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19 <book id=
"index" lang=
"en">
21 <title>Free Culture
</title>
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
25 <subtitle>Version
2004-
02-
10</subtitle>
29 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
52 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz
25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "
50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
78 <itemizedlist mark=
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79 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B
&N
</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin
</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
89 <sbr/>The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
91 <sbr/>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
106 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
107 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
108 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
118 <sbr/>a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
120 <sbr/>Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig,
121 <sbr/>All rights reserved
122 <sbr/>Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
123 The New York Times, January
16,
2003. Copyright
© 2003 by The New York Times Co.
124 Reprinted with permission.
125 <sbr/>Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page
159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
126 <sbr/>All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
127 <sbr/>Diagram on page
164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
128 <sbr/>Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
129 <sbr/>Lessig, Lawrence.
130 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
131 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
133 <sbr/>Includes index.
134 <sbr/>ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
135 <sbr/>1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
136 <sbr/>3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
138 <sbr/>343.7309'
9—dc22
139 <sbr/>This book is printed on acid-free paper.
140 <sbr/>Printed in the United States of America
141 <sbr/>1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
142 <sbr/>Designed by Marysarah Quinn
150 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
151 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
152 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
153 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
154 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
155 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
156 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
157 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
158 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
159 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
160 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
165 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
169 <figure id=
"CreativeCommons">
170 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</title>
171 <graphic fileref=
"images/cc.png"></graphic>
177 <title>List of figures
</title>
184 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
185 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
186 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
187 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
192 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
196 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
197 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
198 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
199 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
200 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
201 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
205 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
206 2 Architecture and Law: Force
207 2 Market: Concentration
210 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
211 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
212 2 Constraining Creators
213 2 Constraining Innovators
214 2 Corrupting Citizens
216 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
217 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
221 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
222 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
224 2 1. More Formalities
225 3 Registration and Renewal
228 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
229 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
230 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
239 <chapter id=
"c-preface">
240 <title>PREFACE
</title>
242 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
243 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
244 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
248 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
249 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
250 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
251 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
252 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times,
30 January
2000.
257 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
259 or "code," functioned as a kind of law
—and his review suggested
260 the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we could always
261 "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a switch and be back
262 home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and any troubles
263 that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
266 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
267 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
268 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
270 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
271 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
272 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
275 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
276 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
277 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
278 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
281 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
282 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"
—not
283 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
284 freesoftware movement
<footnote>
286 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies
57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
287 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
288 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
289 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
290 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
291 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
292 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
293 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
294 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
295 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"
—a culture in
296 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
297 or of creators from the past.
300 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
301 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
302 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
303 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
304 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
305 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
306 culture deem fundamental.
308 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
310 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
311 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
312 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
313 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
314 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
315 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
316 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
317 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
322 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
323 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
324 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
325 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
326 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
327 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times,
22 May
2003.
332 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
333 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
334 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
335 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
336 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
337 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
338 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
339 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
340 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
341 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
342 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
343 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
344 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
345 that this work is "merely" derivative.
348 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
349 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this book
350 than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been its own.
351 Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of values. Like
352 Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And like Stallman,
353 I believe those are values of our past that will need to be defended in
354 our future. A free culture has been our past, but it will only be our
356 if we change the path we are on right now.
358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
359 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
360 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
361 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
362 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
363 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
367 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
369 anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is filled
370 with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract that get
371 enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its
373 becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism
374 in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear about our
376 today. It is against that extremism that this book is written.
380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
383 <chapter id=
"c-introduction">
384 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
386 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
387 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
388 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
389 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
390 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
391 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
394 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
395 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
396 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
397 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."
<footnote><para>
398 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries
3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
399 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
402 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
403 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
404 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
407 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
408 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
409 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
410 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
411 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
412 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
413 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
416 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
417 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
418 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
419 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
420 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
421 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
422 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
423 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
424 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
427 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
428 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
429 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
430 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
431 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
432 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
433 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
434 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
438 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
439 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
440 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
441 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
442 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
443 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
444 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
445 the public has a just claim.
<footnote><para>
446 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find that
447 there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land effectively
449 the value of the Causbys' land. This example was suggested to me
450 by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty:
451 Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship," Stanford Law
453 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul Goldstein, Real Property
455 N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
1112–13.
460 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
463 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
464 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
465 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
467 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
468 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
469 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
470 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
471 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
474 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
475 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
476 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
477 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
478 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
479 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
480 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
481 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
482 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
483 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
484 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
485 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
486 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
487 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else
—the power of
488 "common sense"
—would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
489 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
492 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
493 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
494 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
495 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
496 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
497 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
498 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
499 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
500 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
501 understanding of radio.
502 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
505 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
506 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
507 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
508 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
509 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
510 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
511 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
512 much less transmitter power and static.
515 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting
516 of the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in
517 New York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
518 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
520 miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and then with a
521 clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an electrical
523 it produced the sound of an announcer's voice: "This is amateur
524 station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on frequency
526 at two and a half meters."
529 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
533 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
534 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was
535 crumpled and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling
536 forest fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a
538 solo and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was
539 projected with a live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
540 "music box."
<footnote><para>
541 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
542 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
547 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a
548 vastly superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention,
550 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the
551 then dominant AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio
552 stations across the United States, but the stations in large cities were all
553 owned by a handful of networks.
554 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
557 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
558 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
559 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
560 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
561 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
565 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
566 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a revolution
—
567 start up a whole damn new industry to compete with RCA.
<footnote><para>
568 See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," First
570 Church of America, at www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
572 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
577 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
578 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
579 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
584 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
585 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
586 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
587 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
588 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
589 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
594 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
595 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
596 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
597 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
598 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
599 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
600 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
601 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
602 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
603 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
604 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
609 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
610 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
611 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
612 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
617 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
619 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
620 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
621 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
622 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
623 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
624 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
625 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
629 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
630 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
631 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
632 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
633 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
634 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
635 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
636 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
637 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
638 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
641 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
642 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
643 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
644 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
645 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
646 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
647 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
648 course always public spirited; the reality is something
649 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
650 to themselves, would crumble in
651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
652 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
653 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
655 of technological change.
658 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good
659 date upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the
661 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
662 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had
664 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years before.
<footnote><para>
665 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look
666 at Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
667 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
668 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
670 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
674 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
675 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
676 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
677 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
678 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
679 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
680 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
681 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
682 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
685 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
687 itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that the
688 Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
689 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as old as
690 the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change, would reject
691 it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet has introduced.
694 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
695 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
697 of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our culture
698 that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By "noncommercial
699 culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around parks or on
700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
701 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
702 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader,"
703 or Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
706 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
707 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
708 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the peace,
709 then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly concerned
710 with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it left this
712 "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary individuals shared and
713 transformed their culture
—telling stories, reenacting scenes from plays
714 or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were
715 left alone by the law.
718 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
719 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
720 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
721 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
722 marketplace.
<footnote>
723 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
725 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
726 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
727 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
728 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
729 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
730 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
731 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
735 course, an important part of creativity and culture, and it has become
736 an increasingly important part in America. But in no sense was it
738 within our tradition. It was instead just one part, a controlled
739 part, balanced with the free.
742 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
743 been erased.
<footnote><para>
744 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
747 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and,
748 pushed by big media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in
749 our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
750 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
752 to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
754 that it never reached before. The technology that preserved the
755 balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were free and
756 uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has been undone.
757 The consequence is that we are less and less a free culture, more and
758 more a permission culture.
760 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
762 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
764 And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the
765 protectionism that justifies the changes that I will describe below is not
766 the limited and balanced sort that has defined the law in the past. This
767 is not a protectionism to protect artists. It is instead a protectionism
768 to protect certain forms of business. Corporations threatened by the
769 potential of the Internet to change the way both commercial and
770 noncommercial culture are made and shared have united to induce
771 lawmakers to use the law to protect them. It is the story of RCA and
772 Armstrong; it is the dream of the Causbys.
775 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
776 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that
777 reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
779 for making and cultivating culture generally, and that change
780 in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet is thus to
781 the industries that built and distributed content in the twentieth
783 what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was to the
784 railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of the end,
785 or at least a substantial transformation. Digital technologies, tied to the
786 Internet, could produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market
787 for building and cultivating culture; that market could include a much
788 wider and more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce
789 and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending
790 upon a few important factors, those creators could earn more on average
791 from this system than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our
792 day don't use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
795 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
797 in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the early
798 twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using their
799 power to get the law to protect them against this new, more efficient,
800 more vibrant technology for building culture. They are succeeding in
801 their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet remakes them.
804 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
805 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
806 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
807 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether "piracy" will
808 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
809 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
811 Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
812 calls his "own terrorist war"
<footnote><para>
813 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
814 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
815 Times,
17 January
2002.
816 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
817 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
818 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
822 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
823 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
825 in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls "creative
827 I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the law, properly tuned,
828 should punish "piracy," whether on or off the Internet.
831 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
832 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
833 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
834 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
837 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
838 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
839 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
840 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
841 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
842 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
844 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
845 Journal
106 (
1996):
283.
847 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
848 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
849 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
850 could cultivate and extend our culture.
853 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
854 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
855 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
856 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
857 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
858 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
859 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
860 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
861 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
863 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26 -->
865 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
867 of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or
868 otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for
869 neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a
871 tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
874 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
876 by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its
877 code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace.
878 There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet
880 to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and
881 culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to
883 the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
886 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property."
887 The property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
888 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding this
889 "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
891 of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
892 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners of
893 "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys, treat
894 these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object when
895 a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to us as it
896 was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are "trespassing"
897 upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to us as it was to
898 them that the law should intervene to stop this trespass.
901 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
902 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
904 sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky Causbys,
905 common sense is on the side of the property owners in this war. Unlike
906 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
907 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
911 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
913 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
914 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
915 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
916 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
917 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
918 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
922 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
923 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
925 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
930 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
931 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
934 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
935 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
936 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
937 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
938 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
941 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
942 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
943 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
945 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
949 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe
950 it was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
951 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt against
952 the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual property."
953 What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a sheriff
955 an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of this silliness will
956 be much more profound.
957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
960 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
961 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
965 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
966 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
968 French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird sort we
969 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
970 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
971 can be more fully understood.
974 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
975 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
977 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
978 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
979 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
980 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
982 by the changes to use their power to change the law
—and more
983 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
984 who we have always been.
987 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
988 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
989 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
990 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
991 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
992 to which most of us remain oblivious.
995 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
996 <chapter id=
"c-piracy">
997 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1001 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
1002 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1003 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1005 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1006 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1010 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1011 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1012 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1014 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1019 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1020 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1022 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1023 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1024 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1026 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1027 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1030 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1031 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1032 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1034 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1035 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1038 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1040 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1041 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1043 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1044 piercing
—our kids are becoming thieves!
1047 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1048 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1049 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1050 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1053 The idea goes something like this:
1057 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1058 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1059 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1060 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1061 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1066 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1067 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1068 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1070 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1071 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review
65 (
1990):
397.
1073 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1074 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1075 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1076 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1078 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1079 Up," Wall Street Journal,
21 August
1996, available at
1080 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1081 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1082 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe,
24 November
2002.
1084 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1085 "right"
—even against the Girl Scouts.
1087 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1089 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1090 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1092 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1093 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1095 It has never taken hold within our law.
1098 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1099 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1100 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1101 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1102 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1105 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1106 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1107 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1108 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1109 copyright law today regulates both.
1112 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1113 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1114 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1115 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1116 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1117 more expense of doing business.
1119 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1121 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1122 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1123 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1124 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1125 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1126 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1127 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1128 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1129 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1130 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1131 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1132 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1133 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1134 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1135 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1137 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."
<footnote>
1138 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1141 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books,
2002),
1142 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1143 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1144 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1145 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1146 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1147 enabled are much more tenuous.
1149 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1150 this creative class.
1153 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1154 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1155 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1158 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1159 <sect1 id=
"creators">
1160 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1162 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1163 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1164 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1165 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1166 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1169 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1170 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1171 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1172 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1173 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1174 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1178 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1179 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1180 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1181 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1185 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1186 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1187 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1188 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1189 synchronization was pretty close.
1192 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1194 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1195 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1196 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1197 wonderful! And it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1199 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1201 (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1206 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1207 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1208 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1211 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1212 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1213 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1214 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1215 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1216 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1217 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1220 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also
1221 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1222 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1223 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1226 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of
1227 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1228 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1229 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1230 The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular and among the best of its
1234 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1236 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1237 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1239 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1240 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1241 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1242 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1243 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No.
1"
1244 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1245 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1246 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1248 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1249 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1250 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1251 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1252 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1256 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1257 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1258 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1260 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1261 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1262 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1264 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1265 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1266 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1267 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1268 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1269 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1270 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1271 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1275 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1276 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1277 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1278 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1279 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1280 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1281 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1284 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1285 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1286 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1287 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1288 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1289 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1290 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (
1937),
1291 Fantasia (
1940), Pinocchio (
1940), Dumbo (
1941), Bambi (
1942), Song of
1292 the South (
1946), Cinderella (
1950), Alice in Wonderland (
1951), Robin
1293 Hood (
1952), Peter Pan (
1953), Lady and the Tramp
1294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1295 (
1955), Mulan (
1998), Sleeping Beauty (
1959),
101 Dalmatians (
1961),
1296 The Sword in the Stone (
1963), and The Jungle Book (
1967)
—not to
1297 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1298 Treasure Planet (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1299 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1300 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1301 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1304 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1305 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1306 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1307 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1308 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1309 creativity"
—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1310 culture around us and makes it something different.
1312 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1313 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1314 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1315 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1316 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1318 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1319 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1321 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1322 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1323 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1325 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1326 Web site associated with this book, available at
1327 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1329 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1330 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1331 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1332 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1335 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1336 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1337 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1338 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1339 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1340 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1341 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1344 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1345 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1346 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1347 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1349 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1350 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1351 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1352 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1353 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1354 content from before the Great Depression.
1357 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1358 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1359 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1363 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1364 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1365 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1366 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1367 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1368 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1369 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1372 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1373 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1374 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1375 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1376 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1377 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1378 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1379 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1380 interestingly different way.
1383 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1384 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1385 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1388 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1389 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1390 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1391 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1393 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1394 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1395 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1396 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1397 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1398 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1399 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1402 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1403 huge. More than
33,
000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1404 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1405 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1406 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1407 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1408 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1409 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1410 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1413 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1414 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1415 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1416 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1417 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1418 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1419 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1420 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1421 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1422 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1423 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1424 original copyright owner's permission.
1427 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1428 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1429 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1430 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1431 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1434 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1435 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1436 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1438 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1439 York: Perennial,
2000).
1443 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1444 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1445 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1446 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1447 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1448 which are fifty years old."
1451 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1452 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1453 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1454 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1455 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1456 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1457 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1459 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1460 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1461 Review
55 (
2002):
155,
182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1462 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1463 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1464 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1465 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1466 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1470 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1471 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1472 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1473 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1474 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1475 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1476 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1477 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1481 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1482 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1483 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1484 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1485 to prosecute cases like this."
1488 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1489 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1490 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1491 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1492 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1493 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1494 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1495 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1496 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1497 their clients or hurt them?
1498 Let's pause for a moment.
1501 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1502 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1503 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1506 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1507 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1508 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1509 "intellectual property."
<footnote><para>
1511 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1513 Copyrights and Copywrongs,
11 (New York: New York
1515 Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1516 Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately describes a set of
1517 "property" rights
—copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret
—but the
1518 nature of those rights is very different.
1520 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1522 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1523 intellectual property.
1526 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1527 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1528 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1529 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1530 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1531 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1532 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1533 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1534 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1535 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1536 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1537 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1541 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1542 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1543 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1545 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1546 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1550 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1551 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1552 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1553 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1554 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1555 form, whether large or small.
1558 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1559 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1560 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1561 particular find it hard to say why.
1564 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1565 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1566 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1567 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1568 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1569 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1570 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1571 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1572 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1573 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1574 movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s; two volcano disaster
1578 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1579 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1580 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1581 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1582 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1583 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1584 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1585 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1586 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1589 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1590 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1591 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1592 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1593 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1594 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1595 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1596 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1597 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1600 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1601 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1602 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1605 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1607 <sect1 id=
"mere-copyists">
1608 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
</title>
1610 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1611 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1612 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1613 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1614 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1615 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1616 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1619 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1620 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1621 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1622 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1623 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1624 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1625 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1626 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1630 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1631 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1633 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1634 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1635 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1636 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1637 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1638 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1639 population of photographers.
1642 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1643 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1644 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1645 do the rest."
<footnote><para>
1647 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1648 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1652 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1653 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1654 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1655 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1656 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1657 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1658 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1659 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1660 chemicals.
<footnote>
1661 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1664 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1670 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1671 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1672 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1673 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1674 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1675 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1676 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1677 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1678 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1679 percent.
<footnote><para>
1682 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1683 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1685 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1688 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1691 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1692 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1693 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1694 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1695 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1696 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1697 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1698 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1699 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1700 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1701 interpretation or bias."
<footnote><para>
1707 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1708 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1709 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1710 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1711 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1712 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1713 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1714 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1715 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1716 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1720 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1721 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1722 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1723 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1724 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1725 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1726 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1727 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1729 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co.,
50 S.E.
1733 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1734 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1735 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1736 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1737 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1740 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1741 that they thought valuable.
1743 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1745 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1746 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1747 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1748 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1749 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1750 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1751 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1754 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1755 Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193.
1756 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1757 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1758 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1759 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1762 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1763 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1764 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1765 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1766 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1767 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1768 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1769 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1770 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1772 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1773 Problems
19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1774 Review
48 (
1960)
398–407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1775 Inc.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1780 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1781 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1782 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1783 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1784 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1785 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1786 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1787 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1788 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1789 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1790 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1791 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1792 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1796 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1797 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1798 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1799 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1800 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1801 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1802 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1803 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1804 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1805 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1806 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1807 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1808 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1809 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1810 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1811 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1812 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1813 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1814 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1815 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1816 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1817 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1818 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1822 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1823 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1824 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1825 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1826 professional quality for $
595."
