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17
18 <book id="index" lang="en">
19 <bookinfo>
20 <title>Free Culture</title>
21
22 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
23
24 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
25 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY</subtitle>
26
27 <pubdate>2004-03-25</pubdate>
28
29 <releaseinfo>Version 2004-02-10</releaseinfo>
30
31 <authorgroup>
32 <author>
33 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
34 <surname>Lessig</surname>
35 </author>
36 </authorgroup>
37
38 <copyright>
39 <year>2004</year>
40 <holder>Lawrence Lessig</holder>
41 </copyright>
42
43 <legalnotice>
44 <para>
45 <inlinemediaobject>
46 <imageobject>
47 <imagedata fileref="images/cc.png" width="100%" align="center"/>
48 </imageobject>
49 <imageobject>
50 <imagedata fileref="images/cc.svg" width="100%" align="center"/>
51 </imageobject>
52 <textobject>
53 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</phrase>
54 </textobject>
55 </inlinemediaobject>
56 </para>
57
58 <para>
59 This version of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is licensed under
60 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
61 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
62 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
63 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
64 </para>
65 </legalnotice>
66
67 <abstract>
68 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
69 <para>
70 LAWRENCE LESSIG
71 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
72 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
73 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
74 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
75 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
76 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
77 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
78 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
79 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
80 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
81 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
82 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
83 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
84 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
85 Appeals.
86 </para>
87 </abstract>
88 </bookinfo>
89
90 <colophon>
91 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
92
93 <para>
94 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
95 </para>
96 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
97 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
98 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
99 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
100 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
101 </itemizedlist>
102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
103
104 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
105 <para>
106 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
107 </para>
108 <para>
109 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
110 </para>
111 <para>
112 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
113 </para>
114
115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
116 <para>
117 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
118 </para>
119
120 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
121 <para>
122 FREE CULTURE
123 </para>
124
125 <para>
126 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
127 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
128 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
129 </para>
130
131 <para>
132 LAWRENCE LESSIG
133 </para>
134
135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
136 <para>
137 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
138 York, New York
139 </para>
140 <para>
141 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
142 </para>
143 <para>
144 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
145 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, January 16, 2003. Copyright
146 &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
147 </para>
148 <para>
149 Cartoon in <xref linkend="fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
150 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
151 </para>
152 <para>
153 Diagram in <xref linkend="fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
154 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
155 </para>
156 <para>
157 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
158 </para>
159 <para>
160 Lessig, Lawrence.
161 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
162 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
163 </para>
164 <para>
165 p. cm.
166 </para>
167 <para>
168 Includes index.
169 </para>
170 <para>
171 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
172 </para>
173 <para>
174 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
175 </para>
176 <para>
177 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
178 </para>
179 <para>
180 KF2979.L47
181 </para>
182 <para>
183 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
184 </para>
185 <para>
186 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
187 </para>
188 <para>
189 Printed in the United States of America
190 </para>
191 <para>
192 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
193 </para>
194 <para>
195 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
196 </para>
197
198 <para>
199 &translationblock;
200 </para>
201
202 <para>
203 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
204 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
205 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
206 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
207 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
208 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
209 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
210 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
211 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
212 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
213 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
214 </para>
215 </colophon>
216
217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
218 <dedication>
219 <para>
220 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
221 it continues still.
222 </para>
223 </dedication>
224
225 <toc id="toc"></toc>
226
227 <lot>
228 <title>List of figures</title>
229 </lot>
230
231 <!--
232 c PREFACE xiii
233 c INTRODUCTION
234 c "PIRACY"
235 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
236 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
237 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
238 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
239 2 Film
240 2 Recorded Music
241 2 Radio
242 2 Cable TV
243 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
244 2 Piracy I
245 2 Piracy II
246 c "PROPERTY"
247 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
248 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
249 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
250 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
251 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
252 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
253 2 Beginnings
254 2 Law: Duration
255 2 Law: Scope
256 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
257 2 Architecture and Law: Force
258 2 Market: Concentration
259 2 Together
260 c PUZZLES
261 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
262 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
263 2 Constraining Creators
264 2 Constraining Innovators
265 2 Corrupting Citizens
266 c BALANCES
267 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
268 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
269 c CONCLUSION
270 c AFTERWORD
271 1 Us, Now
272 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
273 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
274 1 Them, Soon
275 2 1. More Formalities
276 3 Registration and Renewal
277 3 Marking
278 2 2. Shorter Terms
279 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
280 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
281 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
282 c NOTES
283 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
284 c INDEX
285 -->
286
287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
288
289 <preface id="preface">
290 <title>PREFACE</title>
291 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
292 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
293 </indexterm>
294 <para>
295 At the end of his review of my first book, <citetitle>Code: And Other
296 Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle>, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and
297 author of countless technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
298 </para>
299 <blockquote>
300 <para>
301 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
302 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
303 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
304 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
305 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 30 January 2000.
306 </para></footnote>
307 </para>
308 </blockquote>
309 <para>
310 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
311 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
312 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
313 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
314 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
315 any troubles that exist in <emphasis>that</emphasis> space wouldn't
316 "affect" us anymore.
317 </para>
318 <para>
319 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
320 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
321 <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
322 causes even after the modem is turned
323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
324 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
325 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
326 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
327 </para>
328 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
329 <para>
330 But unlike <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
331 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
332 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
333 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
334 important.
335 </para>
336 <para>
337 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
338 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
339 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
340 free software movement<footnote>
341 <para>
342 Richard M. Stallman, <citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
343 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets,"
344 "free trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A
345 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
346 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
347 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
348 follow-on creators and innovators remain <emphasis>as free as
349 possible</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
350 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
351 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
352 "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in which creators get to create
353 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
354 past.
355 </para>
356 <para>
357 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
358 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
359 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
360 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
361 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
362 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
363 culture deem fundamental.
364 </para>
365 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
366 <para>
367 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
368 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
369 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
370 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
371 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
372 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
373 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
374 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
375 he asked,
376 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
377 </para>
378 <blockquote>
379 <para>
380 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
381 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
382 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
383 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
384 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
385 "The Great Media Gulp," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 May 2003.
386 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
387 </para></footnote>
388 </para>
389 </blockquote>
390 <para>
391 This idea is an element of the argument of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle>, though my
392 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
393 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
394 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
395 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
396 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
397 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
398 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
399 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
400 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
401 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in <citetitle>Free Software, Free
402 Society</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
403 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
404 that this work is "merely" derivative.
405 </para>
406 <para>
407 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
408 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
409 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
410 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
411 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
412 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
413 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
414 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
415
416 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
417 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
418 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
419 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
420 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
421 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
422 what I advance here.
423 </para>
424 <para>
425 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
426 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
427 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
428 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
429 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
430 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
431 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
432 book is written.
433 </para>
434
435 </preface>
436 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
437
438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
439 <chapter id="c-introduction">
440 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
441 <para>
442 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
443 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
444 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
445 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
446 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
447 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
448 </para>
449 <para>
450 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
451 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
452 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
453 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
454 St. George Tucker, <citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
455 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
456 </para></footnote>
457 For many
458 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
459 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
460 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
461 </para>
462 <para>
463 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
464 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
465 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
466 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
467 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
468 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
469 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
470 </para>
471 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
472 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
473 <para>
474 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
475 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
476 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
477 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
478 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
479 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
480 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
481 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
482 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
483 </para>
484 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
485 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
486 <para>
487 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
488 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
489 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
490 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
491 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
492 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
493 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
494 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
495 </para>
496 <blockquote>
497 <para>
498 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
499 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
500 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
501 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
502 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
503 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
504 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
505 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
506 <para>
507 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
508 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
509 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
510 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
511 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
512 Authorship," <citetitle>Stanford Law Review</citetitle> 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
513 Goldstein, <citetitle>Real Property</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
514 1112&ndash;13.
515 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
516 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
517 </para></footnote>
518 </para>
519 </blockquote>
520 <para>
521 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
522 </para>
523 <para>
524 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
525 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
526 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
528 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
529 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
530 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
531 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
532 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
533 </para>
534 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
535 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
536 <para>
537 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
538 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
539 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
540 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
541 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
542 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
543 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
544 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
545 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
546 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
547 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
548 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
549 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
550 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
551 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
552 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
553 </para>
554 <para>
555 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
556 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
557 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
558 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
559 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
560 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
561 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
562 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
563 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
564 understanding of radio.
565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
566 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham</primary></indexterm>
567 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
568 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
569 </para>
570 <para>
571 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
572 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
573 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
574 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
575 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
576 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
577 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
578 much less transmitter power and static.
579 </para>
580 <para>
581 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
582 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
583 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
584 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
585 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
586 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
587 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
588 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
589 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
590 </para>
591 <para>
592 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
593 </para>
594 <blockquote>
595 <para>
596 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
597 sounded like a glass of water being poured. &hellip; A paper was crumpled
598 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
599 fire. &hellip; Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
600 and guitar number were performed. &hellip; The music was projected with a
601 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
602 box."<footnote><para>
603 Lawrence Lessing, <citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong</citetitle>
604 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
605 </para></footnote>
606 </para>
607 </blockquote>
608 <para>
609 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
610 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
611 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
612 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
613 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
614 a handful of networks.
615 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
616 </para>
617 <para>
618 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
619 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
620 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
621 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
622 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
623 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
624 </para>
625 <blockquote>
626 <para>
627 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
628 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
629 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
630 RCA.<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
631 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
632 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
633
634 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
635 </para></footnote>
636 </para>
637 </blockquote>
638 <para>
639 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
640 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
641 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
642 described,
643 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
644 </para>
645 <blockquote>
646 <para>
647 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
648 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
649 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
650 unrestrained, posed &hellip; a complete reordering of radio power
651 &hellip; and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
652 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
653 </para></footnote>
654 </para>
655 </blockquote>
656 <para>
657 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
658 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
659 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
660 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
661 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
662 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
663 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
664 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
665 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
666 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
667 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
668 </para>
669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
670 <blockquote>
671 <para>
672 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
673 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
674 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
675 deviousness.<footnote><para>
676 Lessing, 256.
677 </para></footnote>
678 </para>
679 </blockquote>
680 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
681 <para>
682 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
683 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
684 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
685 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
686 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
687 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
688 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
689 least temporarily.
690 </para>
691 <para>
692 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
693 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
694 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
695 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
696 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
697 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
698 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
699 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
700 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
701 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
702 </para>
703 <para>
704 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
705 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
706 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
707 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
708 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
709 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
710 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
711 course always public spirited; the reality is something
712 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
713 to themselves, would crumble in
714 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
715 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
716 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
717 effect of technological change.
718 </para>
719 <para>
720 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
721 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
722 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
723 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
724 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
725 before.<footnote><para>
726 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
727 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
728 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
729 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
730 </para></footnote>
731 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
732 of 2004.
733 </para>
734 <para>
735 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
736 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
737 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
738 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
739 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
740 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
741 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
742 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
743 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
744 </para>
745 <para>
746 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
747 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
748 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
749 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
750 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
751 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
752 has introduced.
753 </para>
754 <para>
755 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
756 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
757 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
758 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
759 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
760 parks or on
761 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
762 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
763 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
764 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
765 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel</primary></indexterm>
766 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah</primary></indexterm>
767 </para>
768 <para>
769 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
770 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
771 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
772 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
773 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
774 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
775 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
776 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
777 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
778 </para>
779 <para>
780 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
781 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
782 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
783 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
784 marketplace.<footnote>
785 <para>
786 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
787 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
788 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
789 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
790 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
791 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
792 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
793 198&ndash;200.
794 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
795 </para></footnote>
796 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
797 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
798 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
799 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
800 </para>
801 <para>
802 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
803 been erased.<footnote><para>
804 See Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
805 2001), ch. 13.
806 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
807 </para></footnote>
808 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
809 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
810 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
811 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
812 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
813 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
814 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
815 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
816 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
817 culture, more and more a permission culture.
818 </para>
819 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
820 <para>
821 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
822 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
823 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
824 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
825 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
826 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
827 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
828 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
829 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
830 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
831 Causbys.
832 </para>
833 <para>
834 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
835 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
836 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
837 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
838 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
839 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
840 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
841 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
842 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
843 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
844 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
845 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
846 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
847 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
848 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
849 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
850 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
851 </para>
852 <para>
853 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
854 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
855 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
856 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
857 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
858 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
859 remakes them.
860 </para>
861 <para>
862 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
863 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
864 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
865 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
866 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
867 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
868 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
869 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
870 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
871 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," <citetitle>New York
872 Times</citetitle>, 17 January 2002.
873 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
874 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
875 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
876 against it.
877 </para>
878 <para>
879 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
880 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
881 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
882 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
883 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
884 Internet.
885 </para>
886 <para>
887 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
888 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
889 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
890 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
891 </para>
892 <para>
893 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
894 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
895 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
896 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
897 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
898 <para>
899 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," <citetitle>Yale Law
900 Journal</citetitle> 106 (1996): 283.
901 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
902 </para></footnote>
903 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
904 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
905 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
906 could cultivate and extend our culture.
907 </para>
908 <para>
909 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
910 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
911 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
912 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
913 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
914 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
915 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
916 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
917 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
918 </para>
919 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
920 <para>
921 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
922 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
923 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
924 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
925 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
926 against an industry.
927 </para>
928 <para>
929 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
930 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
931 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
932 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
933 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
934 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
935 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
936 </para>
937 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
938 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
939 <para>
940 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
941 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
942 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
943 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
944 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
945 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
946 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
947 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
948 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
949 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
950 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
951 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
952 trespass.
953 </para>
954 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
955 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
956 <para>
957 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
958 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
959 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
960 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
961 war. Unlike
962 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
963 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
964 on its side.
965 </para>
966 <para>
967 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
968 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
969 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
970 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
971 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
972 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
973 <emphasis>uses</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
974 accepted as it is now.
975 </para>
976 <para>
977 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
978 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
979 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
980 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
981 </para>
982 <para>
983 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
984 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
985 </para>
986 <para>
987 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
988 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
989 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
990 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
991 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
992 </para>
993 <para>
994 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
995 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
996 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
997 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
998 view?
999 </para>
1000 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1001 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1002 <para>
1003 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1004 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1005 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1006 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
1007 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1008 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1009 this silliness will be much more profound.
1010 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1011 </para>
1012 <para>
1013 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1014 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1015 ideas.
1016 </para>
1017 <para>
1018 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1019 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1020 obscure French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird
1021 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1022 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1023 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1024 </para>
1025 <para>
1026 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1027 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1028 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1029 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1030 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1031 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1032 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1033 law&mdash;and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1034 fundamental about who we have always been.
1035 </para>
1036 <para>
1037 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1038 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1039 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1040 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1041 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1042 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1043 </para>
1044 </chapter>
1045 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1046 <part id="c-piracy">
1047 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1048 <partintro>
1049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1050 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1051 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1052 </indexterm>
1053 <para>
1054 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1055 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1056 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1057 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1058 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1059 </para>
1060 <blockquote>
1061 <para>
1062 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1063 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1064 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1065 <!-- f1 -->
1066 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1067 </para></footnote>
1068 </para>
1069 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1070 </blockquote>
1071 <para>
1072 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1073 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1074 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1075 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1076 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1077 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1079 </para>
1080 <para>
1081 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1082 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1083 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1084 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1085 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1086 profit."
1087 </para>
1088 <para>
1089 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1090 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1091 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1092 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1093 never mind body piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming
1094 <emphasis>thieves</emphasis>!
1095 </para>
1096 <para>
1097 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1098 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1099 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1100 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1101 </para>
1102 <para>
1103 The idea goes something like this:
1104 </para>
1105 <blockquote>
1106 <para>
1107 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1108 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1109 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1110 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1111 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1112 piracy.
1113 </para>
1114 </blockquote>
1115 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1116 <para>
1117 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1118 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1119 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1120 <!-- f2 -->
1121 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1122 in the Pepsi Generation," <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review</citetitle> 65 (1990): 397.
1123 </para></footnote>
1124 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1125 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1126 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1127 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1128 <!-- f3 -->
1129 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1130 Up," <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 21 August 1996, available at
1131 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1132 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1133 Speech, No One Wins," <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 24 November 2002.
1134 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
1135 </para></footnote>
1136 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1137 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1138 </para>
1139 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1140 <para>
1141 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1142 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1143 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1144 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1145 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1146 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1147 </para>
1148 <para>
1149 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1150 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1151 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1152 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1153 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1154 </para>
1155 <para>
1156 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1157 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1158 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1159 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1160 copyright law today regulates both.
1161 </para>
1162 <para>
1163 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1164 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1165 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1166 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1167 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1168 more expense of doing business.
1169 </para>
1170 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1171 <para>
1172 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1173 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1174 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1175 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1176 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1177 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1178 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1179 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1180 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1181 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1182 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1183 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1184 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1185 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1186 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1187 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1188 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1189 <para>
1190 <!-- f4 -->
1191 In <citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1192 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1193 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1194 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1195 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1196 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1197 enabled are much more tenuous.
1198 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1199 </para></footnote>
1200 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1201 this creative class.
1202 </para>
1203 <para>
1204 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1205 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1206 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1207 </para>
1208 </partintro>
1209
1210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1211 <chapter id="creators">
1212 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1213 <para>
1214 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1215 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called <citetitle>Plane Crazy</citetitle>.
1216 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1217 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle> brought
1218 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1219 </para>
1220 <para>
1221 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1222 movie <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1223 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1224 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1225 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1226 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1227 </para>
1228 <blockquote>
1229 <para>
1230 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1231 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1232 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1233 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1235 </para>
1236 <para>
1237 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1238 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1239 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1240 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1241 synchronization was pretty close.
1242 </para>
1243 <para>
1244 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1245 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1246 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1247 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1248 it was something new!<footnote><para>
1249 <!-- f1 -->
1250 Leonard Maltin, <citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1251 Cartoons</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1252 </para></footnote>
1253 </para>
1254 </blockquote>
1255 <para>
1256 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1257 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1258 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1259 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1260 </para>
1261 <para>
1262 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1263 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1264 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1265 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1266 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1267 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1268 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1269 </para>
1270 <para>
1271 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also marks
1272 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1273 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1274 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>.
1275 </para>
1276 <para>
1277 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of silent
1278 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1279 uncontrollable laughter from his audience. <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1280 Jr</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1281 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular
1282 and among the best of its genre.
1283 </para>
1284 <para>
1285 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1286 Willie.
1287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1288 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1289 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1290 <!-- f2 -->
1291 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1292 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1293 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1294 use the music for five songs in <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1295 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1296 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1297 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1298 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1299 </para></footnote>
1300 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1301 the invention of synchronized sound in <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle> that we
1302 get <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1303 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1304 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1305 Mouse.
1306 </para>
1307 <para>
1308 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1309 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1310 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1311 <!-- f3 -->
1312 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1313 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1314 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1315 </para></footnote>
1316 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1317 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1318 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1319 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1320 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1321 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1322 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1323 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1324 old.
1325 </para>
1326 <para>
1327 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1328 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1329 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1330 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1331 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1332 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1333 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1334 </para>
1335 <para>
1336 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1337 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1338 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1339 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1340 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1341 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1342 work of others is astonishing when set together: <citetitle>Snow White</citetitle>
1343 (1937), <citetitle>Fantasia</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Pinocchio</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Dumbo</citetitle>
1344 (1941), <citetitle>Bambi</citetitle> (1942), <citetitle>Song of the South</citetitle> (1946),
1345 <citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle> (1950), <citetitle>Alice in Wonderland</citetitle> (1951), <citetitle>Robin
1346 Hood</citetitle> (1952), <citetitle>Peter Pan</citetitle> (1953), <citetitle>Lady and the Tramp</citetitle>
1347 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1348 (1955), <citetitle>Mulan</citetitle> (1998), <citetitle>Sleeping Beauty</citetitle> (1959), <citetitle>101
1349 Dalmatians</citetitle> (1961), <citetitle>The Sword in the Stone</citetitle> (1963), and
1350 <citetitle>The Jungle Book</citetitle> (1967)&mdash;not to mention a recent example
1351 that we should perhaps quickly forget, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>
1352 (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1353 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1354 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1355 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1356 </para>
1357 <para>
1358 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1359 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1360 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1361 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1362 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1363 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1364 culture around us and makes it something different.
1365 </para>
1366 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1367 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1368 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1369 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1370 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1371 <!-- f4 -->
1372 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1373 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1374 determining
1375 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1376 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1377 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1378 average
1379 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1380 Web site associated with this book, available at
1381 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1382 </para></footnote>
1383 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1384 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1385 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1386 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1387 </para>
1388 <para>
1389 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1390 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1391 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1392 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1393 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1394 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1395 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1396 </para>
1397 <para>
1398 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1399 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1400 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1401 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1402
1403 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1404 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1405 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1406 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1407 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1408 content from before the Great Depression.
1409 </para>
1410 <para>
1411 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1412 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1413 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1414 universal.
1415 </para>
1416 <para>
1417 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1418 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: <citetitle>manga</citetitle>, or
1419 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1420 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1421 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1422 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1423 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1424 </para>
1425 <para>
1426 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1427 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1428 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1429 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1430 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1431 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1432 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1433 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1434 interestingly different way.
1435 </para>
1436 <para>
1437 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1438 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1439 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1440 </para>
1441 <para>
1442 This is the phenomenon of <citetitle>doujinshi</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1443 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1444 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is <emphasis>just</emphasis> a
1445 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1446 transforming it either subtly or
1447 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1448 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1449 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1450 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1451 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1452 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1453 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1454 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1455 </para>
1456 <para>
1457 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1458 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1459 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1460 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1461 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1462 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1463 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1464 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1465 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1466 </para>
1467 <para>
1468 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1469 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1470 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1471 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1472 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1473 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1474 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1475 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1476 Jr</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without
1477 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1478 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1479 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1480 </para>
1481 <indexterm id="idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'>
1482 <primary>Winick, Judd</primary>
1483 </indexterm>
1484 <para>
1485 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1486 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1487 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1488 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1489 in Japan now. &hellip; American comics were born out of copying each
1490 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1491 other. &hellip; That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1492 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1493 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1494 <!-- f5 -->
1495 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, <citetitle>Reinventing Comics</citetitle> (New
1496 York: Perennial, 2000).
1497 </para></footnote>
1498 </para>
1499 <para>
1500 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1501 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1502 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1503 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1504 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1505 which are fifty years old."
1506 </para>
1507 <indexterm startref="idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'/>
1508 <para>
1509 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1510 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1511 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1512 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1513 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1514 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1515 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1516 <!-- f6 -->
1517 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1518 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1519 Review</citetitle> 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1520 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1521 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1522 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1523 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1524 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1525 </para></footnote>
1526 </para>
1527 <para>
1528 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1529 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1530 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1531 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1532 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1533 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1534 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1535 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1536 culture?
1537 </para>
1538 <para>
1539 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1540 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1541 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1542 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1543 to prosecute cases like this."
1544 </para>
1545 <para>
1546 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1547 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1548 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1549 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1550 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1551 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1552 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1553 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1554 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1555 their clients or hurt them?
1556 Let's pause for a moment.
1557 </para>
1558 <para>
1559 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1560 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1561 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1562 </para>
1563 <para>
1564 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1565 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1566 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1567 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1568 <!-- f7 -->
1569 The term <citetitle>intellectual property</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1570 Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 11 (New York: New York
1571 University Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
1572 (New York: Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately
1573 describes a set of "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents,
1574 trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the nature of those rights is
1575 very different.
1576 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
1577 </para></footnote>
1578 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1579 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1580 property.
1581 </para>
1582 <para>
1583 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1584 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1585 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1586 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1587 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1588 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1589 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1590 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1591 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1592 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1593 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1594 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1595 the public domain.
1596 </para>
1597 <para>
1598 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1599 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1600 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1601
1602 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1603 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1604 freedom is good.
1605 </para>
1606 <para>
1607 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1608 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1609 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1610 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1611 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1612 form, whether large or small.
1613 </para>
1614 <para>
1615 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1616 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1617 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1618 particular find it hard to say why.
1619 </para>
1620 <para>
1621 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1622 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1623 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1624 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1625 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1626 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1627 permission from anyone. (Does <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> believe
1628 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1629 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1630 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1631 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s;
1632 two volcano disaster films in 1997.
1633 </para>
1634 <para>
1635 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1636 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1637 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1638 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1639 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1640 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1641 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1642 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1643 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1644 </para>
1645 <para>
1646 The hard question is therefore not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> a
1647 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1648 question instead is "<emphasis>How</emphasis> free is this culture?"
1649 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1650 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1651 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1652 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1653 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1654 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1655 a studio or not?
1656 </para>
1657 <para>
1658 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1659 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1660 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1661 </para>
1662
1663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1664 </chapter>
1665 <chapter id="mere-copyists">
1666 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1667 <indexterm id="idxphotography" class='startofrange'>
1668 <primary>photography</primary>
1669 </indexterm>
1670 <para>
1671 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1672 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1673 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1674 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1675 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1676 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1677 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1678 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1679 </para>
1680 <para>
1681 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1682 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1683 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1684 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1685 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1686 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1687 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1688 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1689 amateurs.
1690 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William</primary></indexterm>
1691 </para>
1692 <indexterm id="idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'>
1693 <primary>Eastman, George</primary>
1694 </indexterm>
1695 <para>
1696 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1697 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1698 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1699 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1700 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1701 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1702 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1703 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1704 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1705 population of photographers.
1706 </para>
1707 <para>
1708 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1709 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1710 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1711 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1712 <!-- f1 -->
1713 Reese V. Jenkins, <citetitle>Images and Enterprise</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1714 </para></footnote> As he described in <citetitle>The Kodak Primer</citetitle>:
1715 </para>
1716 <blockquote>
1717 <para>
1718 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1719 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1720 that only an expert can do. &hellip; We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1721 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1722 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1723 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1724 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1725 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1726 chemicals.<footnote>
1727 <para>
1728 <!-- f2 -->
1729 Brian Coe, <citetitle>The Birth of Photography</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1730 1977), 53.
1731 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1732 </para></footnote>
1733 </para>
1734 </blockquote>
1735 <para>
1736 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1737 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1738 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1739 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1740 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1741 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1742 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1743 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1744 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by 11
1745 percent.<footnote><para>
1746 <!-- f3 -->
1747 Jenkins, 177.
1748 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1749 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1750 <!-- f4 -->
1751 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1752 </para></footnote>
1753 </para>
1754 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1755 <para>
1756
1757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1758 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1759 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1760 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1761 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1762 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1763 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1764 permanent record of his family and its activities. &hellip; For the first
1765 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1766 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1767 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1768 <!-- f5 -->
1769 Coe, 58.
1770 </para></footnote>
1771 </para>
1772 <para>
1773 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1774 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1775 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1776 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1777 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1778 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1779 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1780 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1781 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1782 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1783 have before.
1784 </para>
1785 <para>
1786 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1787 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1788 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1789 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1790 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1791 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1792 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1793 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1794 <!-- f6 -->
1795 For illustrative cases, see, for example, <citetitle>Pavesich</citetitle>
1796 v. <citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co</citetitle>., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
1797 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Chinn</citetitle>, 123090 S.W. 364, 366
1798 (Ky. 1909); <citetitle>Corliss</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Walker</citetitle>, 64 F. 280 (Mass.
