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17
18 <book id="index" lang="en">
19 <bookinfo>
20 <title>Free Culture</title>
21
22 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
23
24 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
25 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY</subtitle>
26
27 <pubdate>2004-03-25</pubdate>
28
29 <releaseinfo>Version 2004-02-10</releaseinfo>
30
31 <authorgroup>
32 <author>
33 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
34 <surname>Lessig</surname>
35 </author>
36 </authorgroup>
37
38 <copyright>
39 <year>2004</year>
40 <holder>Lawrence Lessig</holder>
41 </copyright>
42
43 <legalnotice>
44 <para>
45 <inlinemediaobject>
46 <imageobject>
47 <imagedata fileref="images/cc.png" width="100%" align="center"/>
48 </imageobject>
49 <imageobject>
50 <imagedata fileref="images/cc.svg" width="100%" align="center"/>
51 </imageobject>
52 <textobject>
53 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</phrase>
54 </textobject>
55 </inlinemediaobject>
56 </para>
57
58 <para>
59 This version of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is licensed under
60 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
61 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
62 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
63 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
64 </para>
65 </legalnotice>
66
67 <abstract>
68 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
69 <para>
70 LAWRENCE LESSIG
71 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
72 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
73 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
74 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
75 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
76 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
77 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
78 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
79 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
80 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
81 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
82 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
83 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
84 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
85 Appeals.
86 </para>
87 </abstract>
88 </bookinfo>
89
90 <colophon>
91 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
92
93 <para>
94 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
95 </para>
96 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
97 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
98 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
99 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
100 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
101 </itemizedlist>
102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
103
104 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
105 <para>
106 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
107 </para>
108 <para>
109 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
110 </para>
111 <para>
112 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
113 </para>
114
115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
116 <para>
117 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
118 </para>
119
120 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
121 <para>
122 FREE CULTURE
123 </para>
124
125 <para>
126 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
127 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
128 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
129 </para>
130
131 <para>
132 LAWRENCE LESSIG
133 </para>
134
135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
136 <para>
137 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
138 York, New York
139 </para>
140 <para>
141 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
142 </para>
143 <para>
144 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
145 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, January 16, 2003. Copyright
146 &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
147 </para>
148 <para>
149 Cartoon in <xref linkend="fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
150 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
151 </para>
152 <para>
153 Diagram in <xref linkend="fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
154 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
155 </para>
156 <para>
157 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
158 </para>
159 <para>
160 Lessig, Lawrence.
161 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
162 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
163 </para>
164 <para>
165 p. cm.
166 </para>
167 <para>
168 Includes index.
169 </para>
170 <para>
171 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
172 </para>
173 <para>
174 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
175 </para>
176 <para>
177 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
178 </para>
179 <para>
180 KF2979.L47
181 </para>
182 <para>
183 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
184 </para>
185 <para>
186 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
187 </para>
188 <para>
189 Printed in the United States of America
190 </para>
191 <para>
192 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
193 </para>
194 <para>
195 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
196 </para>
197
198 <para>
199 &translationblock;
200 </para>
201
202 <para>
203 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
204 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
205 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
206 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
207 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
208 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
209 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
210 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
211 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
212 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
213 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
214 </para>
215 </colophon>
216
217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
218 <dedication>
219 <para>
220 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
221 it continues still.
222 </para>
223 </dedication>
224
225 <toc id="toc"></toc>
226
227 <lot>
228 <title>List of figures</title>
229 </lot>
230
231 <!--
232 c PREFACE xiii
233 c INTRODUCTION
234 c "PIRACY"
235 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
236 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
237 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
238 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
239 2 Film
240 2 Recorded Music
241 2 Radio
242 2 Cable TV
243 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
244 2 Piracy I
245 2 Piracy II
246 c "PROPERTY"
247 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
248 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
249 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
250 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
251 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
252 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
253 2 Beginnings
254 2 Law: Duration
255 2 Law: Scope
256 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
257 2 Architecture and Law: Force
258 2 Market: Concentration
259 2 Together
260 c PUZZLES
261 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
262 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
263 2 Constraining Creators
264 2 Constraining Innovators
265 2 Corrupting Citizens
266 c BALANCES
267 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
268 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
269 c CONCLUSION
270 c AFTERWORD
271 1 Us, Now
272 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
273 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
274 1 Them, Soon
275 2 1. More Formalities
276 3 Registration and Renewal
277 3 Marking
278 2 2. Shorter Terms
279 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
280 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
281 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
282 c NOTES
283 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
284 c INDEX
285 -->
286
287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
288
289 <preface id="preface">
290 <title>PREFACE</title>
291 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
292 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
293 </indexterm>
294 <para>
295 At the end of his review of my first book, <citetitle>Code: And Other
296 Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle>, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and
297 author of countless technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
298 </para>
299 <blockquote>
300 <para>
301 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
302 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
303 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
304 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
305 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 30 January 2000.
306 </para></footnote>
307 </para>
308 </blockquote>
309 <para>
310 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
311 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
312 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
313 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
314 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
315 any troubles that exist in <emphasis>that</emphasis> space wouldn't
316 "affect" us anymore.
317 </para>
318 <para>
319 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
320 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
321 <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
322 causes even after the modem is turned
323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
324 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
325 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
326 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
327 </para>
328 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
329 <para>
330 But unlike <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
331 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
332 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
333 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
334 important.
335 </para>
336 <para>
337 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
338 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
339 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
340 free software movement<footnote>
341 <para>
342 Richard M. Stallman, <citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
343 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets,"
344 "free trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A
345 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
346 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
347 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
348 follow-on creators and innovators remain <emphasis>as free as
349 possible</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
350 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
351 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
352 "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in which creators get to create
353 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
354 past.
355 </para>
356 <para>
357 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
358 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
359 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
360 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
361 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
362 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
363 culture deem fundamental.
364 </para>
365 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
366 <para>
367 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
368 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
369 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
370 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
371 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
372 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
373 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
374 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
375 he asked,
376 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
377 </para>
378 <blockquote>
379 <para>
380 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
381 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
382 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
383 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
384 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
385 "The Great Media Gulp," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 May 2003.
386 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
387 </para></footnote>
388 </para>
389 </blockquote>
390 <para>
391 This idea is an element of the argument of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle>, though my
392 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
393 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
394 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
395 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
396 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
397 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
398 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
399 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
400 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
401 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in <citetitle>Free Software, Free
402 Society</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
403 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
404 that this work is "merely" derivative.
405 </para>
406 <para>
407 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
408 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
409 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
410 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
411 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
412 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
413 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
414 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
415
416 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
417 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
418 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
419 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
420 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
421 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
422 what I advance here.
423 </para>
424 <para>
425 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
426 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
427 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
428 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
429 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
430 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
431 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
432 book is written.
433 </para>
434
435 </preface>
436 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
437
438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
439 <chapter id="c-introduction">
440 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
441 <para>
442 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
443 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
444 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
445 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
446 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
447 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
448 </para>
449 <para>
450 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
451 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
452 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
453 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
454 St. George Tucker, <citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
455 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
456 </para></footnote>
457 For many
458 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
459 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
460 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
461 </para>
462 <para>
463 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
464 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
465 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
466 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
467 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
468 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
469 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
470 </para>
471 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
472 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
473 <para>
474 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
475 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
476 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
477 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
478 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
479 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
480 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
481 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
482 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
483 </para>
484 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
485 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
486 <para>
487 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
488 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
489 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
490 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
491 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
492 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
493 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
494 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
495 </para>
496 <blockquote>
497 <para>
498 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
499 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
500 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
501 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
502 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
503 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
504 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
505 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
506 <para>
507 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
508 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
509 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
510 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
511 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
512 Authorship," <citetitle>Stanford Law Review</citetitle> 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
513 Goldstein, <citetitle>Real Property</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
514 1112&ndash;13.
515 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
516 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
517 </para></footnote>
518 </para>
519 </blockquote>
520 <para>
521 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
522 </para>
523 <para>
524 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
525 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
526 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
528 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
529 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
530 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
531 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
532 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
533 </para>
534 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
535 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
536 <para>
537 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
538 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
539 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
540 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
541 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
542 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
543 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
544 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
545 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
546 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
547 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
548 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
549 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
550 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
551 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
552 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
553 </para>
554 <para>
555 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
556 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
557 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
558 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
559 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
560 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
561 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
562 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
563 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
564 understanding of radio.
565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
566 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham</primary></indexterm>
567 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
568 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
569 </para>
570 <para>
571 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
572 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
573 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
574 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
575 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
576 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
577 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
578 much less transmitter power and static.
579 </para>
580 <para>
581 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
582 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
583 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
584 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
585 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
586 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
587 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
588 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
589 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
590 </para>
591 <para>
592 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
593 </para>
594 <blockquote>
595 <para>
596 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
597 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
598 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
599 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
600 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
601 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
602 box."<footnote><para>
603 Lawrence Lessing, <citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong</citetitle>
604 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
605 </para></footnote>
606 </para>
607 </blockquote>
608 <para>
609 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
610 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
611 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
612 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
613 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
614 a handful of networks.
615 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
616 </para>
617 <para>
618 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
619 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
620 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
621 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
622 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
623 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
624 </para>
625 <blockquote>
626 <para>
627 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
628 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
629 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
630 RCA.<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
631 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
632 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
633
634 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
635 </para></footnote>
636 </para>
637 </blockquote>
638 <para>
639 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
640 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
641 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
642 described,
643 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
644 </para>
645 <blockquote>
646 <para>
647 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
648 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
649 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
650 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
651 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
652 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
653 </para></footnote>
654 </para>
655 </blockquote>
656 <para>
657 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
658 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
659 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
660 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
661 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
662 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
663 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
664 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
665 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
666 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
667 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
668 </para>
669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
670 <blockquote>
671 <para>
672 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
673 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
674 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
675 deviousness.<footnote><para>
676 Lessing, 256.
677 </para></footnote>
678 </para>
679 </blockquote>
680 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
681 <para>
682 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
683 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
684 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
685 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
686 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
687 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
688 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
689 least temporarily.
690 </para>
691 <para>
692 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
693 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
694 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
695 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
696 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
697 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
698 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
699 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
700 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
701 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
702 </para>
703 <para>
704 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
705 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
706 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
707 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
708 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
709 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
710 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
711 course always public spirited; the reality is something
712 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
713 to themselves, would crumble in
714 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
715 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
716 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
717 effect of technological change.
718 </para>
719 <para>
720 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
721 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
722 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
723 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
724 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
725 before.<footnote><para>
726 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
727 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
728 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
729 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
730 </para></footnote>
731 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
732 of 2004.
733 </para>
734 <para>
735 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
736 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
737 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
738 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
739 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
740 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
741 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
742 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
743 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
744 </para>
745 <para>
746 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
747 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
748 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
749 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
750 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
751 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
752 has introduced.
753 </para>
754 <para>
755 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
756 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
757 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
758 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
759 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
760 parks or on
761 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
762 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
763 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
764 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
765 </para>
766 <para>
767 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
768 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
769 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
770 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
771 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
772 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
773 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
774 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
775 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
776 </para>
777 <para>
778 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
779 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
780 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
781 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
782 marketplace.<footnote>
783 <para>
784 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
785 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
786 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
787 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
788 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
789 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
790 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
791 198&ndash;200.
792 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
793 </para></footnote>
794 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
795 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
796 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
797 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
798 </para>
799 <para>
800 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
801 been erased.<footnote><para>
802 See Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
803 2001), ch. 13.
804 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
805 </para></footnote>
806 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
807 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
808 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
809 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
810 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
811 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
812 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
813 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
814 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
815 culture, more and more a permission culture.
816 </para>
817 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
818 <para>
819 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
820 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
821 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
822 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
823 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
824 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
825 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
826 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
827 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
828 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
829 Causbys.
830 </para>
831 <para>
832 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
833 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
834 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
835 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
836 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
837 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
838 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
839 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
840 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
841 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
842 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
843 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
844 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
845 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
846 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
847 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
848 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
849 </para>
850 <para>
851 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
852 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
853 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
854 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
855 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
856 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
857 remakes them.
858 </para>
859 <para>
860 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
862 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
863 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
864 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
865 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
866 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
867 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
868 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
869 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," <citetitle>New York
870 Times</citetitle>, 17 January 2002.
871 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
872 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
873 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
874 against it.
875 </para>
876 <para>
877 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
878 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
879 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
880 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
881 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
882 Internet.
883 </para>
884 <para>
885 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
886 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
887 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
888 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
889 </para>
890 <para>
891 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
892 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
893 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
894 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
895 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
896 <para>
897 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," <citetitle>Yale Law
898 Journal</citetitle> 106 (1996): 283.
899 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
900 </para></footnote>
901 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
902 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
903 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
904 could cultivate and extend our culture.
905 </para>
906 <para>
907 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
908 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
909 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
910 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
911 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
912 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
913 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
914 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
915 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
916 </para>
917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
918 <para>
919 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
920 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
921 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
922 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
923 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
924 against an industry.
925 </para>
926 <para>
927 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
928 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
929 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
930 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
931 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
932 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
933 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
934 </para>
935 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
936 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
937 <para>
938 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
939 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
940 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
941 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
942 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
943 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
944 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
945 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
946 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
947 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
948 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
949 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
950 trespass.
951 </para>
952 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
953 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
954 <para>
955 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
956 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
957 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
958 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
959 war. Unlike
960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
961 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
962 on its side.
963 </para>
964 <para>
965 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
966 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
967 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
968 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
969 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
970 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
971 <emphasis>uses</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
972 accepted as it is now.
973 </para>
974 <para>
975 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
976 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
977 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
978 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
979 </para>
980 <para>
981 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
982 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
983 </para>
984 <para>
985 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
986 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
987 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
988 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
989 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
990 </para>
991 <para>
992 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
993 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
994 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
995 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
996 view?
997 </para>
998 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
999 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1000 <para>
1001 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1002 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1003 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1004 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
1005 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1006 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1007 this silliness will be much more profound.
1008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1009 </para>
1010 <para>
1011 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1012 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1013 ideas.
1014 </para>
1015 <para>
1016 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1017 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1018 obscure French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird
1019 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1020 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1021 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1022 </para>
1023 <para>
1024 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1025 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1026 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1027 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1028 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1029 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1030 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1031 law&mdash;and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1032 fundamental about who we have always been.
1033 </para>
1034 <para>
1035 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1036 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1037 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1038 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1039 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1040 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1041 </para>
1042 </chapter>
1043 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1044 <part id="c-piracy">
1045 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1046 <partintro>
1047 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1048 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1049 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1050 </indexterm>
1051 <para>
1052 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1053 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1054 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1055 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1056 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1057 </para>
1058 <blockquote>
1059 <para>
1060 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1061 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1062 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1063 <!-- f1 -->
1064 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1065 </para></footnote>
1066 </para>
1067 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1068 </blockquote>
1069 <para>
1070 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1071 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1072 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1073 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1074 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1075 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1076 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1077 </para>
1078 <para>
1079 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1080 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1081 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1082 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1083 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1084 profit."
1085 </para>
1086 <para>
1087 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1088 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1089 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1090 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1091 never mind body piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming
1092 <emphasis>thieves</emphasis>!
1093 </para>
1094 <para>
1095 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1096 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1097 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1098 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1099 </para>
1100 <para>
1101 The idea goes something like this:
1102 </para>
1103 <blockquote>
1104 <para>
1105 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1106 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1107 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1108 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1109 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1110 piracy.
1111 </para>
1112 </blockquote>
1113 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1114 <para>
1115 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1116 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1117 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1118 <!-- f2 -->
1119 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1120 in the Pepsi Generation," <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review</citetitle> 65 (1990): 397.
1121 </para></footnote>
1122 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1123 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1124 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1125 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1126 <!-- f3 -->
1127 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1128 Up," <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 21 August 1996, available at
1129 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1130 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1131 Speech, No One Wins," <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 24 November 2002.
1132 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
1133 </para></footnote>
1134 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1135 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1136 </para>
1137 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1138 <para>
1139 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1140 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1142 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1143 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1144 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1145 </para>
1146 <para>
1147 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1148 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1149 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1150 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1151 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1152 </para>
1153 <para>
1154 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1155 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1156 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1157 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1158 copyright law today regulates both.
1159 </para>
1160 <para>
1161 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1162 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1163 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1164 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1165 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1166 more expense of doing business.
1167 </para>
1168 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1169 <para>
1170 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1171 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1172 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1173 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1174 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1175 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1176 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1177 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1178 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1179 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1180 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1181 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1182 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1183 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1184 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1185 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1186 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1187 <para>
1188 <!-- f4 -->
1189 In <citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1190 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1191 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1192 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1193 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1194 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1195 enabled are much more tenuous.
1196 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1197 </para></footnote>
1198 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1199 this creative class.
1200 </para>
1201 <para>
1202 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1203 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1204 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1205 </para>
1206 </partintro>
1207
1208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1209 <chapter id="creators">
1210 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1211 <para>
1212 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1213 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called <citetitle>Plane Crazy</citetitle>.
1214 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1215 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle> brought
1216 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1217 </para>
1218 <para>
1219 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1220 movie <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1221 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1222 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1223 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1224 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1225 </para>
1226 <blockquote>
1227 <para>
1228 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1229 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1230 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1231 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1232 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1233 </para>
1234 <para>
1235 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1236 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1237 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1238 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1239 synchronization was pretty close.
1240 </para>
1241 <para>
1242 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1243 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1244 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1245 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1246 it was something new!<footnote><para>
1247 <!-- f1 -->
1248 Leonard Maltin, <citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1249 Cartoons</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1250 </para></footnote>
1251 </para>
1252 </blockquote>
1253 <para>
1254 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1255 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1256 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1257 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1258 </para>
1259 <para>
1260 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1261 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1262 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1263 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1264 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1265 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1266 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1267 </para>
1268 <para>
1269 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also marks
1270 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1271 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1272 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>.
1273 </para>
1274 <para>
1275 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of silent
1276 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1277 uncontrollable laughter from his audience. <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1278 Jr</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1279 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular
1280 and among the best of its genre.
1281 </para>
1282 <para>
1283 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1284 Willie.
1285 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1286 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1287 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1288 <!-- f2 -->
1289 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1290 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1291 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1292 use the music for five songs in <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1293 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1294 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1295 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1296 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1297 </para></footnote>
1298 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1299 the invention of synchronized sound in <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle> that we
1300 get <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1301 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1302 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1303 Mouse.
1304 </para>
1305 <para>
1306 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1307 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1308 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1309 <!-- f3 -->
1310 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1311 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1312 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1313 </para></footnote>
1314 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1315 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1316 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1317 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1318 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1319 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1320 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1321 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1322 old.
1323 </para>
1324 <para>
1325 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1326 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1327 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1328 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1329 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1330 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1331 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1332 </para>
1333 <para>
1334 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1335 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1336 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1337 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1338 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1339 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1340 work of others is astonishing when set together: <citetitle>Snow White</citetitle>
1341 (1937), <citetitle>Fantasia</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Pinocchio</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Dumbo</citetitle>
1342 (1941), <citetitle>Bambi</citetitle> (1942), <citetitle>Song of the South</citetitle> (1946),
1343 <citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle> (1950), <citetitle>Alice in Wonderland</citetitle> (1951), <citetitle>Robin
1344 Hood</citetitle> (1952), <citetitle>Peter Pan</citetitle> (1953), <citetitle>Lady and the Tramp</citetitle>
1345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1346 (1955), <citetitle>Mulan</citetitle> (1998), <citetitle>Sleeping Beauty</citetitle> (1959), <citetitle>101
1347 Dalmatians</citetitle> (1961), <citetitle>The Sword in the Stone</citetitle> (1963), and
1348 <citetitle>The Jungle Book</citetitle> (1967)&mdash;not to mention a recent example
1349 that we should perhaps quickly forget, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>
1350 (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1351 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1352 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1353 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1354 </para>
1355 <para>
1356 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1357 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1358 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1359 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1360 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1361 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1362 culture around us and makes it something different.
1363 </para>
1364 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1365 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1366 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1367 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1368 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1369 <!-- f4 -->
1370 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1371 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1372 determining
1373 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1374 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1375 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1376 average
1377 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1378 Web site associated with this book, available at
1379 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1380 </para></footnote>
1381 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1382 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1383 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1384 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1385 </para>
1386 <para>
1387 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1388 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1389 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1390 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1391 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1392 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1393 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1394 </para>
1395 <para>
1396 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1397 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1398 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1399 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1400
1401 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1402 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1403 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1404 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1405 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1406 content from before the Great Depression.
1407 </para>
1408 <para>
1409 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1410 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1411 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1412 universal.
1413 </para>
1414 <para>
1415 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1416 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: <citetitle>manga</citetitle>, or
1417 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1418 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1419 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1420 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1421 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1422 </para>
1423 <para>
1424 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1425 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1426 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1427 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1428 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1429 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1430 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1431 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1432 interestingly different way.
1433 </para>
1434 <para>
1435 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1436 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1437 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1438 </para>
1439 <para>
1440 This is the phenomenon of <citetitle>doujinshi</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1441 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1442 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is <emphasis>just</emphasis> a
1443 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1444 transforming it either subtly or
1445 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1446 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1447 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1448 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1449 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1450 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1451 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1452 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1453 </para>
1454 <para>
1455 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1456 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1457 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1458 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1459 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1460 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1461 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1462 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1463 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1464 </para>
1465 <para>
1466 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1467 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1468 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1469 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1470 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1471 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1472 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1473 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1474 Jr</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without
1475 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1476 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1477 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1478 </para>
1479 <indexterm id="idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'>
1480 <primary>Winick, Judd</primary>
1481 </indexterm>
1482 <para>
1483 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1484 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1485 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1486 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1487 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1488 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1489 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1490 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1491 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1492 <!-- f5 -->
1493 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, <citetitle>Reinventing Comics</citetitle> (New
1494 York: Perennial, 2000).
1495 </para></footnote>
1496 </para>
1497 <para>
1498 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1499 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1500 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1501 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1502 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1503 which are fifty years old."
1504 </para>
1505 <indexterm startref="idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'/>
1506 <para>
1507 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1508 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1509 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1510 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1511 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1512 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1513 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1514 <!-- f6 -->
1515 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1516 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1517 Review</citetitle> 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1518 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1519 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1520 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1521 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1522 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1523 </para></footnote>
1524 </para>
1525 <para>
1526 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1527 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1528 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1529 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1530 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1531 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1532 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1533 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1534 culture?
1535 </para>
1536 <para>
1537 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1538 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1539 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1540 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1541 to prosecute cases like this."
1542 </para>
1543 <para>
1544 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1545 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1546 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1547 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1549 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1550 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1551 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1552 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1553 their clients or hurt them?
1554 Let's pause for a moment.
1555 </para>
1556 <para>
1557 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1558 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1559 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1560 </para>
1561 <para>
1562 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1563 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1564 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1565 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1566 <!-- f7 -->
1567 The term <citetitle>intellectual property</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1568 Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 11 (New York: New York
1569 University Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
1570 (New York: Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately
1571 describes a set of "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents,
1572 trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the nature of those rights is
1573 very different.
1574 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
1575 </para></footnote>
1576 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1577 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1578 property.
1579 </para>
1580 <para>
1581 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1582 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1583 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1584 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1585 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1586 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1587 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1588 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1589 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1590 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1591 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1592 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1593 the public domain.
1594 </para>
1595 <para>
1596 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1597 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1598 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1599
1600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1601 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1602 freedom is good.
1603 </para>
1604 <para>
1605 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1606 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1607 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1608 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1609 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1610 form, whether large or small.
1611 </para>
1612 <para>
1613 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1614 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1615 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1616 particular find it hard to say why.
1617 </para>
1618 <para>
1619 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1620 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1621 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1622 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1623 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1624 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1625 permission from anyone. (Does <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> believe
1626 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1627 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1628 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1629 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s;
1630 two volcano disaster films in 1997.
1631 </para>
1632 <para>
1633 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1634 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1635 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1636 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1637 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1638 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1639 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1640 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1642 </para>
1643 <para>
1644 The hard question is therefore not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> a
1645 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1646 question instead is "<emphasis>How</emphasis> free is this culture?"
1647 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1648 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1649 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1650 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1651 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1652 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1653 a studio or not?
1654 </para>
1655 <para>
1656 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1657 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1658 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1659 </para>
1660
1661 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1662 </chapter>
1663 <chapter id="mere-copyists">
1664 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1665 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1666 <para>
1667 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1668 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1669 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1670 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1671 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1672 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1673 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1674 </para>
1675 <para>
1676 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1677 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1678 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1679 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1680 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1681 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1682 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1683 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1684 amateurs.
1685 </para>
1686 <indexterm id="idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'>
1687 <primary>Eastman, George</primary>
1688 </indexterm>
1689 <para>
1690 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1691 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1692 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1693 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1694 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1695 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1696 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1697 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1698 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1699 population of photographers.
1700 </para>
1701 <para>
1702 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1703 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1704 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1705 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1706 <!-- f1 -->
1707 Reese V. Jenkins, <citetitle>Images and Enterprise</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1708 </para></footnote> As he described in <citetitle>The Kodak Primer</citetitle>:
1709 </para>
1710 <blockquote>
1711 <para>
1712 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1713 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1714 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1715 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1716 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1717 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1718 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1719 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1720 chemicals.<footnote>
1721 <para>
1722 <!-- f2 -->
1723 Brian Coe, <citetitle>The Birth of Photography</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1724 1977), 53.
1725 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1726 </para></footnote>
1727 </para>
1728 </blockquote>
1729 <para>
1730 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1731 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1732 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1733 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1734 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1735 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1736 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1737 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1738 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1739 percent.<footnote><para>
1740 <!-- f3 -->
1741 Jenkins, 177.
1742 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1743 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1744 <!-- f4 -->
1745 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1746 </para></footnote>
1747 </para>
1748 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1749 <para>
1750
1751 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1752 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1753 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1754 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1755 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1756 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1757 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1758 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1759 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1760 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1761 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1762 <!-- f5 -->
1763 Coe, 58.
1764 </para></footnote>
1765 </para>
1766 <para>
1767 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1768 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1769 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1770 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1771 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1772 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1773 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1774 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1775 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1776 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1777 have before.
1778 </para>
1779 <para>
1780 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1781 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1782 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1783 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1784 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1785 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1786 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1787 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1788 <!-- f6 -->
1789 For illustrative cases, see, for example, <citetitle>Pavesich</citetitle>
1790 v. <citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co</citetitle>., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
1791 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Chinn</citetitle>, 123090 S.W. 364, 366
1792 (Ky. 1909); <citetitle>Corliss</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Walker</citetitle>, 64 F. 280 (Mass.
1793 Dist. Ct. 1894).
1794 </para></footnote>
1795 </para>
1796 <para>
1797 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1798 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1799 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1800 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1801 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1802 draw
1803 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1804 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1805 that they thought valuable.
