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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>Version 2004-02-10</subtitle>
26
27 <authorgroup>
28 <author>
29 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig</surname>
31 </author>
32 </authorgroup>
33
34 <copyright>
35 <year>2004</year>
36 <holder>
37 Lawrence Lessig.
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
45 </holder>
46 </copyright>
47
48 <abstract>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
50 <para>
51 LAWRENCE LESSIG
52 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
66 Appeals.
67 </para>
68 </abstract>
69 </bookinfo>
70
71 <chapter id="c-info">
72 <title>Info</title>
73 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
74
75 <para>
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
77 </para>
78 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
79 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
83 </itemizedlist>
84 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
85
86 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
87 <para>
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
89 <sbr/>The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
90 in a Connected World
91 <sbr/>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
92 </para>
93
94 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
95 <para>
96 THE PENGUIN PRESS
97 <sbr/>NEW YORK
98 </para>
99
100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
101 <para>
102 FREE CULTURE
103 </para>
104
105 <para>
106 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
107 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
108 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
109 </para>
110
111 <para>
112 LAWRENCE LESSIG
113 </para>
114
115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
116 <para>
117 THE PENGUIN PRESS
118 <sbr/>a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
119 York, New York
120 <sbr/>Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
121 <sbr/>All rights reserved
122 <sbr/>Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
123 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
124 Reprinted with permission.
125 <sbr/>Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
126 <sbr/>All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
127 <sbr/>Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
128 <sbr/>Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
129 <sbr/>Lessig, Lawrence.
130 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
131 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
132 <sbr/>p. cm.
133 <sbr/>Includes index.
134 <sbr/>ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
135 <sbr/>1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
136 <sbr/>3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
137 <sbr/>KF2979.L47
138 <sbr/>343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
139 <sbr/>This book is printed on acid-free paper.
140 <sbr/>Printed in the United States of America
141 <sbr/>1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
142 <sbr/>Designed by Marysarah Quinn
143 </para>
144
145 <para>
146 &translationblock;
147 </para>
148
149 <para>
150 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
151 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
152 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
153 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
154 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
155 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
156 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
157 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
158 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
159 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
160 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
161 </para>
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
163
164 <para>
165 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
166 it continues still.
167 </para>
168
169 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
170 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
171 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
172 </figure>
173
174 <toc id="toc"></toc>
175
176 <lot>
177 <title>List of figures</title>
178 </lot>
179
180 <!--
181 c PREFACE xiii
182 c INTRODUCTION
183 c "PIRACY"
184 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
185 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
186 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
187 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
188 2 Film
189 2 Recorded Music
190 2 Radio
191 2 Cable TV
192 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
193 2 Piracy I
194 2 Piracy II
195 c "PROPERTY"
196 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
197 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
198 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
199 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
200 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
201 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
202 2 Beginnings
203 2 Law: Duration
204 2 Law: Scope
205 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
206 2 Architecture and Law: Force
207 2 Market: Concentration
208 2 Together
209 c PUZZLES
210 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
211 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
212 2 Constraining Creators
213 2 Constraining Innovators
214 2 Corrupting Citizens
215 c BALANCES
216 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
217 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
218 c CONCLUSION
219 c AFTERWORD
220 1 Us, Now
221 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
222 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
223 1 Them, Soon
224 2 1. More Formalities
225 3 Registration and Renewal
226 3 Marking
227 2 2. Shorter Terms
228 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
229 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
230 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
231 c NOTES
232 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
233 c INDEX
234 -->
235
236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
237
238 </chapter>
239 <chapter id="c-preface">
240 <title>PREFACE</title>
241 <para>
242 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
243 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
244 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
245 </para>
246 <blockquote>
247 <para>
248 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
249 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
250 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
251 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
252 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
253 </para></footnote>
254 </para>
255 </blockquote>
256 <para>
257 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
258 software,
259 or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review suggested
260 the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we could always
261 "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a switch and be back
262 home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and any troubles
263 that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
264 </para>
265 <para>
266 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
267 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
268 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
270 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
271 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
272 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
273 </para>
274 <para>
275 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
276 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
277 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
278 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
279 </para>
280 <para>
281 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
282 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
283 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
284 freesoftware movement<footnote>
285 <para>
286 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
287 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
288 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
289 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
290 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
291 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
292 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
293 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
294 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
295 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
296 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
297 or of creators from the past.
298 </para>
299 <para>
300 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
301 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
302 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
303 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
304 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
305 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
306 culture deem fundamental.
307 </para>
308 <para>
309 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
310 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
311 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
312 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
313 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
314 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
315 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
316 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
317 he asked,
318 </para>
319 <blockquote>
320 <para>
321 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
322 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
323 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
324 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
325 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
326 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
327 </para></footnote>
328 </para>
329 </blockquote>
330 <para>
331 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
332 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
333 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
334 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
335 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
336 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
337 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
338 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
339 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
340 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
341 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
342 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
343 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
344 that this work is "merely" derivative.
345 </para>
346 <para>
347 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
348 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this book
349 than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been its own.
350 Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of values. Like
351 Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And like Stallman,
352 I believe those are values of our past that will need to be defended in
353 our future. A free culture has been our past, but it will only be our
354 future
355 if we change the path we are on right now.
356 xv
357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
358 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
359 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
360 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
361 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
362 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
363 what I advance here.
364 </para>
365 <para>
366 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
367 between
368 anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is filled
369 with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract that get
370 enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its
371 property
372 becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism
373 in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear about our
374 culture
375 today. It is against that extremism that this book is written.
376 </para>
377
378 </chapter>
379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
380
381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
382 <chapter id="c-introduction">
383 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
384 <para>
385 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
386 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
387 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
388 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
389 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
390 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
391 </para>
392 <para>
393 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
394 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
395 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
396 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
397 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
398 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
399 </para></footnote>
400 For many
401 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
402 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
403 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
404 </para>
405 <para>
406 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
407 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
408 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
409 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
410 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
411 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
412 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
413 </para>
414 <para>
415 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
416 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
417 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
418 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
419 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
420 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
421 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
422 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
423 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
424 </para>
425 <para>
426 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
427 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
428 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
429 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
430 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
431 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
432 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
433 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
434 </para>
435 <blockquote>
436 <para>
437 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
438 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
439 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
440 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
441 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
442 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
443 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
444 the public has a just claim.<footnote><para>
445 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find that
446 there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land effectively
447 destroyed
448 the value of the Causbys' land. This example was suggested to me
449 by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty:
450 Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship," Stanford Law
451 Review
452 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul Goldstein, Real Property
453 (Mineola,
454 N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984), 1112&ndash;13.
455 </para></footnote>
456 </para>
457 </blockquote>
458 <para>
459 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
460 </para>
461 <para>
462 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
463 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
464 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
466 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
467 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
468 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
469 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
470 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
471 </para>
472 <para>
473 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
474 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
475 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
476 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
477 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
478 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
479 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
480 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
481 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
482 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
483 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
484 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
485 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
486 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
487 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
488 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
489 </para>
490 <para>
491 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
492 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
493 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
494 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
495 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
496 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
497 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
498 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
499 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
500 understanding of radio.
501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
502 </para>
503 <para>
504 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
505 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
506 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
507 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
508 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
509 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
510 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
511 much less transmitter power and static.
512 </para>
513 <para>
514 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting
515 of the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in
516 New York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
517 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
518 seventeen
519 miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and then with a
520 clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an electrical
521 device,
522 it produced the sound of an announcer's voice: "This is amateur
523 station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on frequency
524 modulation
525 at two and a half meters."
526 </para>
527 <para>
528 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
529 </para>
530 <blockquote>
531 <para>
532 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
533 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was
534 crumpled and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling
535 forest fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a
536 piano
537 solo and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was
538 projected with a live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
539 "music box."<footnote><para>
540 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
541 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
542 </para></footnote>
543 </para>
544 </blockquote>
545 <para>
546 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a
547 vastly superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention,
548 Armstrong
549 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the
550 then dominant AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio
551 stations across the United States, but the stations in large cities were all
552 owned by a handful of networks.
553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
554 </para>
555 <para>
556 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
557 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
558 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
559 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
560 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
561 </para>
562 <blockquote>
563 <para>
564 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
565 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a revolution&mdash;
566 start up a whole damn new industry to compete with RCA.<footnote><para>
567 See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," First
568 Electronic
569 Church of America, at www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
570
571 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
572 </para></footnote>
573 </para>
574 </blockquote>
575 <para>
576 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
577 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
578 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
579 described,
580 </para>
581 <blockquote>
582 <para>
583 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
584 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
585 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
586 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
587 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
588 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
589 </para></footnote>
590 </para>
591 </blockquote>
592 <para>
593 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
594 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
595 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
596 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
597 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
598 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
599 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
600 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
601 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
602 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
603 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
604 </para>
605 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
606 <blockquote>
607 <para>
608 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
609 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
610 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
611 deviousness.<footnote><para>
612 Lessing, 256.
613 </para></footnote>
614 </para>
615 </blockquote>
616 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
617 <para>
618 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
619 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
620 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
621 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
622 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
623 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
624 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
625 least temporarily.
626 </para>
627 <para>
628 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
629 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
630 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
631 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
632 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
633 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
634 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
635 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
636 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
637 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
638 </para>
639 <para>
640 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
641 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
642 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
643 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
644 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
645 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
646 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
647 course always public spirited; the reality is something
648 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
649 to themselves, would crumble in
650 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
651 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
652 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
653 effect
654 of technological change.
655 </para>
656 <para>
657 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good
658 date upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the
659 Internet
660 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
661 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had
662 access
663 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years before.<footnote><para>
664 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look
665 at Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
666 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
667 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
668 </para></footnote>
669 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
670 of 2004.
671 </para>
672 <para>
673 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
674 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
675 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
676 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
677 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
678 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
679 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
680 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
681 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
682 </para>
683 <para>
684 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
685 Internet
686 itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that the
687 Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
688 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as old as
689 the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change, would reject
690 it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet has introduced.
691 </para>
692 <para>
693 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
694 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
695 regulation
696 of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our culture
697 that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By "noncommercial
698 culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around parks or on
699 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
700 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
701 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader,"
702 or Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
703 </para>
704 <para>
705 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
706 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
707 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the peace,
708 then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly concerned
709 with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it left this
710 culture
711 "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary individuals shared and
712 transformed their culture&mdash;telling stories, reenacting scenes from plays
713 or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were
714 left alone by the law.
715 </para>
716 <para>
717 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
718 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
719 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
720 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
721 marketplace.<footnote>
722 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
723 <para>
724 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
725 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
726 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
727 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
728 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
729 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
730 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
731 198&ndash;200.
732 </para></footnote>
733 This is also, of
734 course, an important part of creativity and culture, and it has become
735 an increasingly important part in America. But in no sense was it
736 dominant
737 within our tradition. It was instead just one part, a controlled
738 part, balanced with the free.
739 </para>
740 <para>
741 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
742 been erased.<footnote><para>
743 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
744 2001), ch. 13.
745 </para></footnote>
746 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and,
747 pushed by big media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in
748 our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
749 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
750 expanded
751 to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
752 creativity
753 that it never reached before. The technology that preserved the
754 balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were free and
755 uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has been undone.
756 The consequence is that we are less and less a free culture, more and
757 more a permission culture.
758 </para>
759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
760 <para>
761 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
762 creativity.
763 And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the
764 protectionism that justifies the changes that I will describe below is not
765 the limited and balanced sort that has defined the law in the past. This
766 is not a protectionism to protect artists. It is instead a protectionism
767 to protect certain forms of business. Corporations threatened by the
768 potential of the Internet to change the way both commercial and
769 noncommercial culture are made and shared have united to induce
770 lawmakers to use the law to protect them. It is the story of RCA and
771 Armstrong; it is the dream of the Causbys.
772 </para>
773 <para>
774 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
775 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that
776 reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
777 marketplace
778 for making and cultivating culture generally, and that change
779 in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet is thus to
780 the industries that built and distributed content in the twentieth
781 century
782 what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was to the
783 railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of the end,
784 or at least a substantial transformation. Digital technologies, tied to the
785 Internet, could produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market
786 for building and cultivating culture; that market could include a much
787 wider and more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce
788 and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending
789 upon a few important factors, those creators could earn more on average
790 from this system than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our
791 day don't use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
792 </para>
793 <para>
794 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
795 happening
796 in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the early
797 twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using their
798 power to get the law to protect them against this new, more efficient,
799 more vibrant technology for building culture. They are succeeding in
800 their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet remakes them.
801 </para>
802 <para>
803 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
804 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
805 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
806 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
807 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
808 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
809 Motion
810 Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
811 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
812 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
813 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
814 Times, 17 January 2002.
815 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
816 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
817 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
818 against it.
819 </para>
820 <para>
821 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
822 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
823 especially
824 in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls "creative
825 property."
826 I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the law, properly tuned,
827 should punish "piracy," whether on or off the Internet.
828 </para>
829 <para>
830 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
831 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
832 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
833 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
834 </para>
835 <para>
836 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
837 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
838 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
839 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
840 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
841 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
842 <para>
843 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
844 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
845 </para></footnote>
846 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
847 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
848 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
849 could cultivate and extend our culture.
850 </para>
851 <para>
852 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
853 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
854 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
855 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
856 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
857 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
858 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
859 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
860 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
861 </para>
862 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26 -->
863 <para>
864 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
865 "centrality
866 of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or
867 otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for
868 neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a
869 morality
870 tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
871 </para>
872 <para>
873 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
874 inspired
875 by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its
876 code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace.
877 There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet
878 technologies
879 to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and
880 culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to
881 understand
882 the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
883 </para>
884 <para>
885 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property."
886 The property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
887 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding this
888 "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
889 sacredness
890 of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
891 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners of
892 "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys, treat
893 these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object when
894 a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to us as it
895 was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are "trespassing"
896 upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to us as it was to
897 them that the law should intervene to stop this trespass.
898 </para>
899 <para>
900 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
901 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
902 Common
903 sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky Causbys,
904 common sense is on the side of the property owners in this war. Unlike
905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
906 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
907 on its side.
908 </para>
909 <para>
910 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
911 increasingly
912 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
913 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
914 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
915 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
916 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
917 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
918 </para>
919 <para>
920 The puzzle is, Why?
921 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
922 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
923 because
924 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
925 absolute
926 claim was wrong?
927 </para>
928 <para>
929 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
930 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
931 </para>
932 <para>
933 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
934 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
935 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
936 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
937 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
938 </para>
939 <para>
940 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
941 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
942 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
943 Armstrong
944 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
945 more powerful view?
946 </para>
947 <para>
948 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe
949 it was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
950 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt against
951 the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual property."
952 What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a sheriff
953 arresting
954 an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of this silliness will
955 be much more profound.
956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
957 </para>
958 <para>
959 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
960 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
961 ideas.
962 </para>
963 <para>
964 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
965 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
966 obscure
967 French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird sort we
968 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
969 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
970 can be more fully understood.
971 </para>
972 <para>
973 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
974 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
975 government,
976 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
977 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
978 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
979 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
980 threatened
981 by the changes to use their power to change the law&mdash;and more
982 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
983 who we have always been.
984 </para>
985 <para>
986 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
987 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
988 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
989 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
990 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
991 to which most of us remain oblivious.
992 </para>
993 </chapter>
994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
995 <chapter id="c-piracy">
996 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
997
998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
999 <para>
1000 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
1001 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1002 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1003 capture.
1004 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1005 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1006 </para>
1007 <blockquote>
1008 <para>
1009 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1010 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1011 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1012 <!-- f1 -->
1013 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1014 </para></footnote>
1015 </para>
1016 </blockquote>
1017 <para>
1018 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1019 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1020 efficient
1021 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1022 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1023 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1024 content
1025 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1026 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1027 </para>
1028 <para>
1029 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1030 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1031 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1032 sharing
1033 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1034 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1035 </para>
1036 <para>
1037 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1038 increasingly
1039 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1040 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1041 believe
1042 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1043 piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1044 </para>
1045 <para>
1046 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1047 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1048 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1049 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1050 </para>
1051 <para>
1052 The idea goes something like this:
1053 </para>
1054 <blockquote>
1055 <para>
1056 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1057 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1058 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1059 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1060 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1061 piracy.
1062 </para>
1063 </blockquote>
1064 <para>
1065 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1066 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1067 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1068 <!-- f2 -->
1069 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1070 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1071 </para></footnote>
1072 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1073 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1074 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1075 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1076 <!-- f3 -->
1077 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1078 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1079 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1080 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1081 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1082 </para></footnote>
1083 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1084 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1085 </para>
1086 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1087 <para>
1088 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1089 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1091 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1092 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1093 property.
1094 It has never taken hold within our law.
1095 </para>
1096 <para>
1097 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1098 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1099 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1100 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1101 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1102 </para>
1103 <para>
1104 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1105 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1106 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1107 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1108 copyright law today regulates both.
1109 </para>
1110 <para>
1111 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1112 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1113 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1114 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1115 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1116 more expense of doing business.
1117 </para>
1118 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1119 <para>
1120 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1121 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1122 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1123 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1124 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1125 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1126 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1127 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1128 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1129 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1130 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1131 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1132 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1133 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1134 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1136 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1137 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1138 <para>
1139 <!-- f4 -->
1140 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1141 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1142 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1143 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1144 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1145 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1146 enabled are much more tenuous.
1147 </para></footnote>
1148 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1149 this creative class.
1150 </para>
1151 <para>
1152 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1153 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1154 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1155 </para>
1156
1157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1158 <sect1 id="creators">
1159 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1160 <para>
1161 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1162 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1163 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1164 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1165 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1166 </para>
1167 <para>
1168 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1169 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1170 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1171 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1172 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1173 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1174 </para>
1175 <blockquote>
1176 <para>
1177 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1178 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1179 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1180 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1182 </para>
1183 <para>
1184 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1185 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1186 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1187 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1188 synchronization was pretty close.
1189 </para>
1190 <para>
1191 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1192 electric.
1193 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1194 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1195 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1196 wonderful! And it was something new!<footnote><para>
1197 <!-- f1 -->
1198 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1199 Cartoons
1200 (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1201 </para></footnote>
1202 </para>
1203 </blockquote>
1204 <para>
1205 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1206 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1207 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1208 </para>
1209 <para>
1210 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1211 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1212 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1213 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1214 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1215 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1216 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1217 </para>
1218 <para>
1219 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1220 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1221 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1222 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1223 </para>
1224 <para>
1225 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1226 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1227 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1228 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1229 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1230 genre.
1231 </para>
1232 <para>
1233 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1235 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1236 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1237 <!-- f2 -->
1238 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1239 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1240 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1241 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1242 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1243 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1244 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1245 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1246 </para></footnote>
1247 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1248 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1249 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1250 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1251 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1252 Mouse.
1253 </para>
1254 <para>
1255 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1256 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1257 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1258 <!-- f3 -->
1259 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1260 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1261 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1262 </para></footnote>
1263 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1264 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1265 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1266 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1267 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1268 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1269 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1270 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1271 old.
1272 </para>
1273 <para>
1274 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1275 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1276 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1277 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1278 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1279 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1280 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1281 </para>
1282 <para>
1283 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1284 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1285 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1286 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1287 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1288 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1289 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937),
1290 Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of
1291 the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin
1292 Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1293 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1294 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1295 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1296 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1297 Treasure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1298 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1299 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1300 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1301 </para>
1302 <para>
1303 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1304 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1305 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1306 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1307 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1308 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1309 culture around us and makes it something different.
1310 </para>
1311 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1312 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1313 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1314 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1315 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1316 <!-- f4 -->
1317 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1318 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1319 determining
1320 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1321 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1322 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1323 average
1324 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1325 Web site associated with this book, available at
1326 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1327 </para></footnote>
1328 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1329 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1330 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1331 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1332 </para>
1333 <para>
1334 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1335 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1336 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1337 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1338 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1339 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1340 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1341 </para>
1342 <para>
1343 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1344 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1345 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1346 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1347
1348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1349 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1350 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1351 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1352 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1353 content from before the Great Depression.
1354 </para>
1355 <para>
1356 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1357 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1358 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1359 universal.
1360 </para>
1361 <para>
1362 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1363 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1364 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1365 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1366 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1367 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1368 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1369 </para>
1370 <para>
1371 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1372 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1373 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1374 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1375 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1376 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1377 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1378 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1379 interestingly different way.
1380 </para>
1381 <para>
1382 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1383 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1384 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1385 </para>
1386 <para>
1387 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1388 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1389 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1390 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1392 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1393 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1394 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1395 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1396 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1397 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1398 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1399 </para>
1400 <para>
1401 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1402 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1403 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1404 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1405 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1406 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1407 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1408 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1409 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1410 </para>
1411 <para>
1412 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1413 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1414 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1415 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1416 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1417 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1418 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1419 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1420 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1421 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1422 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1423 original copyright owner's permission.
1424 </para>
1425 <para>
1426 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1427 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1428 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1429 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1430 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1431
1432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1433 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1434 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1435 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1436 <!-- f5 -->
1437 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1438 York: Perennial, 2000).
1439 </para></footnote>
1440 </para>
1441 <para>
1442 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1443 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1444 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1445 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1446 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1447 which are fifty years old."
1448 </para>
1449 <para>
1450 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1451 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1452 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1453 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1454 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1455 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1456 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1457 <!-- f6 -->
1458 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1459 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1460 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1461 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1462 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1463 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1464 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1465 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1466 </para></footnote>
1467 </para>
1468 <para>
1469 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1470 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1471 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1472 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1473 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1474 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1475 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1476 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1477 culture?
1478 </para>
1479 <para>
1480 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1481 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1482 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1483 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1484 to prosecute cases like this."
1485 </para>
1486 <para>
1487 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1488 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1489 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1490 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1492 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1493 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1494 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1495 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1496 their clients or hurt them?
1497 Let's pause for a moment.
1498 </para>
1499 <para>
1500 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1501 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1502 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1503 </para>
1504 <para>
1505 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1506 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1507 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1508 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1509 <!-- f7 -->
1510 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1511 Vaidhyanathan,
1512 Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1513 University
1514 Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1515 Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately describes a set of
1516 "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the
1517 nature of those rights is very different.
1518 </para></footnote>
1519 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1520 property;
1521 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1522 intellectual property.
1523 </para>
1524 <para>
1525 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1526 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1527 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1528 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1529 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1530 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1531 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1532 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1533 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1534 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1535 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1536 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1537 the public domain.
1538 </para>
1539 <para>
1540 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1541 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1542 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1543
1544 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1545 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1546 freedom is good.
1547 </para>
1548 <para>
1549 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1550 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1551 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1552 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1553 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1554 form, whether large or small.
1555 </para>
1556 <para>
1557 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1558 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1559 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1560 particular find it hard to say why.
1561 </para>
1562 <para>
1563 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1564 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1565 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1566 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1567 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1568 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1569 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1570 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1571 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1572 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1573 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster
1574 films in 1997.
1575 </para>
1576 <para>
1577 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1578 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1579 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1580 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1581 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1582 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1583 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1584 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1586 </para>
1587 <para>
1588 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1589 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1590 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1591 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1592 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1593 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1594 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1595 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1596 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1597 </para>
1598 <para>
1599 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1600 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1601 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1602 </para>
1603
1604 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1605 </sect1>
1606 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1607 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1608 <para>
1609 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1610 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1611 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1612 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1613 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1614 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1615 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1616 </para>
1617 <para>
1618 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1619 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1620 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1621 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1622 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1623 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1624 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1625 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1626 amateurs.
1627 </para>
1628 <para>
1629 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1630 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1632 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1633 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1634 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1635 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1636 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1637 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1638 population of photographers.
1639 </para>
1640 <para>
1641 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1642 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1643 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1644 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1645 <!-- f1 -->
1646 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1647 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1648 </para>
1649 <blockquote>
1650 <para>
1651 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1652 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1653 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1654 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1655 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1656 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1657 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1658 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1659 chemicals.<footnote>
1660 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1661 <para>
1662 <!-- f2 -->
1663 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1664 1977), 53.
1665 </para></footnote>
1666 </para>
1667 </blockquote>
1668 <para>
1669 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1670 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1671 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1672 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1673 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1674 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1675 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1676 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1677 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1678 percent.<footnote><para>
1679 <!-- f3 -->
1680 Jenkins, 177.
1681 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1682 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1683 <!-- f4 -->
1684 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1685 </para></footnote>
1686 </para>
1687 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1688 <para>
1689
1690 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1691 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1692 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1693 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1694 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1695 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1696 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1697 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1698 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1699 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1700 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1701 <!-- f5 -->
1702 Coe, 58.
1703 </para></footnote>
1704 </para>
1705 <para>
1706 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1707 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1708 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1709 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1710 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1711 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1712 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1713 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1714 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1715 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1716 have before.
1717 </para>
1718 <para>
1719 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1720 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1721 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1722 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1723 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1724 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1725 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1726 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1727 <!-- f6 -->
1728 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1729 </para></footnote>
1730 </para>
1731 <para>
1732 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1733 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1734 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1735 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1736 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1737 draw
1738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1739 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1740 that they thought valuable.
1741 </para>
1742 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1743 <para>
1744 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1745 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1746 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1747 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1748 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1749 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1750 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1751 <para>
1752 <!-- f7 -->
1753 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1754 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1755 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1756 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1757 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1758 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1759 </para>
1760 <para>
1761 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1762 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1763 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1764 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1765 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1766 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1767 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1768 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1769 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1770 <!-- f8 -->
1771 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1772 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1773 Review 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1774 Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1775 (1993).
1776 </para></footnote>)
1777 </para>
1778 <para>
1779 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1780 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1781 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1782 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1783 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1784 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1785 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1786 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1787 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1788 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1789 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1790 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1791 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1792 </para>
1793 <para>
1794
1795 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1796 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1797 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1798 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1799 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1800 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1801 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1802 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1803 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1804 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1805 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1806 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1807 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1808 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1809 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1810 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1811 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1812 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1813 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1814 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1815 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1816 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1817 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1818 learn.
1819 </para>
1820 <para>
1821 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1822 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1823 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1824 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1825 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1826 <!-- f9 -->
1827 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1828 Software
1829 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1830 February 2002, available at
1831 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1832 </para></footnote>
1833 These buses are filled with technology that
1834 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1835 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1836 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1837 teachers call "media literacy."
1838 </para>
1839 <para>
1840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1841 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1842 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1843 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1844 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1845 the way people access it."
1846 </para>
1847 <para>
1848 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1849 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1850 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1851 about.
1852 </para>
1853 <para>
1854 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1855 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1856 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1857 <!-- f10 -->
1858 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1859 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1860 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1861 </para></footnote>
1862 it is increasingly important to understand the
1863 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1864 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1865 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1866 constructing
1867 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1868 </para>
1869 <para>
1870 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1871 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1872 written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult it is to
1873 sequence
1874 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1875 understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1876 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1877 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1878 emotion or builds suspense.
1879 </para>
1880 <para>
1881 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1882 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1883 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1884 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1885 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1886 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1887 </para>
1888 <para>
1889 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just
1890 film, as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of
1891 Southern
1892 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1893
1894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1895 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1896 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1897 texture."<footnote>
1898 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1899 <para>
1900 <!-- f11 -->
1901 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1902 2002.
1903 </para></footnote>
1904 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1905 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1906 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1907 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1908 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1909 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1910 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1911 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1912 <!-- f12 -->
1913 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1914 November 2000, available at
1915 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1916 available at
1917 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1918 </para></footnote>
1919 </para>
1920 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1921 <para>
1922 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1923 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1924 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1925 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1926 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1927 </para>
1928 <para>
1929 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1930 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1931 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1932 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1933 </para>
1934 <blockquote>
1935 <para>
1936 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1937 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1938 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1939 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1940 being read-only.
1941 </para>
1942 </blockquote>
1943 <para>
1944 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1945 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1946 twentieth century.