1799 Dist. Ct. 1894).
1800 </para></footnote>
1801 </para>
1802 <para>
1803 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1804 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1805 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1806 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1807 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1808 draw
1809 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1810 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1811 that they thought valuable.
1812 </para>
1813 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1814 <para>
1815 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1816 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1817 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1818 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1819 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1820 <para>
1821 <!-- f7 -->
1822 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1823 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review</citetitle> 4 (1890): 193.
1824 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1825 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1826 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1827 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1828 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1829 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1830 </para>
1831 <para>
1832 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1833 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1834 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1835 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1836 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1837 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1838 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1839 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1840 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1841 <!-- f8 -->
1842 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1843 Problems</citetitle> 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," <citetitle>California Law
1844 Review</citetitle> 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; <citetitle>White</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1845 Inc</citetitle>., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1846 (1993).
1847 </para></footnote>)
1848 </para>
1849 <para>
1850 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1851 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1852 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1853 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1854 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1855 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1856 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1857 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1858 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1859 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1860 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1861 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1862 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1863 </para>
1864 <para>
1865
1866 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1867 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1868 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1869 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1870 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1871 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1872 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1873 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1874 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1875 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1876 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1877 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1878 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1879 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1880 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1881 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1882 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1883 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1884 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1885 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1886 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1887 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1888 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1889 learn.
1890 </para>
1891 <indexterm startref="idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'/>
1892 <indexterm startref="idxphotography" class='endofrange'/>
1893 <para>
1894 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1895 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1896 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1897 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1898 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1899 <!-- f9 -->
1900 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1901 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1902 cadalyst, February 2002, available at
1903 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1904 </para></footnote>
1905 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1906 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1907 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1908 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1909 </para>
1910 <para>
1911 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1912 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1913 Think!, puts it, "is the ability &hellip; to understand, analyze, and
1914 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1915 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1916 the way people access it."
1917 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave</primary></indexterm>
1918 </para>
1919 <para>
1920 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1921 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1922 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1923 about.
1924 </para>
1925 <para>
1926 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1927 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1928 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1929 <!-- f10 -->
1930 Judith Van Evra, <citetitle>Television and Child Development</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1931 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1932 Study," <citetitle>Denver Post</citetitle>, 25 May 1997, B6.
1933 </para></footnote>
1934 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1935 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
1936 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
1937 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
1938 (at least at first) terrible media.
1939 </para>
1940 <para>
1941 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1942 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
1943 has written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult
1944 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
1945 language to be understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of
1946 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
1947 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
1948 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
1949 </para>
1950 <para>
1951 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1952 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1953 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1954 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1955 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1956 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1957 </para>
1958 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
1959 <para>
1960 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1961 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1962 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1963
1964 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1965 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1966 about "the placement of objects, color, &hellip; rhythm, pacing, and
1967 texture."<footnote>
1968 <para>
1969 <!-- f11 -->
1970 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1971 2002.
1972 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1973 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
1974 </para></footnote>
1975 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1976 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1977 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1978 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1979 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1980 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1981 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1982 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1983 <!-- f12 -->
1984 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1985 November 2000, available at
1986 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1987 available at
1988 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1989 </para></footnote>
1990 </para>
1991 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1992 <para>
1993 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1994 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1995 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1996 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1997 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1998 </para>
1999 <para>
2000 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
2001 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
2002 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2003 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2004 </para>
2005 <blockquote>
2006 <para>
2007 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2008 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2009 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2010 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2011 being read-only.
2012 </para>
2013 </blockquote>
2014 <para>
2015 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2016 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2017 twentieth century.
2018 </para>
2019 <para>
2020 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2021 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2022 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2023 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2024 literacy,
2025 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2026 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2027 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2028 express."<footnote>
2029 <para>
2030 <!-- f13 -->
2031 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2032 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2033 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2034 language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
2035 <!-- f14 -->
2036 Ibid.
2037 </para></footnote>
2038 </para>
2039 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2040 <para>
2041 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2042 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2043 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2044 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2045 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2046 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2047 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2048 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2049 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2050 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2051 </para>
2052 <para>
2053 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2054 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2055 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2056 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
2057 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2058 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2059 </para>
2060 <para>
2061 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2062 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2063 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2064 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2065 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2066 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2067 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2068 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2069 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2070 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2071 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2072 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2073 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2074 <emphasis>these</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2075 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2076 </para>
2077 <para>
2078
2079 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2080 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2081 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2082 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2083 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2084 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2085 part&mdash;and increasingly, not the most powerful part&mdash;of
2086 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2087 our interview,
2088 </para>
2089 <blockquote>
2090 <para>
2091 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2092 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2093 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2094 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2095 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2096 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2097 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2098 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2099 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2100 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2101 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2102 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2103 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2104 camera and &hellip; saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2105 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2106 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2107 about the topic. &hellip;
2108 </para>
2109 <para>
2110 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2111 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2112 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2113 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2114 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2115 </para>
2116 <para>
2117 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2118 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2119 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2120 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2121 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2122 had a lot of power with this language."
2123 </para>
2124 </blockquote>
2125 <para>
2126 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2127 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2128 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2129 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2130 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2131 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2132 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2133 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2134 world would be watching.
2135 </para>
2136 <para>
2137 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2138 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2139 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2140 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2141 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2142 entertainment is tragedy.
2143 </para>
2144 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2145 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2146 <para>
2147 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2148 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2149 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2150 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2151 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2152 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2153 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2154 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2155 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2156 the term in his book <citetitle>Cyber Rights</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2157 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2158 was also the Internet.
2159 </para>
2160 <para>
2161 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2162 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2163 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2164 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2165 movie
2166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2167 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2168 with sound or text.
2169 </para>
2170 <para>
2171 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2172 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2173 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2174 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2175 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2176 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2177 spread practically instantaneously.
2178 </para>
2179 <para>
2180 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2181 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2182 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2183 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2184 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2185 cultures, it records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind
2186 of electronic <citetitle>Jerry Springer</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2187 </para>
2188 <para>
2189 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2190 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2191 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2192 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2193 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2194 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2195 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2196 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2197 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2198 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2199 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2200 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2201 </para>
2202 <para>
2203 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2204 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2205 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2206 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2207 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2208 people vote
2209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2210 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2211 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2212 </para>
2213 <para>
2214 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2215 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2216 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2217 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2218 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2219 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2220 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2221 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2222 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2223 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2224 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2225 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2226 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2227 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2228 <!-- f15 -->
2229 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, <citetitle>Democracy in America</citetitle>,
2230 bk. 1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2231 </para></footnote>
2232 </para>
2233 <para>
2234 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2235 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2236 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2237 <!-- f16 -->
2238 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," <citetitle>Journal of
2239 Political Philosophy</citetitle> 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2240 </para></footnote>
2241 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2242 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2243 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2244 </para>
2245 <para>
2246 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2247 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2248 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2249 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2250 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2251 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2252 <!-- f17 -->
2253 Cass Sunstein, <citetitle>Republic.com</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2254 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2255 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2256 little beyond what our friends say.
2257 </para>
2258 <para>
2259 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2260 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2261 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2262 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2263 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2264
2265 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2266 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2267 place.
2268 </para>
2269 <para>
2270 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2271 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2272 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2273 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2274 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2275 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2276 </para>
2277 <para>
2278 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2279 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race
2280 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2281 is having an effect.
2282 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard</primary></indexterm>
2283 </para>
2284 <para>
2285 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2286 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2287 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2288 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2289 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2290 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2291 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2292 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2293 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2294 resign as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2295 <!-- f18 -->
2296 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2297 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2298 </para></footnote>
2299 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent</primary></indexterm>
2300 </para>
2301 <para>
2302 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2303 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2304 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2305 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2306 on.
2307 </para>
2308 <para>
2309 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2310 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2311 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2312 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2313 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2314 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2315 peer-generated rankings.
2316 </para>
2317 <indexterm id="idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'>
2318 <primary>Winer, Dave</primary>
2319 </indexterm>
2320 <para>
2321 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2322 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2323 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2324 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2325 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2326 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2327 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2328 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2329 get it out of the way."
2330 </para>
2331 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2332 <para>
2333 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2334 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2335 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2336 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2337 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2338 <!-- f19 -->
2339 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2340 </para></footnote>
2341 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2342 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2343 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2344 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2345 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2346 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2347 told her <emphasis>that</emphasis> they were writing "the story.")
2348 </para>
2349 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2350 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2351 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2352 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2353 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2354 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2355 had seen.<footnote><para>
2356 <!-- f20 -->
2357 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2358 Information Online," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2359 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2360 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2361 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2362 </para></footnote>
2363 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2364 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2365 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2366 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2367 </para>
2368 <para>
2369 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2370 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2371 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2372 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2373 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2374 <para>
2375 <!-- f21 -->
2376 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" <citetitle>New
2377 York Times</citetitle>, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2378 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2379 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2380 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2381 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a <citetitle>Houston Chronicle</citetitle> reporter, was
2382 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2383 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2384 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2385 </para></footnote>
2386 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2387
2388 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2389 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2390 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2391 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2392 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2393 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2394 </para>
2395 <para>
2396 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2397 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2398 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2399 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2400 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2401 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2402 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2403 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2404 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2405 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2406 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2407 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2408 extraordinary to report.
2409 </para>
2410 <indexterm startref="idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'/>
2411 <indexterm id="idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'>
2412 <primary>Brown, John Seely</primary>
2413 </indexterm>
2414 <para>
2415 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2416 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and &hellip; the
2417 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating &hellip; innovation."
2418 </para>
2419 <para>
2420 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2421 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2422 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2423 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2424 affect learning.
2425 </para>
2426 <para>
2427 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2428 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2429 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2430 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2431 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2432 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2434 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2435 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2436 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2437 the tinkering of many others.
2438 </para>
2439 <para>
2440 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2441 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2442 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2443 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2444 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2445 </para>
2446 <para>
2447 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2448 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you &hellip;
2449 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2450 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2451 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2452 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2453 </para>
2454 <para>
2455 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2456 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2457 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2458 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2459 platform. &hellip; You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2460 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2461 learn.
2462 </para>
2463 <para>
2464 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2465 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2466 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2467 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2468 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2469 text. "The Web &hellip; says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2470 you are visual, if you are interested in film &hellip; [then] there is a
2471 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2472 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2473 </para>
2474 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2475 <para>
2476 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2477 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2478
2479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2480 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2481 kind of recognition.
2482 </para>
2483 <para>
2484 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2485 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2486 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2487 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2488 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2489 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2490 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2491 </para>
2492 <para>
2493 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2494 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2495 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>)
2496 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2497 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2498 general.<footnote><para>
2499 <!-- f22 -->
2500 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2501 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," <citetitle>Communications
2502 of the Association for Computer Machinery</citetitle> 43 (2000): 9.
2503 </para></footnote>
2504 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2505 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2506 </para>
2507 <para>
2508 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2509 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2510 and want to learn."
2511 </para>
2512 <para>
2513 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2514 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2515 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. &hellip; We're building an
2516 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2517 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2518 </para>
2519 <indexterm startref="idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'/>
2520 <para>
2521 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2522 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2523 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2524 the law to close down that technology.
2525 </para>
2526 <para>
2527 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2528 chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="collectors"/>,
2529 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2530 </para>
2531 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2532 </chapter>
2533 <chapter id="catalogs">
2534 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2535 <para>
2536 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2537 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2538 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2539 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2540 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2541 </para>
2542 <para>
2543 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2544 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2545 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2546 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2547 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2548 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2549 </para>
2550 <para>
2551 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2552 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2553 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2554 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2555 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2556 </para>
2557 <para>
2558 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2560 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2561 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2562 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2563 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2564 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2565 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2566 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2567 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2568 </para>
2569 <para>
2570 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2571 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2572 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2573 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2574 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2575 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2576 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2577 </para>
2578 <para>
2579 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2580 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2581 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2582 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2583 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2584 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2585 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2586 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2587 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2588 on-line.
2589 </para>
2590 <para>
2591 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2592 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2593 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2594 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2595 be on users' computers.
2596 </para>
2597 <para>
2598 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2599 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2600 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2601 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2602 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2603 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2604 computer.
2605 </para>
2606 <para>
2607 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2608 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2609 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2610 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2611 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2612 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2613 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2614 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2615 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2616 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2617 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2618 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2619 supposed to do.
2620 </para>
2621 <para>
2622 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2623 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2624 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2625 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2626 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2627 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2628 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2629 </para>
2630 <para>
2631 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2632 wrong. &hellip; I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2633 engine that I ran or &hellip; what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2634 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2635 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2636 easier to use"&mdash;again, a <emphasis>search engine</emphasis>,
2637 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2638 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2639 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2640 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2641 with music.
2642 </para>
2643 <para>
2644 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2645 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2646 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2647 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2648 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2649 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2650 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2651 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2652 Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2653 </para>
2654 <para>
2655 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2656 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2657 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2658 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2659 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2660 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2661 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100
2662 <emphasis>billion</emphasis>&mdash;six times the
2663 <emphasis>total</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2664 2001.<footnote><para>
2665
2666 <!-- f1 -->
2667 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2668 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC</citetitle> 6
2669 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2670 </para></footnote>
2671 </para>
2672 <para>
2673 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2674 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2675 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2676 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2677 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2678 </para>
2679 <para>
2680 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2681 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2682 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2683 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2684 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2685 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2686 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2687 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2688 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2689 </para>
2690 <para>
2691 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2692 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2693 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2694 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2695 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2697 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2698 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2699 </para>
2700 <para>
2701 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2702 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2703 </para>
2704 <para>
2705 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2706 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2707 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2708 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2709 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2710 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2711 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2712 <!-- f2 -->
2713 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2714 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2715 the Arts, <citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon</citetitle> (2000).
2716 </para></footnote>
2717 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2718 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2719 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2720 <!-- f3 -->
2721 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2722 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, A24.
2723 </para></footnote>
2724 </para>
2725 <para>
2726 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2727 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2728 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2729 activist:
2730 </para>
2731 <blockquote>
2732 <para>
2733 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2734 an activist. &hellip; [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2735 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2736 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2737 </para>
2738 </blockquote>
2739 <para>
2740 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2741 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2742 I. &hellip; He's not a tree hugger. &hellip; I think it's bizarre that they would
2743 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2744 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2745 </para>
2746 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2747 </chapter>
2748 <chapter id="pirates">
2749 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2750 <para>
2751 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2752 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2753 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2754 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2755 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2756 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2757 </para>
2758 <section id="film">
2759 <title>Film</title>
2760 <para>
2761 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2762 <!-- f1 -->
2763 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2764 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 87&ndash;93,
2765 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2766 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
2767 </para></footnote>
2768 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2769 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2770 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2771 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2772 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2773 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2774 this creative property
2775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2776 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2777 </para>
2778 <para>
2779 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2780 </para>
2781 <blockquote>
2782 <para>
2783 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2784 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2785 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2786 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2787 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2788 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2789 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2790 </para>
2791 <para>
2792 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2793 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2794 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2795 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2796 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2797 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2798 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2799 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2800 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2801 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2802 <!-- f2 -->
2803 J. A. Aberdeen, <citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2804 Picture Producers</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2805 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2806 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2807 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2808 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2809 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2810 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2811 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2812 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2813 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2814 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William</primary></indexterm>
2815 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2816 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2817 </para>
2818 </blockquote>
2819 <para>
2820 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2821 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2822 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2823 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2824 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2825 <!-- f3 -->
2826 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," <citetitle>The Silents Majority</citetitle>, archived at
2827 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2828 </para></footnote>
2829 That led the independents to flee the East
2830 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2831 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2832 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2833 did just that.
2834 </para>
2835 <para>
2836 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2837 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2838 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2839
2840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2841 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2842 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2843 Edison's creative property.
2844 </para>
2845 </section>
2846 <section id="recordedmusic">
2847 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2848 <para>
2849 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2850 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2851 </para>
2852 <indexterm id="idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'>
2853 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri</primary>
2854 </indexterm>
2855 <para>
2856 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2857 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2858 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2859 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2860 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2861 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2862 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2863 right to perform it publicly.
2864 </para>
2865 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2866 <para>
2867 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2868 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2869 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2870 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2871 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2872 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2873 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2874 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2875 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2876 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2877 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2878 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2879 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2880 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2881 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2882 its composer anything.
2883 </para>
2884 <indexterm startref="idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'/>
2885 <para>
2886 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2887 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2888 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2889 put it,
2890 </para>
2891 <blockquote>
2892 <para>
2893 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2894 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2895 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2896 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2897 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2898 rights.<footnote><para>
2899 <!-- f4 -->
2900 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2901 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2902 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2903 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in <citetitle>Legislative History of the
2904 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2905 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2906 </para></footnote>
2907 </para>
2908 </blockquote>
2909 <para>
2910 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2911 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2912 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2913 <!-- f5 -->
2914 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2915 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2916 </para></footnote>
2917 and the "music publishing industry"
2918 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2919 <!-- f6 -->
2920 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2921 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2922 </para></footnote>
2923 As John Philip
2924 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2925 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2926 <!-- f7 -->
2927 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2928 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2929 </para></footnote>
2930 </para>
2931 <para>
2932 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2933 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2934 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2935 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2936 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2937 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2938 <!-- f8 -->
2939
2940 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2941 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2942 Perforating Company of New York).
2943 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
2944 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
2945 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2946 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
2947 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
2948 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
2949 statute."<footnote><para>
2950 <!-- f9 -->
2951 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
2952 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2953 Graphophone Company Association).
2954 </para></footnote>
2955 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company</primary></indexterm>
2956 </para>
2957 <para>
2958 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
2959 <emphasis>and</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
2960 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical
2961 reproductions" of their music. But rather than simply granting the
2962 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
2963 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
2964 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
2965 recorded once. This is the part of
2966
2967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2968 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2969 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2970 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2971 </para>
2972 <para>
2973 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2974 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
2975 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
2976 Copyright Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
2977 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
2978 the fee set by the statute.
2979 </para>
2980 <para>
2981 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2982 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2983 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2984 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2985 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2986 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2987 Grisham.
2988 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
2989 </para>
2990 <para>
2991 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2992 thus, in effect, the law <emphasis>subsidizes</emphasis> the recording
2993 industry through a kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a
2994 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
2995 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
2996 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
2997 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
2998 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
2999 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3000 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3001 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3002 creativity.<footnote><para>
3003
3004 <!-- f10 -->
3005 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
3006 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
3007 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3008 in <citetitle>Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3009 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3010 </para></footnote>
3011 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
3012 </para>
3013 <para>
3014 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3015 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3016 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3017 relates,
3018 </para>
3019 <blockquote>
3020 <para>
3021 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3023 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3024 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3025 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3026 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3027 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3028 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3029 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before 1909 and
3030 the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3031 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3032 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3033 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3034 choice.<footnote><para>
3035 <!-- f11 -->
3036 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
3037 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
3038 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3039 this report.</para></footnote>
3040 </para>
3041 </blockquote>
3042 <para>
3043 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3044 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3045 </para>
3046 </section>
3047 <section id="radio">
3048 <title>Radio</title>
3049 <para>
3050 Radio was also born of piracy.
3051 </para>
3052 <para>
3053 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3054 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3055 <!-- f12 -->
3056 See 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3057 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3058 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3059 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3060 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3061 station. See <citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Whiteman</citetitle>, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3062 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3063 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3064 Copyright," <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 281.
3065 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3066 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3067 </para></footnote>
3068 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3069 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3070 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3071 </para>
3072 <para>
3073 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3074 copy of the <emphasis>composer's</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3075 also performing a copy of the <emphasis>recording artist's</emphasis>
3076 work. It's one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the
3077 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3078 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3079 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3080 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3081 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3082 music for his work.
3083 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
3084
3085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3086 </para>
3087 <para>
3088 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3089 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3090 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3091 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3092 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3093 of playing the song.
3094 </para>
3095 <indexterm id="idxmadonna" class='startofrange'>
3096 <primary>Madonna</primary>
3097 </indexterm>
3098 <para>
3099 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3100 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3101 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3102 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3103 </para>
3104 <para>
3105 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3106 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3107 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3108 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3109 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3110 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to
3111 <emphasis>pirate</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3112 her anything.
3113 </para>
3114 <indexterm startref="idxmadonna" class='endofrange'/>
3115 <para>
3116 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3117 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3118 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3119 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3120 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3121 to take something for nothing.
3122 </para>
3123 </section>
3124 <section id="cabletv">
3125 <title>Cable TV</title>
3126 <para>
3127
3128 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3129 </para>
3130 <para>
3131 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3132 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3133 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3134 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3136 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3137 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3138 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3139 give away.
3140 </para>
3141 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3142 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3143 <para>
3144 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3145 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3146 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3147 <!-- f13 -->
3148 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3149 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3150 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3151 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3152 Commission).
3153 </para></footnote>
3154 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3155 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3156 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3157 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3158 <!-- f14 -->
3159 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3160 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3161 </para></footnote>
3162 As another broadcaster put it,
3163 </para>
3164 <blockquote>
3165 <para>
3166 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3167 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3168 paid for.<footnote><para>
3169 <!-- f15 -->
3170 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3171 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3172 </para></footnote>
3173 </para>
3174 </blockquote>
3175 <para>
3176 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3177 </para>
3178 <blockquote>
3179 <para>
3180 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3181 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3182 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3183 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3184 <!-- f16 -->
3185 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3186 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3187 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3188 </para></footnote>
3189 </para>
3190 </blockquote>
3191 <para>
3192 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3193 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3194 compensation."<footnote><para>
3195 <!-- f17 -->
3196 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3197 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3198 </para></footnote>
3199 </para>
3200 <para>
3201 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3202 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3203 </para>
3204 <blockquote>
3205 <para>
3206 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3207 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3208 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3209 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. &hellip; The
3210
3211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3212 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3213 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3214 <!-- f18 -->
3215 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3216 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3217 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3218 </para></footnote>
3219 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3220 </para>
3221 </blockquote>
3222 <para>
3223 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3224 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3225 </para>
3226 <para>
3227 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3228 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3229 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3230 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3231 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3232 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3233 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3234 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3235 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3236 created by broadcasters' content.
3237 </para>
3238 <para>
3239 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3240 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3241 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3242 today<footnote><para>
3243 <!-- f19 -->
3244 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, <citetitle>The Engine
3245 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3246 Information</citetitle>, available at
3247 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3248 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3249 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3250 </para></footnote>
3251 &mdash; then <emphasis>every</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3252 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3253 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV. &hellip; The list is long and
3254 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3255 last. Every generation&mdash;until now.
3256 </para>
3257 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3258 </section>
3259 </chapter>
3260 <chapter id="piracy">
3261 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3262 <para>
3263 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3264 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3265 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3266 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3267 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3268 should stop it.
3269 </para>
3270 <para>
3271 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3272 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3273 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3274 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3275 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3276 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3277 has so often done in the past.
3278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3279 </para>
3280 <section id="piracy-i">
3281 <title>Piracy I</title>
3282 <para>
3283 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3284 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3285 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3286 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3287 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3288 <!-- f1 -->
3289 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), <citetitle>The
3290 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003</citetitle>, July 2003, available
3291 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See
3292 also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk," <citetitle>Financial
3293 Times</citetitle>, 14 February 2003, 11.
3294 </para></footnote>
3295 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3296 estimates that it loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3297 </para>
3298 <para>
3299 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3300 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3301 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3302 This piracy is wrong.
3303 </para>
3304 <para>
3305 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3306 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3307 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3308 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3309 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3310 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3311 of our existence, treated as right.
3312 </para>
3313 <para>
3314 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3315 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3316 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3317 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3318 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3319 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3320 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3321 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3322 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3323 </para>
3324 <para>
3325 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3326 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3327 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3328 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3329 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3330 similar childhood.
3331 </para>
3332 <para>
3333 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3334 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3335 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3336 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3337 <!-- f2 -->
3338 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: <citetitle>Who
3339 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3340 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3341 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3342 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3343 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3344 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3345 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3346 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3347 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3348 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3349 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3350 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3351 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3352 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3353 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3354 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3355 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3356 is wrong.
3357 </para>
3358 <para>
3359 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3360 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3361 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3362 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3363 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3364 <!-- f3 -->
3365 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3366 Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3367 144&ndash;90. "In some instances &hellip; the impact of piracy on the
3368 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3369 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3370 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3371 pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3372 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3373 </para></footnote>
3374 </para>
3375 <para>
3376 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3377 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3378 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3379 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3380 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3381 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3382 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3383 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3384 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3385 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3386 piracy of the tangible.
3387 </para>
3388 <para>
3389 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3390 property right of a very special sort, it <emphasis>is</emphasis> a
3391 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3392 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3393 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3394 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3395 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3396 give people the right to "take" copyrighted content whether or not the
3397 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3398
3399 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3400 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3401 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3402 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3403 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3404 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3405 </para>
3406 <para>
3407 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3408 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal"
3409 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3410 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3411 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3412 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3413 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3414 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3415 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3416 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3417 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3418 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3419 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3420 <indexterm>
3421 <primary>Microsoft</primary>
3422 <secondary>Windows operating system of</secondary>
3423 </indexterm>
3424 <indexterm><primary>Windows</primary></indexterm>
3425 </para>
3426 <para>
3427 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3428 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3429 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3430 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3431 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3432 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3433 </para>
3434 <para>
3435 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3436 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3437 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3438 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3439 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3440 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3441 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3442 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3443 what&mdash;at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3444 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3445 violating the law is still wrong.
3446 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3447 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3448 </para>
3449 <para>
3450 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3451 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3452 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3453 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3454 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3455 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3456 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3457 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3458 is flat out wrong.
3459 </para>
3460 <para>
3461 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3462 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3463 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3464 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3465 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3466 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3467 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3468 </para>
3469 <para>
3470 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3471 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3472 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3473 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3474 </para>
3475 <para>
3476 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3477 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3478 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3479 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3480 </para>
3481 <para>
3482 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3483 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3484 sharing to survive.
3485 </para>
3486 </section>
3487 <section id="piracy-ii">
3488 <title>Piracy II</title>
3489 <para>
3490 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3491 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3492 <!-- f4 -->
3493 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3494 </para></footnote>
3495 This means we must determine whether
3496 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3498 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3499 author of his profit.
3500 </para>
3501 <para>
3502 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3503 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3504 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3505 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3506 <!-- f5 -->
3507 See Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3508 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle> (New York:
3509 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3510 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3511 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3512 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3513 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3514 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3515
3516 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3517 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3518 put together components that had been developed independently.
3519 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3520 </para>
3521 <para>
3522 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3523 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3524 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3525 system.<footnote><para>
3526 <!-- f6 -->
3527 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," <citetitle>San
3528 Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3529 <citetitle>New Scientist</citetitle>, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3530 Secures New Financing," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 23 May 2003, C1;
3531 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3532 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) <citetitle>Times</citetitle>, 26 July 2002, 18.
3533 </para></footnote>
3534 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3535 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3536 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3537 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3538 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3539 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3540 or your 20,000 best friends.