1806 </para>
1807 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1808 <para>
1809 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1810 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1811 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1812 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1813 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1814 <para>
1815 <!-- f7 -->
1816 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1817 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review</citetitle> 4 (1890): 193.
1818 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1819 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1820 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1821 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1822 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1823 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1824 </para>
1825 <para>
1826 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1827 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1828 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1829 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1830 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1831 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1832 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1833 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1834 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1835 <!-- f8 -->
1836 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1837 Problems</citetitle> 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," <citetitle>California Law
1838 Review</citetitle> 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; <citetitle>White</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1839 Inc</citetitle>., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1840 (1993).
1841 </para></footnote>)
1842 </para>
1843 <para>
1844 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1845 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1846 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1847 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1848 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1849 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1850 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1851 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1852 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1853 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1854 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1855 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1856 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1857 </para>
1858 <para>
1859
1860 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1861 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1862 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1863 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1864 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1865 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1866 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1867 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1868 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1869 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1870 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1871 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1872 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1873 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1874 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1875 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1876 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1877 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1878 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1879 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1880 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1881 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1882 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1883 learn.
1884 </para>
1885 <indexterm startref="idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'/>
1886 <para>
1887 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1888 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1889 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1890 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1891 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1892 <!-- f9 -->
1893 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1894 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1895 cadalyst, February 2002, available at
1896 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1897 </para></footnote>
1898 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1899 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1900 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1901 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1902 </para>
1903 <para>
1904 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1905 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1906 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1907 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1908 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1909 the way people access it."
1910 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave</primary></indexterm>
1911 </para>
1912 <para>
1913 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1914 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1915 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1916 about.
1917 </para>
1918 <para>
1919 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1920 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1921 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1922 <!-- f10 -->
1923 Judith Van Evra, <citetitle>Television and Child Development</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1924 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1925 Study," <citetitle>Denver Post</citetitle>, 25 May 1997, B6.
1926 </para></footnote>
1927 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1928 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
1929 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
1930 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
1931 (at least at first) terrible media.
1932 </para>
1933 <para>
1934 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1935 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
1936 has written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult
1937 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
1938 language to be understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of
1939 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
1940 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
1941 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
1942 </para>
1943 <para>
1944 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1945 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1946 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1947 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1948 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1949 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1950 </para>
1951 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
1952 <para>
1953 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1954 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1955 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1956
1957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1958 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1959 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1960 texture."<footnote>
1961 <para>
1962 <!-- f11 -->
1963 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1964 2002.
1965 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1966 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
1967 </para></footnote>
1968 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1969 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1970 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1971 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1972 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1973 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1974 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1975 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1976 <!-- f12 -->
1977 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1978 November 2000, available at
1979 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1980 available at
1981 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1982 </para></footnote>
1983 </para>
1984 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1985 <para>
1986 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1987 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1988 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1989 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1990 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1991 </para>
1992 <para>
1993 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1994 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1995 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1996 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1997 </para>
1998 <blockquote>
1999 <para>
2000 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2001 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2002 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2003 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2004 being read-only.
2005 </para>
2006 </blockquote>
2007 <para>
2008 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2009 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2010 twentieth century.
2011 </para>
2012 <para>
2013 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2014 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2015 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2016 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2017 literacy,
2018 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2019 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2020 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2021 express."<footnote>
2022 <para>
2023 <!-- f13 -->
2024 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2025 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2026 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2027 language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
2028 <!-- f14 -->
2029 Ibid.
2030 </para></footnote>
2031 </para>
2032 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2033 <para>
2034 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2035 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2036 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2037 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2038 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2039 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2040 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2041 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2042 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2043 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2044 </para>
2045 <para>
2046 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2047 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2048 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2049 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
2050 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2051 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2052 </para>
2053 <para>
2054 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2055 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2056 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2057 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2058 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2059 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2060 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2061 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2062 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2063 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2064 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2065 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2066 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2067 <emphasis>these</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2068 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2069 </para>
2070 <para>
2071
2072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2073 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2074 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2075 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2076 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2077 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2078 part&mdash;and increasingly, not the most powerful part&mdash;of
2079 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2080 our interview,
2081 </para>
2082 <blockquote>
2083 <para>
2084 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2085 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2086 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2087 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2088 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2089 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2090 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2091 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2092 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2093 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2094 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2095 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2096 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2097 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2098 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2099 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2100 about the topic. . . .
2101 </para>
2102 <para>
2103 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2104 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2105 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2106 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2107 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2108 </para>
2109 <para>
2110 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2111 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2112 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2114 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2115 had a lot of power with this language."
2116 </para>
2117 </blockquote>
2118 <para>
2119 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2120 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2121 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2122 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2123 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2124 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2125 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2126 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2127 world would be watching.
2128 </para>
2129 <para>
2130 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2131 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2132 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2133 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2134 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2135 entertainment is tragedy.
2136 </para>
2137 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2138 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2139 <para>
2140 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2141 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2142 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2143 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2144 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2145 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2146 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2147 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2148 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2149 the term in his book <citetitle>Cyber Rights</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2150 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2151 was also the Internet.
2152 </para>
2153 <para>
2154 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2155 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2156 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2157 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2158 movie
2159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2160 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2161 with sound or text.
2162 </para>
2163 <para>
2164 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2165 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2166 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2167 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2168 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2169 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2170 spread practically instantaneously.
2171 </para>
2172 <para>
2173 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2174 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2175 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2176 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2177 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2178 cultures, it records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind
2179 of electronic <citetitle>Jerry Springer</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2180 </para>
2181 <para>
2182 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2183 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2184 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2185 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2186 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2187 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2188 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2189 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2190 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2191 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2192 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2193 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2194 </para>
2195 <para>
2196 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2197 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2198 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2199 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2200 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2201 people vote
2202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2203 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2204 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2205 </para>
2206 <para>
2207 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2208 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2209 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2210 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2211 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2212 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2213 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2214 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2215 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2216 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2217 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2218 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2219 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2220 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2221 <!-- f15 -->
2222 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, <citetitle>Democracy in America</citetitle>,
2223 bk. 1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2224 </para></footnote>
2225 </para>
2226 <para>
2227 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2228 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2229 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2230 <!-- f16 -->
2231 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," <citetitle>Journal of
2232 Political Philosophy</citetitle> 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2233 </para></footnote>
2234 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2235 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2236 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2237 </para>
2238 <para>
2239 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2240 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2241 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2242 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2243 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2244 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2245 <!-- f17 -->
2246 Cass Sunstein, <citetitle>Republic.com</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2247 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2248 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2249 little beyond what our friends say.
2250 </para>
2251 <para>
2252 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2253 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2254 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2255 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2256 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2257
2258 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2259 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2260 place.
2261 </para>
2262 <para>
2263 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2264 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2265 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2266 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2267 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2268 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2269 </para>
2270 <para>
2271 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2272 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race
2273 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2274 is having an effect.
2275 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard</primary></indexterm>
2276 </para>
2277 <para>
2278 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2279 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2280 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2281 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2282 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2283 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2284 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2285 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2286 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2287 resign as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2288 <!-- f18 -->
2289 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2290 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2291 </para></footnote>
2292 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent</primary></indexterm>
2293 </para>
2294 <para>
2295 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2296 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2297 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2298 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2299 on.
2300 </para>
2301 <para>
2302 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2303 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2304 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2305 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2306 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2307 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2308 peer-generated rankings.
2309 </para>
2310 <indexterm id="idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'>
2311 <primary>Winer, Dave</primary>
2312 </indexterm>
2313 <para>
2314 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2316 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2317 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2318 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2319 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2320 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2321 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2322 get it out of the way."
2323 </para>
2324 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2325 <para>
2326 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2327 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2328 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2329 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2330 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2331 <!-- f19 -->
2332 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2333 </para></footnote>
2334 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2335 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2336 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2337 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2338 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2339 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2340 told her <emphasis>that</emphasis> they were writing "the story.")
2341 </para>
2342 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2343 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2344 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2345 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2346 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2347 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2348 had seen.<footnote><para>
2349 <!-- f20 -->
2350 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2351 Information Online," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2352 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2353 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2354 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2355 </para></footnote>
2356 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2357 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2358 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2359 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2360 </para>
2361 <para>
2362 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2363 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2364 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2365 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2366 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2367 <para>
2368 <!-- f21 -->
2369 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" <citetitle>New
2370 York Times</citetitle>, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2371 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2372 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2373 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2374 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a <citetitle>Houston Chronicle</citetitle> reporter, was
2375 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2376 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2377 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2378 </para></footnote>
2379 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2380
2381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2382 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2383 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2384 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2385 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2386 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2387 </para>
2388 <para>
2389 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2390 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2391 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2392 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2393 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2394 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2395 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2396 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2397 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2398 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2399 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2400 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2401 extraordinary to report.
2402 </para>
2403 <indexterm startref="idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'/>
2404 <indexterm id="idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'>
2405 <primary>Brown, John Seely</primary>
2406 </indexterm>
2407 <para>
2408 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2409 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2410 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2411 </para>
2412 <para>
2413 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2414 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2415 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2416 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2417 affect learning.
2418 </para>
2419 <para>
2420 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2421 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2422 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2423 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2424 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2425 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2426 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2427 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2428 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2429 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2430 the tinkering of many others.
2431 </para>
2432 <para>
2433 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2434 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2435 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2436 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2437 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2438 </para>
2439 <para>
2440 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2441 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2442 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2443 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2444 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2445 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2446 </para>
2447 <para>
2448 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2449 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2450 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2451 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2452 platform. . . . You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2453 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2454 learn.
2455 </para>
2456 <para>
2457 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2458 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2459 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2460 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2461 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2462 text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2463 you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a
2464 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2465 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2466 </para>
2467 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2468 <para>
2469 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2470 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2471
2472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2473 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2474 kind of recognition.
2475 </para>
2476 <para>
2477 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2478 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2479 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2480 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2481 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2482 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2483 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2484 </para>
2485 <para>
2486 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2487 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2488 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>)
2489 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2490 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2491 general.<footnote><para>
2492 <!-- f22 -->
2493 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2494 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," <citetitle>Communications
2495 of the Association for Computer Machinery</citetitle> 43 (2000): 9.
2496 </para></footnote>
2497 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2498 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2499 </para>
2500 <para>
2501 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2502 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2503 and want to learn."
2504 </para>
2505 <para>
2506 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2507 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2508 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2509 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2510 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2511 </para>
2512 <indexterm startref="idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'/>
2513 <para>
2514 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2515 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2516 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2517 the law to close down that technology.
2518 </para>
2519 <para>
2520 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2521 chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="collectors"/>,
2522 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2523 </para>
2524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2525 </chapter>
2526 <chapter id="catalogs">
2527 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2528 <para>
2529 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2530 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2531 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2532 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2533 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2534 </para>
2535 <para>
2536 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2537 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2538 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2539 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2540 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2541 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2542 </para>
2543 <para>
2544 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2545 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2546 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2547 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2548 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2549 </para>
2550 <para>
2551 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2552 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2553 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2554 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2555 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2556 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2557 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2558 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2559 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2560 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2561 </para>
2562 <para>
2563 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2564 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2565 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2566 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2567 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2568 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2569 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2570 </para>
2571 <para>
2572 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2573 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2574 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2575 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2576 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2577 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2578 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2579 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2580 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2581 on-line.
2582 </para>
2583 <para>
2584 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2585 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2586 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2587 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2588 be on users' computers.
2589 </para>
2590 <para>
2591 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2592 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2593 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2594 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2596 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2597 computer.
2598 </para>
2599 <para>
2600 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2601 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2602 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2603 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2604 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2605 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2606 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2607 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2608 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2609 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2610 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2611 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2612 supposed to do.
2613 </para>
2614 <para>
2615 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2616 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2617 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2618 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2619 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2620 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2621 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2622 </para>
2623 <para>
2624 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2625 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2626 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2627 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2628 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2629 easier to use"&mdash;again, a <emphasis>search engine</emphasis>,
2630 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2631 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2632 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2633 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2634 with music.
2635 </para>
2636 <para>
2637 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2638 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2639 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2640 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2641 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2642 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2643 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2644 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2645 Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2646 </para>
2647 <para>
2648 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2649 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2650 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2651 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2652 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2653 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2654 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100
2655 <emphasis>billion</emphasis>&mdash;six times the
2656 <emphasis>total</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2657 2001.<footnote><para>
2658
2659 <!-- f1 -->
2660 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2661 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC</citetitle> 6
2662 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2663 </para></footnote>
2664 </para>
2665 <para>
2666 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2667 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2668 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2669 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2670 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2671 </para>
2672 <para>
2673 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2674 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2675 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2676 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2677 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2678 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2679 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2680 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2681 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2682 </para>
2683 <para>
2684 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2685 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2686 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2687 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2688 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2690 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2691 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2692 </para>
2693 <para>
2694 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2695 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2696 </para>
2697 <para>
2698 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2699 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2700 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2701 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2702 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2703 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2704 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2705 <!-- f2 -->
2706 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2707 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2708 the Arts, <citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon</citetitle> (2000).
2709 </para></footnote>
2710 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2711 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2712 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2713 <!-- f3 -->
2714 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2715 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, A24.
2716 </para></footnote>
2717 </para>
2718 <para>
2719 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2720 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2721 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2722 activist:
2723 </para>
2724 <blockquote>
2725 <para>
2726 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2727 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2728 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2729 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2730 </para>
2731 </blockquote>
2732 <para>
2733 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2734 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2735 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2736 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2737 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2738 </para>
2739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2740 </chapter>
2741 <chapter id="pirates">
2742 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2743 <para>
2744 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2745 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2746 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2747 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2748 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2749 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2750 </para>
2751 <section id="film">
2752 <title>Film</title>
2753 <para>
2754 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2755 <!-- f1 -->
2756 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2757 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 87&ndash;93,
2758 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2759 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
2760 </para></footnote>
2761 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2762 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2763 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2764 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2765 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2766 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2767 this creative property
2768 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2769 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2770 </para>
2771 <para>
2772 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2773 </para>
2774 <blockquote>
2775 <para>
2776 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2777 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2778 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2779 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2780 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2781 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2782 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2783 </para>
2784 <para>
2785 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2786 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2787 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2788 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2789 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2790 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2791 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2792 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2793 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2794 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2795 <!-- f2 -->
2796 J. A. Aberdeen, <citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2797 Picture Producers</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2798 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2799 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2800 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2801 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2802 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2803 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2804 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2805 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2806 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2807 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2808 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2809 </para>
2810 </blockquote>
2811 <para>
2812 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2813 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2814 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2815 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2816 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2817 <!-- f3 -->
2818 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," <citetitle>The Silents Majority</citetitle>, archived at
2819 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2820 </para></footnote>
2821 That led the independents to flee the East
2822 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2823 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2824 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2825 did just that.
2826 </para>
2827 <para>
2828 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2829 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2830 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2831
2832 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2833 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2834 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2835 Edison's creative property.
2836 </para>
2837 </section>
2838 <section id="recordedmusic">
2839 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2840 <para>
2841 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2842 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2843 </para>
2844 <para>
2845 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2846 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2847 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2848 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2849 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2850 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2851 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2852 right to perform it publicly.
2853 </para>
2854 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2855 <para>
2856 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2857 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2858 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2859 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2860 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2861 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2862 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2863 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2864 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2865 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2866 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2867 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2868 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2869 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2870 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2871 its composer anything.
2872 </para>
2873 <para>
2874 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2876 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2877 put it,
2878 </para>
2879 <blockquote>
2880 <para>
2881 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2882 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2883 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2884 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2885 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2886 rights.<footnote><para>
2887 <!-- f4 -->
2888 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2889 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2890 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2891 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in <citetitle>Legislative History of the
2892 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2893 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2894 </para></footnote>
2895 </para>
2896 </blockquote>
2897 <para>
2898 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2899 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2900 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2901 <!-- f5 -->
2902 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2903 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2904 </para></footnote>
2905 and the "music publishing industry"
2906 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2907 <!-- f6 -->
2908 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2909 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2910 </para></footnote>
2911 As John Philip
2912 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2913 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2914 <!-- f7 -->
2915 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2916 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2917 </para></footnote>
2918 </para>
2919 <para>
2920 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2921 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2922 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2923 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2924 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2925 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2926 <!-- f8 -->
2927
2928 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2929 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2930 Perforating Company of New York).
2931 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
2932 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
2933 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2934 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
2935 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
2936 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
2937 statute."<footnote><para>
2938 <!-- f9 -->
2939 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
2940 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2941 Graphophone Company Association).
2942 </para></footnote>
2943 </para>
2944 <para>
2945 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
2946 <emphasis>and</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
2947 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical
2948 reproductions" of their music. But rather than simply granting the
2949 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
2950 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
2951 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
2952 recorded once. This is the part of
2953
2954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2955 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2956 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2957 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2958 </para>
2959 <para>
2960 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2961 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
2962 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
2963 Copyright Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
2964 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
2965 the fee set by the statute.
2966 </para>
2967 <para>
2968 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2969 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2970 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2971 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2972 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2973 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2974 Grisham.
2975 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
2976 </para>
2977 <para>
2978 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2979 thus, in effect, the law <emphasis>subsidizes</emphasis> the recording
2980 industry through a kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a
2981 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
2982 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
2983 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
2984 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
2985 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
2986 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
2987 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
2988 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2989 creativity.<footnote><para>
2990
2991 <!-- f10 -->
2992 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2993 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2994 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2995 in <citetitle>Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2996 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2997 </para></footnote>
2998 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2999 </para>
3000 <para>
3001 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3002 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3003 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3004 relates,
3005 </para>
3006 <blockquote>
3007 <para>
3008 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3009 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3010 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3011 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3012 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3013 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3014 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3015 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3016 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before 1909 and
3017 the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3018 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3019 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3020 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3021 choice.<footnote><para>
3022 <!-- f11 -->
3023 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
3024 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
3025 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3026 this report.</para></footnote>
3027 </para>
3028 </blockquote>
3029 <para>
3030 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3031 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3032 </para>
3033 </section>
3034 <section id="radio">
3035 <title>Radio</title>
3036 <para>
3037 Radio was also born of piracy.
3038 </para>
3039 <para>
3040 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3041 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3042 <!-- f12 -->
3043 See 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3044 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3045 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3046 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3047 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3048 station. See <citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Whiteman</citetitle>, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3049 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3050 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3051 Copyright," <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 281.
3052 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3053 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3054 </para></footnote>
3055 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3056 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3057 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3058 </para>
3059 <para>
3060 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3061 copy of the <emphasis>composer's</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3062 also performing a copy of the <emphasis>recording artist's</emphasis>
3063 work. It's one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the
3064 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3065 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3066 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3067 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3068 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3069 music for his work.
3070 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
3071
3072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3073 </para>
3074 <para>
3075 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3076 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3077 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3078 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3079 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3080 of playing the song.
3081 </para>
3082 <indexterm id="idxmadonna" class='startofrange'>
3083 <primary>Madonna</primary>
3084 </indexterm>
3085 <para>
3086 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3087 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3088 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3089 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3090 </para>
3091 <para>
3092 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3093 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3094 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3095 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3096 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3097 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to
3098 <emphasis>pirate</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3099 her anything.
3100 </para>
3101 <indexterm startref="idxmadonna" class='endofrange'/>
3102 <para>
3103 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3104 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3105 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3106 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3107 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3108 to take something for nothing.
3109 </para>
3110 </section>
3111 <section id="cabletv">
3112 <title>Cable TV</title>
3113 <para>
3114
3115 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3116 </para>
3117 <para>
3118 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3119 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3120 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3121 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3122 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3123 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3124 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3125 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3126 give away.
3127 </para>
3128 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3129 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3130 <para>
3131 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3132 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3133 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3134 <!-- f13 -->
3135 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3136 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3137 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3138 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3139 Commission).
3140 </para></footnote>
3141 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3142 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3143 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3144 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3145 <!-- f14 -->
3146 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3147 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3148 </para></footnote>
3149 As another broadcaster put it,
3150 </para>
3151 <blockquote>
3152 <para>
3153 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3154 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3155 paid for.<footnote><para>
3156 <!-- f15 -->
3157 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3158 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3159 </para></footnote>
3160 </para>
3161 </blockquote>
3162 <para>
3163 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3164 </para>
3165 <blockquote>
3166 <para>
3167 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3168 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3169 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3170 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3171 <!-- f16 -->
3172 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3173 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3174 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3175 </para></footnote>
3176 </para>
3177 </blockquote>
3178 <para>
3179 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3180 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3181 compensation."<footnote><para>
3182 <!-- f17 -->
3183 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3184 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3185 </para></footnote>
3186 </para>
3187 <para>
3188 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3189 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3190 </para>
3191 <blockquote>
3192 <para>
3193 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3194 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3195 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3196 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3197
3198 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3199 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3200 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3201 <!-- f18 -->
3202 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3203 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3204 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3205 </para></footnote>
3206 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3207 </para>
3208 </blockquote>
3209 <para>
3210 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3211 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3212 </para>
3213 <para>
3214 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3215 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3216 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3217 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3218 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3219 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3220 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3221 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3222 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3223 created by broadcasters' content.
3224 </para>
3225 <para>
3226 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3227 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3228 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3229 today<footnote><para>
3230 <!-- f19 -->
3231 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, <citetitle>The Engine
3232 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3233 Information</citetitle>, available at
3234 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3235 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3236 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3237 </para></footnote>
3238 &mdash; then <emphasis>every</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3239 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3240 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV. . . . The list is long and
3241 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3242 last. Every generation&mdash;until now.
3243 </para>
3244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3245 </section>
3246 </chapter>
3247 <chapter id="piracy">
3248 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3249 <para>
3250 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3251 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3252 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3253 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3254 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3255 should stop it.
3256 </para>
3257 <para>
3258 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3259 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3260 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3261 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3262 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3263 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3264 has so often done in the past.
3265 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3266 </para>
3267 <section id="piracy-i">
3268 <title>Piracy I</title>
3269 <para>
3270 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3271 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3272 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3273 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3274 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3275 <!-- f1 -->
3276 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), <citetitle>The
3277 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003</citetitle>, July 2003, available
3278 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See
3279 also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk," <citetitle>Financial
3280 Times</citetitle>, 14 February 2003, 11.
3281 </para></footnote>
3282 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3283 estimates that it loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3284 </para>
3285 <para>
3286 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3287 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3288 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3289 This piracy is wrong.
3290 </para>
3291 <para>
3292 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3293 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3294 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3295 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3296 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3297 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3298 of our existence, treated as right.
3299 </para>
3300 <para>
3301 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3302 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3303 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3304 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3305 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3306 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3307 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3308 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3309 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3310 </para>
3311 <para>
3312 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3313 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3315 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3316 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3317 similar childhood.
3318 </para>
3319 <para>
3320 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3321 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3322 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3323 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3324 <!-- f2 -->
3325 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: <citetitle>Who
3326 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3327 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3328 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3329 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3330 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3331 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3332 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3333 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3334 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3335 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3336 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3337 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3338 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3339 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3340 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3341 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3342 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3343 is wrong.
3344 </para>
3345 <para>
3346 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3347 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3348 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3349 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3350 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3351 <!-- f3 -->
3352 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3353 Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3354 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the
3355 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3356 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3357 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3358 pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3359 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3360 </para></footnote>
3361 </para>
3362 <para>
3363 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3364 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3365 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3366 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3367 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3368 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3369 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3370 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3371 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3372 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3373 piracy of the tangible.
3374 </para>
3375 <para>
3376 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3377 property right of a very special sort, it <emphasis>is</emphasis> a
3378 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3379 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3380 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3381 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3382 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3383 give people the right to "take" copyrighted content whether or not the
3384 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3385
3386 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3387 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3388 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3389 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3390 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3391 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3392 </para>
3393 <para>
3394 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3395 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal"
3396 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3397 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3398 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3399 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3400 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3401 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3402 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3403 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3404 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3405 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3406 <indexterm>
3407 <primary>Microsoft</primary>
3408 <secondary>Windows operating system of</secondary>
3409 </indexterm>
3410 <indexterm><primary>Windows</primary></indexterm>
3411 </para>
3412 <para>
3413 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3414 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3415 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3416 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3417 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3418 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3419 </para>
3420 <para>
3421 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3422 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3423 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3424 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3425 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3426 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3427 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3428 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3429 what&mdash;at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3430 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3431 violating the law is still wrong.
3432 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3433 </para>
3434 <para>
3435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3436 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3437 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3438 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3439 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3440 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3441 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3442 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3443 is flat out wrong.
3444 </para>
3445 <para>
3446 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3447 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3448 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3449 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3450 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3451 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3452 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3453 </para>
3454 <para>
3455 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3456 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3457 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3458 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3459 </para>
3460 <para>
3461 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3462 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3463 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3464 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3465 </para>
3466 <para>
3467 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3468 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3469 sharing to survive.
3470 </para>
3471 </section>
3472 <section id="piracy-ii">
3473 <title>Piracy II</title>
3474 <para>
3475 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3476 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3477 <!-- f4 -->
3478 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3479 </para></footnote>
3480 This means we must determine whether
3481 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3483 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3484 author of his profit.
3485 </para>
3486 <para>
3487 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3488 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3489 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3490 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3491 <!-- f5 -->
3492 See Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3493 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle> (New York:
3494 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3495 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3496 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3497 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3498 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3499 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3500
3501 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3502 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3503 put together components that had been developed independently.
3504 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3505 </para>
3506 <para>
3507 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3508 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3509 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3510 system.<footnote><para>
3511 <!-- f6 -->
3512 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," <citetitle>San
3513 Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3514 <citetitle>New Scientist</citetitle>, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3515 Secures New Financing," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 23 May 2003, C1;
3516 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3517 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) <citetitle>Times</citetitle>, 26 July 2002, 18.
3518 </para></footnote>
3519 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3520 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3521 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3522 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3523 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3524 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3525 or your 20,000 best friends.
3526 </para>
3527 <para>
3528 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3529 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3530 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3531 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3532
3533 <!-- f7 -->
3534 See Ipsos-Insight, <citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution</citetitle>
3535 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3536 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3537 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3538 </para></footnote>
3539 A survey by the NPD group quoted in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>
3540 estimated that 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3541 exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3542 <!-- f8 -->
3543 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," <citetitle>New
3544 York Times</citetitle>, 6 June 2003, A1.
3545 </para></footnote>
3546 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3547 massive quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The
3548 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3549 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3550 </para>
3551 <para>
3552 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3553 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3554 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3555 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more
3556 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3557 do&mdash;the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3558 of harm it entails.
3559 </para>
3560 <para>
3561 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3562 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3563 different kinds into four types.
3564 </para>
3565 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3566 <listitem><para>
3567 <!-- A. -->
3568 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3569 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3570 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3571 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3572 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3573 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3574 users who download instead of purchasing.
3575 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
3576 </para></listitem>
3577 <listitem><para>
3578 <!-- B. -->
3579 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3580 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3581 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3582 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3583 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3584 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3585 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3586 music purchased.