<footnote><para>
1828 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1830 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1831 February
2002, available at
1832 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1834 These buses are filled with technology that
1835 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1836 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1837 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1838 teachers call "media literacy."
1841 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1842 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1843 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1844 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1845 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1846 the way people access it."
1849 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1850 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1851 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1855 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1856 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1857 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
1859 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1860 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1861 Study," Denver Post,
25 May
1997, B6.
1863 it is increasingly important to understand the
1864 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1865 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1866 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1868 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1871 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1872 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1873 written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult it is to
1875 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1876 understandable
—few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1877 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1878 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1879 emotion or builds suspense.
1882 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1883 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1884 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1885 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1886 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1887 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1890 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just
1891 film, as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of
1893 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1896 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1897 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1899 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
1902 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
1905 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1906 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1907 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1908 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1909 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1910 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1911 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1912 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
1914 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4
1915 November
2000, available at
1916 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>; "Timeline,"
22 November
2000,
1918 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
1921 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
1923 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1924 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1925 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1926 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1927 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1930 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
1931 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
1932 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1933 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1937 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1938 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1939 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1940 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1945 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1946 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1950 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1951 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1953 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1954 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1956 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1958 language for what they need to create or express."
<footnote>
1959 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
1962 Interview with Daley and Barish.
1963 </para></footnote> It is to enable
1964 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."
<footnote><para>
1969 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
1971 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
1972 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
1973 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
1974 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
1975 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
1976 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
1977 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
1978 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
1979 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
1980 students know something about
—gun violence.
1983 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
1984 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
1985 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
1986 away. The "kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,"
1987 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
1988 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
1991 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
1992 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
1993 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
1994 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
1995 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
1996 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
1997 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
1998 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
1999 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2000 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2001 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2002 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2003 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2004 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2005 to this form of expression.
2009 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2010 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2011 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2013 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2015 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2016 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part
—and
2018 not the most powerful part
—of constructing meaning. As Daley
2019 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2023 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2024 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2025 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2026 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2027 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2028 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2029 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2030 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2031 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2032 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2033 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2034 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2035 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2036 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2037 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2038 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2039 about the topic. . . .
2042 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2043 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2044 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2045 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2046 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2049 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2050 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2051 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2052 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2053 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2054 had a lot of power with this language."
2058 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2059 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2060 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2061 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2062 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2063 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2064 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2065 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2066 world would be watching.
2069 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2070 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2071 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2072 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2073 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2074 entertainment is tragedy.
2076 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2077 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2079 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2080 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2081 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2082 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2083 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2084 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2085 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2086 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2087 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2088 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2089 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2090 was also the Internet.
2093 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2094 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2095 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2096 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2098 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2099 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2103 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2104 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2105 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2106 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2107 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2108 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2109 spread practically instantaneously.
2112 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2113 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2114 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2115 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2116 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2117 records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2118 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2121 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2122 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2123 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2124 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2125 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2126 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2127 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2128 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2129 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2130 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2131 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2132 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2135 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2136 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2137 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2138 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2139 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2142 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2143 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2146 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2147 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2148 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2149 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2150 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2151 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2152 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2153 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2154 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2155 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2156 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2157 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2158 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2159 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2161 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk.
1, trans.
2162 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2166 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2167 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2168 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2170 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2172 Philosophy
10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2174 And in some towns in
2175 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2176 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2181 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2183 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2184 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2186 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2187 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2188 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2190 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2191 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2192 </para></footnote> We say what our
2193 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2196 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2197 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2198 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2200 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2201 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2203 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2204 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2208 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2209 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2210 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2211 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2212 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2213 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2216 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2217 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential
2218 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2220 is having an effect.
2223 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2224 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2225 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2227 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2228 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2229 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2230 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2232 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2233 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2234 as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2236 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2237 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2241 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial
2243 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2244 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2245 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move on.
2248 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2249 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2251 interesting story, more and more people link to that story. And as
2252 the number of links to a particular story increases, it rises in the ranks
2253 of stories. People read what is popular; what is popular has been
2255 by a very democratic process of peer-generated rankings.
2258 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2260 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2261 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2262 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2263 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2264 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2265 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2266 get it out of the way."
2269 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2270 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide
2271 more from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN
2272 admitted it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the
2274 to its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2276 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2278 It also needs to sustain a more
2280 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the
2281 Internet from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite
2283 with a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the
2284 reporter over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She
2285 needed to offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that
2286 wasn't warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2289 Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the debate
—"amateur" not
2290 in the sense of inexperienced, but in the sense of an Olympic athlete,
2291 meaning not paid by anyone to give their reports. It allows for a much
2292 broader range of input into a story, as reporting on the Columbia
2294 revealed, when hundreds from across the southwest United States
2295 turned to the Internet to retell what they had seen.
<footnote><para>
2297 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2299 Online," New York Times,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci D. Kramer,
2300 "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall," Online
2302 Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2303 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2306 readers to read across the range of accounts and "triangulate," as Winer
2307 puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are "communicating directly with
2308 our constituency, and the middle man is out of it"
—with all the
2310 and costs, that might entail.
2313 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected with
2314 blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts, for
2316 figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's not clear that
2317 "journalism" is happy about this
—some journalists have been told to
2318 curtail their blogging.
<footnote><para>
2320 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2321 York Times,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2322 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2324 in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the war on March
9,
2325 stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses' request. Last year Steve
2327 a Houston Chronicle reporter, was fired for keeping a personal Web log,
2328 published under a pseudonym, that dealt with some of the issues and
2329 people he was covering.")
2331 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2334 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2335 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2336 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2337 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2338 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2341 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2342 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2344 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2345 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2346 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2347 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2348 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2349 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2350 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2351 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2352 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2353 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2358 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2359 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2360 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2363 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2365 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2366 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2367 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2370 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2371 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2373 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2375 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2376 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2377 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2379 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2380 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2381 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2382 tinkering of many others.
2385 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2386 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2387 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2388 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2389 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2392 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2394 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2395 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2396 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2397 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2399 a major apprenticeship platform."
2402 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2403 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2405 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2407 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2408 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2409 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2412 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2413 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2414 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2416 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2417 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2418 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2420 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2421 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2422 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2424 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2426 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2427 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2430 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2434 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2435 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2436 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2437 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2438 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2439 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2440 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2443 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2444 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2445 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2446 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2447 general.
<footnote><para>
2449 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2450 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2451 of the Association for Computer Machinery
43 (
2000):
9.
2453 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2454 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2457 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2458 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2462 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2463 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2464 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2465 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2466 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2469 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2470 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2471 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2472 the law to close down that technology.
2475 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2476 chapter
9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2480 <sect1 id=
"catalogs">
2481 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2483 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2484 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2485 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2486 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2487 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2490 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2491 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2492 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2493 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2494 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2495 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2498 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2499 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2500 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2501 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2502 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2505 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2507 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2508 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2509 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2510 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2511 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2512 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2513 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2514 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2517 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2518 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2519 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2520 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2521 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2522 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2523 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2526 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2527 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2528 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2529 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2530 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2531 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2532 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2533 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2534 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2538 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2539 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2540 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2541 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2542 be on users' computers.
2545 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2546 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2547 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2549 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2550 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2551 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2555 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2556 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2557 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2558 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2559 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2560 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2561 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2562 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2563 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2564 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2565 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2566 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2570 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2571 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2572 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2573 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2574 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2575 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2576 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2579 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2580 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2581 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2582 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2583 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2584 easier to use"
—again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2585 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2586 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2587 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2588 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2591 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2592 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2593 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2595 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2596 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2597 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2598 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2599 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2600 that Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2603 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2604 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2605 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2606 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2607 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2608 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2609 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100 billion
—six
2610 times the total profit of the film industry in
2001.
<footnote><para>
2612 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2613 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC
6
2614 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2618 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2619 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2620 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2621 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2622 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2625 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2626 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2627 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2628 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2629 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2630 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2631 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2632 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2633 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2636 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2637 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2638 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2639 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2640 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2642 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2643 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2646 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2647 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2650 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2651 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2652 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2653 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2654 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2655 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2656 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2658 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2659 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2660 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (
2000).
2662 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2663 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2664 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2666 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2667 Wall Street Journal,
10 September
2003, A24.
2671 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2672 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2673 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2678 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2679 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2680 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2681 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2685 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2686 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2687 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2688 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2689 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2691 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2693 <sect1 id=
"pirates">
2694 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
</title>
2696 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2697 their permission
—if "if value, then right" is true
—then the history of
2698 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2699 "big media" today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2700 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2701 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2706 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2708 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2709 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
87–93,
2710 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2712 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2713 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2714 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2715 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2716 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2717 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2718 this creative property
2719 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2720 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2723 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2727 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2728 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2729 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2730 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2731 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2732 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2733 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2736 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2737 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2738 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2739 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2740 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2741 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2742 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2743 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2744 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2745 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2747 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2748 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2749 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2750 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2751 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2752 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2753 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2754 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2755 the Propertization of Copyright" (September
2002), University of
2756 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2757 Working Paper No.
159.
</para></footnote>
2761 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2762 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2763 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2764 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2765 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."
<footnote><para>
2767 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2768 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2770 That led the independents to flee the East
2771 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2772 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2773 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2777 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2778 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2779 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2781 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2782 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2783 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2784 Edison's creative property.
2787 <sect2 id=
"recordedmusic">
2788 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2790 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2791 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2794 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2795 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2796 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2797 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2798 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2799 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2800 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2801 right to perform it publicly.
2803 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2805 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2806 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2807 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2808 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2809 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2810 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2811 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2812 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2813 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2814 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2815 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2816 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2817 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2818 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2819 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2820 its composer anything.
2823 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2824 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2825 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2830 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2831 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2832 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2833 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2834 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2835 rights.
<footnote><para>
2837 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2838 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2839 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2840 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2841 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2842 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2847 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2848 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2849 genius of American composers,"
<footnote><para>
2851 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2852 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2854 and the "music publishing industry"
2855 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."
<footnote><para>
2857 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2858 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2861 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2862 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."
<footnote><para>
2864 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
2865 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2869 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2870 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2871 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2872 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2873 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2874 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
2876 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
2877 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2879 Company of New York).
2880 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2881 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2882 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2883 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2884 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2885 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."
<footnote><para>
2887 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376
2889 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2891 Graphophone Company Association).
2895 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2896 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2897 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2898 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2900 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2901 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2902 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2904 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2905 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2907 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2908 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2911 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2912 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2913 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2914 Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2916 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2920 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2921 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
2922 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
2924 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
2925 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
2926 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
2928 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2930 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2931 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
2932 of piracy
—by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
2933 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
2934 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
2935 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
2936 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
2937 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2938 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2939 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
2941 follow-on creativity.
<footnote><para>
2943 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
2944 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
2945 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2946 in Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2947 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2951 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2952 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2953 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2958 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2959 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2960 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2962 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2964 in the United States and throughout the world; records
2965 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
2966 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
2968 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
2969 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
2970 before
1909 and the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
2971 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
2972 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
2973 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
2975 quality, and a greater choice.
<footnote><para>
2977 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
2978 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
2979 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
2980 this report.
</para></footnote>
2984 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
2986 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2990 <title>Radio
</title>
2992 Radio was also born of piracy.
2995 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
2996 "public performance" of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
2998 See
17 United States Code, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning, record
2999 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3001 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
3002 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
3003 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
3005 Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd Cir.
1940). See also Randal C.
3006 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
3007 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
3008 Review
70 (
2003):
281.
3010 As I described above,
3011 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3012 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3014 money for that performance.
3017 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3018 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3019 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3021 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3022 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3023 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3025 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3026 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3028 of the music for his work.
3030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3033 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3035 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3036 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3038 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3039 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3043 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3045 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3046 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3047 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3050 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3051 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3052 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3053 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3054 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3055 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3056 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3059 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3060 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3061 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3063 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3064 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3065 something for nothing.
3068 <sect2 id=
"cabletv">
3069 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3072 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3075 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with
3076 cable television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the
3078 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable
3080 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3081 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3082 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3084 content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever did
—
3085 Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to give away.
3087 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3089 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3090 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3091 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."
<footnote><para>
3093 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the Subcommittee
3094 on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
3095 on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966) (statement of
3096 Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
3098 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3099 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3100 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3101 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<footnote><para>
3103 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3104 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3106 As another broadcaster put it,
3110 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3111 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3112 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3114 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3115 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3120 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable
3125 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3126 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3127 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3128 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3130 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3131 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3132 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3137 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president
3139 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of compensation."
<footnote><para>
3141 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3142 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3146 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant
3148 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3152 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have
3153 any copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether
3155 holders who are already compensated, who already have a
3156 monopoly, should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3158 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3159 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3160 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3162 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3164 acting assistant attorney general).
3169 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the
3170 Supreme Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright
3174 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3175 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3176 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3178 the question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable
3179 companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but
3180 the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright owner.
3181 The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto
3182 power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable companies thus
3183 built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value created by
3188 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy"
3189 means using value from someone else's creative property without
3191 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described today
<footnote><para>
3193 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3194 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3195 Information, available at
3196 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>. "The
3197 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3198 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
3200 — then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3201 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3202 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3203 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3204 generation
—until now.
3206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3210 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
</title>
3213 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy
3214 comes in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3215 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3216 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its defense,
3217 this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should
3221 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3222 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3223 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3224 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3225 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3227 copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has
3228 so often done in the past.
3229 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3231 <sect2 id=
"piracy-i">
3232 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3234 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3235 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3236 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3237 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3238 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3240 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3241 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003, July
2003, available at
3243 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3244 Financial Times,
14 February
2003,
11.
3246 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3247 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually
3248 worldwide to piracy.
3251 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3252 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3253 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3254 This piracy is wrong.
3257 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3258 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3259 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3261 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3262 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3264 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3265 existence, treated as right.
3268 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3269 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3270 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3271 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3272 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3273 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3275 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3276 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3277 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3280 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3281 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3283 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3285 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3289 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3290 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3291 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3292 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3294 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3295 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10–13,
3296 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3297 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3298 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3299 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3300 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3301 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3302 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3303 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3304 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3305 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3306 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3307 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3308 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3309 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3310 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3314 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3315 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3316 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3317 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3318 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3320 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3321 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3322 144–90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3323 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3325 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3326 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
3330 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3331 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3332 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3333 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3334 "You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3335 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3336 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3337 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3338 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3339 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3340 piracy of the tangible.
3343 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3344 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3346 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3347 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3348 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3350 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3351 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3353 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3356 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3357 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3358 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3360 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3361 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3364 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3365 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3366 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3367 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3368 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3370 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3371 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3373 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3374 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3375 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3377 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3380 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3381 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3382 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3383 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3385 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3386 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3389 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3391 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3392 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3394 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3395 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3396 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3397 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3399 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what
—at
3400 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3402 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3406 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3407 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3408 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3409 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3410 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3411 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3412 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3413 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3417 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3418 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3419 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3420 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3421 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3422 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3423 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3426 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3427 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3428 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3429 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3432 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3433 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3434 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3435 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3438 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3439 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3444 <sect2 id=
"piracy-ii">
3445 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3447 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3448 the author of [his] profit."
<footnote><para>
3450 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3452 This means we must determine whether
3453 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3455 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3456 author of his profit.
3459 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors
3460 of the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3462 Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and,
3464 off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3466 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3467 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3468 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3469 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
3470 up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.
3471 This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing
3473 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see
3474 Lawrence Lessig, Future,
89–92,
139.
3475 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3476 put together components that had been developed independently.
3479 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3480 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3481 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3482 system.
<footnote><para>
3484 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3485 San Francisco Chronicle,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3486 New Scientist,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3487 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle,
23 May
2003, C1;
3489 Wake-Up Call," Economist,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3491 at War with the Internet" (London) Times,
26 July
2002,
18.
3493 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3494 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3495 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3496 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3497 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3498 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3499 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3502 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3504 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3505 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3506 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3508 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3509 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3510 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3511 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3514 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that
43 million citizens
3515 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3517 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3518 York Times,
6 June
2003, A1.
3521 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3522 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3523 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3525 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3528 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3529 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3531 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3532 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more carefully
3533 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do
—the kinds of
3534 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3538 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3539 different kinds into four types.
3541 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3544 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3546 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3547 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3548 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3549 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3550 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3551 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3557 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3558 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3559 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3560 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3562 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3563 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3565 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3566 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3570 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3572 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3573 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3574 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3576 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3577 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3578 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3579 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3580 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3582 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3583 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3584 content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same harm
3585 that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3589 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3591 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3592 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3597 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3600 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3602 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3603 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.
<footnote><para>
3605 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,
148–49.
3607 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3609 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3610 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3611 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer
—and
3613 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3617 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3618 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3620 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3621 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3622 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3623 that is "devastating" the industry.
3626 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3628 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3630 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3631 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
&
3632 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3633 labels fought it."
<footnote><para>
3635 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3637 Business Model Crisis (
2003),
3. This report describes the music
3639 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3640 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3641 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3642 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3643 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In
1988,
40 percent
3644 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3645 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3646 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3647 Government Printing Office, October
1989),
145–56.
3649 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3650 album unsold, and when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the
3651 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3653 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3656 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3657 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3658 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3659 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3661 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3662 innovation at the major labels."
<footnote><para>
3664 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying,
4.
3668 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3669 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3670 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3671 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3672 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3673 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3674 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3675 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3678 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3679 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3680 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3681 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3682 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3683 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3684 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3687 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3689 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3690 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3693 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9
3695 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7 percent.
