
12956 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
12957 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
12958 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
12959 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
12960 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
12962 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
12964 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
12965 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
12966 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
12967 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
12968 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
12969 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
12970 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
12971 protected by the friction disappears, too.
12974 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
12975 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
12976 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
12977 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
12978 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
12979 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
12980 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
12984 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
12985 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
12986 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
12987 friction did.
<footnote><para>
12990 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
12991 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
12992 Law Review
1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
12994 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
12995 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
12996 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
12997 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
12998 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
12999 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13000 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13003 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13004 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13005 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13008 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13009 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13010 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13011 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13012 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13013 care much about controlling their software.
13015 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13017 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13018 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13019 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13020 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13021 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13025 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13026 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13027 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13028 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13029 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13030 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13031 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13032 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13033 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13037 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13038 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13039 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13040 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13041 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13042 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13043 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13046 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13047 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13048 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13049 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13050 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13051 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13052 fundamentally weakened.
13055 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13056 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13057 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13058 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13061 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13062 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13063 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13064 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13065 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13066 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13067 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13068 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13072 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13073 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13074 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13075 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13076 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13077 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13080 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13081 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13082 scientific journals are produced.
13085 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13086 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13087 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13088 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13089 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13090 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13091 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13092 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13093 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13094 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13095 and Westlaw are also free
13096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13097 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13098 Court opinion through their respective services.
13101 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13102 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13103 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13104 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13105 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13106 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13107 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13110 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13111 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13112 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13115 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13116 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13117 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13118 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13119 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13120 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13121 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13122 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13123 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13124 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13127 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13128 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13129 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13130 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13131 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13135 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13136 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13137 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13138 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13140 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13141 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13142 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13143 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13144 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13145 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13146 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
13149 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13150 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13151 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13152 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13153 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13154 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13159 <sect2 id=
"oneidea">
13160 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13161 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13162 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13165 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13166 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13169 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13170 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13171 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13172 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13173 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13174 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13175 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13176 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13179 Simple
—which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13180 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13181 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13182 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13183 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13184 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13185 three expressions together
—a legal license, a human-readable
13187 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13188 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13189 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13190 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13191 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13192 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13193 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13194 certain freedoms are given.
13197 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13198 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13199 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13200 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13201 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13202 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13203 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13204 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13205 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13208 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13209 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13210 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13211 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13212 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13213 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13214 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13215 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13219 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13220 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13221 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13222 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13223 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13224 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13226 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13227 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13228 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13229 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13232 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13233 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13234 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13235 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13236 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13237 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13238 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13239 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13240 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13241 to begin to build those rules.
13244 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13245 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13246 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13247 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13248 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13251 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13252 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13253 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13254 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13255 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13256 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13257 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13258 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13259 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13260 sales of Cory's book.
13263 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13264 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13265 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13266 was a total success.
13269 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13270 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13271 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13272 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13273 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13274 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13275 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13276 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13280 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13281 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13282 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13283 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13284 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13285 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13286 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13287 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13288 with their own art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13289 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13290 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13291 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13292 because the legal costs are so high
<footnote><para>
13295 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13296 Culture Wars (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13297 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13298 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13299 </para></footnote>),
13300 these artists release into the creative environment content
13301 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13304 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13305 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13306 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13307 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13308 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13309 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13310 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13311 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13312 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13316 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13317 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13318 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13319 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13322 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13323 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13326 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13327 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13328 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13329 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13330 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13331 steps are possible.
13334 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13335 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13336 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13337 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13338 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13339 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13340 creativity to spread more easily.
13342 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13344 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13347 <sect1 id=
"themsoon">
13348 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13350 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13351 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13352 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13353 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13354 changes that we need.
13357 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13358 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13359 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13363 <sect2 id=
"formalities">
13364 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13366 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13367 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13368 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13369 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13372 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13373 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13374 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13378 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13379 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13380 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13381 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13387 As I suggested in chapter
10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13388 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13389 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13390 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13391 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13392 formalities were getting in the way.
13395 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13396 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13397 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13398 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13399 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13400 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13401 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13402 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13403 past. And thus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where
13404 they otherwise could speak.
13407 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13409 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13410 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13411 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13412 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13413 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13414 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13417 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13418 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13419 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13420 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13421 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13422 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13423 developed by others.