3587 </para></listitem>
3588 <listitem><para>
3589 <!-- C. -->
3590 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3591 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3592 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3593 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3594 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3595 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3596 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old
3597 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3598 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3599 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3600 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same
3601 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3602 a local collector.
3603 </para></listitem>
3604 <listitem><para>
3605 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3606 <!-- D. -->
3607 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3608 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3609 wants to give away.
3610 </para></listitem>
3611 </orderedlist>
3612 <para>
3613 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3614 </para>
3615 <para>
3616 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3617 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3618 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3619 harmful.<footnote><para>
3620 <!-- f9 -->
3621 See Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle>, 148&ndash;49.
3622 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3623 </para></footnote>
3624 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3625 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3626 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3627 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3628 answer&mdash;and certainly much more difficult than the current
3629 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3630 </para>
3631 <para>
3632 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3633 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3634 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3635 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3636 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is
3637 "devastating" the industry.
3638 </para>
3639 <para>
3640 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3641 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3642 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3643 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3644 &amp; Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3645 technology, the labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3646 <!-- f10 -->
3647 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, <citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3648 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis</citetitle> (2003), 3. This report
3649 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3650 practice of cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising
3651 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping
3652 is killing music." At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3653 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3654 behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3655 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3656 Assessment, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law</citetitle>,
3657 OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3658 October 1989), 145&ndash;56. </para></footnote>
3659 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3660 when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the industry claimed
3661 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3662 regulating technology was the answer.
3663 </para>
3664 <para>
3665 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3666 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3667 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3668 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3670 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3671 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3672 <!-- f11 -->
3673 U.S. Congress, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying</citetitle>, 4.
3674 </para></footnote>
3675 </para>
3676 <para>
3677 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3678 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3679 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3680 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3681 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3682 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3683 harmful. The question is also <emphasis>how</emphasis> harmful type A
3684 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3685 </para>
3686 <para>
3687 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3688 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3689 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3690 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3691 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3692 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3693 therefore have little <emphasis>static</emphasis> reason to resist
3694 them.
3695
3696 </para>
3697 <para>
3698 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3699 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3700 actually suggest it might be close.
3701 </para>
3702 <para>
3703 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent,
3704 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7
3705 percent.<footnote><para>
3706 <!-- f12 -->
3707 See Recording Industry Association of America, <citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics</citetitle>,
3708 available at
3709 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later
3710 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3711 Association of America, <citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy</citetitle>, 25 June 2003,
3712 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3713 #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3714 have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in to 860 million
3715 units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3716 of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in to $12.6
3717 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3718 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3719 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3720 shipments)."
3721 </para></footnote>
3722 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3723 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3724 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3725 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That no
3726 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3727 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3728 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3729 <!-- f13 -->
3730 <para>
3731 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3732 February 2003, available at
3733 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3734 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3735 </para>
3736 </footnote>
3737 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3738 the decline. As Jane Black of <citetitle>BusinessWeek</citetitle> notes, "The
3739 soundtrack to the film <citetitle>High Fidelity</citetitle> has a list price of
3740 $18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3741 $19.99."<footnote><para>
3742 <!-- f14 -->
3743 Ibid.
3744 </para></footnote>
3745 </para>
3746 <para>
3747
3748 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3749 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3750 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3751 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3752 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3753 although 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3754 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3755 </para>
3756 <para>
3757 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3758 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3759 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between
3760 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own numbers
3761 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3762 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3763 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3764 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of
3765 Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry
3766 would have suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7
3767 percent drop. If 2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3768 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is
3769 a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3770 </para>
3771 <para>
3772 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3773 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3774 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3775 these costs?
3776 </para>
3777 <para>
3778 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that
3779 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3780 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3781 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3782 available.<footnote><para>
3783 <!-- f15 -->
3784 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3785 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3786 Law&mdash;Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3787 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April
3788 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3789 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3790 </para></footnote>
3791 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3792 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3793 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3794 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3795 sense <emphasis>to the company</emphasis> to make it available.
3796 </para>
3797 <para>
3798 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3800 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3801 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3802 today.<footnote><para>
3803 <!-- f16 -->
3804 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3805 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3806 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, <citetitle>The Quiet
3807 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market</citetitle> (2002), available at
3808 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3809 National
3810 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3811 Results,"
3812 available at
3813 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3814 </para></footnote>
3815 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3816 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3817 content, <emphasis>even if the content is still under
3818 copyright</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3819 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3820 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3821 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3822 the content they sell.
3823 </para>
3824 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3825 <para>
3826 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3827 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3828 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3829 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3830 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3831 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3832 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3833 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3834 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3835 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3836 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3837 </para>
3838 <para>
3839 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3840 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3841 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3842 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3843 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3844 shut as well?
3845 </para>
3846 <para>
3847 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3848 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3849 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3850 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3851 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
3852 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3853
3854 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3855 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3856 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3857 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3858 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3859 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3860 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3861 great book!)
3862 </para>
3863 <para>
3864 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3865 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3866 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3867 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3868 </para>
3869 <para>
3870 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3871 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3872 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3873 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3874 unavailable?"
3875 </para>
3876 <para>
3877 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3878 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3879 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
3880 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="pirates"/>, much of
3881 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3882 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3883 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3884 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3885 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3886 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3887 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3888 found only with time.
3889 </para>
3890 <para>
3891 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3892 just what you call type A sharing?"
3893 </para>
3894 <para>
3895 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3896 effect
3897 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3898 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3899 Napster
3900 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3901 developed
3902 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3904 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3905 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3906 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3907 <!-- f17 -->
3908 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3909 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3910 MHP, available at
3911
3912 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an
3913 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
3914 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster</citetitle> (New
3915 York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3916 </para></footnote>
3917 </para>
3918 <para>
3919 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3920 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3921 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3922 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3923 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3924 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3925 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3926 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3927 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3928 </para>
3929 <para>
3930 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3931 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3932 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
3933 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3934 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
3935 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
3936 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3937 </para>
3938 <para>
3939 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3940 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3941 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3942 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
3943 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
3944 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
3945 complained to Congress that their "creative property" was not being
3946 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
3947 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
3948 benefit was enough.
3949 </para>
3950 <para>
3951 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3952 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3953 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3954 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3955 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
3956 price.
3957 </para>
3958 <para>
3959
3960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3961 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3962 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals
3963 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
3964 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
3965 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
3966 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
3967 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
3968 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
3969 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
3970 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
3971 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
3972 Congress chose a path that would assure
3973 <emphasis>compensation</emphasis> without giving the past
3974 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
3975 </para>
3976 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
3977 <para>
3978 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3979 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3980 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3981 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3982 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3983 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3984 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3985 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3986 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3987 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3988 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3989 </para>
3990 <para>
3991 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3992 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3993 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3994 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3995 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
3996 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
3997 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
3998 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
3999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4000 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4001 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4002 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4003 for the architecture it chose.
4004 </para>
4005 <para>
4006 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4007 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4008 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4009 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4010 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4011 copyright."<footnote><para>
4012 <!-- f18 -->
4013 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4014 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4015 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4016 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4017 </para></footnote>
4018 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4019 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4020 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4021 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4022 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4023 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4024 <!-- f19 -->
4025 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4026 </para></footnote>
4027 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4028 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4029 <!-- f20 -->
4030 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4031 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4032 </para></footnote>
4033 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4034 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4035 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4036 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4037 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4038 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4039 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4040 <!-- f21 -->
4041 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4042 of Jack Valenti).
4043 </para></footnote>
4044 </para>
4045 <para>
4046 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4047 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4048 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex
4049 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood
4050 Circuit"&mdash;held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4051 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4052 rule, this totally familiar technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had
4053 called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry" (worse
4054 yet, it was a <emphasis>Japanese</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4055 American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4056 technology.<footnote><para>
4057 <!-- f22 -->
4058 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4059 1981).
4060 </para></footnote>
4061 </para>
4062 <para>
4063 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4064
4065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4066 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4067 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4068 Court wrote,
4069 </para>
4070 <blockquote>
4071 <para>
4072 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4073 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4074 market
4075 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4076 authority
4077 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4078 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4079 implicated
4080 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4081 <!-- f23 -->
4082 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4083 </para></footnote>
4084 </para>
4085 </blockquote>
4086 <para>
4087 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4088 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4089 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4090 enough, this "taking" notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4091 together, a pattern is clear:
4092 </para>
4093
4094 <table id="t1">
4095 <title>Pattern of Court and Congress response</title>
4096 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4097 <thead>
4098 <row>
4099 <entry>CASE</entry>
4100 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4101 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4102 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4103 </row>
4104 </thead>
4105 <tbody>
4106 <row>
4107 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4108 <entry>Composers</entry>
4109 <entry>No protection</entry>
4110 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4111 </row>
4112 <row>
4113 <entry>Radio</entry>
4114 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4115 <entry>N/A</entry>
4116 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4117 </row>
4118 <row>
4119 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4120 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4121 <entry>No protection</entry>
4122 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4123 </row>
4124 <row>
4125 <entry>VCR</entry>
4126 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4127 <entry>No protection</entry>
4128 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4129 </row>
4130 </tbody>
4131 </tgroup>
4132 </table>
4133
4134 <para>
4135 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4136 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4137 <!-- f24 -->
4138 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4139 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4140 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4141 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4142 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4143 1992 (Title 17 of the <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4144 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4145 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4146 Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4147 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4148 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4149 </para></footnote>
4150 In each case, throughout our history,
4151 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4152 work.
4153 </para>
4154 <para>
4155 In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4156 Congress eliminate all free riding. In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of
4157 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4158 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4159 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy."
4160 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4161 the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed some new
4162 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4163 interests at stake.
4164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4165 </para>
4166 <para>
4167 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4168 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4169 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4170 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4171 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4172 regulated?
4173 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4174 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4175 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4176 permission to record a song?
4177 </para>
4178 <para>
4179 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4180 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4181 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4182 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4183 <!-- f25 -->
4184 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
4185 (1984).
4186 </para></footnote>
4187 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4188 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4189 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4190 balancing has historically been done <emphasis>after</emphasis> a
4191 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4192 facilitate the distribution of content.
4193 </para>
4194 <para>
4195 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4196 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4197 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4198 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither
4199 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4200 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4201 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4202 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4203 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4204 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4205 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4206 public interest that innovation continue.
4207 </para>
4208 <para>
4209
4210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4211 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4212 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4213 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4214 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4215 efficient. Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz
4216 writes in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, "could be delayed in the P2P
4217 fight."<footnote><para>
4218 <!-- f26 -->
4219 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4220 Echoes Past Efforts," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 September 2003, C3.
4221 </para></footnote>
4222 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright warriors
4223 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance and
4224 incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content," the
4225 warriors insist, "is our <emphasis>property</emphasis>. Why should we
4226 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4227 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4228 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4229 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4230 arrest him?"
4231 </para>
4232 <para>
4233 "It is <emphasis>our property</emphasis>," the warriors insist. "And
4234 it should be protected just as any other property is protected."
4235 </para>
4236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4237 </section>
4238 </chapter>
4239 </part>
4240 <part id="c-property">
4241 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4242 <partintro>
4243 <para>
4244
4245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4246 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4247 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4248 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4249 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4250 the price she can get.
4251 </para>
4252 <para>
4253 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4254 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4255 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4256 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4257 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4258 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4259 when I take the good <emphasis>idea</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4260 table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4261 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4262 then?
4263 </para>
4264 <para>
4265 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4266 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4267 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4268 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4269 narrow
4270 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4271 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4272 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4273 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4274 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4275 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4276 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4277 <!-- f1 -->
4278 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4279 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</citetitle>, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4280 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4281 </para></footnote>
4282 </para>
4283 <para>
4284 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4285 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4286 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4287 expression
4288 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4289 property.
4290 </para>
4291 <para>
4292 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details,
4293 in other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4294 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4295 "property" in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4296 <!-- f2 -->
4297 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4298 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4299 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4300 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4301 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4302 Adam Mossoff, "What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,"
4303 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review</citetitle> 45 (2003): 373, 429 n. 241.
4304 </para></footnote>
4305 </para>
4306 <para>
4307 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4308 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4309 "copyright material is property" in context. Where did the idea come
4310 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4311 these stories, the significance of this true
4312 statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash; will be a bit
4313 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4314 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4315 </para>
4316 </partintro>
4317
4318 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4319 <chapter id="founders">
4320 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4321 <para>
4322 William Shakespeare wrote <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> in 1595. The play
4323 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4324 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4325 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4326 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4327 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4328 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4329 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare
4330 is so full of clichés."
4331 </para>
4332 <para>
4333 In 1774, almost 180 years after <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> was written, the
4334 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4335 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4336 <!-- f1 -->
4337 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4338 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4339 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to <citetitle>Romeo and
4340 Juliet</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4341 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4342 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4343 Bookseller," <citetitle>American Scholar</citetitle> 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4344 </para></footnote>
4345 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4346 the Conger<footnote><para>
4347 <!-- f2 -->
4348 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle> (Nashville:
4349 Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4350 </para></footnote>
4351 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4352 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of
4353 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4354 that no
4355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4356 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4357 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4358 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4359 </para>
4360 <para>
4361 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4362 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4363 history of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament
4364 adopted the first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4365 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4366 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4367 works already published by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4368 additional years.<footnote><para>
4369 <!-- f3 -->
4370 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4371 "copyright law." See Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 40.
4372 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4373 </para></footnote> Under this law, <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> should have been
4374 free in 1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4375 Tonson's control in 1774?
4376 </para>
4377 <para>
4378 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a "copyright"
4379 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4380 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4381 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4382 expired in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4383 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4384 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4385 that the publishers, or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print
4386 books.
4387 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (1662)</primary></indexterm>
4388 </para>
4389 <para>
4390 There was no <emphasis>positive</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4391 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4392 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4393 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4394 from legislatures "positive law." We call the words from judges
4395 "common law." The common law sets the background against which
4396 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4397 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4398 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4399 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4400 </para>
4401 <para>
4402 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4403 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4404 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4405 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4406
4407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4408 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4409 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4410 ultimately
4411 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4412 </para>
4413 <para>
4414 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book an
4415 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4416 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4417 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4418 copyright "expired," and the work would then be free and could be
4419 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4420 believed.
4421 </para>
4422 <para>
4423 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4424 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4425 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4426 <emphasis>at all?</emphasis>
4427 </para>
4428 <para>
4429 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4430 strong claim. Take <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> as an example: That play
4431 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4432 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4433 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4434 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4435 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4436 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4437 reason is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4438 </para>
4439 <para>
4440 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4441 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4442 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4443 "booksellers."
4444 </para>
4445 <para>
4446 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4447 to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in 1710, it
4448 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4449 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4450 others from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right
4451 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4452 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4453 generally how
4454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4455 a work could be <emphasis>used</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4456 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4457 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4458 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4459 </para>
4460 <para>
4461 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4462 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4463 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4464 permission
4465 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4466 anything,
4467 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4468 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4469 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4470 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4471 </para>
4472 <para>
4473 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4474 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4475 especially
4476 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4477 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4478 monopolies&mdash;especially
4479 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4480 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4481 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4482 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4483 Monopolies,
4484 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4485 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4486 publishing.
4487 </para>
4488 <para>
4489 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4490 naturally
4491 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4492 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4493 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4494 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4495 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4496 specialinterest
4497 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4498 </para>
4499 <para>
4500 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4501 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4502 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4503 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4505
4506 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4507 kind&mdash;tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4508 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4509 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees
4510 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do
4511 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4512 indetted."<footnote><para>
4513
4514 <!-- f4 -->
4515 Philip Wittenberg, <citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4516 Property</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4517 </para></footnote>
4518 </para>
4519 <para>
4520 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4521 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4522 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4523 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4524 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4525 with that idea.
4526 </para>
4527 <para>
4528 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4529 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4530 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4531 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4532 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4533 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4534 compromise
4535 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4536 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4537 construction and spread of culture.
4538 </para>
4539 <para>
4540 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4541 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4542 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4543 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4544 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4545 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4546 they said; they needed more time.
4547 </para>
4548 <para>
4549 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4550 words that echo today,
4551 </para>
4552 <blockquote>
4553 <para>
4554 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4555 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4557 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4558 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4559 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4560 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4561 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4562 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4563 <!-- f5 -->
4564 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4565 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4566 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4567 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4568 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4569 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4570 al., 8, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4571 </para></footnote>
4572 </para>
4573 </blockquote>
4574 <para>
4575 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4576 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4577 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4578 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4579 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4580 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4581 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4582 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4583 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4584 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4585 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4586 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4587 way to protect authors.
4588 </para>
4589 <para>
4590 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4591 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4592 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4593 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4594 rancher has for cattle."<footnote><para>
4595 <!-- f6 -->
4596 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4597 Law Review</citetitle> 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4598 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4599 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4600 </para></footnote>
4601 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4602 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4603 </para>
4604 <para>
4605 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4606 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4607 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4608 <!-- f7 -->
4609 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, <citetitle>Authorship and Copyright</citetitle>
4610 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4611 </para></footnote>
4612 </para>
4613 <para>
4614 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4615 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4616 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4617 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4618 <!-- f8 -->
4619 Mark Rose, <citetitle>Authors and Owners</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4620 1993), 92.
4621 </para></footnote>
4622 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4624 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4625 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4626 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4627 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4628 <!-- f9 -->
4629 Ibid., 93.
4630 </para></footnote>
4631 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4632 </para>
4633 <para>
4634 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4635 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4636 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4637 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4638 Property."<footnote><para>
4639 <!-- f10 -->
4640 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle>, 167 (quoting
4641 Borwell).
4642 </para></footnote>
4643 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4644 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4645 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4646 </para>
4647 <para>
4648 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4649 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4650 the most important early victory being <citetitle>Millar</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Taylor</citetitle>.
4651 </para>
4652 <para>
4653 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4654 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4655 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4656 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4657 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4658 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4659 <!-- f11 -->
4660 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4661 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," <citetitle>Wayne Law Review</citetitle> 29
4662 (1983): 1152.
4663 </para></footnote>
4664 </para>
4665 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4666 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4667 </indexterm>
4668 <para>
4669 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4670 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4671 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4672 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4673 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4674 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4675 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4676 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4677 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4678 </para>
4679 <para>
4680 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4681 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4682 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4683 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4684 with in 1710: How best to limit
4685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4686 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4687 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4688 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4689 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4690 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4691 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4692 </para>
4693 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4694 <para>
4695 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4696 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4697 </para>
4698 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4699 <para>
4700 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4701 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4702 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4703 <!-- f12 -->
4704 Ibid., 1156.
4705 </para></footnote>
4706 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4707 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in <citetitle>Millar</citetitle>,
4708 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4709 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4710 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4711 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4712 </para>
4713 <para>
4714 As few legal cases ever do, <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle> drew an
4715 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4716 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4717 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4718 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4719 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4720 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4721 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4722 </para>
4723 <para>
4724 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4725 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4726 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4727 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4728 House of Lords generally voted.
4729 </para>
4730 <para>
4731 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4732 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4734 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4735 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4736 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4737 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4738 passed into the public domain.
4739 </para>
4740 <para>
4741 "The public domain." Before the case of <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle>
4742 v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4743 England. Before 1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4744 copyrights were perpetual. After 1774, the public domain was
4745 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4746 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4747 history&mdash;including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4748 and Bunyan&mdash;were free of legal restraint.
4749 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4750 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4751 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4752 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4753 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4754 </para>
4755 <para>
4756 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4757 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4758 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4759 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the <citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser</citetitle>
4760 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4761 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4762 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4763 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4764 and illuminations."<footnote><para>
4765 <!-- f13 -->
4766 Rose, 97.
4767 </para></footnote>
4768 </para>
4769 <para>
4770 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4771 equally strong in the opposite direction. The <citetitle>Morning Chronicle</citetitle>
4772 reported:
4773 </para>
4774 <blockquote>
4775 <para>
4776 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4777 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4778 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4779 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4780 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4781 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4782 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4783 successors.<footnote><para>
4784 <!-- f14 -->
4785 Ibid.
4786 </para></footnote>
4787 </para>
4788 </blockquote>
4789 <para>
4790 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4791 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4792 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4793 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4794 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4795 <emphasis>free</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4796 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4797 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4798 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4799 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4800 book from someone. But <emphasis>free</emphasis> in the sense that the
4801 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4802 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4803 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4804 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4805 develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4806 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a <emphasis>competitive
4807 context</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4808 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4809 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4810 </para>
4811 <para>
4812 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4813 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4814 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4815 protected.
4816 </para>
4817 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4818 </chapter>
4819 <chapter id="recorders">
4820 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4821 <para>
4822 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4823 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4824 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4825 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4826 He was their god.)
4827 </para>
4828 <para>
4829 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4830 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4831 today.
4832 </para>
4833 <para>
4834 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4835 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4836 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4837 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4838 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4839 stage.
4840 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4841 </para>
4842 <para>
4843 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4844 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4845 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4846 and the opera company played Wagner, was <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. As Else judged
4847 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4848 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4849 about the scene.
4850 </para>
4851 <para>
4852 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4853 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>.
4854 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4855 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4856 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4857 </para>
4858 <para>
4859 Else called <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4860 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4861 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4862 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4863 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4864 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4865 </para>
4866 <para>
4867 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4868 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4869 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4870 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4871 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4872 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4873 </para>
4874 <para>
4875 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4876 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4877 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4878 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4879 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4880 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot."
4881 </para>
4882 <para>
4883 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4884 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4885 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4886 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4887 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4888 confirm what he had been told.
4889 </para>
4890 <para>
4891 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4892 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4893 clip of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4894 about
4895
4896 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4897 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4898 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4899 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4900 the money."
4901 </para>
4902 <para>
4903 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4904 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4905 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4906 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4907 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4908 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity</citetitle>, from ten years before.
4909 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4910 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The</primary></indexterm>
4911 </para>
4912 <para>
4913 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4914 copyright to <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
4915 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4916 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4917 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4918 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4919 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4920 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4921 says the owner gets to control.
4922 </para>
4923 <para>
4924 For example, "public performance" is a use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> that the
4925 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4926 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4927 Favorite <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4928 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4929 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
4930 by the law.
4931 </para>
4932 <para>
4933 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4934 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4935 <!-- f1 -->
4936 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4937 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4938 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4939 Wake of <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>" (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4940 Law School, 5 August 2003.
4941 </para></footnote>
4942 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>
4943 episode is clearly a fair use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>&mdash;and fair use does
4944 not require the permission of anyone.
4945 </para>
4946 <para>
4947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4948 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4949 </para>
4950 <blockquote>
4951 <para>
4952 The <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4953 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4954 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4955 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4956 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4957 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4958 </para>
4959 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
4960 <listitem><para>
4961 <!-- 1. -->
4962 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4963 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
4964 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
4965 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
4966 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
4967 </para></listitem>
4968 <listitem><para>
4969 <!-- 2. -->
4970 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
4971 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
4972 tracking down and stopping unlicensed <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> usage, just as George
4973 Lucas had a very high profile litigating <citetitle>Star Wars</citetitle> usage. So I decided
4974 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
4975 license to four seconds of <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
4976 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
4977 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
4978 principle.
4979 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George</primary></indexterm>
4980 </para></listitem>
4981 <listitem><para>
4982 <!-- 3. -->
4983 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
4984 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
4985 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
4986 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
4987 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
4988 pockets, me or them.
4989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
4990 </para></listitem>
4991 <listitem><para>
4992 <!-- 4. -->
4993 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
4994 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
4995 money.
4996 </para></listitem>
4997 </orderedlist>
4998 </blockquote>
4999 <para>
5000 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5001 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5002 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5003 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5004 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5005 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5006 </para>
5007 <para>
5008 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5009 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5010 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5011 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5012 not.
5013 </para>
5014 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5015 </chapter>
5016 <chapter id="transformers">
5017 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5018 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5019 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5020 <para>
5021 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5022 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5023 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5024 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5025 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5026 </para>
5027 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5028 <para>
5029 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5030 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5031 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5032 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5033 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5034 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5035 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5036 important to his career.
5037 </para>
5038 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5039 <para>
5040 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5041 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5042 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5043 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5044 </para>
5045 <para>
5046 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5047 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5048 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5049 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5050 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5051 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5052 </para>
5053 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5054 <para>
5055 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5056 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5057 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5058 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5059 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5060 actor's career."
5061 </para>
5062 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5063 <para>
5064 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5065 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5066 </para>
5067 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5068 <para>
5069 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5070 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5071 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5072 for it."<footnote>
5073 <para>
5074 <!-- f1 -->
5075 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5076 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5077 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5078 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5079 <indexterm>
5080 <primary>artists</primary>
5081 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5082 </indexterm>
5083 </para></footnote>
5084 </para>
5085 <para>
5086 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5087 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5088 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5089 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5090 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5091 </para>
5092 <para>
5093 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5094 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5095 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5096 </para>
5097 <blockquote>
5098 <para>
5099 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5100 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5101 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from <citetitle>Dirty
5102 Harry</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5103 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5104 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5105 </para>
5106 <para>
5107 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5108 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5109 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5110 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5111 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5112 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5113 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5114 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5115 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5116 started calling people.
5117 </para>
5118 </blockquote>
5119 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5120 <para>
5121 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5122 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5123 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5124 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5125 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5126 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5127 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5128 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5129 career.
5130 </para>
5131 <para>
5132 It was one <emphasis>year</emphasis> later&mdash;"and even then we
5133 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear."
5134 </para>
5135 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5136 <para>
5137 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5138 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5139 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5140 </para>
5141 <blockquote>
5142 <para>
5143 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5144 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5145 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5146 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5147 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5148 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5149 systematically and cleared the rights.
5150 </para>
5151 </blockquote>
5152 <para>
5153
5154 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5155 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5156 loved it, and it sold very well.
5157 </para>
5158 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5159 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5160 <para>
5161 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5162 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5163 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5164 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5165 at all."<footnote><para>
5166 <!-- f2 -->
5167 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, <citetitle>Seven
5168 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition</citetitle>, available at
5169 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5170 </para></footnote>
5171 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5172 has to be made?
5173 </para>
5174 <para>
5175 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5176 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5177 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5178 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5179 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5180 </para>
5181 <blockquote>
5182 <para>
5183 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5184 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5185 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5186 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5187 compensated for that.
5188 </para>
5189 </blockquote>
5190 <para>
5191 Or at least, is this <emphasis>how</emphasis> the artist should be
5192 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5193 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5194 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5195 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5196 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5197 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5198 made to be more clean?
5199 </para>
5200 <blockquote>
5201 <para>
5202 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5203 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5204 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5205 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5207 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5208 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5209 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5210 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5211 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5212 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5213 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5214 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5215 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5216 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5217 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5218 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5219 </para>
5220 </blockquote>
5221 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5222 <para>
5223 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5224 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5225 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5226 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5227 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5228 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5229 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5230 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5231 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5232 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5233 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5234 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5235 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5236 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5237 "Does this still make sense?"