<footnote><para>
3697 See Recording Industry Association of America,
2002 Yearend Statistics,
3699 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3700 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3701 25 June
2003, available at
3702 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3703 of recorded music have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in
3704 to
860 million units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3705 In terms of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in
3706 to $
12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3708 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3709 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3711 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3713 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3714 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3715 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That
3716 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3717 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average
3718 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<footnote>
3720 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3722 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13
3723 February
2003, available at
3724 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3727 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3728 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3729 High Fidelity has a list price of $
18.98. You could get the whole movie
3730 [on DVD] for $
19.99."
<footnote><para>
3737 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3738 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3739 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3740 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3741 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3743 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3744 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3747 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3748 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3749 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3751 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"
—but their own
3753 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3754 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3755 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3756 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of Kazaa
3757 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"
—then the industry would have
3758 suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7 percent drop. If
2.6
3759 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3760 revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3762 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3765 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3767 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3768 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3772 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that is
3773 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3775 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3776 tracks that are no longer commercially available.
<footnote><para>
3778 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3779 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law
—Coming
3780 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3782 on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
2001) (prepared
3784 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3785 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3789 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3790 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3791 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3793 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3797 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3799 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3801 of used book and used record stores in America today.
<footnote><para>
3803 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3804 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3805 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3806 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (
2002), available at
3807 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3809 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3812 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3815 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3816 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3817 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3818 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3819 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3821 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3822 owner for the content they sell.
3824 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3826 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3827 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3828 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3829 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3830 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3831 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3832 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3833 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3834 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3835 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3836 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3839 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3840 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3841 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3842 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3843 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3847 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3848 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3849 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3850 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3851 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3852 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3854 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3855 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3856 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3857 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3858 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3859 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3860 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3864 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3865 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3866 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3867 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3870 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3871 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3872 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3873 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3877 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3878 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3879 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4, much of
3880 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3881 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3882 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3883 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3884 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3885 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3886 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3887 found only with time.
3890 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3891 just what you call type A sharing?"
3894 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3896 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3897 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3899 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3901 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
3902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3903 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
3904 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3905 "down to zero."
<footnote><para>
3907 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
3908 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
3910 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3911 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3913 Napster (New York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
3917 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3918 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3919 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
3920 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
3921 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
3922 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3923 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3924 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3925 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3928 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3929 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3930 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3932 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3934 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3935 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3936 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3939 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3940 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3941 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3943 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3944 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3945 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3946 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3947 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3949 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3952 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3953 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3954 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3955 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3957 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3962 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3963 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals of
3964 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3965 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3967 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3969 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3970 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3971 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3972 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3974 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3975 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3976 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3978 over the future (cable).
3980 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
3982 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3983 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3984 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3985 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3986 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3987 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3988 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3989 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3990 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3991 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3992 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3995 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3996 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3997 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3998 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3999 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4000 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4001 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4002 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4003 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4004 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4005 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4006 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4007 for the architecture it chose.
4010 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4011 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4012 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4013 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4014 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4015 copyright."
<footnote><para>
4017 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4018 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4019 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4020 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4022 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4023 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4024 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4025 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4026 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4027 and plain common sense."
<footnote><para>
4029 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4031 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4032 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4034 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4037 — a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4038 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4039 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4040 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4041 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4042 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4043 profit from its reproduction."
<footnote><para>
4045 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4050 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4051 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4052 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4053 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"
—held
4054 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4055 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4056 technology
—which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4057 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4058 of the American film industry)
—was an illegal
4059 technology.
<footnote><para>
4061 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4066 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4068 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4069 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4070 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4075 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4076 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4078 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4080 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4081 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4083 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4085 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4090 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4091 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4093 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4094 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4095 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4099 <title>Table
</title>
4100 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4104 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</entry>
4105 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4106 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4111 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4112 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4113 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4114 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4117 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4118 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4120 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4123 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4124 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4125 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4126 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4130 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4131 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4132 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4139 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4140 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4142 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4143 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4144 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4145 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4146 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4147 1992 (Title
17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4148 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4149 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4150 Lessig, Future,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4151 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
293–96.
4153 In each case, throughout our history,
4154 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4158 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4159 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4160 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4161 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4162 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4164 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4165 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4166 the interests at stake.
4167 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4170 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4171 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4172 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4173 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4174 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4176 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4177 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4178 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4179 permission to record a song?
4182 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4183 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4184 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4185 over all possible uses of his work."
<footnote><para>
4187 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
4190 Instead, the particular uses that the
4191 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4192 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4193 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4195 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4196 the distribution of content.
4199 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4200 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4201 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4202 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4203 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4204 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4205 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4206 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4207 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4208 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4210 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4216 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4218 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4219 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4221 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4223 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4224 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."
<footnote><para>
4226 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4227 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times,
22 September
2003, C3.
4229 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4231 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4232 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4233 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4234 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4235 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4236 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4237 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4240 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4241 just as any other property is protected."
4243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4247 <chapter id=
"c-property">
4248 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4252 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4253 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4254 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4255 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4256 the price she can get.
4259 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4260 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4261 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4262 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4263 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4264 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4265 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard
—by, for example,
4267 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4268 thing I am taking then?
4271 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4272 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4274 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4276 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4277 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4278 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4279 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4280 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4281 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4282 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<footnote><para>
4284 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4285 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4286 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4290 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4291 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4292 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4294 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4298 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details, in
4299 other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4301 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4303 in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4305 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4307 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4308 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4310 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4311 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4313 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review
45 (
2003):
4318 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4320 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4322 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4323 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4324 significance of this true statement
—"copyright material is property"
—
4325 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4326 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4330 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4331 <sect1 id=
"founders">
4332 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4334 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in
1595. The play
4335 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4337 had written. He would continue to write plays through
1613,
4338 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4339 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4340 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4341 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4343 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4346 In
1774, almost
180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4347 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4348 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4350 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4351 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4352 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4353 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4354 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4355 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4356 Bookseller," American Scholar
61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4359 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger
<footnote><para>
4361 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4363 University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4366 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4367 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4368 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4369 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4370 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4372 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4374 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4377 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4378 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4379 of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4380 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4381 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4383 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4385 by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.
<footnote><para>
4387 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4389 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
40.
4391 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in
1731. So why
4392 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in
1774?
4395 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4397 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4398 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4399 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4401 in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4402 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4403 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4405 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4408 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4409 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4410 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4412 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4414 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4415 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4417 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4418 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4420 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4422 of any positive law.
4425 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4426 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4427 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4428 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4431 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4432 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4434 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4437 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4438 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4440 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4441 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4443 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4444 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4447 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4448 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4449 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4452 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4453 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4454 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4455 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4456 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4457 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4458 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4459 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4461 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4464 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4466 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4467 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4471 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4472 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4473 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4474 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4476 from reprinting a book. In
1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4477 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4479 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4480 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4481 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4483 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4484 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4488 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4489 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4490 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4492 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4494 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4495 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4496 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4497 to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4500 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4501 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4503 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4504 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4505 monopolies
—especially
4506 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4507 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4508 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4509 against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the Statute of
4511 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4512 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4516 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4518 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4519 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4520 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4521 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4522 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4524 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4527 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4528 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4529 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4530 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4531 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4532 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind
—tools of the
4533 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4535 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4536 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4537 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4538 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."
<footnote><para>
4540 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4541 York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4545 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4546 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4548 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4549 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4550 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4554 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4555 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4556 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4557 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4558 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4559 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4561 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4562 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4563 construction and spread of culture.
4566 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4567 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4568 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4569 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4570 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4571 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4572 they said; they needed more time.
4575 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4576 words that echo today,
4580 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4581 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4583 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4585 a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in
4586 the Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a
4588 to Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general
4589 Tax on the Publick; and all this only to increase the private Gain
4590 of the Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4592 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4593 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4594 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4596 of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
4597 Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4599 (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al.,
8,
4600 Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4605 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in
4606 a series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4607 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4608 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4609 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4610 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4612 "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of Anne,
4613 the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just because the
4614 protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't mean the
4616 of the common law expired: Under the common law they had
4617 the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its Statute of Anne
4618 copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only way to protect
4622 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some
4623 of the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4625 Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it, "The
4626 publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle rancher has
4627 for cattle."
<footnote><para>
4629 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4630 Law Review
40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4631 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4633 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the
4635 His concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4638 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4639 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4640 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4642 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4643 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4647 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4648 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4649 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4650 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4652 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4655 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4657 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4658 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4659 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4660 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."
<footnote><para>
4666 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's
4667 shop in Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where
4668 he sold inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in
4670 of the supposed common law right of Literary Property."
<footnote><para>
4672 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective,
167 (quoting
4676 books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he rested
4677 his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of Anne,
4678 the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4681 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4682 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4683 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4686 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to
4687 James Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the
4689 of the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full
4691 of the statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor
4692 began printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual
4693 common law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4695 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright
4696 Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law
4702 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in
4704 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4705 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4706 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the
4707 common law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4708 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4709 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That
4711 law rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4712 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4715 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if justice
4716 were just a matter of logical deduction from first principles
—Mansfield's
4717 conclusion might make some sense. But what it ignored was the larger
4718 issue that Parliament had struggled with in
1710: How best to limit
4719 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4720 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4721 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4722 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4723 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4725 Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4726 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4729 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4730 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4732 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4734 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4735 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4736 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4740 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4741 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4742 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4743 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4744 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4745 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4748 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4749 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4750 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4751 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4752 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4753 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4754 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4755 statute were no longer protected.
4758 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4759 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4761 of special legal distinction who functioned much like the Justices
4762 in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the House of
4763 Lords generally voted.
4766 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4767 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4768 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4769 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4770 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4771 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4772 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4773 passed into the public domain.
4775 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4777 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4778 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before
1774, there
4779 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4780 After
1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4781 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4782 and the greatest works in English history
—including those of
4783 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan
—were free of
4787 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4788 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4789 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people celebrated
4790 the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser reported, "No
4791 private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the public, and
4792 none has been tried before the House of Lords in the decision of
4793 which so many individuals were interested." "Great rejoicing in
4795 upon victory over literary property: bonfires and
4796 illuminations."
<footnote><para>
4802 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4803 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4808 By the above decision . . . near
200,
000 pounds worth of what
4809 was honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday
4810 thought property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of
4811 London and Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses
4812 to purchase Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who
4813 after many years industry thought they had acquired a
4815 to provide for their families now find themselves without a
4816 shilling to devise to their successors.
<footnote><para>
4823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4824 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4825 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4826 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4828 would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter free.
4829 Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of course,
4830 for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller had an
4832 right to control the publication of that book. And not in the
4833 sense that books could be stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you
4834 still had to buy the book from someone. But free in the sense that the
4835 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4836 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free culture
4837 would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English culture
4838 would develop as the many English readers chose to let it develop
—
4839 chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the memes they
4840 repeated and endorsed. Chose in a competitive context, not a context
4841 in which the choices about what culture is available to people and
4842 how they get access to it are made by the few despite the wishes of
4846 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4848 resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a world
4849 where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4854 <sect1 id=
"recorders">
4855 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4857 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4858 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4859 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4860 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4864 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4865 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4869 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4870 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4872 are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4874 a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and in
4875 the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the stage.
4878 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some
4880 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4881 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers and
4882 the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4884 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4888 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4889 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4890 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4891 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4892 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4895 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get
4897 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a
4898 four-and-a-halfsecond
4899 image on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How
4900 could it hurt? Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told
4901 Else to contact Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4904 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4905 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4906 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4907 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4908 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4911 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we
4913 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at least
4914 that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation." And
4915 second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us to use
4916 this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited Simpsons which
4917 was in the corner of the shot."
4920 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to
4921 someone he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca
4923 He explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . .
4924 We're asking for your educational rate on this." That was the
4926 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4927 confirm what he had been told.
4930 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes,
4931 you have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
4932 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film about
4934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4935 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4936 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant to
4937 Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want the
4941 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was
4943 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4944 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the very
4945 last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally replaced the
4946 shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on, The Day After
4947 Trinity, from ten years before.
4950 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox,
4951 owns the copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property.
4952 To use that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the
4954 of the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4955 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4956 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4957 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner of
4958 the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law says the
4959 owner gets to control.
4962 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that
4963 the copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4964 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4965 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the
4967 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4968 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set by
4972 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4973 thought is "fair use."
<footnote><para>
4975 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that lawyers don't
4976 permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard A. Posner with William
4977 F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred " (draft on
4978 file with author), University of Chicago Law School,
5 August
2003.
4980 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot
4981 of a Simpsons episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons
—and fair use
4982 does not require the permission of anyone.
4985 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4986 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4990 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf
4992 what lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and
4993 what is crushingly relevant in practice to those of us actually
4994 trying to make and broadcast documentaries. I never had any
4995 doubt that it was "clearly fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But
4996 I couldn't rely on the concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4998 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5001 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires
5002 that we buy Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers
5004 a detailed "visual cue sheet" listing the source and
5006 status of each shot in the film. They take a dim view of
5007 "fair use," and a claim of "fair use" can grind the application
5012 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the
5013 first place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a
5014 history of tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons
5015 usage, just as George Lucas had a very high profile litigating
5016 Star Wars usage. So I decided to play by the book, thinking
5017 that we would be granted free or cheap license to four seconds
5018 of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working to
5020 on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk legal
5021 trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5026 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford
5027 Law School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also
5028 confirmed that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within
5029 an inch of your life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He
5030 made clear that it would boil down to who had the bigger
5032 department and the deeper pockets, me or them.
5033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5037 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5038 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5044 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory
5046 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture.
5047 But in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5048 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means
5049 that the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law
5050 has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5053 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5054 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5056 profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has matured
5057 into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or not.
5059 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5061 <sect1 id=
"transformers">
5062 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5063 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5064 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5066 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5067 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5068 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5069 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5070 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5072 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5074 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5075 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5076 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5077 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5078 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5079 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5080 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5081 important to his career.
5083 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5085 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5086 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5087 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5088 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5092 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5093 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5094 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5095 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5096 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5098 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5100 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5101 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5102 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5103 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5104 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5107 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5109 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5110 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5112 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5114 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5115 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5116 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5119 <primary>artists
</primary>
5120 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5124 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5125 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5126 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5127 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5131 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5132 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5133 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5134 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5135 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5138 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5139 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5140 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5144 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5145 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5146 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5147 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5148 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5149 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5153 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the
5155 rate for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking
5156 about a clip of less than a minute, but to reuse that performance
5157 in the CD-ROM the rate at the time was about $
600.
5158 So we had to identify the people
—some of them were hard to
5159 identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
5160 crashing through the glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman?
5161 And then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some
5162 others, and we just started calling people.
5165 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5167 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5168 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5169 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5170 "Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5171 know, $
1,
200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5172 to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5173 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5174 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5178 It was one year later
—"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5179 were totally in the clear."
5181 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5183 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5184 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5185 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5189 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5190 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5191 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5192 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5193 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5194 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5195 systematically and cleared the rights.
5200 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5201 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5202 loved it, and it sold very well.
5204 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5206 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5207 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5208 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5209 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5210 at all."
<footnote><para>
5212 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5213 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5214 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5216 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5220 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5221 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5222 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5223 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5224 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5228 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5229 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when
30 seconds of
5230 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5231 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5232 compensated for that.
5236 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5237 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license that
5238 someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips like this?
5239 Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would have to track
5240 down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit permission
5241 from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of the
5243 process could be made to be more clean?
5247 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5248 mechanism
—where
5249 you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5250 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5251 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5253 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it
5254 with lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost
5255 as the producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of
5257 X dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a
5258 known cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes
5259 this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have
5260 a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me
5261 X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get
5263 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you
5264 say, "Oh, I want a hundred minutes of something and I have no
5265 idea what it's going to cost me, and a certain number of people are
5266 going to hold me up for money," then it becomes difficult to put
5267 one of these things together.
5270 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5272 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5273 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5274 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5275 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5276 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5277 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5278 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5279 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5280 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5281 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5282 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5283 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5284 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5285 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5286 "Does this still make sense?"
5289 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5290 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5291 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5292 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5295 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5296 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5299 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5300 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
60 Minutes episode.
5301 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5302 judges loved every minute of it.
5304 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5306 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5307 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5308 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5309 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5310 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5311 were just violated in this room?"
5313 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5315 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5316 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5317 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5318 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5319 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5320 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5321 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5322 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5323 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5324 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5325 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5326 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5327 couldn't easily do them legally.
5330 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5331 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5332 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5333 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5334 planted in your presentation.
5337 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5339 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5340 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5341 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5342 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5343 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5344 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5345 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5348 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5349 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5350 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5351 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5352 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5355 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5356 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5357 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5358 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5359 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5360 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5361 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5362 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5363 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5364 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5365 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5366 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5370 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5371 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5372 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5373 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5376 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5377 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5379 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5380 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5381 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5382 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5383 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5384 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5388 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5389 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5390 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5391 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5392 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5393 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5394 new audiences, it is Mike."
5397 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5398 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5399 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5400 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5401 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5402 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5403 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5404 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5407 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5408 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5409 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5410 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5411 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5412 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5413 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5414 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5415 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5416 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5417 curse, reserved for the few.
5419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5421 <sect1 id=
"collectors">
5422 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5424 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to
5425 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5426 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5427 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5428 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5429 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5430 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5433 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5434 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive
5435 that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the
5436 world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5437 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as well
5438 as when those pages changed.
5441 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5443 In the dystopia described in
1984, old newspapers were
5445 updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved
5446 of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
5449 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5450 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5451 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5452 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5455 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5456 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5457 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5458 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5459 library
—constantly
5460 updated, without any reliable memory.
5463 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back
5465 and the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the
5466 Internet was. You have the power to see what you remember. More
5467 importantly, perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't
5468 remember and what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5470 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5471 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003, press
5472 release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later
5473 changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended."
5474 E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5478 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we
5480 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the
5482 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965,
5483 or to Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5484 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5485 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5486 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what it is
5487 convenient to remember, but remember something close to the truth.