13426 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13428 <sect3 id=
"registration">
13429 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13431 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13432 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13433 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13434 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13435 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13436 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13437 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13438 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13439 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13440 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13441 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13444 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13445 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13446 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13447 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13448 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13449 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13450 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13453 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13454 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13455 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13456 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13457 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13458 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13459 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13460 with which registration occurs up.
13463 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13464 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13465 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13466 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13467 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13468 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13469 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13470 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13471 formality
—while producing a database
13472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13473 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13477 <sect3 id=
"marking">
13478 <title>MARKING
</title>
13480 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13481 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13482 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13483 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13484 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13485 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13486 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13487 uniformly across all media.
13490 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13491 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13492 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13496 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13497 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13498 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13499 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13500 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13501 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13502 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13503 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13506 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13507 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13508 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13509 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13510 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13511 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13513 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13514 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13515 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13517 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13518 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13519 stop using the work in any new
13520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13521 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13522 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13526 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13527 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13528 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13529 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13530 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13533 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13534 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13535 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13536 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13537 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13538 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13539 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13540 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13541 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13544 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13545 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13546 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13547 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13548 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13549 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13552 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13553 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13554 make things unclear.
13557 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13558 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13559 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13560 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13561 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13562 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13568 <sect2 id=
"shortterms">
13569 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13571 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13572 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13576 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13577 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13578 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13579 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13580 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13581 term.
<footnote><para>
13583 "A Radical Rethink," Economist,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13585 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13587 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13590 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13591 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13592 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13595 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13598 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13599 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13600 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13601 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13602 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13603 regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
</para></listitem>
13606 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13607 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13608 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13609 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13610 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13611 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13612 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13613 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13615 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13619 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13620 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13621 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13622 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13623 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13624 veteran to apply for a pension.
<footnote><para>
13626 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13627 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
13629 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
13631 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13632 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13634 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions
</primary></indexterm>
13638 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13639 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13640 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in
1923 for the law to
13641 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13642 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13643 fewer authors to create in
1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13644 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13645 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13646 in
1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13647 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13648 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13649 not increase their creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done,
13650 and there's nothing we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
13653 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13654 that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976, the average
13655 term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13658 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13659 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13660 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13661 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13664 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13667 <sect2 id=
"freefairuse">
13668 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
13670 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13671 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13672 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13673 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13674 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13675 the emergence of that new technology.
13678 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13679 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13680 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13681 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13682 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13683 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13684 though that movie is not "my writing."
13687 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
13688 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13689 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
13691 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13692 University Press,
1967),
32.
13694 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13695 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13696 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13700 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13701 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13702 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13703 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
13704 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
13709 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13710 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13711 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13712 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13713 Consider each limitation in turn.
13716 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13717 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13719 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13720 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13721 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13722 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13723 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13724 after the creative work is done.
13725 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
13728 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13729 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13730 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13731 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13732 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13733 perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no
13734 longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all
13735 the creative possibilities that digital technologies enable; now
13736 imagine pouring molasses into the machines. That's what this general
13737 requirement of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13740 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13741 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13742 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
13743 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
13744 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13748 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13749 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13750 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13751 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
13754 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13755 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
13756 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
13758 His view is that the law should be written so that
13759 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13762 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13763 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13764 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13765 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13766 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13769 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13770 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13771 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13772 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13773 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13774 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13778 <sect2 id=
"liberatemusic">
13779 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
13781 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13782 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13783 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
13784 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13785 battles around the sharing of music.
13788 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13789 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13790 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13791 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13792 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13793 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13794 innovation on the network.
13797 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13798 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13799 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13800 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13801 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13804 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13805 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13806 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13807 chapter
5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13809 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
13812 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13813 for purchasing CDs.
13817 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13818 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13823 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13824 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13825 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13829 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13830 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13831 owner plainly endorses.
13835 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13836 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13837 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13838 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13839 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13840 significantly weakened.
13843 As I said in chapter
5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13844 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13845 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13846 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13850 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13851 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13855 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13856 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13857 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13858 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13859 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
13860 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13861 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13862 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13863 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13864 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13867 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13868 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13869 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13870 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13871 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13872 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13873 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13874 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13875 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13876 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
13877 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
13878 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13879 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13882 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13883 that give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet
13884 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13885 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
13886 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
13887 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
13888 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
13889 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
13890 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13891 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13892 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13893 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13894 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13895 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13896 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13897 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
13899 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
13900 April
2002, available at
13901 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
13906 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13907 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13908 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
13909 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13910 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13911 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13912 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13913 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13914 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13915 artists get paid, during
13917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13918 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13919 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13922 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13923 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
13924 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13925 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13926 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13927 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13928 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13929 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13930 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13933 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13934 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13935 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13936 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13937 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13938 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13939 way that returns something to the artist.