5238 </para>
5239 <para>
5240 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5241 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5242 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5243 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5244
5245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5246 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5247 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5248 </para>
5249 <para>
5250 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5251 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode.
5252 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5253 judges loved every minute of it.
5254 </para>
5255 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5256 <para>
5257 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5258 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5259 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5260 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5261 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5262 were just violated in this room?"
5263 </para>
5264 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5265 <para>
5266 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5267 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5268 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5269 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5270 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5271 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5272 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5273 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5274 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5275 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5276 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5277 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5278 couldn't easily do them legally.
5279 </para>
5280 <para>
5281 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5282 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5283 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5284 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5285 planted in your presentation.
5286 </para>
5287 <para>
5288 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5289 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5290 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5291 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5292 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5293 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5294 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5295 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5296 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5297 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5298 </para>
5299 <para>
5300 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5301 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5302 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5303 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5304 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5305 </para>
5306 <para>
5307 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5308 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5309 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5310 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5311 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5312 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5313 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5314 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5315 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5316 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5317 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5318 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5319 registers the work.
5320 </para>
5321 <para>
5322 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5323 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5324 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5325 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5326 </para>
5327 <para>
5328 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5329 Myers, the comic genius of <citetitle>Saturday Night Live</citetitle> and
5330 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5331 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5332 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5333 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5334 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5335 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5336 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5337 entertainment."
5338 </para>
5339 <para>
5340 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5341 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5342 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5343 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5344 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5345 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5346 new audiences, it is Mike."
5347 </para>
5348 <para>
5349 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5350 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5351 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5352 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5353 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5354 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5355 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5356 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5357 </para>
5358 <para>
5359 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5360 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5361 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5362 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5363 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5364 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5365 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5366 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5367 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5368 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5369 curse, reserved for the few.
5370 </para>
5371 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5372 </chapter>
5373 <chapter id="collectors">
5374 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5375 <para>
5376 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5377 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5378 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5379 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5380 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5381 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5382 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5383 </para>
5384 <para>
5385 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5386 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5387 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5388 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5389 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5390 well as when those pages changed.
5391 </para>
5392 <para>
5393 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5394 appreciated. In the dystopia described in <citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5395 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5396 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5397 reports.
5398 </para>
5399 <para>
5400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5401 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5402 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5403 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5404 </para>
5405 <para>
5406 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5407 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5408 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5409 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5410 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5411 </para>
5412 <para>
5413 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5414 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5415 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5416 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5417 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5418 <!-- f1 -->
5419 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5420 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5421 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5422 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5423 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5424 </para></footnote>
5425 </para>
5426 <para>
5427 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5428 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5429 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5430 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5431 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5432 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5433 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5434 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5435 truth.
5436 </para>
5437 <para>
5438 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5439 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We <emphasis>all</emphasis>
5440 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5441 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5442 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5443 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5444 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5445 </para>
5446 <para>
5447 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5448 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5449 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5450 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5451 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5452 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5453 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5454 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5455 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5456 </para>
5457 <para>
5458 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5459 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5460 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5461 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5462 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5463 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5464 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5465 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5466 </para>
5467 <para>
5468 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5469 human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5470 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the
5471 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5472 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5473 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5474 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5475 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5476 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5477 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5478 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5479 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5480 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5481 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5482 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5483 </para>
5484 <blockquote>
5485 <para>
5486 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5487 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5488 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5489 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5490 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5491
5492 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5493 <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5494 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5495 </para>
5496 </blockquote>
5497 <para>
5498 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5499 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5500 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5501 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5502 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5503 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5504 </para>
5505 <para>
5506 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5507 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5508 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5509 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5510 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5511 work.
5512 </para>
5513 <para>
5514 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5515 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5516 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5517 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5518 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed
5519 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5520 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5521 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5522 <!-- f2 -->
5523 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5524 the Library of Congress," <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly</citetitle> 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5525 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, <citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5526 Preservation in the United States</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5527 Co., 1992), 36.
5528 </para></footnote>
5529 </para>
5530 <para>
5531 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5532 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5533 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5534 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5535 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5536 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5537 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5538 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5539 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5540 </para>
5541 <para>
5542 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5544 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5545 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5546 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5547 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5548 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5549 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5550 events of that day.
5551 </para>
5552 <para>
5553 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5554 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5555 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5556 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5557 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5558 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5559 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5560 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5561 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5562 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5563 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5564 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5565 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5566 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5567 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5568 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5569 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive</primary></indexterm>
5570 </para>
5571 <para>
5572 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5573 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5574 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5575 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5576 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5577 to find them.
5578 </para>
5579 <para>
5580 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5581 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5582 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5583 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5584 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5585 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5586 </para>
5587 <para>
5588 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5589 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5590 life, if the
5591
5592 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5593 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5594 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5595 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5596 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5597 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5598 </para>
5599 <para>
5600 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5601 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5602 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5603 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5604 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5605 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5606 longer sold.
5607 </para>
5608 <para>
5609 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5610 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5611 <!-- f3 -->
5612 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5613 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>,
5614 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5615 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5616 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," <citetitle>Boston
5617 College Law Review</citetitle> 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5618 </para></footnote>). After
5619 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5620 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5621 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5622 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5623 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5624 </para>
5625 <para>
5626 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5627 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5628 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5629 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5630 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5631 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5632 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5633 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5634 disappears.
5635 </para>
5636 <para>
5637 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5638 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5639 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5640 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5641 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5642 generally, the
5643 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5644 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5645 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5646 little practical effect.
5647 </para>
5648 <para>
5649 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5650 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5651 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5652 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5653 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5654 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5655 </para>
5656 <para>
5657 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5658 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5659 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5660 Kahle describes,
5661 </para>
5662 <blockquote>
5663 <para>
5664 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5665 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5666 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5667 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5668 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5669 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5670 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5671 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5672 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5673 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5674 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5675 </para>
5676 </blockquote>
5677 <para>
5678 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5679 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5680 libraries or archives could be. <emphasis>When</emphasis> the
5681 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5682 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5683 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5684 will draw upon it to understand it;
5685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5686 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5687 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5688 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5689 future <emphasis>for</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5690 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5691 </para>
5692 <para>
5693 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5694 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5695 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5696 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5697 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5698 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5699 </para>
5700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5701 </chapter>
5702 <chapter id="property-i">
5703 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5704 <para>
5705 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5706 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5707 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5708 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5709 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5710 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5711 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5712 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5713 </para>
5714 <para>
5715 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5716 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5717 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5718 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5719 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5720 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5721 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5722 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5723 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5724 Warner Brothers.
5725 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.</primary></indexterm>
5726 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment</primary></indexterm>
5727 <indexterm><primary>MGM</primary></indexterm>
5728 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5729 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox</primary></indexterm>
5730 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5731 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers</primary></indexterm>
5732 </para>
5733 <para>
5734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5735 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5736 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5737 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5738 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5739 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5740 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5741 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5742 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5743 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5744 Washingtonian way.
5745 </para>
5746 <para>
5747 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5748 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5749 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5750 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5751 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5752 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5753 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5754 </para>
5755 <para>
5756 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5757 perfectly:
5758 </para>
5759 <blockquote>
5760 <para>
5761 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5762 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5763 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5764 theme which animates this entire debate: <emphasis>Creative property
5765 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5766 other property owners in the nation</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5767 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5768 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5769 <!-- f1 -->
5770 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5771 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5772 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5773 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5774 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5775 Valenti).
5776 </para></footnote>
5777 </para>
5778 </blockquote>
5779 <para>
5780 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5781 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5782 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5783 this:
5784 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5785 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5786 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5787 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5788 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5789 </para>
5790 <para>
5791 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5792 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5793 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5794 extreme a claim made by <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> who is serious in
5795 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5796 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5797 it comes to the nature and scope of "creative property." His views
5798 have <emphasis>no</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5799 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5800 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5801 </para>
5802 <para>
5803 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5804 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5805 <!-- f2 -->
5806 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5807 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5808 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5809 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5810 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5811 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, <citetitle>Private Property and the
5812 Constitution</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5813 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5814 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5815 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5816 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5817 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5818 in our tradition.
5819 </para>
5820 <para>
5821 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5822 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5823 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5824 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5825 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5826 culture would develop.
5827 </para>
5828 <para>
5829 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5830 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5831 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5832 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5833 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5834 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5835 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5836 the same would be to
5837
5838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5839 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5840 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5841 perfect control.
5842 </para>
5843 <para>
5844 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5845 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5846 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5847 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5848 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5849 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5850 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5851 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5852 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5853 Constitution itself.
5854 </para>
5855 <para>
5856 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5857 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5858 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
5859 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5860 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5861 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5862 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5863 sacred. It cannot <emphasis>ever</emphasis> be taken from the property
5864 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5865 </para>
5866 <para>
5867 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5868 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5869 power to create "creative property," the Constitution
5870 <emphasis>requires</emphasis> that after a "limited time," Congress
5871 take back the rights that it has granted and set the "creative
5872 property" free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
5873 the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your copyright and turns it
5874 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
5875 pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
5876 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5878 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5879 compensation at all.
5880 </para>
5881 <para>
5882 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5883 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5884 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5885 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5886 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5887 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5888 itself.
5889 </para>
5890 <para>
5891 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5892 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5893 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5894 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5895 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5896 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
5897 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5898 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5899 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5900 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5901 </para>
5902 <para>
5903 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5904 least try to understand <emphasis>why</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
5905 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
5906 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
5907 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
5908 domain?
5909 </para>
5910 <para>
5911 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5912 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5913 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5914 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5915 should be at the core of this war: Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis>
5916 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
5917 <emphasis>whether</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
5918 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
5919 ought to be. Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> artists should be paid,
5920 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
5921 also control how culture develops.
5922 </para>
5923 <para>
5924
5925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5926 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5927 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5928 than the narrow language of the law allows. In <citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
5929 Cyberspace</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5930 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5931 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5932 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5933 </para>
5934 <figure id="fig-1331">
5935 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
5936 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
5937 </figure>
5938 <para>
5939 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5940 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5941 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5942 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5943 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5944 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5945 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5946 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5947 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5948 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5949 Web, you can be punished
5950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5951 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5952 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5953 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
5954 </para>
5955 <para>
5956 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5957 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5958 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5959 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5960 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5961 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5962 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5963 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5964 the source of the enforcement.
5965 </para>
5966 <para>
5967 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5968 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5969 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5970 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5971 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5972 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5973 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5974 individual or group might behave.
5975 </para>
5976 <para>
5977 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
5978 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
5979 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
5980 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
5981 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
5982 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
5983 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
5984 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
5985 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
5986 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder
5987 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
5988 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
5989 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
5990 </para>
5991 <para>
5992
5993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
5994 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
5995 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
5996 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
5997 undermined by another.
5998 </para>
5999 <para>
6000 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6001 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6002 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6003 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6004 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6005 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6006 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6007 </para>
6008 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6009 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6010 </indexterm>
6011 <para>
6012 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6013 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6014 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6015 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6016 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6017 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6018 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6019 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6020 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6021 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6022 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6023 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6024 </para>
6025 <para>
6026 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6027 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6028 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6029 <!-- f3 -->
6030 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6031 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6032 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6033 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6034 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Code: And
6035 Other Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6036 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies</citetitle>,
6037 June 1998.
6038 </para></footnote>
6039 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6040 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6041 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6042 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6043 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6044 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6045 used to require that other laws be more
6046 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6047 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6048 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6049 driving.
6050 </para>
6051 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6052
6053 <figure id="fig-1361">
6054 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6055 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6056 </figure>
6057 <para>
6058 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6059 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6060 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6061 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6062 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6063 another.<footnote>
6064 <para>
6065 <!-- f4 -->
6066 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6067 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6068 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6069 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6070 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6071 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6072 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6073 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6074 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6075 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6076 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6077 of liberty. As I argued in <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, we come from a long tradition of
6078 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6079 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6080 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6081 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, <citetitle>On Liberty</citetitle> (Indiana:
6082 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6083 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6084 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6085 J. Samuels, eds., <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays</citetitle> (London:
6086 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6087 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6088 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6089 places easier; 42 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6090 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6091 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6092 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6093 of these groups might face.
6094 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6095 </para></footnote>
6096 </para>
6097 <section id="hollywood">
6098 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6099 <para>
6100 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6101 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6102 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6103 rallying makes sense.
6104 </para>
6105 <para>
6106 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6107 Internet:
6108 </para>
6109 <figure id="fig-1371">
6110 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6111 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6112 </figure>
6113 <para>
6114 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6115 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6116 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6117 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6118 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6119 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6120 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6121 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6122 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6123 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6124 this form of infringement.
6125 </para>
6126 <para>
6127 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6128 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6129 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6130 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6131 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6132 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6133 </para>
6134 <para>
6135 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6136 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6137 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6138 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6139 Iraq
6140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6141 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6142 looting that results.
6143 </para>
6144 <figure id="fig-1381">
6145 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6146 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6147 </figure>
6148 <para>
6149 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6150 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6151 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6152 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6153 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6154 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6155 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6156 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6157 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6158 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6159 </para>
6160 <para>
6161 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6162 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6163 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6164 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6165 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6166 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6167 life. Homeowners living in a
6168
6169 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6170 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6171 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6172 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6173 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6174 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6175 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6176 </para>
6177 <para>
6178 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6179 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6180 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6181 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6182 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6183 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6184 </para>
6185 <para>
6186 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6187 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6188 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6189 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6190 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6191 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6192 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6193 <!-- f5 -->
6194 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6195 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6196 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6197 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6198 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6199 October 2003, available at
6200 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6201 </para></footnote>
6202
6203 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6204 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6205 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6206 <emphasis>for the purpose of</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6207 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6208 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring
6209 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6210 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6211 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6212 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6213 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6214 </para>
6215 <para>
6216 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6217 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6218 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6220 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6221 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6222 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6223 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6224 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6225 <!-- f6 -->
6226 Fred Warshofsky, <citetitle>The Patent Wars</citetitle> (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6227 </para></footnote>
6228 And relative to a
6229 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6230 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6231 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6232 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6233 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6234 Brezhnev.
6235 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6236 </para>
6237 <para>
6238 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6239 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6240 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6241 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6242 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6243 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6244 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6245 opportunities for innovation and change.
6246 </para>
6247 <para>
6248 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6249 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6250 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6251 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6252 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6253 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6254 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6255 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6256 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6257 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6258 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6259 regulation is justified.
6260 </para>
6261 <para>
6262 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6264 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6265 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6266 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6267 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6268 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6269 </para>
6270 <para>
6271 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6272 </para>
6273 <indexterm id="idxddt" class='startofrange'>
6274 <primary>DDT</primary>
6275 </indexterm>
6276 <para>
6277 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6278 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6279 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6280 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6281 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6282 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann</primary></indexterm>
6283 </para>
6284 <para>
6285 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6286 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6287 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6288 </para>
6289 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6290 <para>
6291 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published <citetitle>Silent Spring</citetitle>, which argued that
6292 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6293 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6294 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6295 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6296 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6297 </para>
6298 <para>
6299 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6300 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6301 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6302 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6303 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6304 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6305 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6306 </para>
6307 <para>
6308 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6309 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6310 culture.<footnote><para>
6311 <!-- f7 -->
6312 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6313 Environmentalism for the Net?" <citetitle>Duke Law Journal</citetitle> 47 (1997): 87.
6314 </para></footnote>
6315 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6316 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6317 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6318 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6319 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6320 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6322 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6323 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6324 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6325 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6326 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6327 </para>
6328 <para>
6329 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6330 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6331 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6332 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6333 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6334 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6335 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6336 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6337 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6338 </para>
6339 <para>
6340 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6341 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6342 be lost.
6343 </para>
6344 <indexterm startref="idxddt" class='endofrange'/>
6345 </section>
6346 <section id="beginnings">
6347 <title>Beginnings</title>
6348 <para>
6349 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6350 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6351 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6352 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6353 </para>
6354 <para>
6355 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6356 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6357 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6358 </para>
6359 <para>
6360 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6361 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6362 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6363
6364 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6365 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6366 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6367 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power
6368 <emphasis>to promote progress</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6369 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6370 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6371 </para>
6372 <para>
6373 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6374 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="founders"/>,
6375 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6376 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6377 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6378 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6379 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6380 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6381 </para>
6382 <para>
6383 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6384 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6385 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6386 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6387 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6388 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6389 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6390 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6391 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6392 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6393 case, a <emphasis>structure</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6394 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6395 concentrations of power.
6396 </para>
6397 <para>
6398 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6399 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6400 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6401 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6402 years since they first struck its design.
6403 </para>
6404 <para>
6405 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6406 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6408 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6409 started here:
6410 </para>
6411 <figure id="fig-1441">
6412 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6413 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6414 </figure>
6415 <para>
6416 We will end here:
6417 </para>
6418 <figure id="fig-1442">
6419 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6420 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6421 </figure>
6422 <para>
6423 Let me explain how.
6424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6425 </para>
6426 </section>
6427 <section id="lawduration">
6428 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6429 <para>
6430 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6431 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6432 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6433 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6434 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6435 authorship.<footnote>
6436 <para>
6437 <!-- f8 -->
6438 William W. Crosskey, <citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6439 the United States</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6440 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6441 Law of the Land,' <emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6442 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law</emphasis>"
6443 (emphasis added).
6444 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6445 </para></footnote>
6446 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6447 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6448 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6449 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6450 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6451 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6452 </para>
6453 <para>
6454 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6455 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6456 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6457 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6458 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6459 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6460 </para>
6461 <para>
6462 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6463 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6464 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6465 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6466 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6467 </para>
6468 <para>
6469 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6470 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6471 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6472 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6473 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6474 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6475 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6476 <!-- f9 -->
6477 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6478 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <citetitle>A
6479 History of Book Publishing in the United States</citetitle>, vol. 1, <citetitle>The Creation
6480 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6481 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6482 1790 act; William J. Maher, <citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6483 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context</citetitle>, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6484 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6485 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6486 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6487 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6488 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6489 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6490 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6491 </para>
6492 <para>
6493 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6494 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6496 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6497 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6498 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6499 copyright, either.
6500 </para>
6501 <para>
6502 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6503 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6504 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6505 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6506 domain.<footnote><para>
6507 <!-- f10 -->
6508 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6509 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6510 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6511 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6512 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright</citetitle>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6513 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6514 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6515 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6516 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6517 </para>
6518 <para>
6519 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6520 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6521 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6522 <!-- f11 -->
6523 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6524 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6525 no longer <emphasis>effectively</emphasis> controlled by
6526 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6527 is to sell the books as used books; that use&mdash;because it does not
6528 involve publication&mdash;is effectively free.
6529 </para>
6530 <para>
6531 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6532 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6533 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6534 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6535 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6536 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6537 </para>
6538 <para>
6539 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6540 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6541 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6542 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6543 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6544 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6545 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6546 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6547 </para>
6548 <para>
6549 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6550 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6551 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6552 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6553
6554 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6555 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6556 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6557 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6558 </para>
6559 <para>
6560 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6561 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6562 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6563 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6564 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6565 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6566 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6567 value.
6568 </para>
6569 <para>
6570 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6571 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6572 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6573 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6574 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6575 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6576 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6577 was ninety-five years.
6578 </para>
6579 <para>
6580 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6581 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6582 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6583 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6584 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6585 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6586 them.
6587 </para>
6588 <para>
6589 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6590 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6591 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6592 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6593 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6594 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6595 years.<footnote><para>
6596 <!-- f12 -->
6597 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6598 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6599 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6600 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6601 </para></footnote>
6602 </para>
6603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6604 </section>
6605 <section id="lawscope">
6606 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6607 <para>
6608 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6609 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6610 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6611 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6612 </para>
6613 <para>
6614 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6615 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6616 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6617 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6618 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6619 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6620 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6621 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6622 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6623 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6624 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6625 </para>
6626 <para>
6627 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6628 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6629 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6630 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6631 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6632 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6633 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6634 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6635 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6636 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6637 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6638 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6639 on the initial creative work.
6640 </para>
6641 <para>
6642 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6643 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6644 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6646 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6647 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6648 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6649 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6650 famous &copy; or the word <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>. And for most
6651 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6652 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6653 secured.
6654 </para>
6655 <para>
6656 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6657 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6658 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6659 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6660 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6661 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6662 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6663 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6664 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6665 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6666 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6667 original author.
6668 </para>
6669 <para>
6670 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6671 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6672 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6673 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6674 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6675 copy available for others to copy.
6676 </para>
6677 <para>
6678 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6679 differences.
6680 </para>
6681 <para>
6682 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6683 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6684 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6685 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6686 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6687 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6688 <!-- f13 -->
6689 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6690 Creation of American Literature," 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6691 International Law and Politics</citetitle> 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6692 Federal Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6693
6694 </para></footnote>
6695 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6696 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6697 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6698 </para>
6699 <para>
6700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6701 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6702 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6703 was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6704 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6705 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6706 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6707 were restrained.
6708 </para>
6709 <para>
6710 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6711 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6712 every note to your spouse, every doodle, <emphasis>every</emphasis>
6713 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is
6714 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6715 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6716 protect it.
6717 </para>
6718 <para>
6719 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6720 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6721 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6722 </para>
6723 <para>
6724 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6725 control
6726 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6727 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6728 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6729 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6730 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6731 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6732 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6733 exclusive
6734 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6735 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6736 </para>
6737 <para>
6738 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6739 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6740 expansion
6741 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6742 copyright.
6743 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6744 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6745 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6746 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6747 </para>
6748 <para>
6749 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6750 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6751 within a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you
6752 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6753 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6754 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6755 <emphasis>that</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6756 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6757 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6758 not protect derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6759 <!-- f14 -->
6760 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," <citetitle>Legal Affairs</citetitle>, July/August
6761 2003, available at
6762 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6763 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
6764 </para></footnote>
6765 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6766 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6767 the wrong of direct piracy.
6768 </para>
6769 <para>
6770 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6771 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6772 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6773 of my book.<footnote><para>
6774 <!-- f15 -->
6775 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6776 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6777 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and
6778 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination:
6779 Copyright's Constitutionality," <citetitle>Yale Law Journal</citetitle> 112 (2002):
6780 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6781 </para></footnote>
6782 These two different uses of my creative work are
6783 treated the same.
6784 </para>
6785 <para>
6786 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6787 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6788 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6789 creates
6790 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6791 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6792 originally created?
6793 </para>
6794 <para>
6795 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6796 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6797 simply
6798 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6799 rights originally granted.
6800 </para>
6801 </section>
6802 <section id="lawreach">
6803 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6804 <para>
6805 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6806 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6807 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6808 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6809 <!-- f16 -->
6810 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
6811 certainly regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a
6812 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
6813 per se doesn't make a copy; 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6814 106(4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17
6815 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 112(a). But the presumption under the
6816 existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6817 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6818 </para></footnote>
6819 </para>
6820 <para>
6821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6822 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
6823 <emphasis>copy</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
6824 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative
6825 property" deserves the "same rights" as all other property, it is the
6826 <emphasis>obvious</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
6827 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
6828 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
6829 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
6830 copies should <emphasis>not</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
6831 law. More precisely, they should not <emphasis>always</emphasis> be
6832 the trigger for copyright law.
6833 </para>
6834 <para>
6835 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6836 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6837 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6838 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6839 <!-- f17 -->
6840 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6841 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6842 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6843 basis
6844 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6845 </para></footnote>
6846 because it is clear that the
6847 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6848 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6849 </para>
6850 <para>
6851 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6852 empty circle.
6853 </para>
6854 <figure id="fig-1521">
6855 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6856 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6857 </figure>
6858 <para>
6859 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6860 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6861 all its potential <emphasis>uses</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
6862 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
6863 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
6864 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
6865 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
6866 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
6867 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
6868 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
6869 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
6870 acts do not make a copy.
6871 </para>
6872 <figure id="fig-1531">
6873 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6874 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6875 </figure>
6876 <para>
6877 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6878 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6879 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6880 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6881 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6882 diagram on next page).
6883 </para>
6884 <para>
6885 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6886 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6887 </para>
6888 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6889 <figure id="fig-1541">
6890 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6891 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6892 </figure>
6893 <para>
6894 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6895 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6896 unregulated.
6897 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6898 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6899 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6900 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6901 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6902 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6903 </para>
6904 <figure id="fig-1542">
6905 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6906 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6907 </figure>
6908 <para> </para>
6909 <figure id="fig-1551">
6910 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6911 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
6912 </figure>
6913 <para>
6914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6915 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6916 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
6917 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6918 </para>
6919 <para>
6920 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
6921 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
6922 <!-- f18 -->
6923 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6924 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6925 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6926 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6927 </para></footnote>
6928 And because of this single,
6929 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6930 category
6931 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6932 unregulated
6933 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6934 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6935 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6936 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
6937 category
6938 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6939 copyrighted
6940 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
6941 burden of this shift.
6942 </para>
6943 <para>
6944 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6945 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
6946 be no plausible <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>-related argument that
6947 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
6948 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
6949 the book once, ten times, or every
6950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6951 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
6952 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6953 produced
6954 a copy.
6955 </para>
6956 <para>
6957 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
6958 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6959 only once or only once a month, then <emphasis>copyright
6960 law</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
6961 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
6962 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
6963 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
6964 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
6965 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
6966 copyright owner's wish.
6967 </para>
6968 <para>
6969 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6970 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6971 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6972 points also become clear:
6973 </para>
6974 <para>
6975 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6976 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6977 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6978 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
6979 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
6980 part of free culture before the Internet.
6981 </para>
6982 <para>
6983 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
6984 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
6985 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
6986 <emphasis>any</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
6987 using a machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become
6988 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
6989 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
6990 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
6991 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
6992 creative work.
6993 </para>
6994 <para>
6995 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
6996
6997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
6998 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
6999 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7000 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7001 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7002 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7003 Internet,
7004 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7005 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7006 protected
7007 before because reading was not regulated.
7008 </para>
7009 <para>
7010 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7011 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7012 depend upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question
7013 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7014 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7015 <emphasis>unregulated</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7016 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7017 enough.
7018 </para>
7019 <para>
7020 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7021 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7022 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7023 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7024 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7025 </para>
7026 <para>
7027 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7028 began
7029 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7030 previews.
7031 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7032 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7033 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7034 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7035 before
7036 you bought it.
7037 </para>
7038 <para>
7039 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7040 distributors
7041 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7042 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7043 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7044 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7045 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7046 business
7047 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7048 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7049 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7050 immediately.
7051 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7052 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7053 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7054 </para>
7055 <para>
7056 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7057 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7058 infringed"
7059 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7060 willful
7061 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7062 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7063 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7064 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7065 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7066 </para>
7067 <para>
7068 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7069 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7070 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7071 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7072 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7073 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7074 Disney's permission.