5490 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5492 it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is whether
5493 we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More directly, the
5494 key is whether an objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do
5495 that, by collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5497 for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5500 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the
5502 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5503 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5505 in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5508 to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to think that
5509 we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns around the
5510 world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the one kept by the
5515 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5516 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5518 In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5520 It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
5521 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5523 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie
5524 of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10 billion
5525 pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5528 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge
5529 in human history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5530 terabytes of material"
—and was "ten times larger than the Library of
5531 Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set
5532 out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been
5534 the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more
5535 ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture
5536 was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of that
5538 is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news are
5540 each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a specific
5541 exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and is available
5542 to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that, [television] is almost
5543 unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were Barbara Walters you could get
5544 access to [the archives], but if you are just a graduate student?" As Kahle
5549 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with
5551 Brown? Remember that back and forth surreal experience of
5552 a politician interacting with a fictional television character? If you
5553 were a graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to
5554 get those original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5557 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5558 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5562 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5563 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5564 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5565 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5567 America will have an easier time than researchers trying to
5569 the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5572 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5573 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5575 These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
5576 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once
5577 the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
5580 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library of
5582 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long
5583 as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5584 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
1915
5585 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed back."
5586 Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any
5587 library. The copy exists
—if it exists at all
—in the library archive of the
5588 film company.
<footnote><para>
5590 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
5591 Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly
13 nos.
2–3 (
1980):
5;
5593 Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the United
5594 States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
& Co.,
1992),
36.
5598 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5599 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5600 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5601 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5603 they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5605 But those copies were simply kept by the broadcasters. No
5606 library had any right to them; the government didn't demand them.
5607 The content of this part of American culture is practically invisible to
5608 anyone who would look.
5611 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5612 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5613 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5615 from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5617 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations
5618 from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made their
5619 coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5621 could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5625 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger,
5626 whose archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films"
5627 (meaning films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never
5628 copyrighted), Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle
5629 digitize
1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet
5630 to be downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5631 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5632 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock footage
5633 sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the material they
5634 wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made films on
5635 their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to be made.
5636 Either way, the archive enabled access to this important part of our
5638 Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film that instructed
5639 children how to save themselves in the middle of nuclear attack? Go to
5640 archive.org, and you can download the film in a few minutes
—for free.
5643 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that
5644 we otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
5645 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law
5646 doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in
5647 an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
5650 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to
5651 this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His
5652 aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part of our
5654 Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but
5656 a second life that all creative property has
—a noncommercial life.
5659 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5660 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
5662 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5663 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5665 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
5666 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
5667 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial
5669 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5672 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5674 has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers
5675 the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is
5676 used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive
5677 of knowledge about our history. In this second life, the content can
5678 continue to inform even if that information is no longer sold.
5681 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of
5682 print very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5684 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5685 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5686 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5687 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese, "The
5688 First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston College Law
5690 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5691 </para></footnote>). After it is
5692 out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the copyright
5693 owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many get to read
5694 the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are thus the
5696 life of a book. That second life is extremely important to the
5697 spread and stability of culture.
5700 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5702 property does not hold true with the most important components
5703 of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
5704 these
—television, movies, music, radio, the Internet
—there is no
5706 of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've replaced
5707 libraries with Barnes
& Noble superstores. With this culture, what's
5708 accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
5710 that, culture disappears.
5713 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5714 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5716 all television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is
5718 high. So even though the law in principle would have
5719 restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5721 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly difficult
5722 to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had little
5727 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution
5728 is that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
5729 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or
5731 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
5732 books published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an
5733 archive of all moving images and sound.
5736 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never
5738 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it;
5739 but we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5744 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of
5746 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases
5747 of movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed]
5748 during the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million
5749 different titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that
5750 would fit in this room and be able to be afforded by a small
5752 So we're at a turning point in our history. Universal access is
5753 the goal. And the opportunity of leading a different life, based on
5754 this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind
5755 would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria,
5756 putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
5761 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5762 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5763 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5764 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5765 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5767 perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand it;
5768 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5769 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
5770 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
5771 become unimaginable for much of our past
—a future for our past. The
5772 technology of digital arts could make the dream of the Library of
5773 Alexandria real again.
5776 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building
5777 such an archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might
5778 like to call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might
5779 seem, the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5781 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that
5782 Kahle and others would exercise.
5784 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5786 <sect1 id=
"property-i">
5787 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
</title>
5789 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture
5791 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C.,
5792 with Lyndon Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture
5793 of Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5794 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5795 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5796 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5799 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion
5800 Picture Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose
5801 goal was to defend American movies against increasing domestic
5803 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but
5805 and distributors of entertainment for television, video, and
5806 cable. Its board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven
5807 major producers and distributors of motion picture and television
5809 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures
5811 MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal
5812 Studios, and Warner Brothers.
5815 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5816 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president
5817 before him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5818 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most
5820 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5821 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays
5822 the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5823 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5824 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5825 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5829 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5831 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5832 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5833 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5834 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5835 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine
5836 the meaning of "creative property."
5839 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5844 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges
5845 and the counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting,
5846 reasonable men and women will keep returning to the
5848 issue, the central theme which animates this entire debate:
5850 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protection
5851 resident in all other property owners in the nation. That is the issue.
5852 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5853 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5855 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5856 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5858 on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
5859 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
97th
5860 Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
5865 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5866 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5868 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this:
5869 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5870 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5872 resident in all other property owners in the nation." There are
5873 no second-class citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should
5874 be no second-class property owners.
5877 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5878 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5879 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a
5880 claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this claim of
5881 Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is perhaps
5882 the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and scope
5883 of "creative property." His views have no reasonable connection to our
5884 actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has
5885 slowly redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5888 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5890 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5892 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
5893 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
5894 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
5895 right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
5897 meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private
5898 Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
5900 </para></footnote> it has never been the
5901 case, nor should it be, that "creative property owners" have been
5903 the same rights and protection resident in all other property
5904 owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were given the same rights
5905 as all other property owners, that would effect a radical, and radically
5906 undesirable, change in our tradition.
5909 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat
5910 for our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5911 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5913 in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a
5914 powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5915 culture would develop.
5918 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5919 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to
5920 convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5922 We have always treated rights in creative property differently
5923 from the rights resident in all other property owners. They have never
5924 been the same. And they should never be the same, because, however
5925 counterintuitive this may seem, to make them the same would be to
5927 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5928 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5930 depends upon the owners of creativity having less than perfect
5934 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most
5935 powerful of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5937 in assuring that the new can displace them. No organization
5938 does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what's
5939 good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A society that
5940 defends the ideals of free culture must preserve precisely the
5942 for new creativity to threaten the old.
5943 To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5944 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5945 Constitution itself.
5948 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so
5949 strongly did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5950 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if it
5951 condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm
—it is
5952 required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you
5953 "just compensation" for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees
5954 that property is, in a certain sense, sacred. It cannot ever be taken from
5955 the property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5958 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5959 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5960 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that after
5961 a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has granted and
5962 set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
5964 does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
5965 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not
5966 have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking."
5968 the same Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5970 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5975 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5976 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be
5977 treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in
5978 our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be
5979 accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is
5981 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
5984 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5985 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5986 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5988 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college
5989 to produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it
5990 did in
1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be
5991 the first to admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected
5992 some of those mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should
5993 reject as well. So my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did
5997 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5998 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5999 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given the
6000 same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
6002 property there must be a public domain?
6005 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6007 of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
6009 Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6010 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that should
6011 be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property should be
6013 but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights the law gives to
6014 creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights ought to
6015 be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether institutions designed
6016 to assure that artists get paid need also control how culture develops.
6020 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6021 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6022 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6023 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
6024 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6025 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6026 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6027 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6029 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
6030 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
6031 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6034 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6035 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each
6036 case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.
6037 For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals
6039 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated
—
6040 either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious
6041 constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening
6043 after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for
6045 you willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song
6046 from her latest CD and posting it on the Web, you can be punished
6047 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6048 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6049 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6052 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6053 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6054 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6055 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6056 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6057 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6058 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6059 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6060 the source of the enforcement.
6063 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6064 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6065 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6066 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it is to
6067 be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But
6068 given a set of norms, and a background of property and contract law,
6069 the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or
6073 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6074 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a constraint on
6075 behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across
6076 a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community to
6077 integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
6078 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as
6079 with the market, architecture effects its constraint through
6080 simultaneous conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts
6081 enforcing contracts, or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by
6082 "architecture." If a
500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law
6083 of gravity that enforces this constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket
6084 stands between you and a flight to New York, it is the market that
6085 enforces this constraint.
6089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6090 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6092 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced
6093 by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by
6097 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6098 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6100 thing, we have to consider how these four modalities interact.
6101 Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well be; my
6102 claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most
6103 significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must
6104 consider how these four in particular interact.
6107 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6108 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say
6109 how fast you can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in
6110 part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most
6112 drivers; governors in buses, as another example, set the
6114 rate at which the driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted
6115 by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of
6116 gasoline indirectly constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a
6118 may or may not constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at
50
6119 mph by a school in your own neighborhood and you're likely to be
6120 punished by the neighbors. The same norm wouldn't be as effective in
6121 a different town, or at night.
6124 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6125 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6126 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6128 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6129 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6130 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right self-consciously to
6131 change the other three. The right of the other three is more timidly
6133 See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New
6134 York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95; Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago
6135 School," Journal of Legal Studies, June
1998.
6137 The law, in other words, sometimes
6138 operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality.
6139 Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to
6141 the incentives to drive more slowly. The law might be used to
6142 mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty of driving
6143 rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless
6144 driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be more
6145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6146 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed limit, for
6147 example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast driving.
6149 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6150 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6151 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6154 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6155 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6156 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6157 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6158 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6160 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6163 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6164 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6165 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6166 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6167 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6168 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6169 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6170 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6171 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6172 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6173 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6174 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6175 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6176 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6177 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6178 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6179 Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended
6180 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6181 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6182 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6183 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6184 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6185 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6186 places easier;
42 United States Code, section
12101 (
2000). Each of
6187 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6188 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6189 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6190 of these groups might face.
</para></footnote>
6192 <sect2 id=
"hollywood">
6193 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6195 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6196 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6197 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6198 rallying makes sense.
6201 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6204 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6205 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6206 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6210 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6211 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6212 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6213 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6214 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6215 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6216 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6217 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6218 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6219 this form of infringement.
6222 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6223 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6224 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6225 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6226 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6227 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6230 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6231 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6232 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6233 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6236 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6237 looting that results.
6239 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6240 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6241 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6244 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6245 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6246 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6247 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6248 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6249 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6250 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6251 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6252 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6253 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6256 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6257 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6258 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6259 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6260 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6261 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6262 life. Homeowners living in a
6264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6265 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6266 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6267 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6268 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6269 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6270 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6273 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6274 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6275 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6276 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6277 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6278 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6281 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6282 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6283 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6284 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6285 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6286 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6287 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6289 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6290 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6291 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6292 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6293 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6
6294 October
2003, available at
6295 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6298 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6299 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6300 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6301 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6302 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6303 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6304 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6305 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6306 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6307 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6308 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6311 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6312 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6313 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6315 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6316 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6317 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6318 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6319 have an interest in excluding future competitors."
<footnote><para>
6321 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6324 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6325 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6326 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6327 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6328 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6332 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6333 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6334 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6335 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6336 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6337 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6338 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6339 opportunities for innovation and change.
6342 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6343 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6344 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6345 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6346 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6347 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6348 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6349 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6350 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6351 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6352 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6353 regulation is justified.
6356 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6358 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6359 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6360 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6361 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6362 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6365 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6368 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6369 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6370 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6371 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6372 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6375 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6376 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6377 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6380 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6381 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6382 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6383 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6386 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6387 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6388 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6389 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6390 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6391 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6392 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6395 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6396 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6397 culture.
<footnote><para>
6399 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6400 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal
47 (
1997):
87.
6402 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6403 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6404 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6405 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6406 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6407 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6408 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6409 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6410 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6411 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6412 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6413 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6416 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6417 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6418 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6419 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6420 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6421 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6422 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6423 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6424 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6427 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6428 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6432 <sect2 id=
"beginnings">
6433 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6435 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6436 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6437 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6438 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6441 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6442 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6443 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6446 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6447 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6448 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6450 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6451 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6452 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6453 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6454 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6455 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6456 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6459 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6460 in chapter
6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6461 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6462 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6463 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6464 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6465 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6468 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6469 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6470 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6471 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6472 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6473 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6474 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6475 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6476 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6477 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6478 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6479 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6483 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6484 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6485 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6486 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6487 years since they first struck its design.
6490 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6491 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6492 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6493 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6496 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6497 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6498 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6503 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6504 <title>"Copyright
" today.
</title>
6505 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6509 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6512 <sect2 id=
"lawduration">
6513 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6515 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6516 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6517 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6519 creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6520 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6521 authorship.
<footnote><para>
6523 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
6524 United States (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
485–86:
6525 "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme Law of the Land,'
6526 the perpetual rights which authors had, or were supposed by some to have, under
6527 the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6529 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in
6530 the United States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the
6532 law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work
6534 in the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England,
6535 this lingering uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely
6536 upon a public domain to reprint and distribute works.
6539 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6540 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
6541 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections.
6542 Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the
6544 for all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any
6545 state copyrights expired as well.
6548 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6549 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6550 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6551 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6552 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6555 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6556 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6557 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6558 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6559 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6560 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6561 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6563 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6564 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6565 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol.
1, The Creation
6566 of an Industry,
1630–1865 (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6567 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6568 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6569 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context,
7–10 (
2002),
6570 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6571 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6572 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6573 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6574 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6575 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6576 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6579 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6580 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6581 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6582 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6583 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6584 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6588 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6589 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6590 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6591 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6592 domain.
<footnote><para>
6594 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6595 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6596 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6597 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6598 Studies on Copyright, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6599 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6600 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6601 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6602 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6605 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6606 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6607 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6609 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6610 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6611 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6612 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6613 books; that use
—because it does not involve publication
—is
6617 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6618 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6619 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6620 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6621 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6622 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6625 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6626 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6627 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6628 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6629 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6630 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6631 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6632 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6635 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6636 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6637 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6638 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6640 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6641 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6642 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6643 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6646 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6647 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6648 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6649 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6650 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6651 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6652 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6656 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6657 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6658 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6659 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6660 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6661 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6662 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6663 was ninety-five years.
6666 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6667 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6668 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6669 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6670 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6671 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6675 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6676 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6677 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6678 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6679 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6680 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6681 years.
<footnote><para>
6683 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6684 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6685 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6686 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6691 <sect2 id=
"lawscope">
6692 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6694 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6695 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6696 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6697 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6700 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6701 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6702 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6703 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6704 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6705 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6706 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6707 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6708 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6709 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6710 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6713 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6714 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6715 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6716 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6717 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6718 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6719 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6720 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6721 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6722 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6723 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6724 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6725 on the initial creative work.
6728 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6729 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6730 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6732 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6733 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6734 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6735 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6736 famous
© or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6737 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6738 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6741 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6742 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6743 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6744 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6745 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6746 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6747 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6748 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6749 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6750 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6751 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6755 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6756 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6757 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6758 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6759 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6760 copy available for others to copy.
6763 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6767 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6768 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6769 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6770 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6771 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6772 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6774 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6776 of American Literature,"
29 New York University Journal of
6778 Law and Politics
255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6779 Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6781 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6782 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6783 the United States
—publishers.
6786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6787 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6788 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6789 act was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and
6790 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6791 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6793 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6797 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6798 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6799 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6801 to a tangible form
—all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6802 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6803 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6806 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6807 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6808 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6811 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6813 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6814 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6815 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6816 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6817 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6818 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6819 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6821 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6822 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6825 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6826 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6828 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6830 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6831 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6832 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6833 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6838 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6839 a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6840 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6841 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6842 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6843 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6844 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6846 derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6848 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6850 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6852 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6853 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6854 the wrong of direct piracy.
6857 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6858 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6859 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6861 use of my book.
<footnote><para>
6863 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6864 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6865 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6866 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6868 Yale Law Journal
112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially pp.
53–59).
6870 These two different uses of my creative work are
6874 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6875 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6876 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6878 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6879 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6883 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6884 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6886 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6887 rights originally granted.
6890 <sect2 id=
"lawreach">
6891 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6893 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6894 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6895 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6896 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6898 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6899 regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a copyrighted
6900 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6901 make a copy;
17 United States Code, section
106(
4). And it certainly
6903 doesn't regulate a "copy";
17 United States Code, section
112(a). But
6904 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;"
17
6905 United States Code, section
102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6909 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6910 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6911 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6912 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6913 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6914 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6915 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6916 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6917 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6918 trigger for copyright law.
6921 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6922 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6923 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6924 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
6926 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6927 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6928 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6930 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6932 because it is clear that the
6933 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6934 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6937 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6940 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
6941 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
6942 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
6945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6946 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6947 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6948 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6949 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6950 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6951 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6952 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6953 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6954 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6955 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6958 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
6959 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
6960 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
6963 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6964 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6965 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6966 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6967 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6968 diagram on next page).
6971 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6972 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6974 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6975 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
6976 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
6977 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
6980 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6981 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6983 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6984 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6985 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6986 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6987 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6988 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6990 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
6991 <title>Unregulated copying considered
"fair uses.
"</title>
6992 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
6995 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
6996 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
6997 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
7000 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7001 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7002 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
7003 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7006 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
7007 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
7009 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
7010 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
7011 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
7012 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
7014 And because of this single,
7015 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
7017 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
7019 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
7020 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
7021 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
7022 because each use also makes a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into
7024 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
7026 work must look exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the
7027 burden of this shift.
7030 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7031 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
7032 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
7033 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
7035 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
7036 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7037 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use
—reading
—
7038 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
7043 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
7045 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7046 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
7048 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
7050 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
7051 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
7052 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
7053 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
7054 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
7057 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7058 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7059 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7060 points also become clear:
7063 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7064 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7066 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7068 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7069 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7070 free culture before the Internet.
