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1 Title: A fist full of non-anonymous Bitcoins
2 Tags: english, bitcoin, personvern, sikkerhet, usenix
3 Date: 2014-01-29 14:10
4
5 <p>Bitcoin is a incredible use of peer to peer communication and
6 encryption, allowing direct and immediate money transfer without any
7 central control. It is sometimes claimed to be ideal for illegal
8 activity, which I believe is quite a long way from the truth. At least
9 I would not conduct illegal money transfers using a system where the
10 details of every transaction are kept forever. This point is
11 investigated in
12 <a href="https://www.usenix.org/publications/login">USENIX ;login:</a>
13 from December 2013, in the article
14 "<a href="https://www.usenix.org/system/files/login/articles/03_meiklejohn-online.pdf">A
15 Fistful of Bitcoins - Characterizing Payments Among Men with No
16 Names</a>" by Sarah Meiklejohn, Marjori Pomarole,Grant Jordan, Kirill
17 Levchenko, Damon McCoy, Geoffrey M. Voelker, and Stefan Savage. They
18 analyse the transaction log in the Bitcoin system, using it to find
19 addresses belong to individuals and organisations and follow the flow
20 of money from both Bitcoin theft and trades on Silk Road to where the
21 money end up. This is how they wrap up their article:</p>
22
23 <p><blockquote>
24 <p>"To demonstrate the usefulness of this type of analysis, we turned
25 our attention to criminal activity. In the Bitcoin economy, criminal
26 activity can appear in a number of forms, such as dealing drugs on
27 Silk Road or simply stealing someone else’s bitcoins. We followed the
28 flow of bitcoins out of Silk Road (in particular, from one notorious
29 address) and from a number of highly publicized thefts to see whether
30 we could track the bitcoins to known services. Although some of the
31 thieves attempted to use sophisticated mixing techniques (or possibly
32 mix services) to obscure the flow of bitcoins, for the most part
33 tracking the bitcoins was quite straightforward, and we ultimately saw
34 large quantities of bitcoins flow to a variety of exchanges directly
35 from the point of theft (or the withdrawal from Silk Road).</p>
36
37 <p>As acknowledged above, following stolen bitcoins to the point at
38 which they are deposited into an exchange does not in itself identify
39 the thief; however, it does enable further de-anonymization in the
40 case in which certain agencies can determine (through, for example,
41 subpoena power) the real-world owner of the account into which the
42 stolen bitcoins were deposited. Because such exchanges seem to serve
43 as chokepoints into and out of the Bitcoin economy (i.e., there are
44 few alternative ways to cash out), we conclude that using Bitcoin for
45 money laundering or other illicit purposes does not (at least at
46 present) seem to be particularly attractive."</p>
47 </blockquote><p>
48
49 <p>These researches are not the first to analyse the Bitcoin
50 transaction log. The 2011 paper
51 "<a href="http://arxiv.org/abs/1107.4524">An Analysis of Anonymity in
52 the Bitcoin System</A>" by Fergal Reid and Martin Harrigan is
53 summarized like this:</p>
54
55 <p><blockquote>
56 "Anonymity in Bitcoin, a peer-to-peer electronic currency system, is a
57 complicated issue. Within the system, users are identified by
58 public-keys only. An attacker wishing to de-anonymize its users will
59 attempt to construct the one-to-many mapping between users and
60 public-keys and associate information external to the system with the
61 users. Bitcoin tries to prevent this attack by storing the mapping of
62 a user to his or her public-keys on that user's node only and by
63 allowing each user to generate as many public-keys as required. In
64 this chapter we consider the topological structure of two networks
65 derived from Bitcoin's public transaction history. We show that the
66 two networks have a non-trivial topological structure, provide
67 complementary views of the Bitcoin system and have implications for
68 anonymity. We combine these structures with external information and
69 techniques such as context discovery and flow analysis to investigate
70 an alleged theft of Bitcoins, which, at the time of the theft, had a
71 market value of approximately half a million U.S. dollars."
72 </blockquote></p>
73
74 <p>I hope these references can help kill the urban myth that Bitcoin
75 is anonymous. It isn't really a good fit for illegal activites. Use
76 cash if you need to stay anonymous, at least until regular DNA
77 sampling of notes and coins become the norm. :)</p>
78
79 <p>As usual, if you use Bitcoin and want to show your support of my
80 activities, please send Bitcoin donations to my address
81 <b><a href="bitcoin:15oWEoG9dUPovwmUL9KWAnYRtNJEkP1u1b">15oWEoG9dUPovwmUL9KWAnYRtNJEkP1u1b</a></b>.</p>