7075 </para>
7076 <para>
7077 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7078 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7079 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7080 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7081 was in the marketplace, the "first-sale doctrine" would free the
7082 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7083 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7084 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7085 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7086 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7087 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7088 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7089 </para>
7090 <para>
7091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7092 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7093 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the
7094 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7095 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7096 abuse. If Barnes &amp; Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7097 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7098 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7099 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7100 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7101 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7102 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7103 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7104 happening are quite slight.
7105 </para>
7106 <para>
7107 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7108 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7109 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7110 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7111 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7112 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7113 </para>
7114 </section>
7115 <section id="lawforce">
7116 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7117 <para>
7118 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7119 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7120 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7121 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7122 </para>
7123 <para>
7124 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7125 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7126 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7127 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7128 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7129 your freedom.
7130 </para>
7131 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7132 <indexterm id="idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7133 <primary>Marx Brothers</primary>
7134 </indexterm>
7135 <indexterm id="idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7136 <primary>Warner Brothers</primary>
7137 </indexterm>
7138 <para>
7139 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7140 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7142 <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7143 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7144 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7145 plan.<footnote><para>
7146 <!-- f19 -->
7147 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," <citetitle>Law and
7148 Contemporary Problems</citetitle> 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7149 </para></footnote>
7150 </para>
7151 <para>
7152 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7153 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7154 you were."<footnote><para>
7155 <!-- f20 -->
7156 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and
7157 Copywrongs</citetitle>, 1&ndash;3.
7158 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
7159 </para></footnote>
7160 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7161 <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7162 trying to control <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>, then the Marx
7163 Brothers would insist on control over <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>.
7164 </para>
7165 <para>
7166 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7167 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7168 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7169 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7170 </para>
7171 <para>
7172 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7173 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7174 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7175 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7176 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7177 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7178 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7179 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7180 </para>
7181 <indexterm startref="idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7182 <indexterm startref="idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7183
7184 <indexterm id="idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'>
7185 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader</primary>
7186 </indexterm>
7187 <para>
7188 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7189 </para>
7190 <para>
7191 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7192 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7193 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7194 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7195 technology.
7196 </para>
7197 <para>
7198 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7199 Reader.
7200 </para>
7201 <para>
7202 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7203 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7204 public domain: <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, for example, is in
7205 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7206 public domain: My own book <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
7207 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7208 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7209 copy of
7210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7211 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7212 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7213 </para>
7214 <figure id="fig-1611">
7215 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7216 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7217 </figure>
7218 <para>
7219 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7220 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7221 </para>
7222 <figure id="fig-1612">
7223 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7224 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7225 </figure>
7226 <para>
7227 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7228 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7229 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7230 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7231 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7232 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>
7233 read aloud through the computer.
7234 </para>
7235 <para>
7236 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7237 translation): Aristotle's <citetitle>Politics</citetitle>.
7238 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle</primary></indexterm>
7239 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics</citetitle>, (Aristotle)</primary></indexterm>
7240 </para>
7241 <figure id="fig-1621">
7242 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7243 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7244 </figure>
7245 <para>
7246 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7247 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7248 the book.
7249 </para>
7250 <figure id="fig-1622">
7251 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7252 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7253 </figure>
7254 <para>
7255 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7256 original e-book version of my last book, <citetitle>The Future of
7257 Ideas</citetitle>:
7258 </para>
7259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7260 <figure id="fig-1631">
7261 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7262 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7263 </figure>
7264 <para>
7265 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7266 </para>
7267 <para>
7268 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7269 "permissions"&mdash; as if the publisher has the power to control how
7270 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7271 certainly does have the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright
7272 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7273 power.<footnote><para>
7274 <!-- f21 -->
7275 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7276 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7277 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7278 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7279 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7280 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7281 subsequently acquired the book.
7282 </para></footnote>
7283 When my e-book of <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> says I have the
7284 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7285 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7286 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7287 control that the law would enable.
7288 </para>
7289 <para>
7290 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7291 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7292 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us
7293 deal with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till
7294 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7295 till 2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7296 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7297 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7298 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7299 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7300 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7301 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7302 aloud&mdash;it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7303 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7304 won't read aloud.
7305 </para>
7306 <para>
7307 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7308 These are <emphasis>controls</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7309 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7310 you tried to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the
7311 sentence.
7312 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers</primary></indexterm>
7313 </para>
7314 <para>
7315 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7316 <emphasis>law</emphasis> as copyright <emphasis>code</emphasis>. The
7317 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7318 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7319 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7320 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7321 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7322 </para>
7323 <para>
7324 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7325 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7326 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7327 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7328 to defeat these protections as well?
7329 </para>
7330 <para>
7331 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7332 eBook Reader.
7333 </para>
7334 <para>
7335 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7336 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7337 on the Adobe site was a copy of <citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7338 Wonderland</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7339 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7340 following report:
7341 </para>
7342 <figure id="fig-1641">
7343 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7344 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7345 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7346 </figure>
7347 <para>
7348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7349 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7350 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7351 "permissions" indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7352 </para>
7353 <para>
7354 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7355 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7356 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7357 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7358 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7359 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7360 </para>
7361 <para>
7362 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7363 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7364 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7365 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7366 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7367 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7368 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7369 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7370 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7371 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7372 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7373 </para>
7374 <para>
7375 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7376 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7377 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7378 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7379 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7380 often crazy.
7381 </para>
7382 <indexterm startref="idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'/>
7383 <para>
7384 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7385 story of mine that makes the same point.
7386 </para>
7387 <indexterm id="idxaibo" class='startofrange'>
7388 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7389 </indexterm>
7390 <para>
7391 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7392 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7393 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7394 </para>
7395 <para>
7396 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7397 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7398 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7399 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7400 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7401 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7402 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7403 </para>
7404 <para>
7405 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7406 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7407 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7408 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7409 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7410 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7411 </para>
7412 <para>
7413 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7414 word <citetitle>hack</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7415 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7416 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, <citetitle>hack</citetitle> is a much
7417 more positive term. <citetitle>Hack</citetitle> just means code that enables the program to
7418 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7419 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7420 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7421 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7422 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7423 </para>
7424 <para>
7425 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7426 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7427 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7428 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7429 ethically.
7430 </para>
7431 <para>
7432 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7433 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7434 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7435 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7436 than Sony had built.
7437 </para>
7438 <indexterm startref="idxaibo" class='endofrange'/>
7439 <para>
7440 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7441 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7442 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7443 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7444 the
7445
7446 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7447 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7448 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7449 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7450 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7451 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7452 thought, <emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7453 a robot dog to dance?</emphasis>
7454 </para>
7455 <para>
7456 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7457 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7458 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7459 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7460 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7461 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7462 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7463 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7464 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7465 </para>
7466 <para>
7467 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7468 <!-- f22 -->
7469 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7470 <citetitle>Science</citetitle> 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7471 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," <citetitle>American Prospect</citetitle>,
7472 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7473 DMCA," <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter</citetitle>, 11 December 2001; Bill
7474 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," <citetitle>Billboard</citetitle>,
7475 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7476 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7477 Questions about <citetitle>Felten and USENIX</citetitle> v. <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> Legal Case," available at
7478 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7479 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7480 </para></footnote>
7481 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7482 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7483 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7484 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7485 </para>
7486 <para>
7487 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7488 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7489 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7490 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7491 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7492 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7493 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7494 Internet much more.
7495 </para>
7496 <para>
7497 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7498 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7499 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7500 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7501 </para>
7502 <para>
7503 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7504 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7505 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7506 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7507 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7508 </para>
7509 <para>
7510 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7511 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7512 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7513 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7514 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7515 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7516 </para>
7517 <para>
7518 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7519 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7520 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7521 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7522 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7523 constituted, succeed.
7524 </para>
7525 <para>
7526 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7527 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7528 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7529 wrote:
7530 </para>
7531 <blockquote>
7532 <para>
7533 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7534 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7535 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7536 </para>
7537 </blockquote>
7538 <para>
7539 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7540 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7541 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7542 </para>
7543 <blockquote>
7544 <para>
7545 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7547 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7548 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7549 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7550 </para>
7551 </blockquote>
7552 <para>
7553 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7554 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7555 spreading such information an offense.
7556 </para>
7557 <para>
7558 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7559 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7560 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7561 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7562 technologies&mdash; technologies to control the replication and
7563 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7564 <emphasis>code</emphasis> to modify the original
7565 <emphasis>code</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7566 protection for copyright owners.
7567 </para>
7568 <para>
7569 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7570 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7571 <emphasis>legal code</emphasis> intended to buttress
7572 <emphasis>software code</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7573 support the <emphasis>legal code of copyright</emphasis>.
7574 </para>
7575 <para>
7576 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7577 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7578 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7579 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7580 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7581 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7582 have been a copyright violation.
7583 </para>
7584 <para>
7585 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7586 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7587 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7588 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7589 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7590 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7591 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7592 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7593 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7594 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7595 </para>
7596 <para>
7597 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7598 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7599 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7600 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7601 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7602 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7603 </para>
7604 <para>
7605 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7606 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7607 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7608 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7609 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7610 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "<citetitle>Mr. Rogers</citetitle>," for example, had
7611 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7612 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7613 </para>
7614 <blockquote>
7615 <para>
7616 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7617 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7618 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7619 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7620 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7621 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7622 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7623 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7624 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7625 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7626 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7627 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7628 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7629 important.<footnote><para>
7630 <!-- f23 -->
7631 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
7632 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7633 James Lardner, <citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7634 the VCR</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7635 </para></footnote>
7636 </para>
7637 </blockquote>
7638 <para>
7639 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7640 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7641 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7642 the VCR responsible.
7643 </para>
7644 <para>
7645 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7646 the DMCA.
7647 </para>
7648 <para>
7649 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7650 </para>
7651 <para>
7652 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7653 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7654 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7655 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7656 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7657 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7658 </para>
7659 <para>
7660 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7661 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7662 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7663 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7664 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7665 and bad uses.
7666 </para>
7667 <figure id="fig-1711">
7668 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7669 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7670 </figure>
7671 <para>
7672 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7673 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7674 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: <emphasis>No one ever
7675 died from copyright circumvention</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7676 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7677 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7678 </para>
7679 <para>
7680 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7681 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7682 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7683 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7684 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7685 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7686 </para>
7687 <para>
7688 This is how <emphasis>code</emphasis> becomes
7689 <emphasis>law</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7690 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7691 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7692 law&mdash;increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7693 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7694 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7695 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect&mdash;at
7696 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7697 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7698 </para>
7699 <para>
7700 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7701 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7702 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7703 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7704 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7705 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7706 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7707 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7708 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7709 </para>
7710 <para>
7711
7712 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7713 For example, imagine you were part of a <citetitle>Star Trek</citetitle> fan club. You
7714 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7715 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7716 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7717 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7718 <!-- f24 -->
7719 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7720 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7721 Entertainment Law Journal</citetitle> 17 (1997): 651.
7722 </para></footnote>
7723 </para>
7724 <para>
7725 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7726 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7727 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7728 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7729 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7730 </para>
7731 <para>
7732 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7733 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7734 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7735 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7736 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7737 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7738 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7739 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7740 </para>
7741 <para>
7742 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7743 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7744 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7745 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7746 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7747 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7748 </para>
7749 </section>
7750 <section id="marketconcentration">
7751 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7752 <para>
7753 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7754 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7755 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7756 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7757 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7758 find better ways
7759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7760 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7761 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7762 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7763 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7764 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7765 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7766 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7767 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7768 control.
7769 </para>
7770 <para>
7771 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7772 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7773 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7774 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7775 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7776 </para>
7777 <para>
7778 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7779 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7780 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7781 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7782 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7783 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7784 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7785 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7786 of the media.
7787 </para>
7788 <para>
7789 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7790 nature.
7791 </para>
7792 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7793 <para>
7794 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7795 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7796 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7797 <!-- f25 -->
7798 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7799 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7800 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7801 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7802 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7803 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7804 <!-- f26 -->
7805 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7806 Slide," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 23 December 2002.
7807 </para></footnote>
7808 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7809 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7810 <!-- f27 -->
7811 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," <citetitle>Charleston Gazette</citetitle>,
7812 31 May 2003.
7813 </para></footnote>
7814 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John</primary></indexterm>
7815 </para>
7816 <para>
7817 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7818 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7819 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7820 seventy-five stations. Today <emphasis>one</emphasis> company owns
7821 more than 1,200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
7822 total number of radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most
7823 markets, the two largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that
7824 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of
7825 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
7826 </para>
7827 <para>
7828 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7829 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7830 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7831 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7832 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7833 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7834 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7835 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7836 protected&mdash; by the market.
7837 </para>
7838 <para>
7839 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7840 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7841 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7842 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7843 </para>
7844 <blockquote>
7845 <para>
7846 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7847 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7848 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7849 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7850 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7851 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7852 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7853 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7854 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7855 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7856 <!-- f28 -->
7857 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly</citetitle> (September
7858 2003): 89.
7859 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7860 </para></footnote>
7861 </para>
7862 </blockquote>
7863 <para>
7864 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7865 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7866 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7867 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7868 </para>
7869 <figure id="fig-1761">
7870 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7871 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7872 </figure>
7873 <para>
7874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7875 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7876 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7877 distribute content?
7878 </para>
7879 <para>
7880 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7881 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7882 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7883 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7884 </para>
7885 <para>
7886 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7887 integration may matter.
7888 </para>
7889 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7890 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7891 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7892 <para>
7893 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle>. He took
7894 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7895 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7896 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7897 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7898 </para>
7899 <para>
7900 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7901 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7902 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7903 control.<footnote><para>
7904 <!-- f29 -->
7905 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7906 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7907 Missouri,
7908 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7909 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7910 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7911 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7912 </para></footnote>
7913 </para>
7914 <para>
7915
7916 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7917 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7918 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7919 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7920 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
7921 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7922 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the
7923 networks.
7924 </para>
7925 <para>
7926 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7927 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
7928 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7929 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In 1992,
7930 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7931 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7932 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16
7933 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7934 year there was one."<footnote><para>
7935 <!-- f30 -->
7936 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7937 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
7938 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7939 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7940 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7941 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7942 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
7943 2003.
7944 </para></footnote>
7945 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7946 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
7947 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7948 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7949 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7950 63%."<footnote><para>
7951 <!-- f31 -->
7952 Ibid.
7953 </para></footnote>
7954 </para>
7955 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7956 <para>
7957 Today, another Norman Lear with another <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle> would
7958 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7959 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7960 owned by the network.
7961 </para>
7962 <para>
7963 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7964 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7965 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7966 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry</primary></indexterm>
7967 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill</primary></indexterm>
7968 </para>
7969 <blockquote>
7970 <para>
7971 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7972 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7973 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7974 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7975 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7976 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7977 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7978 handful.<footnote><para>
7979 <!-- f32 -->
7980 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers</citetitle>, Bill
7981 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
7982 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
7983 </para></footnote>
7984 </para>
7985 </blockquote>
7986 <para>
7987 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
7988 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
7989 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
7990 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
7991 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
7992 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
7993 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
7994 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
7995 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
7996 democracy.
7997 </para>
7998 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
7999 <para>
8000 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8001 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8002 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8003 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8004 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8005 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8006 <!-- f33 -->
8007 Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8008 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle>
8009 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
8010 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8011 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8012 Concepts in Technological Evolution," <citetitle>Research Policy</citetitle> 14 (1985):
8013 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8014 Kaplan, <citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8015 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them</citetitle>
8016 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
8017
8018 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8019 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8020 sprinting.
8021 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8022 </para>
8023 <para>
8024 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8025 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8026 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8027 measure.
8028 </para>
8029 <para>
8030 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8031 suggest the concern.
8032 </para>
8033 <para>
8034 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8035 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8036 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8037 </para>
8038 <para>
8039 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8040 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8041 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8042
8043 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8044 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8045 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8046 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8047 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8048 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8049 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8050 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8051 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8052 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8053 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8054 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8055 outweigh these costs.
8056 </para>
8057 <para>
8058 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8059 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8060 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8061 these issues.
8062 </para>
8063 <para>
8064 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8065 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8066 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8067 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8068 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8069 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8070 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8071 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8072 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8073 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8074 </para>
8075 <para>
8076 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8077 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8078 </para>
8079 <para>
8080 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8081 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8082 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8083 war. Can you do it?
8084 </para>
8085 <para>
8086 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8088 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8089 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8090 message will be heard then?
8091 </para>
8092 <para>
8093 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8094 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8095 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8096 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8097 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8098 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8099 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8100 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8101 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8102 <!-- f34 -->
8103 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8104 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8105 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8106 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8107 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8108 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8109 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8110 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8111 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8112 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," <citetitle>New
8113 York Times</citetitle>, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8114 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8115 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8116 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8117 Radio," <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review</citetitle> 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8118 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8119 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association</citetitle> v. <citetitle>FCC</citetitle>, 184 F. 3d 872
8120 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8121 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8122 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8123 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8124 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8125 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8126 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8127 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8128 <indexterm><primary>Comcast</primary></indexterm>
8129 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project</primary></indexterm>
8130 <indexterm><primary>NBC</primary></indexterm>
8131 <indexterm><primary>WJOA</primary></indexterm>
8132 <indexterm><primary>WRC</primary></indexterm>
8133 </para></footnote>
8134 </para>
8135 <para>
8136 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8137 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8138 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8139 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8140 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8141 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8142 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8143 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8144 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8145 </para>
8146 </section>
8147 <section id="together">
8148 <title>Together</title>
8149 <para>
8150 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8151 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8152 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8153 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8154 </para>
8155 <para>
8156 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8157 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8158 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8159 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8160 to seem
8161
8162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8163 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8164 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8165 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8166 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8167 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8168 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8169 be redefined.
8170 </para>
8171 <para>
8172 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8173 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8174 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8175 our culture today.
8176 </para>
8177 <para>
8178 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8179 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8180 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8181 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8182 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8183 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8184 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8185 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8186 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8187 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8188 </para>
8189 <para>
8190 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8191 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8192 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8193 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8194 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8195 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8196 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8197 future. And these changes have to be <emphasis>reductions</emphasis>
8198 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8199 in control that technology and the market enable.
8200 </para>
8201 <para>
8202 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8203 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8204 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8205 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8206 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8207 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8208 more of the development of our culture than now</emphasis>.
8209 </para>
8210 <para>
8211 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8212 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8213 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8214 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8215 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8216 were independent of the networks. <emphasis>Never</emphasis> has
8217 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8218 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8219 regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8220 energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation
8221 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8222 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8223 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8224 known.<footnote><para>
8225 <!-- f35 -->
8226 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8227 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8228 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
8229 </para></footnote>
8230 </para>
8231 <para>
8232 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8233 </para>
8234 <para>
8235 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8236 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8237 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8238 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8239 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8240 </para>
8241
8242 <table id="t2">
8243 <title>Law status in 1790</title>
8244 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8245 <thead>
8246 <row>
8247 <entry></entry>
8248 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8249 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8250 </row>
8251 </thead>
8252 <tbody>
8253 <row>
8254 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8255 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8256 <entry>Free</entry>
8257 </row>
8258 <row>
8259 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8260 <entry>Free</entry>
8261 <entry>Free</entry>
8262 </row>
8263 </tbody>
8264 </tgroup>
8265 </table>
8266
8267 <para>
8268 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8269 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8270 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8271
8272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8273 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8274 noncommercial work was also free.
8275 </para>
8276 <para>
8277 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8278 </para>
8279
8280 <table id="t3">
8281 <title>Law status at the end of ninetheenth centory</title>
8282 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8283 <thead>
8284 <row>
8285 <entry></entry>
8286 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8287 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8288 </row>
8289 </thead>
8290 <tbody>
8291 <row>
8292 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8293 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8294 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8295 </row>
8296 <row>
8297 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8298 <entry>Free</entry>
8299 <entry>Free</entry>
8300 </row>
8301 </tbody>
8302 </tgroup>
8303 </table>
8304
8305 <para>
8306 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8307 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8308 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8309 transformation were still essentially free.
8310 </para>
8311 <para>
8312 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8313 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8314 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8315 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8316 we could say the law began to look like this:
8317 </para>
8318
8319 <table id="t4">
8320 <title>Law status in 1975</title>
8321 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8322 <thead>
8323 <row>
8324 <entry></entry>
8325 <entry>COPY</entry>
8326 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8327 </row>
8328 </thead>
8329 <tbody>
8330 <row>
8331 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8332 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8333 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8334 </row>
8335 <row>
8336 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8337 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8338 <entry>Free</entry>
8339 </row>
8340 </tbody>
8341 </tgroup>
8342 </table>
8343
8344 <para>
8345 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8346 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8347 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8348 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8349 that the law now looks like this:
8350 </para>
8351
8352 <table id="t5">
8353 <title>Law status now</title>
8354 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8355 <thead>
8356 <row>
8357 <entry></entry>
8358 <entry>COPY</entry>
8359 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8360 </row>
8361 </thead>
8362 <tbody>
8363 <row>
8364 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8365 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8366 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8367 </row>
8368 <row>
8369 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8370 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8371 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8372 </row>
8373 </tbody>
8374 </tgroup>
8375 </table>
8376
8377 <para>
8378 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8379 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8380 creativity&mdash;
8381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8382 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8383 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8384 </para>
8385 <para>
8386 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8387 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8388 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8389 these domains actually does any good.
8390 </para>
8391 <para>
8392 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8393 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8394 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8395 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8396 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8397 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/> and
8398 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="transformers"/>, one
8399 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8400 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8401 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8402 </para>
8403 <para>
8404 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8405 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8406 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8407 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8408 property rights<footnote><para>
8409 <!-- f36 -->
8410 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8411 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8412 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8413 Disintegration of Property," in <citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property</citetitle>, J. Roland
8414 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8415 Press, 1980).
8416 </para></footnote>)
8417 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8418 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8419 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8420 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8421 did not control <emphasis>at all</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8422 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8423 free, and for almost 180 years our country consistently protected a
8424 vibrant and rich free culture.
8425 </para>
8426 <para>
8427 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8428 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8429 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8430 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8431 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8432 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8433 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8434 chapter 7). Adding
8435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8436 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8437 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8438 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8439 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8440 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8441 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8442 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8443 dominates the debate today.
8444 </para>
8445 <para>
8446 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8447 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8448 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8449 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8450 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8451 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8452 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8453 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8454 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8455 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8456 lawyer.
8457 </para>
8458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8459 </section>
8460 </chapter>
8461 </part>
8462 <part id="c-puzzles">
8463 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8464
8465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8466 <chapter id="chimera">
8467 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8468 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8469 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8470 </indexterm>
8471 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8472 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8473 </indexterm>
8474 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8475 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8476 </indexterm>
8477
8478 <para>
8479 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8480 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8481 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8482 <!-- f1. -->
8483 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8484 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8485 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8486 </para></footnote>
8487 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8488 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8489 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8490 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8491 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8492 villagers to explore life as a king.
8493 </para>
8494 <para>
8495 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8496 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8497 "blind." They don't have the word <citetitle>blind</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8498 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8499 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8500 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8501 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8502 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8503 alone!'"
8504 </para>
8505 <para>
8506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8507 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8508 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8509 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8510 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8511 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8512 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8513 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8514 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8515 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8516 </para>
8517 <para>
8518 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8519 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8520 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8521 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8522 </para>
8523 <para>
8524 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8525 is affected," he reports.
8526 </para>
8527 <para>
8528 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8529 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8530 his brain."
8531 </para>
8532 <para>
8533 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8534 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8535 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8536 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8537 </para>
8538 <para>
8539 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8540 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8541 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8542 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8543 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8544 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8545 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8546 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8547
8548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8549 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8550 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8551 scene. . . ."
8552 </para>
8553 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8554 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8555 <para>
8556 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8557 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8558 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8559 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8560 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8561 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8562 </para>
8563 <para>
8564 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8565 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8566 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8567 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8568 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8569 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8570 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8571 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8572 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8573 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8574 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8575 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8576 </para>
8577 <para>
8578 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8579 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8580 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8581 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8582 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8583 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8584 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8585 </para>
8586 <para>
8587 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8588 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8589 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8590 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8591 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8592 from Tower.
8593 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
8594 </para>
8595 <para>
8596
8597 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8598 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8599 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8600 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8601 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8602 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8603 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8604 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8605 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8606 </para>
8607 <para>
8608 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8609 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8610 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8611 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8612 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8613 </para>
8614 <para>
8615 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8616 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8617 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8618 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8619 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8620 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8621 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8622 implemented.<footnote><para>
8623 <!-- f2. -->
8624 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8625 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8626 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003,
8627 available at
8628 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8629 #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8630 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8631 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8632 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up
8633 Stakes on Piracy," <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 17 July 2003, available at
8634 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil
8635 penalties are currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent
8636 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8637 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than 600 songs
8638 through a family computer, see <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8639 re. Verizon Internet Services)</citetitle>, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24
8640 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
8641 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8642 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8643 $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8644 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8645 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8646 Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8647 August 2003, available at
8648 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an
8649 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8650 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8651 identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8652 Name Students," <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 8 August 2003, D3, available at
8653 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8654 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
8655 </para></footnote>
8656
8657 </para>
8658 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8659 <para>
8660 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8661 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8662 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8663 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8664 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8665 </para>
8666 <para>
8667 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8668 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8669 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8670 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8671 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8672 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe <emphasis>either</emphasis> extreme
8673 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8674 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8675 </para>
8676 <para>
8677
8678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8679 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8680 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8681 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8682 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8683 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8684 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8685 </para>
8686 <para>
8687 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8688 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8689 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8690 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8691 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8692 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8693 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8694 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8695 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8696 protection for copyrighted material,
8697 </para>
8698 <blockquote>
8699 <para>
8700 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8701 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8702 </para>
8703 <para>
8704 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8705 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8706 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8707 answer
8708 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8709 well produce a totally different industry model.
8710 </para>
8711 <para>
8712 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8713 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8714 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8715 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8716 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8717 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8718 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8719 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8720 interests.<footnote><para>
8721 <!-- f3. -->
8722 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8723 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8724 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8725 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Peter
8726 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8727 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8728 Congressional Testimony File. </para></footnote>
8729 </para>
8730 </blockquote>
8731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8732 <para>
8733 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8734 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8735 changed.
8736 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal</primary></indexterm>
8737 </para>
8738 <para>
8739 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8740 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8741 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8742 </para>
8743
8744 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8745 </chapter>
8746 <chapter id="harms">
8747 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8748 <para>
8749
8750 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8751 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8752 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8753 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8754 prohibition,
8755 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8756 </para>
8757 <para>
8758 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8759 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8760 extend
8761 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8762 justified?
8763 </para>
8764 <para>
8765 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8766 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8767 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8768 our history.