7073 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7075 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7076 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7078 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7079 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7081 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7083 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7084 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7086 uses of creative work.
7089 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7092 burden on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7093 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7094 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7095 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7096 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7098 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7099 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7101 before because reading was not regulated.
7104 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7105 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7107 upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question about
7108 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7109 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7110 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7112 of fair use are not enough.
7115 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7116 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7117 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7118 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7119 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7122 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it
7124 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7126 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7127 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7128 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7129 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7134 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7136 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7137 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7138 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7140 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7142 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7143 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7144 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7146 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7147 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7148 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7151 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7152 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7154 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7156 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7157 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7158 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7159 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7160 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7163 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7164 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7165 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7166 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7167 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7168 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7169 Disney's permission.
7172 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7173 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7174 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7175 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7177 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7178 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7179 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7180 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7181 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7182 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7183 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7187 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7189 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the right to say
7190 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7191 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes
&
7193 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7194 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7196 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7197 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7199 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7200 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7201 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7202 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7205 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7206 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7207 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7208 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7210 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7211 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7214 <sect2 id=
"lawforce">
7215 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7217 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7218 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7219 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7220 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7223 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7224 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7225 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7226 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7227 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7231 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7232 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7234 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7235 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7236 if they went forward with their plan.
<footnote><para>
7238 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7240 Problems
44 (
1981):
172–73.
7244 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7245 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7246 you were."
<footnote><para>
7248 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
1–3.
7250 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7251 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7252 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7255 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7256 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7257 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7258 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7261 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7262 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7263 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7264 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7266 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7267 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7268 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7269 that is not at all funny.
7272 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7275 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7276 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7277 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7279 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7282 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7286 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7287 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7288 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7289 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7290 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7291 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7293 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7296 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7297 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7298 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7301 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7302 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7304 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7305 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7306 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7310 According to my eBook
7311 Reader, I have the permission
7312 to copy to the clipboard of the
7313 computer ten text selections
7314 every ten days. (So far, I've
7315 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7316 I also have the permission to
7317 print ten pages from the book
7318 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7319 the permission to use the Read
7320 Aloud button to hear
7322 read aloud through the
7326 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7327 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7329 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7330 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
"Politics
"</title>
7331 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7334 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7335 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7338 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7339 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
"Politics
".
</title>
7340 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7343 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7344 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7347 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7348 <title>List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas
".
</title>
7349 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7352 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7355 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"
—
7356 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7357 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7358 the power
—up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7360 copyright, there is no such copyright power.
<footnote><para>
7362 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7363 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7364 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7366 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7367 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7368 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7371 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7372 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7373 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7374 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7377 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7378 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7379 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7380 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7381 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till
2 A.M., but
7382 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7383 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7384 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7385 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7387 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7388 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7389 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud
—it's not that the company
7390 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7391 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7394 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7395 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7396 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7397 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7400 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7401 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7402 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7403 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7404 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7405 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7408 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7409 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7411 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7412 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7413 protections as well?
7416 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7420 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7422 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7423 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7424 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7425 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7427 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7428 <title>List of the permissions for
"Alice's Adventures in
7429 Wonderland
".
</title>
7430 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7434 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7436 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7438 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7441 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7442 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7443 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7444 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7445 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7446 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7449 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7450 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7451 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7452 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7453 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7454 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7455 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7456 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7457 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7458 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7459 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7462 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7463 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7464 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7465 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7466 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7470 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7471 story of mine that makes the same point.
7473 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7475 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7476 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7477 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7480 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7481 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7482 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7483 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7484 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7485 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7486 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7489 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7490 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7491 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7492 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7493 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7494 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7497 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7498 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7499 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7500 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7501 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7502 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7503 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7504 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7505 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7506 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7509 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7510 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7511 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7512 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7515 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7517 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7518 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7519 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7520 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7521 than Sony had built.
7524 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7525 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7526 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7527 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7531 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7532 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7533 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7534 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7535 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7536 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7540 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7541 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7542 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7543 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7544 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7545 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7546 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7547 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7548 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7551 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7553 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7554 Science
293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7555 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7556 January
2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7557 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter,
11 December
2001; Bill
7558 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7559 May
2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7560 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7562 about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7563 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7565 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7566 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7567 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7568 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7571 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7572 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7573 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7574 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7575 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7576 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7577 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7581 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7582 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7583 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7584 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7587 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7588 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7589 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7590 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7591 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7594 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7595 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7596 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7597 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7598 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7599 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7602 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7603 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7604 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7605 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7606 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7607 constituted, succeed.
7610 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7611 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7612 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7617 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7618 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7619 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7623 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7624 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7625 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7629 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7630 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7631 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7632 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7633 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7637 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7638 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7639 spreading such information an offense.
7642 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7643 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7644 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7645 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies
—
7646 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7647 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7648 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7651 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7652 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7653 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7654 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7657 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7658 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7659 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7660 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7661 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7662 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7663 have been a copyright violation.
7666 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7667 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7668 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7669 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7670 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7671 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7672 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7673 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7674 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7675 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7678 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7679 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7680 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7681 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7682 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7683 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7686 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7687 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7688 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7689 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7690 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7691 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7692 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7693 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7697 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7698 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7699 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7700 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7701 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7702 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7703 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7704 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7705 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7706 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7707 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7708 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7709 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7710 important.
<footnote><para>
7712 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
7713 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7714 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7715 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7721 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7722 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7723 the VCR responsible.
7726 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7730 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7733 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7734 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7735 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7736 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7737 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7738 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7741 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7743 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7744 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7745 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7748 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7749 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7750 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7753 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7754 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7755 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7756 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7757 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7758 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7761 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7762 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7763 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7764 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7765 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7766 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7769 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7770 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7771 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law
—increasing its
7772 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7773 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7774 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7775 owners effect
—at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7776 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7779 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7780 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7781 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7782 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7783 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7784 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7785 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7786 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7787 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7792 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7793 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7794 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7795 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7796 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7798 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7799 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7800 Entertainment Law Journal
17 (
1997):
651.
7804 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7805 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7806 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7807 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7808 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7811 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7812 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7813 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7814 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7815 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7816 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7817 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7818 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7821 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7822 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7823 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7824 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7825 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7826 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7829 <sect2 id=
"marketconcentration">
7830 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7832 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7833 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7834 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7835 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7836 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7839 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7840 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7841 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7842 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7843 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7844 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7845 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7846 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7850 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7851 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7852 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7853 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7854 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7857 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7858 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7859 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7860 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7861 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7862 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7863 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7864 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7868 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7871 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
7873 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7874 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7875 ownership, "five companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<footnote><para>
7877 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7878 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
7879 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
7880 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7881 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
7882 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
7884 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7885 Slide," New York Times,
23 December
2002.
7887 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7888 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."
<footnote><para>
7890 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7895 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7896 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7897 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7898 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than
1,
200
7899 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7900 radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7901 largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that market's
7902 revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of the
7903 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7906 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7907 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7908 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7909 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7910 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
7911 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
7912 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7913 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7914 protected
— by the market.
7917 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7918 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7919 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7923 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7924 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
7925 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7926 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7927 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7928 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7929 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7930 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7931 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7932 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7934 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7940 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7941 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7942 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7943 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7945 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
7946 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
7947 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
7950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7951 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7952 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7956 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7957 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7958 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7959 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7962 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7963 integration may matter.
7965 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
7966 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
7967 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7969 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7970 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7971 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7972 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7973 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7976 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7977 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7978 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7979 control.
<footnote><para>
7981 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7982 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7984 3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7985 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
7986 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7987 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
7992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7993 The network did not control those copyrights because the law
7995 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The
7996 law required a separation between the networks and the content
7998 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
7999 1992, because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8001 percent of it
—was "independent" of the networks.
8004 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this
8006 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.
8007 In
1985, there were twenty-five independent television production
8009 in
2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
8010 1992, only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a
8011 company it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8012 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
8013 16 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control,
8014 last year there was one."
<footnote><para>
8016 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on
8017 Media Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th
8018 Cong.,
1st sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of
8020 Union and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8021 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of
8022 America, West, in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond,
8023 Virginia,
27 February
2003.
8025 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television
8026 was owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
8027 1992 and
2002, the number of prime time television hours per week
8028 produced by network studios increased over
200%, whereas the
8030 of prime time television hours per week produced by independent
8031 studios decreased
63%."
<footnote><para>
8036 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8038 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
8039 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8040 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8041 owned by the network.
8044 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the
8046 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller
8047 few. As Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8051 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8052 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8053 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8054 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8055 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8056 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent
8058 companies producing television programs. Now you have less
8059 than a handful.
<footnote><para>
8061 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
8062 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
8063 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
8068 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of
8069 such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8071 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from
8072 networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the network
8073 wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from the
8075 it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question
8076 without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment to Siberia,
8077 but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are
8078 quashed. This is not the environment for a democracy.
8080 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8082 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8083 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8084 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8085 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8086 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8087 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8089 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
8091 Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard
8092 Business School Press,
1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was
8093 first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of
8094 Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
8095 Research Policy
14 (
1985):
235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard
8096 Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are
8097 Built to Last Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform
8098 Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
8102 giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the field is
8103 only open to the giants, there will be far too little sprinting.
8106 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8107 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8108 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8112 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8113 suggest the concern.
8116 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8117 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8118 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8121 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8122 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8123 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8125 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8126 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were all
8127 quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8129 damage from it is so great as to make waging the war insane.
8130 When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice system, the
8131 desperation of generations of kids whose only real economic
8133 are as drug warriors, the queering of constitutional protections
8135 of the constant surveillance this war requires, and, most profoundly,
8136 the total destruction of the legal systems of many South American
8138 because of the power of the local drug cartels, I find it impossible
8139 to believe that the marginal benefit in reduced drug consumption by
8140 Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
8143 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and
8144 it is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8146 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8150 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
8151 launched a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The
8153 produced scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal
8154 drugs. In one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar,
8155 discussing the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the
8156 collateral damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of
8157 drug legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8158 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes his
8159 mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on
8160 the pro-legalization campaign.
8163 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8164 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8167 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8168 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8169 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the
8170 drug war. Can you do it?
8173 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8174 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8175 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8176 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8181 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of
8183 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8184 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
8185 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First
8187 but the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to
8188 choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media
8189 will refuse one side of a crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.
8190 And the courts will defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8192 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads that
8193 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
8194 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
8196 The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
8197 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
8198 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and
8200 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine,
15 October
2003.
8201 These restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for
8203 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with
8204 Rejection from TV Networks," New York Times,
13 March
2003, C4.
8206 of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC or the
8207 courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general overview,
8208 see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
8210 on Television and Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review
6 (
1988):
8211 449–79, and for a more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the
8212 courts, see Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC,
184 F.
3d
8213 872 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8214 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
8215 transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel buses. Phillip
8216 Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni Rejects
8217 Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8218 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground was
8219 that the criticism was "too controversial."
8223 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived in
8224 a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media
8225 throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control
8227 to the media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which
8228 political positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in
8229 an obvious and important way, concentration matters. You might like
8230 the positions the handful of companies selects. But you should not like
8231 a world in which a mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us
8236 <sect2 id=
"together">
8237 <title>Together
</title>
8239 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8241 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In
8242 the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No
8243 sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8246 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
—
8247 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology
8248 and markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8250 our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins to seem
8252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8253 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8255 the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated markets
8256 to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing the
8258 expanded "property" rights granted by copyright fundamentally
8259 changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and build upon our
8260 past, then we have to ask whether this property should be redefined.
8263 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8264 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8265 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8269 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8271 And these massive shifts in the effective power of copyright
8272 regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content industry and
8273 resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly enable control
8274 over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether another
8276 is called for. Not an adjustment that increases copyright's
8277 power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
8279 to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
8280 regulation
—a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8283 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8285 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8286 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8287 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8288 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8290 holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8292 suggest that we may well need similar changes in the future. And
8293 these changes have to be reductions in the scope of copyright, in
8295 to the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the
8299 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8300 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8301 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8302 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8304 technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8305 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the
8307 of our culture than now.
8310 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8311 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when only
8312 publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much more
8313 diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for even
8314 then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers were
8316 of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a wide
8317 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
8318 remotely as long. This form of regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny
8319 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a
8321 regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
8322 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into
8323 the most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8324 known.
<footnote><para>
8326 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8327 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8331 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8334 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8335 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8337 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8338 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8339 that copyright law has undergone.
8340 In
1790, the law looked like this:
8345 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8349 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8350 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8355 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8356 <entry>©</entry>
8360 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8369 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8370 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8371 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8373 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8374 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8375 noncommercial work was also free.
8378 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8383 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8387 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8388 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8393 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8394 <entry>©</entry>
8395 <entry>©</entry>
8398 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8407 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8409 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8410 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8411 transformation were still essentially free.
8414 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and
8416 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8417 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8419 Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more
8421 we could say the law began to look like this:
8426 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8431 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8436 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8437 <entry>©</entry>
8438 <entry>©</entry>
8441 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8442 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8450 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through,
8451 say, copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the
8453 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of
8454 digital technologies, especially in the context of a digital network,
8455 means that the law now looks like this:
8460 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8465 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8470 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8471 <entry>©</entry>
8472 <entry>©</entry>
8475 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8476 <entry>©</entry>
8477 <entry>©</entry>
8484 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8486 was not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity
—
8487 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8488 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules designed
8489 to regulate commercial publishers.
8492 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8493 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8494 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8495 these domains actually does any good.
8498 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8499 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8500 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8502 noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8504 sketched especially in chapters
7 and
8, one might well wonder
8505 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8506 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8507 rights were more sharply restricted.
8510 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8511 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8512 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8514 historically, this property right (as with all property rights
<footnote><para>
8516 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8518 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance
8519 public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of
8520 Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland Pennock and John W.
8521 Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press,
1980).
8523 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8524 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8525 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8527 And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright" did not
8528 control at all the freedom of others to build upon or transform a creative
8529 work. American culture was born free, and for almost
180 years our
8530 country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free culture.
8533 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8534 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8535 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8536 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story
8537 of chapter
6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar
8539 that is increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair
8540 use right become unavoidably high (the story of chapter
7). Adding
8541 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8542 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8544 limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8). And
8546 archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property
8547 notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture
8548 (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But
8549 the nature of the property that builds a free culture is very different
8550 from the extremist vision that dominates the debate today.
8553 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8555 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
8556 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing
8557 and distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed
8558 in a way that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property
8559 right that is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or
8560 was intended to be. The property right that is copyright has become
8561 unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and
8562 transform becomes weakened in a world in which creation requires
8563 permission and creativity must check with a lawyer.
8565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8569 <chapter id=
"c-puzzles">
8570 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8574 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8575 <sect1 id=
"chimera">
8576 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8579 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8580 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8581 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8582 <!-- f1. --> H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8583 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8584 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8586 The valley is extraordinarily
8587 beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate, slopes of rich
8588 brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent fruit." But the
8589 villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an opportunity. "In the
8590 Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King."
8591 So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a king.
8594 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8595 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8596 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8598 as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the sound
8599 of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to control
8600 him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't
8602 he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute, and
8603 which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
8606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8607 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak)
8608 the virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8610 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8611 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8613 of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies,
8614 and she listened to his description of the stars and the mountains and
8615 her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence."
8616 "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could only half
8618 but she was mysteriously delighted."
8621 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously
8623 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8624 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything
8625 right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8628 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8629 is affected," he reports.
8632 "What affects it?" the father asks.
8633 "Those queer things that are called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in
8634 such a way as to affect his brain."
8637 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8638 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple
8639 and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these irritant bodies
8643 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They
8645 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8646 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8648 in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8649 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8650 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8651 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8652 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8655 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8657 that she was not the person whose blood was at the scene. . . ."
8660 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8662 A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of
8663 DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two
8664 individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person
8665 can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of
8666 a "person" should reflect this reality.
8669 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright
8670 and culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8671 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8672 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8673 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong.
8674 One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
8675 records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
8676 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
8677 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just
8678 send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant
8680 just like what every executive in every recording company no
8681 doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8684 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8685 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music,
8686 then sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8687 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8688 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8689 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8691 to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8694 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8695 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8696 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally)
8698 a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free
8699 copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.
8703 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8704 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8705 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take
8706 a CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8708 to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note
8709 that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that
8710 might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is $
1,
000.
8712 to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song CD, I'm
8714 for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8717 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that
8718 it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It
8719 is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side
8721 we need to begin to think about how we should respond to this
8722 chimera. What rules should govern it?
8725 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8726 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a
8727 felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages
8728 just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get
8729 universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no
8731 is used to commit this crime. These responses might be extreme,
8732 but each of them has either been proposed or actually implemented.
<footnote><para>
8733 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8734 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8736 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003, available
8738 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8739 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8740 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8741 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8742 Los Angeles Times,
17 July
2003, available at
8743 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8744 currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8745 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8746 user accused of sharing more than
600 songs through a family computer,
8747 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services),
240 F.
8748 Supp.
2d
24 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8749 high as $
90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8750 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8751 from $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8752 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8754 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8756 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8757 August
2003, available at
8758 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8760 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8761 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8762 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe,
8 August
2003,
8764 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8769 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids
8770 act as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there
8771 be no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8773 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip:
8775 if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8778 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8779 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8780 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8781 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter
8782 is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance
8783 extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a reasonable
8785 But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
8786 of the two extremes.
8790 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8791 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8792 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land
8793 grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give
8795 holders a kind of control over our culture that they have never had
8796 before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8798 and new creativity will be lost.
8801 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8802 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8803 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8804 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8806 that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the
8807 passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to distribute
8808 content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the vice president
8809 for global public policy at one of these new innovators, eMusic.com,
8810 put it when criticizing the DMCA's added protection for copyrighted
8815 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8816 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8819 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8820 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8821 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8823 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8824 well produce a totally different industry model.