1947 </para>
1948 <para>
1949 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1950 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1951 understanding
1952 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1953 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1955 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1956 appropriate
1957 language for what they need to create or express."<footnote>
1958 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1959 <para>
1960 <!-- f13 -->
1961 Interview with Daley and Barish.
1962 </para></footnote> It is to enable
1963 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
1964 <!-- f14 -->
1965 Ibid.
1966 </para></footnote>
1967 </para>
1968 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1969 <para>
1970 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
1971 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
1972 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
1973 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
1974 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
1975 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
1976 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
1977 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
1978 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
1979 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
1980 </para>
1981 <para>
1982 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
1983 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
1984 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
1985 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
1986 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
1987 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
1988 </para>
1989 <para>
1990 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
1991 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
1992 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
1993 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
1994 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
1995 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
1996 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
1997 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
1998 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
1999 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2000 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2001 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2002 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2003 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2004 to this form of expression.
2005 </para>
2006 <para>
2007
2008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2009 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2010 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2011 Daley
2012 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2013 meaning."
2014 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2015 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part&mdash;and
2016 increasingly,
2017 not the most powerful part&mdash;of constructing meaning. As Daley
2018 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2019 </para>
2020 <blockquote>
2021 <para>
2022 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2023 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2024 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2025 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2026 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2027 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2028 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2029 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2030 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2031 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2032 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2033 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2034 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2035 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2036 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2037 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2038 about the topic. . . .
2039 </para>
2040 <para>
2041 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2042 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2043 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2044 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2045 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2046 </para>
2047 <para>
2048 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2049 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2050 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2052 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2053 had a lot of power with this language."
2054 </para>
2055 </blockquote>
2056 <para>
2057 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2058 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2059 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2060 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2061 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2062 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2063 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2064 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2065 world would be watching.
2066 </para>
2067 <para>
2068 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2069 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2070 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2071 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2072 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2073 entertainment is tragedy.
2074 </para>
2075 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2076 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2077 <para>
2078 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2079 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2080 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2081 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2082 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2083 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2084 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2085 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2086 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2087 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2088 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2089 was also the Internet.
2090 </para>
2091 <para>
2092 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2093 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2094 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2095 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2096 movie
2097 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2098 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2099 with sound or text.
2100 </para>
2101 <para>
2102 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2103 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2104 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2105 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2106 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2107 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2108 spread practically instantaneously.
2109 </para>
2110 <para>
2111 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2112 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2113 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2114 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2115 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2116 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2117 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2118 </para>
2119 <para>
2120 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2121 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2122 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2123 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2124 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2125 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2126 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2127 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2128 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2129 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2130 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2131 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2132 </para>
2133 <para>
2134 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2135 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2136 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2137 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2138 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2139 people vote
2140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2141 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2142 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2143 </para>
2144 <para>
2145 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2146 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2147 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2148 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2149 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2150 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2151 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2152 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2153 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2154 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2155 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2156 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2157 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2158 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2159 <!-- f15 -->
2160 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2161 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2162 </para></footnote>
2163 </para>
2164 <para>
2165 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2166 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2167 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2168 <!-- f16 -->
2169 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2170 Political
2171 Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2172 </para></footnote>
2173 And in some towns in
2174 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2175 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2176 deliberation"
2177 to occur.
2178 </para>
2179 <para>
2180 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2181 occur.
2182 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2183 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2184 politics
2185 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2186 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2187 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2188 <!-- f17 -->
2189 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2190 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2191 </para></footnote> We say what our
2192 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2193 </para>
2194 <para>
2195 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2196 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2197 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2198 Technologies
2199 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2200 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2201
2202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2203 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2204 place.
2205 </para>
2206 <para>
2207 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2208 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2209 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2210 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2211 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2212 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2213 </para>
2214 <para>
2215 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2216 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential
2217 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2218 reading
2219 is having an effect.
2220 </para>
2221 <para>
2222 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2223 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2224 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2225 praising
2226 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2227 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2228 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2229 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2230 instances
2231 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2232 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2233 as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2234 <!-- f18 -->
2235 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2236 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2237 </para></footnote>
2238 </para>
2239 <para>
2240 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial
2241 pressures
2242 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2243 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2244 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move on.
2245 </para>
2246 <para>
2247 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2248 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2249 particularly
2250 interesting story, more and more people link to that story. And as
2251 the number of links to a particular story increases, it rises in the ranks
2252 of stories. People read what is popular; what is popular has been
2253 selected
2254 by a very democratic process of peer-generated rankings.
2255 </para>
2256 <para>
2257 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2258 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2259 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2260 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2261 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2262 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2263 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2264 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2265 get it out of the way."
2266 </para>
2267 <para>
2268 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2269 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide
2270 more from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN
2271 admitted it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the
2272 consequences
2273 to its own employees.<footnote><para>
2274 <!-- f19 -->
2275 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2276 </para></footnote>
2277 It also needs to sustain a more
2278 coherent
2279 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the
2280 Internet from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite
2281 uplink
2282 with a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the
2283 reporter over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She
2284 needed to offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that
2285 wasn't warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2286 </para>
2287 <para>
2288 Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the debate&mdash;"amateur" not
2289 in the sense of inexperienced, but in the sense of an Olympic athlete,
2290 meaning not paid by anyone to give their reports. It allows for a much
2291 broader range of input into a story, as reporting on the Columbia
2292 disaster
2293 revealed, when hundreds from across the southwest United States
2294 turned to the Internet to retell what they had seen.<footnote><para>
2295 <!-- f20 -->
2296 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2297 Information
2298 Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci D. Kramer,
2299 "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall," Online
2300 Journalism
2301 Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2302 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2303 </para></footnote>
2304 And it drives
2305 readers to read across the range of accounts and "triangulate," as Winer
2306 puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are "communicating directly with
2307 our constituency, and the middle man is out of it"&mdash;with all the
2308 benefits,
2309 and costs, that might entail.
2310 </para>
2311 <para>
2312 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected with
2313 blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts, for
2314 public
2315 figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's not clear that
2316 "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists have been told to
2317 curtail their blogging.<footnote><para>
2318 <!-- f21 -->
2319 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2320 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2321 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2322 correspondent
2323 in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the war on March 9,
2324 stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses' request. Last year Steve
2325 Olafson,
2326 a Houston Chronicle reporter, was fired for keeping a personal Web log,
2327 published under a pseudonym, that dealt with some of the issues and
2328 people he was covering.")
2329 </para></footnote>
2330 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2331
2332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2333 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2334 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2335 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2336 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2337 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2338 </para>
2339 <para>
2340 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2341 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2342 gatekeeper."
2343 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2344 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2345 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2346 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2347 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2348 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2349 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2350 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2351 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2352 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2353 extraordinary
2354 to report.
2355 </para>
2356 <para>
2357 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2358 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2359 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2360 </para>
2361 <para>
2362 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2363 differently
2364 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2365 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2366 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2367 </para>
2368 <para>
2369 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2370 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2371 lawnmower
2372 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2373 technologies
2374 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2375 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2376 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2377 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2378 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2379 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2380 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2381 tinkering of many others.
2382 </para>
2383 <para>
2384 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2385 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2386 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2387 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2388 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2389 </para>
2390 <para>
2391 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2392 platform,"
2393 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2394 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2395 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2396 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2397 becomes
2398 a major apprenticeship platform."
2399 </para>
2400 <para>
2401 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2402 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2403 abstract,
2404 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2405 doing
2406 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2407 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2408 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2409 </para>
2410 <para>
2411 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2412 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2413 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2414 multiple
2415 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2416 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2417 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2418 artistic,
2419 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2420 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2421 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2422 </para>
2423 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2424 <para>
2425 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2426 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2427
2428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2429 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2430 of recognition.
2431 </para>
2432 <para>
2433 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2434 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2435 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2436 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2437 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2438 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2439 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2440 </para>
2441 <para>
2442 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2443 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2444 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2445 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2446 general.<footnote><para>
2447 <!-- f22 -->
2448 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2449 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2450 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2451 </para></footnote>
2452 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2453 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2454 </para>
2455 <para>
2456 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2457 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2458 and want to learn."
2459 </para>
2460 <para>
2461 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2462 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2463 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2464 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2465 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2466 </para>
2467 <para>
2468 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2469 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2470 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2471 the law to close down that technology.
2472 </para>
2473 <para>
2474 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2475 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2476 </para>
2477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2478 </sect1>
2479 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2480 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2481 <para>
2482 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2483 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2484 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2485 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2486 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2487 </para>
2488 <para>
2489 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2490 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2491 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2492 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2493 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2494 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2495 </para>
2496 <para>
2497 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2498 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2499 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2500 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2501 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2502 </para>
2503 <para>
2504 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2505 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2506 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2507 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2508 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2509 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2510 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2511 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2512 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2513 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2514 </para>
2515 <para>
2516 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2517 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2518 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2519 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2520 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2521 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2522 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2523 </para>
2524 <para>
2525 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2526 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2527 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2528 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2529 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2530 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2531 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2532 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2533 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2534 on-line.
2535 </para>
2536 <para>
2537 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2538 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2539 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2540 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2541 be on users' computers.
2542 </para>
2543 <para>
2544 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2545 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2546 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2547 students
2548 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2549 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2550 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2551 computer.
2552 </para>
2553 <para>
2554 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2555 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2556 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2557 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2558 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2559 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2560 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2561 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2562 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2563 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2564 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2565 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2566 supposed to do.
2567 </para>
2568 <para>
2569 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2570 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2571 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2572 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2573 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2574 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2575 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2576 </para>
2577 <para>
2578 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2579 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2580 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2581 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2582 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2583 easier to use"&mdash;again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2584 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2585 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2586 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2587 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2588 </para>
2589 <para>
2590 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2591 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2592 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2593 demanded
2594 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2595 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2596 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2597 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2598 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2599 that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2600 </para>
2601 <para>
2602 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2603 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2604 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2605 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2606 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2607 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2608 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2609 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2610 <!-- f1 -->
2611 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2612 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2613 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2614 </para></footnote>
2615 </para>
2616 <para>
2617 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2618 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2619 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2620 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2621 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2622 </para>
2623 <para>
2624 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2625 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2626 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2627 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2628 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2629 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2630 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2631 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2632 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2633 </para>
2634 <para>
2635 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2636 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2637 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2638 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2639 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2640 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2641 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2642 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2643 </para>
2644 <para>
2645 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2646 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2647 </para>
2648 <para>
2649 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2650 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2651 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2652 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2653 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2654 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2655 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2656 <!-- f2 -->
2657 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2658 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2659 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2660 </para></footnote>
2661 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2662 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2663 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2664 <!-- f3 -->
2665 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2666 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2667 </para></footnote>
2668 </para>
2669 <para>
2670 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2671 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2672 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2673 activist:
2674 </para>
2675 <blockquote>
2676 <para>
2677 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2678 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2679 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2680 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2681 </para>
2682 </blockquote>
2683 <para>
2684 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2685 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2686 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2687 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2688 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2689 </para>
2690 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2691 </sect1>
2692 <sect1 id="pirates">
2693 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2694 <para>
2695 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2696 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2697 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2698 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2699 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2700 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2701 </para>
2702 <sect2 id="film">
2703 <title>Film</title>
2704 <para>
2705 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2706 <!-- f1 -->
2707 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2708 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2709 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2710 </para></footnote>
2711 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2712 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2713 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2714 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2715 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2716 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2717 this creative property
2718 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2719 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2720 </para>
2721 <para>
2722 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2723 </para>
2724 <blockquote>
2725 <para>
2726 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2727 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2728 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2729 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2730 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2731 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2732 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2733 </para>
2734 <para>
2735 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2736 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2737 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2738 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2739 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2740 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2741 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2742 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2743 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2744 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2745 <!-- f2 -->
2746 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2747 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2748 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2749 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2750 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2751 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2752 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2753 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2754 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2755 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2756 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2757 </para>
2758 </blockquote>
2759 <para>
2760 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2761 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2762 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2763 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2764 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2765 <!-- f3 -->
2766 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2767 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2768 </para></footnote>
2769 That led the independents to flee the East
2770 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2771 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2772 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2773 did just that.
2774 </para>
2775 <para>
2776 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2777 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2778 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2779
2780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2781 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2782 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2783 Edison's creative property.
2784 </para>
2785 </sect2>
2786 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2787 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2788 <para>
2789 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2790 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2791 </para>
2792 <para>
2793 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2794 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2795 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2796 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2797 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2798 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2799 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2800 right to perform it publicly.
2801 </para>
2802 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2803 <para>
2804 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2805 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2806 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2807 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2808 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2809 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2810 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2811 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2812 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2813 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2814 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2815 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2816 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2817 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2818 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2819 its composer anything.
2820 </para>
2821 <para>
2822 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2824 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2825 put it,
2826 </para>
2827 <blockquote>
2828 <para>
2829 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2830 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2831 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2832 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2833 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2834 rights.<footnote><para>
2835 <!-- f4 -->
2836 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2837 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2838 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2839 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2840 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2841 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2842 </para></footnote>
2843 </para>
2844 </blockquote>
2845 <para>
2846 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2847 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2848 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2849 <!-- f5 -->
2850 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2851 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2852 </para></footnote>
2853 and the "music publishing industry"
2854 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2855 <!-- f6 -->
2856 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2857 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2858 </para></footnote>
2859 As John Philip
2860 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2861 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2862 <!-- f7 -->
2863 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2864 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2865 </para></footnote>
2866 </para>
2867 <para>
2868 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2869 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2870 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2871 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2872 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2873 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2874 <!-- f8 -->
2875 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2876 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2877 Perforating
2878 Company of New York).
2879 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2880 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2881 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2882 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2883 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2884 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."<footnote><para>
2885 <!-- f9 -->
2886 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376
2887 (prepared
2888 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2889 American
2890 Graphophone Company Association).
2891 </para></footnote>
2892 </para>
2893 <para>
2894 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2895 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2896 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2897 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2898 control
2899 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2900 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2901 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2902
2903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2904 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2905 authorizes
2906 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2907 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2908 </para>
2909 <para>
2910 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2911 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2912 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2913 Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2914 recordings
2915 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2916 by the statute.
2917 </para>
2918 <para>
2919 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2920 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
2921 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
2922 whatever
2923 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
2924 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
2925 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
2926 </para>
2927 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2928 <para>
2929 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2930 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
2931 of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
2932 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
2933 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
2934 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
2935 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
2936 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2937 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2938 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
2939 stifle
2940 follow-on creativity.<footnote><para>
2941 <!-- f10 -->
2942 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2943 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2944 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2945 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2946 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2947 </para></footnote>
2948 </para>
2949 <para>
2950 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2951 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2952 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2953 relates,
2954 </para>
2955 <blockquote>
2956 <para>
2957 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2959 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2960 industry
2961 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2962 importance
2963 in the United States and throughout the world; records
2964 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
2965 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
2966 access
2967 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
2968 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
2969 before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
2970 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
2971 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
2972 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
2973 improved
2974 quality, and a greater choice.<footnote><para>
2975 <!-- f11 -->
2976 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
2977 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
2978 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
2979 this report.</para></footnote>
2980 </para>
2981 </blockquote>
2982 <para>
2983 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
2984 creative
2985 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2986 </para>
2987 </sect2>
2988 <sect2 id="radio">
2989 <title>Radio</title>
2990 <para>
2991 Radio was also born of piracy.
2992 </para>
2993 <para>
2994 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
2995 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
2996 <!-- f12 -->
2997 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning, record
2998 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
2999 messages
3000 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
3001 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
3002 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
3003 Manufacturing
3004 Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.
3005 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
3006 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
3007 Review 70 (2003): 281.
3008 </para></footnote>
3009 As I described above,
3010 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3011 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3012 composer
3013 money for that performance.
3014 </para>
3015 <para>
3016 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3017 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3018 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3019 Birthday"
3020 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3021 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3022 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3023 station.
3024 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3025 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3026 composer
3027 of the music for his work.
3028
3029 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3030 </para>
3031 <para>
3032 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3033 radio
3034 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3035 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3036 something
3037 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3038 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3039 playing the song.
3040 </para>
3041 <para>
3042 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3043 music.
3044 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3045 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3046 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3047 </para>
3048 <para>
3049 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3050 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3051 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3052 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3053 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3054 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3055 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3056 </para>
3057 <para>
3058 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3059 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3060 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3061 ordinarily
3062 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3063 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3064 something for nothing.
3065 </para>
3066 </sect2>
3067 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3068 <title>Cable TV</title>
3069 <para>
3070
3071 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3072 </para>
3073 <para>
3074 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with
3075 cable television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the
3076 content
3077 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable
3078 companies
3079 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3080 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3081 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3082 broadcasters'
3083 content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever did&mdash;
3084 Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to give away.
3085 </para>
3086 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3087 <para>
3088 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3089 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3090 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3091 <!-- f13 -->
3092 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the Subcommittee
3093 on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
3094 on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966) (statement of
3095 Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
3096 </para></footnote>
3097 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3098 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3099 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3100 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3101 <!-- f14 -->
3102 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3103 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3104 </para></footnote>
3105 As another broadcaster put it,
3106 </para>
3107 <blockquote>
3108 <para>
3109 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3110 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3111 paid for.<footnote><para>
3112 <!-- f15 -->
3113 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3114 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3115 </para></footnote>
3116 </para>
3117 </blockquote>
3118 <para>
3119 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable
3120 enough:
3121 </para>
3122 <blockquote>
3123 <para>
3124 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3125 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3126 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3127 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3128 <!-- f16 -->
3129 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3130 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3131 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3132 </para></footnote>
3133 </para>
3134 </blockquote>
3135 <para>
3136 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president
3137 Charlton
3138 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of compensation."<footnote><para>
3139 <!-- f17 -->
3140 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3141 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3142 </para></footnote>
3143 </para>
3144 <para>
3145 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant
3146 Attorney
3147 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3148 </para>
3149 <blockquote>
3150 <para>
3151 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have
3152 any copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether
3153 copyright
3154 holders who are already compensated, who already have a
3155 monopoly, should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3156
3157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3158 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3159 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3160 <!-- f18 -->
3161 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3162 Zimmerman,
3163 acting assistant attorney general).
3164 </para></footnote>
3165 </para>
3166 </blockquote>
3167 <para>
3168 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the
3169 Supreme Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright
3170 owners nothing.
3171 </para>
3172 <para>
3173 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3174 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3175 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3176 resolved
3177 the question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable
3178 companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but
3179 the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright owner.
3180 The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto
3181 power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable companies thus
3182 built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value created by
3183 broadcasters'
3184 content.
3185 </para>
3186 <para>
3187 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy"
3188 means using value from someone else's creative property without
3189 permission
3190 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described today<footnote><para>
3191 <!-- f19 -->
3192 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3193 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3194 Information, available at
3195 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3196 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3197 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3198 </para></footnote>
3199 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3200 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3201 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3202 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3203 generation&mdash;until now.
3204 </para>
3205 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3206 </sect2>
3207 </sect1>
3208 <sect1 id="piracy">
3209 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3210 <para>
3211
3212 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy
3213 comes in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3214 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3215 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its defense,
3216 this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should
3217 stop it.
3218 </para>
3219 <para>
3220 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3221 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3222 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3223 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3224 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3225 outright
3226 copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has
3227 so often done in the past.
3228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3229 </para>
3230 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3231 <title>Piracy I</title>
3232 <para>
3233 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3234 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3235 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3236 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3237 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3238 <!-- f1 -->
3239 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3240 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at
3241
3242 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3243 Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3244 </para></footnote>
3245 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3246 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually
3247 worldwide to piracy.
3248 </para>
3249 <para>
3250 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3251 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3252 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3253 This piracy is wrong.
3254 </para>
3255 <para>
3256 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3257 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3258 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3259 foreign
3260 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3261 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3262 developing
3263 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3264 existence, treated as right.
3265 </para>
3266 <para>
3267 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3268 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3269 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3270 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3271 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3272 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3273 violate
3274 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3275 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3276 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3277 </para>
3278 <para>
3279 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3280 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3281 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3282 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3283 pirate
3284 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3285 childhood.
3286 </para>
3287 <para>
3288 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3289 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3290 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3291 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3292 <!-- f2 -->
3293 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3294 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3295 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3296 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3297 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3298 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3299 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3300 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3301 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3302 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3303 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3304 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3305 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3306 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3307 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3308 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3309 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3310 is wrong.
3311 </para>
3312 <para>
3313 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3314 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3315 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3316 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3317 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3318 <!-- f3 -->
3319 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3320 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3321 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3322 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3323 instance
3324 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3325 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3326 </para></footnote>
3327 </para>
3328 <para>
3329 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3330 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3331 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3332 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3333 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3334 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3335 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3336 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3337 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3338 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3339 piracy of the tangible.
3340 </para>
3341 <para>
3342 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3343 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3344 property
3345 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3346 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3347 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3348 licenses
3349 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3350 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3351 copyrighted
3352 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3353
3354 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3355 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3356 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3357 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3358 technology
3359 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3360 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3361 </para>
3362 <para>
3363 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3364 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3365 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3366 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3367 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3368 nation
3369 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3370 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3371 benefit
3372 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3373 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3374 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3375 Microsoft.
3376 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3377 </para>
3378 <para>
3379 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3380 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3381 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3382 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3383 become
3384 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3385 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3386 </para>
3387 <para>
3388 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3389 alcoholic
3390 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3391 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3392 ordinarily
3393 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3394 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3395 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3396 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3397 giving
3398 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what&mdash;at
3399 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3400 copyright
3401 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3402 wrong.
3403 </para>
3404 <para>
3405 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3406 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3407 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3408 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3409 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3410 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3411 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3412 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3413 is flat out wrong.
3414 </para>
3415 <para>
3416 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3417 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3418 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3419 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3420 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3421 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3422 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3423 </para>
3424 <para>
3425 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3426 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3427 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3428 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3429 </para>
3430 <para>
3431 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3432 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3433 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3434 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3435 </para>
3436 <para>
3437 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3438 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3439 sharing
3440 to survive.
3441 </para>
3442 </sect2>
3443 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3444 <title>Piracy II</title>
3445 <para>
3446 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3447 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3448 <!-- f4 -->
3449 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3450 </para></footnote>
3451 This means we must determine whether
3452 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3453 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3454 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3455 author of his profit.
3456 </para>
3457 <para>
3458 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors
3459 of the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3460 innovations.
3461 Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and,
3462 arguably,
3463 off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3464 <!-- f5 -->
3465 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3466 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3467 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3468 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
3469 up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.
3470 This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing
3471 technology
3472 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see
3473 Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3474 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3475 put together components that had been developed independently.
3476 </para>
3477 <para>
3478 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3479 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3480 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3481 system.<footnote><para>
3482 <!-- f6 -->
3483 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3484 San Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3485 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3486 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3487 "Napster's
3488 Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3489 "Hollywood
3490 at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3491 </para></footnote>
3492 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3493 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3494 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3495 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3496 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3497 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3498 or your 20,000 best friends.
3499 </para>
3500 <para>
3501 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3502 Americans
3503 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3504 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3505 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3506 <!-- f7 -->
3507 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3508 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3509 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3510 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3511 </para></footnote>
3512 A survey by the NPD
3513 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens
3514 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3515 <!-- f8 -->
3516 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3517 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3518 </para></footnote>
3519 The vast
3520 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3521 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3522 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3523 enjoy
3524 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3525 </para>
3526 <para>
3527 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3528 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3529 infringement,
3530 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3531 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more carefully
3532 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do&mdash;the kinds of
3533 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3534 </para>
3535 <para>
3536 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3537 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3538 different kinds into four types.
3539 </para>
3540 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3541 <listitem><para>
3542 <!-- A. -->
3543 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3544 purchasing
3545 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3546 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3547 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3548 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3549 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3550 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3551 instead
3552 of purchasing.
3553 </para></listitem>
3554 <listitem><para>
3555 <!-- B. -->
3556 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3557 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3558 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3559 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3560 succeed.
3561 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3562 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3563 recommendations
3564 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3565 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3566 </para></listitem>
3567 <listitem><para>
3568 <!-- C. -->
3569 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3570 copyrighted
3571 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3572 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3573 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3574 rewarding
3575 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3576 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3577 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3578 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3579 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3580 available.)
3581 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3582 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3583 content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same harm
3584 that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3585 a local collector.
3586 </para></listitem>
3587 <listitem><para>
3588 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3589 <!-- D. -->
3590 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3591 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3592 wants to give away.
3593 </para></listitem>
3594 </orderedlist>
3595 <para>
3596 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3597 </para>
3598 <para>
3599 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3600 perspective
3601 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3602 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.<footnote><para>
3603 <!-- f9 -->
3604 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3605 </para></footnote>
3606 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3607 illegal,
3608 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3609 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3610 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer&mdash;and
3611 certainly
3612 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3613 suggests.
3614 </para>
3615 <para>
3616 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3617 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3618 Hollywood,
3619 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3620 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3621 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3622 that is "devastating" the industry.
3623 </para>
3624 <para>
3625 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3626 harmful
3627 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3628 practice
3629 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3630 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst &amp;
3631 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3632 labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3633 <!-- f10 -->
3634 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3635 Industry's
3636 Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music
3637 industry's
3638 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3639 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3640 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3641 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3642 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent
3643 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3644 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3645 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3646 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145&ndash;56.
3647 </para></footnote>
3648 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3649 album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the
3650 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3651 problem,
3652 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3653 </para>
3654 <para>
3655 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3656 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3657 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3658 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3659 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3660 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3661 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3662 <!-- f11 -->
3663 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3664 </para></footnote>
3665 </para>
3666 <para>
3667 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3668 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3669 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3670 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3671 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3672 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3673 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3674 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3675 </para>
3676 <para>
3677 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3678 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3679 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3680 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3681 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3682 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3683 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3684 </para>
3685 <para>
3686 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3687 because
3688 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3689 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3690 </para>
3691 <para>
3692 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3693 percent,
3694 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3695 <!-- f12 -->
3696 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3697 available at
3698 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3699 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3700 25 June 2003, available at
3701 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3702 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3703 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3704 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3705 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3706 music
3707 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3708 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3709 </para></footnote>
3710 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3711 Internet
3712 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3713 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3714 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3715 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3716 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3717 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3718 <!-- f13 -->
3719 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3720 <para>
3721 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3722 February 2003, available at
3723 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3724 </para>
3725 </footnote>
3726 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3727 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3728 High Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie
3729 [on DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3730 <!-- f14 -->
3731 Ibid.
3732 </para></footnote>
3733 </para>
3734 <para>
3735
3736 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3737 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3738 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3739 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3740 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3741 although
3742 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3743 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3744 </para>
3745 <para>
3746 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3747 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3748 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3749 between
3750 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3751 numbers
3752 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3753 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3754 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3755 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3756 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3757 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3758 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3759 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3760 between
3761 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3762 </para>
3763 <para>
3764 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3765 assume,
3766 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3767 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3768 costs?
3769 </para>
3770 <para>
3771 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3772 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3773 available.
3774 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3775 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3776 <!-- f15 -->
3777 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3778 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3779 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3780 Committee
3781 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3782 statement
3783 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3784 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3785 </para></footnote>
3786 And while it's
3787 conceivable
3788 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3789 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3790 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3791 distributor
3792 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3793 make it available.
3794 </para>
3795 <para>
3796 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3797 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3798 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3799 thousands
3800 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3801 <!-- f16 -->
3802 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3803 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3804 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3805 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3806 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3807 National
3808 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3809 Results,"
3810 available at
3811 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3812 </para></footnote>
3813 These
3814 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3815 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3816 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3817 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3818 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3819 companies
3820 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3821 owner for the content they sell.
3822 </para>
3823 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3824 <para>
3825 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3826 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3827 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3828 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3829 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3830 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3831 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3832 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3833 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3834 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3835 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3836 </para>
3837 <para>
3838 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3839 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3840 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3841 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3842 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3843 shut as well?
3844 </para>
3845 <para>
3846 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3847 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3848 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3849 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3850 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3851 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3852
3853 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3854 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3855 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3856 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3857 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3858 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3859 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3860 great book!)
3861 </para>
3862 <para>
3863 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3864 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3865 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3866 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3867 </para>
3868 <para>
3869 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3870 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3871 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3872 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3873 unavailable?"