8769 </para>
8770 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8771 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8772 <para>
8773 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8774 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8775 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8776 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8777 </para>
8778 <para>
8779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8780 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8781 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8782 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8783 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8784 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8785 </para>
8786 <section id="constrain">
8787 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8788 <para>
8789 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8790 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8791 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8792 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8793 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8794 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8795 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8796 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8797 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8798 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8799 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8800 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8801 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8802 </para>
8803 <para>
8804 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8805 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8806 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8807 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8808 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8809 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8810 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8811 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8812 the culture all around.
8813 </para>
8814 <para>
8815 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8816 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8817
8818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8819
8820 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8821 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8822 storytelling extended across the globe.
8823 </para>
8824 <para>
8825 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8826 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8827 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8828 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8829 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8830 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8831 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8832 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8833 work is presumptively illegal.
8834 </para>
8835 <para>
8836 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8837 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8838 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8839 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8840 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8841 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8842 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8843 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8844 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8845 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8846 million.<footnote><para>
8847 <!-- f1. -->
8848 See Lynne W. Jeter, <citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom</citetitle>
8849 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8850 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8851 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8852 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8853 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8854 </para></footnote>
8855 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8856 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8857 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8858 suffering.<footnote>
8859 <para>
8860 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8861 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8862 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8863 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8864 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8865 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8866 available at
8867 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8868 recent months.
8869 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8870 </para></footnote>
8871 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8872 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8873 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8874 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8875 </para>
8876 <para>
8877 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8878 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
8879 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
8880 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
8881 Disneys "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
8882 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
8883 designed to
8884
8885 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8886 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
8887 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
8888 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
8889 we will begin to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the
8890 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
8891 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
8892 fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
8893 States.<footnote><para>
8894 <!-- f3. -->
8895
8896 See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," <citetitle>Wired</citetitle>, 7 July
8897 2003, available at
8898 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8899 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
8900 </para></footnote>
8901 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8902 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8903 critical or reflective.
8904 </para>
8905 <para>
8906 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8907 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
8908 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. But an
8909 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8910 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8911 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8912 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8913 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8914 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8915 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8916 </para>
8917 <para>
8918 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8919 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8920 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8921 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8922 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8923 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8924 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8925 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8926 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8927 </para>
8928 <para>
8929 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8930 described in chapter
8931 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/>, in
8932 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
8933 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
8934 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
8935 use.
8936 </para>
8937 <para>
8938
8939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8940 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8941 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8942 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
8943 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8944 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8945 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8946 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8947 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8948 </para>
8949 <para>
8950 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8951 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8952 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8953 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8954 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8955 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8956 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8957 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8958 comfort themselves.
8959 </para>
8960 <para>
8961 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
8962 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8963 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8964 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8965 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
8966 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8967 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8968 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8969 culture that is free.
8970 </para>
8971 <para>
8972 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8973 </para>
8974 <blockquote>
8975 <para>
8976 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8977 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8978 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8979 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8980 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8982 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8983 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8984 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8985 </para>
8986 </blockquote>
8987 </section>
8988 <section id="innovators">
8989 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
8990 <para>
8991 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8992 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8993 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8994 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8995 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8996 think there's little in this story to worry you.
8997 </para>
8998 <para>
8999 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9000 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9001 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9002 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9003 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9004 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9005 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9006 </para>
9007 <para>
9008 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9009 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9010 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9011 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9012 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9013 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9014 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9015 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9016 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9017 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9018 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9019 </para>
9020 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9021 <para>
9022 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9024 strategy that I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select:
9025 labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9026 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9027 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9028 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9029 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9030 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9031 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9032 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9033 </para>
9034 <para>
9035 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9036 I told in <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9037 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9038 </para>
9039 <para>
9040 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9041 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9042 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9043 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9044 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9045 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9046 </para>
9047 <para>
9048 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9049 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9050 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9051 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9052 Raitt. And so on.
9053 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
9054 </para>
9055 <para>
9056 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9057 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9058 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9059 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9060 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9061 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9062 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9063 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9064 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9065 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9066 </para>
9067 <para>
9068 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9069 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9070
9071 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9072 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9073 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9074 the kind of content the users liked.
9075 </para>
9076 <para>
9077 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9078 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9079 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9080 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9081 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9082 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9083 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9084 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9085 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9086 they had already bought.
9087 </para>
9088 <indexterm id="idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'>
9089 <primary>Vivendi Universal</primary>
9090 </indexterm>
9091 <para>
9092 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9093 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9094 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9095 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9096 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9097 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9098 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9099 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9100 </para>
9101 <para>
9102 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9103 </para>
9104 <para>
9105 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9106 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9107 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9108 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9109 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9110 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9111 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9112 demanded.
9113 </para>
9114 <para>
9115 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9116 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9117 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9118 clients in this
9119 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9120 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9121 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9122 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9123 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9124 </para>
9125 <indexterm startref="idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'/>
9126 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9127 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9128 <para>
9129 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9130 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9131 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9132 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9133 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9134 <!-- f4. -->
9135 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," <citetitle>Los Angeles
9136 Times</citetitle>, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9137 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9138 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available
9139 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9140 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," <citetitle>Los Angeles
9141 Times</citetitle>, 28 May 2001.
9142 </para></footnote>
9143 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9144 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9145 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9146 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9147 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9148 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9149 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9150 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9151 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9152 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in <citetitle>Business
9153 2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9154 </para>
9155 <blockquote>
9156 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9157 <para>
9158 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9159 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9160 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9161 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9162 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9163 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9164 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote>
9165 <para>
9166 <!-- f5. -->
9167 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, 16 June
9168 2003, available at
9169 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9170 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9171 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9172 </para></footnote>
9173 </para>
9174 </blockquote>
9175 <para>
9176 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9177 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9178 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9179 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9180 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9181 constantly threatened by litigation.
9182 </para>
9183 <para>
9184
9185 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9186 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9187 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9188 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9189 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9190 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9191 imposes,
9192 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9193 conservative
9194 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9195 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9196 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9197 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9198 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9199 </para>
9200 <para>
9201 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9202 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9203 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9204 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9205 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9206 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9207 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9208 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9209 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9210 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9211 </para>
9212 <para>
9213 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9214 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9215 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9216 culture&mdash;a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9217 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9218 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9219 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9220 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9221 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9222 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9223 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9224 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9226 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9227 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9228 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9229 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9230 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9231 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9232 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9233 </para>
9234 <para>
9235 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9236 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9237 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9238 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9239 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9240 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9241 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9242 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9243 </para>
9244 <para>
9245 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9246 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9247 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9248 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9249 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9250 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9251 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9252 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9253 </para></footnote>
9254
9255 Congress
9256 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9257 "broadcast
9258 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9259 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9260 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9261 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9262 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9263 violators
9264 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9265 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9266 </para></footnote>
9267
9268 </para>
9269 <para>
9270 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9271 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9272 regulation
9273 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9274 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9275
9276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9277 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9278 those requirements.
9279 </para>
9280 <para>
9281 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9282 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9283 impose.<footnote><para>
9284 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9285 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9286 </para></footnote>
9287 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9288 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9289 harm than good.
9290 </para>
9291 <para>
9292 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9293 innovation&mdash;again,
9294 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9295 crowd.
9296 </para>
9297 <para>
9298 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9299 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9300 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9301 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9302 </para>
9303 <para>
9304 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9305 linkend="property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9306 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9307 Jessica Litman in her book <citetitle>Digital
9308 Copyright</citetitle>,<footnote><para>
9309 <!-- f9. -->
9310 Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (Amherst,
9311 N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001).
9312 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
9313 </para></footnote>
9314 overall this history of copyright
9315 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9316 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9317 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9318 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9319 </para>
9320 <para>
9321 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9322 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9323 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9324 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9325 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9326 </para>
9327 <para>
9328 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9329 <!-- f10. -->
9330 The only circuit court exception is found in <citetitle>Recording Industry
9331 Association of America (RIAA)</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems</citetitle>, 180 F. 3d
9332 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9333 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9334 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9335 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9336 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9337 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9338 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Grokster, Ltd</citetitle>., 259 F. Supp. 2d
9339 1029 (C.D. Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the
9340 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9341 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9342 liability.
9343 </para></footnote>
9344 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9345 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9346 here.<footnote><para>
9347 <!-- f11. -->
9348 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9349 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9350 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9351 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9352 August 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9353 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9354 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that
9355 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9356 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9357 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9358 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and
9359 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34,
9360 available at
9361 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9362 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
9363 </para></footnote>
9364 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9365 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9366 </para>
9367 <para>
9368
9369 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9370 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9371 linkend="pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9372 artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she
9373 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9374 version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9375 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9376 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9377 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9378 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9379 </para>
9380 <para>
9381 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9382 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9383 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9384 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9385 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9386 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9387 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9388 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9389 recording artists.
9390 </para>
9391 <para>
9392 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9393 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9394 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9395 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9396 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9397 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9398 metropolitan area.
9399 </para>
9400 <para>
9401 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9402 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9403 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9404 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9405 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9406 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9407 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9408 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9409 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9410 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9411 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9412 </para>
9413 <para>
9414
9415 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9416 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9417 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9418 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9419 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9420 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9421 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9422 FM radio,
9423 </para>
9424 <blockquote>
9425 <para>
9426 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9427 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9428 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9429 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9430 than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong likened the situation
9431 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9432 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9433 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9434 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9435 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9436 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9437 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9438 shackles.<footnote><para>
9439 <!-- f12. -->
9440 Lessing, 239.
9441 </para></footnote>
9442 </para>
9443 </blockquote>
9444 <para>
9445 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not
9446 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9447 underestimated the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and
9448 legislation"<footnote><para>
9449 <!-- f13. -->
9450 Ibid., 229.
9451 </para></footnote>
9452 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9453 </para>
9454 <para>
9455 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9456 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9457 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9458 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9459 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9460 radio?
9461 </para>
9462 <para>
9463 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9464 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9465
9466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9467 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9468 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9469 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9470 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9471 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9472 of "Happy Birthday" on the air, <emphasis>Internet radio
9473 does</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9474 radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9475 burdens terrestrial radio.
9476 </para>
9477 <para>
9478 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9479 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9480 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9481 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9482 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9483 <para>
9484 <!-- f14. -->
9485 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9486 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9487 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9488 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9489 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9490 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9491 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9492 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9493 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9494 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9495 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9496 Distribution," <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin</citetitle> (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9497 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9498 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9499 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9500 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9501 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9502 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9503 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9504 </para></footnote>
9505 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9506 equivalent fee.
9507 </para>
9508 <para>
9509 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9510 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9511 station) would have to collect the following data from <emphasis>every
9512 listening transaction</emphasis>:
9513 </para>
9514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9515 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9516 <listitem><para>
9517 name of the service;
9518 </para></listitem>
9519 <listitem><para>
9520 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9521 </para></listitem>
9522 <listitem><para>
9523 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9524 </para></listitem>
9525 <listitem><para>
9526 date of transmission;
9527 </para></listitem>
9528 <listitem><para>
9529 time of transmission;
9530 </para></listitem>
9531 <listitem><para>
9532 time zone of origination of transmission;
9533 </para></listitem>
9534 <listitem><para>
9535 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9536 </para></listitem>
9537 <listitem><para>
9538 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9539 </para></listitem>
9540 <listitem><para>
9541 sound recording title;
9542 </para></listitem>
9543 <listitem><para>
9544 ISRC code of the recording;
9545 </para></listitem>
9546 <listitem><para>
9547 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9548 </para></listitem>
9549 <listitem><para>
9550 featured recording artist;
9551 </para></listitem>
9552 <listitem><para>
9553 retail album title;
9554 </para></listitem>
9555 <listitem><para>
9556 recording label;
9557 </para></listitem>
9558 <listitem><para>
9559 UPC code of the retail album;
9560 </para></listitem>
9561 <listitem><para>
9562 catalog number;
9563 </para></listitem>
9564 <listitem><para>
9565 copyright owner information;
9566 </para></listitem>
9567 <listitem><para>
9568 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9569 </para></listitem>
9570 <listitem><para>
9571 name of the service or entity;
9572 </para></listitem>
9573 <listitem><para>
9574 channel or program;
9575 </para></listitem>
9576 <listitem><para>
9577 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9578 </para></listitem>
9579 <listitem><para>
9580 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9581 </para></listitem>
9582 <listitem><para>
9583 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9584 </para></listitem>
9585 <listitem><para>
9586 Unique User identifier;
9587 </para></listitem>
9588 <listitem><para>
9589 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9590 </para></listitem>
9591 </orderedlist>
9592
9593 <para>
9594 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9595 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9596 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9597 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9598 Internet radio has to pay a <emphasis>type of copyright fee</emphasis>
9599 that terrestrial radio does not.
9600 </para>
9601 <para>
9602 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9603 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9604 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9605 </para>
9606 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9607 <para>
9608 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9609 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9610 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9611 </para>
9612 <blockquote>
9613 <para>
9614 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9615 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9616 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9617 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9618 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9619 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9620
9621 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9622 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9623 Because
9624 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9625 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9626 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9627 of business. . . ."
9628 </para>
9629 <para>
9630 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an
9631 industry with thousands of webcasters, <emphasis>we think it should be
9632 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9633 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market</emphasis>." (Emphasis
9634 added.)
9635 </para>
9636 </blockquote>
9637 <para>
9638 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9639 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9640 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9641 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9642 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9643 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9644 effective to prevent it.
9645 </para>
9646 </section>
9647 <section id="corruptingcitizens">
9648 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9649 <para>
9650 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9651 dinosaurs
9652 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9653 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9654 </para>
9655 <para>
9656 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9657 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9658 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9659 </para>
9660 <para>
9661 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9662 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9663 large number of citizens. According to <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, 43 million
9664 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9665 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9666 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9667 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9668 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9669 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9670 </para></footnote>
9671 According to the RIAA,
9672 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9673 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9674
9675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9676 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9677 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9678 increasingly
9679 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9680 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9681 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9682 extreme
9683 response by the other.
9684 </para>
9685 <para>
9686 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9687 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9688 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9689 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9690 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9691 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9692 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9693 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9694 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9695 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9696 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9697 was.<footnote><para>
9698 <!-- f16. -->
9699 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," <citetitle>Los
9700 Angeles Times</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, Business.
9701 </para></footnote>
9702 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9703 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9704 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9705 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9706 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9707 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9708 they oppose.
9709 </para>
9710 <para>
9711 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9712 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9713 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9714 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9715 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9716 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9717 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9718 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9719 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9720 <!-- f17. -->
9721 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9722 Prohibition," <citetitle>American Economic Review</citetitle> 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9723 </para></footnote>
9724 We have
9725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9726 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9727 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9728 <!-- f18. -->
9729 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9730 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9731 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9732 </para></footnote>
9733 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9734 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9735 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9736 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9737 cheat.<footnote><para>
9738 <!-- f19. -->
9739 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9740 Compliance," <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature</citetitle> 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9741 compliance literature).
9742 </para></footnote>
9743 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9744 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9745 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9746 </para>
9747 <para>
9748 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9749 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9750 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9751 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9752 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9753 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9754 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9755 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9756 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9757 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9758 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9759 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9760 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9761 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9762 degree of illegality.
9763 </para>
9764 <para>
9765 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9766 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9767 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9768 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9769 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9770 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9771 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9772 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9773 to consider the alternative.
9774 </para>
9775 <para>
9776
9777 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9778 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9779 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9780 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9781 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9782 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9783 </para>
9784 <para>
9785 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9786 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9787 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9788 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9789 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9790 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9791 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9792 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9793 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9794 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9795 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9796 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9797 </para>
9798 <para>
9799 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9800 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9801 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9802 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9803 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9804 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9805 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9806 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9807 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9808 a nation of felons?
9809 </para>
9810 <para>
9811 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9812 </para>
9813 <para>
9814 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9815 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9816 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9817 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9818 used
9819
9820 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9821 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9822 recordings is free.
9823 </para>
9824 <para>
9825 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9826 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9827 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9828 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9829 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9830 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9831 capacities of digital technologies.
9832 </para>
9833 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9834 <para>
9835 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9836 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9837 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9838 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9839 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9840 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9841 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9842 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9843 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9844 </para>
9845 <para>
9846 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9847 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9848 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9849 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9850 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9851 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9852 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9853 on people's machines.
9854 </para>
9855 <para>
9856 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9857 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9858 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9859 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9860 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9861 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9862
9863 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9864 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9865 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9866 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9867 management" system.
9868 </para>
9869 <para>
9870 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9871 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9872 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9873 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9874 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9875 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9876 freedom to move content easily?
9877 </para>
9878 <para>
9879 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9880 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9881 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9882 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9883 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9884 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9885 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9886 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9887 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9888 </para>
9889 <para>
9890 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9891 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9892 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9893 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9894 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9895 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9896 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9897 </para>
9898 <para>
9899 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9900 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9901 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9902 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9903 </para>
9904 <para>
9905 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9906 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9907
9908 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9909
9910 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9911 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9912 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9913 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9914 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9915 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9916 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9917 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9918 generally.
9919 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
9920 </para>
9921 <para>
9922 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9923 explains,
9924 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
9925 </para>
9926 <blockquote>
9927 <para>
9928 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9929 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9930 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9931 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9932 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9933 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9934 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9935 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9936 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9937 </para>
9938 </blockquote>
9939 <para>
9940 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9941 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9942 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9943 </para>
9944 <para>
9945 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
9946 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9947 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9948 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9949 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9950 an Internet user is revealed.
9951 </para>
9952 <para>
9953 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9954 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9955 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9956 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9957 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9958 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9959 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9960 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9961 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
9962 <!-- f20. -->
9963 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9964 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9965 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9966 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9967 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9968 Being Sued," <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
9969 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 15 September
9970 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9971 Fan, Either," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9972 Brianna a Criminal?" <citetitle>Toronto Star</citetitle>, 18 September 2003, P7.
9973 </para></footnote>
9974
9975 </para>
9976 <para>
9977 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9978 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9979 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
9980 <!-- f21. -->
9981 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9982 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9983 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
9984 </para></footnote>
9985 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9986 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9987 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9988 </para>
9989 <para>
9990 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
9991 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
9992 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
9993 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
9994 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
9995 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
9996 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
9997 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
9998 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
9999 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10000 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10001 <!-- f22. -->
10002 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10003 <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10004 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10005 Colleges," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10006 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," <citetitle>Christian Science
10007 Monitor</citetitle>, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10008 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10009 Lawsuit Possible," <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10010 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," <citetitle>Internet News</citetitle>, 30 January
10011 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10012 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
10013 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10014 Sharing," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10015 Are Weapons at Universities," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10016 </para></footnote>
10017 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10018 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10019 </para>
10020 <para>
10021 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10022 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10023 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10024 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10025 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10026 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10027 college students
10028
10029 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10030 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10031 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10032 Says von Lohmann,
10033 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10034 </para>
10035 <blockquote>
10036 <para>
10037 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10038 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10039 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10040 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10041 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10042 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10043 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10044 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10045 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10046 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10047 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10048 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10049 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10050 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10051 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10052 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10053 million of them.
10054 </para>
10055 </blockquote>
10056 <para>
10057 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10058 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10059 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10060 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10061 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10062 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10063 </para>
10064
10065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10066 </section>
10067 </chapter>
10068 </part>
10069 <part id="c-balances">
10070 <title>BALANCES</title>
10071 <partintro>
10072
10073 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10074 <para>
10075 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10076 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10077 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10078 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10079 </para>
10080 <para>
10081 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10082 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10083 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10084 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10085 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10086 everything around.
10087 </para>
10088 <para>
10089 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10090 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10091 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10092 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10093 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10094 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10095 </para>
10096 <para>
10097 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10098 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10099 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10100 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10101 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10102 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10103 made that is happening all around.
10104 </para>
10105 <para>
10106 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10107 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10108 gasoline onto this fire.
10109 </para>
10110 <para>
10111 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10112 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10113 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10114 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10115 </para>
10116 <para>
10117 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10118 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10119 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10120 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10121 success will require.
10122 </para>
10123 </partintro>
10124
10125 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10126 <chapter id="eldred">
10127 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10128 <para>
10129 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10130 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10131 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10132 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10133 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10134 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10135 come alive.
10136 </para>
10137 <para>
10138 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10139 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10140 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10141 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10142 them available for free.
10143 </para>
10144 <para>
10145 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10146 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10147 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10148 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10149 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10150 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10151 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10152 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10153 accessible&mdash;today.
10154 </para>
10155 <para>
10156 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10157 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's <citetitle>Scarlet Letter</citetitle> had passed into the
10158 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10159 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10160 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10161 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10162 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10163 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (<citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle>), sometimes not
10164 (<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame</citetitle>, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>). These are all
10165 commercial publications of public domain works.
10166 </para>
10167 <para>
10168 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10169 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10170 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10171 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10172 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10173 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10174 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10175 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10176 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10177 generally.<footnote><para>
10178 <!-- f1. -->
10179 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10180 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10181 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10182 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10183 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10184 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10185 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10186 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10187 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10188 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10189 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10190 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10191 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10192 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10193 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10194 </para>
10195 <para>
10196 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10197 collection of poems <citetitle>New Hampshire</citetitle> was slated to
10198 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10199 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10200 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
10201 linkend="property-i"/>, in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10202 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by
10203 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10204 than 1923 to his collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10205 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10206 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10207 more than 1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10208 </para>
10209 <para>
10210
10211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10212 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10213 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10214 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10215 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10216 <!-- f2. -->
10217 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10218 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10219 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10220 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10221 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10222 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10223 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10224 </para></footnote>
10225
10226 </para>
10227 <para>
10228 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10229 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10230 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10231 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10232 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10233 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10234 to undertake.
10235 </para>
10236 <para>
10237 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10238 constitutional
10239 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10240 interpretation.
10241 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10242 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10243 importantly
10244 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10245 </para>
10246 <blockquote>
10247 <para>
10248 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10249 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10250 their . . . Writings. . . .
10251 </para>
10252 </blockquote>
10253 <para>
10254 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10255 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10256 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10257 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10258 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10259 specific&mdash;to "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that
10260 are also specific&mdash; by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10261 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10262 </para>
10263 <para>
10264 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10265 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10266 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10267 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10268 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10269 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10270 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10271 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the
10272 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10273 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10274 </para>
10275 <para>
10276 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10277 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10278 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10279 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10280 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10281 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10282 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10283 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10284 this gravy train going.
10285 </para>
10286 <para>
10287 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10288 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10289 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10290 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10291 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10292 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10293 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10294 </para>
10295 <para>
10296 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10297 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10298 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10299 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10300 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10301 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10302 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10303 published by anyone for free.
10304 </para>
10305 <para>
10306 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10307 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10308 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10309 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10310 report:
10311 </para>
10312 <para>
10313 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10314
10315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10316 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10317 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10318 those works.
10319 </para>
10320 <para>
10321 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10322 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10323 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10324 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10325 </para>
10326 <para>
10327 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10328 about it?"
10329 </para>
10330 <para>
10331 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10332 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10333 they support the bill."
10334 </para>
10335 <para>
10336 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10337 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10338 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10339 much is it worth?"
10340 </para>
10341 <para>
10342 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10343 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10344 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10345 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10346 </para>
10347 <para>
10348 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10349 correct conclusion:
10350 </para>
10351 <para>
10352 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10353 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10354 contributions
10355 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10356 </para>
10357 <para>
10358 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10359 contribute
10360 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10361 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10362 </para>
10363 <para>
10364 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10365 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10366 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10367 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10369 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10370 copyrights
10371 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10372 the copyright term extended.
10373 </para>
10374 <para>
10375 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10376 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10377 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10378 </para>
10379 <para>
10380 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10381 Copyright
10382 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10383 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10384 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10385 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10386 contributions.<footnote><para>
10387 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10388 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10389 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 17 October 1998, 22.
10390 </para></footnote>
10391 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10392 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10393 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10394 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10395 Age," available at
10396 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10397 </para></footnote>
10398 Disney is estimated to have
10399 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10400 cycle.<footnote><para>
10401 <!-- f5. -->
10402 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10403 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week</citetitle>, 8 August 1990, available at
10404 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10405 </para></footnote>
10406
10407 </para>
10408 <para>
10409 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10410 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10411 reality
10412 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10413 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10414 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10415 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10416 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10417 "limited."
10418 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10419 and again.
10420 </para>
10421 <para>
10422 It was also my judgment that <emphasis>this</emphasis> Supreme Court
10423 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10424 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10425 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10426 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10427 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10428 Supreme Court's
10429
10430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10431 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10432 guns near schools.
10433 </para>
10434 <para>
10435 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10436 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10437 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10438 "interstate
10439 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10440 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10441 interstate
10442 commerce.
10443 </para>
10444 <para>
10445 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10446 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10447 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10448 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10449 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10450 </para>
10451 <para>
10452 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10453 that in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The government had
10454 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10455 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10456 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10457 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10458 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10459 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10460 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10461 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10462 position to second-guess Congress.
10463 </para>
10464 <para>
10465 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,"
10466 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10467 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10468 </para></footnote>
10469 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10470 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10471 Congress's power. The decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10472 later in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>.<footnote><para>
10473 <!-- f7. -->
10474 <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10475 </para></footnote>
10476 </para>
10477 <para>
10478 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10479 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10480 <!-- f8. -->
10481 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10482 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10483 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10484 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10485 regulate commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce
10486 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10487 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10488 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights&mdash;the
10489 limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10490 </para></footnote>
10491 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10492 yield the conclusion that Congress
10493 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10494 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10495 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power over
10496 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10497 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10498 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10499 term of existing copyrights.
10500 </para>
10501 <para>
10502 <emphasis>If</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
10503 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> stood for
10504 politics&mdash;a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10505 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10506 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10507 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10508 demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an interpretation of the
10509 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10510 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10511 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10512 were going to be petty politicians.
10513 </para>
10514 <para>
10515 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10516 argument in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10517 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10518 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10519 piracy&mdash;piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10520 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10521 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10522 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10523 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10524 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10525 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10526 power&mdash;expressed through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to
10527 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10528 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10529 piracy that affects us all.
10530 </para>
10531 <para>
10532 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10533
10534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10535 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10536 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10537 <!-- f9. -->
10538 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10539 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available
10540 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10541 </para></footnote>
10542 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10543 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10544 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10545 charter.
10546 </para>
10547 <para>
10548 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10549 copyright
10550 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10551 influence
10552 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10553 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10554 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10555 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10556 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10557 bought to extend them again.
10558 </para>
10559 <para>
10560 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10561 extended.
10562 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10563 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10564 society
10565 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10566 Disney's.
10567 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10568 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10569 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10570 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10571 exploited,
10572 and no longer available as a result.
10573 </para>
10574 <para>
10575 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10576 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10577 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10578 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10579 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10580 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10581 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10582 Congressional
10583 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10584 of Petitioners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 7, available at
10585 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10586 </para></footnote>
10587
10588 </para>
10589 <para>
10590 Think practically about the consequence of this
10591 extension&mdash;practically,
10592 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10593
10594 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10595 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10596 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10597 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10598 remaining
10599 9,873. What would you have to do?