13942 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13943 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13944 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13945 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13946 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13947 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13948 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
13949 his being compensated is less than ideal.
13952 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
13953 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
13954 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
13955 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
13956 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
13957 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
13958 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
13962 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
13963 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
13964 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
13965 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
13966 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
13967 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
13968 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
13969 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
13973 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
13974 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
13975 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
13976 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
13977 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
13978 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
13979 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
13980 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
13983 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
13984 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
13985 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
13986 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
13987 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
13988 delivering and accessing content.
13991 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
13992 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
13995 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
13996 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
13997 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
13998 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
13999 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14000 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14001 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14002 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14005 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14006 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14007 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14008 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14009 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14010 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14011 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14014 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14015 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14017 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14018 10 October
2000), available at
14019 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14020 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14021 Stanford University Press,
2004), ch.
6, available at
14022 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14023 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14024 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14025 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14026 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14027 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14028 Broadband?" Washington Post,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14029 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14030 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14032 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14033 Use Fee (IPUF),
3 March
2002, available at
14034 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14035 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today,
13 May
14037 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14038 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14039 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14040 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
14042 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14043 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14044 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14045 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14046 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14047 debate by about a decade. See
14048 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14049 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14050 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14052 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14053 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14054 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14055 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14056 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14057 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14058 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14059 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14063 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14064 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14065 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14066 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14067 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14068 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14069 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14070 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14071 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14072 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14073 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14074 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14075 controlling access.
14078 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14079 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14080 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14081 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14082 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14083 limits on derivative
14085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14086 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14087 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14088 allowed to do with the content itself.
14091 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14092 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14093 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14094 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14095 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14096 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14097 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14098 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14099 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14100 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14101 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14102 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14106 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14107 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14108 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14109 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14110 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14111 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14112 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14113 theaters are often luxurious
—with "first class" seats, and meals
14114 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14115 finding ways to compete with "free."
14118 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14119 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14120 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14121 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14122 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14123 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14127 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14132 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14133 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14134 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14135 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14139 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14142 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14145 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14149 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14150 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14155 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14156 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14160 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14161 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14162 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14166 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14167 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14168 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14169 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14170 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size x,
14171 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14172 market of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14173 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14174 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14175 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14176 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14180 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14181 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14182 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14185 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14186 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14190 <sect2 id=
"firelawyers">
14191 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14193 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14194 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14195 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14196 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14199 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14200 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14201 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14202 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14203 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14204 strong view queers the law.
14207 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14208 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14209 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14210 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14211 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14212 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14213 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14214 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14216 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14217 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review
48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14222 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14223 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14224 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14227 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14228 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14229 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14230 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14232 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14233 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14234 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14235 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14236 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14237 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14238 J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14239 Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14240 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14241 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June
2003,
14243 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14244 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14245 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14246 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14247 Rethinking,
174–76.
14248 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
14250 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14251 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14255 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14256 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14257 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14258 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14259 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14260 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14261 practically never be done.
14264 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14265 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14266 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14267 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14268 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14269 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14270 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14271 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14274 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14275 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14276 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14277 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14278 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14279 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14282 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14283 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14284 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14288 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14289 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14290 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14291 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14292 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14293 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14294 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14297 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14298 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14301 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14302 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14303 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14306 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14307 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14308 keep your lawyers away.
14310 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14314 <chapter id=
"c-notes">
14315 <title>NOTES
</title>
14317 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14318 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14319 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14320 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14321 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14322 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14323 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14324 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14325 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14328 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14331 <chapter id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14332 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14334 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14335 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14336 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14337 to him that this book is dedicated.
14340 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14341 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14342 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14343 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14344 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14345 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14346 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14347 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14348 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14349 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14350 critical eye on much of this.
14353 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14354 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14355 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14356 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14358 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14359 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14360 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14361 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14364 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14365 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14366 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14367 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14368 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14369 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14370 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14371 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14372 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14373 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14374 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14375 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14376 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14377 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14378 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14379 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14380 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14381 a bunch of great replies.)
14384 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14385 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14386 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14387 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14388 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14389 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14390 throughout this book.
14393 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14394 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14395 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14396 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14398 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->