3874 </para>
3875 <para>
3876 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3877 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3878 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
3879 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3880 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3881 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3882 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3883 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3884 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3885 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3886 found only with time.
3887 </para>
3888 <para>
3889 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3890 just what you call type A sharing?"
3891 </para>
3892 <para>
3893 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3894 effect
3895 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3896 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3897 Napster
3898 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3899 developed
3900 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3901 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3902 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3903 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3904 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3905 <!-- f17 -->
3906 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3907 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3908 MHP, available at
3909 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3910 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3911 Fanning's
3912 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3913 </para></footnote>
3914 </para>
3915 <para>
3916 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3917 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3918 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3919 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3920 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3921 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3922 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3923 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3924 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3925 </para>
3926 <para>
3927 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3928 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3929 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3930 content
3931 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3932 technology.
3933 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3934 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3935 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3936 </para>
3937 <para>
3938 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3939 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3940 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3941 composers,
3942 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3943 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3944 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3945 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3946 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3947 broadcast),
3948 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3949 </para>
3950 <para>
3951 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3952 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3953 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3954 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3955 companies
3956 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3957 </para>
3958 <para>
3959
3960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3961 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3962 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
3963 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3964 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3965 Second,
3966 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3967 content
3968 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3969 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3970 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3971 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3972 Congress
3973 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3974 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3975 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3976 control
3977 over the future (cable).
3978 </para>
3979 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
3980 <para>
3981 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3982 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3983 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3984 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3985 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3986 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3987 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3988 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3989 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3990 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3991 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3992 </para>
3993 <para>
3994 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3995 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3996 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3997 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3998 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
3999 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4000 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4001 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4003 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4004 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4005 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4006 for the architecture it chose.
4007 </para>
4008 <para>
4009 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4010 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4011 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4012 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4013 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4014 copyright."<footnote><para>
4015 <!-- f18 -->
4016 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4017 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4018 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4019 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4020 </para></footnote>
4021 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4022 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4023 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4024 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4025 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4026 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4027 <!-- f19 -->
4028 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4029 </para></footnote>
4030 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4031 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4032 <!-- f20 -->
4033 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4034 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4035 </para></footnote>
4036 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4037 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4038 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4039 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4040 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4041 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4042 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4043 <!-- f21 -->
4044 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4045 of Jack Valenti).
4046 </para></footnote>
4047 </para>
4048 <para>
4049 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4050 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4051 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4052 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4053 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4054 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4055 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4056 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4057 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4058 technology.<footnote><para>
4059 <!-- f22 -->
4060 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4061 1981).
4062 </para></footnote>
4063 </para>
4064 <para>
4065 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4066
4067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4068 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4069 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4070 Court wrote,
4071 </para>
4072 <blockquote>
4073 <para>
4074 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4075 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4076 market
4077 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4078 authority
4079 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4080 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4081 implicated
4082 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4083 <!-- f23 -->
4084 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4085 </para></footnote>
4086 </para>
4087 </blockquote>
4088 <para>
4089 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4090 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4091 Congress
4092 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4093 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4094 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4095 </para>
4096
4097 <table id="t1">
4098 <title>Table</title>
4099 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4100 <thead>
4101 <row>
4102 <entry>CASE</entry>
4103 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4104 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4105 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4106 </row>
4107 </thead>
4108 <tbody>
4109 <row>
4110 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4111 <entry>Composers</entry>
4112 <entry>No protection</entry>
4113 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4114 </row>
4115 <row>
4116 <entry>Radio</entry>
4117 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4118 <entry>N/A</entry>
4119 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4120 </row>
4121 <row>
4122 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4123 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4124 <entry>No protection</entry>
4125 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4126 </row>
4127 <row>
4128 <entry>VCR</entry>
4129 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4130 <entry>No protection</entry>
4131 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4132 </row>
4133 </tbody>
4134 </tgroup>
4135 </table>
4136
4137 <para>
4138 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4139 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4140 <!-- f24 -->
4141 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4142 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4143 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4144 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4145 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4146 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4147 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4148 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4149 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4150 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4151 </para></footnote>
4152 In each case, throughout our history,
4153 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4154 work.
4155 </para>
4156 <para>
4157 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4158 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4159 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4160 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4161 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4162 legitimacy
4163 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4164 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4165 the interests at stake.
4166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4167 </para>
4168 <para>
4169 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4170 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4171 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4172 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4173 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4174 regulated?
4175 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4176 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4177 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4178 permission to record a song?
4179 </para>
4180 <para>
4181 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4182 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4183 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4184 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4185 <!-- f25 -->
4186 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4187 (1984).
4188 </para></footnote>
4189 Instead, the particular uses that the
4190 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4191 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4192 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4193 technology
4194 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4195 the distribution of content.
4196 </para>
4197 <para>
4198 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4199 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4200 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4201 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4202 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4203 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4204 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4205 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4206 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4207 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4208 protection
4209 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4210 continue.
4211 </para>
4212 <para>
4213
4214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4215 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4216 superior
4217 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4218 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4219 network.
4220 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4221 efficient.
4222 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4223 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4224 <!-- f26 -->
4225 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4226 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4227 </para></footnote>
4228 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4229 warriors
4230 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4231 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4232 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4233 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4234 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4235 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4236 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4237 </para>
4238 <para>
4239 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4240 just as any other property is protected."
4241 </para>
4242 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4243 </sect2>
4244 </sect1>
4245 </chapter>
4246 <chapter id="c-property">
4247 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4248 <para>
4249
4250 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4251 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4252 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4253 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4254 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4255 the price she can get.
4256 </para>
4257 <para>
4258 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4259 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4260 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4261 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4262 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4263 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4264 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4265 going
4266 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4267 thing I am taking then?
4268 </para>
4269 <para>
4270 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4271 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4273 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4274 narrow
4275 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4276 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4277 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4278 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4279 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4280 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4281 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4282 <!-- f1 -->
4283 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4284 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4285 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4286 </para></footnote>
4287 </para>
4288 <para>
4289 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4290 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4291 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4292 expression
4293 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4294 property.
4295 </para>
4296 <para>
4297 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4298 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4299 turning
4300 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4301 "property"
4302 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4303 <!-- f2 -->
4304 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4305 intangible.
4306 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4307 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4308 physical
4309 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4310 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4311 Property?
4312 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4313 373, 429 n. 241.
4314 </para></footnote>
4315 </para>
4316 <para>
4317 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4318 preceding
4319 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4320 material
4321 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4322 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4323 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4324 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4325 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4326 us draw.
4327 </para>
4328
4329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4330 <sect1 id="founders">
4331 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4332 <para>
4333 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4334 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4335 Shakespeare
4336 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4337 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4338 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4339 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4340 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4341 adaptation
4342 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4343 </para>
4344 <para>
4345 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4346 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4347 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4348 <!-- f1 -->
4349 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4350 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4351 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4352 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4353 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4354 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4355 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4356 </para></footnote>
4357 Tonson was the
4358 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4359 <!-- f2 -->
4360 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4361 Vanderbilt
4362 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4363 </para></footnote>
4364 who
4365 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4366 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4367 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4369 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4370 copyright.
4371 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4372 produce
4373 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4374 </para>
4375 <para>
4376 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4377 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4378 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4379 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4380 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4381 renewable
4382 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4383 published
4384 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4385 <!-- f3 -->
4386 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4387 "copyright
4388 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4389 </para></footnote>
4390 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4391 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4392 </para>
4393 <para>
4394 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4395 "copyright"
4396 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4397 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4398 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4399 expired
4400 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4401 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4402 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4403 publishers,
4404 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4405 </para>
4406 <para>
4407 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4408 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4409 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4410 govern
4411 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4412 "positive
4413 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4414 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4415 legislature,
4416 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4417 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4418 expired
4419 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4420 independent
4421 of any positive law.
4422 </para>
4423 <para>
4424 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4425 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4426 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4427 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4428
4429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4430 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4431 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4432 ultimately
4433 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4434 </para>
4435 <para>
4436 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4437 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4438 however,
4439 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4440 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4441 "expired,"
4442 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4443 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4444 </para>
4445 <para>
4446 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4447 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4448 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4449 </para>
4450 <para>
4451 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4452 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4453 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4454 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4455 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4456 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4457 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4458 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4459 reason
4460 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4461 </para>
4462 <para>
4463 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4464 special
4465 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4466 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4467 "booksellers."
4468 </para>
4469 <para>
4470 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4471 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4472 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4473 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4474 others
4475 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4476 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4477 beyond
4478 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4480 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4481 restrictions
4482 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4483 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4484 perform, and so on.
4485 </para>
4486 <para>
4487 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4488 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4489 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4490 permission
4491 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4492 anything,
4493 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4494 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4495 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4496 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4497 </para>
4498 <para>
4499 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4500 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4501 especially
4502 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4503 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4504 monopolies&mdash;especially
4505 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4506 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4507 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4508 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4509 Monopolies,
4510 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4511 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4512 publishing.
4513 </para>
4514 <para>
4515 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4516 naturally
4517 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4518 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4519 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4520 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4521 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4522 specialinterest
4523 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4524 </para>
4525 <para>
4526 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4527 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4528 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4529 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4531 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4532 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4533 themselves
4534 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4535 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4536 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4537 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4538 <!-- f4 -->
4539 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4540 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4541 </para></footnote>
4542 </para>
4543 <para>
4544 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4545 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4546 Enlightenment
4547 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4548 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4549 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4550 that idea.
4551 </para>
4552 <para>
4553 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4554 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4555 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4556 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4557 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4558 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4559 compromise
4560 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4561 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4562 construction and spread of culture.
4563 </para>
4564 <para>
4565 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4566 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4567 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4568 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4569 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4570 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4571 they said; they needed more time.
4572 </para>
4573 <para>
4574 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4575 words that echo today,
4576 </para>
4577 <blockquote>
4578 <para>
4579 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4580 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4581 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4582 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4583 establishing
4584 a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in
4585 the Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a
4586 Discouragement
4587 to Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general
4588 Tax on the Publick; and all this only to increase the private Gain
4589 of the Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4590 <!-- f5 -->
4591 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4592 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4593 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4594 Encouragement
4595 of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
4596 Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4597 mentioned
4598 (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al., 8,
4599 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4600 </para></footnote>
4601 </para>
4602 </blockquote>
4603 <para>
4604 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in
4605 a series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4606 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4607 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4608 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4609 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4610 creative
4611 "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of Anne,
4612 the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just because the
4613 protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't mean the
4614 protections
4615 of the common law expired: Under the common law they had
4616 the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its Statute of Anne
4617 copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only way to protect
4618 authors.
4619 </para>
4620 <para>
4621 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some
4622 of the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4623 chutzpah.
4624 Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it, "The
4625 publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle rancher has
4626 for cattle."<footnote><para>
4627 <!-- f6 -->
4628 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4629 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4630 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4631 </para></footnote>
4632 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the
4633 author.
4634 His concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4635 </para>
4636 <para>
4637 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4638 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4639 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4640 <!-- f7 -->
4641 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4642 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4643 </para></footnote>
4644 </para>
4645 <para>
4646 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4647 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4648 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4649 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4650 <!-- f8 -->
4651 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4652 1993), 92.
4653 </para></footnote>
4654 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4655 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4656 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4657 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4658 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4659 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4660 <!-- f9 -->
4661 Ibid., 93.
4662 </para></footnote>
4663 </para>
4664 <para>
4665 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's
4666 shop in Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where
4667 he sold inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in
4668 defiance
4669 of the supposed common law right of Literary Property."<footnote><para>
4670 <!-- f10 -->
4671 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4672 Borwell).
4673 </para></footnote>
4674 His
4675 books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he rested
4676 his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of Anne,
4677 the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4678 </para>
4679 <para>
4680 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4681 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4682 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4683 </para>
4684 <para>
4685 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to
4686 James Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the
4687 requirements
4688 of the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full
4689 protection
4690 of the statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor
4691 began printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual
4692 common law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4693 <!-- f11 -->
4694 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright
4695 Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law
4696 Review
4697 29 (1983): 1152.
4698 </para></footnote>
4699 </para>
4700 <para>
4701 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in
4702 English
4703 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4704 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4705 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the
4706 common law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4707 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4708 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That
4709 common
4710 law rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4711 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4712 </para>
4713 <para>
4714 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if justice
4715 were just a matter of logical deduction from first principles&mdash;Mansfield's
4716 conclusion might make some sense. But what it ignored was the larger
4717 issue that Parliament had struggled with in 1710: How best to limit
4718 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4719 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4720 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4721 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4722 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4723 believed,
4724 Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4725 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4726 </para>
4727 <para>
4728 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4729 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4730 </para>
4731 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4732 <para>
4733 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4734 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4735 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4736 <!-- f12 -->
4737 Ibid., 1156.
4738 </para></footnote>
4739 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4740 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4741 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4742 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4743 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4744 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4745 </para>
4746 <para>
4747 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4748 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4749 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4750 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4751 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4752 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4753 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4754 statute were no longer protected.
4755 </para>
4756 <para>
4757 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4758 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4759 members
4760 of special legal distinction who functioned much like the Justices
4761 in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the House of
4762 Lords generally voted.
4763 </para>
4764 <para>
4765 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4766 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4767 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4768 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4769 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4770 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4771 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4772 passed into the public domain.
4773 </para>
4774 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4775 <para>
4776 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4777 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4778 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4779 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4780 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4781 and the greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of
4782 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of
4783 legal restraint.
4784 </para>
4785 <para>
4786 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4787 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4788 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people celebrated
4789 the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser reported, "No
4790 private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the public, and
4791 none has been tried before the House of Lords in the decision of
4792 which so many individuals were interested." "Great rejoicing in
4793 Edinburgh
4794 upon victory over literary property: bonfires and
4795 illuminations."<footnote><para>
4796 <!-- f13 -->
4797 Rose, 97.
4798 </para></footnote>
4799 </para>
4800 <para>
4801 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4802 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4803 reported:
4804 </para>
4805 <blockquote>
4806 <para>
4807 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what
4808 was honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday
4809 thought property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of
4810 London and Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses
4811 to purchase Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who
4812 after many years industry thought they had acquired a
4813 competency
4814 to provide for their families now find themselves without a
4815 shilling to devise to their successors.<footnote><para>
4816 <!-- f14 -->
4817 Ibid.
4818 </para></footnote>
4819 </para>
4820 </blockquote>
4821 <para>
4822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4823 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4824 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4825 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4826 England
4827 would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter free.
4828 Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of course,
4829 for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller had an
4830 exclusive
4831 right to control the publication of that book. And not in the
4832 sense that books could be stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you
4833 still had to buy the book from someone. But free in the sense that the
4834 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4835 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free culture
4836 would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English culture
4837 would develop as the many English readers chose to let it develop&mdash;
4838 chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the memes they
4839 repeated and endorsed. Chose in a competitive context, not a context
4840 in which the choices about what culture is available to people and
4841 how they get access to it are made by the few despite the wishes of
4842 the many.
4843 </para>
4844 <para>
4845 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4846 antimonopoly,
4847 resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a world
4848 where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4849 protected.
4850 </para>
4851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4852 </sect1>
4853 <sect1 id="recorders">
4854 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4855 <para>
4856 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4857 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4858 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4859 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4860 He was their god.)
4861 </para>
4862 <para>
4863 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4864 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4865 today.
4866 </para>
4867 <para>
4868 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4869 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4870 Stagehands
4871 are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4872 During
4873 a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and in
4874 the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the stage.
4875 </para>
4876 <para>
4877 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some
4878 stagehands
4879 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4880 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers and
4881 the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4883 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4884 about the scene.
4885 </para>
4886 <para>
4887 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4888 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4889 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4890 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4891 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4892 </para>
4893 <para>
4894 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get
4895 permission.
4896 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a
4897 four-and-a-halfsecond
4898 image on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How
4899 could it hurt? Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told
4900 Else to contact Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4901 </para>
4902 <para>
4903 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4904 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4905 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4906 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4907 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4908 </para>
4909 <para>
4910 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we
4911 discovered
4912 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at least
4913 that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation." And
4914 second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us to use
4915 this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited Simpsons which
4916 was in the corner of the shot."
4917 </para>
4918 <para>
4919 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to
4920 someone he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca
4921 Herrera.
4922 He explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . .
4923 We're asking for your educational rate on this." That was the
4924 educational
4925 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4926 confirm what he had been told.
4927 </para>
4928 <para>
4929 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes,
4930 you have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4931 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film about
4932
4933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4934 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4935 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant to
4936 Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want the
4937 money."
4938 </para>
4939 <para>
4940 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was
4941 playing
4942 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4943 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the very
4944 last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally replaced the
4945 shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on, The Day After
4946 Trinity, from ten years before.
4947 </para>
4948 <para>
4949 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox,
4950 owns the copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property.
4951 To use that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the
4952 permission
4953 of the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4954 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4955 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4956 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner of
4957 the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law says the
4958 owner gets to control.
4959 </para>
4960 <para>
4961 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that
4962 the copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4963 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4964 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the
4965 copyright
4966 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4967 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set by
4968 the law.
4969 </para>
4970 <para>
4971 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4972 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4973 <!-- f1 -->
4974 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that lawyers don't
4975 permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard A. Posner with William
4976 F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred " (draft on
4977 file with author), University of Chicago Law School, 5 August 2003.
4978 </para></footnote>
4979 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot
4980 of a Simpsons episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use
4981 does not require the permission of anyone.
4982 </para>
4983 <para>
4984 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4985 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4986 </para>
4987 <blockquote>
4988 <para>
4989 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf
4990 between
4991 what lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and
4992 what is crushingly relevant in practice to those of us actually
4993 trying to make and broadcast documentaries. I never had any
4994 doubt that it was "clearly fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But
4995 I couldn't rely on the concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4996 </para>
4997 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
4998 <listitem><para>
4999 <!-- 1. -->
5000 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires
5001 that we buy Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers
5002 require
5003 a detailed "visual cue sheet" listing the source and
5004 licensing
5005 status of each shot in the film. They take a dim view of
5006 "fair use," and a claim of "fair use" can grind the application
5007 process to a halt.
5008 </para></listitem>
5009 <listitem><para>
5010 <!-- 2. -->
5011 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the
5012 first place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a
5013 history of tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons
5014 usage, just as George Lucas had a very high profile litigating
5015 Star Wars usage. So I decided to play by the book, thinking
5016 that we would be granted free or cheap license to four seconds
5017 of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working to
5018 exhaustion
5019 on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk legal
5020 trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5021 principle.
5022 </para></listitem>
5023 <listitem><para>
5024 <!-- 3. -->
5025 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford
5026 Law School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also
5027 confirmed that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within
5028 an inch of your life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He
5029 made clear that it would boil down to who had the bigger
5030 legal
5031 department and the deeper pockets, me or them.
5032 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5033 </para></listitem>
5034 <listitem><para>
5035 <!-- 4. -->
5036 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5037 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5038 money.
5039 </para></listitem>
5040 </orderedlist>
5041 </blockquote>
5042 <para>
5043 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory
5044 therefore
5045 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture.
5046 But in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5047 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means
5048 that the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law
5049 has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5050 </para>
5051 <para>
5052 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5053 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5054 publishers'
5055 profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has matured
5056 into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or not.
5057 </para>
5058 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5059 </sect1>
5060 <sect1 id="transformers">
5061 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5062 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5063 <para>
5064 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5065 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5066 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5067 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5068 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5069 </para>
5070 <para>
5071 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5072 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5073 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very difficult.
5074 In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to build
5075 retrospectives
5076 on the work of particular actors. The first actor chosen was
5077 Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5078 Eastwood,
5079 with clips from his films and interviews with figures important
5080 to his career.
5081 </para>
5082 <para>
5083 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor
5084 and as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with
5085 Eastwood,
5086 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5087 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5088 </para>
5089 <para>
5090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5091 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5092 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5093 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5094 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5095 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5096 </para>
5097 <para>
5098 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5099 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5100 Eastwood's
5101 films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem arose. "No
5102 one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No one had
5103 ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an actor's
5104 career."
5105 </para>
5106 <para>
5107 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5108 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5109 </para>
5110 <para>
5111 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5112 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5113 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5114 for it."<footnote>
5115 <indexterm>
5116 <primary>artists</primary>
5117 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5118 </indexterm>
5119 <para>
5120 <!-- f1 -->
5121 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5122 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5123 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5124 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5125 </para></footnote>
5126 </para>
5127 <para>
5128 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5129 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5130 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5131 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5132 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5133 </para>
5134 <para>
5135 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5136 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5137 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5138 </para>
5139 <blockquote>
5140 <para>
5141 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips.
5142 We made some artistic decisions about what film clips to
5143 include&mdash;of
5144 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip
5145 from Dirty Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground
5146 who's wiggling under the gun and you need to get his
5147 permission.
5148 And then you have to decide what you are going to pay
5149 him.
5150 </para>
5151 <para>
5152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5153 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the
5154 dayplayer
5155 rate for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking
5156 about a clip of less than a minute, but to reuse that performance
5157 in the CD-ROM the rate at the time was about $600.
5158 So we had to identify the people&mdash;some of them were hard to
5159 identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
5160 crashing through the glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman?
5161 And then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some
5162 others, and we just started calling people.
5163 </para>
5164 </blockquote>
5165 <para>
5166 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5167 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5168 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5169 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5170 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5171 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5172 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5173 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5174 career.
5175 </para>
5176 <para>
5177 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5178 were totally in the clear."
5179 </para>
5180 <para>
5181 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5182 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5183 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5184 </para>
5185 <blockquote>
5186 <para>
5187 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up
5188 their hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many
5189 copyrights,
5190 there's the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director,
5191 there's the actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into
5192 its constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this
5193 many directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it
5194 very systematically and cleared the rights.
5195 </para>
5196 </blockquote>
5197 <para>
5198
5199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5200 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5201 loved it, and it sold very well.
5202 </para>
5203 <para>
5204 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5205 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done this
5206 efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5207 nothing
5208 so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at
5209 all."<footnote><para>
5210 <!-- f2 -->
5211 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5212 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5213 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5214 </para></footnote>
5215 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5216 has to be made?
5217 </para>
5218 <para>
5219 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5220 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5221 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5222 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5223 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5224 </para>
5225 <blockquote>
5226 <para>
5227 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5228 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5229 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5230 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5231 compensated for that.
5232 </para>
5233 </blockquote>
5234 <para>
5235 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5236 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license that
5237 someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips like this?
5238 Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would have to track
5239 down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit permission
5240 from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of the
5241 creative
5242 process could be made to be more clean?
5243 </para>
5244 <blockquote>
5245 <para>
5246 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5247 mechanism&mdash;where
5248 you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5249 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5250 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5252 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it
5253 with lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost
5254 as the producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of
5255 paying
5256 X dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a
5257 known cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes
5258 this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have
5259 a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me
5260 X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get
5261 investments
5262 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you
5263 say, "Oh, I want a hundred minutes of something and I have no
5264 idea what it's going to cost me, and a certain number of people are
5265 going to hold me up for money," then it becomes difficult to put
5266 one of these things together.
5267 </para>
5268 </blockquote>
5269 <para>
5270 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some
5271 of the richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and
5272 access that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him
5273 a year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity
5274 is never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5275 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5276 Republican
5277 hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5278 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5279 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea
5280 that land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing
5281 flythrough
5282 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5283 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5284 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5285 regulationminimizing
5286 Republican should look at the rights and ask, "Does this
5287 still make sense?"
5288 </para>
5289 <para>
5290 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5291 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5292 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5293 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5294
5295 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5296 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5297 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5298 </para>
5299 <para>
5300 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5301 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5302 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5303 judges loved every minute of it.
5304 </para>
5305 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5306 <para>
5307 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5308 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5309 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5310 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5311 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5312 were just violated in this room?"
5313 </para>
5314 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5315 <para>
5316 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5317 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5318 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5319 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5320 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5321 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5322 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5323 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5324 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5325 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5326 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5327 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5328 couldn't easily do them legally.
5329 </para>
5330 <para>
5331 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5332 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5333 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5334 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5335 planted in your presentation.
5336 </para>
5337 <para>
5338 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5339 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5340 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5341 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5342 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5343 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5344 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5345 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5346 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5347 </para>
5348 <para>
5349 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5350 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5351 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5352 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5353 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5354 </para>
5355 <para>
5356 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5357 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5358 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5359 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5360 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5361 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5362 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5363 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5364 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5365 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5366 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5367 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5368 registers the work.
5369 </para>
5370 <para>
5371 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5372 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5373 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5374 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5375 </para>
5376 <para>
5377 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5378 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5380 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5381 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5382 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5383 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5384 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5385 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5386 entertainment."
5387 </para>
5388 <para>
5389 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5390 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5391 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5392 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5393 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5394 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5395 new audiences, it is Mike."
5396 </para>
5397 <para>
5398 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5399 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5400 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5401 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5402 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5403 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5404 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5405 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5406 </para>
5407 <para>
5408 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5409 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5410 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5411 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5412 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5413 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5414 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5415 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5416 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5417 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5418 curse, reserved for the few.
5419 </para>
5420 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5421 </sect1>
5422 <sect1 id="collectors">
5423 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5424 <para>
5425 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5426 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5427 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5428 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5429 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5430 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5431 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5432 </para>
5433 <para>
5434 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5435 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive
5436 that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the
5437 world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5438 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as well
5439 as when those pages changed.
5440 </para>
5441 <para>
5442 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5443 appreciated.
5444 In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5445 constantly
5446 updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved
5447 of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
5448 </para>
5449 <para>
5450 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5451 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5452 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5453 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5454 </para>
5455 <para>
5456 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5457 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5458 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5459 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5460 library&mdash;constantly
5461 updated, without any reliable memory.
5462 </para>
5463 <para>
5464 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back
5465 Machine,
5466 and the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the
5467 Internet was. You have the power to see what you remember. More
5468 importantly, perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't
5469 remember and what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5470 <!-- f1 -->
5471 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5472 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003, press
5473 release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later
5474 changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended."
5475 E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5476 </para></footnote>
5477 </para>
5478 <para>
5479 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we
5480 remember
5481 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the
5482 reaction
5483 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965,
5484 or to Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5485 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5486 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5487 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what it is
5488 convenient to remember, but remember something close to the truth.
5489 </para>
5490 <para>
5491 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5492 repeat
5493 it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is whether
5494 we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More directly, the
5495 key is whether an objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do
5496 that, by collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5497 researchers,
5498 for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5499 </para>
5500 <para>
5501 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the
5502 Internet
5503 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5504 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5505 important
5506 in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5507 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5508 important
5509 to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to think that
5510 we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns around the
5511 world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the one kept by the
5512 Internet
5513 Archive.
5514 </para>
5515 <para>
5516 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5517 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5518 researcher.
5519 In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5520 success.
5521 It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
5522 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5523 Internet
5524 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie
5525 of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10 billion
5526 pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5527 </para>
5528 <para>
5529 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge
5530 in human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5531 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the Library of
5532 Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set
5533 out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been
5534 constructing
5535 the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more
5536 ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture
5537 was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of that
5538 culture
5539 is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news are
5540 recorded
5541 each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a specific
5542 exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and is available
5543 to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that, [television] is almost
5544 unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were Barbara Walters you could get
5545 access to [the archives], but if you are just a graduate student?" As Kahle
5546 put it,
5547 </para>
5548 <blockquote>
5549 <para>
5550 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with
5551 Murphy
5552 Brown? Remember that back and forth surreal experience of
5553 a politician interacting with a fictional television character? If you
5554 were a graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to
5555 get those original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5556
5557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5558 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5559 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5560 </para>
5561 </blockquote>
5562 <para>
5563 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5564 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5565 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5566 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5567 nineteenthcentury
5568 America will have an easier time than researchers trying to
5569 understand
5570 the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5571 </para>
5572 <para>
5573 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5574 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5575 libraries.