10600 </para>
10601 <para>
10602 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10603 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10604 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10605 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10606 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10607 list of books still under copyright.
10608 </para>
10609 <para>
10610 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10611 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10612 </para>
10613 <para>
10614 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10615 owners
10616 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10617 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10618 being at least a list?
10619 </para>
10620 <para>
10621 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10622 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10623 practically
10624 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10625 thousands
10626 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10627 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10628 </para>
10629 <para>
10630 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10631 apologists for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of
10632 copyright owners?"
10633 </para>
10634 <para>
10635 Well, actually, if you think about it, there <emphasis>are</emphasis>
10636 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10637 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10638 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10639 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10640 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10641 what tangible property.
10642 </para>
10643 <para>
10644 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10645 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10646 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10647
10648 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10649 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10650 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10651 happen
10652 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10653 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10654 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10655 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10656 know quite well who owns what property.
10657 </para>
10658 <para>
10659 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10660 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10661 already
10662 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10663 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10664 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10665 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10666 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10667 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10668 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10669 </para>
10670 <para>
10671 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10672 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10673 consequence
10674 for other creative works is much more dire.
10675 </para>
10676 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10677 <para>
10678 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10679 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10680 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10681 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, <citetitle>The Lucky Dog</citetitle>, is
10682 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10683 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10684 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10685 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10686 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10687 films."<footnote><para>
10688 <!-- f11. -->
10689 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10690 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10691 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10692 Down Copyright Extension," <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 9 October 2002.
10693 </para></footnote>
10694
10695 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The</primary></indexterm>
10696 </para>
10697 <para>
10698 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10699 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10700 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10701 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10702 </para>
10703 <para>
10704 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10705
10706 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10707 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10708 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10709 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10710 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10711 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10712 work available for distribution.
10713 </para>
10714 <para>
10715 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10716 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10717 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10718 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10719 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10720 mm film.<footnote><para>
10721 <!-- f12. -->
10722 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10723 Supporting the Petitoners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
10724 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01- 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
10725 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10726 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, available at
10727 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10728 </para></footnote>
10729
10730 </para>
10731 <para>
10732 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10733 important.
10734 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10735 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10736 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10737 locate the copyright owner.
10738 </para>
10739 <para>
10740 Or more accurately, <emphasis>owners</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
10741 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
10742 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
10743 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
10744 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
10745 to these films is exceptionally high.
10746 </para>
10747 <para>
10748 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10749 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10750 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10751 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10752 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10753 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10754 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10755 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10756 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10757 </para>
10758 <para>
10759 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10760
10761 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10762 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10763 benefit
10764 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10765 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10766 the copyright expires.
10767 </para>
10768 <para>
10769 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10770 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10771 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10772 canisters
10773 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10774 than dust.
10775 </para>
10776 <para>
10777 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10778 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10779 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10780 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10781 creative
10782 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10783 free expression."
10784 </para>
10785 <para>
10786 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10787 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10788 indicated,
10789 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10790 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10791 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10792 distributors,
10793 the commercial life ends.
10794 </para>
10795 <para>
10796 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10797 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10798 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10799 between
10800 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10801 Friday
10802 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10803 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10804 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10805 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10806 have, we need to have access to this history.
10807 </para>
10808 <para>
10809 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10810
10811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10812 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10813 this context do no good.
10814 </para>
10815 <para>
10816 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10817 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10818 <emphasis>copyright-related use</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
10819 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
10820 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
10821 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
10822 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
10823 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
10824 was independent of copyright law.
10825 </para>
10826 <para>
10827 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10828 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10829 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10830 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10831 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10832 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10833 market didn't have more to offer.
10834 </para>
10835 <para>
10836 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10837 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10838 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10839 would not have interfered with anything.
10840 </para>
10841 <para>
10842 But this situation has now changed.
10843 </para>
10844 <para>
10845 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10846 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10847 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10848 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10849 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10850 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10851 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10852 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10853 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10854 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10855 </para>
10856 <para>
10857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10858 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10859 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10860 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10861 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10862 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10863 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10864 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10865 written for a radically different context.
10866 </para>
10867 <para>
10868 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10869 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10870 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10871 <emphasis>copyright</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
10872 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
10873 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
10874 context, copyright is serving no purpose <emphasis>at all</emphasis>
10875 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
10876 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
10877 </para>
10878 <para>
10879 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10880 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10881 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10882 culture widely?"
10883 </para>
10884 <para>
10885 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10886 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
10887 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10888 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10889 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10890 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
10891 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10892 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
10893 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10894 </para>
10895 <para>
10896 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10897 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10898 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10899 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10900
10901 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10902 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10903 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10904 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10905 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
10906 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
10907 <!-- f13. -->
10908 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
10909 December 2002, available at
10910 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
10911 </para></footnote>
10912
10913 </para>
10914 <para>
10915 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10916 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10917 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10918 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
10919 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
10920 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10921 </para>
10922 <para>
10923 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10924 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10925 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10926 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10927 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10928 </para>
10929 <para>
10930 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10931 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10932 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10933 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10934 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10935 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10936 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10937 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10938 power to extend existing terms.
10939 </para>
10940 <para>
10941 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10942 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10943 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10944 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10945 </para>
10946 <para>
10947 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10948 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10949
10950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10951 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10952 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10953 overstepped its bounds.
10954 </para>
10955 <para>
10956 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10957 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10958 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10959 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10960 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10961 </para>
10962 <para>
10963 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10964 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10965 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
10966 briefs and preparing for argument.
10967 </para>
10968 <para>
10969 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10970 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10971 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10972 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10973 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10974 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10975 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10976 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10977 </para>
10978 <para>
10979 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10980 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10981 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10982 mistake lost it.
10983 </para>
10984 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
10985 <para>
10986 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
10987 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
10988 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
10989 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
10990 heat
10991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
10992 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
10993 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
10994 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
10995 </para>
10996 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
10997 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
10998 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
10999 <para>
11000 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11001 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11002 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11003 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11004 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11005 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11006 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11007 most powerful media companies in the world."
11008 </para>
11009 <para>
11010 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11011 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11012 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11013 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11014 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11015 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11016 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11017 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11018 interpretation
11019 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11020 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11021 unconstitutional,
11022 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11023 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11024 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11025 Constitution,
11026 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11027 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11028 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11029 </para>
11030 <para>
11031 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11032 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11033 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11034 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11035 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11036 why it was unconstitutional.
11037 </para>
11038 <para>
11039 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11040
11041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11042 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11043 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11044 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11045 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11046 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11047 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11048 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11049 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11050 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11051 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11052 <emphasis>law</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11053 the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11054 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11055 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11056 </para>
11057 <para>
11058 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11059 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11060 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11061 Congress. In November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11062 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11063 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11064 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11065 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11066 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11067 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11068 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11069 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11070 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11071 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis</primary></indexterm>
11072 </para>
11073 <para>
11074 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11075 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11076 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11077 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11078 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11079 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11080 </para>
11081 <para>
11082 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11083 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11084
11085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11086 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11087 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11088 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11089 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11090 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11091 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11092 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11093 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11094 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11095 </para>
11096 <para>
11097 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11098 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11099 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11100 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11101 </para>
11102 <para>
11103 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11104 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11105 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11106 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11107 clear.
11108 </para>
11109 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11110 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11111 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11112 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11113 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11114 <para>
11115 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11116 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11117 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11118 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11119 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11120 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11121 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11122 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11123 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11124 </para>
11125 <para>
11126 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11127 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11128 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11129 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11130 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11131 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11132 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11133 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11134
11135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11136 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11137 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11138 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11139 </para>
11140 <para>
11141 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11142 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11143 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11144 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11145 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11146 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11147 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11148 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11149 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11150 confidence in our argument.
11151 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11152 </para>
11153 <para>
11154 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11155 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11156 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11157 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11158 copyright holders.
11159 </para>
11160 <para>
11161 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11162 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11163 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11164 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11165 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11166 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11167 wanted to control.
11168 </para>
11169 <para>
11170 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11171 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11172 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11173 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11174 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11175 pornography."<footnote><para>
11176 <!-- f14. -->
11177 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
11178 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11179 </para></footnote>
11180 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11181 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11182 to license <citetitle>Porgy and Bess</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11183 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11184 <!-- f15. -->
11185 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11186 Mouse Joins the Fray," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 28 March 1998, B7.
11187 </para></footnote>
11188 That's
11189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11190 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11191 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11192 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11193 </para>
11194 <para>
11195 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11196 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11197 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11198 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11199 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11200 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11201 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11202 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11203 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11204 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11205 </para>
11206 <para>
11207 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11208 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11209 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11210 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11211 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11212 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11213 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11214 </para>
11215 <para>
11216 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11217 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11218 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11219 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11220 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11221 five who had supported the <citetitle>Lopez/Morrison</citetitle> line of cases that said that
11222 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11223 powers had limits.
11224 </para>
11225 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11226 <para>
11227 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11228 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11229 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11230 the Constitution
11231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11232 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11233 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11234 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11235 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11236 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11237 </para>
11238 <para>
11239 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11240 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11241 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11242 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11243 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11244 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11245 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11246 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11247 sense.
11248 </para>
11249 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11250 <para>
11251 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11252 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11253 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11254 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11255 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11256 these retrospective extensions.
11257 </para>
11258 <para>
11259 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11260 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11261 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11262 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11263 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11264 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11265 </para>
11266 <para>
11267 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11268 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11269 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11270 overriding
11271 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11272 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11273 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11274 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11275 </para>
11276 <para>
11277 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11278 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11279 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
11280
11281 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11282 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11283 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11284 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11285 supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the Court to
11286 reconcile <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> with <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>: If Congress's power to
11287 regulate commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to
11288 regulate copyright be limited.
11289 </para>
11290 <para>
11291 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11292 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11293 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11294 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11295 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11296 </para>
11297 <para>
11298 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11299 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11300 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11301 existing
11302 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11303 </para>
11304 <para>
11305 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11306 extended
11307 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11308 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11309 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11310 existing
11311 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11312 restraint
11313 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11314 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11315 hesitated
11316 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11317 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11318 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11319 arrived
11320 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11321 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11322
11323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11324 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11325 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11326 </para>
11327 <para>
11328 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11329 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11330 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11331 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11332 Congress
11333 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11334 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11335 this central idea.
11336 </para>
11337 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11338 <para>
11339 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11340 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11341 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11342 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11343 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11344 </para>
11345 <para>
11346 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11347 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11348 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11349 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11350 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11351 </para>
11352 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11353 <para>
11354 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11355 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11356 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11357 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11358 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11359 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11360 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11361 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11362 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11363 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11364 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11365
11366 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11367 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11368 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11369 </para>
11370 <para>
11371 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11372 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11373 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11374 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11375 congressmen
11376 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11377 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11378 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11379 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11380 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11381 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11382 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11383 family of the Justices.
11384 </para>
11385 <para>
11386 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11387 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11388 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11389 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11390 </para>
11391 <para>
11392 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11393 The history was bothering her.
11394 </para>
11395 <blockquote>
11396 <para>
11397 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11398 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11399 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11400 practice that began with the very first act.
11401 </para>
11402 </blockquote>
11403 <para>
11404 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11405 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11406 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11407 </para>
11408 <blockquote>
11409 <para>
11410 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11411 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11413 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11414 is yes.
11415 </para>
11416 </blockquote>
11417 <para>
11418 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11419 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11420 Kennedy, who observed,
11421 </para>
11422 <blockquote>
11423 <para>
11424 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11425 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11426 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11427 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11428 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11429 </para>
11430 </blockquote>
11431 <para>
11432 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11433 student,
11434 I answered,
11435 </para>
11436 <blockquote>
11437 <para>
11438 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11439 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11440 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11441 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11442 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11443 </para>
11444 </blockquote>
11445 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11446 <para>
11447 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11448 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11449 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11450 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11451 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11452 </para>
11453 <para>
11454 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11455 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> ruling,
11456 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11457 </para>
11458 <para>
11459 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11460 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11461
11462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11463 </para>
11464 <blockquote>
11465 <para>
11466 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11467 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11468 </para>
11469 <para>
11470 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11471 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11472 domain
11473 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11474 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11475 into the Copyright Clause.
11476 </para>
11477 </blockquote>
11478 <para>
11479 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11480 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11481 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11482 </para>
11483 <blockquote>
11484 <para>
11485 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11486 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11487 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11488 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11489 time.
11490 </para>
11491 </blockquote>
11492 <para>
11493 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11494 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11495 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11496 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11497 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11498 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11499 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11500 Patent Clause&mdash; indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11501 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11502 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11503 Court to my side.
11504 </para>
11505 <para>
11506 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11507 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11508
11509 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11510 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11511 optimistic.
11512 </para>
11513 <para>
11514 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11515 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11516 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11517 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11518 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11519 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11520 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11521 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11522 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11523 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11524 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in particular,
11525 the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11526 law that it had established elsewhere.
11527 </para>
11528 <para>
11529 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11530 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11531 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11532 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11533 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11534 </para>
11535 <para>
11536 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11537 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11538 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11539 </para>
11540 <para>
11541 My <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11542 money in the world against <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. And here
11543 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11544 reasoning.
11545 </para>
11546 <para>
11547 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11548 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11549 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11550 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11551 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11552 </para>
11553 <para>
11554
11555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11556 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11557 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11558 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11559 </para>
11560 <para>
11561 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11562 Souter. Neither believes in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11563 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11564 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11565 </para>
11566 <para>
11567 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11568 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11569 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11570 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11571 reconcile the two simply <emphasis>by not addressing the
11572 argument</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11573 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11574 followed from the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11575 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11576 </para>
11577 <para>
11578 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11579 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11580 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11581 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11582 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11583 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11584 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11585 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11586 the system we have.
11587 </para>
11588 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11589 <para>
11590 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11591 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11592 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11593 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11594 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11595 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11596 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11597 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11598 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11599 </para>
11600 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11601 <para>
11602 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11603 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11604 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11605 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11606 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11607 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11608 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11609 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11610 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11611 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11612 </para>
11613 <para>
11614 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11615 because neither believed in the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11616 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11617 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11618 Sentelle. It was <citetitle>Hamlet</citetitle> without the Prince.
11619 </para>
11620 <para>
11621 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11622 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11623 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11624 </para>
11625 <para>
11626 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11627 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> didn't
11628 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11629 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11630 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11631 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11632 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11633 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11634 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11635 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11636 "originalism" now?
11637 </para>
11638 <para>
11639 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11640 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11641 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11642 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11643
11644 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11645 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11646 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11647 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11648 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11649 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11650 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11651 own principles.
11652 </para>
11653 <para>
11654 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11655 myself.
11656 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11657 the law as it is.
11658 </para>
11659 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11660 <para>
11661 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11662 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11663 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11664 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11665 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11666 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11667 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11668 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11669 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11670 </para>
11671 <para>
11672 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11673 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11674 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11675 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11676 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11677 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11678 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11679 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11680 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11681 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11682 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11683 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11684 effort to persuade; but I
11685 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11686 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11687 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11688 should decide the issue.
11689 </para>
11690 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11691 <para>
11692 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11693 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11694 Kathleen Sullivan?
11695 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11696 </para>
11697 <para>
11698 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11699 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11700 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11701 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11702 </para>
11703 <para>
11704 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11705 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11706 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11707 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11708 have persuaded.
11709 </para>
11710 <para>
11711 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11712 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11713 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11714 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11715 issue should not be raised until it is.
11716 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
11717 </para>
11718 <para>
11719 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11720 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11721 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11722 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11723 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11724 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11725 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11726 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11727 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11728 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11729 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11730
11731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11732 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11733 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11734 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11735 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11736 harmful law. <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
11737 </para>
11738 <blockquote>
11739 <para>
11740 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11741 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11742 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11743 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11744 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11745 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11746 </para>
11747 </blockquote>
11748 <para>
11749 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11750 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11751 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11752 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11753 in the face felt exactly like that.
11754 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
11755 </para>
11756 <para>
11757 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11758 quote from <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>. That "grand experiment" we call the
11759 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11760 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11761 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11762 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11763 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11764 </para>
11765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11766 </chapter>
11767 <chapter id="eldred-ii">
11768 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11769 <para>
11770 The day <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11771 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was
11772 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11773 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11774 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11775 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11776 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11777 </para>
11778 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11779 <para>
11780 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11781 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11782 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11783 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11784 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11785 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11786 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11787 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11788 </para>
11789 <para>
11790 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11791 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11793 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11794 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11795 the work passed into the public domain.
11796 </para>
11797 <para>
11798 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11799 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11800 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11801 </para>
11802 <para>
11803 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11804 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11805 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11806 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11807 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11808 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11809 everything else, let the content go.
11810 </para>
11811 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11812 <para>
11813 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11814 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11815 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11816 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11817 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11818 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11819 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11820 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11821 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11822 the stupid harm of the present system.
11823 </para>
11824 <para>
11825 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11826 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11827 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11828 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11829 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11830 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11831 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11832 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11833 where copyright owners could be identified.
11834 </para>
11835 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11836 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11837 <para>
11838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11839 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
11840 linkend="property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
11841 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11842 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11843 <!-- f1. -->
11844 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11845 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11846 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11847 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11848 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11849 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11850 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11851 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11852 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11853 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11854 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11855 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11856 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11857 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11858 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11859 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>International
11860 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
11861 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11862 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11863 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11864 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11865 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11866 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11867 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11868 </para>
11869 <para>
11870 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11871 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11872 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11873 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11874 know what's protected and what's not.
11875 </para>
11876 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11877 <para>
11878 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11879 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11880 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11881 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11882 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11883 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11884 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an <citetitle>i</citetitle> or cross a
11885 <citetitle>t</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
11886 </para>
11887 <para>
11888 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11889 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11890 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11891 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11892 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11893 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11894 </para>
11895 <para>
11896 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11897 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11898 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11899 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11900 burden
11901 imposed upon creators.
11902 </para>
11903 <para>
11904 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
11905 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11906
11907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11908 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11909 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11910 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11911 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11912 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11913 table.
11914 </para>
11915 <para>
11916 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11917 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11918 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11919 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11920 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11921 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11922 spread.
11923 </para>
11924 <para>
11925 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11926 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11927 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11928 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11929 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11930 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
11931 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11932 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11933 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11934 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11935 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11936 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11937 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11938 system of protection for property generally.
11939 </para>
11940 <para>
11941 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11942 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11943 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11944 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11945 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11946 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11947 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11948 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11949
11950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11951 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
11952 <emphasis>lawyer</emphasis> transactions take their place.
11953 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
11954 </para>
11955 <para>
11956 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11957 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11958 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11959 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11960 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11961 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11962 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11963 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11964 </para>
11965 <para>
11966 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11967 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11968 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11969 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11970 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11971 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11972 seen before <emphasis>because there are no formalities</emphasis>.
11973 </para>
11974 <para>
11975 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11976 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11977 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11978 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11979 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11980 </para>
11981 <para>
11982 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11983 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
11984 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
11985 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
11986 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
11987 </para>
11988 <para>
11989 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
11990 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
11991 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
11992 registration?
11993 </para>
11994 <para>
11995 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
11996 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
11997 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
11998
11999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12000 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12001 address the real problem of <emphasis>governments</emphasis> standing
12002 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12003 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12004 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12005 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12006 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12007 upon historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of
12008 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12009 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12010 </para>
12011 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12012 <para>
12013 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12014 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12015 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12016 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12017 </para>
12018 <para>
12019 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12020 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12021 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12022 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12023 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12024 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12025 something good might happen here.
12026 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe</primary></indexterm>
12027 </para>
12028 <para>
12029 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12030 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12031 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12032 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12033 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12034 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12035 </para>
12036 <para>
12037 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12038 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12039 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12040 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12041 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12042 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12043 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12044 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12045 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12046 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12047 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12048 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12049 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12050 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12051 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12052 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12053 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12054 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12055 film is a valid derivative use.
12056 </para>
12057 <para>
12058 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12059 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12060 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12061 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12062 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12063 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12064 </para>
12065 <para>
12066 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12067 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12068 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12069 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12070 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12071 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12072 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12073 threat.
12074 </para>
12075 <para>
12076 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12077 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12078 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12079 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12080 sense?
12081 </para>
12082 <para>
12083
12084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12085 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12086 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12087 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12088 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12089 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12090 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12091 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12092 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12093 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12094 </para>
12095 <para>
12096 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12097 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12098 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12099 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12100 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12101 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12102 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12103 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12104 </para>
12105 <para>
12106 What does this industry really want?
12107 </para>
12108 <para>
12109 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12110 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12111 protecting <emphasis>their</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12112 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12113 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12114 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12115 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12116 content that doesn't require <emphasis>their</emphasis> permission
12117 first.
12118 </para>
12119 <para>
12120 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12121 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12122 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12123 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12124 theirs. <emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12125 theirs</emphasis>.
12126 </para>
12127 <para>
12128 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12129 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12130
12131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12132 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12133 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12134 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12135 and to share its own creation.
12136 </para>
12137 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12138 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12139 <para>
12140 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12141 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12142 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12143 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12144 block the progress of others.
12145 </para>
12146 <para>
12147 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12148 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12149 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12150 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12151 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12152 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12153 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12154 </para>
12155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12156 </chapter>
12157 </part>
12158 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12159 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12160 <para>
12161 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12162 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12163 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12164 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12165 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12166 </para>
12167 <para>
12168 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12169 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12170 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12171 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12172 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12173 the disease almost invisible.
12174 </para>
12175 <para>
12176 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12177 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12178 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12179 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12180 population:
12181 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12182 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12183 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12184 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12185 available at
12186 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12187 release
12188 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12189 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12190 </para></footnote>
12191 </para>
12192 <para>
12193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12194 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12195 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12196 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12197 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12198 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12199 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12200 </para>
12201 <para>
12202 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12203 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12204 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12205 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12206 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12207 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12208 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12209 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12210 changes.
12211 </para>
12212 <para>
12213 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12214 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12215 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12216 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12217 costs significantly below the market price.
12218 </para>
12219 <para>
12220 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12221 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12222 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12223 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12224 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12225 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12226 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12227 <para>
12228 <!-- f2. -->
12229 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12230 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12231 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12232 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12233 </para></footnote>
12234 </para>
12235 <para>
12236 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12237 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12238 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12239 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12240 imports."<footnote><para>
12241 <!-- f3. -->
12242 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12243 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12244 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12245 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 14, available at
12246 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a
12247 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12248 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12249 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess.,
12250 Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57 (statement of James
12251 Love).
12252 </para></footnote>
12253 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12254 government asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add
12255 pressure to that request, in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12256 possible trade sanctions.
12257 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12258 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12259 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12260 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12261 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12262 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12263 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12264 patent&mdash; pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12265 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12266 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12267 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12268 <!-- f4. -->
12269 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12270 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12271 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12272 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12273 </para>
12274 <para>
12275 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12276 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12277 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12278 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12279 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12280 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12281 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12282 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12283 </para>
12284 <para>
12285 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12286 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12287 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12288 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12289 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12290 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12291 </para>
12292 <para>
12293 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12294 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12295 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12296 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12297 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12298 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12299 by U.S. companies.
12300 </para>
12301 <para>
12302 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12303 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12304 argument
12305 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12306 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12307 <!-- f5. -->
12308 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12309 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24
12310 May 1999, A1, available at
12311 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12312 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12313 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12314 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12315 Medicines," <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus</citetitle> 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12316 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12317 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12318 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12319 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," <citetitle>Widener Law
12320 Symposium Journal</citetitle> (Spring 2001): 175.
12321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12322 </para></footnote>
12323 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12324 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12325 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12326 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12327 </para>
12328 <para>
12329 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12330 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12331 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12332 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12333 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12334 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12335 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12336 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12337 </para>
12338 <para>
12339 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12340 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12341 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12342 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12343 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12344 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12345 </para>
12346 <para>
12347 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12348 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12349 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12350 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12351 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12352 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12353 </para>
12354 <para>
12355 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12356 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12357 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12358 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12359 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12360 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12361 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12362 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12363 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12364 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12365 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12366 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12367 idea called "intellectual property."
12368 </para>
12369 <para>
12370 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12371 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12372 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12373 What is the argument?
12374 </para>
12375 <para>
12376 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12377 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12378 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12379 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12380 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12381 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12382 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12383 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12384 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12385 were balanced in just this sense.
12386 </para>
12387 <para>
12388 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12389 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12390 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12391 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12392 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12393 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12394 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12395 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12396 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12397 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12398 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12399 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12400 our
12401 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12402 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12403 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12404 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12405 this common sense open its eyes.
12406 </para>
12407 <para>
12408 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12409 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12410 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12411 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12412 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12413 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12414 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12415 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12416 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12417 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12418 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12419 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12420 </para>
12421 <para>
12422 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12423 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12424 meeting.<footnote><para>
12425 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>,
12426 August 2003, E1, available at
12427 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12428 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12429 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12430 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12431 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12432 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12433 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12434 </para></footnote>
12435 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12436 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12437 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12438 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12439 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12440 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12441 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12442 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12443 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12444 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12445 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12446 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12447 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12448 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12449 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12450 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12451 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12452 in the early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12453 <indexterm><primary>academic journals</primary></indexterm>
12454 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12455 </para>
12456 <para>
12457 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12458 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12459 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12460 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12461 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12462 </para>
12463 <para>
12464 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12465 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12466 meeting.
12467 </para></footnote>
12468 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12469 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12470 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12471 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12472 property issues.
12473 </para>
12474 <para>
12475 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12476 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12477 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12478 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12479 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12480 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12481 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12482 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12483 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12484 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12485 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12486 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12487 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12488 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12489 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12490 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12491 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12492 stuff of
12493 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12494 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12495 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12496 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12497 </para>
12498 <para>
12499 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12500 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12501 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12502 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12503 </para>
12504 <para>
12505 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12506 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12507 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12508 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12509 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12510 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12511 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12512 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12513 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12514 </para>
12515 <para>
12516 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12517 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12518 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12519 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12520 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12521 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM
12522 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12523 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12524 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12525 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12526 <!-- f8. -->
12527 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12528 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12529 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12530 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12531 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12532 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12533 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide," <citetitle>Government Policy
12534 Toward Open Source Software</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12535 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12536 Public Policy Research, 2002), 69, available at
12537 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also
12538 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, <citetitle>The Commercial Software
12539 Model</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (3
12540 May 2001), available at
12541 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12542 </para></footnote>
12543 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12544 </para>
12545 <para>
12546 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12547 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12548 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12549 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12550 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12551 by
12552 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12553 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12554 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12555 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12556 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12557 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12558 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12559 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12560 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12561 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12562 </para>
12563 <para>
12564 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12565 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12566 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12567 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12568 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12569 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12570 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12571 <!-- f9. -->
12572 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12573 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12574 </para></footnote>
12575 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12576 </para>
12577 <para>
12578 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12579 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12580 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12581 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12582 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12583 its lobbying efforts.