3541 </para>
3542 <para>
3543 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3544 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3545 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3546 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3547
3548 <!-- f7 -->
3549 See Ipsos-Insight, <citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution</citetitle>
3550 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3551 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3552 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3553 </para></footnote>
3554 A survey by the NPD group quoted in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>
3555 estimated that 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3556 exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3557 <!-- f8 -->
3558 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," <citetitle>New
3559 York Times</citetitle>, 6 June 2003, A1.
3560 </para></footnote>
3561 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3562 massive quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The
3563 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3564 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3565 </para>
3566 <para>
3567 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3568 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3569 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3570 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more
3571 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3572 do&mdash;the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3573 of harm it entails.
3574 </para>
3575 <para>
3576 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3577 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3578 different kinds into four types.
3579 </para>
3580 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3581 <listitem><para>
3582 <!-- A. -->
3583 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3584 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3585 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3586 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3587 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3588 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3589 users who download instead of purchasing.
3590 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
3591 </para></listitem>
3592 <listitem><para>
3593 <!-- B. -->
3594 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3595 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3596 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3597 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3598 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3599 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3600 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3601 music purchased.
3602 </para></listitem>
3603 <listitem><para>
3604 <!-- C. -->
3605 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3606 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3607 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3608 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3609 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3610 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3611 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old
3612 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3613 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3614 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3615 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same
3616 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3617 a local collector.
3618 </para></listitem>
3619 <listitem><para>
3620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3621 <!-- D. -->
3622 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3623 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3624 wants to give away.
3625 </para></listitem>
3626 </orderedlist>
3627 <para>
3628 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3629 </para>
3630 <para>
3631 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3632 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3633 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3634 harmful.<footnote><para>
3635 <!-- f9 -->
3636 See Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle>, 148&ndash;49.
3637 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3638 </para></footnote>
3639 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3640 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3641 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3642 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3643 answer&mdash;and certainly much more difficult than the current
3644 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3645 </para>
3646 <para>
3647 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3648 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3649 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3650 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3651 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is
3652 "devastating" the industry.
3653 </para>
3654 <para>
3655 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3656 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3657 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3658 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3659 &amp; Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3660 technology, the labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3661 <!-- f10 -->
3662 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, <citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3663 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis</citetitle> (2003), 3. This report
3664 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3665 practice of cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising
3666 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping
3667 is killing music." At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3668 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3669 behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3670 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3671 Assessment, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law</citetitle>,
3672 OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3673 October 1989), 145&ndash;56. </para></footnote>
3674 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3675 when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the industry claimed
3676 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3677 regulating technology was the answer.
3678 </para>
3679 <para>
3680 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3681 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3682 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' &hellip; was
3683 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3684 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3685 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3686 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3687 <!-- f11 -->
3688 U.S. Congress, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying</citetitle>, 4.
3689 </para></footnote>
3690 </para>
3691 <para>
3692 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3693 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3694 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3695 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3696 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3697 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3698 harmful. The question is also <emphasis>how</emphasis> harmful type A
3699 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3700 </para>
3701 <para>
3702 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3703 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3704 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3705 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3706 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3707 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3708 therefore have little <emphasis>static</emphasis> reason to resist
3709 them.
3710
3711 </para>
3712 <para>
3713 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3714 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3715 actually suggest it might be close.
3716 </para>
3717 <para>
3718 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent,
3719 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7
3720 percent.<footnote><para>
3721 <!-- f12 -->
3722 See Recording Industry Association of America, <citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics</citetitle>,
3723 available at
3724 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later
3725 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3726 Association of America, <citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy</citetitle>, 25 June 2003,
3727 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3728 #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3729 have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in to 860 million
3730 units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3731 of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in to $12.6
3732 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3733 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3734 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3735 shipments)."
3736 </para></footnote>
3737 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3738 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3739 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3740 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That no
3741 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3742 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3743 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3744 <!-- f13 -->
3745 <para>
3746 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3747 February 2003, available at
3748 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3749 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3750 </para>
3751 </footnote>
3752 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3753 the decline. As Jane Black of <citetitle>BusinessWeek</citetitle> notes, "The
3754 soundtrack to the film <citetitle>High Fidelity</citetitle> has a list price of
3755 $18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3756 $19.99."<footnote><para>
3757 <!-- f14 -->
3758 Ibid.
3759 </para></footnote>
3760 </para>
3761 <para>
3762
3763 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3764 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3765 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3766 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3767 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3768 although 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3769 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3770 </para>
3771 <para>
3772 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3773 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3774 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between
3775 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own numbers
3776 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3777 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3778 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3779 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of
3780 Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry
3781 would have suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7
3782 percent drop. If 2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3783 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is
3784 a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3785 </para>
3786 <para>
3787 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3788 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3789 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3790 these costs?
3791 </para>
3792 <para>
3793 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that
3794 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3795 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3796 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3797 available.<footnote><para>
3798 <!-- f15 -->
3799 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3800 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3801 Law&mdash;Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3802 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April
3803 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3804 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3805 </para></footnote>
3806 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3807 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3808 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3809 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3810 sense <emphasis>to the company</emphasis> to make it available.
3811 </para>
3812 <para>
3813 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3815 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3816 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3817 today.<footnote><para>
3818 <!-- f16 -->
3819 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3820 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3821 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, <citetitle>The Quiet
3822 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market</citetitle> (2002), available at
3823 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3824 National
3825 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3826 Results,"
3827 available at
3828 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3829 </para></footnote>
3830 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3831 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3832 content, <emphasis>even if the content is still under
3833 copyright</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3834 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3835 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3836 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3837 the content they sell.
3838 </para>
3839 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3840 <para>
3841 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3842 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3843 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3844 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3845 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3846 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3847 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3848 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3849 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3850 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3851 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3852 </para>
3853 <para>
3854 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3855 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3856 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3857 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3858 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3859 shut as well?
3860 </para>
3861 <para>
3862 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3863 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3864 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3865 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3866 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
3867 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3868
3869 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3870 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3871 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3872 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3873 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3874 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3875 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3876 great book!)
3877 </para>
3878 <para>
3879 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3880 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3881 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3882 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3883 </para>
3884 <para>
3885 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3886 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3887 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3888 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3889 unavailable?"
3890 </para>
3891 <para>
3892 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3893 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3894 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
3895 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="pirates"/>, much of
3896 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3897 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3898 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3899 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3900 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3901 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3902 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3903 found only with time.
3904 </para>
3905 <para>
3906 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3907 just what you call type A sharing?"
3908 </para>
3909 <para>
3910 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3911 effect
3912 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3913 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3914 Napster
3915 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3916 developed
3917 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3919 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3920 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3921 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3922 <!-- f17 -->
3923 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3924 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3925 MHP, available at
3926
3927 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an
3928 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
3929 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster</citetitle> (New
3930 York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3931 </para></footnote>
3932 </para>
3933 <para>
3934 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3935 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3936 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3937 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3938 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3939 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3940 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3941 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3942 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3943 </para>
3944 <para>
3945 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3946 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3947 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
3948 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3949 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
3950 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
3951 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3952 </para>
3953 <para>
3954 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3955 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3956 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3957 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
3958 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
3959 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
3960 complained to Congress that their "creative property" was not being
3961 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
3962 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
3963 benefit was enough.
3964 </para>
3965 <para>
3966 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3967 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3968 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3969 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3970 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
3971 price.
3972 </para>
3973 <para>
3974
3975 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3976 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3977 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals
3978 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
3979 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
3980 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
3981 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
3982 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
3983 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
3984 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
3985 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
3986 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
3987 Congress chose a path that would assure
3988 <emphasis>compensation</emphasis> without giving the past
3989 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
3990 </para>
3991 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
3992 <para>
3993 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3994 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3995 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3996 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3997 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3998 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3999 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4000 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4001 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4002 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4003 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4004 </para>
4005 <para>
4006 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4007 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4008 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4009 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4010 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4011 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4012 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4013 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4014 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4015 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4016 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4017 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4018 for the architecture it chose.
4019 </para>
4020 <para>
4021 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4022 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4023 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4024 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4025 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4026 copyright."<footnote><para>
4027 <!-- f18 -->
4028 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4029 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4030 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4031 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4032 </para></footnote>
4033 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4034 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4035 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4036 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4037 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4038 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4039 <!-- f19 -->
4040 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4041 </para></footnote>
4042 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4043 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4044 <!-- f20 -->
4045 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4046 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4047 </para></footnote>
4048 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4049 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4050 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4051 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4052 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4053 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4054 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4055 <!-- f21 -->
4056 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4057 of Jack Valenti).
4058 </para></footnote>
4059 </para>
4060 <para>
4061 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4062 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4063 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex
4064 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood
4065 Circuit"&mdash;held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4066 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4067 rule, this totally familiar technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had
4068 called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry" (worse
4069 yet, it was a <emphasis>Japanese</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4070 American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4071 technology.<footnote><para>
4072 <!-- f22 -->
4073 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4074 1981).
4075 </para></footnote>
4076 </para>
4077 <para>
4078 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4079
4080 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4081 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4082 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4083 Court wrote,
4084 </para>
4085 <blockquote>
4086 <para>
4087 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4088 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4089 market
4090 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4091 authority
4092 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4093 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4094 implicated
4095 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4096 <!-- f23 -->
4097 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4098 </para></footnote>
4099 </para>
4100 </blockquote>
4101 <para>
4102 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4103 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4104 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4105 enough, this "taking" notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4106 together, a pattern is clear:
4107 </para>
4108
4109 <table id="t1">
4110 <title>Pattern of Court and Congress response</title>
4111 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4112 <thead>
4113 <row>
4114 <entry>CASE</entry>
4115 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4116 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4117 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4118 </row>
4119 </thead>
4120 <tbody>
4121 <row>
4122 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4123 <entry>Composers</entry>
4124 <entry>No protection</entry>
4125 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4126 </row>
4127 <row>
4128 <entry>Radio</entry>
4129 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4130 <entry>N/A</entry>
4131 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4132 </row>
4133 <row>
4134 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4135 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4136 <entry>No protection</entry>
4137 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4138 </row>
4139 <row>
4140 <entry>VCR</entry>
4141 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4142 <entry>No protection</entry>
4143 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4144 </row>
4145 </tbody>
4146 </tgroup>
4147 </table>
4148
4149 <para>
4150 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4151 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4152 <!-- f24 -->
4153 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4154 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4155 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4156 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4157 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4158 1992 (Title 17 of the <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4159 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4160 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4161 Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4162 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4163 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4164 </para></footnote>
4165 In each case, throughout our history,
4166 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4167 work.
4168 </para>
4169 <para>
4170 In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4171 Congress eliminate all free riding. In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of
4172 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4173 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4174 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy."
4175 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4176 the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed some new
4177 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4178 interests at stake.
4179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4180 </para>
4181 <para>
4182 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4183 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4184 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4185 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4186 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4187 regulated?
4188 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4189 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4190 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4191 permission to record a song?
4192 </para>
4193 <para>
4194 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4195 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4196 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4197 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4198 <!-- f25 -->
4199 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
4200 (1984).
4201 </para></footnote>
4202 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4203 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4204 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4205 balancing has historically been done <emphasis>after</emphasis> a
4206 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4207 facilitate the distribution of content.
4208 </para>
4209 <para>
4210 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4211 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4212 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4213 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither
4214 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4215 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4216 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4217 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4218 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4219 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4220 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4221 public interest that innovation continue.
4222 </para>
4223 <para>
4224
4225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4226 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4227 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4228 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4229 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4230 efficient. Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz
4231 writes in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, "could be delayed in the P2P
4232 fight."<footnote><para>
4233 <!-- f26 -->
4234 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4235 Echoes Past Efforts," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 September 2003, C3.
4236 </para></footnote>
4237 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright warriors
4238 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance and
4239 incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content," the
4240 warriors insist, "is our <emphasis>property</emphasis>. Why should we
4241 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4242 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4243 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4244 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4245 arrest him?"
4246 </para>
4247 <para>
4248 "It is <emphasis>our property</emphasis>," the warriors insist. "And
4249 it should be protected just as any other property is protected."
4250 </para>
4251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4252 </section>
4253 </chapter>
4254 </part>
4255 <part id="c-property">
4256 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4257 <partintro>
4258 <para>
4259
4260 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4261 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4262 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4263 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4264 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4265 the price she can get.
4266 </para>
4267 <para>
4268 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4269 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4270 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4271 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4272 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4273 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4274 when I take the good <emphasis>idea</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4275 table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4276 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4277 then?
4278 </para>
4279 <para>
4280 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4281 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4283 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4284 narrow
4285 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4286 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4287 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4288 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4289 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4290 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4291 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4292 <!-- f1 -->
4293 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4294 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</citetitle>, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4295 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4296 </para></footnote>
4297 </para>
4298 <para>
4299 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4300 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4301 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4302 expression
4303 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4304 property.
4305 </para>
4306 <para>
4307 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details,
4308 in other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4309 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4310 "property" in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4311 <!-- f2 -->
4312 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4313 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4314 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4315 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4316 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4317 Adam Mossoff, "What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,"
4318 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review</citetitle> 45 (2003): 373, 429 n. 241.
4319 </para></footnote>
4320 </para>
4321 <para>
4322 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4323 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4324 "copyright material is property" in context. Where did the idea come
4325 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4326 these stories, the significance of this true
4327 statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash; will be a bit
4328 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4329 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4330 </para>
4331 </partintro>
4332
4333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4334 <chapter id="founders">
4335 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4336 <para>
4337 William Shakespeare wrote <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> in 1595. The play
4338 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4339 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4340 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4341 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4342 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4343 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4344 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare
4345 is so full of clichés."
4346 </para>
4347 <para>
4348 In 1774, almost 180 years after <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> was written, the
4349 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4350 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4351 <!-- f1 -->
4352 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4353 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4354 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to <citetitle>Romeo and
4355 Juliet</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4356 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4357 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4358 Bookseller," <citetitle>American Scholar</citetitle> 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4359 </para></footnote>
4360 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4361 the Conger<footnote><para>
4362 <!-- f2 -->
4363 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle> (Nashville:
4364 Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4365 </para></footnote>
4366 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4367 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of
4368 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4369 that no
4370 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4371 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4372 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4373 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4374 </para>
4375 <para>
4376 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4377 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4378 history of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament
4379 adopted the first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4380 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4381 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4382 works already published by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4383 additional years.<footnote><para>
4384 <!-- f3 -->
4385 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4386 "copyright law." See Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 40.
4387 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4388 </para></footnote> Under this law, <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> should have been
4389 free in 1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4390 Tonson's control in 1774?
4391 </para>
4392 <para>
4393 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a "copyright"
4394 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4395 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4396 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4397 expired in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4398 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4399 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4400 that the publishers, or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print
4401 books.
4402 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (1662)</primary></indexterm>
4403 </para>
4404 <para>
4405 There was no <emphasis>positive</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4406 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4407 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4408 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4409 from legislatures "positive law." We call the words from judges
4410 "common law." The common law sets the background against which
4411 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4412 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4413 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4414 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4415 </para>
4416 <para>
4417 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4418 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4419 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4420 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4421
4422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4423 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4424 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4425 ultimately
4426 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4427 </para>
4428 <para>
4429 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book an
4430 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4431 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4432 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4433 copyright "expired," and the work would then be free and could be
4434 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4435 believed.
4436 </para>
4437 <para>
4438 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4439 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4440 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4441 <emphasis>at all?</emphasis>
4442 </para>
4443 <para>
4444 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4445 strong claim. Take <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> as an example: That play
4446 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4447 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4448 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4449 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4450 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4451 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4452 reason is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4453 </para>
4454 <para>
4455 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4456 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4457 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4458 "booksellers."
4459 </para>
4460 <para>
4461 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4462 to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in 1710, it
4463 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4464 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4465 others from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right
4466 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4467 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4468 generally how
4469 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4470 a work could be <emphasis>used</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4471 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4472 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4473 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4474 </para>
4475 <para>
4476 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4477 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4478 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4479 permission
4480 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4481 anything,
4482 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4483 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4484 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4485 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4486 </para>
4487 <para>
4488 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4489 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4490 especially
4491 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4492 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4493 monopolies&mdash;especially
4494 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4495 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4496 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4497 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4498 Monopolies,
4499 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4500 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4501 publishing.
4502 </para>
4503 <para>
4504 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4505 naturally
4506 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4507 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4508 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4509 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4510 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4511 specialinterest
4512 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4513 </para>
4514 <para>
4515 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4516 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4517 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4518 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4519 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4520
4521 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4522 kind&mdash;tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4523 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4524 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees
4525 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do
4526 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4527 indetted."<footnote><para>
4528
4529 <!-- f4 -->
4530 Philip Wittenberg, <citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4531 Property</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4532 </para></footnote>
4533 </para>
4534 <para>
4535 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4536 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4537 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4538 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4539 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4540 with that idea.
4541 </para>
4542 <para>
4543 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4544 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4545 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4546 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4547 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4548 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4549 compromise
4550 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4551 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4552 construction and spread of culture.
4553 </para>
4554 <para>
4555 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4556 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4557 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4558 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4559 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4560 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4561 they said; they needed more time.
4562 </para>
4563 <para>
4564 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4565 words that echo today,
4566 </para>
4567 <blockquote>
4568 <para>
4569 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4570 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4571 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4572 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4573 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4574 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4575 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4576 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4577 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4578 <!-- f5 -->
4579 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4580 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4581 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4582 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4583 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4584 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4585 al., 8, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4586 </para></footnote>
4587 </para>
4588 </blockquote>
4589 <para>
4590 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4591 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4592 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4593 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4594 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4595 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4596 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4597 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4598 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4599 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4600 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4601 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4602 way to protect authors.
4603 </para>
4604 <para>
4605 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4606 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4607 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4608 "The publishers &hellip; had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4609 rancher has for cattle."<footnote><para>
4610 <!-- f6 -->
4611 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4612 Law Review</citetitle> 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4613 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4614 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4615 </para></footnote>
4616 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4617 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4618 </para>
4619 <para>
4620 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4621 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4622 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4623 <!-- f7 -->
4624 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, <citetitle>Authorship and Copyright</citetitle>
4625 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4626 </para></footnote>
4627 </para>
4628 <para>
4629 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4630 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4631 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4632 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4633 <!-- f8 -->
4634 Mark Rose, <citetitle>Authors and Owners</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4635 1993), 92.
4636 </para></footnote>
4637 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4638 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4639 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4640 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4641 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4642 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4643 <!-- f9 -->
4644 Ibid., 93.
4645 </para></footnote>
4646 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4647 </para>
4648 <para>
4649 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4650 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4651 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4652 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4653 Property."<footnote><para>
4654 <!-- f10 -->
4655 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle>, 167 (quoting
4656 Borwell).
4657 </para></footnote>
4658 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4659 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4660 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4661 </para>
4662 <para>
4663 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4664 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4665 the most important early victory being <citetitle>Millar</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Taylor</citetitle>.
4666 </para>
4667 <para>
4668 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4669 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4670 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4671 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4672 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4673 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4674 <!-- f11 -->
4675 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4676 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," <citetitle>Wayne Law Review</citetitle> 29
4677 (1983): 1152.
4678 </para></footnote>
4679 </para>
4680 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4681 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4682 </indexterm>
4683 <para>
4684 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4685 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4686 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4687 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4688 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4689 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4690 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4691 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4692 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4693 </para>
4694 <para>
4695 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4696 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4697 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4698 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4699 with in 1710: How best to limit
4700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4701 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4702 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4703 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4704 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4705 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4706 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4707 </para>
4708 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4709 <para>
4710 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4711 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4712 </para>
4713 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4714 <para>
4715 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4716 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4717 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4718 <!-- f12 -->
4719 Ibid., 1156.
4720 </para></footnote>
4721 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4722 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in <citetitle>Millar</citetitle>,
4723 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4724 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4725 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4726 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4727 </para>
4728 <para>
4729 As few legal cases ever do, <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle> drew an
4730 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4731 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4732 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4733 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4734 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4735 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4736 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4737 </para>
4738 <para>
4739 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4740 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4741 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4742 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4743 House of Lords generally voted.
4744 </para>
4745 <para>
4746 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4747 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4748 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4749 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4750 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4751 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4752 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4753 passed into the public domain.
4754 </para>
4755 <para>
4756 "The public domain." Before the case of <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle>
4757 v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4758 England. Before 1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4759 copyrights were perpetual. After 1774, the public domain was
4760 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4761 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4762 history&mdash;including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4763 and Bunyan&mdash;were free of legal restraint.
4764 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4765 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4766 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4767 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4768 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4769 </para>
4770 <para>
4771 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4772 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4773 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4774 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the <citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser</citetitle>
4775 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4776 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4777 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4778 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4779 and illuminations."<footnote><para>
4780 <!-- f13 -->
4781 Rose, 97.
4782 </para></footnote>
4783 </para>
4784 <para>
4785 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4786 equally strong in the opposite direction. The <citetitle>Morning Chronicle</citetitle>
4787 reported:
4788 </para>
4789 <blockquote>
4790 <para>
4791 By the above decision &hellip; near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4792 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4793 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4794 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4795 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4796 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4797 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4798 successors.<footnote><para>
4799 <!-- f14 -->
4800 Ibid.
4801 </para></footnote>
4802 </para>
4803 </blockquote>
4804 <para>
4805 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4806 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4807 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4808 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4809 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4810 <emphasis>free</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4811 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4812 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4813 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4814 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4815 book from someone. But <emphasis>free</emphasis> in the sense that the
4816 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4817 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4818 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4819 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4820 develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4821 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a <emphasis>competitive
4822 context</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4823 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4824 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4825 </para>
4826 <para>
4827 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4828 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4829 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4830 protected.
4831 </para>
4832 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4833 </chapter>
4834 <chapter id="recorders">
4835 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4836 <para>
4837 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4838 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4839 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4840 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4841 He was their god.)
4842 </para>
4843 <para>
4844 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4845 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4846 today.
4847 </para>
4848 <para>
4849 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4850 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4851 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4852 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4853 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4854 stage.
4855 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4856 </para>
4857 <para>
4858 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4859 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4860 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4861 and the opera company played Wagner, was <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. As Else judged
4862 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4863 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4864 about the scene.
4865 </para>
4866 <para>
4867 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4868 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>.
4869 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4870 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4871 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4872 </para>
4873 <para>
4874 Else called <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4875 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4876 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4877 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4878 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4879 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4880 </para>
4881 <para>
4882 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4883 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4884 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4885 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4886 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4887 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4888 </para>
4889 <para>
4890 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4891 &hellip; that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4892 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4893 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4894 to use this four-point-five seconds of &hellip; entirely unsolicited
4895 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot."
4896 </para>
4897 <para>
4898 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4899 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4900 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. &hellip; We're
4901 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4902 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4903 confirm what he had been told.
4904 </para>
4905 <para>
4906 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4907 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4908 clip of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4909 about
4910
4911 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4912 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4913 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4914 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4915 the money."
4916 </para>
4917 <para>
4918 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4919 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4920 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4921 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4922 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4923 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity</citetitle>, from ten years before.
4924 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4925 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The</primary></indexterm>
4926 </para>
4927 <para>
4928 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4929 copyright to <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
4930 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4931 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4932 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4933 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4934 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4935 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4936 says the owner gets to control.
4937 </para>
4938 <para>
4939 For example, "public performance" is a use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> that the
4940 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4941 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4942 Favorite <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4943 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4944 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
4945 by the law.
4946 </para>
4947 <para>
4948 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4949 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4950 <!-- f1 -->
4951 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4952 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4953 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4954 Wake of <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>" (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4955 Law School, 5 August 2003.
4956 </para></footnote>
4957 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>
4958 episode is clearly a fair use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>&mdash;and fair use does
4959 not require the permission of anyone.
4960 </para>
4961 <para>
4962 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4963 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4964 </para>
4965 <blockquote>
4966 <para>
4967 The <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4968 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4969 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4970 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4971 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4972 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4973 </para>
4974 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
4975 <listitem><para>
4976 <!-- 1. -->
4977 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4978 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
4979 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
4980 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
4981 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
4982 </para></listitem>
4983 <listitem><para>
4984 <!-- 2. -->
4985 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
4986 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
4987 tracking down and stopping unlicensed <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> usage, just as George
4988 Lucas had a very high profile litigating <citetitle>Star Wars</citetitle> usage. So I decided
4989 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
4990 license to four seconds of <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
4991 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
4992 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
4993 principle.
4994 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George</primary></indexterm>
4995 </para></listitem>
4996 <listitem><para>
4997 <!-- 3. -->
4998 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
4999 School &hellip; who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5000 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5001 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5002 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5003 pockets, me or them.
5004 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5005 </para></listitem>
5006 <listitem><para>
5007 <!-- 4. -->
5008 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5009 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5010 money.
5011 </para></listitem>
5012 </orderedlist>
5013 </blockquote>
5014 <para>
5015 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5016 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5017 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5018 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5019 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5020 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5021 </para>
5022 <para>
5023 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5024 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5025 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5026 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5027 not.
5028 </para>
5029 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5030 </chapter>
5031 <chapter id="transformers">
5032 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5033 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5034 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5035 <para>
5036 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5037 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5038 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5039 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5040 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5041 </para>
5042 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5043 <para>
5044 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5045 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5046 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5047 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5048 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5049 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5050 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5051 important to his career.
5052 </para>
5053 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5054 <para>
5055 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5056 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5057 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5058 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5059 </para>
5060 <para>
5061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5062 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5063 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5064 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5065 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5066 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5067 </para>
5068 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5069 <para>
5070 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5071 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5072 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5073 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5074 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5075 actor's career."
5076 </para>
5077 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5078 <para>
5079 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5080 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5081 </para>
5082 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5083 <para>
5084 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5085 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5086 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5087 for it."<footnote>
5088 <para>
5089 <!-- f1 -->
5090 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5091 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5092 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5093 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5094 <indexterm>
5095 <primary>artists</primary>
5096 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5097 </indexterm>
5098 </para></footnote>
5099 </para>
5100 <para>
5101 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5102 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5103 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5104 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5105 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5106 </para>
5107 <para>
5108 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5109 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5110 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5111 </para>
5112 <blockquote>
5113 <para>
5114 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5115 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5116 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from <citetitle>Dirty
5117 Harry</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5118 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5119 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5120 </para>
5121 <para>
5122 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5123 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5124 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5125 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5126 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5127 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5128 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5129 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5130 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5131 started calling people.
5132 </para>
5133 </blockquote>
5134 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5135 <para>
5136 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5137 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5138 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5139 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5140 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5141 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5142 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5143 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5144 career.
5145 </para>
5146 <para>
5147 It was one <emphasis>year</emphasis> later&mdash;"and even then we
5148 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear."
5149 </para>
5150 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5151 <para>
5152 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5153 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5154 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5155 </para>
5156 <blockquote>
5157 <para>
5158 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5159 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5160 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5161 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5162 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5163 directors, &hellip; this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5164 systematically and cleared the rights.
5165 </para>
5166 </blockquote>
5167 <para>
5168
5169 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5170 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5171 loved it, and it sold very well.
5172 </para>
5173 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5174 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5175 <para>
5176 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5177 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5178 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5179 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5180 at all."<footnote><para>
5181 <!-- f2 -->
5182 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, <citetitle>Seven
5183 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition</citetitle>, available at
5184 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5185 </para></footnote>
5186 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5187 has to be made?