5576 These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
5577 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once
5578 the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
5579 </para>
5580 <para>
5581 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library of
5582 Congress
5583 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long
5584 as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5585 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In 1915
5586 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed back."
5587 Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any
5588 library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at all&mdash;in the library archive of the
5589 film company.<footnote><para>
5590 <!-- f2 -->
5591 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
5592 Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3 (1980): 5;
5593 Anthony
5594 Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the United
5595 States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp; Co., 1992), 36.
5596 </para></footnote>
5597 </para>
5598 <para>
5599 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5600 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5601 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5602 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5603 required
5604 they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5605 "copyrighted."
5606 But those copies were simply kept by the broadcasters. No
5607 library had any right to them; the government didn't demand them.
5608 The content of this part of American culture is practically invisible to
5609 anyone who would look.
5610 </para>
5611 <para>
5612 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5614 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5615 stations
5616 from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5617 September
5618 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations
5619 from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made their
5620 coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5621 Anyone
5622 could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5623 events of that day.
5624 </para>
5625 <para>
5626 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger,
5627 whose archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films"
5628 (meaning films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never
5629 copyrighted), Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle
5630 digitize 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet
5631 to be downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5632 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5633 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock footage
5634 sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the material they
5635 wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made films on
5636 their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to be made.
5637 Either way, the archive enabled access to this important part of our
5638 culture.
5639 Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film that instructed
5640 children how to save themselves in the middle of nuclear attack? Go to
5641 archive.org, and you can download the film in a few minutes&mdash;for free.
5642 </para>
5643 <para>
5644 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that
5645 we otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
5646 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law
5647 doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in
5648 an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
5649 </para>
5650 <para>
5651 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to
5652 this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His
5653 aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part of our
5654 culture.
5655 Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but
5656 during
5657 a second life that all creative property has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5658 </para>
5659 <para>
5660 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5661 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
5662
5663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5664 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5665 market
5666 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
5667 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
5668 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial
5669 market,
5670 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5671 </para>
5672 <para>
5673 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5674 tradition
5675 has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers
5676 the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is
5677 used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive
5678 of knowledge about our history. In this second life, the content can
5679 continue to inform even if that information is no longer sold.
5680 </para>
5681 <para>
5682 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of
5683 print very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5684 <!-- f3 -->
5685 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5686 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5687 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5688 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese, "The
5689 First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston College Law
5690 Review
5691 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5692 </para></footnote>). After it is
5693 out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the copyright
5694 owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many get to read
5695 the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are thus the
5696 second
5697 life of a book. That second life is extremely important to the
5698 spread and stability of culture.
5699 </para>
5700 <para>
5701 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5702 creative
5703 property does not hold true with the most important components
5704 of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
5705 these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the Internet&mdash;there is no
5706 guarantee
5707 of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've replaced
5708 libraries with Barnes &amp; Noble superstores. With this culture, what's
5709 accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
5710 Beyond
5711 that, culture disappears.
5712 </para>
5713 <para>
5714 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5715 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5716 accessible
5717 all television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is
5718 extraordinarily
5719 high. So even though the law in principle would have
5720 restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5721 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5722 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly difficult
5723 to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had little
5724 practical
5725 effect.
5726 </para>
5727 <para>
5728 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution
5729 is that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
5730 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or
5731 distributed
5732 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
5733 books published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an
5734 archive of all moving images and sound.
5735 </para>
5736 <para>
5737 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never
5738 imagined
5739 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it;
5740 but we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5741 Kahle describes,
5742 </para>
5743 <blockquote>
5744 <para>
5745 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of
5746 music.
5747 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases
5748 of movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed]
5749 during the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million
5750 different titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that
5751 would fit in this room and be able to be afforded by a small
5752 company.
5753 So we're at a turning point in our history. Universal access is
5754 the goal. And the opportunity of leading a different life, based on
5755 this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind
5756 would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria,
5757 putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
5758 press.
5759 </para>
5760 </blockquote>
5761 <para>
5762 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5763 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5764 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5765 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5766 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5767 remains
5768 perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand it;
5769 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5770 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
5771 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
5772 become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a future for our past. The
5773 technology of digital arts could make the dream of the Library of
5774 Alexandria real again.
5775 </para>
5776 <para>
5777 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building
5778 such an archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might
5779 like to call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might
5780 seem, the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5781 someone's
5782 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that
5783 Kahle and others would exercise.
5784 </para>
5785 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5786 </sect1>
5787 <sect1 id="property-i">
5788 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5789 <para>
5790 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture
5791 Association
5792 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C.,
5793 with Lyndon Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture
5794 of Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5795 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5796 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5797 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5798 </para>
5799 <para>
5800 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion
5801 Picture Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose
5802 goal was to defend American movies against increasing domestic
5803 criticism.
5804 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but
5805 producers
5806 and distributors of entertainment for television, video, and
5807 cable. Its board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven
5808 major producers and distributors of motion picture and television
5809 programs
5810 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures
5811 Entertainment,
5812 MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal
5813 Studios, and Warner Brothers.
5814 </para>
5815 <para>
5816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5817 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president
5818 before him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5819 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most
5820 important
5821 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5822 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays
5823 the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5824 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5825 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5826 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5827 Washingtonian way.
5828 </para>
5829 <para>
5830 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5831 culture
5832 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5833 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5834 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5835 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5836 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine
5837 the meaning of "creative property."
5838 </para>
5839 <para>
5840 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5841 perfectly:
5842 </para>
5843 <blockquote>
5844 <para>
5845 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges
5846 and the counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting,
5847 reasonable men and women will keep returning to the
5848 fundamental
5849 issue, the central theme which animates this entire debate:
5850 Creative
5851 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protection
5852 resident in all other property owners in the nation. That is the issue.
5853 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5854 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5855 <!-- f1 -->
5856 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5857 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5858 Subcommittee
5859 on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
5860 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th
5861 Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
5862 </para></footnote>
5863 </para>
5864 </blockquote>
5865 <para>
5866 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5867 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5868 "central
5869 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this:
5870 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5871 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5872 protections
5873 resident in all other property owners in the nation." There are
5874 no second-class citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should
5875 be no second-class property owners.
5876 </para>
5877 <para>
5878 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5879 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5880 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a
5881 claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this claim of
5882 Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is perhaps
5883 the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and scope
5884 of "creative property." His views have no reasonable connection to our
5885 actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has
5886 slowly redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5887 </para>
5888 <para>
5889 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5890 precise
5891 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5892 <!-- f2 -->
5893 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
5894 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
5895 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
5896 right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
5897 ordinary
5898 meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private
5899 Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977),
5900 26&ndash;27.
5901 </para></footnote> it has never been the
5902 case, nor should it be, that "creative property owners" have been
5903 "accorded
5904 the same rights and protection resident in all other property
5905 owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were given the same rights
5906 as all other property owners, that would effect a radical, and radically
5907 undesirable, change in our tradition.
5908 </para>
5909 <para>
5910 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat
5911 for our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5912 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5913 overturned
5914 in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a
5915 powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5916 culture would develop.
5917 </para>
5918 <para>
5919 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5920 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to
5921 convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5922 history.
5923 We have always treated rights in creative property differently
5924 from the rights resident in all other property owners. They have never
5925 been the same. And they should never be the same, because, however
5926 counterintuitive this may seem, to make them the same would be to
5927
5928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5929 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5930 Creativity
5931 depends upon the owners of creativity having less than perfect
5932 control.
5933 </para>
5934 <para>
5935 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most
5936 powerful of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5937 notwithstanding,
5938 in assuring that the new can displace them. No organization
5939 does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what's
5940 good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A society that
5941 defends the ideals of free culture must preserve precisely the
5942 opportunity
5943 for new creativity to threaten the old.
5944 To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5945 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5946 Constitution itself.
5947 </para>
5948 <para>
5949 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so
5950 strongly did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5951 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if it
5952 condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm&mdash;it is
5953 required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you
5954 "just compensation" for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees
5955 that property is, in a certain sense, sacred. It cannot ever be taken from
5956 the property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5957 </para>
5958 <para>
5959 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5960 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5961 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that after
5962 a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has granted and
5963 set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
5964 Congress
5965 does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
5966 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not
5967 have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking."
5968 Instead,
5969 the same Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5970 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5971 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5972 compensation
5973 at all.
5974 </para>
5975 <para>
5976 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5977 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be
5978 treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in
5979 our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be
5980 accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is
5981 effectively
5982 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
5983 </para>
5984 <para>
5985 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5986 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5987 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5988 appointed
5989 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college
5990 to produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it
5991 did in 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be
5992 the first to admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected
5993 some of those mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should
5994 reject as well. So my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did
5995 it, we should, too.
5996 </para>
5997 <para>
5998 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5999 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
6000 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given the
6001 same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
6002 creative
6003 property there must be a public domain?
6004 </para>
6005 <para>
6006 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6007 history
6008 of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
6009 enabled.
6010 Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6011 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that should
6012 be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property should be
6013 protected,
6014 but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights the law gives to
6015 creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights ought to
6016 be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether institutions designed
6017 to assure that artists get paid need also control how culture develops.
6018 </para>
6019 <para>
6020
6021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6022 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6023 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6024 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
6025 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6026 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6027 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6028 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6029 </para>
6030 <figure id="fig-1331">
6031 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
6032 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6033 </figure>
6034 <para>
6035 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6036 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each
6037 case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.
6038 For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals
6039 represent
6040 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated&mdash;
6041 either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious
6042 constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening
6043 punishments
6044 after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for
6045 example,
6046 you willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song
6047 from her latest CD and posting it on the Web, you can be punished
6048 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6049 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6050 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6051 </para>
6052 <para>
6053 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6054 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6055 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6056 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6057 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6058 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6059 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6060 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6061 the source of the enforcement.
6062 </para>
6063 <para>
6064 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6065 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6066 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6067 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it is to
6068 be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But
6069 given a set of norms, and a background of property and contract law,
6070 the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or
6071 group might behave.
6072 </para>
6073 <para>
6074 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6075 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a constraint on
6076 behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across
6077 a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community to
6078 integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
6079 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as
6080 with the market, architecture effects its constraint through
6081 simultaneous conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts
6082 enforcing contracts, or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by
6083 "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law
6084 of gravity that enforces this constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket
6085 stands between you and a flight to New York, it is the market that
6086 enforces this constraint.
6087 </para>
6088 <para>
6089
6090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6091 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6092 obvious:
6093 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced
6094 by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by
6095 another.
6096 </para>
6097 <para>
6098 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6099 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6100 particular
6101 thing, we have to consider how these four modalities interact.
6102 Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well be; my
6103 claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most
6104 significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must
6105 consider how these four in particular interact.
6106 </para>
6107 <para>
6108 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6109 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say
6110 how fast you can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in
6111 part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most
6112 rational
6113 drivers; governors in buses, as another example, set the
6114 maximum
6115 rate at which the driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted
6116 by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of
6117 gasoline indirectly constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a
6118 community
6119 may or may not constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at 50
6120 mph by a school in your own neighborhood and you're likely to be
6121 punished by the neighbors. The same norm wouldn't be as effective in
6122 a different town, or at night.
6123 </para>
6124 <para>
6125 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6126 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6127 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6128 <!-- f3 -->
6129 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6130 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6131 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right self-consciously to
6132 change the other three. The right of the other three is more timidly
6133 expressed.
6134 See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New
6135 York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95; Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago
6136 School," Journal of Legal Studies, June 1998.
6137 </para></footnote>
6138 The law, in other words, sometimes
6139 operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality.
6140 Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to
6141 increase
6142 the incentives to drive more slowly. The law might be used to
6143 mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty of driving
6144 rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless
6145 driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be more
6146 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6147 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed limit, for
6148 example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast driving.
6149 </para>
6150 <figure id="fig-1361">
6151 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6152 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6153 </figure>
6154 <para>
6155 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6156 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6157 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6158 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6159 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6160 another.<footnote><para>
6161 <!-- f4 -->
6162 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6163 because
6164 their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6165 particular
6166 moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the government. For
6167 instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people think it is meaningless
6168 to say that one's liberty has been restrained. A bridge has washed out, and
6169 it's harder to get from one place to another. To talk about this as a loss of
6170 freedom, they say, is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of
6171 ordinary
6172 life.
6173 I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which depends
6174 upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue against any
6175 insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view of liberty. As I
6176 argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of political thought with a
6177 broader focus than the narrow question of what the government did when.
6178 John Stuart Mill defended freedom of speech, for example, from the
6179 tyranny of narrow minds, not from the fear of government prosecution;
6180 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19.
6181 John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of labor
6182 from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, "The Right
6183 to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds., John R.
6184 Commons: Selected Essays (London: Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans
6185 with Disabilities Act increases the liberty of people with physical
6186 disabilities
6187 by changing the architecture of certain public places, thereby making
6188 access to those places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000).
6189 Each of these interventions to change existing conditions changes the
6190 liberty of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6191 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each of these
6192 groups might face.
6193 </para></footnote>
6194 </para>
6195 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6196 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6197 <para>
6198
6199 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6200 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6201 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6202 rallying makes sense.
6203 </para>
6204 <para>
6205 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6206 Internet:
6207 </para>
6208 <figure id="fig-1371">
6209 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6210 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6211 </figure>
6212 <para>
6213 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6214 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The
6215 law limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties
6216 on those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6217 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture)
6218 and expensive to copy and share content (market). Finally, those
6219 penalties
6220 are mitigated by norms we all recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping
6221 other kids' records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be
6222 infringement,
6223 but the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least)
6224 had no problem with this form of infringement.
6225 </para>
6226 <para>
6227 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s
6228 and p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes
6229 dramatically,
6230 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6231 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6232 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6233 becomes
6234 an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6235 </para>
6236 <para>
6237 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6238 Technology
6239 has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change,
6240 when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of
6241 protection
6242 for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is Iraq
6243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6244 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6245 looting that results.
6246 </para>
6247 <figure id="fig-1381">
6248 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6249 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6250 </figure>
6251 <para>
6252 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6253 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6254 Department
6255 (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6256 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6257 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6258 Internet
6259 had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6260 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6261 innovative
6262 marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to develop
6263 code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should educate
6264 kids to better protect copyright.
6265 </para>
6266 <para>
6267 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6268 preserve
6269 the particular balance that existed before the change induced by
6270 the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content industry
6271 to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life
6272 you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if
6273 something
6274 comes along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a
6275
6276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6277 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6278 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6279 property
6280 (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government to
6281 bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions
6282 have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when
6283 imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6284 </para>
6285 <para>
6286 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6287 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6288 technological
6289 innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the
6290 changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the
6291 content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown
6292 describes
6293 it, its "architecture of revenue."
6294 </para>
6295 <para>
6296 But just because a particular interest asks for government support,
6297 it doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6298 technology
6299 has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6300 follow
6301 that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6302 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6303 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6304 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6305 <!-- f5 -->
6306 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6307 BusinessWeek
6308 online, 2 August 1999, available at
6309 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more recent
6310 analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana R. Schoenberger, "Can
6311 Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6 October 2003,
6312 available
6313 at
6314 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6315 </para></footnote>
6316 Does anyone believe the government should ban
6317 digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have weakened the
6318 freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks
6319 from roads for the purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the
6320 subject
6321 of this book, remote channel changers have weakened the
6322 "stickiness"
6323 of television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the
6324 TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this
6325 change has weakened the television advertising market. But does
6326 anyone
6327 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial
6328 television?
6329 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to
6330 switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6331 </para>
6332 <para>
6333 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6334 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6335 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6337 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6338 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6339 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6340 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6341 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6342 <!-- f6 -->
6343 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6344 </para></footnote>
6345 And relative to a
6346 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6347 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6348 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6349 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6350 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6351 Brezhnev.
6352 </para>
6353 <para>
6354 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6355 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6356 government
6357 for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6358 guarantee
6359 that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the
6360 duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they
6361 create, in response to the request of those hurt by changing technology,
6362 are changes that preserve the incentives and opportunities for
6363 innovation
6364 and change.
6365 </para>
6366 <para>
6367 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include, obviously,
6368 copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the industry
6369 complaining
6370 about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in
6371 a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be
6372 especially
6373 wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government
6374 to get into the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and
6375 dangers of that game are precisely why our framers created the First
6376 Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . .
6377 abridging the freedom of speech." So when Congress is being asked to
6378 pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom of speech, it should ask&mdash;
6379 carefully&mdash;whether such regulation is justified.
6380 </para>
6381 <para>
6382 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6383 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6384 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6385 "justified."
6386 My argument is about their effect. For before we get to the
6387 question
6388 of justification, a hard question that depends a great deal upon
6389 your values, we should first ask whether we understand the effect of the
6390 changes the content industry wants.
6391 </para>
6392 <para>
6393 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6394 </para>
6395 <para>
6396 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6397 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6398 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6399 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6400 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6401 </para>
6402 <para>
6403 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6404 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6405 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6406 </para>
6407 <para>
6408 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued
6409 that DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6410 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6411 reproduce.
6412 Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6413 </para>
6414 <para>
6415 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly
6416 did not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of
6417 problems
6418 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse
6419 than the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately,
6420 the problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at
6421 least when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways
6422 to solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6423 </para>
6424 <para>
6425 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6426 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6427 culture.<footnote><para>
6428 <!-- f7 -->
6429 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6430 Environmentalism
6431 for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6432 </para></footnote>
6433 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of
6434 this chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that
6435 authors
6436 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given
6437 away "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6438 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6439 environment,
6440 much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6441 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6442 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6443 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6444 protecting
6445 copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors.
6446 It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware
6447 of our actions' effects on the environment.
6448 </para>
6449 <para>
6450 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6451 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6452 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6453 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6454 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6455 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6456 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6457 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6458 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6459 </para>
6460 <para>
6461 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6462 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6463 be lost.
6464 </para>
6465 </sect2>
6466 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6467 <title>Beginnings</title>
6468 <para>
6469 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and
6470 improved
6471 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
6472 "creative property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the
6473 English
6474 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6475 </para>
6476 <para>
6477 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6478 Congress
6479 in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I,
6480 section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6481 </para>
6482 <para>
6483 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6484 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6485 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6486
6487 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6488 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause does
6489 not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant "creative
6490 property
6491 rights." It says that Congress has the power to promote progress. The
6492 grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the
6493 purpose of enriching publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of
6494 rewarding
6495 authors.
6496 </para>
6497 <para>
6498 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we
6499 saw in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6500 assure
6501 that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over culture
6502 by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume
6503 the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike
6504 the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6505 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6506 </para>
6507 <para>
6508 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6509 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built
6510 structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built
6511 a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them
6512 short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the
6513 federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6514 concentrating
6515 power in the federal government, they built structures to reinforce
6516 the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose members were
6517 at the time selected by the states, and an electoral college, also selected
6518 by the states, to select the president. In each case, a structure built
6519 checks and balances into the constitutional frame, structured to
6520 prevent
6521 otherwise inevitable concentrations of power.
6522 </para>
6523 <para>
6524 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call
6525 "copyright"
6526 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they
6527 ever considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put
6528 our "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
6529 210 years since they first struck its design.
6530 </para>
6531 <para>
6532 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6533 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6535 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6536 started here:
6537 </para>
6538 <figure id="fig-1441">
6539 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6540 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6541 </figure>
6542 <para>
6543 We will end here:
6544 </para>
6545 <figure id="fig-1442">
6546 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6547 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6548 </figure>
6549 <para>
6550 Let me explain how.
6551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6552 </para>
6553 </sect2>
6554 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6555 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6556 <para>
6557 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6558 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6559 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6560 protecting
6561 creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6562 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6563 authorship.<footnote><para>
6564 <!-- f8 -->
6565 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
6566 United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1, 485&ndash;86:
6567 "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme Law of the Land,'
6568 the perpetual rights which authors had, or were supposed by some to have, under
6569 the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6570 </para></footnote>
6571 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in
6572 the United States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the
6573 common
6574 law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work
6575 published
6576 in the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England,
6577 this lingering uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely
6578 upon a public domain to reprint and distribute works.
6579 </para>
6580 <para>
6581 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6582 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
6583 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections.
6584 Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the
6585 copyrights
6586 for all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any
6587 state copyrights expired as well.
6588 </para>
6589 <para>
6590 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6591 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6592 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6593 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6594 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6595 </para>
6596 <para>
6597 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6598 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6599 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6600 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6601 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6602 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6603 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6604 <!-- f9 -->
6605 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6606 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6607 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6608 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6609 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6610 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6611 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6612 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6613 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6614 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6615 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6616 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6617 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6618 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6619 </para>
6620 <para>
6621 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6622 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6624 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6625 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6626 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6627 copyright, either.
6628 </para>
6629 <para>
6630 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6631 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6632 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6633 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6634 domain.<footnote><para>
6635 <!-- f10 -->
6636 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6637 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6638 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6639 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6640 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6641 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6642 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6643 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6644 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6645 </para>
6646 <para>
6647 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6648 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6649 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6650 <!-- f11 -->
6651 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6652 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6653 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6654 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6655 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6656 effectively free.
6657 </para>
6658 <para>
6659 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6660 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6661 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6662 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6663 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6664 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6665 </para>
6666 <para>
6667 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6668 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6669 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6670 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6671 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6672 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6673 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6674 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6675 </para>
6676 <para>
6677 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6678 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6679 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6680 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6681
6682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6683 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6684 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6685 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6686 </para>
6687 <para>
6688 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6689 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6690 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6691 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6692 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6693 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6694 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6695 value.
6696 </para>
6697 <para>
6698 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6699 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6700 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6701 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6702 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6703 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6704 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6705 was ninety-five years.
6706 </para>
6707 <para>
6708 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6709 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6710 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6711 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6712 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6713 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6714 them.
6715 </para>
6716 <para>
6717 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6718 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6719 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6720 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6721 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6722 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6723 years.<footnote><para>
6724 <!-- f12 -->
6725 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6726 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6727 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6728 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6729 </para></footnote>
6730 </para>
6731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6732 </sect2>
6733 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6734 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6735 <para>
6736 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6737 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6738 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6739 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6740 </para>
6741 <para>
6742 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6743 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6744 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6745 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6746 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6747 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6748 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6749 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6750 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6751 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6752 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6753 </para>
6754 <para>
6755 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6756 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6757 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6758 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6759 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6760 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6761 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6762 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6763 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6764 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6765 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6766 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6767 on the initial creative work.
6768 </para>
6769 <para>
6770 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6771 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6772 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6773 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6774 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6775 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6776 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6777 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6778 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6779 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6780 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6781 </para>
6782 <para>
6783 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6784 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6785 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6786 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6787 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6788 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6789 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6790 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6791 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6792 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6793 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6794 original author.
6795 </para>
6796 <para>
6797 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6798 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6799 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6800 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6801 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6802 copy available for others to copy.
6803 </para>
6804 <para>
6805 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6806 differences.
6807 </para>
6808 <para>
6809 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6810 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6811 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6812 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6813 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6814 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6815 <!-- f13 -->
6816 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6817 Creation
6818 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6819 International
6820 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6821 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6822 </para></footnote>
6823 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6824 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6825 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6826 </para>
6827 <para>
6828 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6829 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6830 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6831 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6832 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6833 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6834 creative
6835 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6836 restrained.
6837 </para>
6838 <para>
6839 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6840 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6841 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6842 reduced
6843 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6844 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6845 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6846 </para>
6847 <para>
6848 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6849 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6850 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6851 </para>
6852 <para>
6853 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6854 control
6855 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6856 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6857 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6858 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6859 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6860 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6861 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6862 exclusive
6863 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6864 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6865 </para>
6866 <para>
6867 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6868 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6869 expansion
6870 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6871 copyright.
6872 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6873 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6874 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6875 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6876 </para>
6877 <para>
6878
6879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6880 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6881 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6882 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6883 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6884 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6885 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6886 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6887 protect
6888 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6889 <!-- f14 -->
6890 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6891 2003, available at
6892 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6893 </para></footnote>
6894 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6895 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6896 the wrong of direct piracy.
6897 </para>
6898 <para>
6899 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6900 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6901 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6902 transformative
6903 use of my book.<footnote><para>
6904 <!-- f15 -->
6905 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6906 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6907 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6908 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6909 Constitutionality,"
6910 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6911 </para></footnote>
6912 These two different uses of my creative work are
6913 treated the same.
6914 </para>
6915 <para>
6916 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6917 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6918 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6919 creates
6920 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6921 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6922 originally created?
6923 </para>
6924 <para>
6925 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6926 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6927 simply
6928 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6929 rights originally granted.
6930 </para>
6931 </sect2>
6932 <sect2 id="lawreach">
6933 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6934 <para>
6935 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6936 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6937 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6938 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6939 <!-- f16 -->
6940 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6941 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
6942 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6943 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
6944 sometimes
6945 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
6946 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
6947 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6948 </para></footnote>
6949 </para>
6950 <para>
6951 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6952 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6953 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6954 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6955 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6956 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6957 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6958 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6959 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6960 trigger for copyright law.
6961 </para>
6962 <para>
6963 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6964 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6965 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6966 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6967 <!-- f17 -->
6968 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6969 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6970 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6971 basis
6972 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6973 </para></footnote>
6974 because it is clear that the
6975 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6976 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6977 </para>
6978 <para>
6979 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6980 empty circle.
6981 </para>
6982 <figure id="fig-1521">
6983 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6984 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6985 </figure>
6986 <para>
6987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6988 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6989 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6990 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6991 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6992 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6993 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6994 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6995 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6996 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6997 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6998 not make a copy.
6999 </para>
7000 <figure id="fig-1531">
7001 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
7002 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
7003 </figure>
7004 <para>
7005 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7006 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7007 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7008 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7009 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7010 diagram on next page).
7011 </para>
7012 <para>
7013 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7014 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
7015 </para>
7016 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7017 <figure id="fig-1541">
7018 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
7019 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
7020 </figure>
7021 <para>
7022 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
7023 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7024 unregulated.
7025 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
7026 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
7027 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
7028 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
7029 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
7030 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7031 </para>
7032 <figure id="fig-1542">
7033 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
7034 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
7035 </figure>
7036 <para> </para>
7037 <figure id="fig-1551">
7038 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
7039 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
7040 </figure>
7041 <para>
7042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7043 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7044 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
7045 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7046 </para>
7047 <para>
7048 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
7049 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
7050 <!-- f18 -->
7051 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
7052 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
7053 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
7054 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
7055 </para></footnote>
7056 And because of this single,
7057 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
7058 category
7059 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
7060 unregulated
7061 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
7062 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
7063 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
7064 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
7065 category
7066 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
7067 copyrighted
7068 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
7069 burden of this shift.
7070 </para>
7071 <para>
7072 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7073 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
7074 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
7075 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
7076 nothing
7077 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
7078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7079 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
7080 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
7081 produced
7082 a copy.
7083 </para>
7084 <para>
7085 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
7086 different
7087 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7088 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
7089 copyright
7090 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
7091 accidental
7092 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
7093 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
7094 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
7095 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
7096 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
7097 </para>
7098 <para>
7099 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7100 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7101 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7102 points also become clear:
7103 </para>
7104 <para>
7105 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7106 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7107 presumptively
7108 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7109 evidence
7110 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7111 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7112 free culture before the Internet.
7113 </para>
7114 <para>
7115 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7116 transformative
7117 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7118 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7119 transformation
7120 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7121 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7122 releasing
7123 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7124 justification.
7125 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7126 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7127 transformative
7128 uses of creative work.
7129 </para>
7130 <para>
7131 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7132
7133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7134 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7135 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7136 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7137 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7138 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7139 Internet,
7140 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7141 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7142 protected
7143 before because reading was not regulated.
7144 </para>
7145 <para>
7146 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7147 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7148 depend
7149 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
7150 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7151 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7152 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7153 protections
7154 of fair use are not enough.
7155 </para>
7156 <para>
7157 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7158 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7159 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7160 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7161 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7162 </para>
7163 <para>
7164 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7165 began
7166 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7167 previews.