12584 </para>
12585 <para>
12586 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12587 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12588 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12589 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12590 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12591 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12592 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12593 goals of WIPO."
12594 </para>
12595 <para>
12596 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12597 </para>
12598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12599 <para>
12600 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12601 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12602 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12603 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12604 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12605 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12606 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12607 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12608 </para>
12609 <para>
12610 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12611 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12612 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12613 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12614 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12615 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12616 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12617 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12618 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12619 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12620 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12621 </para>
12622 <para>
12623 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12624 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12625 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12626 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12627 <emphasis>their</emphasis> rights. If they want to "waive" or
12628 "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12629 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $20 billion to do
12630 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12631 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12632 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12633 to do with <emphasis>their</emphasis> property.
12634 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
12635 </para>
12636 <para>
12637 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12638 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12639 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12640 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12641 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12642 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12643 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12644 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12645 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12646 way possible.
12647 </para>
12648 <para>
12649 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12650 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12651 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12652 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12653 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12654 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12655 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12656 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12657 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12658 that control.
12659 </para>
12660 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12661 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12662 <para>
12663 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12664 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12665 <!-- f10. -->
12666 See Drahos with Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism</citetitle>, 210&ndash;20.
12667 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12668 </para></footnote>
12669 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12670 choice now is whether that information society will be
12671 <emphasis>free</emphasis> or <emphasis>feudal</emphasis>. The trend is
12672 toward the feudal.
12673 </para>
12674 <para>
12675 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12676 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12677 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12678 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12679 </para>
12680 <blockquote>
12681 <para>
12682 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12683 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12684 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12685 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12686 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12687 say anything wrong. But in the world
12688 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12689 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12690 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12691 </para>
12692 </blockquote>
12693 <para>
12694 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12695 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12696 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12697 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12698 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12699 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12700 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12701 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12702 </para>
12703 <para>
12704 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12705 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12706 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12707 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12708 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12709 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12710 </para>
12711 <para>
12712 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12713 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12714 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12715 our own country's history).
12716 </para>
12717 <para>
12718 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12719 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12720 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12721 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12722 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12723 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12724 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12725 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12726 democracy in the world, become?
12727 </para>
12728 <para>
12729 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12730 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12731 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12732 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12733 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12734 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12735 </para>
12736 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12737 <para>
12738 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12739 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12740 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12741 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12742 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12743 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12744 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12745 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12746 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12747 hearings and a different result.
12748 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted</primary></indexterm>
12749 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
12750 </para>
12751 <para>
12752 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12753 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12754 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12755 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12756 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12757 concentration in the media.
12758 </para>
12759 <para>
12760 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12761 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12762 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12763 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12764 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12765 </para>
12766 <para>
12767 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12768 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12769 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12770 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12771 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12772 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12773 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12774 </para>
12775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12776 <para>
12777 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12778 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12779 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12780 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12781 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12782 </para>
12783 <para>
12784 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12785 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12786 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12787 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12788 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12789 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12790 </para>
12791 <para>
12792 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12793 of our tragedy.
12794 </para>
12795 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
12796 <para>
12797 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12798 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12799 <!-- f11. -->
12800 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12801 2003, available at
12802 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12803 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12804 2003, available at
12805 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12806 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12807 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," <citetitle>New York Daily News</citetitle>, 9
12808 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12809 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12810 Defendants," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12811 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," <citetitle>Wired News</citetitle>, 10 September 2003,
12812 available at
12813 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12814 </para></footnote>
12815 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12816 music.<footnote><para>
12817 <!-- f12. -->
12818 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12819 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12820 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12821 </para></footnote>
12822 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12823 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12824 <!-- f13. -->
12825 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12826 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12827 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12828 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12829 </para></footnote>
12830 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12831 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12832 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12833 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12834 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12835 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12836 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12837 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12838 kids who use a computer to share content.
12839 </para>
12840 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12841 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12842 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
12843 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12844 <para>
12845 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12846 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12847 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12848 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12849 24 August 2003, available at
12850 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12851 </para></footnote>
12852 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12853 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12854 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12855 country.<footnote><para>
12856 <!-- f15. -->
12857 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
12858 available at
12859 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12860 </para></footnote>
12861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12862 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12863 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12864 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12865 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12866 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12867 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12868 day into the Causbys.
12869 </para>
12870 <para>
12871 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12872 potential is ever to be realized.
12873
12874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12875
12876 </para>
12877 </chapter>
12878 <chapter id="c-afterword">
12879 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
12880 <para>
12881
12882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12883 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12884 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12885 maps what might be done.
12886 </para>
12887 <para>
12888 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12889 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12890 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12891 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12892 </para>
12893 <para>
12894 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12895 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12896 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
12897 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12898 is so important.
12899 </para>
12900 <para>
12901 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12902 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12903 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12904 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12905 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12906 </para>
12907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12908
12909 <section id="usnow">
12910 <title>US, NOW</title>
12911 <para>
12912 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12913 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
12914 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12915 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12916 </para>
12917 <para>
12918 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12919 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12920 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
12921 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
12922 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12923 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12924 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12925 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12926 </para>
12927 <para>
12928 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12929 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12930 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12931 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12932 the
12933
12934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12935 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12936 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12937 unprotected.
12938 </para>
12939 <para>
12940 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12941 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12942 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12943 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12944 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12945 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12946 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12947 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12948 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12949 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12950 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12951 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12952 </para>
12953 <para>
12954 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
12955 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12956 reserved"&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12957 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12958 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12959 before.
12960 </para>
12961
12962 <section id="examples">
12963 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
12964 <para>
12965 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12966 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12967 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12968 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12969 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12970 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12971 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12972 assured.
12973 </para>
12974 <para>
12975 What made it assured?
12976 </para>
12977 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12978 <para>
12979 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12980 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>, your
12981 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
12982 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12983 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
12984 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
12985 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
12986 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
12987 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
12988 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
12989 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
12990 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
12991 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
12992 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
12993 </para>
12994 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
12995 <para>
12996 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
12997 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
12998 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
12999 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13000 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13001 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13002 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13003 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13004 </para>
13005 <para>
13006 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13007 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13008 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13009 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13010 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13011 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13012 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13013 disappears.
13014 </para>
13015 <para>
13016 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13017 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13018 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13019 friction did.<footnote><para>
13020 <!-- f1. -->
13021
13022 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13023 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13024 Law Review</citetitle> 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13025
13026 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13027 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13028 also Jeffrey Rosen, <citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13029 in an Anxious Age</citetitle> (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13030 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13031 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13032 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13033
13034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13035 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13036 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13037 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13038 </para>
13039 <para>
13040 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13041 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13042 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13043 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13044 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13045 care much about controlling their software.
13046 </para>
13047 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13048 <para>
13049 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13050 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13051 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13052 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13053 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13054 people's work.
13055 </para>
13056 <para>
13057 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13058 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13059 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13060 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13061 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13062 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13063 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13064 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13065 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13066 anything else?
13067 </para>
13068 <para>
13069 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13070 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13071 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13072 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13073 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13074 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13075 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13076 </para>
13077 <para>
13078 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13079 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13080 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13081 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13082 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13083 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13084 fundamentally weakened.
13085 </para>
13086 <para>
13087 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13088 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13089 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13090 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13091 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13092 </para>
13093 <para>
13094 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13095 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13096 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13097 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13098 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13099 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13100 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13101 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13102 byproduct.
13103 </para>
13104 <para>
13105 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13106 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13107 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13108 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13109 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13110 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13111 </para>
13112 <para>
13113 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13114 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13115 scientific journals are produced.
13116 </para>
13117 <indexterm id="idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'>
13118 <primary>academic journals</primary>
13119 </indexterm>
13120 <para>
13121 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13122 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13123 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13124 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13125 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13126 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13127 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13128 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13129 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13130 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13131 and Westlaw are also free
13132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13133 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13134 Court opinion through their respective services.
13135 </para>
13136 <para>
13137 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13138 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13139 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13140 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13141 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13142 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13143 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13144 </para>
13145 <para>
13146 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13147 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13148 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13149 </para>
13150 <para>
13151 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13152 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13153 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13154 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13155 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13156 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13157 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13158 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13159 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13160 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13161 </para>
13162 <para>
13163 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13164 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13165 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13166 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13167 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13168 granted before.
13169 </para>
13170 <para>
13171 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13172 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13173 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13174 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13176 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13177 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13178 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13179 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13180 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13181 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13182 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13183 </para>
13184 <para>
13185 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13186 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13187 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13188 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13189 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13190 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13191 and science.
13192 </para>
13193 <indexterm startref="idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'/>
13194
13195 </section>
13196 <section id="oneidea">
13197 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13198 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13199 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13200 </indexterm>
13201 <para>
13202 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13203 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13204 </para>
13205 <para>
13206 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13207 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13208 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13209 <emphasis>reasonable</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13210 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13211 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13212 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13213 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13214 make this possible.
13215 </para>
13216 <para>
13217 <emphasis>Simple</emphasis>&mdash;which means without a middleman, or
13218 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13219 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13220 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13221 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13222 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13223 shared. These three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a
13224 human-readable description, and
13225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13226 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13227 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13228 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13229 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13230 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13231 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13232 certain freedoms are given.
13233 </para>
13234 <para>
13235 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13236 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13237 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13238 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13239 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13240 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13241 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13242 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13243 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13244 </para>
13245 <para>
13246 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13247 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13248 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13249 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13250 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13251 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13252 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13253 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13254 a public domain.
13255 </para>
13256 <para>
13257 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13258 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13259 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13260 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13261 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13262 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13264 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13265 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13266 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13267 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13268 </para>
13269 <para>
13270 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13271 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13272 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13273 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13274 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13275 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13276 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13277 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13278 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13279 to begin to build those rules.
13280 </para>
13281 <para>
13282 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13283 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13284 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
13285 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13286 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13287 </para>
13288 <para>
13289 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13290 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13291 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13292 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13293 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13294 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13295 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13296 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13297 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13298 <emphasis>increase</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13299 </para>
13300 <para>
13301 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13302 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13303 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13304 was a total success.
13305 </para>
13306 <para>
13307 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13308 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13310 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled <citetitle>Free for All</citetitle>,
13311 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13312 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13313 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13314 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13315 well.
13316 </para>
13317 <para>
13318 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13319 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13320 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13321 reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because anything
13322 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13323 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13324 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13325 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13326 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13327 <emphasis>legal</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13328 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13329 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow"
13330 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13331 high<footnote><para>
13332 <!-- f2. -->
13333
13334 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13335 Culture Wars</citetitle> (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13336 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13337 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13338 </para></footnote>),
13339 these artists release into the creative environment content
13340 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13341 </para>
13342 <para>
13343 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13344 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13345 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13346 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13347 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13348 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13349 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13350 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13351 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13352 say it to others.
13353 </para>
13354 <para>
13355 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13356 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13357 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13358 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13359
13360 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13361 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13362 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13363 </para>
13364 <para>
13365 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13366 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13367 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13368 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13369 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13370 steps are possible.
13371 </para>
13372 <para>
13373 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13374 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13375 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13376 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13377 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13378 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13379 creativity to spread more easily.
13380 </para>
13381 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13382
13383 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13384 </section>
13385 </section>
13386 <section id="themsoon">
13387 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13388 <para>
13389 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13390 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13391 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13392 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13393 changes that we need.
13394 </para>
13395 <para>
13396 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13397 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13398 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13399 to our end.
13400 </para>
13401
13402 <section id="formalities">
13403 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13404 <para>
13405 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13406 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13407 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13408 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13409 </para>
13410 <para>
13411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13412 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13413 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13414 protected.
13415 </para>
13416 <para>
13417 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13418 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13419 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13420 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13421 </para>
13422 <para>
13423 Why?
13424 </para>
13425 <para>
13426 As I suggested in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
13427 linkend="property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13428 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13429 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13430 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13431 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13432 formalities were getting in the way.
13433 </para>
13434 <para>
13435 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13436 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13437 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13438 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13439 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13440 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13441 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13442 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13443 past. And thus, the <emphasis>lack</emphasis> of formalities forces
13444 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13445 </para>
13446 <para>
13447 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13448 <!-- f1. -->
13449 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13450 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13451 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13452 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13453 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13454 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13455 </para>
13456 <para>
13457 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13458 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13459 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13460 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13461 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13462 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13463 developed by others.
13464 </para>
13465
13466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13467
13468 <section id="registration">
13469 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13470 <para>
13471 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13472 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13473 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13474 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13475 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13476 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13477 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13478 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13479 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13480 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13481 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13482 </para>
13483 <para>
13484 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13485 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13486 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13487 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13488 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13489 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13490 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13491 </para>
13492 <para>
13493 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13494 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13495 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13496 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13497 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13498 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13499 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13500 with which registration occurs up.
13501 </para>
13502 <para>
13503 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13504 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13505 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13506 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13507 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13508 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13509 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13510 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13511 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13512 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13513 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13514 </para>
13515
13516 </section>
13517 <section id="marking">
13518 <title>MARKING</title>
13519 <para>
13520 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13521 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13522 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13523 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13524 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13525 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13526 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13527 uniformly across all media.
13528 </para>
13529 <para>
13530 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13531 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13532 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13533 use the work.
13534 </para>
13535 <para>
13536 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13537 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13538 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13539 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13540 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13541 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13542 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13543 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13544 </para>
13545 <para>
13546 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13547 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13548 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13549 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13550 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13551 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13552 <!-- f2. -->
13553 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13554 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13555 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13556 </para></footnote>
13557 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13558 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13559 stop using the work in any new
13560 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13561 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13562 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13563 their work.
13564 </para>
13565 <para>
13566 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13567 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13568 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13569 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13570 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13571 </para>
13572 <para>
13573 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13574 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13575 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13576 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13577 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13578 <emphasis>solely</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13579 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13580 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13581 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13582 other important functions.
13583 </para>
13584 <para>
13585 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13586 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13587 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13588 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13589 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13590 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13591 </para>
13592 <para>
13593 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13594 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13595 make things unclear.
13596 </para>
13597 <para>
13598 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13599 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13600 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13601 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13602 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13603 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13604 </para>
13605
13606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13607 </section>
13608 </section>
13609 <section id="shortterms">
13610 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13611 <para>
13612 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13613 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13614 natural authors.
13615 </para>
13616 <para>
13617 In <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13618 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13619 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13620 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13621 radical. <citetitle>The Economist</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13622 copyright term.<footnote><para>
13623
13624 <!-- f3. -->
13625 "A Radical Rethink," <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13626 available at
13627 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13628 </para></footnote>
13629 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13630 </para>
13631 <para>
13632 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13633 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13634 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13635 terms.
13636 </para>
13637 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13638 <listitem><para>
13639 <!-- (1) -->
13640 <emphasis>Keep it short:</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13641 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13642 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13643 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13644 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13645 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13646 </para></listitem>
13647 <listitem><para>
13648 <!-- (2) -->
13649 <emphasis>Keep it simple:</emphasis> The line between the public
13650 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13651 fuzziness of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13652 "expression." That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13653 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
13654 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
13655 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
13656 "lawyer-free zone" makes the complexities of "fair use" and
13657 "idea/expression" less necessary to navigate.
13658 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13659 </para></listitem>
13660 <listitem><para>
13661 <!-- (3) -->
13662 <emphasis>Keep it alive:</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
13663 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13664 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
13665 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
13666 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
13667 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
13668 pension.<footnote><para>
13669 <!-- f4. -->
13670 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13671 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13672 available at
13673 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13674 </para></footnote>
13675 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13676 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13677 single form.
13678 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions</primary></indexterm>
13679 </para></listitem>
13680 <listitem><para>
13681 <!-- (4) -->
13682 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:</emphasis> Whatever the term of
13683 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
13684 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
13685 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
13686 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
13687 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in 1923 than we
13688 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
13689 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
13690 the number of authors who wrote in 1923. Of course, we can increase
13691 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
13692 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
13693 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
13694 creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
13695 we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13696 </orderedlist>
13697 <para>
13698 These changes together should produce an <emphasis>average</emphasis>
13699 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976,
13700 the average term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
13701 same.
13702 </para>
13703 <para>
13704 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13705 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13706 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13707 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13708 </para>
13709
13710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13711
13712 </section>
13713 <section id="freefairuse">
13714 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13715 <para>
13716 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13717 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13718 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13719 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13720 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13721 the emergence of that new technology.
13722 </para>
13723 <para>
13724 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13725 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13726 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13727 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13728 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13729 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13730 though that movie is not "my writing."
13731 </para>
13732 <para>
13733 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13734 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13735 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13736 <!-- f5. -->
13737 Benjamin Kaplan, <citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
13738 University Press, 1967), 32.
13739 </para></footnote>
13740 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13741 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13742 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13743 </para>
13744 <blockquote>
13745 <para>
13746 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13747 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13748 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13749 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13750 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13751 </para></footnote>
13752 </para>
13753 </blockquote>
13754 <para>
13755 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13756 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13757 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13758 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13759 Consider each limitation in turn.
13760 </para>
13761 <para>
13762 <emphasis>Term:</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
13763 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
13764 sense to protect John
13765
13766 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13767 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13768 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13769 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13770 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13771 after the creative work is done.
13772 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
13773 </para>
13774 <para>
13775 <emphasis>Scope:</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
13776 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
13777 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
13778 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
13779 material. When all "reuse" of creative material was within the control
13780 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
13781 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
13782 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
13783 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
13784 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
13785 the creative process. Smothers it.
13786 </para>
13787 <para>
13788 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13789 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13790 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13791 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13792 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13793 much more sense.
13794 </para>
13795 <para>
13796 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13797 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13798 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13799 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13800 <para>
13801 <!-- f7. -->
13802 Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13803 Jukebox</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13804 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13805 </para></footnote>
13806 His view is that the law should be written so that
13807 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13808 </para>
13809 <para>
13810 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13811 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13812 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13813 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13814 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13815 </para>
13816 <para>
13817 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13819 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13820 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13821 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13822 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13823 </para>
13824 </section>
13825
13826 <section id="liberatemusic">
13827 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13828 <para>
13829 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13830 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13831 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13832 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13833 battles around the sharing of music.
13834 </para>
13835 <para>
13836 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13837 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13838 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13839 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13840 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13841 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13842 innovation on the network.
13843 </para>
13844 <para>
13845 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13846 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13847 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13848 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13849 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13850 </para>
13851 <para>
13852 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
13853 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
13854 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
13855 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="piracy"/>, they enable
13856 four different kinds of sharing:
13857 </para>
13858 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
13859 <listitem><para>
13860 <!-- A. -->
13861 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13862 for purchasing CDs.
13863 </para></listitem>
13864 <listitem><para>
13865 <!-- B. -->
13866 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13867 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13868 </para></listitem>
13869 <listitem><para>
13870 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13871 <!-- C. -->
13872 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13873 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13874 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13875 </para></listitem>
13876 <listitem><para>
13877 <!-- D. -->
13878 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13879 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13880 owner plainly endorses.
13881 </para></listitem>
13882 </orderedlist>
13883 <para>
13884 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13885 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13886 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13887 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13888 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13889 significantly weakened.
13890 </para>
13891 <para>
13892 As I said in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
13893 linkend="piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13894 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13895 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13896 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13897 networks.
13898 </para>
13899 <para>
13900 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13901 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13902 should respond.
13903 </para>
13904 <para>
13905 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13906 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13907 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13908 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13909 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
13910 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13911 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13912 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13913 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13914 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13915 </para>
13916 <para>
13917 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13918 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13919 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13920 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13921 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13922 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13923 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13924 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13925 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13926 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
13927 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
13928 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13929 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13930 </para>
13931 <para>
13932 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
13933 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio,
13934 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
13935 then, is the critical point: When it is <emphasis>extremely</emphasis>
13936 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
13937 <emphasis>easier</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
13938 access to content than it will be to download and store content
13939 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
13940 content</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
13941 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13942 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13943 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13944 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13945 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13946 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13947 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13948 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
13949 <!-- f8. -->
13950 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
13951 April 2002, available at
13952 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
13953 </para></footnote>
13954
13955 </para>
13956 <para>
13957 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13958 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13959 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
13960 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13961 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13962 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13963 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13964 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13965 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13966 artists get paid, during
13967
13968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13969 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13970 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13971 </para>
13972 <para>
13973 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13974 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
13975 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13976 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13977 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13978 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13979 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13980 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13981 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13982 </para>
13983 <para>
13984 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13985 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13986 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13987 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13988 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13989 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13990 way that returns something to the artist.
13991 </para>
13992 <para>
13993 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13994 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13995 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13996 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13997 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13998 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13999 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14000 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14001 </para>
14002 <para>
14003 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14004 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14005 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14006 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14007 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14008 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14009 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14010 </para>
14011 <para>
14012
14013 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14014 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14015 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14016 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14017 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14018 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14019 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14020 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14021 trade.
14022 </para>
14023 <para>
14024 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14025 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14026 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14027 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14028 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14029 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14030 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14031 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14032 </para>
14033 <para>
14034 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14035 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14036 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14037 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14038 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14039 delivering and accessing content.
14040 </para>
14041 <para>
14042 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14043 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14044 </para>
14045 <para>
14046 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14047 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14048 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14049 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14050 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14051 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14052 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14053 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14054 </para>
14055 <para>
14056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14057 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14058 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14059 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14060 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14061 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14062 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14063 </para>
14064 <para>
14065 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14066 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14067 <para>
14068 <!-- f9. -->
14069 William Fisher, <citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities</citetitle> (last
14070 revised: 10 October 2000), available at
14071 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William
14072 Fisher, <citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14073 Entertainment</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14074 2004), ch. 6, available at
14075 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14076 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14077 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14078 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14079 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14080 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14081 Broadband?" <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14082 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14083 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14084 available at
14085 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, <citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14086 Use Fee (IPUF)</citetitle>, 3 March 2002, available at
14087 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14088 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 13 May
14089 2002, available at
14090 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14091 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14092 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14093 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14094 2002, available at
14095 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14096 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14097 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14098 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14099 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14100 debate by about a decade. See
14101 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14102 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14103 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14104 </para></footnote>
14105 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14106 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14107 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14108 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14109 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14110 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14111 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14112 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14113 tax.
14114 </para>
14115 <para>
14116 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14117 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14118 <citetitle>Promises to Keep</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14119 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14120 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14121 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14122 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14123 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14124 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14125 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14126 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14127 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14128 controlling access.
14129 </para>
14130 <para>
14131 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14132 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14133 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14134 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14135 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14136 limits on derivative
14137
14138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14139 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14140 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14141 allowed to do with the content itself.
14142 </para>
14143 <para>
14144 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14145 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14146 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14147 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14148 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14149 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14150 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14151 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14152 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14153 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14154 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14155 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14156 on-line.
14157 </para>
14158 <para>
14159 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14160 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14161 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14162 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14163 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14164 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14165 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14166 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14167 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14168 finding ways to compete with "free."
14169 </para>
14170 <para>
14171 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14172 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14173 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14174 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14175 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14176 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14177 the law.
14178 </para>
14179 <para>
14180 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14181 </para>
14182 <para>
14183
14184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14185 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14186 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14187 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14188 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14189 create.
14190 </para>
14191 <para>
14192 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14193 by
14194 </para>
14195 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14196 <listitem><para>
14197 <!-- 1. -->
14198 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14199 </para></listitem>
14200 <listitem><para>
14201 <!-- 2. -->
14202 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14203 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14204 statute;
14205 </para></listitem>
14206 <listitem><para>
14207 <!-- 3. -->
14208 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14209 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14210 </para></listitem>
14211 </orderedlist>
14212 <para>
14213 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14214 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14215 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14216 something then?
14217 </para>
14218 <para>
14219 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14220 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14221 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14222 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14223 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size <citetitle>x</citetitle>,
14224 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14225 market of five times <citetitle>x</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14226 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14227 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14228 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14229 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14230 pirates.
14231 </para>
14232 <para>
14233 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14234 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14235 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14236
14237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14238 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14239 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14240 </para>
14241 </section>
14242
14243 <section id="firelawyers">
14244 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14245 <para>
14246 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14247 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14248 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14249 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14250 </para>
14251 <para>
14252 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14253 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14254 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14255 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14256 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14257 strong view queers the law.
14258 </para>
14259 <para>
14260 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14261 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14262 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14263 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14264 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14265 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14266 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14267 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14268 <!-- f10. -->
14269 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14270 Memorial Lecture), <citetitle>UCLA Law Review</citetitle> 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14271 </para></footnote>
14272
14273 </para>
14274 <para>
14275 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14276 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14277 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14278 </para>
14279 <para>
14280 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14281 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14282 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14283 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14284 <!-- f11. -->
14285 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14286 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14287 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14288 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14289 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14290 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14291 J. Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14292 Drive the Digital Marketplace</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14293 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14294 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June 2003,
14295 available at
14296 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14297 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14298 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14299 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14300 <citetitle>Rethinking</citetitle>, 174&ndash;76.
14301 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
14302 </para></footnote>
14303 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14304 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14305 them it works.
14306 </para>
14307 <para>
14308 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14309 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14310 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14311 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14312 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14313 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14314 practically never be done.
14315 </para>
14316 <para>
14317 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14318 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14319 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14320 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14321 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14322 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14323 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14324 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14325 </para>
14326 <para>
14327 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14328 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14329 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14330 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14331 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14332 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14333 </para>
14334 <para>
14335 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14336 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14337 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14338 its review.
14339 </para>
14340 <para>
14341 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14342 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14343 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14344 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14345 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14346 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14347 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14348 </para>
14349 <para>
14350 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14351 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14352
14353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14354 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14355 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14356 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14357 </para>
14358 <para>
14359 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14360 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14361 keep your lawyers away.
14362 </para>
14363 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14364 </section>
14365 </section>
14366 </chapter>
14367 <chapter id="c-notes">
14368 <title>NOTES</title>
14369 <para>
14370 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14371 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14372 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14373 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14374 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14375 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14376 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14377 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14378 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14379 the material.
14380 </para>
14381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14382
14383 </chapter>
14384 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14385 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14386 <para>
14387 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14388 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14389 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14390 to him that this book is dedicated.
14391 </para>
14392 <para>
14393 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14394 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14395 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14396 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14397 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14398 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14399 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14400 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14401 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14402 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14403 critical eye on much of this.
14404 </para>
14405 <para>
14406 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14407 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14408 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14409 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14410 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14411 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14412 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14413 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14414 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14415 </para>
14416 <para>
14417 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14418 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14419 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14420 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14421 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14422 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14423 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14424 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14425 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14426 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14427 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14428 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14429 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14430 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14431 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14432 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14433 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14434 a bunch of great replies.)
14435 </para>
14436 <para>
14437 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14438 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14439 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14440 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14441 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14442 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14443 throughout this book.
14444 </para>
14445 <para>
14446 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14447 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14448 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14449 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14450 </para>
14451 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14452
14453 </chapter>
14454 <index></index>
14455 </book>