-<p>Departementet sier altså at sin anbefaling er at fingeravtrykk skal
-opptas og lagres i alle nasjonale ID-kort. Det skrives som om det
-blir valgfritt, på samme måten som det skrives passloven, der det i
-loven sier at det kan
-«<a href="https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1997-06-19-82#§6">innhentes
-og lagres i passet biometrisk personinformasjon i form av ansiktsfoto
-og fingeravtrykk (to fingre)</a>». Men på tross av en slik
-formulering i passloven er innført krav om å avgi fingeravtrykk for å
-få et pass i Norge. Proposisjonen sier i tillegg i del 1
-(Proposisjonens hovedinnhold) at ID-kortene skal være like pålitelig
-som pass og ha samme sikkerhetsnivå som pass. Departementet foreslår
-altså i realiteten at ID-kortene skal ha gis etter samme regler som
-for pass.</p>
-
-<p>Formuleringene fra hovedinnholdet i proposisjonen er videreført i
-<a href="https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Innstillinger/Stortinget/2014-2015/inns-201415-243/?lvl=0">innstillingen
-fra stortingskomiteen</a>, der det konkret står «De foreslåtte reglene
-vil gi befolkningen tilbud om et offentlig utstedt identitetsbevis som
-vil være like pålitelig som passet, og mer praktisk å bruke som
-legitimasjon» og «Det nasjonale ID-kortet skal også holde samme
-sikkerhetsnivå som passet». Komiteen har altså ingen kommentarer
-eller innsigelser til dette forslaget, og gjorde i debatten da saken
-ble vedtatt det klart at dette var en god sak og at en enstemmig
-komité var glad for resultatet. Stortinget har dermed stilt seg helt
-og fullt bak departementets forslag.</p>
-
-<p>For meg er det åpenbart når en leser proposisjonen at "like
-pålitelig" og "samme sikkerhetsnivå" vil bli tolket av departementet
-som "med samme biometrisk informasjon som i passene, og departementet
-forklarer i tillegg i proposisjonen at de har tenkt at
-fingeravtrykkene "vil bli beskyttet på samme måte som fingeravtrykkene
-i passene". Jeg ser det dermed som åpenbart at den samme
-tvangsinnhentingen av fingeravtrykk som gjelder for pass vil bli
-viderført til de nasjonale ID-kortene.</p>
-
-<p>Det eneste som kan endre dette er massive protester fra
-befolkningen på at folk som ikke er mistenkt for noe kriminelt skal
-tvinges til å gi fingeravtrykket til politiet for å f.eks. kunne få
-bankkonto eller stemme ved valg. Det kunne få departementet til å
-snu. Desverre tror jeg ikke det vil skje.</p>
-</description>
- </item>
-
- <item>
- <title>Norwegian citizens now required by law to give their fingerprint to the police</title>
- <link>http://people.skolelinux.org/pere/blog/Norwegian_citizens_now_required_by_law_to_give_their_fingerprint_to_the_police.html</link>
- <guid isPermaLink="true">http://people.skolelinux.org/pere/blog/Norwegian_citizens_now_required_by_law_to_give_their_fingerprint_to_the_police.html</guid>
- <pubDate>Sun, 10 May 2015 16:00:00 +0200</pubDate>
- <description><p>5 days ago, the Norwegian Parliament decided, unanimously, that all
-citizens of Norway, no matter if they are suspected of something
-criminal or not, are
-<a href="https://www.holderdeord.no/votes/1430838871e">required to
-give fingerprints to the police</a> (vote details from Holder de
-ord). The law make it sound like it will be optional, but in a few
-years there will be no option any more. The ID will be required to
-vote, to get a bank account, a bank card, to change address on the
-post office, to receive an electronic ID or to get a drivers license
-and many other tasks required to function in Norway. The banks plan
-to stop providing their own ID on the bank cards when this new
-national ID is introduced, and the national road authorities plan to
-change the drivers license to no longer be usable as identity cards.
-In effect, to function as a citizen in Norway a national ID card will
-be required, and to get it one need to provide the fingerprints to
-the police.</p>
-
-<p>In addition to handing the fingerprint to the police (which
-promised to not make a copy of the fingerprint image at that point in
-time, but say nothing about doing it later), a picture of the
-fingerprint will be stored on the RFID chip, along with a picture of
-the face and other information about the person. Some of the
-information will be encrypted, but the encryption will be the same
-system as currently used in the passports. The codes to decrypt will
-be available to a lot of government offices and their suppliers around
-the globe, but for those that do now know anyone in those circles it
-is good to know that
-
-<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2006/nov/17/news.homeaffairs">the
-encryption is already broken</a>. And they
-<a href="http://www.networkworld.com/article/2215057/wireless/bad-guys-could-read-rfid-passports-at-217-feet--maybe-a-lot-more.html">can
-be read from 70 meters away</a>. This can be mitigated a bit by
-keeping it in a Faraday cage (metal box or metal wire container), but
-one will be required to take it out of there often enough to expose
-ones private and personal information to a lot of people that have no
-business getting access to that information.</p>
-
-<p>The new Norwegian national IDs are a vehicle for identity theft,
-and I feel sorry for us all having politicians accepting such invasion
-of privacy without any objections. So are the Norwegian passports,
-but it has been possible to function in Norway without those so far.