7168 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7169 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7170 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7171 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7172 before
7173 you bought it.
7174 </para>
7175 <para>
7176 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7177 distributors
7178 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7179 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7180 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7182 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7183 business
7184 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7185 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7186 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7187 immediately.
7188 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7189 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7190 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7191 </para>
7192 <para>
7193 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7194 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7195 infringed"
7196 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7197 willful
7198 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7199 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7200 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7201 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7202 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7203 </para>
7204 <para>
7205 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7206 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7207 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7208 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7209 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7210 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7211 Disney's permission.
7212 </para>
7213 <para>
7214 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7215 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7216 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7217 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7218 marketplace,
7219 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7220 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7221 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7222 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7223 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7224 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7225 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7226 </para>
7227 <para>
7228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7229 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7230 control
7231 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7232 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7233 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7234 Noble
7235 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7236 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7237 argument
7238 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7239 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7240 exercising
7241 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7242 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7243 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7244 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7245 </para>
7246 <para>
7247 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7248 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7249 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7250 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7251 owners
7252 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7253 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7254 </para>
7255 </sect2>
7256 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7257 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7258 <para>
7259 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7260 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7261 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7262 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7263 </para>
7264 <para>
7265 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7266 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7267 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7268 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7269 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7270 your freedom.
7271 </para>
7272 <para>
7273 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7274 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7276 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7277 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7278 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7279 <!-- f19 -->
7280 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7281 Contemporary
7282 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7283 </para></footnote>
7284 </para>
7285 <para>
7286 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7287 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7288 you were."<footnote><para>
7289 <!-- f20 -->
7290 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7291 </para></footnote>
7292 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7293 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7294 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7295 </para>
7296 <para>
7297 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7298 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7299 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7300 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7301 </para>
7302 <para>
7303 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7304 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7305 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7306 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7307 copyrighted
7308 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7309 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7310 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7311 that is not at all funny.
7312 </para>
7313 <para>
7314 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7315 </para>
7316 <para>
7317 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7318 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7319 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7320 technology,
7321 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7322 </para>
7323 <para>
7324 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7325 Reader.
7326 </para>
7327 <para>
7328 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7329 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7330 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7331 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7332 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7333 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7335 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7336 called Permissions.
7337 </para>
7338 <figure id="fig-1611">
7339 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7340 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7341 </figure>
7342 <para>
7343 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7344 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7345 </para>
7346 <figure id="fig-1612">
7347 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7348 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7349 </figure>
7350 <para>
7351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7352 According to my eBook
7353 Reader, I have the permission
7354 to copy to the clipboard of the
7355 computer ten text selections
7356 every ten days. (So far, I've
7357 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7358 I also have the permission to
7359 print ten pages from the book
7360 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7361 the permission to use the Read
7362 Aloud button to hear
7363 Middlemarch
7364 read aloud through the
7365 computer.
7366 </para>
7367 <para>
7368 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7369 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7370 </para>
7371 <figure id="fig-1621">
7372 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7373 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7374 </figure>
7375 <para>
7376 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7377 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7378 the book.
7379 </para>
7380 <figure id="fig-1622">
7381 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7382 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7383 </figure>
7384 <para>
7385 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7386 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7387 </para>
7388 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7389 <figure id="fig-1631">
7390 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7391 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7392 </figure>
7393 <para>
7394 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7395 </para>
7396 <para>
7397 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7398 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7399 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7400 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7401 under
7402 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7403 <!-- f21 -->
7404 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7405 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7406 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7407 obligation
7408 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7409 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7410 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7411 </para></footnote>
7412 When my e-book of
7413 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7414 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7415 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7416 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7417 </para>
7418 <para>
7419 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7420 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7421 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7422 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7423 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7424 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7425 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7426 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7427 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7428 restrictions:
7429 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7430 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7431 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7432 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7433 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7434 </para>
7435 <para>
7436 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7437 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7438 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7439 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7440 </para>
7441 <para>
7442 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7443 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7444 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7445 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7446 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7447 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7448 </para>
7449 <para>
7450 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7451 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7452 technologies
7453 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7454 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7455 protections as well?
7456 </para>
7457 <para>
7458 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7459 eBook Reader.
7460 </para>
7461 <para>
7462 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7463 public
7464 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7465 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7466 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7467 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7468 </para>
7469 <figure id="fig-1641">
7470 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7471 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7472 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7473 </figure>
7474 <para>
7475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7476 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7477 allowed
7478 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7479 "permissions"
7480 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7481 </para>
7482 <para>
7483 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7484 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7485 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7486 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7487 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7488 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7489 </para>
7490 <para>
7491 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7492 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7493 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7494 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7495 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7496 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7497 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7498 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7499 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7500 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7501 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7502 </para>
7503 <para>
7504 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7505 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7506 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7507 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7508 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7509 often crazy.
7510 </para>
7511 <para>
7512 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7513 story of mine that makes the same point.
7514 </para>
7515 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7516 <para>
7517 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7518 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7519 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7520 </para>
7521 <para>
7522 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7523 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7524 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7526 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7527 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7528 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7529 </para>
7530 <para>
7531 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7532 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7533 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7534 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7535 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7536 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7537 </para>
7538 <para>
7539 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7540 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7541 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7542 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7543 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7544 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7545 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7546 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7547 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7548 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7549 </para>
7550 <para>
7551 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7552 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7553 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7554 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7555 ethically.
7556 </para>
7557 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7558 <para>
7559 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7560 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7561 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7562 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7563 than Sony had built.
7564 </para>
7565 <para>
7566 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7567 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7568 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7569 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7570 the
7571
7572 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7573 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7574 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7575 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7576 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7577 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7578 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7579 dog to dance?
7580 </para>
7581 <para>
7582 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7583 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7584 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7585 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7586 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7587 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7588 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7589 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7590 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7591 </para>
7592 <para>
7593 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7594 <!-- f22 -->
7595 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7596 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7597 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7598 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7599 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7600 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7601 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7602 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7603 Questions
7604 about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7605 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7606 </para></footnote>
7607 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7608 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7609 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7610 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7611 </para>
7612 <para>
7613 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7614 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7615 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7616 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7617 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7618 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7619 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7620 Internet much more.
7621 </para>
7622 <para>
7623 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7624 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7625 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7626 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7627 </para>
7628 <para>
7629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7630 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7631 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7632 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7633 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7634 </para>
7635 <para>
7636 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7637 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7638 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7639 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7640 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7641 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7642 </para>
7643 <para>
7644 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7645 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7646 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7647 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7648 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7649 constituted, succeed.
7650 </para>
7651 <para>
7652 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7653 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7654 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7655 wrote:
7656 </para>
7657 <blockquote>
7658 <para>
7659 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7660 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7661 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7662 </para>
7663 </blockquote>
7664 <para>
7665 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7666 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7667 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7668 </para>
7669 <blockquote>
7670 <para>
7671 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7673 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7674 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7675 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7676 </para>
7677 </blockquote>
7678 <para>
7679 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7680 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7681 spreading such information an offense.
7682 </para>
7683 <para>
7684 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7685 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7686 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7687 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7688 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7689 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7690 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7691 </para>
7692 <para>
7693 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7694 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7695 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7696 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7697 </para>
7698 <para>
7699 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7700 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7701 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7702 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7703 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7704 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7705 have been a copyright violation.
7706 </para>
7707 <para>
7708 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7709 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7710 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7711 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7712 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7713 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7714 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7716 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7717 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7718 </para>
7719 <para>
7720 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7721 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7722 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7723 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7724 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7725 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7726 </para>
7727 <para>
7728 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7729 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7730 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7731 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7732 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7733 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7734 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7735 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7736 </para>
7737 <blockquote>
7738 <para>
7739 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7740 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7741 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7742 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7743 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7744 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7745 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7746 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7747 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7748 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7749 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7750 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7751 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7752 important.<footnote><para>
7753 <!-- f23 -->
7754 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7755 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7756 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7757 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7758 </para></footnote>
7759 </para>
7760 </blockquote>
7761 <para>
7762 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7763 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7764 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7765 the VCR responsible.
7766 </para>
7767 <para>
7768 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7769 the DMCA.
7770 </para>
7771 <para>
7772 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7773 </para>
7774 <para>
7775 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7776 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7777 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7778 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7779 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7780 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7781 </para>
7782 <para>
7783 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7784 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7785 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7786 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7787 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7788 and bad uses.
7789 </para>
7790 <figure id="fig-1711">
7791 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7792 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7793 </figure>
7794 <para>
7795 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7796 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7797 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7798 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7799 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7800 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7801 </para>
7802 <para>
7803 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7804 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7805 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7806 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7807 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7808 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7809 </para>
7810 <para>
7811 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7812 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7813 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7814 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7815 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7816 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7817 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7818 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7819 </para>
7820 <para>
7821 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7822 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7823 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7824 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7825 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7826 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7827 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7828 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7829 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7830 </para>
7831 <para>
7832
7833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7834 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7835 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7836 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7837 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7838 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7839 <!-- f24 -->
7840 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7841 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7842 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7843 </para></footnote>
7844 </para>
7845 <para>
7846 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7847 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7848 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7849 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7850 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7851 </para>
7852 <para>
7853 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7854 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7855 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7856 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7857 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7858 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7859 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7860 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7861 </para>
7862 <para>
7863 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7864 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7865 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7866 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7867 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7868 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7869 </para>
7870 </sect2>
7871 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
7872 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7873 <para>
7874 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7875 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7876 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7877 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7878 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7879 find better ways
7880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7881 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7882 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7883 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7884 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7885 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7886 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7887 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7888 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7889 control.
7890 </para>
7891 <para>
7892 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7893 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7894 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7895 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7896 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7897 </para>
7898 <para>
7899 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7900 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7901 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7902 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7903 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7904 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7905 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7906 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7907 of the media.
7908 </para>
7909 <para>
7910 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7911 nature.
7912 </para>
7913 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7914 <para>
7915 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7916 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7917 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7918 <!-- f25 -->
7919 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7920 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7921 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7922 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7923 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7924 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7925 <!-- f26 -->
7926 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7927 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
7928 </para></footnote>
7929 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7930 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7931 <!-- f27 -->
7932 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7933 31 May 2003.
7934 </para></footnote>
7935 </para>
7936 <para>
7937 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7938 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7940 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
7941 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7942 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7943 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
7944 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
7945 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7946 </para>
7947 <para>
7948 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7949 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7950 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7951 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7952 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7953 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7954 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7955 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7956 protected&mdash; by the market.
7957 </para>
7958 <para>
7959 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7960 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7961 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7962 </para>
7963 <blockquote>
7964 <para>
7965 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7966 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7967 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7968 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7969 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7970 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7971 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7972 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7973 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7974 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7975 <!-- f28 -->
7976 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7977 2003): 89.
7978 </para></footnote>
7979 </para>
7980 </blockquote>
7981 <para>
7982 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7983 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7984 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7985 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7986 </para>
7987 <figure id="fig-1761">
7988 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7989 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7990 </figure>
7991 <para>
7992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7993 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7994 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7995 distribute content?
7996 </para>
7997 <para>
7998 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7999 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8000 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8001 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8002 </para>
8003 <para>
8004 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8005 integration may matter.
8006 </para>
8007 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
8008 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8009 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8010 <para>
8011 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
8012 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8013 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8014 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8015 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8016 </para>
8017 <para>
8018 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8019 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8020 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8021 control.<footnote><para>
8022 <!-- f29 -->
8023 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8024 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
8025 Missouri,
8026 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8027 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
8028 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8029 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
8030 </para></footnote>
8031 </para>
8032 <para>
8033
8034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8035 The network did not control those copyrights because the law
8036 forbade
8037 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The
8038 law required a separation between the networks and the content
8039 producers;
8040 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
8041 1992, because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8042 television&mdash;75
8043 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the networks.
8044 </para>
8045 <para>
8046 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this
8047 independence.
8048 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.
8049 In 1985, there were twenty-five independent television production
8050 studios;
8051 in 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
8052 1992, only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a
8053 company it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8054 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992,
8055 16 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control,
8056 last year there was one."<footnote><para>
8057 <!-- f30 -->
8058 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on
8059 Media Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th
8060 Cong., 1st sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of
8061 Consumers
8062 Union and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8063 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of
8064 America, West, in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond,
8065 Virginia, 27 February 2003.
8066 </para></footnote>
8067 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television
8068 was owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
8069 1992 and 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week
8070 produced by network studios increased over 200%, whereas the
8071 number
8072 of prime time television hours per week produced by independent
8073 studios decreased 63%."<footnote><para>
8074 <!-- f31 -->
8075 Ibid.
8076 </para></footnote>
8077 </para>
8078 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8079 <para>
8080 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
8081 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8082 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8083 owned by the network.
8084 </para>
8085 <para>
8086 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the
8087 ownership
8088 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller
8089 few. As Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8090 </para>
8091 <blockquote>
8092 <para>
8093 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8094 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8095 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8096 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8097 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8098 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent
8099 production
8100 companies producing television programs. Now you have less
8101 than a handful.<footnote><para>
8102 <!-- f32 -->
8103 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
8104 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8105 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8106 </para></footnote>
8107 </para>
8108 </blockquote>
8109 <para>
8110 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of
8111 such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8112 Increasingly
8113 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from
8114 networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the network
8115 wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from the
8116 inside,
8117 it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question
8118 without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment to Siberia,
8119 but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are
8120 quashed. This is not the environment for a democracy.
8121 </para>
8122 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8123 <para>
8124 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8125 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8126 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8127 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8128 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8129 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8130 <!-- f33 -->
8131 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
8132 National
8133 Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard
8134 Business School Press, 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was
8135 first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of
8136 Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
8137 Research Policy 14 (1985): 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard
8138 Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are
8139 Built to Last Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform
8140 Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001).
8141 </para></footnote>
8142
8143 Lumbering
8144 giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the field is
8145 only open to the giants, there will be far too little sprinting.
8146 </para>
8147 <para>
8148 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8149 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8150 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8151 measure.
8152 </para>
8153 <para>
8154 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8155 suggest the concern.
8156 </para>
8157 <para>
8158 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8159 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8160 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8161 </para>
8162 <para>
8163 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8164 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8165 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8166
8167 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8168 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were all
8169 quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8170 collateral
8171 damage from it is so great as to make waging the war insane.
8172 When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice system, the
8173 desperation of generations of kids whose only real economic
8174 opportunities
8175 are as drug warriors, the queering of constitutional protections
8176 because
8177 of the constant surveillance this war requires, and, most profoundly,
8178 the total destruction of the legal systems of many South American
8179 nations
8180 because of the power of the local drug cartels, I find it impossible
8181 to believe that the marginal benefit in reduced drug consumption by
8182 Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
8183 </para>
8184 <para>
8185 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and
8186 it is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8187 depend
8188 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8189 these issues.
8190 </para>
8191 <para>
8192 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
8193 launched a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The
8194 campaign
8195 produced scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal
8196 drugs. In one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar,
8197 discussing the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the
8198 collateral damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of
8199 drug legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8200 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes his
8201 mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on
8202 the pro-legalization campaign.
8203 </para>
8204 <para>
8205 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8206 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8207 </para>
8208 <para>
8209 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8210 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8211 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the
8212 drug war. Can you do it?
8213 </para>
8214 <para>
8215 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8216 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8217 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8218 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8219 message
8220 will be heard then?
8221 </para>
8222 <para>
8223 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of
8224 avoiding
8225 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8226 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
8227 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First
8228 Amendment,
8229 but the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to
8230 choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media
8231 will refuse one side of a crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.
8232 And the courts will defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8233 <!-- f34 -->
8234 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads that
8235 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
8236 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
8237 policy."
8238 The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
8239 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
8240 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and
8241 returned
8242 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine, 15 October 2003.
8243 These restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for
8244 example,
8245 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with
8246 Rejection from TV Networks," New York Times, 13 March 2003, C4.
8247 Outside
8248 of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC or the
8249 courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general overview,
8250 see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
8251 Advertising
8252 on Television and Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988):
8253 449&ndash;79, and for a more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the
8254 courts, see Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d
8255 872 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8256 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
8257 transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel buses. Phillip
8258 Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni Rejects
8259 Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8260 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground was
8261 that the criticism was "too controversial."
8262 </para></footnote>
8263 </para>
8264 <para>
8265 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived in
8266 a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media
8267 throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control
8268 access
8269 to the media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which
8270 political positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in
8271 an obvious and important way, concentration matters. You might like
8272 the positions the handful of companies selects. But you should not like
8273 a world in which a mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us
8274 get to know about.
8275
8276 </para>
8277 </sect2>
8278 <sect2 id="together">
8279 <title>Together</title>
8280 <para>
8281 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8282 copyright
8283 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In
8284 the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No
8285 sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8286 </para>
8287 <para>
8288 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8289 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology
8290 and markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8291 cultivate
8292 our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins to seem
8293
8294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8295 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8296 supplement
8297 the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated markets
8298 to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing the
8299 massively
8300 expanded "property" rights granted by copyright fundamentally
8301 changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and build upon our
8302 past, then we have to ask whether this property should be redefined.
8303 </para>
8304 <para>
8305 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8306 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8307 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8308 our culture today.
8309 </para>
8310 <para>
8311 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8312 notwithstanding.
8313 And these massive shifts in the effective power of copyright
8314 regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content industry and
8315 resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly enable control
8316 over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether another
8317 adjustment
8318 is called for. Not an adjustment that increases copyright's
8319 power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
8320 adjustment
8321 to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
8322 regulation&mdash;a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8323 </para>
8324 <para>
8325 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8326 constant
8327 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8328 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8329 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8330 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8331 copyright
8332 holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8333 technology
8334 suggest that we may well need similar changes in the future. And
8335 these changes have to be reductions in the scope of copyright, in
8336 response
8337 to the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the
8338 market enable.
8339 </para>
8340 <para>
8341 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8342 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8344 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8345 changing
8346 technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8347 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the
8348 development
8349 of our culture than now.
8350 </para>
8351 <para>
8352 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8353 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when only
8354 publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much more
8355 diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for even
8356 then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers were
8357 independent
8358 of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a wide
8359 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
8360 remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny
8361 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a
8362 massive
8363 regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
8364 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into
8365 the most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8366 known.<footnote><para>
8367 <!-- f35 -->
8368 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8369 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8370 </para></footnote>
8371 </para>
8372 <para>
8373 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8374 </para>
8375 <para>
8376 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8377 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8378 distinguished
8379 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8380 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8381 that copyright law has undergone.
8382 In 1790, the law looked like this:
8383 </para>
8384
8385 <table id="t2">
8386 <title></title>
8387 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8388 <thead>
8389 <row>
8390 <entry></entry>
8391 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8392 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8393 </row>
8394 </thead>
8395 <tbody>
8396 <row>
8397 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8398 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8399 <entry>Free</entry>
8400 </row>
8401 <row>
8402 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8403 <entry>Free</entry>
8404 <entry>Free</entry>
8405 </row>
8406 </tbody>
8407 </tgroup>
8408 </table>
8409
8410 <para>
8411 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8412 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8413 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8414
8415 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8416 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8417 noncommercial work was also free.
8418 </para>
8419 <para>
8420 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8421 </para>
8422
8423 <table id="t3">
8424 <title></title>
8425 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8426 <thead>
8427 <row>
8428 <entry></entry>
8429 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8430 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8431 </row>
8432 </thead>
8433 <tbody>
8434 <row>
8435 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8436 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8437 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8438 </row>
8439 <row>
8440 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8441 <entry>Free</entry>
8442 <entry>Free</entry>
8443 </row>
8444 </tbody>
8445 </tgroup>
8446 </table>
8447
8448 <para>
8449 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8450 published,
8451 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8452 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8453 transformation were still essentially free.
8454 </para>
8455 <para>
8456 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and
8457 after
8458 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8459 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8460 expanded.
8461 Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more
8462 common,
8463 we could say the law began to look like this:
8464 </para>
8465
8466 <table id="t4">
8467 <title></title>
8468 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8469 <thead>
8470 <row>
8471 <entry></entry>
8472 <entry>COPY</entry>
8473 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8474 </row>
8475 </thead>
8476 <tbody>
8477 <row>
8478 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8479 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8480 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8481 </row>
8482 <row>
8483 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8484 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8485 <entry>Free</entry>
8486 </row>
8487 </tbody>
8488 </tgroup>
8489 </table>
8490
8491 <para>
8492 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through,
8493 say, copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the
8494 commercial
8495 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of
8496 digital technologies, especially in the context of a digital network,
8497 means that the law now looks like this:
8498 </para>
8499
8500 <table id="t5">
8501 <title></title>
8502 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8503 <thead>
8504 <row>
8505 <entry></entry>
8506 <entry>COPY</entry>
8507 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8508 </row>
8509 </thead>
8510 <tbody>
8511 <row>
8512 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8513 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8514 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8515 </row>
8516 <row>
8517 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8518 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8519 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8520 </row>
8521 </tbody>
8522 </tgroup>
8523 </table>
8524
8525 <para>
8526 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8527 creativity
8528 was not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity&mdash;
8529 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8530 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules designed
8531 to regulate commercial publishers.
8532 </para>
8533 <para>
8534 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8535 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8536 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8537 these domains actually does any good.
8538 </para>
8539 <para>
8540 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8541 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8542 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8543 especially,
8544 noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8545 reasons
8546 sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8547 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8548 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8549 rights were more sharply restricted.
8550 </para>
8551 <para>
8552 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8553 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8554 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8555 notwithstanding,
8556 historically, this property right (as with all property rights<footnote><para>
8557 <!-- f36 -->
8558 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8559 movement
8560 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance
8561 public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of
8562 Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland Pennock and John W.
8563 Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
8564 </para></footnote>)
8565 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8566 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8567 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8568 technologies.
8569 And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright" did not
8570 control at all the freedom of others to build upon or transform a creative
8571 work. American culture was born free, and for almost 180 years our
8572 country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free culture.
8573 </para>
8574 <para>
8575 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8576 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8577 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8578 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story
8579 of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar
8580 concern
8581 that is increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair
8582 use right become unavoidably high (the story of chapter 7). Adding
8583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8584 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8585 familiar
8586 limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter 8). And
8587 granting
8588 archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property
8589 notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture
8590 (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But
8591 the nature of the property that builds a free culture is very different
8592 from the extremist vision that dominates the debate today.
8593 </para>
8594 <para>
8595 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8596 response
8597 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
8598 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing
8599 and distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed
8600 in a way that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property
8601 right that is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or
8602 was intended to be. The property right that is copyright has become
8603 unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and
8604 transform becomes weakened in a world in which creation requires
8605 permission and creativity must check with a lawyer.
8606 </para>
8607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8608 </sect2>
8609 </sect1>
8610 </chapter>
8611 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8612 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8613
8614 <para> </para>
8615
8616 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8617 <sect1 id="chimera">
8618 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8619 <para>
8620
8621 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8622 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8623 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8624 <!-- f1. --> H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8625 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8626 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8627 </para></footnote>
8628 The valley is extraordinarily
8629 beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate, slopes of rich
8630 brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent fruit." But the
8631 villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an opportunity. "In the
8632 Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King."
8633 So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a king.
8634 </para>
8635 <para>
8636 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8637 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8638 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8639 Indeed,
8640 as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the sound
8641 of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to control
8642 him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't
8643 understand,'
8644 he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute, and
8645 which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
8646 </para>
8647 <para>
8648 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8649 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak)
8650 the virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8651 affection,
8652 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8653 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8654 description
8655 of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies,
8656 and she listened to his description of the stars and the mountains and
8657 her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence."
8658 "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could only half
8659 understand,
8660 but she was mysteriously delighted."
8661 </para>
8662 <para>
8663 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously
8664 delighted"
8665 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8666 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything
8667 right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8668 </para>
8669 <para>
8670 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8671 is affected," he reports.
8672 </para>
8673 <para>
8674 "What affects it?" the father asks.
8675 "Those queer things that are called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in
8676 such a way as to affect his brain."
8677 </para>
8678 <para>
8679 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8680 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple
8681 and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these irritant bodies
8682 [the eyes]."
8683 </para>
8684 <para>
8685 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They
8686 inform
8687 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8688 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8689 believe
8690 in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8691 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8692 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8693 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8694 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8695
8696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8697 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8698 certainty
8699 that she was not the person whose blood was at the scene. . . ."
8700 </para>
8701 <para>
8702 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8703 impossible.
8704 A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of
8705 DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two
8706 individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person
8707 can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of
8708 a "person" should reflect this reality.
8709 </para>
8710 <para>
8711 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright
8712 and culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8713 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8714 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8715 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong.
8716 One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
8717 records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
8718 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
8719 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just
8720 send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant
8721 respects,
8722 just like what every executive in every recording company no
8723 doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8724 </para>
8725 <para>
8726 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8727 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music,
8728 then sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8729 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8730 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8731 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8732 allowed
8733 to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8734 </para>
8735 <para>
8736 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8737 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8738 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally)
8739 releases
8740 a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free
8741 copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.
8742 </para>
8743 <para>
8744
8745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8746 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8747 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take
8748 a CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8749 something
8750 to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note
8751 that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that
8752 might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is $1,000.
8753 According
8754 to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song CD, I'm
8755 liable
8756 for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8757 </para>
8758 <para>
8759 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that
8760 it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It
8761 is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side
8762 asserts,
8763 we need to begin to think about how we should respond to this
8764 chimera. What rules should govern it?
8765 </para>
8766 <para>
8767 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8768 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a
8769 felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages
8770 just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get
8771 universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no
8772 computer
8773 is used to commit this crime. These responses might be extreme,
8774 but each of them has either been proposed or actually implemented.<footnote><para>
8775 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8776 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8777 "Copyright
8778 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, available
8779 at
8780 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8781 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8782 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8783 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8784 Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8785 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8786 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8787 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8788 user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer,
8789 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.
8790 Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8791 high as $90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8792 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8793 from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8794 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8795 billion
8796 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8797 Elizabeth
8798 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8799 August 2003, available at
8800 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8801 targeting
8802 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8803 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8804 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003,
8805 D3, available at
8806 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8807 </para></footnote>
8808
8809 </para>
8810 <para>
8811 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids
8812 act as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there
8813 be no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8814 copyrighted
8815 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip:
8816 regulated,
8817 if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8818 </para>
8819 <para>
8820 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8821 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8822 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8823 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter
8824 is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance
8825 extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a reasonable
8826 alternative.
8827 But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
8828 of the two extremes.
8829 </para>
8830 <para>
8831
8832 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8833 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8834 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land
8835 grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give
8836 content
8837 holders a kind of control over our culture that they have never had
8838 before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8839 innovation
8840 and new creativity will be lost.
8841 </para>
8842 <para>
8843 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8844 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8845 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8846 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8847 innovation
8848 that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the
8849 passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to distribute
8850 content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the vice president
8851 for global public policy at one of these new innovators, eMusic.com,
8852 put it when criticizing the DMCA's added protection for copyrighted
8853 material,
8854 </para>
8855 <blockquote>
8856 <para>
8857 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8858 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8859 </para>
8860 <para>
8861 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8862 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8863 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8864 answer
8865 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8866 well produce a totally different industry model.
8867 </para>
8868 <para>
8869 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8870 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8871 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8872 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8873 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8874 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8875 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8876 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8877 interests.<footnote><para>
8878 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8879 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8880 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8881 Protection,
8882 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
8883 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8884 EMusic.com),
8885 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8886 Congressional
8887 Testimony File.
8888 </para></footnote>
8889 </para>
8890 </blockquote>
8891 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8892 <para>
8893 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8894 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8895 changed.
8896 </para>
8897 <para>
8898 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8899 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8900 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8901 </para>
8902
8903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8904 </sect1>
8905 <sect1 id="harms">
8906 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8907 <para>
8908
8909 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8910 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8911 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8912 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8913 prohibition,
8914 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8915 </para>
8916 <para>
8917 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8918 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8919 extend
8920 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8921 justified?