5188 </para>
5189 <para>
5190 For, as he acknowledged, "very few &hellip; have the time and resources,
5191 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5192 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5193 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5194 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5195 </para>
5196 <blockquote>
5197 <para>
5198 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5199 he or she gets paid very well. &hellip; And then when 30 seconds of
5200 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5201 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person &hellip; should be
5202 compensated for that.
5203 </para>
5204 </blockquote>
5205 <para>
5206 Or at least, is this <emphasis>how</emphasis> the artist should be
5207 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5208 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5209 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5210 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5211 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5212 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5213 made to be more clean?
5214 </para>
5215 <blockquote>
5216 <para>
5217 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5218 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5219 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5220 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5221 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5222 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5223 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5224 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5225 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5226 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5227 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5228 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5229 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5230 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5231 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5232 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5233 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5234 </para>
5235 </blockquote>
5236 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5237 <para>
5238 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5239 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5240 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5241 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5242 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5243 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5244 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5245 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5246 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5247 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5248 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5249 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5250 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5251 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5252 "Does this still make sense?"
5253 </para>
5254 <para>
5255 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5256 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5257 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5258 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5259
5260 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5261 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5262 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5263 </para>
5264 <para>
5265 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5266 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode.
5267 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5268 judges loved every minute of it.
5269 </para>
5270 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5271 <para>
5272 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5273 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5274 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5275 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5276 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5277 were just violated in this room?"
5278 </para>
5279 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5280 <para>
5281 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5282 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5283 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5284 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5285 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5286 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5287 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5288 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5289 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5290 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5291 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5292 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5293 couldn't easily do them legally.
5294 </para>
5295 <para>
5296 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5297 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5298 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5299 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5300 planted in your presentation.
5301 </para>
5302 <para>
5303 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5304 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5305 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5306 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5307 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5308 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5309 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5310 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5311 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5312 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5313 </para>
5314 <para>
5315 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5316 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5317 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5318 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5319 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5320 </para>
5321 <para>
5322 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5323 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5324 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5325 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5326 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5327 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5328 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5329 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5330 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5331 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5332 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5333 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5334 registers the work.
5335 </para>
5336 <para>
5337 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5338 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5339 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5340 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5341 </para>
5342 <para>
5343 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5344 Myers, the comic genius of <citetitle>Saturday Night Live</citetitle> and
5345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5346 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5347 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5348 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5349 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5350 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5351 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5352 entertainment."
5353 </para>
5354 <para>
5355 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5356 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5357 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5358 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5359 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5360 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5361 new audiences, it is Mike."
5362 </para>
5363 <para>
5364 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5365 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5366 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5367 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5368 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5369 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5370 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5371 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5372 </para>
5373 <para>
5374 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5375 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5376 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5377 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5378 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5379 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5380 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5381 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5382 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5383 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5384 curse, reserved for the few.
5385 </para>
5386 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5387 </chapter>
5388 <chapter id="collectors">
5389 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5390 <para>
5391 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5392 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5393 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5394 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5395 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5396 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5397 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5398 </para>
5399 <para>
5400 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5401 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5402 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5403 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5404 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5405 well as when those pages changed.
5406 </para>
5407 <para>
5408 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5409 appreciated. In the dystopia described in <citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5410 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5411 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5412 reports.
5413 </para>
5414 <para>
5415 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5416 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5417 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5418 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5419 </para>
5420 <para>
5421 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5422 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5423 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5424 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5425 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5426 </para>
5427 <para>
5428 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5429 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5430 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5431 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5432 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5433 <!-- f1 -->
5434 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5435 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5436 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5437 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5438 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5439 </para></footnote>
5440 </para>
5441 <para>
5442 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5443 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5444 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5445 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5446 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5447 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5448 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5449 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5450 truth.
5451 </para>
5452 <para>
5453 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5454 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We <emphasis>all</emphasis>
5455 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5456 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5457 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5458 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5459 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5460 </para>
5461 <para>
5462 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5463 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5464 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5465 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5467 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5468 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5469 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5470 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5471 </para>
5472 <para>
5473 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5474 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5475 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5476 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5477 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5478 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5479 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5480 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5481 </para>
5482 <para>
5483 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5484 human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5485 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the
5486 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5487 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5488 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5489 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5490 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5491 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5492 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5493 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5494 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5495 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5496 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5497 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5498 </para>
5499 <blockquote>
5500 <para>
5501 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5502 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5503 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5504 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5505 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5506
5507 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5508 <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode that came out after it &hellip; it would be almost
5509 impossible. &hellip; Those materials are almost unfindable. &hellip;
5510 </para>
5511 </blockquote>
5512 <para>
5513 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5514 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5515 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5516 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5517 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5518 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5519 </para>
5520 <para>
5521 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5522 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5523 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5524 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5525 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5526 work.
5527 </para>
5528 <para>
5529 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5530 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5531 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5532 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5533 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed
5534 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5535 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5536 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5537 <!-- f2 -->
5538 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5539 the Library of Congress," <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly</citetitle> 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5540 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, <citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5541 Preservation in the United States</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5542 Co., 1992), 36.
5543 </para></footnote>
5544 </para>
5545 <para>
5546 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5547 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5548 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5549 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5550 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5551 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5552 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5553 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5554 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5555 </para>
5556 <para>
5557 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5558 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5559 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5560 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5561 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5562 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5563 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5564 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5565 events of that day.
5566 </para>
5567 <para>
5568 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5569 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5570 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5571 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5572 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5573 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5574 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5575 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5576 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5577 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5578 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5579 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5580 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5581 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5582 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5583 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5584 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive</primary></indexterm>
5585 </para>
5586 <para>
5587 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5588 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5589 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5590 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5591 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5592 to find them.
5593 </para>
5594 <para>
5595 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5596 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5597 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5598 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5599 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5600 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5601 </para>
5602 <para>
5603 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5604 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5605 life, if the
5606
5607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5608 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5609 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5610 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5611 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5612 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5613 </para>
5614 <para>
5615 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5616 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5617 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5618 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5619 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5620 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5621 longer sold.
5622 </para>
5623 <para>
5624 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5625 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5626 <!-- f3 -->
5627 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5628 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>,
5629 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5630 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5631 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," <citetitle>Boston
5632 College Law Review</citetitle> 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5633 </para></footnote>). After
5634 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5635 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5636 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5637 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5638 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5639 </para>
5640 <para>
5641 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5642 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5643 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5644 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5645 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5646 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5647 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5648 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5649 disappears.
5650 </para>
5651 <para>
5652 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5653 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5654 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5655 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5656 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5657 generally, the
5658 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5659 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5660 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5661 little practical effect.
5662 </para>
5663 <para>
5664 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5665 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5666 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5667 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5668 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5669 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5670 </para>
5671 <para>
5672 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5673 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5674 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5675 Kahle describes,
5676 </para>
5677 <blockquote>
5678 <para>
5679 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5680 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5681 movies, &hellip; and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5682 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5683 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5684 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5685 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5686 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5687 &hellip; thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5688 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5689 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5690 </para>
5691 </blockquote>
5692 <para>
5693 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5694 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5695 libraries or archives could be. <emphasis>When</emphasis> the
5696 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5697 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5698 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5699 will draw upon it to understand it;
5700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5701 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5702 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5703 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5704 future <emphasis>for</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5705 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5706 </para>
5707 <para>
5708 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5709 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5710 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5711 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5712 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5713 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5714 </para>
5715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5716 </chapter>
5717 <chapter id="property-i">
5718 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5719 <para>
5720 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5721 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5722 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5723 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5724 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5725 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5726 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5727 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5728 </para>
5729 <para>
5730 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5731 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5732 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5733 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5734 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5735 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5736 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5737 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5738 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5739 Warner Brothers.
5740 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.</primary></indexterm>
5741 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment</primary></indexterm>
5742 <indexterm><primary>MGM</primary></indexterm>
5743 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5744 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox</primary></indexterm>
5745 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5746 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers</primary></indexterm>
5747 </para>
5748 <para>
5749 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5750 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5751 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5752 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5753 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5754 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5755 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5756 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5757 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5758 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5759 Washingtonian way.
5760 </para>
5761 <para>
5762 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5763 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5764 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5765 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5766 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5767 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5768 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5769 </para>
5770 <para>
5771 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5772 perfectly:
5773 </para>
5774 <blockquote>
5775 <para>
5776 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5777 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5778 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5779 theme which animates this entire debate: <emphasis>Creative property
5780 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5781 other property owners in the nation</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5782 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5783 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5784 <!-- f1 -->
5785 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5786 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5787 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5788 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5789 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5790 Valenti).
5791 </para></footnote>
5792 </para>
5793 </blockquote>
5794 <para>
5795 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5796 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5797 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5798 this:
5799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5800 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5801 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5802 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5803 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5804 </para>
5805 <para>
5806 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5807 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5808 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5809 extreme a claim made by <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> who is serious in
5810 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5811 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5812 it comes to the nature and scope of "creative property." His views
5813 have <emphasis>no</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5814 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5815 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5816 </para>
5817 <para>
5818 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5819 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5820 <!-- f2 -->
5821 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5822 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5823 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5824 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5825 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5826 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, <citetitle>Private Property and the
5827 Constitution</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5828 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5829 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5830 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5831 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5832 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5833 in our tradition.
5834 </para>
5835 <para>
5836 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5837 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5838 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5839 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5840 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5841 culture would develop.
5842 </para>
5843 <para>
5844 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5845 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5846 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5847 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5848 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5849 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5850 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5851 the same would be to
5852
5853 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5854 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5855 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5856 perfect control.
5857 </para>
5858 <para>
5859 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5860 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5861 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5862 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5863 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5864 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5865 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5866 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5867 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5868 Constitution itself.
5869 </para>
5870 <para>
5871 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5872 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5873 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
5874 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5875 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5876 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5877 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5878 sacred. It cannot <emphasis>ever</emphasis> be taken from the property
5879 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5880 </para>
5881 <para>
5882 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5883 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5884 power to create "creative property," the Constitution
5885 <emphasis>requires</emphasis> that after a "limited time," Congress
5886 take back the rights that it has granted and set the "creative
5887 property" free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
5888 the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your copyright and turns it
5889 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
5890 pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
5891 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5893 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5894 compensation at all.
5895 </para>
5896 <para>
5897 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5898 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5899 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5900 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5901 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5902 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5903 itself.
5904 </para>
5905 <para>
5906 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5907 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5908 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5909 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5910 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5911 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
5912 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5913 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5914 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5915 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5916 </para>
5917 <para>
5918 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5919 least try to understand <emphasis>why</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
5920 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
5921 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
5922 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
5923 domain?
5924 </para>
5925 <para>
5926 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5927 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5928 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5929 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5930 should be at the core of this war: Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis>
5931 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
5932 <emphasis>whether</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
5933 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
5934 ought to be. Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> artists should be paid,
5935 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
5936 also control how culture develops.
5937 </para>
5938 <para>
5939
5940 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5941 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5942 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5943 than the narrow language of the law allows. In <citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
5944 Cyberspace</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5945 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5946 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5947 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5948 </para>
5949 <figure id="fig-1331">
5950 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
5951 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
5952 </figure>
5953 <para>
5954 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5955 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5956 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5957 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5958 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5959 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5960 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5961 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5962 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5963 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5964 Web, you can be punished
5965 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5966 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5967 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5968 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
5969 </para>
5970 <para>
5971 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5972 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5973 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5974 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5975 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5976 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5977 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5978 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5979 the source of the enforcement.
5980 </para>
5981 <para>
5982 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5983 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5984 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5985 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5986 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5987 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5988 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5989 individual or group might behave.
5990 </para>
5991 <para>
5992 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
5993 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
5994 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
5995 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
5996 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
5997 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
5998 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
5999 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6000 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6001 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder
6002 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6003 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6004 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6005 </para>
6006 <para>
6007
6008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6009 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6010 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6011 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6012 undermined by another.
6013 </para>
6014 <para>
6015 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6016 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6017 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6018 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6019 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6020 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6021 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6022 </para>
6023 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6024 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6025 </indexterm>
6026 <para>
6027 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6028 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6029 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6030 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6031 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6032 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6033 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6034 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6035 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6036 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6037 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6038 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6039 </para>
6040 <para>
6041 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6042 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6043 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6044 <!-- f3 -->
6045 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6046 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6047 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6048 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6049 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Code: And
6050 Other Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6051 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies</citetitle>,
6052 June 1998.
6053 </para></footnote>
6054 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6055 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6056 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6057 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6058 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6059 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6060 used to require that other laws be more
6061 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6062 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6063 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6064 driving.
6065 </para>
6066 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6067
6068 <figure id="fig-1361">
6069 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6070 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6071 </figure>
6072 <para>
6073 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6074 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6075 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6076 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6077 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6078 another.<footnote>
6079 <para>
6080 <!-- f4 -->
6081 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6082 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6083 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6084 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6085 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6086 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6087 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6088 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6089 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6090 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6091 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6092 of liberty. As I argued in <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, we come from a long tradition of
6093 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6094 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6095 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6096 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, <citetitle>On Liberty</citetitle> (Indiana:
6097 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6098 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6099 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6100 J. Samuels, eds., <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays</citetitle> (London:
6101 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6102 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6103 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6104 places easier; 42 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6105 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6106 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6107 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6108 of these groups might face.
6109 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6110 </para></footnote>
6111 </para>
6112 <section id="hollywood">
6113 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6114 <para>
6115 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6116 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6117 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6118 rallying makes sense.
6119 </para>
6120 <para>
6121 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6122 Internet:
6123 </para>
6124 <figure id="fig-1371">
6125 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6126 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6127 </figure>
6128 <para>
6129 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6130 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6131 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6132 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6133 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6134 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6135 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6136 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6137 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6138 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6139 this form of infringement.
6140 </para>
6141 <para>
6142 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6143 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6144 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6145 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6146 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6147 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6148 </para>
6149 <para>
6150 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6151 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6152 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6153 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6154 Iraq
6155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6156 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6157 looting that results.
6158 </para>
6159 <figure id="fig-1381">
6160 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6161 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6162 </figure>
6163 <para>
6164 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6165 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6166 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6167 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6168 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6169 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6170 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6171 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6172 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6173 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6174 </para>
6175 <para>
6176 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6177 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6178 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6179 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6180 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6181 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6182 life. Homeowners living in a
6183
6184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6185 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6186 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6187 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6188 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6189 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6190 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6191 </para>
6192 <para>
6193 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6194 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6195 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6196 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6197 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6198 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6199 </para>
6200 <para>
6201 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6202 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6203 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6204 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6205 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6206 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6207 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6208 <!-- f5 -->
6209 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6210 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6211 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6212 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6213 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6214 October 2003, available at
6215 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6216 </para></footnote>
6217
6218 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6219 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6220 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6221 <emphasis>for the purpose of</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6222 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6223 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring
6224 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6225 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6226 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6227 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6228 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6229 </para>
6230 <para>
6231 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6232 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6233 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6235 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6236 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6237 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6238 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6239 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6240 <!-- f6 -->
6241 Fred Warshofsky, <citetitle>The Patent Wars</citetitle> (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6242 </para></footnote>
6243 And relative to a
6244 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6245 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6246 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6247 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6248 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6249 Brezhnev.
6250 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6251 </para>
6252 <para>
6253 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6254 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6255 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6256 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6257 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6258 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6259 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6260 opportunities for innovation and change.
6261 </para>
6262 <para>
6263 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6264 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6265 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6266 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6267 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6268 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6269 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6270 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6271 shall make no law &hellip; abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6272 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6273 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6274 regulation is justified.
6275 </para>
6276 <para>
6277 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6279 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6280 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6281 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6282 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6283 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6284 </para>
6285 <para>
6286 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6287 </para>
6288 <indexterm id="idxddt" class='startofrange'>
6289 <primary>DDT</primary>
6290 </indexterm>
6291 <para>
6292 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6293 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6294 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6295 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6296 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6297 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann</primary></indexterm>
6298 </para>
6299 <para>
6300 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6301 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6302 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6303 </para>
6304 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6305 <para>
6306 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published <citetitle>Silent Spring</citetitle>, which argued that
6307 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6308 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6309 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6310 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6311 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6312 </para>
6313 <para>
6314 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6315 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6316 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6317 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6318 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6319 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6320 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6321 </para>
6322 <para>
6323 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6324 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6325 culture.<footnote><para>
6326 <!-- f7 -->
6327 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6328 Environmentalism for the Net?" <citetitle>Duke Law Journal</citetitle> 47 (1997): 87.
6329 </para></footnote>
6330 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6331 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6332 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6333 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6334 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6335 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6337 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6338 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6339 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6340 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6341 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6342 </para>
6343 <para>
6344 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6345 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6346 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6347 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6348 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6349 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6350 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6351 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6352 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6353 </para>
6354 <para>
6355 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6356 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6357 be lost.
6358 </para>
6359 <indexterm startref="idxddt" class='endofrange'/>
6360 </section>
6361 <section id="beginnings">
6362 <title>Beginnings</title>
6363 <para>
6364 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6365 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6366 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6367 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6368 </para>
6369 <para>
6370 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6371 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6372 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6373 </para>
6374 <para>
6375 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6376 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6377 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6378
6379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6380 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6381 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6382 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power
6383 <emphasis>to promote progress</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6384 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6385 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6386 </para>
6387 <para>
6388 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6389 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="founders"/>,
6390 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6391 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6392 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6393 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6394 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6395 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6396 </para>
6397 <para>
6398 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6399 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6400 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6401 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6402 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6403 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6404 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6405 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6406 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6407 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6408 case, a <emphasis>structure</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6409 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6410 concentrations of power.
6411 </para>
6412 <para>
6413 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6414 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6415 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6416 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6417 years since they first struck its design.
6418 </para>
6419 <para>
6420 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6421 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6423 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6424 started here:
6425 </para>
6426 <figure id="fig-1441">
6427 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6428 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6429 </figure>
6430 <para>
6431 We will end here:
6432 </para>
6433 <figure id="fig-1442">
6434 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6435 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6436 </figure>
6437 <para>
6438 Let me explain how.
6439 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6440 </para>
6441 </section>
6442 <section id="lawduration">
6443 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6444 <para>
6445 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6446 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6447 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6448 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6449 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6450 authorship.<footnote>
6451 <para>
6452 <!-- f8 -->
6453 William W. Crosskey, <citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6454 the United States</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6455 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6456 Law of the Land,' <emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6457 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law</emphasis>"
6458 (emphasis added).
6459 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6460 </para></footnote>
6461 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6462 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6463 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6464 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6465 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6466 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6467 </para>
6468 <para>
6469 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6470 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6471 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6472 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6473 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6474 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6475 </para>
6476 <para>
6477 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6478 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6479 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6480 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6481 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6482 </para>
6483 <para>
6484 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6485 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6486 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6487 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6488 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6489 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6490 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6491 <!-- f9 -->
6492 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6493 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <citetitle>A
6494 History of Book Publishing in the United States</citetitle>, vol. 1, <citetitle>The Creation
6495 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6496 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6497 1790 act; William J. Maher, <citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6498 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context</citetitle>, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6499 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6500 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6501 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6502 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6503 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6504 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6505 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6506 </para>
6507 <para>
6508 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6509 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6510 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6511 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6512 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6513 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6514 copyright, either.
6515 </para>
6516 <para>
6517 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6518 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6519 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6520 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6521 domain.<footnote><para>
6522 <!-- f10 -->
6523 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6524 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6525 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6526 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6527 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright</citetitle>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6528 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6529 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6530 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6531 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6532 </para>
6533 <para>
6534 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6535 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6536 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6537 <!-- f11 -->
6538 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6539 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6540 no longer <emphasis>effectively</emphasis> controlled by
6541 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6542 is to sell the books as used books; that use&mdash;because it does not
6543 involve publication&mdash;is effectively free.
6544 </para>
6545 <para>
6546 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6547 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6548 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6549 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6550 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6551 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6552 </para>
6553 <para>
6554 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6555 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6556 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6557 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6558 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6559 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6560 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6561 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6562 </para>
6563 <para>
6564 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6565 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6566 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6567 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6568
6569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6570 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6571 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6572 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6573 </para>
6574 <para>
6575 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6576 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6577 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6578 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6579 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6580 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6581 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6582 value.
6583 </para>
6584 <para>
6585 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6586 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6587 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6588 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6589 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6590 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6591 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6592 was ninety-five years.
6593 </para>
6594 <para>
6595 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6596 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6597 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6598 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6599 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6600 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6601 them.
6602 </para>
6603 <para>
6604 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6605 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6606 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6607 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6608 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6609 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6610 years.<footnote><para>
6611 <!-- f12 -->
6612 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6613 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6614 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6615 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6616 </para></footnote>
6617 </para>
6618 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6619 </section>
6620 <section id="lawscope">
6621 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6622 <para>
6623 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6624 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6625 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6626 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6627 </para>
6628 <para>
6629 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6630 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6631 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6632 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6633 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6634 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6635 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6636 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6637 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6638 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6639 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6640 </para>
6641 <para>
6642 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6643 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6644 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6645 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6646 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6647 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6648 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6649 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6650 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6651 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6652 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6653 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6654 on the initial creative work.
6655 </para>
6656 <para>
6657 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6658 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6659 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6661 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6662 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6663 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6664 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6665 famous &copy; or the word <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>. And for most
6666 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6667 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6668 secured.
6669 </para>
6670 <para>
6671 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6672 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6673 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6674 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6675 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6676 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6677 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6678 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6679 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6680 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6681 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6682 original author.
6683 </para>
6684 <para>
6685 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6686 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6687 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6688 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6689 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6690 copy available for others to copy.
6691 </para>
6692 <para>
6693 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6694 differences.
6695 </para>
6696 <para>
6697 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6698 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6699 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6700 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6701 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6702 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6703 <!-- f13 -->
6704 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6705 Creation of American Literature," 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6706 International Law and Politics</citetitle> 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6707 Federal Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6708
6709 </para></footnote>
6710 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6711 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6712 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6713 </para>
6714 <para>
6715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6716 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6717 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6718 was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6719 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6720 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6721 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6722 were restrained.
6723 </para>
6724 <para>
6725 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6726 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6727 every note to your spouse, every doodle, <emphasis>every</emphasis>
6728 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is
6729 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6730 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6731 protect it.
6732 </para>
6733 <para>
6734 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6735 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6736 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6737 </para>
6738 <para>
6739 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6740 control
6741 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6742 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6743 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6744 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6745 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6746 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6747 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6748 exclusive
6749 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6750 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6751 </para>
6752 <para>
6753 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6754 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6755 expansion
6756 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6757 copyright.
6758 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6759 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6760 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6761 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6762 </para>
6763 <para>
6764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6765 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6766 within a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you
6767 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6768 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6769 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6770 <emphasis>that</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6771 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6772 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6773 not protect derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6774 <!-- f14 -->
6775 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," <citetitle>Legal Affairs</citetitle>, July/August
6776 2003, available at
6777 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6778 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
6779 </para></footnote>
6780 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6781 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6782 the wrong of direct piracy.
6783 </para>
6784 <para>
6785 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6786 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6787 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6788 of my book.<footnote><para>
6789 <!-- f15 -->
6790 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6791 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6792 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and
6793 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination:
6794 Copyright's Constitutionality," <citetitle>Yale Law Journal</citetitle> 112 (2002):
6795 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6796 </para></footnote>
6797 These two different uses of my creative work are
6798 treated the same.
6799 </para>
6800 <para>
6801 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6802 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6803 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6804 creates
6805 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6806 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6807 originally created?
6808 </para>
6809 <para>
6810 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6811 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6812 simply
6813 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6814 rights originally granted.
6815 </para>
6816 </section>
6817 <section id="lawreach">
6818 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6819 <para>
6820 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6821 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6822 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6823 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6824 <!-- f16 -->
6825 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
6826 certainly regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a
6827 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
6828 per se doesn't make a copy; 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6829 106(4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17
6830 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 112(a). But the presumption under the
6831 existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6832 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6833 </para></footnote>
6834 </para>
6835 <para>
6836 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6837 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
6838 <emphasis>copy</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
6839 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative
6840 property" deserves the "same rights" as all other property, it is the
6841 <emphasis>obvious</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
6842 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
6843 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
6844 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
6845 copies should <emphasis>not</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
6846 law. More precisely, they should not <emphasis>always</emphasis> be
6847 the trigger for copyright law.
6848 </para>
6849 <para>
6850 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6851 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6852 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6853 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6854 <!-- f17 -->
6855 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6856 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6857 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6858 basis
6859 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6860 </para></footnote>
6861 because it is clear that the
6862 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6863 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6864 </para>
6865 <para>
6866 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6867 empty circle.
6868 </para>
6869 <figure id="fig-1521">
6870 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6871 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6872 </figure>
6873 <para>
6874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6875 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6876 all its potential <emphasis>uses</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
6877 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
6878 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
6879 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
6880 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
6881 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
6882 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
6883 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
6884 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
6885 acts do not make a copy.
6886 </para>
6887 <figure id="fig-1531">
6888 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6889 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6890 </figure>
6891 <para>
6892 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6893 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6894 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6895 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6896 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6897 diagram on next page).
6898 </para>
6899 <para>
6900 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6901 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6902 </para>
6903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6904 <figure id="fig-1541">
6905 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6906 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6907 </figure>
6908 <para>
6909 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6910 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6911 unregulated.
6912 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6913 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6914 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6915 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6916 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6917 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6918 </para>
6919 <figure id="fig-1542">
6920 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6921 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6922 </figure>
6923 <para> </para>
6924 <figure id="fig-1551">
6925 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6926 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
6927 </figure>
6928 <para>
6929 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6930 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6931 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
6932 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6933 </para>
6934 <para>
6935 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
6936 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
6937 <!-- f18 -->
6938 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6939 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6940 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6941 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6942 </para></footnote>
6943 And because of this single,
6944 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6945 category
6946 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6947 unregulated
6948 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6949 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6950 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6951 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
6952 category
6953 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6954 copyrighted
6955 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
6956 burden of this shift.
6957 </para>
6958 <para>
6959 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6960 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
6961 be no plausible <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>-related argument that
6962 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
6963 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
6964 the book once, ten times, or every
6965 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6966 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
6967 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6968 produced
6969 a copy.
6970 </para>
6971 <para>
6972 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
6973 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6974 only once or only once a month, then <emphasis>copyright
6975 law</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
6976 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
6977 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
6978 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
6979 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
6980 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
6981 copyright owner's wish.
6982 </para>
6983 <para>
6984 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6985 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6986 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6987 points also become clear:
6988 </para>
6989 <para>
6990 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6991 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6992 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6993 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
6994 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
6995 part of free culture before the Internet.
6996 </para>
6997 <para>
6998 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
6999 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7000 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7001 <emphasis>any</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7002 using a machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become
7003 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7004 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7005 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7006 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7007 creative work.
7008 </para>
7009 <para>
7010 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7011
7012 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7013 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7014 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7015 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7016 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7017 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7018 Internet,
7019 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7020 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7021 protected
7022 before because reading was not regulated.
7023 </para>
7024 <para>
7025 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7026 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7027 depend upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question
7028 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7029 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7030 <emphasis>unregulated</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7031 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7032 enough.
7033 </para>
7034 <para>
7035 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7036 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7037 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7038 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7039 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7040 </para>
7041 <para>
7042 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7043 began
7044 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7045 previews.
7046 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7047 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7048 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7049 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7050 before
7051 you bought it.
