From: Petter Reinholdtsen This is a copy of
+an
+email I posted to the nikita-noark mailing list. Please follow up
+there if you would like to discuss this topic. The background is that
+we are making a free software archive system based on the Norwegian
+Noark 5 standard for government archives. I've been wondering a bit lately how trusted timestamps could be
+stored in Noark 5.
+Trusted
+timestamps can be used to verify that some information
+(document/file/checksum/metadata) have not been changed since a
+specific time in the past. This is useful to verify the integrity of
+the documents in the archive. Then it occured to me, perhaps the trusted timestamps could be
+stored as dokument variants (ie dokumentobjekt referered to from
+dokumentbeskrivelse) with the filename set to the hash it is
+stamping? Given a "dokumentbeskrivelse" with an associated "dokumentobjekt",
+a new dokumentobjekt is associated with "dokumentbeskrivelse" with the
+same attributes as the stamped dokumentobjekt except these
+attributes: This assume a service following
+IETF RFC 3161 is
+used, which specifiy the given MIME type for replies and the .tsr file
+ending for the content of such trusted timestamp. As far as I can
+tell from the Noark 5 specifications, it is OK to have several
+variants/renderings of a dokument attached to a given
+dokumentbeskrivelse objekt. It might be stretching it a bit to make
+some of these variants represent crypto-signatures useful for
+verifying the document integrity instead of representing the dokument
+itself. Using the source of the service in formatDetaljer allow several
+timestamping services to be used. This is useful to spread the risk
+of key compromise over several organisations. It would only be a
+problem to trust the timestamps if all of the organisations are
+compromised. The following oneliner on Linux can be used to generate the tsr
+file. $input is the path to the file to checksum, and $sha256 is the
+SHA-256 checksum of the file (ie the "
+
+
+
+
+openssl ts -query -data "$inputfile" -cert -sha256 -no_nonce \
+ | curl -s -H "Content-Type: application/timestamp-query" \
+ --data-binary "@-" http://zeitstempel.dfn.de > $sha256.tsr
+
To verify the timestamp, you first need to download the public key +of the trusted timestamp service, for example using this command:
+ ++ ++wget -O ca-cert.txt \ + https://pki.pca.dfn.de/global-services-ca/pub/cacert/chain.txt +
Note, the public key should be stored alongside the timestamps in +the archive to make sure it is also available 100 years from now. It +is probably a good idea to standardise how and were to store such +public keys, to make it easier to find for those trying to verify +documents 100 or 1000 years from now. :)
+ +The verification itself is a simple openssl command:
+ ++ ++openssl ts -verify -data $inputfile -in $sha256.tsr \ + -CAfile ca-cert.txt -text +
Is there any reason this approach would not work? Is it somehow against +the Noark 5 specification?