8922 </para>
8923 <para>
8924 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8925 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8926 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8927 our history.
8928 </para>
8929 <para>
8930 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still
8931 on the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme
8932 claims of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8933 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8934 </para>
8935 <para>
8936 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8937 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8938 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8939 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8940 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8941 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8942 </para>
8943 <sect2 id="constrain">
8944 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8945 <para>
8946 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8947 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8948 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8949 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8950 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8951 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8952 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8953 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8954 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8955 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8956 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8957 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8958 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8959 </para>
8960 <para>
8961 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8962 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8963 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8964 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8965 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8966 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8967 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8968 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8969 the culture all around.
8970 </para>
8971 <para>
8972 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8973 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8974
8975 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8976
8977 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8978 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8979 storytelling extended across the globe.
8980 </para>
8981 <para>
8982 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8983 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8984 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8985 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8986 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8987 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8988 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8989 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8990 work is presumptively illegal.
8991 </para>
8992 <para>
8993 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8994 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8995 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8996 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8997 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8998 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8999 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
9000 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
9001 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
9002 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
9003 million.<footnote><para>
9004 <!-- f1. -->
9005 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
9006 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
9007 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9008 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
9009 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
9010 </para></footnote>
9011 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9012 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9013 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
9014 suffering.<footnote><para>
9015 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9016 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
9017 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9018 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
9019 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
9020 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
9021 available at
9022 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9023 recent months.
9024 </para></footnote>
9025 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9026 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9027 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9028 </para>
9029 <para>
9030 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9031 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
9032 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
9033 creative
9034 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
9035 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
9036 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
9037
9038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9039 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
9040 create,
9041 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
9042 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
9043 begin
9044 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
9045 necessarily
9046 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
9047 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
9048 "illegal
9049 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
9050 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
9051 available
9052 at
9053 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9054 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
9055 </para></footnote>
9056 In what does their "illegality" consist?
9057 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9058 critical or reflective.
9059 </para>
9060 <para>
9061 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9062 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
9063 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9064 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9065 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9066 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9067 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9068 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9069 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9070 </para>
9071 <para>
9072 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9073 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9074 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9075 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9076 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9077 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9078 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9079 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9080 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9081 </para>
9082 <para>
9083 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9084 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
9085 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
9086 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
9087 law regulates such a use.
9088 </para>
9089 <para>
9090
9091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9092 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9093 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9094 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
9095 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9096 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9097 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9098 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9099 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9100 </para>
9101 <para>
9102 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9103 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
9104 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9105 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9106 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9107 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9108 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9109 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9110 comfort themselves.
9111 </para>
9112 <para>
9113 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
9114 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9115 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9116 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9117 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
9118 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9119 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9120 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9121 culture that is free.
9122 </para>
9123 <para>
9124 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9125 </para>
9126 <blockquote>
9127 <para>
9128 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9129 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9130 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9131 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
9132 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9134 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9135 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9136 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9137 </para>
9138 </blockquote>
9139 </sect2>
9140 <sect2 id="innovators">
9141 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9142 <para>
9143 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9144 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9145 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9146 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9147 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9148 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9149 </para>
9150 <para>
9151 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9152 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9153 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9154 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9155 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9156 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9157 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9158 </para>
9159 <para>
9160 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9161 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9162 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9163 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9164 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9165 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9166 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9167 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9168 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9169 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9170 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9171 </para>
9172 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9173 <para>
9174 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9176 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
9177 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9178 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9179 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9180 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9181 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9182 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9183 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9184 </para>
9185 <para>
9186 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9187 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9188 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9189 </para>
9190 <para>
9191 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9192 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9193 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9194 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9195 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9196 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9197 </para>
9198 <para>
9199 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9200 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9201 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9202 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9203 Raitt. And so on.
9204 </para>
9205 <para>
9206 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9207 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9208 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9209 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9210 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9211 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9212 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9213 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9214 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9215 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9216 </para>
9217 <para>
9218 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9219 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9220
9221 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9222 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9223 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9224 the kind of content the users liked.
9225 </para>
9226 <para>
9227 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9228 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9229 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9230 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9231 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9232 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9233 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9234 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9235 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9236 they had already bought.
9237 </para>
9238 <para>
9239 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9240 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9241 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9242 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9243 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9244 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9245 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9246 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9247 </para>
9248 <para>
9249 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9250 </para>
9251 <para>
9252 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9253 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9254 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9255 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9256 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9257 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9258 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9259 demanded.
9260 </para>
9261 <para>
9262 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9263 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9264 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9265 clients in this
9266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9267 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9268 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9269 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9270 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9271 </para>
9272 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9273 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9274 <para>
9275 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9276 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9277 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9278 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9279 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9280 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9281 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9282 innovation
9283 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9284 Revolution
9285 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9286 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9287 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9288 Times, 28 May 2001.
9289 </para></footnote>
9290 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9291 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9292 industry
9293 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9294 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9295 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9296 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9297 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9298 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9299 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9300 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9301 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9302 </para>
9303 <blockquote>
9304 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9305 <para>
9306 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9307 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9308 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9309 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9310 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9311 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9312 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote>
9313 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9314 <para>
9315 <!-- f5. -->
9316 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9317 2003, available at
9318 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9319 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9320 </para></footnote>
9321 </para>
9322 </blockquote>
9323 <para>
9324 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9325 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9326 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9327 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9328 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9329 constantly threatened by litigation.
9330 </para>
9331 <para>
9332
9333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9334 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9335 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9336 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9337 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9338 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9339 imposes,
9340 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9341 conservative
9342 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9343 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9344 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9345 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9346 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9347 </para>
9348 <para>
9349 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9350 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9351 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9352 systematically
9353 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9354 industries
9355 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9356 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9357 competition.
9358 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9359 competition.
9360 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9361 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9362 overregulatedregulated
9363 market.
9364 </para>
9365 <para>
9366 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9367 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9368 burden
9369 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture&mdash;a
9370 culture
9371 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9372 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9373 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9374 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9375 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9376 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9377 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9378 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9380 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9381 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9382 creativity.
9383 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9384 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9385 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9386 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9387 technology
9388 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9389 </para>
9390 <para>
9391 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9392 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9393 Internet's
9394 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9395 feature
9396 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9397 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9398 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9399 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9400 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9401 </para>
9402 <para>
9403 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9404 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9405 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9406 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9407 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9408 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9409 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9410 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9411 </para></footnote>
9412
9413 Congress
9414 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9415 "broadcast
9416 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9417 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9418 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9419 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9420 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9421 violators
9422 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9423 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9424 </para></footnote>
9425
9426 </para>
9427 <para>
9428 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9429 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9430 regulation
9431 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9432 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9433
9434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9435 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9436 those requirements.
9437 </para>
9438 <para>
9439 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9440 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9441 impose.<footnote><para>
9442 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9443 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9444 </para></footnote>
9445 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9446 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9447 harm than good.
9448 </para>
9449 <para>
9450 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9451 innovation&mdash;again,
9452 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9453 crowd.
9454 </para>
9455 <para>
9456 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9457 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9458 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9459 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9460 </para>
9461 <para>
9462 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9463 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9464 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9465 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9466 2001).
9467 </para></footnote>
9468 overall this history of copyright
9469 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9470 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9471 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9472 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9473 </para>
9474 <para>
9475 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9476 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9477 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9478 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9479 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9480 </para>
9481 <para>
9482 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9483 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9484 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9485 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9486 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9487 copyright
9488 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9489 music
9490 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9491 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9492 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9493 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9494 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9495 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9496 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9497 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9498 </para></footnote>
9499 It has been
9500 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9501 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9502 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9503 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9504 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9505 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9506 August
9507 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9508 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9509 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9510 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9511 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9512 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9513 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9514 World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34, available at
9515 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9516 </para></footnote>
9517 But there is one
9518 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9519 demise
9520 of Internet radio.
9521 </para>
9522 <para>
9523
9524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9525 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9526 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9527 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9528 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9529 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9530 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9531 copyright
9532 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9533 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9534 </para>
9535 <para>
9536 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9537 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9538 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9539 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9540 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9541 Probably
9542 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9543 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9544 efforts
9545 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9546 </para>
9547 <para>
9548 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9549 technology
9550 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9551 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9552 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9553 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9554 regular
9555 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9556 </para>
9557 <para>
9558 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9559 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9560 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9561 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9562 broadcasters
9563 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9564 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9565 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9566 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9567 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9568 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9569 in to this new form of radio.
9570 </para>
9571 <para>
9572
9573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9574 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9575 improvement
9576 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9577 improvement
9578 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9579 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9580 establish
9581 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9582 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9583 </para>
9584 <blockquote>
9585 <para>
9586 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9587 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9588 radio
9589 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9590 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9591 competition
9592 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9593 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9594 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9595 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9596 communications
9597 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9598 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9599 acquire
9600 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9601 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9602 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.<footnote><para>
9603 <!-- f12. --> Lessing, 239.
9604 </para></footnote>
9605 </para>
9606 </blockquote>
9607 <para>
9608 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not because
9609 Armstrong
9610 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9611 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"<footnote><para>
9612 <!-- f13. --> Ibid., 229.
9613 </para></footnote>
9614 to
9615 retard
9616 the growth of this competing technology.
9617 </para>
9618 <para>
9619 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9620 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9621 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9622 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9623 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9624 radio?
9625 </para>
9626 <para>
9627 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9628 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9629
9630 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9631 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9632 phenomenon
9633 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9634 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9635 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9636 hypothetical
9637 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9638 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9639 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9640 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9641 </para>
9642 <para>
9643 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9644 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9645 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9646 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9647 over $1 million a year.<footnote><para>
9648 <!-- f14. --> This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9649 Arbitration
9650 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example
9651 offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw
9652 (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain
9653 submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected.
9654 See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
9655 and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP DTRA 1 and 2,
9656 available at
9657 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9658 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker,
9659 "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution," Antitrust
9660 Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was not confusion, these are just
9661 old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected from
9662 digital
9663 entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the
9664 name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of
9665 powerful
9666 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9667 </para></footnote>
9668 A regular radio station broadcasting the same
9669 content would pay no equivalent fee.
9670 </para>
9671 <para>
9672 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9673 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9674 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9675 </para>
9676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9677 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9678 <listitem><para>
9679 name of the service;
9680 </para></listitem>
9681 <listitem><para>
9682 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9683 </para></listitem>
9684 <listitem><para>
9685 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9686 </para></listitem>
9687 <listitem><para>
9688 date of transmission;
9689 </para></listitem>
9690 <listitem><para>
9691 time of transmission;
9692 </para></listitem>
9693 <listitem><para>
9694 time zone of origination of transmission;
9695 </para></listitem>
9696 <listitem><para>
9697 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9698 </para></listitem>
9699 <listitem><para>
9700 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9701 </para></listitem>
9702 <listitem><para>
9703 sound recording title;
9704 </para></listitem>
9705 <listitem><para>
9706 ISRC code of the recording;
9707 </para></listitem>
9708 <listitem><para>
9709 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9710 </para></listitem>
9711 <listitem><para>
9712 featured recording artist;
9713 </para></listitem>
9714 <listitem><para>
9715 retail album title;
9716 </para></listitem>
9717 <listitem><para>
9718 recording label;
9719 </para></listitem>
9720 <listitem><para>
9721 UPC code of the retail album;
9722 </para></listitem>
9723 <listitem><para>
9724 catalog number;
9725 </para></listitem>
9726 <listitem><para>
9727 copyright owner information;
9728 </para></listitem>
9729 <listitem><para>
9730 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9731 </para></listitem>
9732 <listitem><para>
9733 name of the service or entity;
9734 </para></listitem>
9735 <listitem><para>
9736 channel or program;
9737 </para></listitem>
9738 <listitem><para>
9739 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9740 </para></listitem>
9741 <listitem><para>
9742 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9743 </para></listitem>
9744 <listitem><para>
9745 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9746 </para></listitem>
9747 <listitem><para>
9748 Unique User identifier;
9749 </para></listitem>
9750 <listitem><para>
9751 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9752 </para></listitem>
9753 </orderedlist>
9754
9755 <para>
9756 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9757 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9758 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9759 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9760 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9761 does not.
9762 </para>
9763 <para>
9764 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9765 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9766 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9767 </para>
9768 <para>
9769 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed
9770 obvious
9771 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9772 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9773 </para>
9774 <blockquote>
9775 <para>
9776 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9777 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9778 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9779 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9780 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9781 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9782
9783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9784 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9785 Because
9786 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9787 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9788 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9789 of business. . . ."
9790 </para>
9791 <para>
9792 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9793 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9794 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9795 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9796 </para>
9797 </blockquote>
9798 <para>
9799 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9800 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9801 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9802 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9803 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9804 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9805 effective to prevent it.
9806 </para>
9807 </sect2>
9808 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9809 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9810 <para>
9811 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9812 dinosaurs
9813 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9814 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9815 </para>
9816 <para>
9817 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9818 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9819 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9820 </para>
9821 <para>
9822 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9823 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9824 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9825 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9826 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9827 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9828 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9829 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9830 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9831 </para></footnote>
9832 According to the RIAA,
9833 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9834 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9835
9836 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9837 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9838 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9839 increasingly
9840 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9841 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9842 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9843 extreme
9844 response by the other.
9845 </para>
9846 <para>
9847 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9848 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9849 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9850 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9851 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9852 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9853 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9854 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9855 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9856 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9857 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9858 was.<footnote><para>
9859 <!-- f16. -->
9860 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9861 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9862 </para></footnote>
9863 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9864 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9865 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9866 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9867 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9868 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9869 they oppose.
9870 </para>
9871 <para>
9872 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9873 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9874 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9875 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9876 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9877 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9878 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9879 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9880 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9881 <!-- f17. -->
9882 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9883 Prohibition," American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9884 </para></footnote>
9885 We have
9886 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9887 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9888 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9889 <!-- f18. -->
9890 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9891 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9892 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9893 </para></footnote>
9894 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9895 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9896 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9897 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9898 cheat.<footnote><para>
9899 <!-- f19. -->
9900 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9901 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9902 compliance literature).
9903 </para></footnote>
9904 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9905 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9906 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9907 </para>
9908 <para>
9909 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9910 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9911 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9912 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9913 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9914 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9915 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9916 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9917 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9918 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9919 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9920 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9921 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9922 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9923 degree of illegality.
9924 </para>
9925 <para>
9926 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9927 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9928 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9929 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9930 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9931 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9932 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9933 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9934 to consider the alternative.
9935 </para>
9936 <para>
9937
9938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9939 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9940 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9941 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9942 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9943 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9944 </para>
9945 <para>
9946 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9947 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9948 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9949 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9950 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9951 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9952 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9953 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9954 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9955 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9956 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9957 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9958 </para>
9959 <para>
9960 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9961 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9962 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9963 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9964 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9965 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9966 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9967 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9968 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9969 a nation of felons?
9970 </para>
9971 <para>
9972 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9973 </para>
9974 <para>
9975 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9976 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9977 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9978 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9979 used
9980
9981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9982 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9983 recordings is free.
9984 </para>
9985 <para>
9986 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9987 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9988 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9989 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9990 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9991 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9992 capacities of digital technologies.
9993 </para>
9994 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9995 <para>
9996 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9997 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9998 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9999 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
10000 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
10001 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
10002 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
10003 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
10004 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
10005 </para>
10006 <para>
10007 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
10008 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10009 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
10010 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10011 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10012 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10013 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10014 on people's machines.
10015 </para>
10016 <para>
10017 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10018 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10019 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10020 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10021 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10022 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10023
10024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10025 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10026 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10027 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
10028 management" system.
10029 </para>
10030 <para>
10031 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10032 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10033 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10034 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10035 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10036 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10037 freedom to move content easily?
10038 </para>
10039 <para>
10040 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10041 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10042 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10043 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10044 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10045 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10046 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10047 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10048 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10049 </para>
10050 <para>
10051 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10052 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10053 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10054 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10055 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10056 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10057 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10058 </para>
10059 <para>
10060 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10061 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10062 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10063 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10064 </para>
10065 <para>
10066 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10067 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10068
10069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10070
10071 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10072 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10073 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10074 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10075 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
10076 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
10077 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
10078 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
10079 generally.
10080 </para>
10081 <para>
10082 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
10083 explains,
10084 </para>
10085 <blockquote>
10086 <para>
10087 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10088 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
10089 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10090 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10091 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10092 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
10093 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
10094 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10095 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
10096 </para>
10097 </blockquote>
10098 <para>
10099 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10100 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10101 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10102 </para>
10103 <para>
10104 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
10105 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10106 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10107 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10108 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10109 an Internet user is revealed.
10110 </para>
10111 <para>
10112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10113 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10114 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10115 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10116 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10117 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10118 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10119 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10120 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
10121 <!-- f20. -->
10122 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10123 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10124 Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
10125 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10126 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10127 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
10128 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September
10129 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10130 Fan, Either," New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
10131 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
10132 </para></footnote>
10133
10134 </para>
10135 <para>
10136 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10137 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10138 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10139 <!-- f21. -->
10140 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10141 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10142 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10143 </para></footnote>
10144 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10145 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10146 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10147 </para>
10148 <para>
10149 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10150 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10151 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10152 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10153 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10154 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10155 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10156 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10157 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10158 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10159 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10160 <!-- f22. -->
10161 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10162 Boston Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10163 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10164 Colleges," Washington Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10165 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
10166 Monitor, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10167 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10168 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10169 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News, 30 January
10170 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10171 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
10172 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10173 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10174 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10175 </para></footnote>
10176 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10177 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10178 </para>
10179 <para>
10180 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10181 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10182 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10183 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10184 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10185 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10186 college students
10187
10188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10189 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10190 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10191 Says von Lohmann,
10192 </para>
10193 <blockquote>
10194 <para>
10195 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10196 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10197 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10198 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10199 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10200 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10201 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10202 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10203 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10204 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10205 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10206 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10207 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10208 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10209 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10210 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10211 million of them.
10212 </para>
10213 </blockquote>
10214 <para>
10215 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10216 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10217 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10218 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10219 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10220 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10221 </para>
10222
10223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10224 </sect2>
10225 </sect1>
10226 </chapter>
10227 <chapter id="c-balances">
10228 <title>BALANCES</title>
10229
10230 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10231 <para>
10232 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10233 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10234 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10235 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10236 </para>
10237 <para>
10238 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10239 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10240 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10241 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10242 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10243 everything around.
10244 </para>
10245 <para>
10246 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10247 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10248 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10249 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10250 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10251 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10252 </para>
10253 <para>
10254 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10255 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10256 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10257 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10258 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10259 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10260 made that is happening all around.
10261 </para>
10262 <para>
10263 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10264 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10265 gasoline onto this fire.
10266 </para>
10267 <para>
10268 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10269 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10270 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10271 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10272 </para>
10273 <para>
10274 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10275 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10276 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10277 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10278 success will require.
10279 </para>
10280
10281 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10282 <sect1 id="eldred">
10283 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10284 <para>
10285 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10286 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10287 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10288 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10289 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10290 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10291 come alive.
10292 </para>
10293 <para>
10294 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10295 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10296 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10297 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10298 them available for free.
10299 </para>
10300 <para>
10301 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10302 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10303 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10304 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10305 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10307 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10308 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10309 accessible&mdash;today.
10310 </para>
10311 <para>
10312 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10313 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10314 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10315 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10316 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10317 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10318 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10319 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10320 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10321 commercial publications of public domain works.
10322 </para>
10323 <para>
10324 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10325 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10326 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10327 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10328 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10329 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10330 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10331 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10332 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10333 generally.<footnote><para>
10334 <!-- f1. -->
10335 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10336 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10337 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10338 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10339 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10340 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10341 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10342 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10343 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10344 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10345 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10346 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10347 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10348 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10349 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10350 </para>
10351 <para>
10352 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10353 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10354 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10355 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
10356 in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10357 terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
10358 would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
10359 collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10360 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10361 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
10362 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10363 </para>
10364 <para>
10365
10366 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10367 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10368 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10369 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10370 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10371 <!-- f2. -->
10372 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10373 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10374 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10375 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10376 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10377 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10378 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10379 </para></footnote>
10380
10381 </para>
10382 <para>
10383 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10384 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10385 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10386 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10387 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10388 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10389 to undertake.
10390 </para>
10391 <para>
10392 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10393 constitutional
10394 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10395 interpretation.
10396 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10397 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10398 importantly
10399 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10400 </para>
10401 <blockquote>
10402 <para>
10403 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10404 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10405 their . . . Writings. . . .
10406 </para>
10407 </blockquote>
10408 <para>
10409 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10410 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10411 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10412 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10413 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10414 specific&mdash;to
10415 "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that are also specific&mdash;
10416 by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
10417 </para>
10418 <para>
10419 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10420 extending
10421 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10422 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10423 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10425 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10426 Congress
10427 has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what
10428 the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the installment
10429 plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10430 </para>
10431 <para>
10432 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10433 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10434 consideration
10435 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10436 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10437 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the
10438 practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10439 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10440 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to
10441 keep this gravy train going.
10442 </para>
10443 <para>
10444 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10445 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
10446 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10447 beneficiaries
10448 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce
10449 it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can
10450 do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must do&mdash;and those
10451 things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10452 </para>
10453 <para>
10454 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10455 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10456 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10457 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10458 continues
10459 to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10460 benefits
10461 greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher would
10462 pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be published
10463 by anyone for free.
10464 </para>
10465 <para>
10466 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10467 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10468 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10469 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10470 report:
10471 </para>
10472 <para>
10473 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10474
10475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10476 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10477 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10478 those works.
10479 </para>
10480 <para>
10481 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10482 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10483 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10484 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10485 </para>
10486 <para>
10487 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10488 about it?"
10489 </para>
10490 <para>
10491 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10492 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10493 they support the bill."
10494 </para>
10495 <para>
10496 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10497 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10498 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10499 much is it worth?"
10500 </para>
10501 <para>
10502 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10503 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10504 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10505 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10506 </para>
10507 <para>
10508 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10509 correct conclusion:
10510 </para>
10511 <para>
10512 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10513 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10514 contributions
10515 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10516 </para>
10517 <para>
10518 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10519 contribute
10520 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10521 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10522 </para>
10523 <para>
10524 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10525 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10526 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10527 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10528 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10529 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10530 copyrights
10531 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10532 the copyright term extended.
10533 </para>
10534 <para>
10535 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10536 legislation
10537 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10538 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10539 </para>
10540 <para>
10541 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10542 Copyright
10543 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10544 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10545 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10546 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10547 contributions.<footnote><para>
10548 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10549 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10550 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10551 </para></footnote>
10552 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10553 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10554 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10555 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10556 Age," available at
10557 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10558 </para></footnote>
10559 Disney is estimated to have
10560 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10561 cycle.<footnote><para>
10562 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10563 Congressional
10564 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10565 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10566 </para></footnote>
10567
10568 </para>
10569 <para>
10570 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10571 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10572 reality
10573 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10574 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10575 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10576 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10577 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10578 "limited."
10579 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10580 and again.
10581 </para>
10582 <para>
10583 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10584 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10585 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10586 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10587 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10588 scholars,
10589 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10590
10591 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10592 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10593 guns near schools.
10594 </para>
10595 <para>
10596 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10597 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10598 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10599 "interstate
10600 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10601 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10602 interstate
10603 commerce.
10604 </para>
10605 <para>
10606 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10607 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10608 activity,
10609 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10610 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10611 interpreted
10612 to impose no limit.
10613 </para>
10614 <para>
10615 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10616 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10617 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10618 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10619 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10620 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10621 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10622 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10623 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10624 government
10625 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10626 </para>
10627 <para>
10628 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10629 arguments,"
10630 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10631 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10632 </para></footnote>
10633 If anything Congress says is interstate
10634 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10635 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10636 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10637 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10638 </para></footnote>
10639
10640 </para>
10641 <para>
10642 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10643 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10644 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10645 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10646 context
10647 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10648 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10649 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10650 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10651 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10652 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10653 </para></footnote>
10654 And if it is applied to the
10655 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10656 Congress
10657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10658 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10659 existing
10660 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10661 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10662 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10663 copyrights
10664 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10665 existing copyrights.
10666 </para>
10667 <para>
10668 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10669 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10670 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10671 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10672 rejected
10673 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10674 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10675 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10676 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10677 boring.
10678 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10679 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10680 </para>
10681 <para>
10682 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10683 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10684 Constitution's
10685 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10686 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10687 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10688 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10689 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10690 already
10691 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10692 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10693 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10694 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10695 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10696 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10697 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10698 </para>
10699 <para>
10700 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10701
10702 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10703 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10704 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10705 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10706 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10707 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10708 </para></footnote>
10709 But
10710 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10711 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10712 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10713 </para>
10714 <para>
10715 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10716 copyright
10717 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10718 influence
10719 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10720 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10721 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10722 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10723 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10724 bought to extend them again.
10725 </para>
10726 <para>
10727 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10728 extended.
10729 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10730 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10731 society
10732 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10733 Disney's.
10734 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10735 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10736 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10737 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10738 exploited,
10739 and no longer available as a result.
10740 </para>
10741 <para>
10742 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10743 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10744 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10745 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10746 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10747 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10748 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10749 Congressional
10750 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10751 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10752 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10753 </para></footnote>
10754
10755 </para>
10756 <para>
10757 Think practically about the consequence of this
10758 extension&mdash;practically,
10759 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10760
10761 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10762 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10763 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10764 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10765 remaining
10766 9,873. What would you have to do?
10767 </para>
10768 <para>
10769 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10770 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10771 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10772 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10773 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10774 list of books still under copyright.
10775 </para>
10776 <para>
10777 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10778 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10779 </para>
10780 <para>
10781 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10782 owners
10783 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10784 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10785 being at least a list?
10786 </para>
10787 <para>
10788 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10789 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10790 practically
10791 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10792 thousands
10793 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10794 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10795 </para>
10796 <para>
10797 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10798 apologists
10799 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10800 owners?"
10801 </para>
10802 <para>
10803 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10804 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10805 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10806 suggesting
10807 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10808 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10809 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10810 </para>
10811 <para>
10812 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10813 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10814 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10815
10816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10817 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10818 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10819 happen
10820 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10821 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10822 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10823 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10824 know quite well who owns what property.
10825 </para>
10826 <para>
10827 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10828 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10829 already
10830 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10831 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10832 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10833 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10834 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10835 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10836 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10837 </para>
10838 <para>
10839 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10840 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10841 consequence
10842 for other creative works is much more dire.
10843 </para>
10844 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10845 <para>
10846 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10847 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10848 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10849 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10850 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10851 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10852 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10853 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10854 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10855 films."<footnote><para>
10856 <!-- f11. -->
10857 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10858 Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10859 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10860 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
10861 </para></footnote>
10862
10863 </para>
10864 <para>
10865 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10866 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10867 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10868 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10869 </para>
10870 <para>
10871 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10872
10873 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10874 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10875 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10876 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10877 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10878 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10879 work available for distribution.
10880 </para>
10881 <para>
10882 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10883 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10884 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10885 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10886 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10887 mm film.<footnote><para>
10888 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10889 Supporting
10890 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
10891 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10892 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10893 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10894 </para></footnote>
10895
10896 </para>
10897 <para>
10898 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10899 important.
10900 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10901 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10902 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10903 locate the copyright owner.
10904 </para>
10905 <para>
10906 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10907 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10908 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10909 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10910 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10911 exceptionally
10912 high.
10913 </para>
10914 <para>
10915 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10916 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10917 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10918 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10919 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10920 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10921 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10922 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10923 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10924 </para>
10925 <para>
10926 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10927
10928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10929 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10930 benefit
10931 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10932 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10933 the copyright expires.
10934 </para>
10935 <para>
10936 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10937 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10938 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10939 canisters
10940 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10941 than dust.
10942 </para>
10943 <para>
10944 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10945 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10946 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10947 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10948 creative
10949 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10950 free expression."
10951 </para>
10952 <para>
10953 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10954 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10955 indicated,
10956 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10957 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10958 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10959 distributors,
10960 the commercial life ends.