7052 </para>
7053 <para>
7054 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7055 distributors
7056 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7057 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7058 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7059 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7060 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7061 business
7062 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7063 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7064 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7065 immediately.
7066 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7067 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7068 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7069 </para>
7070 <para>
7071 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7072 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7073 infringed"
7074 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7075 willful
7076 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7077 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7078 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7079 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7080 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7081 </para>
7082 <para>
7083 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7084 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7085 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7086 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7087 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7088 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7089 Disney's permission.
7090 </para>
7091 <para>
7092 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7093 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7094 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7095 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7096 was in the marketplace, the "first-sale doctrine" would free the
7097 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7098 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7099 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7100 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7101 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7102 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7103 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7104 </para>
7105 <para>
7106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7107 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7108 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the
7109 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7110 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7111 abuse. If Barnes &amp; Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7112 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7113 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7114 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7115 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7116 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7117 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7118 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7119 happening are quite slight.
7120 </para>
7121 <para>
7122 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7123 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7124 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7125 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7126 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7127 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7128 </para>
7129 </section>
7130 <section id="lawforce">
7131 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7132 <para>
7133 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7134 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7135 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7136 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7137 </para>
7138 <para>
7139 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7140 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7141 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7142 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7143 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7144 your freedom.
7145 </para>
7146 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7147 <indexterm id="idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7148 <primary>Marx Brothers</primary>
7149 </indexterm>
7150 <indexterm id="idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7151 <primary>Warner Brothers</primary>
7152 </indexterm>
7153 <para>
7154 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7155 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7156 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7157 <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7158 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7159 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7160 plan.<footnote><para>
7161 <!-- f19 -->
7162 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," <citetitle>Law and
7163 Contemporary Problems</citetitle> 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7164 </para></footnote>
7165 </para>
7166 <para>
7167 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7168 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7169 you were."<footnote><para>
7170 <!-- f20 -->
7171 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and
7172 Copywrongs</citetitle>, 1&ndash;3.
7173 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
7174 </para></footnote>
7175 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7176 <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7177 trying to control <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>, then the Marx
7178 Brothers would insist on control over <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>.
7179 </para>
7180 <para>
7181 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7182 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7183 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7184 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7185 </para>
7186 <para>
7187 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7188 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7189 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7190 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7191 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7192 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7193 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7194 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7195 </para>
7196 <indexterm startref="idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7197 <indexterm startref="idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7198
7199 <indexterm id="idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'>
7200 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader</primary>
7201 </indexterm>
7202 <para>
7203 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7204 </para>
7205 <para>
7206 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7207 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7208 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7209 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7210 technology.
7211 </para>
7212 <para>
7213 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7214 Reader.
7215 </para>
7216 <para>
7217 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7218 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7219 public domain: <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, for example, is in
7220 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7221 public domain: My own book <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
7222 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7223 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7224 copy of
7225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7226 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7227 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7228 </para>
7229 <figure id="fig-1611">
7230 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7231 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7232 </figure>
7233 <para>
7234 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7235 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7236 </para>
7237 <figure id="fig-1612">
7238 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7239 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7240 </figure>
7241 <para>
7242 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7243 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7244 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7245 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7246 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7247 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>
7248 read aloud through the computer.
7249 </para>
7250 <para>
7251 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7252 translation): Aristotle's <citetitle>Politics</citetitle>.
7253 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle</primary></indexterm>
7254 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics</citetitle>, (Aristotle)</primary></indexterm>
7255 </para>
7256 <figure id="fig-1621">
7257 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7258 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7259 </figure>
7260 <para>
7261 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7262 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7263 the book.
7264 </para>
7265 <figure id="fig-1622">
7266 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7267 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7268 </figure>
7269 <para>
7270 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7271 original e-book version of my last book, <citetitle>The Future of
7272 Ideas</citetitle>:
7273 </para>
7274 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7275 <figure id="fig-1631">
7276 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7277 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7278 </figure>
7279 <para>
7280 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7281 </para>
7282 <para>
7283 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7284 "permissions"&mdash; as if the publisher has the power to control how
7285 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7286 certainly does have the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright
7287 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7288 power.<footnote><para>
7289 <!-- f21 -->
7290 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7291 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7292 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7293 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7294 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7295 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7296 subsequently acquired the book.
7297 </para></footnote>
7298 When my e-book of <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> says I have the
7299 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7300 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7301 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7302 control that the law would enable.
7303 </para>
7304 <para>
7305 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7306 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7307 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us
7308 deal with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till
7309 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7310 till 2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7311 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7312 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7313 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7314 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7315 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7316 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7317 aloud&mdash;it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7318 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7319 won't read aloud.
7320 </para>
7321 <para>
7322 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7323 These are <emphasis>controls</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7324 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7325 you tried to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the
7326 sentence.
7327 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers</primary></indexterm>
7328 </para>
7329 <para>
7330 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7331 <emphasis>law</emphasis> as copyright <emphasis>code</emphasis>. The
7332 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7333 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7334 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7335 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7336 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7337 </para>
7338 <para>
7339 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7340 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7341 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7342 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7343 to defeat these protections as well?
7344 </para>
7345 <para>
7346 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7347 eBook Reader.
7348 </para>
7349 <para>
7350 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7351 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7352 on the Adobe site was a copy of <citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7353 Wonderland</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7354 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7355 following report:
7356 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)</primary></indexterm>
7357 </para>
7358 <figure id="fig-1641">
7359 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7360 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7361 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7362 </figure>
7363 <para>
7364 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7365 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7366 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7367 "permissions" indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7368 </para>
7369 <para>
7370 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7371 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7372 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7373 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7374 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7375 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7376 </para>
7377 <para>
7378 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7379 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7380 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7381 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7382 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7383 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7384 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7385 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7386 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7387 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7388 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7389 </para>
7390 <para>
7391 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7392 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7393 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7394 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7395 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7396 often crazy.
7397 </para>
7398 <indexterm startref="idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'/>
7399 <para>
7400 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7401 story of mine that makes the same point.
7402 </para>
7403 <indexterm id="idxaibo" class='startofrange'>
7404 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7405 </indexterm>
7406 <para>
7407 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7408 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7409 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7410 </para>
7411 <para>
7412 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7413 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7414 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7415 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7416 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7417 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7418 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7419 </para>
7420 <para>
7421 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7422 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7423 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7424 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7425 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7426 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7427 </para>
7428 <para>
7429 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7430 word <citetitle>hack</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7431 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7432 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, <citetitle>hack</citetitle> is a much
7433 more positive term. <citetitle>Hack</citetitle> just means code that enables the program to
7434 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7435 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7436 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7437 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7438 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7439 </para>
7440 <para>
7441 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7442 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7443 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7444 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7445 ethically.
7446 </para>
7447 <para>
7448 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7449 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7450 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7451 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7452 than Sony had built.
7453 </para>
7454 <indexterm startref="idxaibo" class='endofrange'/>
7455 <para>
7456 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7457 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7458 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7459 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7460 the
7461
7462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7463 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7464 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7465 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7466 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7467 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7468 thought, <emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7469 a robot dog to dance?</emphasis>
7470 </para>
7471 <para>
7472 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7473 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7474 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7475 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7476 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7477 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7478 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7479 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7480 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7481 </para>
7482 <para>
7483 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7484 <!-- f22 -->
7485 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7486 <citetitle>Science</citetitle> 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7487 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," <citetitle>American Prospect</citetitle>,
7488 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7489 DMCA," <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter</citetitle>, 11 December 2001; Bill
7490 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," <citetitle>Billboard</citetitle>,
7491 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7492 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7493 Questions about <citetitle>Felten and USENIX</citetitle> v. <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> Legal Case," available at
7494 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7495 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7496 </para></footnote>
7497 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7498 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7499 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7500 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7501 </para>
7502 <para>
7503 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7504 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7505 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7506 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7507 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7508 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7509 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7510 Internet much more.
7511 </para>
7512 <para>
7513 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7514 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7515 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7516 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7517 </para>
7518 <para>
7519 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7520 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7521 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7522 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7523 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7524 </para>
7525 <para>
7526 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7527 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7528 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7529 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7530 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7531 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7532 </para>
7533 <para>
7534 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7535 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7536 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7537 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7538 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7539 constituted, succeed.
7540 </para>
7541 <para>
7542 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7543 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7544 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7545 wrote:
7546 </para>
7547 <blockquote>
7548 <para>
7549 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7550 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7551 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7552 </para>
7553 </blockquote>
7554 <para>
7555 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7556 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7557 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7558 </para>
7559 <blockquote>
7560 <para>
7561 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7562 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7563 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7564 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7565 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7566 </para>
7567 </blockquote>
7568 <para>
7569 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7570 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7571 spreading such information an offense.
7572 </para>
7573 <para>
7574 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7575 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7576 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7577 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7578 technologies&mdash; technologies to control the replication and
7579 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7580 <emphasis>code</emphasis> to modify the original
7581 <emphasis>code</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7582 protection for copyright owners.
7583 </para>
7584 <para>
7585 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7586 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7587 <emphasis>legal code</emphasis> intended to buttress
7588 <emphasis>software code</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7589 support the <emphasis>legal code of copyright</emphasis>.
7590 </para>
7591 <para>
7592 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7593 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7594 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7595 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7596 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7597 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7598 have been a copyright violation.
7599 </para>
7600 <para>
7601 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7602 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7603 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7604 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7605 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7606 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7607 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7608 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7609 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7610 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7611 </para>
7612 <para>
7613 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7614 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7615 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7616 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7617 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7618 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7619 </para>
7620 <para>
7621 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7622 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7623 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7624 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7625 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7626 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "<citetitle>Mr. Rogers</citetitle>,"
7627 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7628 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7629 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7630 </para>
7631 <blockquote>
7632 <para>
7633 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7634 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7635 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7636 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7637 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7638 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7639 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7640 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7641 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7642 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7643 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7644 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7645 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7646 important.<footnote><para>
7647 <!-- f23 -->
7648 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
7649 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7650 James Lardner, <citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7651 the VCR</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7652 </para></footnote>
7653 </para>
7654 </blockquote>
7655 <para>
7656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7657 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7658 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7659 the VCR responsible.
7660 </para>
7661 <para>
7662 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7663 the DMCA.
7664 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7665 </para>
7666 <para>
7667 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7668 </para>
7669 <para>
7670 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7671 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7672 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7673 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7674 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7675 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7676 </para>
7677 <para>
7678 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7680 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7681 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7682 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7683 and bad uses.
7684 </para>
7685 <figure id="fig-1711">
7686 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7687 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7688 </figure>
7689 <para>
7690 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7691 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7692 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: <emphasis>No one ever
7693 died from copyright circumvention</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7694 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7695 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7696 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7697 </para>
7698 <para>
7699 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7700 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7701 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7702 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7703 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7704 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7705 </para>
7706 <para>
7707 This is how <emphasis>code</emphasis> becomes
7708 <emphasis>law</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7709 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7710 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7711 law&mdash;increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7712 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7713 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7714 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect&mdash;at
7715 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7716 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7717 </para>
7718 <para>
7719 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7720 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7721 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7722 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7723 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7724 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7725 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7726 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7727 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7728 </para>
7729 <para>
7730
7731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7732 For example, imagine you were part of a <citetitle>Star Trek</citetitle> fan club. You
7733 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7734 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7735 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7736 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7737 <!-- f24 -->
7738 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7739 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7740 Entertainment Law Journal</citetitle> 17 (1997): 651.
7741 </para></footnote>
7742 </para>
7743 <para>
7744 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7745 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7746 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7747 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7748 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7749 </para>
7750 <para>
7751 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7752 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7753 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7754 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7755 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7756 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7757 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7758 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7759 </para>
7760 <para>
7761 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7762 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7763 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7764 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7765 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7766 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7767 </para>
7768 </section>
7769 <section id="marketconcentration">
7770 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7771 <para>
7772 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7773 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7774 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7775 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7776 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7777 find better ways
7778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7779 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7780 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7781 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7782 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7783 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7784 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7785 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7786 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7787 control.
7788 </para>
7789 <para>
7790 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7791 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7792 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7793 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7794 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7795 </para>
7796 <para>
7797 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7798 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7799 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7800 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7801 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7802 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7803 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7804 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7805 of the media.
7806 </para>
7807 <para>
7808 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7809 nature.
7810 </para>
7811 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7812 <para>
7813 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7814 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7815 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7816 <!-- f25 -->
7817 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7818 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7819 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7820 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7821 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7822 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7823 <!-- f26 -->
7824 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7825 Slide," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 23 December 2002.
7826 </para></footnote>
7827 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7828 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7829 <!-- f27 -->
7830 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," <citetitle>Charleston Gazette</citetitle>,
7831 31 May 2003.
7832 </para></footnote>
7833 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John</primary></indexterm>
7834 </para>
7835 <para>
7836 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7837 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7839 seventy-five stations. Today <emphasis>one</emphasis> company owns
7840 more than 1,200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
7841 total number of radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most
7842 markets, the two largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that
7843 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of
7844 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
7845 </para>
7846 <para>
7847 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7848 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7849 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7850 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7851 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7852 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7853 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7854 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7855 protected&mdash; by the market.
7856 </para>
7857 <para>
7858 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7859 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7860 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7861 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7862 </para>
7863 <blockquote>
7864 <para>
7865 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7866 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7867 &hellip; Fox TV shows &hellip; Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7868 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7869 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7870 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7871 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7872 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7873 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7874 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7875 <!-- f28 -->
7876 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly</citetitle> (September
7877 2003): 89.
7878 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7879 </para></footnote>
7880 </para>
7881 </blockquote>
7882 <para>
7883 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7884 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7885 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7886 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7887 </para>
7888 <figure id="fig-1761">
7889 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7890 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7891 </figure>
7892 <para>
7893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7894 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7895 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7896 distribute content?
7897 </para>
7898 <para>
7899 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7900 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7901 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7902 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7903 </para>
7904 <para>
7905 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7906 integration may matter.
7907 </para>
7908 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7909 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7910 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7911 <para>
7912 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle>. He took
7913 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7914 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7915 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7916 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7917 </para>
7918 <para>
7919 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7920 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7921 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7922 control.<footnote><para>
7923 <!-- f29 -->
7924 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7925 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7926 Missouri,
7927 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7928 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7929 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7930 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7931 </para></footnote>
7932 </para>
7933 <para>
7934
7935 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7936 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7937 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7938 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7939 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
7940 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7941 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the
7942 networks.
7943 </para>
7944 <para>
7945 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7946 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
7947 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7948 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In 1992,
7949 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7950 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7951 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16
7952 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7953 year there was one."<footnote><para>
7954 <!-- f30 -->
7955 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7956 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
7957 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7958 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7959 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7960 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7961 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
7962 2003.
7963 </para></footnote>
7964 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7965 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
7966 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7967 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7968 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7969 63%."<footnote><para>
7970 <!-- f31 -->
7971 Ibid.
7972 </para></footnote>
7973 </para>
7974 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7975 <para>
7976 Today, another Norman Lear with another <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle> would
7977 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7978 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7979 owned by the network.
7980 </para>
7981 <para>
7982 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7983 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7984 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7985 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry</primary></indexterm>
7986 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill</primary></indexterm>
7987 </para>
7988 <blockquote>
7989 <para>
7990 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7991 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7992 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7993 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7995 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7996 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7997 handful.<footnote><para>
7998 <!-- f32 -->
7999 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers</citetitle>, Bill
8000 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8001 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8002 </para></footnote>
8003 </para>
8004 </blockquote>
8005 <para>
8006 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8007 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8008 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8009 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8010 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8011 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8012 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
8013 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8014 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8015 democracy.
8016 </para>
8017 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8018 <para>
8019 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8020 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8021 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8022 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8023 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8024 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8025 <!-- f33 -->
8026 Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8027 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle>
8028 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
8029 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8030 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8031 Concepts in Technological Evolution," <citetitle>Research Policy</citetitle> 14 (1985):
8032 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8033 Kaplan, <citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8034 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them</citetitle>
8035 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
8036
8037 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8038 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8039 sprinting.
8040 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8041 </para>
8042 <para>
8043 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8044 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8045 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8046 measure.
8047 </para>
8048 <para>
8049 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8050 suggest the concern.
8051 </para>
8052 <para>
8053 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8054 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8055 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8056 </para>
8057 <para>
8058 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8059 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8060 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8061
8062 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8063 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8064 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8065 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8066 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8067 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8068 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8069 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8070 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8071 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8072 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8073 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8074 outweigh these costs.
8075 </para>
8076 <para>
8077 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8078 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8079 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8080 these issues.
8081 </para>
8082 <para>
8083 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8084 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8085 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8086 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8087 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8088 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8089 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8090 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8091 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8092 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8093 </para>
8094 <para>
8095 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8096 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8097 </para>
8098 <para>
8099 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8100 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8101 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8102 war. Can you do it?
8103 </para>
8104 <para>
8105 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8107 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8108 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8109 message will be heard then?
8110 </para>
8111 <para>
8112 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8113 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8114 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8115 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8116 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8117 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8118 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8119 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8120 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8121 <!-- f34 -->
8122 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8123 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8124 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8125 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8126 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8127 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8128 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8129 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8130 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8131 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," <citetitle>New
8132 York Times</citetitle>, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8133 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8134 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8135 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8136 Radio," <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review</citetitle> 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8137 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8138 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association</citetitle> v. <citetitle>FCC</citetitle>, 184 F. 3d 872
8139 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8140 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8141 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8142 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8143 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8144 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8145 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8146 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8147 <indexterm><primary>Comcast</primary></indexterm>
8148 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project</primary></indexterm>
8149 <indexterm><primary>NBC</primary></indexterm>
8150 <indexterm><primary>WJOA</primary></indexterm>
8151 <indexterm><primary>WRC</primary></indexterm>
8152 </para></footnote>
8153 </para>
8154 <para>
8155 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8156 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8157 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8158 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8159 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8160 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8161 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8162 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8163 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8164 </para>
8165 </section>
8166 <section id="together">
8167 <title>Together</title>
8168 <para>
8169 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8170 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8171 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8172 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8173 </para>
8174 <para>
8175 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8176 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8177 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8178 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8179 to seem
8180
8181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8182 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8183 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8184 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8185 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8186 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8187 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8188 be redefined.
8189 </para>
8190 <para>
8191 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8192 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8193 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8194 our culture today.
8195 </para>
8196 <para>
8197 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8198 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8199 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8200 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8201 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8202 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8203 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8204 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8205 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8206 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8207 </para>
8208 <para>
8209 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8210 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8211 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8212 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8213 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8214 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8215 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8216 future. And these changes have to be <emphasis>reductions</emphasis>
8217 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8218 in control that technology and the market enable.
8219 </para>
8220 <para>
8221 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8222 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8224 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8225 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8226 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8227 more of the development of our culture than now</emphasis>.
8228 </para>
8229 <para>
8230 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8231 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8232 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8233 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8234 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8235 were independent of the networks. <emphasis>Never</emphasis> has
8236 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8237 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8238 regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8239 energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation
8240 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8241 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8242 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8243 known.<footnote><para>
8244 <!-- f35 -->
8245 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8246 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8247 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
8248 </para></footnote>
8249 </para>
8250 <para>
8251 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8252 </para>
8253 <para>
8254 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8255 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8256 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8257 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8258 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8259 </para>
8260
8261 <table id="t2">
8262 <title>Law status in 1790</title>
8263 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8264 <thead>
8265 <row>
8266 <entry></entry>
8267 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8268 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8269 </row>
8270 </thead>
8271 <tbody>
8272 <row>
8273 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8274 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8275 <entry>Free</entry>
8276 </row>
8277 <row>
8278 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8279 <entry>Free</entry>
8280 <entry>Free</entry>
8281 </row>
8282 </tbody>
8283 </tgroup>
8284 </table>
8285
8286 <para>
8287 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8288 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8289 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8290
8291 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8292 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8293 noncommercial work was also free.
8294 </para>
8295 <para>
8296 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8297 </para>
8298
8299 <table id="t3">
8300 <title>Law status at the end of ninetheenth centory</title>
8301 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8302 <thead>
8303 <row>
8304 <entry></entry>
8305 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8306 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8307 </row>
8308 </thead>
8309 <tbody>
8310 <row>
8311 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8312 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8313 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8314 </row>
8315 <row>
8316 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8317 <entry>Free</entry>
8318 <entry>Free</entry>
8319 </row>
8320 </tbody>
8321 </tgroup>
8322 </table>
8323
8324 <para>
8325 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8326 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8327 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8328 transformation were still essentially free.
8329 </para>
8330 <para>
8331 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8332 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8333 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8334 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8335 we could say the law began to look like this:
8336 </para>
8337
8338 <table id="t4">
8339 <title>Law status in 1975</title>
8340 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8341 <thead>
8342 <row>
8343 <entry></entry>
8344 <entry>COPY</entry>
8345 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8346 </row>
8347 </thead>
8348 <tbody>
8349 <row>
8350 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8351 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8352 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8353 </row>
8354 <row>
8355 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8356 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8357 <entry>Free</entry>
8358 </row>
8359 </tbody>
8360 </tgroup>
8361 </table>
8362
8363 <para>
8364 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8365 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8366 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8367 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8368 that the law now looks like this:
8369 </para>
8370
8371 <table id="t5">
8372 <title>Law status now</title>
8373 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8374 <thead>
8375 <row>
8376 <entry></entry>
8377 <entry>COPY</entry>
8378 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8379 </row>
8380 </thead>
8381 <tbody>
8382 <row>
8383 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8384 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8385 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8386 </row>
8387 <row>
8388 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8389 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8390 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8391 </row>
8392 </tbody>
8393 </tgroup>
8394 </table>
8395
8396 <para>
8397 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8398 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8399 creativity&mdash;
8400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8401 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8402 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8403 </para>
8404 <para>
8405 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8406 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8407 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8408 these domains actually does any good.
8409 </para>
8410 <para>
8411 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8412 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8413 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8414 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8415 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8416 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/> and
8417 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="transformers"/>, one
8418 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8419 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8420 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8421 </para>
8422 <para>
8423 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8424 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8425 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8426 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8427 property rights<footnote><para>
8428 <!-- f36 -->
8429 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8430 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8431 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8432 Disintegration of Property," in <citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property</citetitle>, J. Roland
8433 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8434 Press, 1980).
8435 </para></footnote>)
8436 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8437 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8438 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8439 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8440 did not control <emphasis>at all</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8441 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8442 free, and for almost 180 years our country consistently protected a
8443 vibrant and rich free culture.
8444 </para>
8445 <para>
8446 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8447 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8448 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8449 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8450 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8451 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8452 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8453 chapter 7). Adding
8454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8455 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8456 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8457 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8458 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8459 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8460 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8461 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8462 dominates the debate today.
8463 </para>
8464 <para>
8465 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8466 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8467 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8468 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8469 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8470 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8471 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8472 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8473 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8474 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8475 lawyer.
8476 </para>
8477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8478 </section>
8479 </chapter>
8480 </part>
8481 <part id="c-puzzles">
8482 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8483
8484 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8485 <chapter id="chimera">
8486 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8487 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8488 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8489 </indexterm>
8490 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8491 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8492 </indexterm>
8493 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8494 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8495 </indexterm>
8496
8497 <para>
8498 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8499 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8500 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8501 <!-- f1. -->
8502 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8503 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8504 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8505 </para></footnote>
8506 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8507 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8508 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8509 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8510 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8511 villagers to explore life as a king.
8512 </para>
8513 <para>
8514 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8515 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8516 "blind." They don't have the word <citetitle>blind</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8517 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8518 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8519 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8520 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8521 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8522 alone!'"
8523 </para>
8524 <para>
8525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8526 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8527 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8528 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8529 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8530 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8531 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8532 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8533 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8534 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8535 </para>
8536 <para>
8537 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8538 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8539 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8540 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8541 </para>
8542 <para>
8543 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8544 is affected," he reports.
8545 </para>
8546 <para>
8547 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8548 called the eyes &hellip; are diseased &hellip; in such a way as to affect
8549 his brain."
8550 </para>
8551 <para>
8552 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8553 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8554 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8555 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8556 </para>
8557 <para>
8558 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8559 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8560 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8561 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8562 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8563 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8564 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8565 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8566
8567 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8568 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8569 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8570 scene. &hellip;"
8571 </para>
8572 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8573 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8574 <para>
8575 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8576 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8577 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8578 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8579 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8580 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8581 </para>
8582 <para>
8583 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8584 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8585 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8586 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8587 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8588 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8589 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8590 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8591 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8592 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8593 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8594 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8595 </para>
8596 <para>
8597 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8598 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8599 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8600 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8601 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8602 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8603 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8604 </para>
8605 <para>
8606 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8607 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8608 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8609 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8610 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8611 from Tower.
8612 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
8613 </para>
8614 <para>
8615
8616 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8617 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8618 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8619 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8620 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8621 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8622 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8623 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8624 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8625 </para>
8626 <para>
8627 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8628 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8629 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8630 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8631 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8632 </para>
8633 <para>
8634 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8635 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8636 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8637 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8638 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8639 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8640 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8641 implemented.<footnote><para>
8642 <!-- f2. -->
8643 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8644 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8645 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003,
8646 available at
8647 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8648 #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8649 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8650 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8651 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up
8652 Stakes on Piracy," <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 17 July 2003, available at
8653 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil
8654 penalties are currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent
8655 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8656 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than 600 songs
8657 through a family computer, see <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8658 re. Verizon Internet Services)</citetitle>, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24
8659 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
8660 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8661 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8662 $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8663 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8664 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8665 Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8666 August 2003, available at
8667 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an
8668 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8669 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8670 identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8671 Name Students," <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 8 August 2003, D3, available at
8672 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8673 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.</primary></indexterm>
8674 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
8675 </para></footnote>
8676
8677 </para>
8678 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8679 <para>
8680 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8681 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8682 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8683 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8684 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8685 </para>
8686 <para>
8687 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8688 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8689 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8690 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8691 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8692 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe <emphasis>either</emphasis> extreme
8693 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8694 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8695 </para>
8696 <para>
8697
8698 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8699 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8700 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8701 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8702 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8703 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8704 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8705 </para>
8706 <para>
8707 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8708 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8709 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8710 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8711 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8712 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8713 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8714 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8715 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8716 protection for copyrighted material,
8717 </para>
8718 <blockquote>
8719 <para>
8720 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8721 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8722 </para>
8723 <para>
8724 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8725 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8726 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8727 answer
8728 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8729 well produce a totally different industry model.
8730 </para>
8731 <para>
8732 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8733 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8734 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8735 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8736 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8737 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8738 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8739 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8740 interests.<footnote><para>
8741 <!-- f3. -->
8742 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8743 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8744 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8745 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Peter
8746 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8747 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8748 Congressional Testimony File. </para></footnote>
8749 </para>
8750 </blockquote>
8751 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8752 <para>
8753 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8754 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8755 changed.
8756 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal</primary></indexterm>
8757 </para>
8758 <para>
8759 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8760 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8761 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8762 </para>
8763
8764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8765 </chapter>
8766 <chapter id="harms">
8767 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8768 <para>
8769
8770 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8771 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8772 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8773 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8774 prohibition,
8775 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8776 </para>
8777 <para>
8778 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8779 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8780 extend
8781 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8782 justified?