8827 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8828 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8829 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8830 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8831 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8832 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8833 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8834 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8835 interests.
<footnote><para>
8836 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8837 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8838 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8840 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement
8841 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8843 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8849 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8851 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8852 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8856 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8857 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8858 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8864 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8867 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8868 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8869 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8870 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8872 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8875 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8876 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8878 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8882 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8883 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8884 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8888 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still
8889 on the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme
8890 claims of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8891 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8895 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8896 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8897 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8898 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8899 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8901 <sect2 id=
"constrain">
8902 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
8904 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8905 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8906 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8907 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8908 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8909 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8910 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8911 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8912 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8913 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8914 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8915 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
8916 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8919 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8920 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8921 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8922 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8923 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8924 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8925 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8926 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8927 the culture all around.
8930 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8931 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8935 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8936 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8937 storytelling extended across the globe.
8940 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8941 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8942 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8943 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8944 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8945 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8946 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8947 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8948 work is presumptively illegal.
8951 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8952 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8953 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8954 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8955 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8956 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
8957 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8958 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
8959 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8960 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
8961 million.
<footnote><para>
8963 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8964 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
8965 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8966 Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
8967 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
8969 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8970 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8971 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
8972 suffering.
<footnote><para>
8973 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8974 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
8975 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8976 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
8977 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
8978 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
8980 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8983 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8984 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8985 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8988 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8989 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8990 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8992 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8993 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8994 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8997 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8999 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
9000 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
9002 to see a world of underground art
—not because the message is
9004 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
9005 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
9007 art" tour the United States.
<footnote><para>
9008 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired,
7 July
2003,
9011 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9012 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
9014 In what does their "illegality" consist?
9015 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9016 critical or reflective.
9019 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9020 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
10. But an
9021 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9022 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9023 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9024 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9025 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9026 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9027 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9030 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9031 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9032 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9033 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9034 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9035 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9036 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9037 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9038 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9041 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9042 described in chapter
7, in response to the story about documentary
9043 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
9044 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
9045 law regulates such a use.
9049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9050 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9051 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9052 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
9053 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9054 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9055 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9056 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9057 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9060 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9061 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
9062 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9063 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9064 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9065 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9066 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9067 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9071 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
9072 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9073 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9074 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9075 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
9076 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9077 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9078 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9079 culture that is free.
9082 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9086 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9087 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9088 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9089 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
9090 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9092 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9093 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9094 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9098 <sect2 id=
"innovators">
9099 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
9101 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9102 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9103 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9104 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9105 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9106 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9109 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9110 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9111 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9112 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9113 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9114 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9115 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9118 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9119 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9120 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9121 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9122 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9123 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9124 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9125 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9126 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9127 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9128 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9130 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9132 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9134 strategy that I described in chapter
10. The consequence of this
9135 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9136 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9137 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9138 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9139 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9140 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9141 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9144 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9145 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9146 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9149 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9150 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9151 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9152 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9153 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9154 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9157 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9158 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9159 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9160 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9164 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9165 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9166 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9167 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9168 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9169 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9170 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9171 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9172 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9173 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9176 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9177 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9180 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9181 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9182 the kind of content the users liked.
9185 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9186 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9187 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9188 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9189 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9190 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9191 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9192 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9193 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9194 they had already bought.
9197 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9198 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9199 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9200 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9201 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9202 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9203 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9204 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9207 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9210 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9211 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9212 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9213 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9214 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9215 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9216 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9220 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9221 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9222 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9225 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9226 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9227 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9228 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9230 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9231 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9233 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9234 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9235 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9236 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9237 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9238 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9239 Times,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9241 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9243 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available at
9244 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9245 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9248 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9249 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9251 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9252 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9253 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9254 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9255 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9256 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9257 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9258 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9259 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9262 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9264 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9265 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9266 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9267 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9268 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9269 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9270 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . .
<footnote>
9271 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9274 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business
2.0,
16 June
9276 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9277 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9282 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with "your money or your
9283 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9284 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9285 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9286 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9287 constantly threatened by litigation.
9291 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9292 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9293 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9294 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9295 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9296 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9298 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9300 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9301 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9302 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9303 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9304 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9307 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9308 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9309 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9311 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9313 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9314 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9316 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9318 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9319 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9320 overregulatedregulated
9324 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9325 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9327 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture
—a
9329 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9330 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9331 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9332 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9333 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9334 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9335 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9336 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9338 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9339 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9341 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9342 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9343 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9344 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9346 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9349 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9350 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9352 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9354 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9355 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9356 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9357 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9358 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9361 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9362 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9363 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9364 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9365 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9366 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9367 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9368 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9372 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9374 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9375 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9376 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9377 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9378 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9380 and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9381 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2,
26–27.
9386 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9387 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9389 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9390 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9393 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9397 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9398 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9399 impose.
<footnote><para>
9400 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9401 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9403 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9404 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9408 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9409 innovation
—again,
9410 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9414 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9415 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9416 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9417 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9420 As I described in chapter
10, despite this feature of copyright as
9421 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9422 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,
<footnote><para>
9423 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9426 overall this history of copyright
9427 is not bad. As chapter
10 details, when new technologies have come
9428 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9429 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9430 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9433 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9434 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9435 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9436 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9437 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9440 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9441 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9442 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
180 F.
3d
1072 (
9th
9443 Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9444 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9446 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9448 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9449 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9450 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9452 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
1029 (C.D.
9453 Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9454 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9455 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9458 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9459 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.
<footnote><para>
9460 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9461 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9462 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9463 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9465 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9466 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9467 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9468 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9469 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9470 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9471 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9472 World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34, available at
9473 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9476 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9483 As I described in chapter
4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9484 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9485 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9486 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous
9487 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9488 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9490 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9491 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9494 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9495 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9496 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9497 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9498 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9500 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9501 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9503 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9506 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9508 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9509 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9510 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9511 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9513 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9516 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9517 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9518 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9519 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9521 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9522 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9523 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9524 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9525 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9526 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9527 in to this new form of radio.
9531 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9532 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9534 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9536 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9537 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9539 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9540 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9544 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9545 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9547 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9548 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9550 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9551 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9552 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9553 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9555 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9556 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9558 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9559 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9560 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.
<footnote><para>
9561 <!-- f12. --> Lessing,
239.
9566 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not because
9568 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9569 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"
<footnote><para>
9570 <!-- f13. --> Ibid.,
229.
9574 the growth of this competing technology.
9577 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9578 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9579 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9580 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9581 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9585 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9586 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9588 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9589 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9591 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9592 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9593 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9595 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9596 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9597 neutral toward Internet radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio
9598 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9601 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9602 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9603 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9604 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9605 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote><para>
9606 <!-- f14. --> This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9608 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example
9609 offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw
9610 (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain
9611 submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected.
9612 See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
9613 and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP DTRA
1 and
2,
9615 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9616 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker,
9617 "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution," Antitrust
9618 Bulletin (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was not confusion, these are just
9619 old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected from
9621 entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the
9622 name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of
9624 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9626 A regular radio station broadcasting the same
9627 content would pay no equivalent fee.
9630 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9631 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9632 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9634 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9635 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9637 name of the service;
9640 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9643 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9646 date of transmission;
9649 time of transmission;
9652 time zone of origination of transmission;
9655 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9658 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9661 sound recording title;
9664 ISRC code of the recording;
9667 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9670 featured recording artist;
9679 UPC code of the retail album;
9685 copyright owner information;
9688 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9691 name of the service or entity;
9697 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9700 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9703 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9706 Unique User identifier;
9709 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9714 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9715 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9716 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9717 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9718 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9722 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9723 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9724 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9726 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
9728 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9729 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9730 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9734 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9735 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9736 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9737 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9738 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9739 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9741 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9742 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9744 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9745 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9746 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9750 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9751 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9752 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9753 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9757 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9758 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9759 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9760 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9761 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9762 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9763 effective to prevent it.
9766 <sect2 id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9767 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9769 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9771 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9772 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9775 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9776 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9777 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9780 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9781 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9782 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times,
43 million
9783 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9784 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9785 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9786 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9787 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9788 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9790 According to the RIAA,
9791 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9792 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9795 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9796 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9798 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9799 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9800 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9802 response by the other.
9805 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9806 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9807 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9808 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9809 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9810 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9811 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9812 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9813 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9814 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9815 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9816 was.
<footnote><para>
9818 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9819 Angeles Times,
10 September
2003, Business.
9821 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9822 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9823 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9824 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9825 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9826 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9830 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9831 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9832 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9833 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9834 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9835 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9836 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9837 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9838 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9840 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9841 Prohibition," American Economic Review
81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9844 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9845 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9846 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9848 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9849 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9850 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9852 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9853 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9854 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9855 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9856 cheat.
<footnote><para>
9858 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9859 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature
36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
9860 compliance literature).
9862 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9863 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9864 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9867 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9868 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9869 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9870 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9871 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9872 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9873 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9874 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9875 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
9876 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9877 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9878 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
9879 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
9880 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9881 degree of illegality.
9884 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9885 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9886 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9887 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9888 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9889 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9890 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9891 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9892 to consider the alternative.
9896 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9897 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9898 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9899 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9900 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9901 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9904 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9905 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9906 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9907 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9908 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9909 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9910 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9911 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9912 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9913 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9914 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9915 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9918 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9919 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9920 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9921 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9922 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9923 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9924 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9925 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9926 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9930 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9933 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9934 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9935 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9936 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9940 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9944 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9945 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9946 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9947 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9948 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9949 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9950 capacities of digital technologies.
9952 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
9954 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9955 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9956 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9957 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9958 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9959 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9960 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9961 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9962 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9965 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
9966 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9967 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9968 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9969 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9970 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9971 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9972 on people's machines.
9975 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9976 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9977 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9978 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9979 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9980 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9982 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9983 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9984 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9985 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9989 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9990 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9991 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9992 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9993 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9994 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9995 freedom to move content easily?
9998 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9999 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10000 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10001 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10002 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10003 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10004 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10005 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10006 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10009 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10010 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10011 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10012 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10013 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10014 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10015 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10018 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10019 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10020 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10021 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10024 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10025 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10027 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10029 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10030 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10031 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10032 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10033 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
10034 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
10035 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
10036 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
10040 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
10045 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10046 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
10047 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10048 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10049 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10050 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
10051 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
10052 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10053 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
10057 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10058 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10059 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10062 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
10063 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10064 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10065 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10066 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10067 an Internet user is revealed.
10070 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10071 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10072 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10073 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10074 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10075 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10076 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10077 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10078 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
10080 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10081 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10082 Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
10083 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10084 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10085 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
10086 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today,
15 September
10087 2003,
4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10088 Fan, Either," New York Times,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
10089 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star,
18 September
2003, P7.
10094 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10095 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10096 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
10098 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10099 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10100 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
10102 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10103 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10104 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10107 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10108 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
10109 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10110 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10111 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10112 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10113 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10114 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10115 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10116 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10117 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10119 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10120 Boston Globe,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10121 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10122 Colleges," Washington Post,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10123 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
10124 Monitor,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10125 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10126 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10127 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News,
30 January
10128 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10129 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman
10130 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10131 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10132 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10134 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10135 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10138 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10139 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10140 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10141 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10142 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10143 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10146 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10147 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10148 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10153 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10154 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10155 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10156 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10157 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10158 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10159 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10160 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10161 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10162 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10163 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10164 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10165 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10166 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10167 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10168 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10173 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10174 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10175 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10176 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10177 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10178 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10185 <chapter id=
"c-balances">
10186 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10190 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10191 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10192 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10193 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10196 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10197 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10198 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10199 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10200 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10204 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10205 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10206 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10207 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10208 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10209 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10212 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10213 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10214 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10215 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10216 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10217 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10218 made that is happening all around.
10221 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10222 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10223 gasoline onto this fire.
10226 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10227 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10228 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10229 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10232 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10233 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10234 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10235 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10236 success will require.
10239 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10240 <sect1 id=
"eldred">
10241 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10243 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10244 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10245 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10246 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10247 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10248 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10252 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10253 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10254 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10255 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10256 them available for free.
10259 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10260 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10261 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10262 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10263 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10265 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10266 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10267 accessible
—today.
10270 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10271 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10272 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10273 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10274 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10275 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10276 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10277 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10278 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10279 commercial publications of public domain works.
10282 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10283 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10284 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10285 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10286 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10287 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10288 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10289 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10290 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10291 generally.
<footnote><para>
10293 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10294 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10295 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10296 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10297 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10298 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10299 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10300 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10301 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10302 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10303 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10304 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10305 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10306 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10307 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10310 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10311 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10312 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10313 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter
10,
10314 in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10315 terms of existing copyrights
—this time by twenty years. Eldred
10316 would not be free to add any works more recent than
1923 to his
10317 collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10318 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10319 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than
1
10320 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10325 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10326 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10327 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10328 "copyrights should be forever."
<footnote><para>
10330 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10331 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10332 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10333 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10334 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10335 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10336 Congress,"
144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10341 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10342 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10343 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10344 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10345 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10346 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10350 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10352 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10354 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10355 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10357 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10361 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10362 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10363 their . . . Writings. . . .
10367 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10368 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10369 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10370 something
—for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10371 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10373 "promote . . . Progress"
—through means that are also specific
—
10374 by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
10377 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10379 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10380 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10381 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10383 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10385 has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what
10386 the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms "on the installment
10387 plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10390 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10391 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10393 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10394 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10395 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the
10396 practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10397 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10398 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to
10399 keep this gravy train going.
10402 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10403 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
10404 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10406 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce
10407 it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can
10408 do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must do
—and those
10409 things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10412 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10413 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10414 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10415 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10417 to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10419 greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher would
10420 pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be published
10421 by anyone for free.
10424 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10425 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10426 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10427 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10431 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10434 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10435 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10439 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10440 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10441 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10442 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10445 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10449 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10450 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10451 they support the bill."
10454 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10455 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10456 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10460 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10461 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10462 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10463 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
10466 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10467 correct conclusion:
10470 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10471 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10473 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10476 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10478 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10479 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
10482 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10483 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10484 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10485 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10486 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10487 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10489 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10490 the copyright term extended.
10493 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10495 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10496 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10499 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10501 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10502 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10503 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10504 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10505 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10506 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10507 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
10508 Chicago Tribune,
17 October
1998,
22.
10510 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10511 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10512 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10513 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10515 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10517 Disney is estimated to have
10518 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10519 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10520 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10522 Quarterly This Week,
8 August
1990, available at
10523 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10528 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10529 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10531 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10532 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10533 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10534 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10535 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10537 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10541 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10542 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10543 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10544 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10545 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10547 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10549 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10550 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10554 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10555 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10556 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10558 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10559 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10564 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10565 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10567 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10568 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10570 to impose no limit.
10573 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10574 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10575 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10576 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10577 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10578 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10579 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10580 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10581 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10583 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10586 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10588 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10589 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10591 If anything Congress says is interstate
10592 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10593 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10594 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.
<footnote><para>
10595 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10600 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10601 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10602 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10603 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10605 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10606 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10607 commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10608 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10609 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10610 to regulate copyrights
—the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10612 And if it is applied to the
10613 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10615 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10616 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10618 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10619 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10620 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10622 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10623 existing copyrights.
10626 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10627 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics
—a conservative
10628 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10629 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10631 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10632 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10633 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10634 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10636 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10637 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10640 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10641 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10643 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10644 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy
—piracy of
10645 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10646 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10647 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10649 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10650 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10651 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10652 work. But now these entities were using their power
—expressed
10653 through the power of lobbyists' money
—to get another twenty-year
10654 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10655 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10658 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10661 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10662 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<footnote><para>
10663 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
10664 186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available at
10665 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10668 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10669 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10670 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10673 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10675 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10677 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10678 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10679 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10680 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10681 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10682 bought to extend them again.
10685 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10687 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10688 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10690 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10692 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10693 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10694 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10695 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10697 and no longer available as a result.
10700 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10701 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10702 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10703 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10704 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10705 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10706 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10708 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10709 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
7, available at
10710 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10715 Think practically about the consequence of this
10716 extension
—practically,
10717 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10719 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10720 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10721 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10722 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10724 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10727 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10728 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10729 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10730 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10731 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10732 list of books still under copyright.
10735 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10736 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10739 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10741 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10742 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10743 being at least a list?
10746 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10747 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10749 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10751 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10752 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10755 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10757 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10761 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10762 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10763 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10765 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10766 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10767 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10770 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10771 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10772 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10774 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10775 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10776 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10778 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10779 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10780 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10781 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10782 know quite well who owns what property.
10785 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10786 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10788 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10789 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10790 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10791 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10792 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10793 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10794 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10797 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10798 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10800 for other creative works is much more dire.
10802 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
10804 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10805 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10806 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10807 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10808 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10809 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10810 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10811 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
10812 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10813 films."
<footnote><para>
10815 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10816 Los Angeles Times,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10817 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10818 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
9 October
2002.
10823 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10824 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10825 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10826 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10829 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10832 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10833 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10834 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10835 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10836 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10837 work available for distribution.
10840 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10841 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10842 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10843 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10844 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10845 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10846 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10848 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
10849 618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10850 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10851 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10856 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10858 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10859 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10860 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10861 locate the copyright owner.
10864 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10865 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10866 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10867 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10868 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10873 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10874 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10875 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10876 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10877 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10878 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10879 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10880 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10881 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10884 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10886 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10887 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10889 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10890 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10891 the copyright expires.
10894 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10895 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10896 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10898 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10902 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10903 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10904 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10905 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10907 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10911 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10912 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10914 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10915 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10916 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10918 the commercial life ends.
10921 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10922 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
10923 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10925 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10927 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10928 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
10929 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10930 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10931 have, we need to have access to this history.
10934 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10936 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10937 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10938 this context do no good.