10961 </para>
10962 <para>
10963 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10964 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10965 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10966 between
10967 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10968 Friday
10969 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10970 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10971 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10972 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10973 have, we need to have access to this history.
10974 </para>
10975 <para>
10976 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10977
10978 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10979 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10980 this context do no good.
10981 </para>
10982 <para>
10983 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10984 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10985 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10986 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10987 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10988 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10989 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10990 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10991 </para>
10992 <para>
10993 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10994 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10995 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10996 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10997 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10998 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10999 market didn't have more to offer.
11000 </para>
11001 <para>
11002 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11003 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11004 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11005 would not have interfered with anything.
11006 </para>
11007 <para>
11008 But this situation has now changed.
11009 </para>
11010 <para>
11011 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11012 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11013 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11014 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11015 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
11016 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
11017 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
11018 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
11019 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
11020 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
11021 </para>
11022 <para>
11023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11024 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
11025 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
11026 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11027 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11028 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11029 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11030 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11031 written for a radically different context.
11032 </para>
11033 <para>
11034 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11035 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11036 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11037 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
11038 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
11039 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
11040 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
11041 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
11042 expression. Copyright is a brake.
11043 </para>
11044 <para>
11045 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11046 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11047 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11048 culture widely?"
11049 </para>
11050 <para>
11051 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11052 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
11053 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11054 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11055 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
11056 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
11057 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11058 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
11059 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11060 </para>
11061 <para>
11062 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11063 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11064 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11065 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11066
11067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11068 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11069 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11070 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11071 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
11072 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
11073 <!-- f13. -->
11074 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
11075 December 2002, available at
11076 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
11077 </para></footnote>
11078
11079 </para>
11080 <para>
11081 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11082 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11083 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11084 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
11085 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
11086 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11087 </para>
11088 <para>
11089 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11090 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11091 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11092 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11093 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11094 </para>
11095 <para>
11096 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11097 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
11098 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11099 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11100 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11101 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11102 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11103 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11104 power to extend existing terms.
11105 </para>
11106 <para>
11107 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11108 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11109 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11110 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11111 </para>
11112 <para>
11113 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11114 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11115
11116 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11117 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11118 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11119 overstepped its bounds.
11120 </para>
11121 <para>
11122 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11123 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11124 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11125 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11126 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11127 </para>
11128 <para>
11129 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11130 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11131 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
11132 briefs and preparing for argument.
11133 </para>
11134 <para>
11135 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11136 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11137 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11138 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11139 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11140 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11141 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11142 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11143 </para>
11144 <para>
11145 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11146 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11147 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11148 mistake lost it.
11149 </para>
11150 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11151 <para>
11152 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11153 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11154 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11155 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11156 heat
11157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11158 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11159 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11160 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11161 </para>
11162 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11163 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11164 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11165 <para>
11166 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11167 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11168 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11169 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11170 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11171 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11172 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11173 most powerful media companies in the world."
11174 </para>
11175 <para>
11176 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11177 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11178 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11179 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11180 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11181 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11182 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11183 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11184 interpretation
11185 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11186 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11187 unconstitutional,
11188 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11189 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11190 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11191 Constitution,
11192 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11193 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11194 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11195 </para>
11196 <para>
11197 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11198 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11199 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11200 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11201 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11202 why it was unconstitutional.
11203 </para>
11204 <para>
11205 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11206
11207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11208 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11209 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11210 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11211 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11212 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11213 minority.
11214 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11215 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11216 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11217 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11218 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11219 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11220 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11221 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11222 </para>
11223 <para>
11224 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11225 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11226 beginning.
11227 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11228 November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11229 Republican
11230 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11231 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11232 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11233 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11234 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11235 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11236 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11237 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11238 </para>
11239 <para>
11240 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11241 supporting
11242 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11243 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11244 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11245 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11246 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11247 </para>
11248 <para>
11249 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11250 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11251
11252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11253 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11254 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11255 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11256 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11257 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11258 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11259 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11260 </para>
11261 <para>
11262 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11263 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11264 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11265 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11266 </para>
11267 <para>
11268 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11269 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11270 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11271 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11272 clear.
11273 </para>
11274 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11275 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11276 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11277 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11278 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11279 <para>
11280 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11281 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11282 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11283 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11284 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11285 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11286 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11287 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11288 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11289 </para>
11290 <para>
11291 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11292 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11293 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11294 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11295 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11296 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11297 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11298 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11299
11300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11301 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11302 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11303 </para>
11304 <para>
11305 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11306 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11307 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11308 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11309 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11310 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11311 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11312 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11313 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11314 confidence in our argument.
11315 </para>
11316 <para>
11317 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11318 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11319 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11320 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11321 copyright holders.
11322 </para>
11323 <para>
11324 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11325 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11326 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11327 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11328 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11329 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11330 wanted to control.
11331 </para>
11332 <para>
11333 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11334 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11335 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11336 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11337 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11338 pornography."<footnote><para>
11339 <!-- f14. -->
11340 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11341 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11342 </para></footnote>
11343 That was also the motive of
11344 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11345 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11346 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11347 <!-- f15. -->
11348 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11349 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11350 </para></footnote>
11351 That's
11352
11353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11354 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11355 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11356 </para>
11357 <para>
11358 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11359 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11360 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11361 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11362 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11363 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11364 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11365 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11366 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11367 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11368 </para>
11369 <para>
11370 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11371 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11372 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11373 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11374 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11375 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11376 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11377 </para>
11378 <para>
11379 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11380 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11381 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11382 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11383 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11384 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11385 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11386 powers had limits.
11387 </para>
11388 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11389 <para>
11390 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11391 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11392 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11393 the Constitution
11394 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11395 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11396 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11397 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11398 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11399 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11400 </para>
11401 <para>
11402 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11403 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11404 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11405 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11406 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11407 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11408 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11409 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11410 sense.
11411 </para>
11412 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11413 <para>
11414 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11415 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11416 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11417 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11418 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11419 these retrospective extensions.
11420 </para>
11421 <para>
11422 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11423 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11424 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11425 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11426 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11427 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11428 </para>
11429 <para>
11430 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11431 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11432 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11433 overriding
11434 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11435 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11436 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11437 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11438 </para>
11439 <para>
11440 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11441 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11442
11443 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11444 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11445 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11446 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11447 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11448 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11449 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11450 copyright be limited.
11451 </para>
11452 <para>
11453 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11454 Congress
11455 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11456 government
11457 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11458 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11459 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11460 </para>
11461 <para>
11462 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11463 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11464 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11465 existing
11466 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11467 </para>
11468 <para>
11469 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11470 extended
11471 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11472 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11473 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11474 existing
11475 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11476 restraint
11477 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11478 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11479 hesitated
11480 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11481 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11482 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11483 arrived
11484 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11485 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11486
11487 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11488 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11489 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11490 </para>
11491 <para>
11492 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11493 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11494 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11495 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11496 Congress
11497 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11498 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11499 this central idea.
11500 </para>
11501 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11502 <para>
11503 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11504 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11505 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11506 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11507 </para>
11508 <para>
11509 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11510 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11511 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11512 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11513 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11514 </para>
11515 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11516 <para>
11517 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11518 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11519 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11520 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11521 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11522 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11523 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11524 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11525 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11526 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11527 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11528
11529 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11530 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11531 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11532 </para>
11533 <para>
11534 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11535 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11536 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11537 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11538 congressmen
11539 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11540 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11541 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11542 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11543 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11544 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11545 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11546 family of the Justices.
11547 </para>
11548 <para>
11549 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11550 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11551 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11552 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11553 </para>
11554 <para>
11555 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11556 The history was bothering her.
11557 </para>
11558 <blockquote>
11559 <para>
11560 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11561 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11562 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11563 practice that began with the very first act.
11564 </para>
11565 </blockquote>
11566 <para>
11567 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11568 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11569 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11570 </para>
11571 <blockquote>
11572 <para>
11573 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11574 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11575 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11576 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11577 is yes.
11578 </para>
11579 </blockquote>
11580 <para>
11581 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11582 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11583 Kennedy, who observed,
11584 </para>
11585 <blockquote>
11586 <para>
11587 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11588 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11589 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11590 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11591 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11592 </para>
11593 </blockquote>
11594 <para>
11595 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11596 student,
11597 I answered,
11598 </para>
11599 <blockquote>
11600 <para>
11601 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11602 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11603 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11604 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11605 effectively
11606 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11607 </para>
11608 </blockquote>
11609 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11610 <para>
11611 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11612 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11613 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11614 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11615 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11616 </para>
11617 <para>
11618 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11619 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11620 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11621 </para>
11622 <para>
11623 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11624 sympathetic.
11625 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11626
11627 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11628 </para>
11629 <blockquote>
11630 <para>
11631 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11632 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11633 </para>
11634 <para>
11635 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11636 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11637 domain
11638 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11639 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11640 into the Copyright Clause.
11641 </para>
11642 </blockquote>
11643 <para>
11644 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11645 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11646 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11647 </para>
11648 <blockquote>
11649 <para>
11650 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11651 unlimited
11652 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11653 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11654 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11655 an unlimited time.
11656 </para>
11657 </blockquote>
11658 <para>
11659 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11660 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11661 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11662 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11663 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11664 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11665 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause&mdash;
11666 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11667 specific
11668 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11669 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11670 </para>
11671 <para>
11672 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11673 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11674
11675 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11676 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11677 optimistic.
11678 </para>
11679 <para>
11680 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11681 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11682 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11683 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11684 believed
11685 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11686 Copyright
11687 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11688 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11689 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11690 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11691 Copyright
11692 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11693 believe
11694 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in
11695 particular, the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule
11696 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11697 </para>
11698 <para>
11699 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11700 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11701 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11702 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11703 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11704 </para>
11705 <para>
11706 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11707 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11708 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11709 </para>
11710 <para>
11711 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11712 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11713 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11714 </para>
11715 <para>
11716 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11717 distinguish
11718 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11719 argument
11720 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11721 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11722 in the Court's opinion.
11723 </para>
11724 <para>
11725
11726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11727 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11728 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11729 generally,
11730 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11731 </para>
11732 <para>
11733 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11734 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11735 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11736 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11737 </para>
11738 <para>
11739 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11740 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11741 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11742 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11743 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11744 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11745 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11746 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11747 would not.
11748 </para>
11749 <para>
11750 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11751 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11752 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11753 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11754 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11755 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11756 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11757 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11758 the system we have.
11759 </para>
11760 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11761 <para>
11762 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11763 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11764 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11765 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11766 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11767 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11768 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11769 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11770 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11771 </para>
11772 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11773 <para>
11774 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11775 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11776 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11777 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11778 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11779 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11780 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11781 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11782 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11783 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11784 </para>
11785 <para>
11786 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11787 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11788 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11789 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11790 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11791 </para>
11792 <para>
11793 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11794 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11795 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11796 </para>
11797 <para>
11798 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11799 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11800 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11801 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11802 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11803 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11804 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11805 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11806 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11807 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11808 "originalism" now?
11809 </para>
11810 <para>
11811 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11812 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11813 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11814 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11815
11816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11817 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11818 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11819 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11820 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11821 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11822 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11823 own principles.
11824 </para>
11825 <para>
11826 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11827 myself.
11828 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11829 the law as it is.
11830 </para>
11831 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11832 <para>
11833 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11834 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11835 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11836 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11837 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11838 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11839 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11840 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11841 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11842 </para>
11843 <para>
11844 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11845 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11846 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11847 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11848 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11849 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11850 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11851 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11852 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11853 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11854 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11855 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11856 effort to persuade; but I
11857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11858 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11859 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11860 should decide the issue.
11861 </para>
11862 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11863 <para>
11864 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11865 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11866 Kathleen Sullivan?
11867 </para>
11868 <para>
11869 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11870 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11871 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11872 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11873 </para>
11874 <para>
11875 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11876 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11877 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11878 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11879 have persuaded.
11880 </para>
11881 <para>
11882 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11883 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11884 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11885 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11886 issue should not be raised until it is.
11887 </para>
11888 <para>
11889 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11890 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11891 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11892 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11893 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11894 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11895 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11896 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11897 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11898 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11899 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11900
11901 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11902 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11903 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11904 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11905 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11906 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11907 </para>
11908 <blockquote>
11909 <para>
11910 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11911 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11912 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11913 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11914 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11915 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11916 </para>
11917 </blockquote>
11918 <para>
11919 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11920 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11921 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11922 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11923 in the face felt exactly like that.
11924 </para>
11925 <para>
11926 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11927 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11928 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11929 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11930 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11931 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11932 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11933 </para>
11934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11935 </sect1>
11936 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
11937 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11938 <para>
11939 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11940 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11941 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11942 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11943 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11944 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11945 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11946 </para>
11947 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11948 <para>
11949 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11950 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11951 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11952 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11953 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11954 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11955 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11956 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11957 </para>
11958 <para>
11959 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11960 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11962 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11963 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11964 the work passed into the public domain.
11965 </para>
11966 <para>
11967 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11968 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11969 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11970 </para>
11971 <para>
11972 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11973 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11974 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11975 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11976 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11977 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11978 everything else, let the content go.
11979 </para>
11980 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11981 <para>
11982 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11983 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11984 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11985 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11986 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11987 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11988 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11989 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11990 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11991 the stupid harm of the present system.
11992 </para>
11993 <para>
11994 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11995 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11996 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11997 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11998 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11999 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
12000 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
12001 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
12002 where copyright owners could be identified.
12003 </para>
12004 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12005 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12006 <para>
12007 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12008 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
12009 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
12010 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
12011 <!-- f1. -->
12012 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12013 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12014 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
12015 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
12016 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
12017 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
12018 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
12019 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12020 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12021 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12022 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12023 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12024 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12025 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12026 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12027 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
12028 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
12029 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
12030 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
12031 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12032 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12033 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12034 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12035 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12036 </para>
12037 <para>
12038 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12039 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12040 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12041 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12042 know what's protected and what's not.
12043 </para>
12044 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12045 <para>
12046 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12047 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12048 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12049 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12050 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12051 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12052 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
12053 in the loss of widows' only income.
12054 </para>
12055 <para>
12056 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12057 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12058 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12059 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12060 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12061 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12062 </para>
12063 <para>
12064 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12065 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12066 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12067 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12068 burden
12069 imposed upon creators.
12070 </para>
12071 <para>
12072 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
12073 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12074
12075 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12076 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12077 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12078 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
12079 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12080 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12081 table.
12082 </para>
12083 <para>
12084 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12085 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12086 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12087 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12088 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12089 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12090 spread.
12091 </para>
12092 <para>
12093 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12094 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12095 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12096 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12097 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12098 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
12099 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12100 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12101 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12102 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12103 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12104 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12105 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12106 system of protection for property generally.
12107 </para>
12108 <para>
12109 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12110 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12111 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12112 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12113 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12114 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12115 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12116 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12117
12118 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12119 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
12120 take their place.
12121 </para>
12122 <para>
12123 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12124 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12125 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12126 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12127 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12128 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12129 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12130 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12131 </para>
12132 <para>
12133 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12134 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12135 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12136 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12137 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12138 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12139 seen before because there are no formalities.
12140 </para>
12141 <para>
12142 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12143 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12144 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12145 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12146 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12147 </para>
12148 <para>
12149 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12150 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12151 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12152 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12153 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12154 </para>
12155 <para>
12156 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12157 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12158 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12159 registration?
12160 </para>
12161 <para>
12162 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12163 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12164 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12165
12166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12167 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12168 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12169 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12170 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12171 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12172 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12173 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12174 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
12175 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12176 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12177 </para>
12178 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12179 <para>
12180 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12181 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12182 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12183 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12184 </para>
12185 <para>
12186 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12187 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12188 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12189 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12190 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12191 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12192 something good might happen here.
12193 </para>
12194 <para>
12195 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12196 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12197 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12198 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12199 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12200 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12201 </para>
12202 <para>
12203 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12204 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12205 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12207 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12208 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12209 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12210 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12211 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12212 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12213 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12214 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12215 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12216 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12217 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12218 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12219 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12220 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12221 film is a valid derivative use.
12222 </para>
12223 <para>
12224 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12225 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12226 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12227 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12228 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12229 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12230 </para>
12231 <para>
12232 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12233 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12234 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12235 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12236 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12237 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12238 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12239 threat.
12240 </para>
12241 <para>
12242 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12243 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12244 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12245 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12246 sense?
12247 </para>
12248 <para>
12249
12250 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12251 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12252 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12253 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12254 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12255 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12256 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12257 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12258 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12259 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12260 </para>
12261 <para>
12262 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12263 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12264 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12265 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12266 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12267 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12268 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12269 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12270 </para>
12271 <para>
12272 What does this industry really want?
12273 </para>
12274 <para>
12275 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12276 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12277 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12278 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12279 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12280 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12281 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12282 permission first.
12283 </para>
12284 <para>
12285 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12286 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12287 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12288 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12289 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12290 </para>
12291 <para>
12292 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12293 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12294
12295 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12296 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12297 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12298 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12299 and to share its own creation.
12300 </para>
12301 <para>
12302 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12303 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12304 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12305 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12306 block the progress of others.
12307 </para>
12308 <para>
12309 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12310 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12311 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12312 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12313 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12314 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12315 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12316 </para>
12317 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12318 </sect1>
12319 </chapter>
12320 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12321 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12322 <para>
12323 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12324 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12325 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12326 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12327 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12328 </para>
12329 <para>
12330 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12331 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12332 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12333 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12334 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12335 the disease almost invisible.
12336 </para>
12337 <para>
12338 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12339 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12340 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12341 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12342 population:
12343 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12344 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12345 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12346 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12347 available at
12348 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12349 release
12350 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12351 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12352 </para></footnote>
12353 </para>
12354 <para>
12355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12356 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12357 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12358 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12359 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12360 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12361 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12362 </para>
12363 <para>
12364 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12365 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12366 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12367 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12368 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12369 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12370 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12371 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12372 changes.
12373 </para>
12374 <para>
12375 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12376 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12377 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12378 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12379 costs significantly below the market price.
12380 </para>
12381 <para>
12382 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12383 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12384 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12385 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12386 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12387 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12388 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12389 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12390 <para>
12391 <!-- f2. -->
12392 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12393 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12394 </para></footnote>
12395 </para>
12396 <para>
12397 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12398 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12399 Association
12400 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12401 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12402 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12403 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12404 Prepared
12405 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12406 2000), 14, available at
12407 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12408 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12409 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12410 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12411 (statement of James Love).
12412 </para></footnote>
12413 Through the
12414 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12415 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12416 request,
12417 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12418 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12419 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12420 began
12421 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12422 government's
12423 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12424 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12425 companies,
12426 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12427 international
12428 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12429 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12430 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12431 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12432 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12433 <!-- f4. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12434 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12435 Prepared
12436 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12437 2000), 15.
12438 </para></footnote>
12439 </para>
12440 <para>
12441 We should place the intervention by the United States in context.
12442 No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans
12443 don't have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12444 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12445 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their
12446 demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12447 marginal,
12448 there was an effect from our government's intervention to stop
12449 the flow of medications into Africa.
12450 </para>
12451 <para>
12452 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12453 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12454 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12455 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12456 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12457 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12458 </para>
12459 <para>
12460 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12461 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12462 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12463 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12464 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12465 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12466 by U.S. companies.
12467 </para>
12468 <para>
12469 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12470 information,
12471 which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument
12472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12473 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12474 <!-- f5. --> See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12475 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12476 May 1999, A1, available at
12477 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink> ("compulsory licenses and gray
12478 markets
12479 pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property protection");
12480 Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
12481 Access
12482 to Essential Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999),
12483 available at
12484 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink> (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS,
12485 Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
12486 Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a
12487 Synopsis,"
12488 Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12490 </para></footnote>
12491 It was because "intellectual property"
12492 would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was
12493 a principle about the importance of "intellectual property" that led
12494 these government actors to intervene against the South African
12495 response
12496 to AIDS.
12497 </para>
12498 <para>
12499 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12500 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12501 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12502 direct
12503 cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans, and
12504 whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an idea?
12505 What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results
12506 in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so
12507 many to die for such an abstraction?
12508 </para>
12509 <para>
12510 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12511 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12512 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12513 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12514 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12515 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12516 </para>
12517 <para>
12518 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12519 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to sell their
12520 drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere.
12521 There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn't get
12522 back into the United States, but those are mere problems of
12523 technology.
12524 They could be overcome.
12525 </para>
12526 <para>
12527 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12528 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12529 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12530 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12531 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12532 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12533 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12534 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12535 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12536 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12537 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12538 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12539 idea called "intellectual property."
12540 </para>
12541 <para>
12542 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12543 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12544 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12545 What is the argument?
12546 </para>
12547 <para>
12548 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the
12549 patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly
12550 the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and
12551 strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the
12552 spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could
12553 endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block
12554 the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market
12555 prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12556 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were
12557 balanced in just this sense.
12558 </para>
12559 <para>
12560 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12561 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12562 extremism.
12563 A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our
12564 tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with consequences
12565 more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other
12566 single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12567 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much
12568 happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically
12569 do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice
12570 how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12571 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that
12572 we don't even question when the control of that property removes our
12573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12574 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12575 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12576 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12577 this common sense open its eyes.
12578 </para>
12579 <para>
12580 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12581 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12582 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12583 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12584 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12585 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12586 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12587 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12588 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12589 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12590 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12591 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12592 </para>
12593 <para>
12594 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12595 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12596 meeting.<footnote><para>
12597 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12598 August 2003, E1, available at
12599 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12600 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12601 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12602 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12603 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12604 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12605 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12606 </para></footnote>
12607 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had
12608 decided
12609 to hold a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to
12610 create public goods." These are projects that have been successful in
12611 producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary
12612 use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the
12613 World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of
12614 protocols
12615 in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support
12616 open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science
12617 project
12618 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12619 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12620 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12621 comprised
12622 a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12623 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12625 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12626 Glaxo-SmithKline,
12627 IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included
12628 the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the
12629 early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12630 </para>
12631 <para>
12632 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12633 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12634 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12635 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12636 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12637 </para>
12638 <para>
12639 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12640 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12641 meeting.
12642 </para></footnote>
12643 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12644 noncommercial
12645 work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12646 perspectives.
12647 And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12648 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12649 property issues.
12650 </para>
12651 <para>
12652 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12653 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12654 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information
12655 Society
12656 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked
12657 what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12658 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12659 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12660 interrupted
12661 to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12662 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12663 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12664 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12665 relatively
12666 minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual
12667 property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an
12668 "Information Society" unless one also talked about the range of
12669 information
12670 and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my
12671 immoderate
12672 moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the
12673 scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of
12674 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12675 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12676 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12677 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12678 </para>
12679 <para>
12680 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual
12681 property,
12682 I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and
12683 should. And thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to
12684 create public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO
12685 agenda.
12686 </para>
12687 <para>
12688 But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial,
12689 at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source and free
12690 software."
12691 Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From
12692 its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software
12693 would be like a conference to discuss Apple's operating system. Both
12694 open source and free software compete with Microsoft's software. And
12695 internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements
12696 that they use open source or free software, rather than "proprietary
12697 software," for their own internal uses.
12698 </para>
12699 <para>
12700 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12701 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12702 noncommercial
12703 software. There are many important companies that depend
12704 fundamentally
12705 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12706 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12707 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM is
12708 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12709 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12710 support a mode of software development that is different from
12711 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12712 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12713 sophisticated.
12714 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12715 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12716 opposition
12717 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12718 license
12719 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12720 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12721 Marketplace
12722 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12723 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12724 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2002), 69,
12725 available at
12726 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12727 president,
12728 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12729 Stern School of Business (3 May 2001), available at
12730 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12731 </para></footnote>
12732 </para>
12733 <para>
12734 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12735 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12736 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12737 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12738 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12739 by
12740 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12741 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12742 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12743 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12744 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12745 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12746 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12747 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12748 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12749 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12750 </para>
12751 <para>
12752 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12753 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12754 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12755 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12756 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12757 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12758 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12759 <!-- f9. -->
12760 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12761 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12762 </para></footnote>
12763 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12764 </para>
12765 <para>
12766 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12767 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12768 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12769 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12770 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12771 its lobbying efforts.
12772 </para>
12773 <para>
12774 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12775 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12776 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12777 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12778 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12779 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12780 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12781 goals of WIPO."
12782 </para>
12783 <para>
12784 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12785 </para>
12786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12787 <para>
12788 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12789 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12790 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12791 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12792 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12793 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12794 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12795 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12796 </para>
12797 <para>
12798 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12799 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12800 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12801 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12802 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12803 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12804 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12805 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12806 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12807 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12808 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12809 </para>
12810 <para>
12811 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12812 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12813 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12814 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12815 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12816 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12817 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12818 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12819 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12820 right to decide what to do with their property.
12821 </para>
12822 <para>
12823 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12824 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12825 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12827 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12828 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12829 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12830 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12831 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12832 way possible.
12833 </para>
12834 <para>
12835 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12836 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12837 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12838 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12839 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12840 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12841 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12842 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12843 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12844 that control.
12845 </para>
12846 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12847 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12848 <para>
12849 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12850 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12851 <!-- f10. -->
12852 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
12853 </para></footnote>
12854 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12855 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12856 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12857 </para>
12858 <para>
12859 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12860 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12861 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12862 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12863 </para>
12864 <blockquote>
12865 <para>
12866 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12867 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12868 should be to promote the right balance of intellectualproperty rights,
12869 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12870 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12871 say anything wrong. But in the world
12872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12873 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12874 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12875 </para>
12876 </blockquote>
12877 <para>
12878 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12879 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12880 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12881 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12882 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12883 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12884 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12885 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12886 </para>
12887 <para>
12888 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12889 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12890 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12891 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12892 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12893 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12894 </para>
12895 <para>
12896 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12897 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12898 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12899 our own country's history).
12900 </para>
12901 <para>
12902 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12903 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12904 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12905 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12906 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12907 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12908 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12909 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12910 democracy in the world, become?
12911 </para>
12912 <para>
12913 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12914 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12915 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12916 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12917 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12918 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12919 </para>
12920 <para>
12921 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12922 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12923 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12924 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12925 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12926 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12927 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12928 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12929 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12930 hearings and a different result.
12931 </para>
12932 <para>
12933 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12934 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12935 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12936 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12937 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12938 concentration in the media.
12939 </para>
12940 <para>
12941 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12942 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12943 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12944 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12945 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12946 </para>
12947 <para>
12948 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12949 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12950 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12951 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12952 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12953 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12954 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12955 </para>
12956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12957 <para>
12958 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12959 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12960 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12961 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12962 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12963 </para>
12964 <para>
12965 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12966 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12967 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12968 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12969 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12970 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12971 </para>
12972 <para>
12973 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12974 of our tragedy.
12975 </para>
12976 <para>
12977 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12978 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12979 <!-- f11. -->
12980 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12981 2003, available at
12982 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12983 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12984 2003, available at
12985 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12986 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12987 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News, 9
12988 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12989 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12990 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12991 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
12992 available at
12993 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12994 </para></footnote>
12995 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12996 music.<footnote><para>
12997 <!-- f12. -->
12998 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12999 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
13000 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
13001 </para></footnote>
13002 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
13003 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
13004 <!-- f13. -->
13005 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13006 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
13007 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
13008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13009 </para></footnote>
13010 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
13011 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
13012 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
13013 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
13014 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
13015 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
13016 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
13017 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
13018 kids who use a computer to share content.
13019 </para>
13020 <para>
13021 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13022 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
13023 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
13024 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
13025 24 August 2003, available at
13026 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
13027 </para></footnote>
13028 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
13029 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13030 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13031 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13032 country.<footnote><para>
13033 <!-- f15. --> "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August
13034 2003, available at
13035 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
13036 </para></footnote>
13037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13038 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13039 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13040 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13041 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13042 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13043 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13044 day into the Causbys.
13045 </para>
13046 <para>
13047 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13048 potential is ever to be realized.