8783 </para>
8784 <para>
8785 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8786 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8787 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8788 our history.
8789 </para>
8790 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8791 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8792 <para>
8793 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8794 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8795 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8796 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8797 </para>
8798 <para>
8799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8800 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8801 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8802 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8803 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8804 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8805 </para>
8806 <section id="constrain">
8807 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8808 <para>
8809 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8810 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8811 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8812 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8813 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8814 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8815 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8816 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8817 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8818 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8819 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8820 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8821 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8822 </para>
8823 <para>
8824 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8825 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8826 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8827 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8828 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8829 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8830 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8831 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8832 the culture all around.
8833 </para>
8834 <para>
8835 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8836 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8837
8838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8839
8840 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8841 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8842 storytelling extended across the globe.
8843 </para>
8844 <para>
8845 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8846 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8847 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8848 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8849 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8850 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8851 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8852 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8853 work is presumptively illegal.
8854 </para>
8855 <para>
8856 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8857 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8858 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8859 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8860 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8861 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8862 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8863 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8864 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8865 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8866 million.<footnote><para>
8867 <!-- f1. -->
8868 See Lynne W. Jeter, <citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom</citetitle>
8869 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8870 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8871 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8872 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8873 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8874 </para></footnote>
8875 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8876 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8877 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8878 suffering.<footnote>
8879 <para>
8880 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8881 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8882 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8883 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8884 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8885 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8886 available at
8887 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8888 recent months.
8889 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8890 </para></footnote>
8891 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8892 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8893 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8894 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8895 </para>
8896 <para>
8897 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8898 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
8899 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
8900 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
8901 Disneys "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
8902 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
8903 designed to
8904
8905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8906 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
8907 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
8908 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
8909 we will begin to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the
8910 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
8911 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
8912 fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
8913 States.<footnote><para>
8914 <!-- f3. -->
8915
8916 See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," <citetitle>Wired</citetitle>, 7 July
8917 2003, available at
8918 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8919 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
8920 </para></footnote>
8921 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8922 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8923 critical or reflective.
8924 </para>
8925 <para>
8926 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8927 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
8928 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. But an
8929 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8930 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8931 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8932 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8933 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8934 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8935 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8936 </para>
8937 <para>
8938 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8939 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8940 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8941 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8942 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8943 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8944 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8945 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8946 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8947 </para>
8948 <para>
8949 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8950 described in chapter
8951 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/>, in
8952 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
8953 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
8954 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
8955 use.
8956 </para>
8957 <para>
8958
8959 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8960 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8961 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8962 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
8963 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8964 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8965 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8966 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8967 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8968 </para>
8969 <para>
8970 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8971 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8972 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8973 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8974 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8975 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8976 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8977 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8978 comfort themselves.
8979 </para>
8980 <para>
8981 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
8982 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8983 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8984 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8985 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
8986 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8987 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8988 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8989 culture that is free.
8990 </para>
8991 <para>
8992 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8993 </para>
8994 <blockquote>
8995 <para>
8996 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8997 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8998 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8999 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made &hellip; you're not
9000 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9001 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9002 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9003 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9004 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9005 </para>
9006 </blockquote>
9007 </section>
9008 <section id="innovators">
9009 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9010 <para>
9011 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9012 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9013 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9014 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9015 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9016 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9017 </para>
9018 <para>
9019 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9020 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9021 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9022 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9023 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9024 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9025 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9026 </para>
9027 <para>
9028 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9029 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9030 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9031 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9032 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9033 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9034 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9035 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9036 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9037 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9038 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9039 </para>
9040 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9041 <para>
9042 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9043 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9044 strategy that I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select:
9045 labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9046 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9047 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9048 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9049 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9050 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9051 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9052 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9053 </para>
9054 <para>
9055 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9056 I told in <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9057 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9058 </para>
9059 <para>
9060 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9061 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9062 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9063 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9064 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9065 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9066 </para>
9067 <para>
9068 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9069 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9070 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9071 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9072 Raitt. And so on.
9073 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
9074 </para>
9075 <para>
9076 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9077 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9078 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9079 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9080 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9081 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9082 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9083 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9084 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9085 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9086 </para>
9087 <para>
9088 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9089 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9090
9091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9092 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9093 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9094 the kind of content the users liked.
9095 </para>
9096 <para>
9097 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9098 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9099 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9100 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9101 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9102 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9103 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9104 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9105 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9106 they had already bought.
9107 </para>
9108 <indexterm id="idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'>
9109 <primary>Vivendi Universal</primary>
9110 </indexterm>
9111 <para>
9112 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9113 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9114 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9115 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9116 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9117 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9118 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9119 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9120 </para>
9121 <para>
9122 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9123 </para>
9124 <para>
9125 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9126 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9127 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9128 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9129 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9130 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9131 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9132 demanded.
9133 </para>
9134 <para>
9135 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9136 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9137 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9138 clients in this
9139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9140 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9141 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9142 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9143 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9144 </para>
9145 <indexterm startref="idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'/>
9146 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9147 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9148 <para>
9149 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9150 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9151 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9152 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9153 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9154 <!-- f4. -->
9155 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," <citetitle>Los Angeles
9156 Times</citetitle>, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9157 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9158 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available
9159 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9160 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," <citetitle>Los Angeles
9161 Times</citetitle>, 28 May 2001.
9162 </para></footnote>
9163 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9164 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9165 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9166 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9167 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9168 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9169 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9170 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9171 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9172 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in <citetitle>Business
9173 2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9174 </para>
9175 <blockquote>
9176 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9177 <para>
9178 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9179 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9180 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9181 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9182 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9183 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9184 United States with bona fide MP3 players. &hellip; <footnote>
9185 <para>
9186 <!-- f5. -->
9187 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, 16 June
9188 2003, available at
9189 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9190 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9191 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9192 </para></footnote>
9193 </para>
9194 </blockquote>
9195 <para>
9196 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9197 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9198 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9199 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9200 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9201 constantly threatened by litigation.
9202 </para>
9203 <para>
9204
9205 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9206 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9207 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9208 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9209 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9210 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9211 imposes,
9212 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9213 conservative
9214 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9215 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9216 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9217 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9218 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9219 </para>
9220 <para>
9221 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9222 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9223 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9224 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9225 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9226 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9227 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9228 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9229 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9230 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9231 </para>
9232 <para>
9233 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9234 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9235 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9236 culture&mdash;a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9237 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9238 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9239 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9240 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9241 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9242 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9243 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9244 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9246 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9247 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9248 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9249 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9250 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9251 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9252 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9253 </para>
9254 <para>
9255 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9256 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9257 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9258 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9259 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9260 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9261 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9262 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9263 </para>
9264 <para>
9265 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9266 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9267 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9268 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9269 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9270 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9271 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9272 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9273 </para></footnote>
9274
9275 Congress
9276 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9277 "broadcast
9278 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9279 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9280 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9281 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9282 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9283 violators
9284 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9285 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9286 </para></footnote>
9287
9288 </para>
9289 <para>
9290 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9291 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9292 regulation
9293 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9294 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9295
9296 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9297 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9298 those requirements.
9299 </para>
9300 <para>
9301 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9302 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9303 impose.<footnote><para>
9304 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9305 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9306 </para></footnote>
9307 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9308 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9309 harm than good.
9310 </para>
9311 <para>
9312 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9313 innovation&mdash;again,
9314 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9315 crowd.
9316 </para>
9317 <para>
9318 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9319 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9320 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9321 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9322 </para>
9323 <para>
9324 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9325 linkend="property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9326 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9327 Jessica Litman in her book <citetitle>Digital
9328 Copyright</citetitle>,<footnote><para>
9329 <!-- f9. -->
9330 Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (Amherst,
9331 N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001).
9332 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
9333 </para></footnote>
9334 overall this history of copyright
9335 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9336 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9337 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9338 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9339 </para>
9340 <para>
9341 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9342 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9343 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9344 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9345 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9346 </para>
9347 <para>
9348 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9349 <!-- f10. -->
9350 The only circuit court exception is found in <citetitle>Recording Industry
9351 Association of America (RIAA)</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems</citetitle>, 180 F. 3d
9352 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9353 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9354 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9355 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9356 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9357 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9358 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Grokster, Ltd</citetitle>., 259 F. Supp. 2d
9359 1029 (C.D. Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the
9360 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9361 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9362 liability.
9363 </para></footnote>
9364 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9365 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9366 here.<footnote><para>
9367 <!-- f11. -->
9368 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9369 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9370 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9371 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9372 August 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9373 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9374 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that
9375 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9376 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9377 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9378 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and
9379 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34,
9380 available at
9381 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9382 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
9383 </para></footnote>
9384 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9385 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9386 </para>
9387 <para>
9388
9389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9390 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9391 linkend="pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9392 artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she
9393 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9394 version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9395 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9396 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9397 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9398 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9399 </para>
9400 <para>
9401 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9402 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9403 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9404 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9405 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9406 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9407 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9408 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9409 recording artists.
9410 </para>
9411 <para>
9412 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9413 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9414 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9415 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9416 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9417 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9418 metropolitan area.
9419 </para>
9420 <para>
9421 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9422 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9423 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9424 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9425 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9426 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9427 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9428 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9429 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9430 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9431 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9432 </para>
9433 <para>
9434
9435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9436 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9437 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9438 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9439 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9440 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9441 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9442 FM radio,
9443 </para>
9444 <blockquote>
9445 <para>
9446 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9447 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9448 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9449 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9450 than by technical restrictions. &hellip; Armstrong likened the situation
9451 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9452 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9453 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9454 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9455 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9456 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9457 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9458 shackles.<footnote><para>
9459 <!-- f12. -->
9460 Lessing, 239.
9461 </para></footnote>
9462 </para>
9463 </blockquote>
9464 <para>
9465 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not
9466 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9467 underestimated the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and
9468 legislation"<footnote><para>
9469 <!-- f13. -->
9470 Ibid., 229.
9471 </para></footnote>
9472 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9473 </para>
9474 <para>
9475 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9476 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9477 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9478 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9479 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9480 radio?
9481 </para>
9482 <para>
9483 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9484 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9485
9486 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9487 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9488 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9489 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9490 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9491 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9492 of "Happy Birthday" on the air, <emphasis>Internet radio
9493 does</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9494 radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9495 burdens terrestrial radio.
9496 </para>
9497 <para>
9498 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9499 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9500 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9501 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9502 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9503 <para>
9504 <!-- f14. -->
9505 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9506 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9507 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9508 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9509 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9510 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9511 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9512 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9513 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9514 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9515 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9516 Distribution," <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin</citetitle> (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9517 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9518 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9519 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9520 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9521 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9522 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9523 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9524 </para></footnote>
9525 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9526 equivalent fee.
9527 </para>
9528 <para>
9529 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9530 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9531 station) would have to collect the following data from <emphasis>every
9532 listening transaction</emphasis>:
9533 </para>
9534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9535 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9536 <listitem><para>
9537 name of the service;
9538 </para></listitem>
9539 <listitem><para>
9540 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9541 </para></listitem>
9542 <listitem><para>
9543 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9544 </para></listitem>
9545 <listitem><para>
9546 date of transmission;
9547 </para></listitem>
9548 <listitem><para>
9549 time of transmission;
9550 </para></listitem>
9551 <listitem><para>
9552 time zone of origination of transmission;
9553 </para></listitem>
9554 <listitem><para>
9555 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9556 </para></listitem>
9557 <listitem><para>
9558 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9559 </para></listitem>
9560 <listitem><para>
9561 sound recording title;
9562 </para></listitem>
9563 <listitem><para>
9564 ISRC code of the recording;
9565 </para></listitem>
9566 <listitem><para>
9567 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9568 </para></listitem>
9569 <listitem><para>
9570 featured recording artist;
9571 </para></listitem>
9572 <listitem><para>
9573 retail album title;
9574 </para></listitem>
9575 <listitem><para>
9576 recording label;
9577 </para></listitem>
9578 <listitem><para>
9579 UPC code of the retail album;
9580 </para></listitem>
9581 <listitem><para>
9582 catalog number;
9583 </para></listitem>
9584 <listitem><para>
9585 copyright owner information;
9586 </para></listitem>
9587 <listitem><para>
9588 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9589 </para></listitem>
9590 <listitem><para>
9591 name of the service or entity;
9592 </para></listitem>
9593 <listitem><para>
9594 channel or program;
9595 </para></listitem>
9596 <listitem><para>
9597 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9598 </para></listitem>
9599 <listitem><para>
9600 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9601 </para></listitem>
9602 <listitem><para>
9603 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9604 </para></listitem>
9605 <listitem><para>
9606 Unique User identifier;
9607 </para></listitem>
9608 <listitem><para>
9609 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9610 </para></listitem>
9611 </orderedlist>
9612
9613 <para>
9614 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9615 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9616 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9617 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9618 Internet radio has to pay a <emphasis>type of copyright fee</emphasis>
9619 that terrestrial radio does not.
9620 </para>
9621 <para>
9622 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9623 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9624 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9625 </para>
9626 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9627 <para>
9628 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9629 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9630 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9631 </para>
9632 <blockquote>
9633 <para>
9634 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9635 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9636 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9637 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9638 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9639 webcasters asked the RIAA, &hellip; "How do you come up with a
9640
9641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9642 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9643 Because
9644 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9645 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9646 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9647 of business. &hellip;"
9648 </para>
9649 <para>
9650 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an
9651 industry with thousands of webcasters, <emphasis>we think it should be
9652 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9653 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market</emphasis>." (Emphasis
9654 added.)
9655 </para>
9656 </blockquote>
9657 <para>
9658 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9659 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9660 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9661 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9662 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9663 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9664 effective to prevent it.
9665 </para>
9666 </section>
9667 <section id="corruptingcitizens">
9668 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9669 <para>
9670 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9671 dinosaurs
9672 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9673 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9674 </para>
9675 <para>
9676 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9677 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9678 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9679 </para>
9680 <para>
9681 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9682 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9683 large number of citizens. According to <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, 43 million
9684 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9685 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9686 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9687 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9688 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9689 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9690 </para></footnote>
9691 According to the RIAA,
9692 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9693 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9694
9695 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9696 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9697 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9698 increasingly
9699 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9700 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9701 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9702 extreme
9703 response by the other.
9704 </para>
9705 <para>
9706 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9707 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9708 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9709 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9710 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9711 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9712 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9713 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9714 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9715 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9716 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9717 was.<footnote><para>
9718 <!-- f16. -->
9719 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," <citetitle>Los
9720 Angeles Times</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, Business.
9721 </para></footnote>
9722 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9723 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9724 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9725 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9726 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9727 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9728 they oppose.
9729 </para>
9730 <para>
9731 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9732 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9733 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9734 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9735 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9736 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9737 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9738 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9739 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9740 <!-- f17. -->
9741 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9742 Prohibition," <citetitle>American Economic Review</citetitle> 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9743 </para></footnote>
9744 We have
9745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9746 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9747 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9748 <!-- f18. -->
9749 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9750 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9751 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9752 </para></footnote>
9753 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9754 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9755 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9756 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9757 cheat.<footnote><para>
9758 <!-- f19. -->
9759 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9760 Compliance," <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature</citetitle> 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9761 compliance literature).
9762 </para></footnote>
9763 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9764 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9765 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9766 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition</primary></indexterm>
9767 </para>
9768 <para>
9769 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9770 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9771 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9772 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9773 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9774 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9775 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9776 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9777 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9778 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9779 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9780 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9781 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9782 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9783 degree of illegality.
9784 </para>
9785 <para>
9786 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9787 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9788 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9789 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9790 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9791 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9792 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9793 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9794 to consider the alternative.
9795 </para>
9796 <para>
9797
9798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9799 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9800 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9801 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9802 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9803 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9804 </para>
9805 <para>
9806 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9807 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9808 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9809 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9810 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9811 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9812 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9813 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9814 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9815 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9816 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9817 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9818 </para>
9819 <para>
9820 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9821 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9822 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9823 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9824 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9825 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9826 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9827 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9828 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9829 a nation of felons?
9830 </para>
9831 <para>
9832 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9833 </para>
9834 <para>
9835 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9836 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9837 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9838 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9839 used
9840
9841 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9842 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9843 recordings is free.
9844 </para>
9845 <para>
9846 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9847 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9848 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9849 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9850 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9851 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9852 capacities of digital technologies.
9853 </para>
9854 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9855 <para>
9856 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9857 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9858 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9859 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9860 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9861 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9862 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9863 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9864 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9865 </para>
9866 <para>
9867 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9868 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9869 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9870 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9871 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9872 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9873 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9874 on people's machines.
9875 </para>
9876 <para>
9877 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9878 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9879 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9880 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9881 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9882 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9883
9884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9885 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9886 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9887 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9888 management" system.
9889 </para>
9890 <para>
9891 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9892 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9893 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9894 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9895 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9896 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9897 freedom to move content easily?
9898 </para>
9899 <para>
9900 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9901 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9902 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9903 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9904 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9905 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9906 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9907 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9908 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9909 </para>
9910 <para>
9911 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9912 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9913 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9914 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9915 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9916 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9917 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9918 </para>
9919 <para>
9920 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9921 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9922 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9923 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9924 </para>
9925 <para>
9926 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9927 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9928
9929 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9930
9931 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9932 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9933 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9934 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9935 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9936 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9937 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9938 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9939 generally.
9940 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
9941 </para>
9942 <para>
9943 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9944 explains,
9945 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
9946 </para>
9947 <blockquote>
9948 <para>
9949 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9950 evaporate to one degree or another. &hellip; If you're a copyright
9951 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9952 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9953 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9954 access? &hellip; Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9955 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9956 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9957 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9958 </para>
9959 </blockquote>
9960 <para>
9961 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9962 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9963 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9964 </para>
9965 <para>
9966 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
9967 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9968 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9969 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9970 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9971 an Internet user is revealed.
9972 </para>
9973 <para>
9974 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9975 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9976 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9977 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9978 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9979 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9980 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9981 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9982 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
9983 <!-- f20. -->
9984 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9985 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9986 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9987 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9988 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9989 Being Sued," <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
9990 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 15 September
9991 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9992 Fan, Either," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9993 Brianna a Criminal?" <citetitle>Toronto Star</citetitle>, 18 September 2003, P7.
9994 </para></footnote>
9995
9996 </para>
9997 <para>
9998 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9999 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10000 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10001 <!-- f21. -->
10002 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10003 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10004 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10005 </para></footnote>
10006 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10007 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10008 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10009 </para>
10010 <para>
10011 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10012 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10013 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10014 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10015 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10016 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10017 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10018 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10019 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10020 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10021 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10022 <!-- f22. -->
10023 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10024 <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10025 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10026 Colleges," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10027 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," <citetitle>Christian Science
10028 Monitor</citetitle>, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10029 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10030 Lawsuit Possible," <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10031 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," <citetitle>Internet News</citetitle>, 30 January
10032 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10033 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
10034 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10035 Sharing," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10036 Are Weapons at Universities," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10037 </para></footnote>
10038 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10039 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10040 </para>
10041 <para>
10042 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10043 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10044 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10045 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10046 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10047 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10048 college students
10049
10050 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10051 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10052 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10053 Says von Lohmann,
10054 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10055 </para>
10056 <blockquote>
10057 <para>
10058 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10059 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10060 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10061 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10062 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10063 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10064 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10065 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10066 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10067 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10068 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10069 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10070 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10071 larger number of Americans than drug use. &hellip; If forty to sixty
10072 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10073 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10074 million of them.
10075 </para>
10076 </blockquote>
10077 <para>
10078 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10079 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10080 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10081 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10082 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10083 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10084 </para>
10085
10086 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10087 </section>
10088 </chapter>
10089 </part>
10090 <part id="c-balances">
10091 <title>BALANCES</title>
10092 <partintro>
10093
10094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10095 <para>
10096 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10097 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10098 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10099 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10100 </para>
10101 <para>
10102 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10103 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10104 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10105 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10106 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10107 everything around.
10108 </para>
10109 <para>
10110 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10111 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10112 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10113 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10114 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10115 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10116 </para>
10117 <para>
10118 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10119 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10120 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10121 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10122 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10123 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10124 made that is happening all around.
10125 </para>
10126 <para>
10127 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10128 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10129 gasoline onto this fire.
10130 </para>
10131 <para>
10132 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10133 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10134 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10135 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10136 </para>
10137 <para>
10138 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10139 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10140 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10141 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10142 success will require.
10143 </para>
10144 </partintro>
10145
10146 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10147 <chapter id="eldred">
10148 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10149 <para>
10150 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10151 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10152 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10153 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10154 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10155 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10156 come alive.
10157 </para>
10158 <para>
10159 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10160 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10161 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10162 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10163 them available for free.
10164 </para>
10165 <para>
10166 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10167 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10168 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10169 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10170 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10171 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10172 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10173 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10174 accessible&mdash;today.
10175 </para>
10176 <para>
10177 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10178 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's <citetitle>Scarlet Letter</citetitle> had passed into the
10179 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10180 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10181 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10182 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10183 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10184 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (<citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle>), sometimes not
10185 (<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame</citetitle>, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>). These are all
10186 commercial publications of public domain works.
10187 </para>
10188 <para>
10189 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10190 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10191 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10192 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10193 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10194 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10195 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10196 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10197 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10198 generally.<footnote><para>
10199 <!-- f1. -->
10200 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10201 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10202 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10203 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10204 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10205 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10206 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10207 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10208 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10209 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10210 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10211 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10212 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10213 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10214 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10215 </para>
10216 <para>
10217 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10218 collection of poems <citetitle>New Hampshire</citetitle> was slated to
10219 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10220 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10221 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
10222 linkend="property-i"/>, in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10223 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by
10224 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10225 than 1923 to his collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10226 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10227 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10228 more than 1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10229 </para>
10230 <para>
10231
10232 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10233 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10234 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10235 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10236 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10237 <!-- f2. -->
10238 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10239 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10240 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10241 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10242 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10243 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10244 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10245 </para></footnote>
10246
10247 </para>
10248 <para>
10249 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10250 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10251 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10252 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10253 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10254 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10255 to undertake.
10256 </para>
10257 <para>
10258 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10259 constitutional
10260 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10261 interpretation.
10262 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10263 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10264 importantly
10265 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10266 </para>
10267 <blockquote>
10268 <para>
10269 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science &hellip;
10270 by securing for limited Times to Authors &hellip; exclusive Right to
10271 their &hellip; Writings. &hellip;
10272 </para>
10273 </blockquote>
10274 <para>
10275 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10276 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10277 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10278 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10279 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10280 specific&mdash;to "promote &hellip; Progress"&mdash;through means that
10281 are also specific&mdash; by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10282 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10283 </para>
10284 <para>
10285 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10286 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10287 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10288 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10289 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10290 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10291 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10292 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the
10293 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10294 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10295 </para>
10296 <para>
10297 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10298 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10299 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10300 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10301 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10302 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10303 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10304 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10305 this gravy train going.
10306 </para>
10307 <para>
10308 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10309 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10310 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10311 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10312 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10313 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10314 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10315 </para>
10316 <para>
10317 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10318 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10319 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10320 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10321 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10322 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10323 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10324 published by anyone for free.
10325 </para>
10326 <para>
10327 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10328 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10329 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10330 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10331 report:
10332 </para>
10333 <para>
10334 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10335
10336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10337 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10338 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10339 those works.
10340 </para>
10341 <para>
10342 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10343 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10344 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10345 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10346 </para>
10347 <para>
10348 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10349 about it?"
10350 </para>
10351 <para>
10352 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10353 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10354 they support the bill."
10355 </para>
10356 <para>
10357 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10358 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10359 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10360 much is it worth?"
10361 </para>
10362 <para>
10363 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10364 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10365 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10366 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10367 </para>
10368 <para>
10369 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10370 correct conclusion:
10371 </para>
10372 <para>
10373 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10374 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10375 contributions
10376 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10377 </para>
10378 <para>
10379 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10380 contribute
10381 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10382 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10383 </para>
10384 <para>
10385 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10386 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10387 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10388 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10390 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10391 copyrights
10392 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10393 the copyright term extended.
10394 </para>
10395 <para>
10396 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10397 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10398 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10399 </para>
10400 <para>
10401 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10402 Copyright
10403 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10404 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10405 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10406 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10407 contributions.<footnote><para>
10408 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10409 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10410 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 17 October 1998, 22.
10411 </para></footnote>
10412 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10413 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10414 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10415 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10416 Age," available at
10417 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10418 </para></footnote>
10419 Disney is estimated to have
10420 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10421 cycle.<footnote><para>
10422 <!-- f5. -->
10423 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10424 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week</citetitle>, 8 August 1990, available at
10425 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10426 </para></footnote>
10427
10428 </para>
10429 <para>
10430 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10431 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10432 reality
10433 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10434 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10435 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10436 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10437 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10438 "limited."
10439 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10440 and again.
10441 </para>
10442 <para>
10443 It was also my judgment that <emphasis>this</emphasis> Supreme Court
10444 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10445 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10446 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10447 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10448 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10449 Supreme Court's
10450
10451 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10452 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10453 guns near schools.
10454 </para>
10455 <para>
10456 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10457 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10458 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10459 "interstate
10460 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10461 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10462 interstate
10463 commerce.
10464 </para>
10465 <para>
10466 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10467 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10468 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10469 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10470 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10471 </para>
10472 <para>
10473 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10474 that in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The government had
10475 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10476 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10477 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10478 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10479 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10480 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10481 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10482 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10483 position to second-guess Congress.
10484 </para>
10485 <para>
10486 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,"
10487 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10488 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10489 </para></footnote>
10490 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10491 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10492 Congress's power. The decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10493 later in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>.<footnote><para>
10494 <!-- f7. -->
10495 <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10496 </para></footnote>
10497 </para>
10498 <para>
10499 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10500 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10501 <!-- f8. -->
10502 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10503 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10504 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10505 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10506 regulate commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce
10507 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10508 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10509 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights&mdash;the
10510 limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10511 </para></footnote>
10512 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10513 yield the conclusion that Congress
10514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10515 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10516 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power over
10517 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10518 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10519 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10520 term of existing copyrights.
10521 </para>
10522 <para>
10523 <emphasis>If</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
10524 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> stood for
10525 politics&mdash;a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10526 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10527 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10528 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10529 demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an interpretation of the
10530 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10531 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10532 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10533 were going to be petty politicians.
10534 </para>
10535 <para>
10536 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10537 argument in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10538 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10539 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10540 piracy&mdash;piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10541 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10542 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10543 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10544 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10545 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10546 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10547 power&mdash;expressed through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to
10548 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10549 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10550 piracy that affects us all.
10551 </para>
10552 <para>
10553 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10554
10555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10556 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10557 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10558 <!-- f9. -->
10559 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10560 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available
10561 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10562 </para></footnote>
10563 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10564 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10565 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10566 charter.
10567 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association</primary></indexterm>
10568 </para>
10569 <para>
10570 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10571 copyright
10572 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10573 influence
10574 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10575 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10576 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10577 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10578 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10579 bought to extend them again.
10580 </para>
10581 <para>
10582 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10583 extended.
10584 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10585 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10586 society
10587 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10588 Disney's.
10589 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10590 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10591 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10592 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10593 exploited,
10594 and no longer available as a result.