-That option is going away with the passing of the new law. In this, I
-envy the Germans, because for them it is optional how much biometric
-information is stored in their national ID.</p>
-
-<p>And if forced collection of fingerprints was not bad enough, the
-information collected in the national ID card register can be handed
-over to foreign intelligence services and police authorities, "when
-extradition is not considered disproportionate".</p>
-</description>
- </item>
-
- <item>
- <title>What would it cost to store all phone calls in Norway?</title>
- <link>http://people.skolelinux.org/pere/blog/What_would_it_cost_to_store_all_phone_calls_in_Norway_.html</link>
- <guid isPermaLink="true">http://people.skolelinux.org/pere/blog/What_would_it_cost_to_store_all_phone_calls_in_Norway_.html</guid>
- <pubDate>Fri, 1 May 2015 19:30:00 +0200</pubDate>
- <description><p>Many years ago, a friend of mine calculated how much it would cost
-to store the sound of all phone calls in Norway, and came up with the
-cost of around 20 million NOK (2.4 mill EUR) for all the calls in a
-year. I got curious and wondered what the same calculation would look
-like today. To do so one need an idea of how much data storage is
-needed for each minute of sound, how many minutes all the calls in
-Norway sums up to, and the cost of data storage.</p>
-
-<p>The 2005 numbers are from
-<a href="http://www.digi.no/analyser/2005/10/04/vi-prater-stadig-mindre-i-roret">digi.no</a>,
-the 2012 numbers are from
-<a href="http://www.nkom.no/aktuelt/nyheter/fortsatt-vekst-i-det-norske-ekommarkedet">a
-NKOM report</a>, and I got the 2013 numbers after asking NKOM via
-email. I was told the numbers for 2014 will be presented May 20th,
-and decided not to wait for those, as I doubt they will be very
-different from the numbers from 2013.</p>
-
-<p>The amount of data storage per minute sound depend on the wanted
-quality, and for phone calls it is generally believed that 8 Kbit/s is
-enough. See for example a
-<a href="http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/voice/voice-quality/7934-bwidth-consume.html#topic1">summary
-on voice quality from Cisco</a> for some alternatives. 8 Kbit/s is 60
-Kbytes/min, and this can be multiplied with the number of call minutes
-to get the storage requirements.</p>
-
-<p>Storage prices varies a lot, depending on speed, backup strategies,
-availability requirements etc. But a simple way to calculate can be
-to use the price of a TiB-disk (around 1000 NOK / 120 EUR) and double
-it to take space, power and redundancy into account. It could be much
-higher with high speed and good redundancy requirements.</p>
-
-<p>But back to the question, What would it cost to store all phone
-calls in Norway? Not much. Here is a small table showing the
-estimated cost, which is within the budget constraint of most medium
-and large organisations:</p>
-
-<table border="1">
-<tr><th>Year</th><th>Call minutes</th><th>Size</th><th>Price in NOK / EUR</th></tr>
-<tr><td>2005</td><td align="right">24 000 000 000</td><td align="right">1.3 PiB</td><td align="right">3 mill / 358 000</td></tr>
-<tr><td>2012</td><td align="right">18 000 000 000</td><td align="right">1.0 PiB</td><td align="right">2.2 mill / 262 000</td></tr>
-<tr><td>2013</td><td align="right">17 000 000 000</td><td align="right">950 TiB</td><td align="right">2.1 mill / 250 000</td></tr>
-</table>
-
-<p>This is the cost of buying the storage. Maintenance need to be
-taken into account too, but calculating that is left as an exercise
-for the reader. But it is obvious to me from those numbers that
-recording the sound of all phone calls in Norway is not going to be
-stopped because it is too expensive. I wonder if someone already is
-collecting the data?</p>
+</ul>
+
+<p>This assume a service following
+<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3161">IETF RFC 3161</a> is
+used, which specifiy the given MIME type for replies and the .tsr file
+ending for the content of such trusted timestamp. As far as I can
+tell from the Noark 5 specifications, it is OK to have several
+variants/renderings of a dokument attached to a given
+dokumentbeskrivelse objekt. It might be stretching it a bit to make
+some of these variants represent crypto-signatures useful for
+verifying the document integrity instead of representing the dokument
+itself.</p>
+
+<p>Using the source of the service in formatDetaljer allow several
+timestamping services to be used. This is useful to spread the risk
+of key compromise over several organisations. It would only be a
+problem to trust the timestamps if all of the organisations are
+compromised.</p>
+
+<p>The following oneliner on Linux can be used to generate the tsr
+file. $input is the path to the file to checksum, and $sha256 is the
+SHA-256 checksum of the file (ie the "<sjekksum>.tsr" value mentioned
+above).</p>
+
+<p><blockquote><pre>
+openssl ts -query -data "$inputfile" -cert -sha256 -no_nonce \
+ | curl -s -H "Content-Type: application/timestamp-query" \
+ --data-binary "@-" http://zeitstempel.dfn.de > $sha256.tsr
+</pre></blockquote></p>
+
+<p>To verify the timestamp, you first need to download the public key
+of the trusted timestamp service, for example using this command:</p>
+
+<p><blockquote><pre>
+wget -O ca-cert.txt \
+ https://pki.pca.dfn.de/global-services-ca/pub/cacert/chain.txt
+</pre></blockquote></p>
+
+<p>Note, the public key should be stored alongside the timestamps in
+the archive to make sure it is also available 100 years from now. It
+is probably a good idea to standardise how and were to store such
+public keys, to make it easier to find for those trying to verify
+documents 100 or 1000 years from now. :)</p>
+
+<p>The verification itself is a simple openssl command:</p>
+
+<p><blockquote><pre>
+openssl ts -verify -data $inputfile -in $sha256.tsr \
+ -CAfile ca-cert.txt -text
+</pre></blockquote></p>
+
+<p>Is there any reason this approach would not work? Is it somehow against
+the Noark 5 specification?</p>