10941 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10942 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10943 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10944 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10945 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10946 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10947 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10948 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10951 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10952 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
10953 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10954 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10955 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10956 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10957 market didn't have more to offer.
10960 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10961 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10962 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10963 would not have interfered with anything.
10966 But this situation has now changed.
10969 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10970 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10971 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10972 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10973 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10974 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10975 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10976 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10977 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10978 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10982 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10983 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10984 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10985 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10986 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10987 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10988 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10989 written for a radically different context.
10992 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10993 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10994 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10995 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10996 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10997 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10998 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10999 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
11000 expression. Copyright is a brake.
11003 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11004 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11005 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11009 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11010 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
11011 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11012 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11013 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
11014 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
11015 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11016 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
11017 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11020 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11021 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11022 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11023 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11025 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11026 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11027 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11028 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11029 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
11030 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
11032 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20
11033 December
2002, available at
11034 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
11039 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11040 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11041 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11042 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
11043 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that
11044 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11047 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11048 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11049 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11050 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11051 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11054 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11055 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
11056 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11057 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11058 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11059 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11060 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11061 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11062 power to extend existing terms.
11065 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11066 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11067 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11068 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11071 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11072 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11074 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11075 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11076 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11077 overstepped its bounds.
11080 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11081 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11082 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11083 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11084 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11087 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11088 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11089 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
11090 briefs and preparing for argument.
11093 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11094 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11095 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11096 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11097 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11098 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11099 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11100 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11103 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11104 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11105 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11108 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11110 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11111 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11112 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11113 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11116 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11117 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11118 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11120 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11121 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11122 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11124 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11125 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11126 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11127 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11128 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11129 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11130 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11131 most powerful media companies in the world."
11134 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11135 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11136 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11137 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11138 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11139 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11140 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11141 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11143 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11144 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11146 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11147 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11148 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11150 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11151 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11152 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11155 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11156 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11157 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11158 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11159 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11160 why it was unconstitutional.
11163 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11166 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11167 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11168 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11169 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11170 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11172 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11173 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11174 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11175 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11176 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11177 gather the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11178 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11179 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11182 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11183 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11185 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11186 November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11188 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11189 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11190 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11191 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11192 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11193 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11194 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11195 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11198 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11200 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11201 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11202 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11203 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11204 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11207 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11208 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11211 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11212 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11213 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11214 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11215 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11216 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11217 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11220 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11221 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11222 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11223 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11226 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11227 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11228 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11229 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11232 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11233 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11234 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11235 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11236 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11238 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11239 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11240 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11241 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11242 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11243 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11244 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11245 nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the fancy term economists use
11246 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11249 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11250 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11251 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11252 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11253 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11254 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11255 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11256 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11258 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11259 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11260 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11263 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11264 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11265 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11266 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11267 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11268 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11269 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11270 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11271 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11272 confidence in our argument.
11275 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11276 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11277 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11278 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11282 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11283 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11284 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11285 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11286 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11287 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11291 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11292 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11293 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11294 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11295 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11296 pornography."
<footnote><para>
11298 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537
11299 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11301 That was also the motive of
11302 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11303 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11304 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11306 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11307 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times,
28 March
1998, B7.
11311 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11312 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11313 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11316 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11317 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11318 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11319 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11320 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11321 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11322 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11323 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11324 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11325 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11328 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11329 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11330 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11331 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11332 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11333 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11334 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11337 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11338 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11339 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11340 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11341 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11342 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11343 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11346 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11348 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11349 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11350 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11352 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11353 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11354 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11355 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11356 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11357 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11360 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11361 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11362 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11363 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11364 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11365 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11366 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11367 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11370 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11372 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11373 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11374 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11375 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11376 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11377 these retrospective extensions.
11380 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11381 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11382 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11383 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11384 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11385 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11388 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11389 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11390 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11392 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11393 most important jurisprudential innovation
—the argument that Judge
11394 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11395 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11398 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11399 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11401 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11402 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11403 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11404 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11405 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11406 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11407 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11408 copyright be limited.
11411 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11413 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11415 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11416 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11417 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11420 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11421 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11422 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11424 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11427 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11429 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11430 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11431 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11433 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11435 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11436 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11438 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11439 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11440 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11442 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11443 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11445 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11446 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11447 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11450 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11451 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11452 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11453 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11455 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11456 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11459 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11461 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11462 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11463 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11464 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11467 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11468 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11469 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11470 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11471 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11473 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11475 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11476 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11477 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11478 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11479 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11480 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11481 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11482 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11483 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11484 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11485 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11487 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11488 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11489 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11492 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11493 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11494 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11495 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11497 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11498 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11499 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11500 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11501 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11502 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11503 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11504 family of the Justices.
11507 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11508 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11509 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11510 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11513 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11514 The history was bothering her.
11518 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11519 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11520 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11521 practice that began with the very first act.
11525 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11526 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11527 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11531 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11532 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11533 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11534 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11539 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11540 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11541 Kennedy, who observed,
11545 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11546 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11547 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11548 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11549 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11553 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11559 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11560 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11561 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11562 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11564 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11567 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11569 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11570 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11571 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11572 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11573 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11576 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11577 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11578 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11581 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11583 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11589 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11590 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11593 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11594 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11596 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11597 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11598 into the Copyright Clause.
11602 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11603 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11604 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11608 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11610 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11611 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11612 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11617 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11618 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11619 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11620 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11621 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11622 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11623 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause
—
11624 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11626 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11627 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11630 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11631 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11633 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11634 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11638 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11639 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11640 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11641 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11643 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11645 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11646 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11647 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11648 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11650 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11652 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in
11653 particular, the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule
11654 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11657 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11658 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11659 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11660 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11661 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11664 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11665 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11666 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11669 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11670 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11671 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11674 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11676 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11678 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11679 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11680 in the Court's opinion.
11684 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11685 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11686 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11688 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11691 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11692 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11693 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11694 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11697 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11698 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11699 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11700 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11701 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11702 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11703 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11704 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11708 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11709 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11710 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11711 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11712 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11713 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11714 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11715 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11716 the system we have.
11718 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11720 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11721 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11722 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11723 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11724 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11725 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11726 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11727 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11728 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11730 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11732 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11733 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11734 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11735 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11736 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11737 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11738 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11739 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11740 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11741 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11744 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11745 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11746 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11747 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11748 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11751 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11752 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11753 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11756 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11757 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11758 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11759 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11760 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11761 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11762 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to
11763 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11764 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11765 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11769 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11770 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11771 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11772 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11774 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11775 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11776 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11777 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11778 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11779 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11780 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11784 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11786 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11789 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11791 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11792 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11793 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11794 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11795 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11796 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11797 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11798 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11799 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11802 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11803 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11804 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11805 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11806 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11807 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11808 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11809 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11810 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11811 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11812 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11813 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11814 effort to persuade; but I
11815 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11816 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11817 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11818 should decide the issue.
11820 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11822 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11823 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11827 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11828 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11829 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11830 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11833 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11834 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11835 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11836 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11840 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11841 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11842 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11843 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11844 issue should not be raised until it is.
11847 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11848 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11849 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11850 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11851 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11852 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11853 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
11854 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11855 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11856 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11857 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11859 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11860 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11861 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11862 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11863 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11864 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11868 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11869 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11870 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11871 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11872 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11873 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11877 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11878 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11879 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11880 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11881 in the face felt exactly like that.
11884 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11885 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11886 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11887 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11888 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11889 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11890 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11894 <sect1 id=
"eldred-ii">
11895 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
11897 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11898 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11899 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
11900 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11901 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11902 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11903 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11905 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11907 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11908 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11909 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11910 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11911 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11912 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11913 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11914 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11917 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11918 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11919 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11920 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11921 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11922 the work passed into the public domain.
11925 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11926 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11927 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11930 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11931 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11932 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11933 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11934 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11935 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
11936 everything else, let the content go.
11938 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11940 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11941 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11942 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11943 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11944 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11945 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11946 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11947 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11948 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11949 the stupid harm of the present system.
11952 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11953 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11954 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11955 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11956 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11957 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11958 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11959 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11960 where copyright owners could be identified.
11962 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11963 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11965 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11966 As I described in chapter
10, formalities in copyright law were
11967 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11968 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
11970 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11971 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11972 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11973 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
11974 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11975 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11976 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11977 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11978 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11979 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11980 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11981 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11982 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11983 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11984 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11985 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11986 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11987 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
11988 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11989 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11990 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11991 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11992 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11993 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11996 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11997 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11998 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11999 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12000 know what's protected and what's not.
12002 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12004 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12005 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12006 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12007 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12008 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12009 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12010 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
12011 in the loss of widows' only income.
12014 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12015 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12016 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12017 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12018 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12019 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12022 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12023 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12024 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12025 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12027 imposed upon creators.
12030 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
12031 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12034 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12035 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12036 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
12037 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12038 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12042 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12043 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12044 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12045 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12046 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12047 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12051 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12052 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12053 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12054 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12055 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12056 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
12057 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12058 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12059 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12060 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12061 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12062 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12063 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12064 system of protection for property generally.
12067 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12068 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12069 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12070 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12071 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12072 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12073 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12074 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12076 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12077 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
12081 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12082 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12083 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12084 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12085 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12086 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12087 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12088 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12091 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12092 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12093 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12094 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12095 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12096 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12097 seen before because there are no formalities.
12100 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12101 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12102 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12103 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12104 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12107 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12108 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12109 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12110 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12111 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12114 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12115 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12116 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12120 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12121 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12122 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12124 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12125 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12126 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12127 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12128 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12129 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12130 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12131 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12132 historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of commercial
12133 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12134 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12136 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12138 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12139 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12140 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12141 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12144 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12145 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12146 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12147 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12148 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12149 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12150 something good might happen here.
12153 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12154 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12155 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12156 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12157 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12158 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12161 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12162 concept in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That
12163 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12165 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12166 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12167 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12168 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12169 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12170 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12171 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12172 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12173 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12174 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12175 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12176 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12177 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12178 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12179 film is a valid derivative use.
12182 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12183 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12184 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12185 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12186 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12187 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12190 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12191 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12192 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12193 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12194 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12195 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12196 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12200 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12201 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12202 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12203 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12209 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12210 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12211 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12212 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12213 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12214 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12215 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12216 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12217 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12220 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12221 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12222 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12223 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12224 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12225 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12226 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12227 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12230 What does this industry really want?
12233 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12234 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12235 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12236 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12237 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12238 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12239 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12243 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12244 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12245 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12246 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12247 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12250 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12251 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12253 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12254 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12255 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12256 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12257 and to share its own creation.
12260 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12261 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12262 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12263 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12264 block the progress of others.
12267 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12268 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12269 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12270 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12271 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12272 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12273 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12278 <chapter id=
"c-conclusion">
12279 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12281 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12282 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12283 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12284 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12285 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12288 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12289 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12290 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12291 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12292 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12293 the disease almost invisible.
12296 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12297 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12298 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12299 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12301 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12302 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12303 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12304 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
12306 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12308 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12309 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12313 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12314 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12315 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12316 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12317 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12318 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12319 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12322 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12323 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12324 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12325 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12326 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12327 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12328 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12329 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12333 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12334 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12335 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12336 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12337 costs significantly below the market price.
12340 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12341 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12342 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12343 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12344 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12345 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12346 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12347 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12350 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12351 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12355 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12356 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12358 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12359 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."
<footnote><para>
12360 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12361 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12363 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12364 2000),
14, available at
12365 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12366 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12367 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12368 Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess., Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57
12369 (statement of James Love).
12372 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12373 asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add pressure to that
12375 in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12377 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12379 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12381 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12382 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12384 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12386 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent
—
12387 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12388 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12389 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12390 of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12391 <!-- f4. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12392 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12394 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12399 We should place the intervention by the United States in context.
12400 No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans
12401 don't have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12402 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12403 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their
12404 demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12406 there was an effect from our government's intervention to stop
12407 the flow of medications into Africa.
12410 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12411 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12412 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12413 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12414 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12415 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12418 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12419 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12420 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12421 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12422 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12423 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12427 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12429 which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument
12430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12431 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12432 <!-- f5. --> See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12433 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle,
24
12434 May
1999, A1, available at
12435 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink> ("compulsory licenses and gray
12437 pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property protection");
12438 Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
12440 to Essential Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus
4:
23 (August
1999),
12442 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink> (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS,
12443 Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
12444 Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a
12446 Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring
2001):
175.
12447 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12449 It was because "intellectual property"
12450 would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was
12451 a principle about the importance of "intellectual property" that led
12452 these government actors to intervene against the South African
12457 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12458 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12459 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12461 cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans, and
12462 whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an idea?
12463 What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results
12464 in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so
12465 many to die for such an abstraction?
12468 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12469 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12470 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12471 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12472 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12473 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12476 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12477 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to sell their
12478 drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere.
12479 There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn't get
12480 back into the United States, but those are mere problems of
12482 They could be overcome.
12485 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12486 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12487 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12488 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12489 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?" Because there is no "sound
12490 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12491 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12492 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12493 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12494 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12495 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12496 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12497 idea called "intellectual property."
12500 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12501 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12502 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12503 What is the argument?
12506 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the
12507 patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly
12508 the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and
12509 strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the
12510 spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could
12511 endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block
12512 the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market
12513 prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12514 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were
12515 balanced in just this sense.
12518 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12519 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12521 A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our
12522 tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with consequences
12523 more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other
12524 single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12525 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much
12526 happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically
12527 do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice
12528 how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12529 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that
12530 we don't even question when the control of that property removes our
12531 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12532 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12533 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12534 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12535 this common sense open its eyes.
12538 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12539 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12540 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12541 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12542 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12543 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12544 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12545 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12546 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12547 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12548 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12549 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12552 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12553 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12554 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12555 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12556 August
2003, E1, available at
12557 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12558 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12559 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12560 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12561 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12562 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12563 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12565 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had
12567 to hold a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to
12568 create public goods." These are projects that have been successful in
12569 producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary
12570 use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the
12571 World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of
12573 in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support
12574 open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science
12576 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12577 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12578 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12580 a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12581 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12583 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12585 IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included
12586 the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the
12587 early
1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12590 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12591 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12592 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12593 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12594 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12597 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12598 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12601 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12603 work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12605 And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12606 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12610 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12611 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12612 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information
12614 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked
12615 what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12616 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12617 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12619 to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12620 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12621 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12622 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12624 minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual
12625 property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an
12626 "Information Society" unless one also talked about the range of
12628 and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my
12630 moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the
12631 scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of
12632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12633 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12634 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12635 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12638 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual
12640 I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and
12641 should. And thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to
12642 create public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO
12646 But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial,
12647 at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source and free
12649 Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From
12650 its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software
12651 would be like a conference to discuss Apple's operating system. Both
12652 open source and free software compete with Microsoft's software. And
12653 internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements
12654 that they use open source or free software, rather than "proprietary
12655 software," for their own internal uses.
12658 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12659 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12661 software. There are many important companies that depend
12663 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12664 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12665 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"
—and IBM is
12666 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12667 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12668 support a mode of software development that is different from
12669 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12670 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12672 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12673 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12675 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12677 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12678 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12680 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12681 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12682 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
2002),
69,
12684 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12686 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12687 Stern School of Business (
3 May
2001), available at
12688 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12692 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12693 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12694 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12695 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12696 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12698 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12699 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12700 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12701 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12702 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12703 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12704 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12705 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12706 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12707 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12710 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12711 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12712 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12713 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12714 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12715 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12716 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12718 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at
<ulink
12719 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12721 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12724 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12725 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12726 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12727 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12728 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12729 its lobbying efforts.
12732 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12733 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12734 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12735 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12736 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12737 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12738 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12742 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12744 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12746 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12747 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12748 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12749 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12750 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12751 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12752 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12753 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12756 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12757 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12758 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12759 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12760 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12761 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12762 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12763 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12764 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12765 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12766 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12769 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12770 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12771 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12772 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12773 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12774 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12775 $
20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12776 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12777 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12778 right to decide what to do with their property.
12781 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12782 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12783 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12784 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12785 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12786 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12787 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12788 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12789 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12793 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12794 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12795 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12796 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12797 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12798 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12799 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12800 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12801 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12804 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12805 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12807 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12808 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12810 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism,
210–20.
12812 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12813 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12814 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12817 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12818 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12819 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12820 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12824 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12825 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12826 should be to promote the right balance of intellectualproperty rights,
12827 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12828 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12829 say anything wrong. But in the world
12830 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12831 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12832 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12836 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12837 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12838 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12839 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12840 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12841 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12842 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12843 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12846 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12847 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12848 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12849 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12850 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12851 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12854 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12855 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12856 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12857 our own country's history).
12860 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12861 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12862 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12863 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12864 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12865 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12866 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12867 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
12868 democracy in the world, become?
12871 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12872 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12873 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12875 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12876 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
12878 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
12880 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12881 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12882 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12883 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12884 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12885 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12886 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12887 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12888 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12889 hearings and a different result.
12892 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12893 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12894 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12895 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12896 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12897 concentration in the media.
12900 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12901 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12902 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12903 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12904 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12907 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12908 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12909 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12910 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12911 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12912 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
12913 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
12915 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12917 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12918 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12919 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12920 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12921 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12924 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12925 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12926 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12927 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12928 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12929 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12932 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12936 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12937 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
12939 John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12941 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
12942 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8 September
12944 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
12945 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12946 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News,
9
12947 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12948 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12949 Defendants," Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12950 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News,
10 September
2003,
12952 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
12954 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12955 music.
<footnote><para>
12957 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12958 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
12959 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
12961 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12962 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
12964 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12965 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
12966 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
12967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12969 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
12970 anonymous
—reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12971 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12972 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12973 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12974 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12975 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12976 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12977 kids who use a computer to share content.
12980 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12981 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12982 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
12983 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12984 24 August
2003, available at
12985 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
12987 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
12988 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12989 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12990 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12991 country.