10595 </para>
10596 <para>
10597 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10598 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10599 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10600 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10601 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10602 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10603 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10604 Congressional
10605 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10606 of Petitioners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 7, available at
10607 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10608 </para></footnote>
10609
10610 </para>
10611 <para>
10612 Think practically about the consequence of this
10613 extension&mdash;practically,
10614 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10615
10616 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10617 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10618 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10619 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10620 remaining
10621 9,873. What would you have to do?
10622 </para>
10623 <para>
10624 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10625 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10626 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10627 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10628 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10629 list of books still under copyright.
10630 </para>
10631 <para>
10632 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10633 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10634 </para>
10635 <para>
10636 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10637 owners
10638 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10639 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10640 being at least a list?
10641 </para>
10642 <para>
10643 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10644 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10645 practically
10646 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10647 thousands
10648 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10649 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10650 </para>
10651 <para>
10652 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10653 apologists for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of
10654 copyright owners?"
10655 </para>
10656 <para>
10657 Well, actually, if you think about it, there <emphasis>are</emphasis>
10658 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10659 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10660 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10661 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10662 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10663 what tangible property.
10664 </para>
10665 <para>
10666 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10667 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10668 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10669
10670 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10671 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10672 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10673 happen
10674 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10675 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10676 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10677 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10678 know quite well who owns what property.
10679 </para>
10680 <para>
10681 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10682 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10683 already
10684 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10685 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10686 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10687 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10688 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10689 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10690 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10691 </para>
10692 <para>
10693 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10694 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10695 consequence
10696 for other creative works is much more dire.
10697 </para>
10698 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10699 <para>
10700 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10701 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10702 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10703 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, <citetitle>The Lucky Dog</citetitle>, is
10704 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10705 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10706 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10707 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10708 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10709 films."<footnote><para>
10710 <!-- f11. -->
10711 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10712 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10713 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10714 Down Copyright Extension," <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 9 October 2002.
10715 </para></footnote>
10716
10717 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The</primary></indexterm>
10718 </para>
10719 <para>
10720 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10721 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10722 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10723 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10724 </para>
10725 <para>
10726 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10727
10728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10729 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10730 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10731 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10732 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10733 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10734 work available for distribution.
10735 </para>
10736 <para>
10737 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10738 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10739 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10740 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10741 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10742 mm film.<footnote><para>
10743 <!-- f12. -->
10744 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10745 Supporting the Petitoners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
10746 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01- 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
10747 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10748 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, available at
10749 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10750 </para></footnote>
10751
10752 </para>
10753 <para>
10754 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10755 important.
10756 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10757 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10758 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10759 locate the copyright owner.
10760 </para>
10761 <para>
10762 Or more accurately, <emphasis>owners</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
10763 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
10764 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
10765 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
10766 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
10767 to these films is exceptionally high.
10768 </para>
10769 <para>
10770 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10771 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10772 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10773 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10774 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10775 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10776 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10777 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10778 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10779 </para>
10780 <para>
10781 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10782
10783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10784 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10785 benefit
10786 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10787 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10788 the copyright expires.
10789 </para>
10790 <para>
10791 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10792 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10793 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10794 canisters
10795 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10796 than dust.
10797 </para>
10798 <para>
10799 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10800 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10801 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10802 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10803 creative
10804 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10805 free expression."
10806 </para>
10807 <para>
10808 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10809 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10810 indicated,
10811 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10812 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10813 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10814 distributors,
10815 the commercial life ends.
10816 </para>
10817 <para>
10818 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10819 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10820 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10821 between
10822 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10823 Friday
10824 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10825 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10826 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10827 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10828 have, we need to have access to this history.
10829 </para>
10830 <para>
10831 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10832
10833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10834 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10835 this context do no good.
10836 </para>
10837 <para>
10838 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10839 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10840 <emphasis>copyright-related use</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
10841 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
10842 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
10843 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
10844 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
10845 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
10846 was independent of copyright law.
10847 </para>
10848 <para>
10849 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10850 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10851 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10852 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10853 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10854 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10855 market didn't have more to offer.
10856 </para>
10857 <para>
10858 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10859 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10860 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10861 would not have interfered with anything.
10862 </para>
10863 <para>
10864 But this situation has now changed.
10865 </para>
10866 <para>
10867 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10868 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10869 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10870 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10871 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10872 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10873 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10874 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10875 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10876 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10877 </para>
10878 <para>
10879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10880 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10881 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10882 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10883 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10884 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10885 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10886 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10887 written for a radically different context.
10888 </para>
10889 <para>
10890 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10891 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10892 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10893 <emphasis>copyright</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
10894 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
10895 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
10896 context, copyright is serving no purpose <emphasis>at all</emphasis>
10897 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
10898 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
10899 </para>
10900 <para>
10901 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10902 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10903 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10904 culture widely?"
10905 </para>
10906 <para>
10907 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10908 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
10909 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10910 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10911 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10912 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
10913 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10914 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
10915 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10916 </para>
10917 <para>
10918 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10919 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10920 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10921 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10922
10923 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10924 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10925 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10926 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10927 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
10928 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
10929 <!-- f13. -->
10930 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
10931 December 2002, available at
10932 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
10933 </para></footnote>
10934
10935 </para>
10936 <para>
10937 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10938 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10939 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10940 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
10941 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
10942 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10943 </para>
10944 <para>
10945 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10946 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10947 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10948 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10949 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10950 </para>
10951 <para>
10952 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10953 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10954 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10955 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10956 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10957 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10958 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10959 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10960 power to extend existing terms.
10961 </para>
10962 <para>
10963 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10964 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10965 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10966 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10967 </para>
10968 <para>
10969 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10970 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10971
10972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10973 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10974 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10975 overstepped its bounds.
10976 </para>
10977 <para>
10978 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10979 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10980 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10981 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10982 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10983 </para>
10984 <para>
10985 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10986 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10987 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
10988 briefs and preparing for argument.
10989 </para>
10990 <para>
10991 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10992 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10993 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10994 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10995 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10996 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10997 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10998 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10999 </para>
11000 <para>
11001 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11002 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11003 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11004 mistake lost it.
11005 </para>
11006 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11007 <para>
11008 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11009 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11010 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11011 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11012 heat
11013 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11014 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11015 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11016 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11017 </para>
11018 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11019 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11020 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11021 <para>
11022 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11023 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11024 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11025 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11026 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11027 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11028 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11029 most powerful media companies in the world."
11030 </para>
11031 <para>
11032 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11033 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11034 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11035 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11036 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11037 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11038 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11039 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11040 interpretation
11041 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11042 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11043 unconstitutional,
11044 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11045 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11046 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11047 Constitution,
11048 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11049 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11050 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11051 </para>
11052 <para>
11053 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11054 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11055 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11056 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11057 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11058 why it was unconstitutional.
11059 </para>
11060 <para>
11061 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11062
11063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11064 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11065 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11066 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11067 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11068 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11069 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11070 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11071 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11072 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11073 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11074 <emphasis>law</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11075 the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11076 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11077 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11078 </para>
11079 <para>
11080 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11081 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11082 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11083 Congress. In November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11084 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11085 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11086 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11087 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11088 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11089 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11090 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11091 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11092 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11093 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis</primary></indexterm>
11094 </para>
11095 <para>
11096 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11097 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11098 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11099 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11100 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11101 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11102 </para>
11103 <para>
11104 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11105 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11106
11107 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11108 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11109 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11110 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11111 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11112 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11113 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11114 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11115 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11116 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11117 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11118 </para>
11119 <para>
11120 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11121 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11122 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11123 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11124 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries</primary></indexterm>
11125 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union</primary></indexterm>
11126 </para>
11127 <para>
11128 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11129 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11130 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11131 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11132 clear.
11133 </para>
11134 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11135 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11136 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11137 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11138 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11139 <para>
11140 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11141 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11142 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11143 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11144 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11145 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11146 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11147 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11148 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11149 </para>
11150 <para>
11151 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11152 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11153 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11154 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11155 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11156 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11157 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11158 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11159
11160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11161 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11162 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11163 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11164 </para>
11165 <para>
11166 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11167 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11168 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11169 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11170 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11171 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11172 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11173 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11174 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11175 confidence in our argument.
11176 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11177 </para>
11178 <para>
11179 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11180 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11181 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11182 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11183 copyright holders.
11184 </para>
11185 <para>
11186 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11187 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11188 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11189 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11190 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11191 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11192 wanted to control.
11193 </para>
11194 <para>
11195 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11196 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11197 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11198 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11199 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11200 pornography."<footnote><para>
11201 <!-- f14. -->
11202 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
11203 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11204 </para></footnote>
11205 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11206 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11207 to license <citetitle>Porgy and Bess</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11208 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11209 <!-- f15. -->
11210 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11211 Mouse Joins the Fray," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 28 March 1998, B7.
11212 </para></footnote>
11213 That's
11214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11215 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11216 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11217 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11218 </para>
11219 <para>
11220 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11221 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11222 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11223 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11224 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11225 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11226 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11227 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11228 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11229 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11230 </para>
11231 <para>
11232 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11233 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11234 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11235 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11236 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11237 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11238 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11239 </para>
11240 <para>
11241 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11242 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11243 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11244 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11245 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11246 five who had supported the <citetitle>Lopez/Morrison</citetitle> line of cases that said that
11247 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11248 powers had limits.
11249 </para>
11250 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11251 <para>
11252 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11253 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11254 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11255 the Constitution
11256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11257 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11258 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11259 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11260 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11261 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11262 </para>
11263 <para>
11264 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11265 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11266 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11267 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11268 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11269 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11270 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11271 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11272 sense.
11273 </para>
11274 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11275 <para>
11276 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11277 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11278 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11279 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11280 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11281 these retrospective extensions.
11282 </para>
11283 <para>
11284 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11285 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11286 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11287 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11288 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11289 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11290 </para>
11291 <para>
11292 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11293 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11294 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11295 overriding
11296 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11297 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11298 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11299 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11300 </para>
11301 <para>
11302 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11303 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11304 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
11305
11306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11307 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11308 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11309 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11310 supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the Court to
11311 reconcile <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> with <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>: If Congress's power to
11312 regulate commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to
11313 regulate copyright be limited.
11314 </para>
11315 <para>
11316 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11317 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11318 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11319 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11320 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11321 </para>
11322 <para>
11323 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11324 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11325 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11326 existing
11327 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11328 </para>
11329 <para>
11330 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11331 extended
11332 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11333 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11334 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11335 existing
11336 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11337 restraint
11338 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11339 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11340 hesitated
11341 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11342 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11343 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11344 arrived
11345 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11346 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11347
11348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11349 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11350 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11351 </para>
11352 <para>
11353 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11354 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11355 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11356 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11357 Congress
11358 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11359 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11360 this central idea.
11361 </para>
11362 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11363 <para>
11364 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11365 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11366 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11367 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11368 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11369 </para>
11370 <para>
11371 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11372 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11373 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11374 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11375 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11376 </para>
11377 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11378 <para>
11379 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11380 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11381 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11382 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11383 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11384 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11385 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11386 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11387 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11388 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11389 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11390
11391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11392 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11393 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11394 </para>
11395 <para>
11396 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11397 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11398 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11399 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11400 congressmen
11401 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11402 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11403 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11404 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11405 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11406 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11407 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11408 family of the Justices.
11409 </para>
11410 <para>
11411 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11412 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11413 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11414 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11415 </para>
11416 <para>
11417 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11418 The history was bothering her.
11419 </para>
11420 <blockquote>
11421 <para>
11422 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11423 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11424 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11425 practice that began with the very first act.
11426 </para>
11427 </blockquote>
11428 <para>
11429 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11430 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11431 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11432 </para>
11433 <blockquote>
11434 <para>
11435 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11436 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11437 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11438 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11439 is yes.
11440 </para>
11441 </blockquote>
11442 <para>
11443 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11444 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11445 Kennedy, who observed,
11446 </para>
11447 <blockquote>
11448 <para>
11449 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11450 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11451 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11452 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11453 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11454 </para>
11455 </blockquote>
11456 <para>
11457 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11458 student,
11459 I answered,
11460 </para>
11461 <blockquote>
11462 <para>
11463 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11464 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11465 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11466 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11467 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11468 </para>
11469 </blockquote>
11470 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11471 <para>
11472 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11473 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11474 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11475 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11476 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11477 </para>
11478 <para>
11479 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11480 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> ruling,
11481 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11482 </para>
11483 <para>
11484 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11485 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11486
11487 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11488 </para>
11489 <blockquote>
11490 <para>
11491 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11492 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11493 </para>
11494 <para>
11495 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11496 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11497 domain
11498 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11499 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11500 into the Copyright Clause.
11501 </para>
11502 </blockquote>
11503 <para>
11504 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11505 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11506 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11507 </para>
11508 <blockquote>
11509 <para>
11510 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11511 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11512 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11513 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11514 time.
11515 </para>
11516 </blockquote>
11517 <para>
11518 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11519 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11520 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11521 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11522 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11523 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11524 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11525 Patent Clause&mdash; indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11526 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11527 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11528 Court to my side.
11529 </para>
11530 <para>
11531 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11532 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11533
11534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11535 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11536 optimistic.
11537 </para>
11538 <para>
11539 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11540 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11541 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11542 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11543 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11544 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11545 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11546 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11547 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11548 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11549 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in particular,
11550 the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11551 law that it had established elsewhere.
11552 </para>
11553 <para>
11554 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11555 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11556 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11557 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11558 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11559 </para>
11560 <para>
11561 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11562 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11563 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11564 </para>
11565 <para>
11566 My <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11567 money in the world against <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. And here
11568 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11569 reasoning.
11570 </para>
11571 <para>
11572 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11573 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11574 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11575 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11576 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11577 </para>
11578 <para>
11579
11580 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11581 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11582 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11583 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11584 </para>
11585 <para>
11586 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11587 Souter. Neither believes in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11588 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11589 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11590 </para>
11591 <para>
11592 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11593 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11594 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11595 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11596 reconcile the two simply <emphasis>by not addressing the
11597 argument</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11598 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11599 followed from the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11600 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11601 </para>
11602 <para>
11603 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11604 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11605 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11606 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11607 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11608 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11609 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11610 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11611 the system we have.
11612 </para>
11613 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11614 <para>
11615 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11616 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11617 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11618 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11619 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11620 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11621 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11622 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11623 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11624 </para>
11625 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11626 <para>
11627 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11628 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11629 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11630 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11631 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11632 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11633 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11634 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11635 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11636 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11637 </para>
11638 <para>
11639 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11640 because neither believed in the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11641 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11642 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11643 Sentelle. It was <citetitle>Hamlet</citetitle> without the Prince.
11644 </para>
11645 <para>
11646 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11647 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11648 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11649 </para>
11650 <para>
11651 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11652 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> didn't
11653 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11654 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11655 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11656 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11657 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11658 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11659 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11660 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11661 "originalism" now?
11662 </para>
11663 <para>
11664 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11665 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11666 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11667 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11668
11669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11670 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11671 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11672 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11673 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11674 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11675 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11676 own principles.
11677 </para>
11678 <para>
11679 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11680 myself.
11681 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11682 the law as it is.
11683 </para>
11684 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11685 <para>
11686 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11687 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11688 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11689 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11690 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11691 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11692 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11693 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11694 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11695 </para>
11696 <para>
11697 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11698 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11699 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11700 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11701 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11702 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11703 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11704 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11705 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11706 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11707 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11708 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11709 effort to persuade; but I
11710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11711 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11712 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11713 should decide the issue.
11714 </para>
11715 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11716 <para>
11717 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11718 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11719 Kathleen Sullivan?
11720 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11721 </para>
11722 <para>
11723 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11724 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11725 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11726 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11727 </para>
11728 <para>
11729 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11730 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11731 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11732 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11733 have persuaded.
11734 </para>
11735 <para>
11736 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11737 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11738 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11739 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11740 issue should not be raised until it is.
11741 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
11742 </para>
11743 <para>
11744 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11745 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11746 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11747 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11748 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11749 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11750 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11751 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11752 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11753 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11754 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11755
11756 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11757 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11758 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11759 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11760 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11761 harmful law. <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
11762 </para>
11763 <blockquote>
11764 <para>
11765 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11766 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11767 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11768 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11769 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11770 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11771 </para>
11772 </blockquote>
11773 <para>
11774 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11775 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11776 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
11777 (<xref linkend="fig-18"/>). The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit
11778 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
11779 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
11780 </para>
11781 <figure id="fig-18">
11782 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon</title>
11783 <graphic fileref="images/18.png"></graphic>
11784 </figure>
11785 <para>
11786 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11787 quote from <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>. That "grand experiment" we call the
11788 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11789 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11790 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11791 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11792 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11793 </para>
11794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11795 </chapter>
11796 <chapter id="eldred-ii">
11797 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11798 <para>
11799 The day <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11800 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was
11801 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11802 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11803 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11804 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11805 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11806 </para>
11807 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11808 <para>
11809 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11810 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11811 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11812 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11813 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11814 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11815 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11816 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11817 </para>
11818 <para>
11819 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11820 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11822 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11823 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11824 the work passed into the public domain.
11825 </para>
11826 <para>
11827 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11828 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11829 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11830 </para>
11831 <para>
11832 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11833 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11834 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11835 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11836 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11837 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11838 everything else, let the content go.
11839 </para>
11840 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11841 <para>
11842 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11843 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11844 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11845 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11846 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11847 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11848 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11849 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11850 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11851 the stupid harm of the present system.
11852 </para>
11853 <para>
11854 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11855 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11856 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11857 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11858 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11859 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11860 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11861 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11862 where copyright owners could be identified.
11863 </para>
11864 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11865 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11866 <para>
11867 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11868 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
11869 linkend="property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
11870 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11871 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11872 <!-- f1. -->
11873 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11874 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11875 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11876 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11877 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11878 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11879 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11880 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11881 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11882 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11883 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11884 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11885 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11886 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11887 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11888 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>International
11889 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
11890 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11891 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11892 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11893 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11894 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11895 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11896 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11897 </para>
11898 <para>
11899 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11900 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11901 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11902 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11903 know what's protected and what's not.
11904 </para>
11905 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11906 <para>
11907 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11908 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11909 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11910 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11911 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11912 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11913 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an <citetitle>i</citetitle> or cross a
11914 <citetitle>t</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
11915 </para>
11916 <para>
11917 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11918 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11919 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11920 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11921 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11922 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11923 </para>
11924 <para>
11925 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11926 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11927 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11928 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11929 burden
11930 imposed upon creators.
11931 </para>
11932 <para>
11933 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
11934 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11935
11936 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11937 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11938 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11939 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11940 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11941 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11942 table.
11943 </para>
11944 <para>
11945 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11946 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11947 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11948 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11949 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11950 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11951 spread.
11952 </para>
11953 <para>
11954 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11955 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11956 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11957 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11958 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11959 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
11960 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11961 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11962 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11963 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11964 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11965 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11966 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11967 system of protection for property generally.
11968 </para>
11969 <para>
11970 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11971 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11972 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11973 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11974 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11975 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11976 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11977 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11978
11979 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11980 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
11981 <emphasis>lawyer</emphasis> transactions take their place.
11982 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
11983 </para>
11984 <para>
11985 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11986 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11987 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11988 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11989 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11990 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11991 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11992 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11993 </para>
11994 <para>
11995 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11996 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11997 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11998 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11999 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12000 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12001 seen before <emphasis>because there are no formalities</emphasis>.
12002 </para>
12003 <para>
12004 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12005 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12006 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12007 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12008 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12009 </para>
12010 <para>
12011 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12012 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12013 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12014 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12015 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12016 </para>
12017 <para>
12018 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12019 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12020 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12021 registration?
12022 </para>
12023 <para>
12024 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12025 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12026 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12027
12028 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12029 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12030 address the real problem of <emphasis>governments</emphasis> standing
12031 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12032 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12033 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12034 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12035 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12036 upon historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of
12037 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12038 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12039 </para>
12040 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12041 <para>
12042 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12043 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12044 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12045 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12046 </para>
12047 <para>
12048 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12049 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12050 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12051 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12052 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12053 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12054 something good might happen here.
12055 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe</primary></indexterm>
12056 </para>
12057 <para>
12058 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12059 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12060 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12061 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12062 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12063 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12064 </para>
12065 <para>
12066 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12067 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12068 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12070 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12071 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12072 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12073 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12074 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12075 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12076 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12077 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12078 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12079 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12080 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12081 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12082 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12083 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12084 film is a valid derivative use.
12085 </para>
12086 <para>
12087 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12088 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12089 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12090 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12091 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12092 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12093 </para>
12094 <para>
12095 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12096 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12097 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12098 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12099 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12100 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12101 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12102 threat.
12103 </para>
12104 <para>
12105 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12106 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12107 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12108 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12109 sense?
12110 </para>
12111 <para>
12112
12113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12114 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12115 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12116 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12117 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12118 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12119 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12120 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12121 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12122 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12123 </para>
12124 <para>
12125 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12126 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12127 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12128 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12129 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12130 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12131 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12132 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12133 </para>
12134 <para>
12135 What does this industry really want?
12136 </para>
12137 <para>
12138 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12139 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12140 protecting <emphasis>their</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12141 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12142 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12143 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12144 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12145 content that doesn't require <emphasis>their</emphasis> permission
12146 first.
12147 </para>
12148 <para>
12149 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12150 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12151 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12152 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12153 theirs. <emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12154 theirs</emphasis>.
12155 </para>
12156 <para>
12157 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12158 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12159
12160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12161 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12162 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12163 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12164 and to share its own creation.
12165 </para>
12166 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12167 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12168 <para>
12169 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12170 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12171 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12172 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12173 block the progress of others.
12174 </para>
12175 <para>
12176 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12177 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12178 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12179 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12180 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12181 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12182 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12183 </para>
12184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12185 </chapter>
12186 </part>
12187 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12188 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12189 <para>
12190 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12191 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12192 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12193 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12194 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12195 </para>
12196 <para>
12197 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12198 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12199 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12200 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12201 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12202 the disease almost invisible.
12203 </para>
12204 <para>
12205 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12206 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12207 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12208 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12209 population:
12210 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12211 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12212 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12213 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12214 available at
12215 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12216 release
12217 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12218 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12219 </para></footnote>
12220 </para>
12221 <para>
12222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12223 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12224 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12225 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12226 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12227 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12228 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12229 </para>
12230 <para>
12231 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12232 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12233 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12234 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12235 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12236 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12237 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12238 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12239 changes.
12240 </para>
12241 <para>
12242 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12243 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12244 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12245 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12246 costs significantly below the market price.
12247 </para>
12248 <para>
12249 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12250 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12251 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12252 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12253 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12254 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12255 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12256 <para>
12257 <!-- f2. -->
12258 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12259 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12260 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12261 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12262 </para></footnote>
12263 </para>
12264 <para>
12265 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12266 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12267 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa &hellip;
12268 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12269 imports."<footnote><para>
12270 <!-- f3. -->
12271 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12272 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12273 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12274 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 14, available at
12275 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a
12276 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12277 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12278 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess.,
12279 Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57 (statement of James
12280 Love).
12281 </para></footnote>
12282 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12283 government asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add
12284 pressure to that request, in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12285 possible trade sanctions.
12286 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12287 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12288 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12289 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12290 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12291 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12292 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12293 patent&mdash; pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12294 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12295 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12296 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12297 <!-- f4. -->
12298 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12299 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12300 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12301 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12302 </para>
12303 <para>
12304 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12305 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12306 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12307 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12308 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12309 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12310 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12311 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12312 </para>
12313 <para>
12314 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12315 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12316 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12317 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12318 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12319 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12320 </para>
12321 <para>
12322 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12323 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12324 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12325 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12326 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12327 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12328 by U.S. companies.
12329 </para>
12330 <para>
12331 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12332 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12333 argument
12334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12335 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12336 <!-- f5. -->
12337 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12338 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24
12339 May 1999, A1, available at
12340 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12341 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12342 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12343 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12344 Medicines," <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus</citetitle> 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12345 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12346 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12347 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12348 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," <citetitle>Widener Law
12349 Symposium Journal</citetitle> (Spring 2001): 175.
12350 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12351 </para></footnote>
12352 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12353 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12354 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12355 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12356 </para>
12357 <para>
12358 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12359 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12360 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12361 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12362 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12363 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12364 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12365 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12366 </para>
12367 <para>
12368 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12369 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12370 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12371 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12372 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12373 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12374 </para>
12375 <para>
12376 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12377 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12378 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12379 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12380 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12381 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12382 </para>
12383 <para>
12384 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12385 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12386 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12387 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12388 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12389 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12390 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12391 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12393 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12394 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12395 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12396 idea called "intellectual property."
12397 </para>
12398 <para>
12399 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12400 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12401 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12402 What is the argument?
12403 </para>
12404 <para>
12405 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12406 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12407 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12408 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12409 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12410 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12411 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12412 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12413 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12414 were balanced in just this sense.
12415 </para>
12416 <para>
12417 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12418 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12419 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12420 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12421 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12422 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12423 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12424 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12425 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12426 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12427 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12428 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12429 our
12430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12431 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12432 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12433 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12434 this common sense open its eyes.
12435 </para>
12436 <para>
12437 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12438 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12439 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12440 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12441 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12442 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12443 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12444 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12445 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12446 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12447 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12448 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12449 </para>
12450 <para>
12451 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12452 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12453 meeting.<footnote><para>
12454 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>,
12455 August 2003, E1, available at
12456 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12457 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12458 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12459 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12460 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12461 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12462 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12463 </para></footnote>
12464 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12465 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12466 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12467 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12468 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12469 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12470 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12471 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12472 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12473 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12474 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12475 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12476 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12478 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12479 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12480 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12481 in the early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12482 <indexterm><primary>academic journals</primary></indexterm>
12483 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12484 </para>
12485 <para>
12486 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12487 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12488 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12489 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12490 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12491 </para>
12492 <para>
12493 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12494 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12495 meeting.
12496 </para></footnote>
12497 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12498 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12499 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12500 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12501 property issues.
12502 </para>
12503 <para>
12504 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12505 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12506 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12507 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12508 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12509 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12510 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12511 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12512 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12513 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12514 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12515 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12516 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12517 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12518 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12519 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12520 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12521 stuff of
12522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12523 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12524 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12525 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12526 </para>
12527 <para>
12528 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12529 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12530 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12531 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12532 </para>
12533 <para>
12534 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12535 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12536 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12537 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12538 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12539 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12540 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12541 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12542 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12543 </para>
12544 <para>
12545 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12546 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12547 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12548 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12549 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12550 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM
12551 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12552 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12553 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12554 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12555 <!-- f8. -->
12556 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12557 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12558 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12559 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12560 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12561 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12562 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide," <citetitle>Government Policy
12563 Toward Open Source Software</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12564 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12565 Public Policy Research, 2002), 69, available at
12566 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also
12567 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, <citetitle>The Commercial Software
12568 Model</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (3
12569 May 2001), available at
12570 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12571 </para></footnote>
12572 <indexterm><primary>"copyleft" licenses</primary></indexterm>
12573 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12574 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12575 </para>
12576 <para>
12577 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12578 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12579 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12580 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12581 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12582 by
12583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12584 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12585 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12586 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12587 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12588 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12589 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12590 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12591 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12592 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12593 </para>
12594 <para>
12595 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12596 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12597 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12598 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12599 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12600 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12601 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12602 <!-- f9. -->
12603 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12604 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12605 </para></footnote>
12606 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12607 </para>
12608 <para>
12609 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12610 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12611 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12612 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12613 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12614 its lobbying efforts.