13049
13050 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13051
13052 </para>
13053 </chapter>
13054 <chapter id="c-afterword">
13055 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
13056 <para>
13057
13058 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13059 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
13060 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
13061 maps what might be done.
13062 </para>
13063 <para>
13064 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13065 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13066 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13067 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13068 </para>
13069 <para>
13070 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13071 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13072 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
13073 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13074 is so important.
13075 </para>
13076 <para>
13077 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13078 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13079 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13080 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13081 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13082 </para>
13083 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13084
13085 <sect1 id="usnow">
13086 <title>US, NOW</title>
13087 <para>
13088 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
13089 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
13090 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13091 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13092 </para>
13093 <para>
13094 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13095 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13096 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
13097 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
13098 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
13099 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
13100 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13101 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13102 </para>
13103 <para>
13104 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13105 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13106 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13107 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13108 the
13109
13110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13111 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13112 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13113 unprotected.
13114 </para>
13115 <para>
13116 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13117 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13118 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13119 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13120 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13121 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
13122 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
13123 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13124 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13125 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
13126 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
13127 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13128 </para>
13129 <para>
13130 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither "all
13131 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"&mdash;
13132 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content
13133 as they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of
13134 freedoms
13135 that we could just take for granted before.
13136 </para>
13137
13138 <sect2 id="examples">
13139 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
13140 <para>
13141 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13142 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13143 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13144 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13145 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13146 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13147 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
13148 assured.
13149 </para>
13150 <para>
13151 What made it assured?
13152 </para>
13153 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13154 <para>
13155 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13156 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
13157 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13158 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13159 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13160 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13161 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13162 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13163 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13164 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13165 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13166 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13167 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13168 </para>
13169 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13170 <para>
13171 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13172 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13173 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13174 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13175 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13176 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13177 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13178 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13179 </para>
13180 <para>
13181 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13182 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13183 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13184 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13185 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13186 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13187 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13188 disappears.
13189 </para>
13190 <para>
13191 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13192 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13193 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13194 friction did.<footnote><para>
13195 <!-- f1. -->
13196
13197 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13198 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
13199 Law Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13200
13201 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13202 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13203 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13204 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13205 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13206 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13207 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13208
13209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13210 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13211 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13212 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13213 </para>
13214 <para>
13215 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13216 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13217 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13218 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13219 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13220 care much about controlling their software.
13221 </para>
13222 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13223 <para>
13224 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13225 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13226 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13227 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13228 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13229 people's work.
13230 </para>
13231 <para>
13232 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13233 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13234 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13235 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13236 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13237 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13238 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13239 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13240 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13241 anything else?
13242 </para>
13243 <para>
13244 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13245 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13246 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13247 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13248 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13249 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13250 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13251 </para>
13252 <para>
13253 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13254 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13255 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13256 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13257 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13258 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13259 fundamentally weakened.
13260 </para>
13261 <para>
13262 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13263 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13264 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13265 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13266 </para>
13267 <para>
13268 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13269 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13270 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13271 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13272 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13273 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13274 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13275 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13276 byproduct.
13277 </para>
13278 <para>
13279 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13280 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13281 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13282 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13283 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13284 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13285 </para>
13286 <para>
13287 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13288 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13289 scientific journals are produced.
13290 </para>
13291 <para>
13292 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many
13293 that printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending
13294 them to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13295 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13296 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
13297 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
13298 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
13299 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
13300 service.
13301 Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and
13302 anyone
13303 is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free
13304 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13305 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13306 Court opinion through their respective services.
13307 </para>
13308 <para>
13309 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability
13310 to charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13311 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13312 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been
13313 allowed
13314 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13315 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13316 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13317 </para>
13318 <para>
13319 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13320 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13321 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13322 </para>
13323 <para>
13324 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13325 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
13326 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to
13327 the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts
13328 because
13329 the library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand
13330 the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks by reading all
13331 available articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a
13332 function of the institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of
13333 paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it was very hard to control
13334 access to a paper journal.
13335 </para>
13336 <para>
13337 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are
13338 demanding
13339 that libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This
13340 means that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries
13341 begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing
13342 technology and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
13343 </para>
13344 <para>
13345 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13346 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13347 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13348 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13349 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13350 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13351 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is then
13352 deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13353 available
13354 for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but the
13355 copyright
13356 for the print journal does not inhibit the right of anyone to
13357 redistribute the work for free.
13358 </para>
13359 <para>
13360 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13361 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and
13362 markets.
13363 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the
13364 traditional
13365 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13366 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13367 presumptively
13368 a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge and science.
13369 </para>
13370
13371 </sect2>
13372 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13373 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13374 <para>
13375 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13376 increasing
13377 control effected through law and technology.
13378 </para>
13379 <para>
13380 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a
13381 nonprofit
13382 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13383 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable copyright
13384 on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for
13385 people to build upon other people's work, by making it simple for
13386 creators
13387 to express the freedom for others to take and build upon their
13388 work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to
13389 bulletproof
13390 licenses, make this possible.
13391 </para>
13392 <para>
13393 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer.
13394 By developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13395 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that
13396 can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13397 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13398 automatically
13399 to identify content that can easily be shared. These three
13400 expressions
13401 together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable description, and
13402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13403 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13404 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone
13405 who accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the
13406 ideal that the person associated with the license believes in something
13407 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13408 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13409 certain
13410 freedoms are given.
13411 </para>
13412 <para>
13413 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13414 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13415 creator
13416 can choose a license that permits any use, so long as attribution is
13417 given. She can choose a license that permits only noncommercial use.
13418 She can choose a license that permits any use so long as the same
13419 freedoms
13420 are given to other uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so
13421 long as no derivative use is made. Or any use at all within developing
13422 nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full copies are not made. Or
13423 lastly, any educational use.
13424 </para>
13425 <para>
13426 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default
13427 of copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13428 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13429 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13430 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13431 governed
13432 by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13433 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13434 content
13435 available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a
13436 public
13437 domain.
13438 </para>
13439 <para>
13440 This is just one project among many within the Creative
13441 Commons.
13442 And of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization
13443 pursuing such freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative
13444 Commons from many is that we are not interested only in talking
13445 about a public domain or in getting legislators to help build a public
13446 domain. Our aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13447 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13448 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13449 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13450 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13451 </para>
13452 <para>
13453 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is
13454 to complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a
13455 culture
13456 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws
13457 written centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could
13458 have imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a
13459 background
13460 of technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense
13461 against the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with
13462 different
13463 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can
13464 use them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way
13465 effectively
13466 to begin to build those rules.
13467 </para>
13468 <para>
13469 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13470 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example,
13471 is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in the Magic
13472 Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13473 Commons
13474 license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13475 </para>
13476 <para>
13477 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13478 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1) those
13479 who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (2)
13480 those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for
13481 free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download Cory's book
13482 instead
13483 of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2) will download
13484 Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (2)-goods.
13485 If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the strategy of releasing
13486 Cory's book free on-line will probably increase sales of Cory's book.
13487 </para>
13488 <para>
13489 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13490 conclusion.
13491 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13492 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was
13493 a total success.
13494 </para>
13495 <para>
13496 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree
13497 content
13498 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13499 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13500 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13501 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13502 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13503 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13504 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13505 well.
13506 </para>
13507 <para>
13508 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13509 proprietary
13510 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13511 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13512 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13513 anything
13514 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others
13515 are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content
13516 from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13517 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13518 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the legal costs of sampling
13519 are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy,
13520 which was born sampling the music of others, has stated that he does
13521 not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs
13522 are so high<footnote><para>
13523 <!-- f2. --> Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real Culture Wars
13524 (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg Hittelman, a Fiat
13525 Lucre
13526 production, available at
13527 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13528 </para></footnote>),
13529 these artists release into the creative environment content
13530 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13531 </para>
13532 <para>
13533 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative
13534 Commons license just because they want to express to others the
13535 importance
13536 of balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system
13537 as it is, you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13538 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13539 appropriate
13540 that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate
13541 description of how most creators view the rights associated with their
13542 content. The Creative Commons license expresses this notion of "Some
13543 Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to say it to others.
13544 </para>
13545 <para>
13546 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13547 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13548 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13549 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13550
13551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13552 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13553 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13554 </para>
13555 <para>
13556 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13557 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13558 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13559 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13560 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13561 steps are possible.
13562 </para>
13563 <para>
13564 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13565 individuals
13566 and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the
13567 creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13568 complements
13569 it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it
13570 easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and
13571 cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread
13572 more easily.
13573 </para>
13574
13575 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13576 </sect2>
13577 </sect1>
13578 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13579 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13580 <para>
13581 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13582 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13583 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13584 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13585 changes that we need.
13586 </para>
13587 <para>
13588 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13589 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13590 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13591 to our end.
13592 </para>
13593
13594 <sect2 id="formalities">
13595 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13596 <para>
13597 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13598 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13599 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13600 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13601 </para>
13602 <para>
13603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13604 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13605 requirements
13606 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
13607 </para>
13608 <para>
13609 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13610 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13611 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13612 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13613 </para>
13614 <para>
13615 Why?
13616 </para>
13617 <para>
13618 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13619 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13620 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13621 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13622 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13623 formalities
13624 were getting in the way.
13625 </para>
13626 <para>
13627 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13628 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13629 burdens
13630 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what,
13631 or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13632 creative
13633 work of others. There are no records, there is no system to trace&mdash;
13634 there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the
13635 massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is
13636 a necessary step for any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
13637 lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could
13638 speak.
13639 </para>
13640 <para>
13641 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13642 <!-- f1. --> The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13643 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
13644 by other countries as well.
13645 </para></footnote>&mdash;but it should
13646 not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We should
13647 require
13648 formalities, but we should establish a system that will create the
13649 incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13650 </para>
13651 <para>
13652 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13653 registering
13654 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally,
13655 the first of these three was something the copyright owner did; the
13656 second
13657 two were something the government did. But a revised system of
13658 formalities would banish the government from the process, except for
13659 the sole purpose of approving standards developed by others.
13660 </para>
13661
13662 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13663
13664 <sect3 id="registration">
13665 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13666 <para>
13667 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with
13668 the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
13669 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
13670 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the
13671 burden of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.
13672 And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of government
13673 policymaking,
13674 the office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus,
13675 when people who know something about the process hear this idea
13676 about formalities, their first reaction is panic&mdash;nothing could be worse
13677 than forcing people to deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13678 </para>
13679 <para>
13680 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a
13681 tradition
13682 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13683 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13684 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't
13685 follow that the government must actually administer the role. Instead,
13686 we should be creating incentives for private parties to serve the public,
13687 subject to standards that the government sets.
13688 </para>
13689 <para>
13690 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13691 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13692 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13693 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13694 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13695 performed
13696 by many competing registrars. That competition drives the cost
13697 of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease with which
13698 registration occurs up.
13699 </para>
13700 <para>
13701 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13702 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry,
13703 but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should
13704 establish
13705 a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
13706 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete
13707 with one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for
13708 registering
13709 and renewing copyrights. That competition would
13710 substantially
13711 lower the burden of this formality&mdash;while producing a database
13712 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13713 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13714 </para>
13715
13716 </sect3>
13717 <sect3 id="marking">
13718 <title>MARKING</title>
13719 <para>
13720 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
13721 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13722 punishment
13723 for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to imposing
13724 the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.
13725 Here again, there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be
13726 enforced in this way. And more importantly, there is no reason a
13727 marking
13728 requirement needs to be enforced uniformly across all media.
13729 </para>
13730 <para>
13731 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13732 copyrighted
13733 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also
13734 makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use
13735 the work.
13736 </para>
13737 <para>
13738 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13739 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13740 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13741 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13742 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13743 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13744 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13745 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13746 </para>
13747 <para>
13748 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13749 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13750 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13751 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13752 copyright
13753 owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13754 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13755 <!-- f2. --> There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13756 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13757 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13758 </para></footnote>
13759 The meaning of an unmarked work would
13760 therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
13761 complain,
13762 then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
13763 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13764 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13765 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13766 their work.
13767 </para>
13768 <para>
13769 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13770 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13771 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13772 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13773 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13774 </para>
13775 <para>
13776 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13777 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13778 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13779 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13780 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13781 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13782 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13783 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13784 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13785 </para>
13786 <para>
13787 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13788 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13789 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13790 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13791 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13792 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13793 </para>
13794 <para>
13795 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13796 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13797 make things unclear.
13798 </para>
13799 <para>
13800 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13801 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13802 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13803 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13804 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13805 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13806 </para>
13807
13808 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13809 </sect3>
13810 </sect2>
13811 <sect2 id="shortterms">
13812 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13813 <para>
13814 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13815 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13816 natural authors.
13817 </para>
13818 <para>
13819 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13820 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five years.
13821 That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost Eldred v.
13822 Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The Economist
13823 endorsed
13824 a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright term.<footnote><para>
13825 <!-- f3. --> "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15, available
13826 at
13827 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13828 </para></footnote>
13829 Others have
13830 proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13831 </para>
13832 <para>
13833 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13834 copyright's
13835 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four
13836 principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
13837 </para>
13838 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13839 <listitem><para>
13840 <!-- (1) -->
13841 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to
13842 give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very
13843 strong protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim
13844 rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13845 derivative
13846 works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13847 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an
13848 author.
13849 </para></listitem>
13850 <listitem><para>
13851 <!-- (2) -->
13852 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and
13853 protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13854 fuzziness
13855 of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13856 "expression."
13857 That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13858 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus
13859 unprotected.
13860 The value of short terms is that there is little need to
13861 build exceptions into copyright when the term itself is kept
13862 short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13863 complexities
13864 of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13865 navigate.
13866 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13867 </para></listitem>
13868 <listitem><para>
13869 <!-- (3) -->
13870 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed.
13871 Especially
13872 if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13873 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the
13874 protection continued. This need not be an onerous burden,
13875 but there is no reason this monopoly protection has to be
13876 granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13877 veteran
13878 to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
13879 <!-- f4. --> Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13880 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13881 available at
13882 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13883 </para></footnote>
13884 If we make veterans suffer that
13885 burden, I don't see why we couldn't require authors to spend
13886 ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
13887 </para></listitem>
13888 <listitem><para>
13889 <!-- (4) -->
13890 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should
13891 be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term
13892 once given should not be extended. It might have been a
13893 mistake
13894 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year
13895 term. I don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then
13896 the consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
13897 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct that
13898 mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do
13899 today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13900 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who
13901 write now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden
13902 that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
13903 increasing
13904 their reward will not increase their creativity in 1923.
13905 What's not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do
13906 about that now.
13907 </para></listitem>
13908 </orderedlist>
13909 <para>
13910 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13911 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
13912 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13913 </para>
13914 <para>
13915 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13916 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13917 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13918 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13919 </para>
13920
13921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13922
13923 </sect2>
13924 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
13925 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13926 <para>
13927 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13928 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13929 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13930 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13931 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13932 the emergence of that new technology.
13933 </para>
13934 <para>
13935 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
13936 "exclusive
13937 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13938 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that
13939 are sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
13940 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the
13941 right to release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
13942 </para>
13943 <para>
13944 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13945 expanded
13946 the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control
13947 translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13948 <!-- f5. --> Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13949 University Press, 1967), 32.
13950 </para></footnote>
13951 The courts have expanded
13952 it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This expansion has
13953 been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
13954 Benjamin
13955 Kaplan.
13956 </para>
13957 <blockquote>
13958 <para>
13959 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13960 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13961 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13962 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13963 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13964 </para></footnote>
13965 </para>
13966 </blockquote>
13967 <para>
13968 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13969 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13970 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13971 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13972 Consider each limitation in turn.
13973 </para>
13974 <para>
13975 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13976 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13977
13978 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13979 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13980 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13981 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13982 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13983 after the creative work is done.
13984 </para>
13985 <para>
13986 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13987 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13988 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13989 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13990 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13991 perhaps
13992 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer
13993 makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the
13994 creative
13995 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine
13996 pouring
13997 molasses into the machines. That's what this general requirement
13998 of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13999 </para>
14000 <para>
14001 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of
14002 the Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation
14003 for foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
14004 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
14005 negotiation
14006 for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make much
14007 more sense.
14008 </para>
14009 <para>
14010 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14011 protected,
14012 and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14013 protected.
14014 This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague Paul
14015 Goldstein.<footnote><para>
14016 <!-- f7. --> Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14017 Jukebox
14018 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
14019 </para></footnote>
14020 His view is that the law should be written so that expanded
14021 protections follow expanded uses.
14022 </para>
14023 <para>
14024 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the
14025 legal
14026 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14027 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14028 incentives
14029 to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with a
14030 strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14031 </para>
14032 <para>
14033 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14035 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14036 certain
14037 statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free a great
14038 deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory rights
14039 regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14040 </para>
14041 </sect2>
14042
14043 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
14044 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
14045 <para>
14046 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it wouldn't
14047 be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that is, to most
14048 people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other policy issue that
14049 better
14050 teaches the lessons of this book than the battles around the sharing
14051 of music.
14052 </para>
14053 <para>
14054 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14055 Internet's
14056 growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14057 powerfully
14058 than any other single application. It was the Internet's killer
14059 app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was the
14060 application
14061 that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the application
14062 that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill innovation on
14063 the network.
14064 </para>
14065 <para>
14066 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music
14067 in particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14068 performed,
14069 and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14070 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14071 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14072 </para>
14073 <para>
14074 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
14075 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
14076 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
14077 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
14078 </para>
14079 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
14080 <listitem><para>
14081 <!-- A. -->
14082 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14083 for purchasing CDs.
14084 </para></listitem>
14085 <listitem><para>
14086 <!-- B. -->
14087 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14088 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14089 </para></listitem>
14090 <listitem><para>
14091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14092 <!-- C. -->
14093 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get
14094 access
14095 to content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright
14096 or that would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14097 </para></listitem>
14098 <listitem><para>
14099 <!-- D. -->
14100 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get
14101 access
14102 to content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the
14103 copyright owner plainly endorses.
14104 </para></listitem>
14105 </orderedlist>
14106 <para>
14107 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14108 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14109 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14110 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14111 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14112 significantly weakened.
14113 </para>
14114 <para>
14115 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14116 controversial.
14117 For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is
14118 real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is significantly
14119 greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing networks.
14120 </para>
14121 <para>
14122 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14123 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14124 should respond.
14125 </para>
14126 <para>
14127 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is addictive
14128 today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a broad range of
14129 content.
14130 It won't be the easiest way to get access to a broad range of content
14131 in ten years. Today, access to the Internet is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we
14132 in the United States are lucky to have broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and
14133 very rarely do we get service at that speed both up and down. Although
14134 wireless access is growing, most of us still get access across wires. Most
14135 only gain access through a machine with a keyboard. The idea of the
14136 always
14137 on, always connected Internet is mainly just an idea.
14138 </para>
14139 <para>
14140 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14141 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14142 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14143 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14144 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14145 question
14146 should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this world?
14147 The question should be, what law will we require when the network
14148 becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is one in
14149 which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net; where
14150 everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the Rockies&mdash;you can
14151 instantaneously be connected to the Internet. Imagine the Internet as
14152 ubiquitous as the best cell-phone service, where with the flip of a
14153 device,
14154 you are connected.
14155 </para>
14156 <para>
14157 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14158 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio, content
14159 that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here, then, is the
14160 critical point: When it is extremely easy to connect to services that give
14161 access to content, it will be easier to connect to services that give you
14162 access to content than it will be to download and store content on the
14163 many devices you will have for playing content. It will be easier, in other
14164 words, to subscribe than it will be to be a database manager, as
14165 everyone
14166 in the download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies
14167 essentially
14168 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if
14169 the services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14170 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over cell
14171 phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14172 paying
14173 for this content even though "free" content is available in the form
14174 of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
14175 <!-- f8. --> See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
14176 3 April 2002, available at
14177 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
14178 </para></footnote>
14179
14180 </para>
14181 <para>
14182 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14183 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14184 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
14185 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14186 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14187 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14188 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14189 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14190 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14191 artists get paid, during
14192
14193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14194 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14195 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14196 </para>
14197 <para>
14198 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14199 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14200 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14201 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14202 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14203 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14204 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14205 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14206 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14207 </para>
14208 <para>
14209 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14210 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14211 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14212 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14213 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14214 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14215 way that returns something to the artist.
14216 </para>
14217 <para>
14218 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14219 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14220 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14221 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14222 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14223 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14224 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14225 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14226 </para>
14227 <para>
14228 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply
14229 deem out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make
14230 copies of the music available for sale, then commercial and
14231 noncommercial
14232 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14233 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would
14234 be incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing
14235 has ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14236 </para>
14237 <para>
14238
14239 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14240 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14241 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14242 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14243 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14244 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14245 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14246 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14247 trade.
14248 </para>
14249 <para>
14250 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14251 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14252 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14253 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14254 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14255 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14256 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14257 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14258 </para>
14259 <para>
14260 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14261 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14262 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14263 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14264 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14265 delivering and accessing content.
14266 </para>
14267 <para>
14268 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14269 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14270 </para>
14271 <para>
14272 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14273 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14274 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14275 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14276 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14277 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14278 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14279 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14280 </para>
14281 <para>
14282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14283 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14284 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14285 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14286 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14287 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14288 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14289 </para>
14290 <para>
14291 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14292 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14293 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14294 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14295 <para>
14296 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14297 10 October 2000), available at
14298 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14299 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14300 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
14301 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14302 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14303 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14304 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14305 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14306 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14307 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14308 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14309 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14310 available at
14311 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14312 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14313 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14314 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14315 2002, available at
14316 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14317 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14318 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14319 McCullagh,
14320 "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14321 2002, available at
14322 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14323 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14324 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14325 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14326 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14327 debate
14328 by about a decade. See
14329 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14330 </para></footnote>
14331 Fisher suggests a
14332 very clever way around the current impasse of the Internet. Under his
14333 plan, all content capable of digital transmission would (1) be marked
14334 with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to evade
14335 these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once the
14336 content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to
14337 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the
14338 basis
14339 of those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The
14340 compensation
14341 would be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
14342 </para>
14343 <para>
14344 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14345 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14346 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14347 simple:
14348 Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14349 system.
14350 I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of the
14351 proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
14352 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14353 facilitating
14354 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal
14355 after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free
14356 exchange
14357 of content, supported through a taxation system, then it can be
14358 continued. If this form of protection is no longer necessary, then the
14359 system could lapse into the old system of controlling access.
14360 </para>
14361 <para>
14362 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His
14363 aim is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the
14364 system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But
14365 the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes
14366 I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the limits on derivative
14367
14368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14369 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14370 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14371 allowed
14372 to do with the content itself.
14373 </para>
14374 <para>
14375 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14376 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14377 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14378 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14379 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14380 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14381 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14382 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14383 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14384 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14385 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14386 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14387 on-line.
14388 </para>
14389 <para>
14390 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14391 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14392 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14393 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14394 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14395 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14396 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14397 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14398 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14399 finding ways to compete with "free."
14400 </para>
14401 <para>
14402 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14403 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14404 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14405 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14406 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14407 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14408 the law.
14409 </para>
14410 <para>
14411 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14412 </para>
14413 <para>
14414
14415 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14416 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14417 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14418 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14419 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14420 create.
14421 </para>
14422 <para>
14423 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14424 by
14425 </para>
14426 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14427 <listitem><para>
14428 <!-- 1. -->
14429 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14430 </para></listitem>
14431 <listitem><para>
14432 <!-- 2. -->
14433 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14434 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14435 statute;
14436 </para></listitem>
14437 <listitem><para>
14438 <!-- 3. -->
14439 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14440 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14441 </para></listitem>
14442 </orderedlist>
14443 <para>
14444 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a
14445 competitive
14446 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14447 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14448 something then?
14449 </para>
14450 <para>
14451 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14452 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But
14453 the real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract.
14454 The real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14455 technology
14456 that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x, or
14457 (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14458 market
14459 of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14460 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14461 authorized
14462 sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14463 compensation
14464 without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then it
14465 may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty pirates.
14466 </para>
14467 <para>
14468 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14469 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not be
14470 on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14471
14472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14473 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting the
14474 space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14475 </para>
14476 </sect2>
14477
14478 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14479 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14480 <para>
14481 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14482 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14483 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14484 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14485 </para>
14486 <para>
14487 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14488 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it is
14489 my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client. And
14490 in a world where the rich clients have one strong view, the
14491 unwillingness
14492 of the profession to question or counter that one strong view queers
14493 the law.
14494 </para>
14495 <para>
14496 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14497 "radical"
14498 by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14499 advocating
14500 are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate and
14501 significant figures in the history of this branch of the law. Many, for
14502 example,
14503 thought crazy the challenge that we brought to the Copyright
14504 Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the dominant scholar
14505 and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville Nimmer, thought it
14506 obvious.<footnote><para>
14507 <!-- f10. --> Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14508 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14509 </para></footnote>
14510
14511 </para>
14512 <para>
14513 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14514 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14515 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14516 </para>
14517 <para>
14518 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and
14519 benefits.
14520 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the
14521 legal system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction
14522 costs of the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14523 <!-- f11. --> A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is to
14524 be commended for his careful review of data about infringement, leading
14525 him to question his own publicly stated position&mdash;twice. He initially
14526 predicted
14527 that downloading would substantially harm the industry. He then
14528 revised his view in light of the data, and he has since revised his view again.
14529 Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True
14530 Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002),
14531 (reviewing his original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J.
14532 Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper,
14533 June 2003, available at
14534 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14535 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14536 effect
14537 of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he underestimates the
14538 costs of the legal system. See, for example, Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14539 </para></footnote>
14540 They see a system that has been
14541 around for hundreds of years, and they assume it works the way their
14542 elementary school civics class taught them it works.
14543 </para>
14544 <para>
14545 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14546 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't
14547 work for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14548 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal level, at
14549 least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of our legal
14550 system
14551 are so astonishingly high that justice can practically never be done.
14552 </para>
14553 <para>
14554 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14555 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14556 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14557 obscure
14558 strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality: very
14559 little.
14560 The law depended upon the careful articulation and development
14561 of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development of legal
14562 doctrine
14563 depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work costs too much,
14564 except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14565 </para>
14566 <para>
14567 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14568 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14569 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14570 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14571 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14572 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14573 </para>
14574 <para>
14575 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the
14576 law away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is
14577 precisely
14578 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left
14579 to its review.
14580 </para>
14581 <para>
14582 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with
14583 digital technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or
14584 think about the amazing things your community could facilitate with
14585 digital technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change
14586 something.
14587 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold
14588 molasses poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that
14589 requires
14590 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's
14591 Russia.
14592 </para>
14593 <para>
14594 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14595 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14596
14597 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14598 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14599 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14600 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14601 </para>
14602 <para>
14603 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14604 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14605 keep your lawyers away.
14606 </para>
14607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14608 </sect2>
14609 </sect1>
14610 </chapter>
14611 <chapter id="c-notes">
14612 <title>NOTES</title>
14613 <para>
14614 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14615 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14616 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14617 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14618 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14619 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14620 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14621 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14622 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14623 the material.
14624 </para>
14625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14626
14627 </chapter>
14628 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14629 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14630 <para>
14631 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14632 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14633 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14634 to him that this book is dedicated.
14635 </para>
14636 <para>
14637 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14638 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14639 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14640 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14641 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14642 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14643 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14644 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14645 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14646 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14647 critical eye on much of this.
14648 </para>
14649 <para>
14650 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14651 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14652 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14653 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14655 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14656 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14657 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14658 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14659 </para>
14660 <para>
14661 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14662 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14663 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14664 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14665 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14666 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14667 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14668 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14669 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14670 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14671 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14672 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14673 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14674 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14675 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14676 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14677 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14678 a bunch of great replies.)
14679 </para>
14680 <para>
14681 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14682 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14683 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14684 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14685 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14686 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14687 throughout this book.
14688 </para>
14689 <para>
14690 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14691 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14692 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14693 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14694 </para>
14695 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14696
14697 </chapter>
14698 </book>