<footnote><para>
12992 <!-- f15. --> "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
12994 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
12996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12997 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12998 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12999 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13000 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13001 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13002 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13003 day into the Causbys.
13006 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13007 potential is ever to be realized.
13009 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13013 <chapter id=
"c-afterword">
13014 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
13017 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13018 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
13019 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
13020 maps what might be done.
13023 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13024 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13025 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13026 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13029 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13030 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13031 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
13032 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13036 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13037 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13038 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13039 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13040 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13045 <title>US, NOW
</title>
13047 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
13048 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
13049 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13050 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13053 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13054 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13055 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights
13056 Reserved"
— and those who reject copyright
—"No Rights
13057 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
13058 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
13059 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13060 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13063 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13064 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13065 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13066 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13070 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13071 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13075 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13076 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13077 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13078 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13079 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13080 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
13081 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
13082 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13083 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13084 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
13085 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
13086 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13089 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither "all
13090 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"
—
13091 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content
13092 as they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of
13094 that we could just take for granted before.
13097 <sect2 id=
"examples">
13098 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
13100 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13101 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13102 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13103 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13104 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13105 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13106 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
13110 What made it assured?
13112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13114 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13115 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
13116 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13117 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13118 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13119 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13120 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13121 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13122 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13123 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13124 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13125 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13126 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13128 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13130 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13131 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13132 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13133 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13134 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13135 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13136 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13137 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13140 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13141 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13142 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13143 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13144 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13145 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13146 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13150 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13151 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13152 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13153 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13156 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13157 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
13158 Law Review
1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13160 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13161 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13162 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13163 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13164 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13165 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13166 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13169 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13170 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13171 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13174 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13175 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13176 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13177 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13178 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13179 care much about controlling their software.
13181 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13183 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13184 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13185 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13186 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13187 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13191 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13192 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13193 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13194 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13195 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13196 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13197 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13198 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13199 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13203 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13204 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13205 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13206 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13207 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13208 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13209 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13212 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13213 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13215 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13216 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13217 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13218 fundamentally weakened.
13221 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13222 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13223 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13224 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13227 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13228 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13229 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13230 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13231 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13232 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13233 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13234 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13238 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13239 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13240 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13241 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13242 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13243 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13246 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13247 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13248 scientific journals are produced.
13251 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many
13252 that printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending
13253 them to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13254 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13255 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
13256 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
13257 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
13258 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
13260 Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and
13262 is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free
13263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13264 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13265 Court opinion through their respective services.
13268 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability
13269 to charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13270 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13271 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been
13273 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13274 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13275 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13278 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13279 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13280 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13283 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13284 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
13285 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to
13286 the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts
13288 the library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand
13289 the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks by reading all
13290 available articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a
13291 function of the institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of
13292 paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it was very hard to control
13293 access to a paper journal.
13296 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are
13298 that libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This
13299 means that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries
13300 begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing
13301 technology and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
13304 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13305 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13306 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13307 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13308 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13309 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13310 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is then
13311 deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13313 for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but the
13315 for the print journal does not inhibit the right of anyone to
13316 redistribute the work for free.
13319 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13320 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and
13322 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the
13324 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13325 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13327 a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge and science.
13331 <sect2 id=
"oneidea">
13332 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13334 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13336 control effected through law and technology.
13339 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13340 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13341 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13342 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13343 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13344 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13345 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13346 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13349 Simple
—which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13350 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13351 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13352 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13353 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13354 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13355 three expressions together
—a legal license, a human-readable
13357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13358 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13359 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13360 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13361 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13362 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13363 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13364 certain freedoms are given.
13367 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13368 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13370 can choose a license that permits any use, so long as attribution is
13371 given. She can choose a license that permits only noncommercial use.
13372 She can choose a license that permits any use so long as the same
13374 are given to other uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so
13375 long as no derivative use is made. Or any use at all within developing
13376 nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full copies are not made. Or
13377 lastly, any educational use.
13380 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default
13381 of copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13382 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13383 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13384 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13386 by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13387 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13389 available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a
13394 This is just one project among many within the Creative
13396 And of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization
13397 pursuing such freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative
13398 Commons from many is that we are not interested only in talking
13399 about a public domain or in getting legislators to help build a public
13400 domain. Our aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13401 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13402 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13403 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13404 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13407 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is
13408 to complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a
13410 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws
13411 written centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could
13412 have imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a
13414 of technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense
13415 against the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with
13417 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can
13418 use them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way
13420 to begin to build those rules.
13423 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13424 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example,
13425 is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in the Magic
13426 Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13428 license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13431 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13432 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1) those
13433 who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (
2)
13434 those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for
13435 free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download Cory's book
13437 of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2) will download
13438 Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (
2)-goods.
13439 If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the strategy of releasing
13440 Cory's book free on-line will probably increase sales of Cory's book.
13443 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13445 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13446 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was
13450 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree
13452 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13453 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13454 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13455 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13456 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13457 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13458 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13462 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13464 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13465 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13466 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13468 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others
13469 are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content
13470 from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13471 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13472 art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the legal costs of sampling
13473 are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy,
13474 which was born sampling the music of others, has stated that he does
13475 not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs
13476 are so high
<footnote><para>
13477 <!-- f2. --> Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real Culture Wars
13478 (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg Hittelman, a Fiat
13480 production, available at
13481 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13482 </para></footnote>),
13483 these artists release into the creative environment content
13484 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13487 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative
13488 Commons license just because they want to express to others the
13490 of balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system
13491 as it is, you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13492 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13494 that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate
13495 description of how most creators view the rights associated with their
13496 content. The Creative Commons license expresses this notion of "Some
13497 Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to say it to others.
13500 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13501 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13502 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13503 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13505 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13506 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13507 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13510 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13511 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13512 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13513 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13514 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13515 steps are possible.
13518 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13520 and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the
13521 creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13523 it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it
13524 easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and
13525 cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread
13529 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13532 <sect1 id=
"themsoon">
13533 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13535 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13536 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13537 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13538 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13539 changes that we need.
13542 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13543 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13544 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13548 <sect2 id=
"formalities">
13549 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13551 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13552 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13553 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13554 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13558 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13560 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
13563 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13564 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13565 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13566 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13572 As I suggested in chapter
10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13573 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13574 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13575 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13576 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13578 were getting in the way.
13581 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13582 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13584 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what,
13585 or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13587 work of others. There are no records, there is no system to trace
—
13588 there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the
13589 massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is
13590 a necessary step for any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
13591 lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could
13595 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13596 <!-- f1. --> The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13597 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
13598 by other countries as well.
13599 </para></footnote>—but it should
13600 not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We should
13602 formalities, but we should establish a system that will create the
13603 incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13606 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13608 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally,
13609 the first of these three was something the copyright owner did; the
13611 two were something the government did. But a revised system of
13612 formalities would banish the government from the process, except for
13613 the sole purpose of approving standards developed by others.
13616 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13618 <sect3 id=
"registration">
13619 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13621 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with
13622 the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
13623 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
13624 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the
13625 burden of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.
13626 And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of government
13628 the office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus,
13629 when people who know something about the process hear this idea
13630 about formalities, their first reaction is panic
—nothing could be worse
13631 than forcing people to deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13634 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a
13636 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13637 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13638 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't
13639 follow that the government must actually administer the role. Instead,
13640 we should be creating incentives for private parties to serve the public,
13641 subject to standards that the government sets.
13644 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13645 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13646 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13647 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13648 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13650 by many competing registrars. That competition drives the cost
13651 of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease with which
13652 registration occurs up.
13655 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13656 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry,
13657 but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should
13659 a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
13660 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete
13661 with one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for
13663 and renewing copyrights. That competition would
13665 lower the burden of this formality
—while producing a database
13666 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13667 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13671 <sect3 id=
"marking">
13672 <title>MARKING
</title>
13674 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
13675 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13677 for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to imposing
13678 the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.
13679 Here again, there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be
13680 enforced in this way. And more importantly, there is no reason a
13682 requirement needs to be enforced uniformly across all media.
13685 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13687 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also
13688 makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use
13692 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13693 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13694 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13695 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13696 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13697 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13698 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13699 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13702 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13703 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13704 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13705 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13707 owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13708 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13709 <!-- f2. --> There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13710 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13711 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13713 The meaning of an unmarked work would
13714 therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
13716 then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
13717 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13718 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13719 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13723 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13724 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13725 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13726 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13727 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13730 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13731 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13732 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13733 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13734 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13735 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13736 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13737 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13738 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13741 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13742 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13743 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13744 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13745 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13746 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13749 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13750 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13751 make things unclear.
13754 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13755 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13756 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13757 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13758 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13759 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13762 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13765 <sect2 id=
"shortterms">
13766 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13768 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13769 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13773 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13774 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five years.
13775 That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost Eldred v.
13776 Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The Economist
13778 a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright term.
<footnote><para>
13779 <!-- f3. --> "A Radical Rethink," Economist,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15, available
13781 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13784 proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13787 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13789 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four
13790 principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
13792 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13795 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to
13796 give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very
13797 strong protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim
13798 rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13800 works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13801 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an
13806 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and
13807 protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13809 of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13811 That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13812 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus
13814 The value of short terms is that there is little need to
13815 build exceptions into copyright when the term itself is kept
13816 short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13818 of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13820 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13824 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed.
13826 if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13827 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the
13828 protection continued. This need not be an onerous burden,
13829 but there is no reason this monopoly protection has to be
13830 granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13832 to apply for a pension.
<footnote><para>
13833 <!-- f4. --> Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13834 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
13836 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
13838 If we make veterans suffer that
13839 burden, I don't see why we couldn't require authors to spend
13840 ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
13844 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should
13845 be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term
13846 once given should not be extended. It might have been a
13848 in
1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year
13849 term. I don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then
13850 the consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
13851 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct that
13852 mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do
13853 today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13854 in
1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who
13855 write now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden
13856 that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
13858 their reward will not increase their creativity in
1923.
13859 What's not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do
13864 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13865 that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976, the average
13866 term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13869 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13870 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13871 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13872 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13878 <sect2 id=
"freefairuse">
13879 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
13881 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13882 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13883 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13884 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13885 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13886 the emergence of that new technology.
13889 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
13891 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13892 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that
13893 are sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
13894 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the
13895 right to release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
13898 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
13900 the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control
13901 translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
13902 <!-- f5. --> Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13903 University Press,
1967),
32.
13905 The courts have expanded
13906 it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This expansion has
13907 been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
13913 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13914 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13915 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13916 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
13917 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
13922 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13923 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13924 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13925 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13926 Consider each limitation in turn.
13929 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13930 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13933 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13934 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13935 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13936 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13937 after the creative work is done.
13940 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13941 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13942 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13943 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13944 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13946 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer
13947 makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the
13949 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine
13951 molasses into the machines. That's what this general requirement
13952 of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13955 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13956 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13957 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
13958 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
13959 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13963 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13964 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13965 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13966 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
13967 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
13970 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13971 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
13973 His view is that the law should be written so that
13974 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13977 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13978 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13979 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13980 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13981 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13984 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13985 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13986 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13987 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13988 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13989 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13993 <sect2 id=
"liberatemusic">
13994 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
13996 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13997 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13998 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
13999 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
14000 battles around the sharing of music.
14003 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14004 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14005 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
14006 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
14007 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
14008 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14009 innovation on the network.
14012 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14013 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14014 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14015 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14016 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14019 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
14020 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
14021 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
14022 chapter
5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
14024 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
14027 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14028 for purchasing CDs.
14032 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14033 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14036 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14038 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14039 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14040 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14044 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14045 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14046 owner plainly endorses.
14050 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14051 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14052 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14053 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14054 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14055 significantly weakened.
14058 As I said in chapter
5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14059 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14060 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14061 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14065 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14066 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14070 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14071 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14072 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14073 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14074 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
14075 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14076 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14077 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14078 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14079 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14082 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14083 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14084 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14086 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14087 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14088 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14089 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14090 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14091 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
14092 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
14093 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14094 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14097 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
14098 that give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet
14099 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
14100 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
14101 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
14102 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
14103 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
14104 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
14105 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14106 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14107 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14108 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14109 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14110 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14111 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
14112 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
14114 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
14115 April
2002, available at
14116 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
14121 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14122 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14123 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
14124 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14125 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14126 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14127 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14128 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14129 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14130 artists get paid, during
14132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14133 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14134 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14137 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14138 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
14139 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14140 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14141 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14142 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14143 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14144 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14145 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14148 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14149 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14150 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14151 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14152 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14153 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14154 way that returns something to the artist.
14157 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14158 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14159 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14160 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14161 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14162 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14163 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14164 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14167 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14168 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14169 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14170 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14171 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14172 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14173 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14178 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14179 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14180 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14181 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14182 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14183 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14184 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14188 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14189 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14190 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14191 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14192 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14193 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14194 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14195 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14198 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14199 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14200 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14201 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14202 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14203 delivering and accessing content.
14206 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14207 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14210 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14211 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14212 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14213 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14214 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14215 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14216 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14217 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14221 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14222 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14223 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14224 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14225 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14226 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14229 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14230 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14231 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14232 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14234 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14235 10 October
2000), available at
14236 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14237 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14238 Stanford University Press,
2004), ch.
6, available at
14239 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14240 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14241 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14242 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14243 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14244 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14245 Broadband?" Washington Post,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14246 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14247 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14249 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14250 Use Fee (IPUF),
3 March
2002, available at
14251 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14252 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today,
13 May
14254 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14255 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14256 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14258 "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
14260 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14261 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14262 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14263 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14264 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14266 by about a decade. See
14267 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14270 very clever way around the current impasse of the Internet. Under his
14271 plan, all content capable of digital transmission would (
1) be marked
14272 with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to evade
14273 these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once the
14274 content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (
2) systems to
14275 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the
14277 of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be compensated. The
14279 would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate tax.
14282 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14283 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14284 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14286 Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14288 I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of the
14289 proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
14290 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14292 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal
14293 after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free
14295 of content, supported through a taxation system, then it can be
14296 continued. If this form of protection is no longer necessary, then the
14297 system could lapse into the old system of controlling access.
14300 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His
14301 aim is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the
14302 system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But
14303 the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes
14304 I described were accomplished
—in particular, the limits on derivative
14306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14307 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14308 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14310 to do with the content itself.
14313 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14314 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14315 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14316 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14317 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14318 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14319 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14320 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14321 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14322 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14323 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14324 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14328 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14329 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14330 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14331 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14332 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14333 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14334 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14335 theaters are often luxurious
—with "first class" seats, and meals
14336 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14337 finding ways to compete with "free."
14340 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14341 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14342 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14343 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14344 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14345 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14349 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14354 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14355 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14356 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14357 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14361 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14364 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14367 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14371 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14372 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14377 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14378 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14382 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a
14384 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14385 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14389 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14390 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But
14391 the real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract.
14392 The real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14394 that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size x, or
14395 (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14397 of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14398 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14400 sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14402 without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then it
14403 may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty pirates.
14406 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14407 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not be
14408 on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14410 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14411 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting the
14412 space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14416 <sect2 id=
"firelawyers">
14417 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14419 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14420 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14421 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14422 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14425 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14426 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it is
14427 my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client. And
14428 in a world where the rich clients have one strong view, the
14430 of the profession to question or counter that one strong view queers
14434 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14436 by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14438 are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate and
14439 significant figures in the history of this branch of the law. Many, for
14441 thought crazy the challenge that we brought to the Copyright
14442 Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the dominant scholar
14443 and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville Nimmer, thought it
14444 obvious.
<footnote><para>
14445 <!-- f10. --> Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14446 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review
48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14451 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14452 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14453 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14456 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and
14458 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the
14459 legal system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction
14460 costs of the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14461 <!-- f11. --> A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is to
14462 be commended for his careful review of data about infringement, leading
14463 him to question his own publicly stated position
—twice. He initially
14465 that downloading would substantially harm the industry. He then
14466 revised his view in light of the data, and he has since revised his view again.
14467 Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True
14468 Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom,
2002),
14469 (reviewing his original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J.
14470 Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper,
14471 June
2003, available at
14472 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14473 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14475 of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he underestimates the
14476 costs of the legal system. See, for example, Rethinking,
174–76.
14478 They see a system that has been
14479 around for hundreds of years, and they assume it works the way their
14480 elementary school civics class taught them it works.
14483 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14484 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't
14485 work for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14486 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal level, at
14487 least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of our legal
14489 are so astonishingly high that justice can practically never be done.
14492 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14493 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14494 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14496 strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality: very
14498 The law depended upon the careful articulation and development
14499 of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development of legal
14501 depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work costs too much,
14502 except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14505 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14506 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14507 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14508 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14509 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14510 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14513 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the
14514 law away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is
14516 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left
14520 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with
14521 digital technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or
14522 think about the amazing things your community could facilitate with
14523 digital technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change
14525 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold
14526 molasses poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that
14528 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's
14532 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14533 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14535 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14536 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14537 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14538 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14541 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14542 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14543 keep your lawyers away.
14545 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14549 <chapter id=
"c-notes">
14550 <title>NOTES
</title>
14552 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14553 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14554 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14555 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14556 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14557 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14558 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14559 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14560 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14563 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14566 <chapter id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14567 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14569 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14570 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14571 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14572 to him that this book is dedicated.
14575 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14576 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14577 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14578 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14579 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14580 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14581 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14582 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14583 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14584 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14585 critical eye on much of this.
14588 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14589 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14590 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14591 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14592 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14593 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14594 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14595 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14596 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14599 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14600 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14601 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14602 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14603 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14604 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14605 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14606 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14607 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14608 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14609 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14610 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14611 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14612 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14613 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14614 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14615 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14616 a bunch of great replies.)
14619 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14620 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14621 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14622 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14623 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14624 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14625 throughout this book.
14628 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14629 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14630 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14631 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14633 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->