12615 </para>
12616 <para>
12617 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12618 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12619 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12620 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12621 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12622 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12623 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12624 goals of WIPO."
12625 </para>
12626 <para>
12627 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12628 </para>
12629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12630 <para>
12631 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12632 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12633 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12634 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12635 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12636 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12637 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12638 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12639 </para>
12640 <para>
12641 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12642 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12643 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12644 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12645 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12646 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12647 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12648 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12649 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12650 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12651 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12652 </para>
12653 <para>
12654 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12655 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12656 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12657 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12658 <emphasis>their</emphasis> rights. If they want to "waive" or
12659 "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12660 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $20 billion to do
12661 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12662 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12663 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12664 to do with <emphasis>their</emphasis> property.
12665 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
12666 </para>
12667 <para>
12668 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12669 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12670 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12671 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12672 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12673 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12674 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12675 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12676 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12677 way possible.
12678 </para>
12679 <para>
12680 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12681 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12682 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12683 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12684 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12685 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12686 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12687 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12688 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12689 that control.
12690 </para>
12691 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12692 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12693 <para>
12694 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12695 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12696 <!-- f10. -->
12697 See Drahos with Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism</citetitle>, 210&ndash;20.
12698 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12699 </para></footnote>
12700 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12701 choice now is whether that information society will be
12702 <emphasis>free</emphasis> or <emphasis>feudal</emphasis>. The trend is
12703 toward the feudal.
12704 </para>
12705 <para>
12706 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12707 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12708 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12709 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12710 </para>
12711 <blockquote>
12712 <para>
12713 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12714 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12715 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12716 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12717 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12718 say anything wrong. But in the world
12719 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12720 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12721 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12722 </para>
12723 </blockquote>
12724 <para>
12725 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12726 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12727 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12728 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12729 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12730 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12731 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12732 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12733 </para>
12734 <para>
12735 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12736 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12737 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12738 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12739 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12740 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12741 </para>
12742 <para>
12743 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12744 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12745 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12746 our own country's history).
12747 </para>
12748 <para>
12749 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12750 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12751 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12752 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12753 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12754 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12755 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12756 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12757 democracy in the world, become?
12758 </para>
12759 <para>
12760 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12761 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12762 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12763 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12764 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12765 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12766 </para>
12767 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12768 <para>
12769 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12770 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12771 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12772 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12773 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12774 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12775 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12776 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12777 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12778 hearings and a different result.
12779 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted</primary></indexterm>
12780 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
12781 </para>
12782 <para>
12783 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12784 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12785 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12786 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12787 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12788 concentration in the media.
12789 </para>
12790 <para>
12791 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12792 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12793 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12794 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12795 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12796 </para>
12797 <para>
12798 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12799 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12800 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12801 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12802 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12803 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12804 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12805 </para>
12806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12807 <para>
12808 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12809 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12810 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12811 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12812 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12813 </para>
12814 <para>
12815 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12816 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12817 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12818 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12819 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12820 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12821 </para>
12822 <para>
12823 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12824 of our tragedy.
12825 </para>
12826 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
12827 <para>
12828 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12829 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12830 <!-- f11. -->
12831 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12832 2003, available at
12833 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12834 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12835 2003, available at
12836 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12837 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12838 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," <citetitle>New York Daily News</citetitle>, 9
12839 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12840 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12841 Defendants," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12842 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," <citetitle>Wired News</citetitle>, 10 September 2003,
12843 available at
12844 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12845 </para></footnote>
12846 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12847 music.<footnote><para>
12848 <!-- f12. -->
12849 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued &hellip; by a Little Old Lady,"
12850 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12851 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12852 </para></footnote>
12853 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12854 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12855 <!-- f13. -->
12856 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12857 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12858 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12859 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12860 </para></footnote>
12861 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12862 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12863 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12864 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12865 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12866 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12867 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12868 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12869 kids who use a computer to share content.
12870 </para>
12871 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12872 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12873 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
12874 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12875 <para>
12876 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12877 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12878 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12879 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12880 24 August 2003, available at
12881 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12882 </para></footnote>
12883 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12884 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12885 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12886 country.<footnote><para>
12887 <!-- f15. -->
12888 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
12889 available at
12890 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12891 </para></footnote>
12892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12893 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12894 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12895 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12896 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12897 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12898 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12899 day into the Causbys.
12900 </para>
12901 <para>
12902 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12903 potential is ever to be realized.
12904
12905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12906
12907 </para>
12908 </chapter>
12909 <chapter id="c-afterword">
12910 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
12911 <para>
12912
12913 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12914 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12915 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12916 maps what might be done.
12917 </para>
12918 <para>
12919 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12920 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12921 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12922 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12923 </para>
12924 <para>
12925 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12926 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12927 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
12928 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12929 is so important.
12930 </para>
12931 <para>
12932 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12933 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12934 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12935 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12936 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12937 </para>
12938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12939
12940 <section id="usnow">
12941 <title>US, NOW</title>
12942 <para>
12943 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12944 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
12945 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12946 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12947 </para>
12948 <para>
12949 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12950 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12951 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
12952 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
12953 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12954 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12955 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12956 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12957 </para>
12958 <para>
12959 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12960 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12961 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12962 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12963 the
12964
12965 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12966 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12967 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12968 unprotected.
12969 </para>
12970 <para>
12971 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12972 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12973 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12974 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12975 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12976 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12977 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12978 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12979 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12980 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12981 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12982 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12983 </para>
12984 <para>
12985 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
12986 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12987 reserved"&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12988 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12989 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12990 before.
12991 </para>
12992
12993 <section id="examples">
12994 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
12995 <para>
12996 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12997 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12998 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12999 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13000 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13001 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13002 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
13003 assured.
13004 </para>
13005 <para>
13006 What made it assured?
13007 </para>
13008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13009 <para>
13010 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13011 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>, your
13012 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13013 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13014 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13015 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13016 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13017 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13018 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13019 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13020 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13021 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13022 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13023 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13024 </para>
13025 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13026 <para>
13027 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13028 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13029 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13030 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13031 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13032 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13033 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13034 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13035 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet</primary></indexterm>
13036 </para>
13037 <para>
13038 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13039 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13040 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13041 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13042 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13043 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13044 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13045 disappears.
13046 </para>
13047 <para>
13048 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13049 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13050 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13051 friction did.<footnote><para>
13052 <!-- f1. -->
13053
13054 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13055 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13056 Law Review</citetitle> 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13057
13058 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13059 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13060 also Jeffrey Rosen, <citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13061 in an Anxious Age</citetitle> (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13062 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13063 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13064 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13065
13066 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13067 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13068 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13069 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13070 </para>
13071 <para>
13072 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13073 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13074 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13075 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13076 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13077 care much about controlling their software.
13078 </para>
13079 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13080 <para>
13081 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13082 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13083 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13084 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13085 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13086 people's work.
13087 </para>
13088 <para>
13089 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13090 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13091 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13092 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13093 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13094 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13095 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13096 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13097 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13098 anything else?
13099 </para>
13100 <para>
13101 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13102 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13103 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13104 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13105 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13106 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13107 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13108 </para>
13109 <para>
13110 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13111 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13113 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13114 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13115 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13116 fundamentally weakened.
13117 </para>
13118 <para>
13119 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13120 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13121 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13122 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13123 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13124 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13125 </para>
13126 <para>
13127 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13128 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13129 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13130 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13131 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13132 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13133 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13134 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13135 byproduct.
13136 </para>
13137 <para>
13138 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13139 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13140 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13141 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13142 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13143 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13144 </para>
13145 <para>
13146 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13147 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13148 scientific journals are produced.
13149 </para>
13150 <indexterm id="idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'>
13151 <primary>academic journals</primary>
13152 </indexterm>
13153 <para>
13154 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13155 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13156 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13157 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13158 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13159 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13160 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13161 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13162 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13163 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13164 and Westlaw are also free
13165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13166 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13167 Court opinion through their respective services.
13168 </para>
13169 <para>
13170 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13171 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13172 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13173 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13174 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13175 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13176 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13177 </para>
13178 <para>
13179 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13180 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13181 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13182 </para>
13183 <para>
13184 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13185 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13186 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13187 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13188 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13189 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13190 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13191 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13192 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13193 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13194 </para>
13195 <para>
13196 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13197 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13198 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13199 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13200 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13201 granted before.
13202 </para>
13203 <para>
13204 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13205 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13206 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13207 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13209 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13210 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13211 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13212 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13213 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13214 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13215 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13216 </para>
13217 <para>
13218 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13219 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13220 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13221 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13222 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13223 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13224 and science.
13225 </para>
13226 <indexterm startref="idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'/>
13227
13228 </section>
13229 <section id="oneidea">
13230 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13231 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13232 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13233 </indexterm>
13234 <para>
13235 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13236 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13237 </para>
13238 <para>
13239 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13240 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13241 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13242 <emphasis>reasonable</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13243 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13244 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13245 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13246 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13247 make this possible.
13248 </para>
13249 <para>
13250 <emphasis>Simple</emphasis>&mdash;which means without a middleman, or
13251 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13252 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13253 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13254 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13255 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13256 shared. These three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a
13257 human-readable description, and
13258 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13259 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13260 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13261 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13262 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13263 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13264 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13265 certain freedoms are given.
13266 </para>
13267 <para>
13268 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13269 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13270 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13271 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13272 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13273 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13274 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13275 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13276 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13277 </para>
13278 <para>
13279 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13280 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13281 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13282 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13283 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13284 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13285 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13286 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13287 a public domain.
13288 </para>
13289 <para>
13290 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13291 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13292 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13293 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13294 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13295 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13296 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13297 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13298 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13299 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13300 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13301 </para>
13302 <para>
13303 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13304 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13305 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13306 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13307 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13308 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13309 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13310 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13311 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13312 to begin to build those rules.
13313 </para>
13314 <para>
13315 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13316 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13317 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
13318 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13319 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13320 </para>
13321 <para>
13322 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13323 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13324 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13325 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13326 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13327 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13328 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13329 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13330 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13331 <emphasis>increase</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13332 </para>
13333 <para>
13334 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13335 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13336 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13337 was a total success.
13338 </para>
13339 <para>
13340 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13341 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13343 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled <citetitle>Free for All</citetitle>,
13344 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13345 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13346 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13347 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13348 well.
13349 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)</primary></indexterm>
13350 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter</primary></indexterm>
13351 </para>
13352 <para>
13353 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13354 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13355 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13356 reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because anything
13357 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13358 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13359 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13360 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13361 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13362 <emphasis>legal</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13363 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13364 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow"
13365 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13366 high<footnote><para>
13367 <!-- f2. -->
13368
13369 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13370 Culture Wars</citetitle> (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13371 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13372 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13373 </para></footnote>),
13374 these artists release into the creative environment content
13375 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13376 </para>
13377 <para>
13378 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13379 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13380 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13381 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13382 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13383 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13384 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13385 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13386 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13387 say it to others.
13388 </para>
13389 <para>
13390 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13391 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13392 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13393 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13394
13395 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13396 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13397 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13398 </para>
13399 <para>
13400 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13401 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13402 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13403 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13404 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13405 steps are possible.
13406 </para>
13407 <para>
13408 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13409 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13410 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13411 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13412 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13413 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13414 creativity to spread more easily.
13415 </para>
13416 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13417
13418 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13419 </section>
13420 </section>
13421 <section id="themsoon">
13422 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13423 <para>
13424 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13425 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13426 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13427 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13428 changes that we need.
13429 </para>
13430 <para>
13431 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13432 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13433 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13434 to our end.
13435 </para>
13436
13437 <section id="formalities">
13438 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13439 <para>
13440 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13441 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13442 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13443 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13444 </para>
13445 <para>
13446 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13447 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13448 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13449 protected.
13450 </para>
13451 <para>
13452 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13453 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13454 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13455 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13456 </para>
13457 <para>
13458 Why?
13459 </para>
13460 <para>
13461 As I suggested in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
13462 linkend="property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13463 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13464 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13465 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13466 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13467 formalities were getting in the way.
13468 </para>
13469 <para>
13470 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13471 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13472 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13473 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13474 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13475 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13476 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13477 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13478 past. And thus, the <emphasis>lack</emphasis> of formalities forces
13479 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13480 </para>
13481 <para>
13482 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13483 <!-- f1. -->
13484 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13485 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13486 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13487 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13488 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13489 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13490 </para>
13491 <para>
13492 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13493 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13494 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13495 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13496 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13497 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13498 developed by others.
13499 </para>
13500
13501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13502
13503 <section id="registration">
13504 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13505 <para>
13506 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13507 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13508 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13509 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13510 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13511 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13512 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13513 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13514 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13515 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13516 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13517 </para>
13518 <para>
13519 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13520 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13521 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13522 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13523 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13524 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13525 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13526 </para>
13527 <para>
13528 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13529 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13530 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13531 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13532 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13533 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13534 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13535 with which registration occurs up.
13536 </para>
13537 <para>
13538 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13539 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13540 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13541 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13542 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13543 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13544 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13545 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13546 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13547 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13548 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13549 </para>
13550
13551 </section>
13552 <section id="marking">
13553 <title>MARKING</title>
13554 <para>
13555 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13556 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13557 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13558 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13559 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13560 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13561 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13562 uniformly across all media.
13563 </para>
13564 <para>
13565 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13566 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13567 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13568 use the work.
13569 </para>
13570 <para>
13571 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13572 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13573 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13574 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13575 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13576 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13577 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13578 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13579 </para>
13580 <para>
13581 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13582 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13583 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13584 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13585 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13586 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13587 <!-- f2. -->
13588 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13589 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13590 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13591 </para></footnote>
13592 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13593 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13594 stop using the work in any new
13595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13596 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13597 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13598 their work.
13599 </para>
13600 <para>
13601 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13602 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13603 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13604 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13605 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13606 </para>
13607 <para>
13608 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13609 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13610 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13611 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13612 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13613 <emphasis>solely</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13614 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13615 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13616 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13617 other important functions.
13618 </para>
13619 <para>
13620 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13621 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13622 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13623 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13624 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13625 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13626 </para>
13627 <para>
13628 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13629 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13630 make things unclear.
13631 </para>
13632 <para>
13633 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13634 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13635 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13636 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13637 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13638 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13639 </para>
13640
13641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13642 </section>
13643 </section>
13644 <section id="shortterms">
13645 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13646 <para>
13647 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13648 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13649 natural authors.
13650 </para>
13651 <para>
13652 In <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13653 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13654 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13655 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13656 radical. <citetitle>The Economist</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13657 copyright term.<footnote><para>
13658
13659 <!-- f3. -->
13660 "A Radical Rethink," <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13661 available at
13662 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13663 </para></footnote>
13664 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13665 </para>
13666 <para>
13667 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13668 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13669 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13670 terms.
13671 </para>
13672 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13673 <listitem><para>
13674 <!-- (1) -->
13675 <emphasis>Keep it short:</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13676 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13677 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13678 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13679 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13680 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13681 </para></listitem>
13682 <listitem><para>
13683 <!-- (2) -->
13684 <emphasis>Keep it simple:</emphasis> The line between the public
13685 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13686 fuzziness of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13687 "expression." That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13688 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
13689 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
13690 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
13691 "lawyer-free zone" makes the complexities of "fair use" and
13692 "idea/expression" less necessary to navigate.
13693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13694 </para></listitem>
13695 <listitem><para>
13696 <!-- (3) -->
13697 <emphasis>Keep it alive:</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
13698 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13699 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
13700 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
13701 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
13702 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
13703 pension.<footnote><para>
13704 <!-- f4. -->
13705 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13706 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13707 available at
13708 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13709 </para></footnote>
13710 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13711 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13712 single form.
13713 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions</primary></indexterm>
13714 </para></listitem>
13715 <listitem><para>
13716 <!-- (4) -->
13717 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:</emphasis> Whatever the term of
13718 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
13719 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
13720 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
13721 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
13722 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in 1923 than we
13723 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
13724 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
13725 the number of authors who wrote in 1923. Of course, we can increase
13726 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
13727 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
13728 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
13729 creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
13730 we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13731 </orderedlist>
13732 <para>
13733 These changes together should produce an <emphasis>average</emphasis>
13734 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976,
13735 the average term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
13736 same.
13737 </para>
13738 <para>
13739 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13740 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13741 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13742 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13743 </para>
13744
13745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13746
13747 </section>
13748 <section id="freefairuse">
13749 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13750 <para>
13751 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13752 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13753 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13754 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13755 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13756 the emergence of that new technology.
13757 </para>
13758 <para>
13759 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13760 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13761 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13762 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13763 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13764 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13765 though that movie is not "my writing."
13766 </para>
13767 <para>
13768 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13769 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13770 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13771 <!-- f5. -->
13772 Benjamin Kaplan, <citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
13773 University Press, 1967), 32.
13774 </para></footnote>
13775 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13776 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13777 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13778 </para>
13779 <blockquote>
13780 <para>
13781 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13782 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13783 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13784 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13785 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13786 </para></footnote>
13787 </para>
13788 </blockquote>
13789 <para>
13790 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13791 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13792 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13793 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13794 Consider each limitation in turn.
13795 </para>
13796 <para>
13797 <emphasis>Term:</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
13798 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
13799 sense to protect John
13800
13801 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13802 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13803 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13804 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13805 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13806 after the creative work is done.
13807 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
13808 </para>
13809 <para>
13810 <emphasis>Scope:</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
13811 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
13812 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
13813 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
13814 material. When all "reuse" of creative material was within the control
13815 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
13816 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
13817 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
13818 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
13819 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
13820 the creative process. Smothers it.
13821 </para>
13822 <para>
13823 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13824 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13825 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13826 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13827 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13828 much more sense.
13829 </para>
13830 <para>
13831 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13832 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13833 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13834 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13835 <para>
13836 <!-- f7. -->
13837 Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13838 Jukebox</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13839 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13840 </para></footnote>
13841 His view is that the law should be written so that
13842 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13843 </para>
13844 <para>
13845 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13846 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13847 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13848 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13849 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13850 </para>
13851 <para>
13852 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13853 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13854 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13855 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13856 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13857 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13858 </para>
13859 </section>
13860
13861 <section id="liberatemusic">
13862 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13863 <para>
13864 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13865 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13866 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13867 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13868 battles around the sharing of music.
13869 </para>
13870 <para>
13871 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13872 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13873 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13874 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13875 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13876 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13877 innovation on the network.
13878 </para>
13879 <para>
13880 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13881 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13882 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13883 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13884 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13885 </para>
13886 <para>
13887 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
13888 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
13889 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
13890 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="piracy"/>, they enable
13891 four different kinds of sharing:
13892 </para>
13893 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
13894 <listitem><para>
13895 <!-- A. -->
13896 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13897 for purchasing CDs.
13898 </para></listitem>
13899 <listitem><para>
13900 <!-- B. -->
13901 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13902 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13903 </para></listitem>
13904 <listitem><para>
13905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13906 <!-- C. -->
13907 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13908 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13909 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13910 </para></listitem>
13911 <listitem><para>
13912 <!-- D. -->
13913 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13914 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13915 owner plainly endorses.
13916 </para></listitem>
13917 </orderedlist>
13918 <para>
13919 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13920 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13921 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13922 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13923 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13924 significantly weakened.
13925 </para>
13926 <para>
13927 As I said in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
13928 linkend="piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13929 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13930 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13931 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13932 networks.
13933 </para>
13934 <para>
13935 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13936 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13937 should respond.
13938 </para>
13939 <para>
13940 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13941 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13942 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13943 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13944 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
13945 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13946 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13947 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13948 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13949 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13950 </para>
13951 <para>
13952 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13953 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13954 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13956 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13957 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13958 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13959 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13960 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13961 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
13962 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
13963 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13964 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13965 </para>
13966 <para>
13967 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
13968 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio,
13969 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
13970 then, is the critical point: When it is <emphasis>extremely</emphasis>
13971 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
13972 <emphasis>easier</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
13973 access to content than it will be to download and store content
13974 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
13975 content</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
13976 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13977 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13978 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13979 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13980 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13981 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13982 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13983 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
13984 <!-- f8. -->
13985 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
13986 April 2002, available at
13987 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
13988 </para></footnote>
13989
13990 </para>
13991 <para>
13992 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13993 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13994 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
13995 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13996 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13997 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13998 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13999 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14000 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14001 artists get paid, during
14002
14003 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14004 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14005 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14006 </para>
14007 <para>
14008 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14009 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14010 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14011 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14012 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14013 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14014 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14015 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14016 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14017 </para>
14018 <para>
14019 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14020 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14021 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14022 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14023 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14024 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14025 way that returns something to the artist.
14026 </para>
14027 <para>
14028 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14029 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14030 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14031 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14032 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14033 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14034 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14035 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14036 </para>
14037 <para>
14038 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14039 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14040 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14041 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14042 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14043 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14044 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14045 </para>
14046 <para>
14047
14048 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14049 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14050 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14051 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14052 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14053 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14054 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14055 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14056 trade.
14057 </para>
14058 <para>
14059 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14060 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14061 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14062 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14063 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14064 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14065 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14066 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14067 </para>
14068 <para>
14069 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14070 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14071 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14072 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14073 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14074 delivering and accessing content.
14075 </para>
14076 <para>
14077 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14078 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14079 </para>
14080 <para>
14081 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14082 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14083 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14084 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14085 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14086 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14087 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14088 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14089 </para>
14090 <para>
14091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14092 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14093 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14094 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14095 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14096 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14097 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14098 </para>
14099 <para>
14100 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14101 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14102 <para>
14103 <!-- f9. -->
14104 William Fisher, <citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities</citetitle> (last
14105 revised: 10 October 2000), available at
14106 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William
14107 Fisher, <citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14108 Entertainment</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14109 2004), ch. 6, available at
14110 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14111 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14112 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14113 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14114 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14115 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14116 Broadband?" <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14117 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14118 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14119 available at
14120 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, <citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14121 Use Fee (IPUF)</citetitle>, 3 March 2002, available at
14122 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14123 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 13 May
14124 2002, available at
14125 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14126 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14127 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14128 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14129 2002, available at
14130 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14131 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14132 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14133 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14134 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14135 debate by about a decade. See
14136 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14137 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14138 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14139 </para></footnote>
14140 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14141 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14142 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14143 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14144 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14145 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14146 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14147 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14148 tax.
14149 </para>
14150 <para>
14151 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14152 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14153 <citetitle>Promises to Keep</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14154 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14155 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14156 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14157 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14158 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14159 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14160 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14161 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14162 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14163 controlling access.
14164 </para>
14165 <para>
14166 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14167 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14168 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14169 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14170 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14171 limits on derivative
14172
14173 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14174 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14175 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14176 allowed to do with the content itself.
14177 </para>
14178 <para>
14179 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14180 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14181 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14182 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14183 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14184 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14185 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14186 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14187 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14188 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14189 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14190 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14191 on-line.
14192 </para>
14193 <para>
14194 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14195 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14196 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14197 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14198 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14199 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14200 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14201 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14202 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14203 finding ways to compete with "free."
14204 </para>
14205 <para>
14206 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14207 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14208 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14209 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14210 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14211 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14212 the law.
14213 </para>
14214 <para>
14215 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14216 </para>
14217 <para>
14218
14219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14220 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14221 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14222 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14223 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14224 create.
14225 </para>
14226 <para>
14227 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14228 by
14229 </para>
14230 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14231 <listitem><para>
14232 <!-- 1. -->
14233 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14234 </para></listitem>
14235 <listitem><para>
14236 <!-- 2. -->
14237 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14238 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14239 statute;
14240 </para></listitem>
14241 <listitem><para>
14242 <!-- 3. -->
14243 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14244 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14245 </para></listitem>
14246 </orderedlist>
14247 <para>
14248 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14249 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14250 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14251 something then?
14252 </para>
14253 <para>
14254 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14255 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14256 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14257 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14258 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size <citetitle>x</citetitle>,
14259 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14260 market of five times <citetitle>x</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14261 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14262 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14263 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14264 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14265 pirates.
14266 </para>
14267 <para>
14268 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14269 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14270 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14271
14272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14273 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14274 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14275 </para>
14276 </section>
14277
14278 <section id="firelawyers">
14279 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14280 <para>
14281 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14282 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14283 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14284 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14285 </para>
14286 <para>
14287 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14288 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14289 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14290 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14291 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14292 strong view queers the law.
14293 </para>
14294 <para>
14295 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14296 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14297 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14298 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14299 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14300 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14301 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14302 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14303 <!-- f10. -->
14304 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14305 Memorial Lecture), <citetitle>UCLA Law Review</citetitle> 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14306 </para></footnote>
14307
14308 </para>
14309 <para>
14310 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14311 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14312 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14313 </para>
14314 <para>
14315 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14316 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14317 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14318 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14319 <!-- f11. -->
14320 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14321 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14322 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14323 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14324 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14325 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14326 J. Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14327 Drive the Digital Marketplace</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14328 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14329 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June 2003,
14330 available at
14331 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14332 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14333 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14334 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14335 <citetitle>Rethinking</citetitle>, 174&ndash;76.
14336 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
14337 </para></footnote>
14338 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14339 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14340 them it works.
14341 </para>
14342 <para>
14343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14344 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14345 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14346 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14347 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14348 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14349 practically never be done.
14350 </para>
14351 <para>
14352 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14353 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14354 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14355 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14356 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14357 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14358 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14359 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14360 </para>
14361 <para>
14362 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14363 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14364 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14365 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14366 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14367 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14368 </para>
14369 <para>
14370 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14371 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14372 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14373 its review.
14374 </para>
14375 <para>
14376 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14377 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14378 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14379 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14380 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14381 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14382 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14383 </para>
14384 <para>
14385 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14386 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14387
14388 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14389 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14390 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14391 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14392 </para>
14393 <para>
14394 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14395 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14396 keep your lawyers away.
14397 </para>
14398 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14399 </section>
14400 </section>
14401 </chapter>
14402 <chapter id="c-notes">
14403 <title>NOTES</title>
14404 <para>
14405 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14406 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14407 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14408 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14409 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14410 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14411 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14412 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14413 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14414 the material.
14415 </para>
14416 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14417
14418 </chapter>
14419 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14420 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14421 <para>
14422 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14423 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14424 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14425 to him that this book is dedicated.
14426 </para>
14427 <para>
14428 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14429 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14430 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14431 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14432 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14433 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14434 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14435 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14436 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14437 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14438 critical eye on much of this.
14439 </para>
14440 <para>
14441 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14442 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14443 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14444 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14445 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14446 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14447 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14448 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14449 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14450 </para>
14451 <para>
14452 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14453 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14454 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14455 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14456 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14457 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14458 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14459 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14460 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14461 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14462 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14463 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14464 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14465 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14466 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14467 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14468 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14469 a bunch of great replies.)
14470 </para>
14471 <para>
14472 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14473 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14474 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14475 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14476 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14477 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14478 throughout this book.
14479 </para>
14480 <para>
14481 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14482 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14483 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14484 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14485 </para>
14486 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14487
14488 </chapter>
14489 <index></index>
14490 </book>